

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
Monterey, California



THESIS

THE WAR IN BOSNIA, 1992-1995: ANALYZING MILITARY ASYMMETRIES AND FAILURES	
by Gheorghe Anghel June 2000	
Thesis Advisor: Co-Advisor:	David Yost Donald Abentheim

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		OMB No. 0704-0188 Form approved	
While reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.			
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)	2. REPORT DATE June 2000	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis	
TITLE AND SUBTITLE: The War in Bosnia, 1992-1995: Analyzing Military Asymmetries and Failures		5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) Gheorghe Anghel			
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A		10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.			
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited		12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT This thesis analyzes the three key failures by the leading external powers in their efforts in 1992-1995 to manage the crisis in Bosnia and impose a settlement. Except for Russia, these leading powers were the so-called NATO Quad: Britain, France, Germany, and the United States. When these powers initially intervened, they failed to comprehend the origins and dynamics of the Yugoslav crisis. These powers successively failed to prevent the outbreak of the fighting, then to properly contain it, and finally to achieve a stable and enduring settlement when the chance presented itself in 1995. The thesis concludes that the failures stemmed from incorrect assessments, a lack of political will, and organizational shortcomings. Because of these failures, the Bosnian conflict remains unsettled, and the current stalemate hinges on continuing political-military commitments by the external powers.			
14. SUBJECT TERMS Bosnia, Serbia, Croatia, Bosnians, Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats, Bosnian Muslims, IFOR, SFOR		15. NUMBER OF PAGES 105	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	14. PRICE CODE 20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UL

NSN 7540-01-280-5500
Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39-18

who "was planning a resistance operation which will not only try to drive out the Germans, but also engage in a social revolution, seizing power for a post-war Communist state."⁴⁶

The Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Serbs held positions that can easily be understood. A minority of Bosnian Croats became "active Ustasa supporters, while the majority welcomed the establishment of the Independent State of Croatia to begin with and became more and more disenchanted thereafter, until in 1943 and 1944 large numbers of them were joining the Partisans."⁴⁷ The Bosnian Serbs became from the beginning active supporters of Cetniks or Partisans that fought against each other as well as against Ustasa and the Axis military occupation.

The Bosnian Muslims were probably the most divided group during the Second World War. Because of their inter-war preference for Zagreb, the initial tendency was to become active supporters of Ustasa. But disillusionment set in quickly among the Muslims: the rule of law simply did not operate in the Ustasa Independent State of Croatia. Consequently, the Bosnian Muslims issued "the Mostar resolution that referred to 'innumerable crimes, abuses, illegalities and forced conversions'"⁴⁸ committed against the Orthodox Serbs by the Catholic Croats in the Ustasa. Although this resolution might suggest a new shift in the Muslims' sympathy from the Croats to the Serbs, this was not the case, since with few exceptions, relations between Muslims and Cetniks (composed of Orthodox Serbs) generally proved tense. Additionally, Muslims were not represented in the royal government-in-exile. In fact, being so divided among them and disappointed by previous alliances, the Bosnian Muslims tried to form their own local defense units to protect themselves against everyone else. By October 1942 there was a "Muslim Volunteer Legion" that fought more against the Communist Partisans than against the Cetniks and that distrusted the Ustasa. In April 1943 the Bosnian Muslims also formed the SS *Handžar* Division, which to their disappointment was sent to Germany instead of being used to protect Muslim towns and villages. Partly as a result of their

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 176.

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 177.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 184.

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 186.

disappointment many Muslims, including 2,000 members of the SS *Handžar* division, joined the Partisans and formed Tito's "Sixteenth Muslim Brigade" in September 1943.

The end of the war found the Muslims "reconciled to the prospect of Communist rule: instead of absorption in Croatia (the Ustasa solution) or absorption in Serbia (the Cetnik plan), they were offered a vaguely federal solution in which Bosnia would continue to exist."⁴⁹ They had fought on all sides and had suffered losses from all sides.

Unfortunately, the Bosnian victims of the Second World War were not to be the last ones. They were added to a long list of refugees, people driven from their homes, and victims of atrocities and extreme violence in Bosnian history.

E. VIOLENCE IN BOSNIAN HISTORY

The numerous wars and long rivalries among Ottomans, Austrians (or Austro-Hungarians), Croats, and Serbs — and among Yugoslavs themselves — and the tragic consequences of the two world wars have generated a large number of refugees and victims that has had a great impact on the size and nature of the Bosnian population. There have been many such examples in Bosnian history. Perhaps these examples have been too numerous to leave much hope for any healing in the foreseeable future.

One such episode occurred during the Austrian-Ottoman war of 1683-1699. The first refugees fled to Bosnia in 1684-1687. They were 130,000 Muslim converts and Ottoman spahis retreating southwards from their abandoned households as the Austrians gradually conquered Ottoman-ruled Hungary. Some of them, who had lost everything, "were embittered men who probably brought with them a new sense of hostility to Christianity."⁵⁰ But soon Christians were to flee also.

In 1690 Turks drove back the Austrians after their march across Bosnia in the previous year. Led by their Patriarch, at least 30,000 Orthodox Serbs fled northwards with the retreating Austrian army. Catholics soon shared the same fate.

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 192.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 85.

Communist Party of Yugoslavia in the Power of Murderers and Spies

November 1949

The Information Bureau, consisting of representatives of the Communist Party of Bulgaria, Rumanian Workers' Party, Working People's Party of Hungary, United Workers' Party of Poland, Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), Communist Party of France, and the Czechoslovak and Italian Communist Parties, having considered the question: "The Yugoslav Communist Party in the power of murderers and spies", unanimously reached the following conclusions:

Whereas, in June 1948 the meeting of the Information Bureau of the Communist Parties noted the change-over of the Tito-Rankovic clique from democracy and socialism to bourgeois nationalism, during the period that has elapsed since the meeting of the Information Bureau, this clique has travelled all the way from bourgeois nationalism to fascism and outright betrayal of the national interests of Yugoslavia.

Recent events show that the Yugoslav Government is completely dependent on foreign imperialist circles and has become an instrument of their aggressive policy, which has resulted in the liquidation of the independence of the Yugoslav Republic.

The Central Committee of the Party and the Government of Yugoslavia have merged completely with the imperialist circles against the entire camp of socialism and democracy; against the Communist Parties of the world; against the New Democracies and the U.S.S.R.

The Belgrade clique of hired spies and murderers made a flagrant deal with imperialist reaction and entered its service, as the Budapest trial of Rajk-Brankov made perfectly clear.

This trial showed that the present Yugoslav rulers, having fled from the camp of democracy and socialism to the camp of capitalism and reaction, have become direct accomplices of the instigators of a new war, and, by their treacherous deeds, are ingratiating themselves with the imperialists and kow-towing to them.

The change-over of the Tito clique to fascism was not fortuitous. It was effected on the order of their masters, the Anglo-American imperialists, whose mercenaries, it is now clear, this clique has been for long.

The Yugoslav traitors, obeying the will of the imperialists, undertook to form in the People's Democracies political gangs consisting of reactionaries, nationalists, clerical and fascist elements and, relying on these gangs, to bring about counter-revolutionary coups in these countries, wrest them from the Soviet Union and the entire socialist camp and subordinate them to the forces of imperialism.

The Tito clique transformed Belgrade into an American center for espionage and anti-Communist propaganda.

When all genuine friends of peace, democracy and socialism see in the U.S.S.R. a powerful fortress of Socialism, a faithful and steadfast defender of the freedom and independence of nations and the principal bulwark of peace, the Tito-Rankovic clique, having attained power under the mask of friendship with the U.S.S.R., began on the orders of the Anglo-American imperialists, a campaign of slander and provocation against the Soviet Union, utilizing the most vile calumnies borrowed from the arsenal of Hitler.

The transformation of the Tito-Rankovic clique into a direct agency of imperialism, and accomplices of the war-mongers, culminated in the lining up of the Yugoslav Government with the imperialist bloc at U.N.O., where the Kardeljs, Djilas and Beblers, joined in a united front with American reactionaries on vital matters of international policy.

In the sphere of home policy, the chief outcome of the activity of the traitor Tito-Rankovic clique is the actual liquidation of the People's Democratic system in Yugoslavia.

Due to the counter-revolutionary policy of the Tito-Rankovic clique which usurped power in the Party and in the State, an anti-Communist police State -- fascist type regime -- has been installed in Yugoslavia.

The social basis of this regime consists of kulaks in the countryside and capitalist elements in the towns.

In fact power in Yugoslavia is in the hands of anti-popular, reactionary elements. Active members of the old bourgeois parties, kulaks and other enemies of People's Democracy, are active in central and local government bodies.

The top fascist rulers rely on an enormously swollen military-police apparatus, with the aid of which they oppress the peoples of Yugoslavia.

They have turned the country into a military camp, wiped out all democratic rights of the working people, and trampled on any free expression of opinion.

The Yugoslav rulers demagogically and insolently deceive the people, alleging they are building socialism in Yugoslavia.

But it is clear to every Marxist that there can be no talk of building socialism in Yugoslavia when the Tito clique has broken with the Soviet Union, with the entire camp of socialism and democracy, thereby depriving Yugoslavia of the main bulwark for building socialism and when it has subordinated the country economically and politically to Anglo-American imperialists.

The State sector in the economy of Yugoslavia has ceased to be people's property, since State power is in the hands of enemies of the people.

The Tito-Rankovic clique has created wide possibilities for the penetration of foreign capital into the economy of the country, and has placed the economy under the control of capitalist monopolies.

Anglo-American industrial-financial circles investing their capital in Yugoslav economy, are transforming Yugoslavia into an agrarian-raw materials adjunct of foreign capital.

The ever growing slavish dependence of Yugoslavia on imperialism leads to intensified exploitation of the working class and to a severe worsening of its conditions.

The policy of the Yugoslav rulers in the countryside bears a kulak-capitalistic character.

The compulsory pseudo co-operatives in the country-side are in the hands of the kulaks and their agencies and represent an instrument for the exploitation of wide masses of working peasants.

The Yugoslav hirelings of imperialism, having seized leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, unloosed a campaign of terror against genuine Communists loyal to the principles of Marxism and Leninism and who fight for Yugoslavia's independence from the imperialists.

Thousands of Yugoslav patriots, devoted to Communism, have been expelled from the Party and incarcerated in jails and concentration camps. Many have been tortured and killed in prison or, as was the case with the well-known Communist, Arso Jovanovic, were dastardly assassinated.

The brutality with which staunch fighters for Communism are being annihilated in Yugoslavia, can be compared only with the atrocities of the Hitler fascists or the butcher Tsaldaris in Greece or Franco in Spain.

Expelling from the ranks of the Party those Communists loyal to proletarian internationalism, annihilating them, the Yugoslav fascists opened wide the doors of the Party to bourgeois and kulak elements.

As a result of the fascist terror of the Tito gangs against the healthy forces in the Yugoslav Communist Party, leadership of the Party is wholly in the hands of spies and murderers, mercenaries of imperialism.

The Communist Party of Yugoslavia has been seized by counter-revolutionary forces, acting arbitrarily in the name of the Party. Recruiting spies and provocateurs in the ranks of the working class parties, is, as is well-known, an old method of the bourgeoisie.

In this way the imperialists seek to undermine the Parties from within and subordinate them to themselves. They have succeeded in realizing this aim in Yugoslavia.

The fascist ideology, and fascist domestic policy, as well as the perfidious foreign policy of the Tito clique, completely subordinated to the foreign imperialist circles, have created a gulf between the espionage fascist Tito-Rankovic clique and the vital interests of the freedom-loving peoples of Yugoslavia.

Consequently, the anti-popular and treacherous activity of the Tito clique is encountering ever-growing resistance from those Communists who have remained loyal to Marxism-Leninism, and among the working class and working peasantry of Yugoslavia.

On the basis of irrefutable facts testifying to the complete change-over of the Tito clique to fascism and its desertion to the camp of world imperialism, the Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers' Parties considers that:

1. The espionage group of Tito, Rankovic Kardelj, Djilas, Pijade, Gosnjak, Maslaric, Bebler, Mrazovic, Vukmanovic, Koca Popovic, Kidric, Neskovic, Zlatic, Velebit, Kolishevski and others, are enemies of the working class and peasantry and enemies of the peoples of Yugoslavia.

2. This espionage group expresses not the will of the peoples of Yugoslavia but the will of the Anglo-

American imperialists, and has therefore betrayed the interests of the country and abolished the political sovereignty and economic independence of Yugoslavia.

3. The "Communist Party of Yugoslavia", as at present constituted, being in the hands of enemies of the people, murderers and spies, has forfeited the right to be called a Communist Party and is merely an apparatus for carrying out the espionage assignments of the clique of Tito-Kardelj-Rankovic-Djilas.

The Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers' Parties considers therefore, that the struggle against the Tito clique, hired spies and murderers, is the international duty of all Communist and Workers' Parties.

It is the duty of Communist and Workers' Parties to give all possible aid to the Yugoslav working class and working peasantry who are fighting for the return of Yugoslavia to the camp of democracy and socialism.

A necessary condition for the return of Yugoslavia to the socialist camp is active struggle on the part of revolutionary elements both inside the Yugoslav Communist Party and outside its ranks, for the regeneration of the revolutionary, genuine Communist Party of Yugoslavia, loyal to Marxism-Leninism, to the principles of proletarian internationalism, and fighting for the independence of Yugoslavia from imperialism.

The loyal Communist forces in Yugoslavia, who in the present brutal conditions of fascist terror, are deprived of the possibility of engaging in open action against the Tito-Rankovic clique, were compelled in the struggle for the cause of Communism, to follow the path taken by the Communists in those countries where legal work is forbidden.

The Information Bureau expresses the firm conviction that, among the workers and peasants of Yugoslavia, forces will be found capable of ensuring victory over the bourgeois-restoration espionage Tito-Rankovic clique; that the toiling people of Yugoslavia led by the working class will succeed in restoring the historical gains of People's Democracy, won at the price of heavy sacrifice and heroic struggle by the peoples of Yugoslavia and that they will take the road of building socialism.

The Information Bureau considers one of the most important tasks of the Communist and Workers' Parties to be an all-round heightening of revolutionary vigilance in Party ranks, exposing and rooting out bourgeois-nationalist elements and agents of imperialism, no matter under what flag they conceal themselves.

The Information Bureau recognizes the need for more ideological work in the Communist and Workers' Parties; more work to train Communists in the spirit of loyalty to proletarian internationalism, irreconcilability to any departure from the principles of Marxism-Leninism, and in the spirit of loyalty to People's Democracy and Socialism. End.

(Resolutions of the Communist Information Bureau Condemning Titoite Revisionism: Resolution of the Information Bureau Concerning the Situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, June 1948, MIA) <https://www.marxists.org/history/erol/ncm-1/workers-advocate/7-6.html> (Communist Party of Yugoslavia in the Power of Murderers and Spies, Cominform, November 1949. MIA. The same document can be found in the ‘Revolutionary Democracy Organization of India’ archives section) <https://www.marxists.org/history/erol/ncm-1/workers-advocate/7-6.html>

Fearing exposure, the Titoites constantly expanded and reinforced Rankovic's Gestapo machinery, exterminating Yugoslav Communists who adhered to the positions of internationalism and all true patriots of the country. Every free expression of progressive, democratic thoughts endangers one's life and freedom. Party organizations which came out against the Belgrade rulers

Spies and assassins are in power in Yugoslavia. The Tito clique now openly fascistizes all links of public and governmental life in the country. People's power has been liquidated in Yugoslavia and only the old shingles remain—"People's Front," "People's Com-

(From Trotsky to Tito, James Klugmann, 1951, Chapter 2) <https://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/1951/trotsky-tito/ch02.htm>

[GET PRINT BOOK](#)

No eBook available

[Amazon.ca](#)
[Chapters.indigo.ca](#)

[Find in a library](#)
[All sellers »](#)



★★★★☆

0 Reviews
[Write review](#)

Tito and His Comrades

By [Jozse Pirijsvec](#)

[About this book](#)

valuable for the party.”¹⁶⁹ And as if this were not enough, they were joined by Ivan Srebrnjak (Antonov), an agent of Soviet military intelligence, who said that some of Broz’s young collaborators, for instance Boris Kidrič and Ivo Lola Ribar, were from well-to-do bourgeois families, sons of notorious Freemasons, and therefore clearly in the service of the Yugoslav regime. Srebrnjak also called the attention of the IKKI to the romance Walter had in Moscow with a certain Elsa, a member of the German Communist Party, who was suspected of working for the Gestapo. He also affirmed that the young woman who brought party correspondence from Yugoslavia to Paris and back (obviously Herta Haas) was also a Gestapo spy. For all these reasons, Srebrnjak felt that Walter needed to explain himself, underscoring his resemblance to Gorkić and inviting the IKKI to disband the CPY.¹⁷⁰

Broz responded to this offensive by counterattacking, increasing his fight against the "Trotskyists," "Fascists," and "spies" who surrounded him. At the beginning of 1938 he wrote an article entitled "Trotskyists: Agents of International Fascism," published by *Proleter* under the pseudonym T. T. He called

GET PRINT BOOK

No eBook available

[Amazon.ca](#)
[Chapters.indigo.ca](#)

Find in a library

[All sellers »](#)



★★★★★
0 Reviews
[Write review](#)

Tito and His Comrades

By [Žože Piričev](#)

[About this book](#)

IN THE GRIP OF THE COLD WAR


The Yugoslavs were not inactive even in this climate of siege, but in October 1949 began to establish secret ties with the Americans, as attested to by Kardelj's meeting in New York with Allen Dulles, director of the recently instituted Central Intelligence Agency. In November of 1950, Vlatko Velebit concluded a formal agreement of collaboration with Frank Wisner, chief of the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC; i.e., of covert CIA operations), which had had an agent in Belgrade since 1948. In order to show their trustworthiness, the Yugoslavs gave the Americans a precious gift: a MIG-15, the newest Soviet fighter, which had experienced a forced landing not far from Zagreb during a spy mission because of a technical failure.³¹⁸ The Americans soon returned the favor: thanks to a tip-off from a White Russian, they were able to inform Tito that, from 1949 onward, all the secret documents related to the correspondence with Washington, and handwritten for safety's sake by Kardelj himself, had been transmitted to Moscow by the chief of the Personnel Office, a woman whose lover worked in the cipher room.³¹⁹ This shocking discovery had disastrous consequences: a special UDBA office was created on the fourth floor of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which in subsequent years allowed Ranković to control and monitor Yugoslav diplomacy.³²⁰ According to Dedijer, Tito himself frequently met CIA functionaries in Belgrade and together they planned common policy. This did not escape the attention of the Soviets.³²¹ In the meantime, Tito's colleagues developed an intense propaganda plan directed at the Communist and socialist parties ready to side with them. This activity took place in Italy and France and, to a degree, in Belgium and in Germany, as well as in India and Indonesia. "Our contacts with the socialists are developing

GET PRINT BOOK

No eBook available

Amazon.ca
Chapters.indigo.ca

Find in a library
All sellers »

 ★★★★★
0 Reviews
[Write review](#)

Tito and His Comrades
By Jože Pijavac

Search in this book

[Go](#)

Books

315. Dedijer, *Novi prilozii*, 3:461.
316. AS, Dedijer, t. e. 244.
317. Pirjevec, *Il gran rifiuto*, 386, 387.
318. Coleman Armstrong Mehta, "‘A Rat Hole to be Watched’ CIA Analyses of the Tito–Stalin Split, 1948–1950" (PhD diss., North Carolina State University, 2005), 9; Jak Koprive, *Generalov let: Spomini generala Ivana Dolničarja* (Ljubljana: Modrijan, 2005), 103.
319. Gojko Berić, *Zbogom XX. stoljeće: Sjećanja Ive Vejvode* (Zagreb: Profil knjiga, 2013), 123; Stefano Terra, *Tre anni con Tito* (Trieste: MGS Press, 2004), 89.
320. Ranko Petković, *Subjektivna istorija jugoslovenske diplomatije* (Belgrade: Službeni list SRJ, 1995), 143.
321. AS, Dedijer, t. e. 197; t. e. 223; t. e. 298; Edemskii, *Ot konfliktia k normalizatsii*, 350, 360, 367.
322. AJ, 836, KMJ I-8/2 I-6/2.

those who opposed the tyranny of the Soviet secret services. In another letter, sent the following day, Foreign Office diplomat M. E. Rose mentioned to Elizabeth Barker, who was active in British wartime propaganda, that word of crimes committed by Tito during the Spanish Civil War were circulating in London in the spring of 1944.¹⁵⁹ Fred Copeman, an English communist and a

(Tito and His Comrades, Joze Pirjevec, 2015, p. 38)

GET PRINT BOOK

Tito and His Comrades


By Jože Pirjevec

Search in this book

Go

EBOOK FROM CA\$54.30

Get this book in print ▼



Spies and Saboteurs: Anglo-American Collaboration and Rivalry in Human ...

By Joseph F. Jakub III

Search in this book Go

About this book

► My library

► My History

Books on Google Play

The performance of the OSS team supporting the Partisans from Italy between October and December 1943 was a testament to the American's ingenuity and energy in moving huge quantities of captured Italian materiel in combat conditions to Yugoslavia. Indeed, it was in the best 'can-do' traditions of Donovan's organization. When OSS dispatched Sterling Hayden in November to Bari, he quickly established a base on behalf of Allied Forces Headquarters at the Italian port of Monopoli, which lay some 30 miles to the south, which became the principal operating base when Bari was bombed by the Germans soon thereafter. With 400 Partisans, 14 schooners, and assorted other vessels, Hayden directed the resupply of the Partisan-held island of Vis, mostly using Italian arms prized away from the British Command.¹³⁸ OSS Bari, meanwhile, delivered 6500 tons of uniforms, food, medicine, weapons, and ammunition to the Partisans via a motley assortment of some 60 seagoing vessels between 15 October and 31 December. The Americans provided 150 000 gallons of petrol to a British torpedo boat facility in the Dalmatian islands that had been established at OSS Bari's request to protect the supply fleet, and delivered large amounts of diesel oil, kerosene, petrol, and lubricating oil to Tito's forces. In conjunction with SOE's Force 133, OSS organized, equipped, and transported to Dalmatia a 'brigade' of 2000 fighters who had been recruited from among Yugoslavs interned in Italy. OSS assigned an officer to manage the Partisan supply facility on Vis and organized a shipping line between Bari and the three major Sicilian ports 'to assist in transporting 7000 tons of captured enemy material to Bari for trans-shipment to Yugoslavia . . . By the end of December 1943 four Partisan bases at Bari, Monopoli, Molfetta, and Manfredonia were in full operation under the command of OSS officers with a staff of some 600 Partisans.'¹³⁹ All told, in less than three and a half months, OSS had delivered


(‘Spies and Saboteurs: Anglo-American Collaboration and Rivalry in Human Intelligence Collection and Special Operations, 1940-1945’, Joseph F. Jakub III, p. 135)

About the Author

JOSEPH F. JAKUB, III is an Oxford-trained intelligence historian, a former US diplomat, and is presently the Senior Investigator for International Affairs for a major US Congressional Committee, where he is leading a team investigating efforts by foreign governments to purchase US foreign policy. *Spies and Saboteurs* is his first book, but he has written extensively on a variety of international security and political issues for the US Government and for international journals. He is also collaborating with former KGB Colonel and British spy Oleg Gordievsky on a book about the present struggle for control of Transcaucasian oil resources. Whilst a member of the US diplomatic service, Dr Jakub received four exceptional performance awards for his work in helping to establish and support the new US Embassies in Central Asia and Transcaucasia after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and for his service during the Gulf War and the Romanian Revolution.

<https://www.amazon.com/Spies-Saboteurs-Anglo-American-Collaboration-Intelligence/dp/0333721500>

READ EBOOK



Congressional Record: Proceedings and Debates of the ..., Volume 91, Part 4

By United States. Congress

Search in this book Go

About this book

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Congressional Record

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 79th CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

VOLUME 91—PART 4

MAY 7, 1945, TO JUNE 6, 1945
(PAGES 4217 TO 5690)

certainly have no inferiority complex. They are after territory and raw materials and the consequent revenue they hope and expect will be derived from such trade as follows the flag. Trade always has been, is, and always will be one of the economic factors and causes of war, an underlying and impelling motive for the quest for power and prestige, de-

on apples, your price being made possible because it costs you less to raise and pick and pack—that is to say, I pay my laborers more, and they live better than yours do. It is not reciprocity, decidedly not, to destroy our industries, put our employees out of work, increase the number of unemployed, and the burden of taxes on our own just to

Mr. KNUTSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may desire to the distinguished gentleman from Massachusetts, the minority leader (Mr. MARTIN). Mr. MARTIN of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I wish to clarify my position in regard to this bill to extend the recip-

Digitized by

READ EBOOK



Congressional Record: Proceedings and Debates of the ..., Volume 91, Part 4

By United States. Congress

Search in this book Go

Congressional Record: Proceedings and Debates of the ..., Volume 91, Part 4

By United States. Congress

Books

EBOOK - FREE



Congressional Record: Proceedings and Debates of the ..., Volume 91, Part 4

By United States. Congress

1945

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—HOUSE

4983

4984

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—HOUSE

MAY 24

that such pressure is applied openly in the case of Congress and is applied se-

Cut the tariff on cotton textiles, on silverware and jewelry, on chemicals, and

for a traitor and Communist stooge like Tito is as sad as it is distrustful. I want

Page 4993

movement is not only anti-Yugoslav but also anti-Allied because it invited the people to resist the English and the Americans. When the Allies double-crossed Mihailovich for a Communist traitor—Tito—they put a stamp of approval on his butchering more than a million gallant Serbs who could have killed a lot of Nazis if we had given them arms. It is incredible that America had a hand in this filthy deal. While the Serbs under Mihailovich were helping us, Tito was helping Hitler. Later when Hitler attacked Russia Tito was killing Serbs—our allies—not Nazis. Tito was the best friend Hitler had. Tito killed more Serbs

only a few scattered groups of partisans, left Vis on a Russian plane in September to join the Red army. The Russian troops then stopped for a month on the Yugoslav frontiers with the hope that Tito would be able to cross Serbian regions and succeed in making contact with the Red army. Tito's troops, composed of Ustashi-Croats who have massacred 600,000 Serbs, of Albanian partisans who have massacred 20,000 Serbs, of Italian partisans who have killed 30,000 Serbs in Montenegro, and Bulgarian partisans who have massacred 10,000 Serbs, attempted vicious attacks in the south, west, and north, but all were repulsed by the regular Yugoslav Army.

son with the Red who have massacred for 4 years—the Ustashis, Croats, the red star on the fight for the massacring some Yugoslav Army succeeded to withdraw Tito's partisans Belgrade, through Mihailovich's troops, intellectuals, hoping in the spair and disorganized. The Russian grade accompanie

history.house.gov

MARTIN, Joseph William, Jr. | US House of Representatives: H

MARTIN, Joseph William, Jr.

1884–1968

OFFICE

Representative

STATE/TERRITORY

Massachusetts

PARTY

Republican

CONGRESS(ES)

69th (1925–1927), 70th (1927–1929), 71st (1929–1931), 72nd (1931–1933), 73rd (1933–1935), 74th (1935–1937), 75th (1937–1939), 76th (1939–1941), 77th (1941–1943), 78th (1943–1945), 79th (1945–1947), 80th (1947–1949), 81st (1949–1951), 82nd (1951–1953), 83rd (1953–1955), 84th (1955–1957), 85th (1957–1959), 86th (1959–1961), 87th (1961–1963), 88th (1963–1965), 89th (1965–1967)

LEADERSHIP POSITIONS

Minority Leader - 76th, 77th, 78th, 79th, 81st, 82nd, 84th, 85th, Speaker of the House - 80th, 83rd

history.house.gov

MARTIN, Joseph William, Jr. | US House of Representatives: Hist

MARTIN, Joseph William, Jr., a Representative from Massachusetts; born in North Attleboro, Bristol County, Mass., November 3, 1884; attended the public schools and was graduated from North Attleboro High School in 1902; reporter on the Attleboro Sun and Providence Journal 1902–1908; publisher of the Evening Chronicle at North Attleboro since 1908 and also publisher of the Franklin (Mass.) Sentinel; member of the State house of representatives 1912–1914; served in the State senate 1914–1917; chairman of the Massachusetts Street Railway Investigating Commission in 1917; chairman of the Massachusetts legislative campaign committee in 1917; executive secretary of the Republican State committee 1922–1925; delegate to the Republican National Conventions in 1916, 1936, 1940, 1948, 1952, and 1956; permanent chairman of the Republican National Conventions in 1940, 1944, 1948, 1952, and 1956; member of the Republican National Committee, serving as chairman 1940–1942; elected as a Republican to the Sixty-ninth and to the twenty succeeding Congresses (March 4, 1925–January 3, 1967); minority leader in the Seventy-sixth, Seventy-seventh, Seventy-eighth, Seventy-ninth, Eighty-first, Eighty-second, Eighty-fourth, and Eighty-fifth Congresses; Speaker of the House of Representatives (Eightieth and Eighty-third Congresses); unsuccessful candidate for renomination in 1966; returned to North Attleboro, Mass.; died in Hollywood, Fla., March 6, 1968; interment in Mount Hope Cemetery, North Attleboro, Mass.

<https://history.house.gov/People/Detail/17559>

GET PRINT BOOK

Cambridge University Press

Amazon.ca

Chapters.indigo.ca

Find in a library

All sellers »

Between East and West: Israel's Foreign Policy Orientation 1948-1956

0 Reviews

Write review

Between East and West: Israel's Foreign Policy Orientation 1948-1956

By Uri Bialer, Bialer Uri

Search in this book

Go

Yugoslavia had always been the location of one of the most important Mossad centers in Eastern Europe. This situation was the result of the special relationship which the Yugoslavs had developed in the course of the Second World War and thereafter with representatives of the Yishuv who had operated in the framework of the British war effort. After the war, it seems to have been buttressed by ideological perceptions. As one of the Mossad emissaries in the Balkans phrased it: “The Yugoslavs saw in the [Mossad] an embodiment of the struggle against imperialism. The Yugoslavs saw the British as imperialists and foes, allies from the time of the war who had returned to their evil ways; moreover, as former partisans, they felt an emotional affinity for the small nation struggling against an enemy that vastly outnumbered and overpowered it.”¹⁴⁵

¹⁴¹ See Kaplan’s cable to Sharett on 14.2.1949, ISA 2329/5.

¹⁴² *Ibid.* See also Avriel’s despatch to Sharett on 7.1.1949, ISA 2514/14.

¹⁴³ 16.3.1949, ISA 2493/4.

¹⁴⁴ Letter to the author, 26.10.1984. For the visit, which has hitherto escaped the attention of historians, its press coverage notwithstanding, see ISA 2514/11.

¹⁴⁵ See Hadari, *Refugees*, p. 173. For the special relationship, see E. Avriel’s *Open the Gates* (Tel Aviv, 1976), pp. 183–92 (Hebrew), and A. Ettinger, *Blind Jump* (Tel Aviv, 1986), pp. 181–203, 273–307 (Hebrew).

(Between East and West: Israel’s Foreign Policy Orientation 1948-1956, Cambridge University Press, Uri Bialer, 1990, p. 114)

Return now

Borrow ends at 7:24 AM

Tito was lenient to Žujović, yet he sent thousands of Cominformists to slave in the camp on Goli Otok (Naked Island), opposite Senj in the north Adriatic. From autumn 1948 until well into the 1950s, about 12,000 men and some women as well were shipped to this inhospitable rock to quarry for marble. The camp was run on the principle of making the prisoners earn their release by breaking the will of those who had not yet made a confession and recantation. All new arrivals were made to run a gauntlet of beating, followed by constant physical and verbal abuse. The prisoners were not allowed visitors, and relatives were not even informed as to the whereabouts of their loved ones; they were merely told that ‘Daddy has gone away on a business trip’. All those released from Naked Island were sworn not to talk about it, under pain of returning there. Even after the end of Communism in Yugoslavia, veterans of Naked Island were loath to speak of their hellish experience.

Return now

Borrow ends at 7:24 AM

Tito set up the Naked Island camp through Ranković, although even Ranković did not know, or want to know, exactly what went on there. According to Djilas, Tito was more than once heard to exclaim in 1948: ‘Off to jail with him! Off to the camp! What else can he expect if he works against his own Party?’ The horror of

Return now

Borrow ends at 7:24 AM

238	TITO
Indeed Boris Kidrić, the head of the Federal Planning Commission, indicted Hebrang and Djujović, the previous economic bosses, for sabotaging and holding back ‘the construction of socialism’. They were accused of attempting to check overambitious planning, and of insisting on the profitability of individual enterprises. ³¹ The Second Plenum of the Central Committee in February 1949 prescribed ‘greater boldness and a faster pace in setting up collective farms’. ³² Although collectivisation in Yugoslavia was not as murderous as it had been in the Soviet Union, it caused immeasurable suffering, anger and waste. In Macedonia there were only two collective farms in 1945; by the end of March 1949 there were 400. In Croatia the number doubled during the first quarter of that year. Collectivisation provoked violent resistance in north-west Bosnia, the Muslim region round Bihać, where Tito had established his headquarters in 1943. The failure of the collective farms caused food shortages in the towns.	

Return now

Borrow ends at 5:26 AM

During the summer of 1943, more British officers parachuted into the territory held by the Partisans, while the RAF started to drop in supplies of clothing and food for the ragged and hungry guerrillas. Tito had not yet lost his fear and suspicion of British political machinations; nor had he cut off his ties with German agents such as the engineer Hans Ott. Even in late November 1943, when Britain was pouring in arms and supplies to the Partisans, Tito’s transport department obtained a herd of horses from the Germans, in return for allowing shipments of chrome to enter the Reich.¹

Return now

Borrow ends at 5:26 AM

principle of national self-determination. Roosevelt appeared to believe that Yugoslavia was an unreal state, formed by committee, and that Serbs and Croats should be allowed to go their separate ways. He did not share Churchill’s enthusiasm for Tito, and in December 1943 he announced his continued support for King Peter. To emphasise this commitment, he made a gift of four US planes to the Royal Yugoslav Air Force.

President Roosevelt wanted to rid the world of empires, whether that of the British in India or of the French in Indo-China, and this attitude may have coloured his outlook on Yugoslavia. Fitzroy

Return now

Borrow ends at 7:24 AM

Yugoslav’. As head of the project for rapid industrialisation, Hebrang relied on plant and economic expertise from the Soviet Union, and came to be seen as Moscow’s man in the leadership. In 1945 he wrote a report for the Kremlin on differences in the Yugoslav Party.¹⁰ When he was dropped from the Politburo in April 1946, Hebrang looked to the Soviet Union for sympathy and support.

Return now

Borrow

The Yugoslav archives show that Tito wrote to the commandant of the 6th Bosnian Brigade, telling him to continue attacking the Chetniks but to avoid fighting the Germans on the way to the Sandjak. Similar orders, written partly in Spanish, were sent to the 1st Bosnian Corps and the 1st Proletarian Brigade. General Glaise von Horstenau personally made it possible for Velebit to deliver a letter from Tito to the Partisans in Slavonia.²⁰ It seems that von Horstenau and local German intelligence officers favoured a deal with the Partisans but knew that such an arrangement would not please the German High Command or the Foreign Office. Von Horstenau’s approach through the Secret Service and Himmler clearly did not work, for at the end of March Hitler announced that he did not deal with rebels – he shot them.²¹

Djilas believes that the ‘March Consultations’ could not have led to any significant result: ‘This was because we essentially sought a respite, while the Germans were setting a trap for us.’²² The trap was sprung in May, when the Germans almost succeeded in destroying the Partisans in ‘Operation Schwarz’, the Fifth Offensive. Meanwhile the 2nd Proletarian Division had scored a crushing victory over the Chetniks; and by early April the Partisans were standing upon the banks of the River Drina, preparing to cross to the Sandjak, Montenegro and, as they imagined, safety.

Tito’s escape across the River Neretva, once hailed as a triumph of tactical feint and daring, was really made possible by a deal with the Germans. Nevertheless, Tito was pleased with himself to the

Return now

Borrow ends at 5:26 AM

On 11 May the Yugoslav government in exile, probably under British coercion, instructed Mihailović to make up his differences with the Partisans and to join the fight against the Germans.

Those Partisans who knew of the ‘March Consultations’ heard all this with private amusement. They still regarded themselves as on the side of the Germans against the British and the royalist exiles. Moreover Mihailović and the Chetniks were moving towards a ‘Great Serb’ chauvinism that made it improbable that they could ever again rule a united Yugoslavia. And in 1943 Mihailović’s commander in Montenegro issued a circular letter addressed ‘To Chetnik intellectuals’, explaining the propaganda they were to spread in Serbian villages. Among the aims to be announced: ‘We are seeking a pure national state. If we achieve that, there will be

(Tito: and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, p. 136) <https://archive.org/details/titorisefallofyu00rich/page/119/mode/1up?view=theater>

[telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/1156422/Richard-West-writer-obituary.html](#)

Richard Leaf West was born in Chelsea on July 18 1930, the son of a publisher and sometime journalist who was once the literary editor of the Daily Mail. The family were bohemian and peripatetic. West was educated at Marlborough, which he disliked conventionally, and at Magdalene College, Cambridge, which he disliked surprisingly. He read History. His education had been interrupted by wartime evacuation to Canada and the United States and was interrupted again by National Service which, in contrast to school or university, he greatly enjoyed.

Serving as an NCO in the Intelligence Corps he spent much of his time in Field Security in Trieste, at the end of the 1940s a tense trouble-spot. Dick

Books

[BUY EBOOK - CA\\$13.99](#)

[Get this book in print ▼](#)

3 Reviews
[Write review](#)

Hunting Evil: The Nazi War Criminals Who Escaped and the Quest to Bring Them ...

By Guy Walters

[About this book](#)

[My library](#)

Add to my library ▼

Write review

Page 119

All such reports must be treated with caution. Post-war Austria and Italy were awash with agents, many of whom were peddling highly suspect intelligence. CIC agents themselves could also be remarkably unprofessional in the way they gathered their “product.” Richard West, a member of the British Intelligence Corps in Trieste in 1949, recalled meeting a CIC agent who would have been dismissed had his superiors known how he was operating. “He had got hold of some Albanian newspapers,” said West, “and gave them to an Albanian to get translated, and he translated all this absolute drivel. He passed it off as though he had a man in Tirana. It made me realize how ridiculous most intelligence services are.”⁷⁷ Of course, by no means all intelligence was worthless, but until the British intelligence files on Pavelić are released, which is unlikely, it is hard to be definitive, and it would be a mistake to adopt a tone of knowing cynicism as a replacement for actual knowledge. However, as we shall see, the British, like the Americans, would employ war criminals in their nascent fight against Communism, but such agents were not of the stature of a former head of state, or quite so bloodstained as

Richard West <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/11564222/Richard-West-writer-obituary.html#:~:text=Serving%20as%20an%20NCO%20in,his%20life%20as%20a%20journalist>.

[illegible]

(Beacons in the Night: With the OSS and Tito's Partisans in Yugoslavia, Franklin Lindsay, p. 334). <http://znaci.net/00003/904.pdf>
<https://www.sup.org/books/title/?id=2859>

TOP SECRET

DIRECTOR'S LOG

8:30 AM, 13 Dec. - 8:30 AM, 14 Dec.

SUBJECT

OSO

Chief, OSO/Belgrade reports that Gen. Velebit has informed Ambassador Allen that all arrangements for liaison between CIA and the UDB in Belgrade will be complete within a week. The Yugoslav officer selected to conduct this liaison will be the direct representative of Interior Minister Rankovic and will sit in the Yugoslav Foreign Office for cover purposes and to avoid the precedent of allowing foreigners to go directly to the Interior Ministry. This procedure follows that proposed by CIA during the original conversations with Gen. Velebit.

Chief, British Secret Service/Madrid has indicated to the U.S. Legal Attache that the British, having already flown radio direction-finding equipment to Madrid, might proceed without Spanish approval to locate a clandestine transmitter in the Valencia area which is one of the targets of a joint CIA-Spanish intelligence project. Reporting this to OSO/Madrid, the Legal Attache added that the Spanish Chief of Counterintelligence has said, in view of his agreement with CIA, that he would take action against the British if they should pursue the operation.

A Norwegian Intelligence officer has advised OSO/Oslo that Nils Langhelle, now Minister of Communications, will replace Defense Minister Hauge, who may become Minister of Justice. OSO fears that the Chief of Norwegian Intelligence, owing to his cordial personal relations with both Ministers, may succeed in monopolizing liaison with CIA by dissolving OSO's promising liaison arrangement with the Norwegian Police, approval of which was recently given with reluctance.

OSO representatives briefed Ambassador Christian Ravndal, newly appointed US Minister to Hungary, on the status and duties of the OSO officer in Budapest. Ambassador Ravndal

TOP SECRET (CONTINUED) 13 DECEMBER 1951

SECURITY INFORMATION

(DIRECTOR'S LOG, Top Secret, CIA, December 13, 1951, p. 208) <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/1951-09-01.pdf>

archive.org Open the gates! : A personal story of "illegal" immigration to Israel : Avriel, Ehud, 1917- : Free Download, Borrow, and...

Borrow ends at 6:49 PM

Return now

Borrow for 14 days

Purchase

334

Part Three: The Seine

thoroughbred horses and to the company of glamorous women, he found Tel Aviv too drab and the whole country too austere for his tastes. He had had enough of war; while Palestine was preparing for the showdown with the British and the Arabs, he wanted to resume his luxurious life. He left both his wife and Palestine.

'Had I been of stronger character, Ben Gurion would have sent me, an experienced arms salesman, on this mission rather than a greenhorn like you.'

Robert Adam and Joseph Nash, at that time business partners, never accepted a penny or even the smallest gift in return for the services they rendered to the Haganah. It was their way of expressing their feeling of responsibility for the fate of Jewish Palestine.

The representative of the Czech armworks was at the airport to meet us. So was my friend Felix Doron, the Haganah man in Prague, who came with us in the black, official-looking limousine to the head office of Adam's business friends.

'Have we emerged from the underground?' Doron whispered to me in the car.

'I hope we have,' I replied. 'Otherwise we shall be wiped off the ground altogether.'

Less than an hour after we entered the offices of the Zbrojovka, Brno - permeated with an air of solid authority and reliable politeness - we had concluded the deal. Adam was at home in these offices; and the younger of the two Czech directors had been at school with Felix Doron, who was born in Prague and had left for Palestine just before the invasion of Czechoslovakia. The two sides in the negotiation understood each other perfectly.

Suddenly, two questions arose that seemed capable of

24: A New Mission

335

chasing arms was to import them in special crates bearing the likeness of a black serpent, the accepted identification of arms and explosives.

I produced the stationery that had been preserved in the Mossad office in Paris. Our Czech partners were delighted: just a couple of weeks ago they had sent a delegation to the capital of the same country to demonstrate their products. They had not yet received even the first report from their men. 'And here you are, flattering us with a huge order for our goods. Could there be a more auspicious indication of the quality of our production?' said the senior director whimsically.

The snake problem, too, found its solution. Our hosts, as eager to sell as we were to buy, agreed to Doron's suggestion that we place the original boxes into specially built crates. The serpent would be on the inner boxes for the sake of good order, yet it would not give away the contents by advertising itself to the British soldiers who might search the boat on which these crates would arrive in Palestine.

Doron and I rushed to the Czech Foreign Office with a letter of introduction to Jan Masaryk, the son of the founder of the Czech republic and then Czech Foreign Minister, as well as a warm friend of Zionism. When I telephoned his office from the armworks, he agreed to see me at once. I explained the situation to Masaryk, who was visibly delighted that his country could help us and pleased that we were able to overcome 'technical difficulties'. He was certain that his communist deputy, Vlado Clementis, would likewise favour assisting our war effort. 'For me, it is enough that you defend yourself against your enemies. But Clementis will be happy to know that by fighting for your life you undermine British imperialism in the Middle East.'

Borrow ends at 1:23 PM  **Return now**  **Borrow for 14 days**  **Purchase**

A stoutly built man with the face of a scholar and intellectual, Piade opened the door for me himself when I arrived at his villa for our talk. Completely dispensing with formality, he brought me into his drawing-room.

'Here you can speak absolutely freely. I have switched off all the microphones and we are alone,' he said with a sarcastic reference to rumours, then current in Belgrade, that even top leaders of the Communist Party were closely watched by the Secret Service.

As we settled down for a long talk, Piade told me of his curiosity about everything concerning the 'Zionist effort in Palestine'.

Borrow ends at 6:49 PM 

Part Three: The Seine

broke out. The warning could not be issued as planned, and although most of the policemen were still able to vacate the building, seven could not, and they were killed in the explosion.

The third and most spectacular assault was on the main radar station on Mount Carmel. The commander of the 1st Battalion of the Palmach, then stationed in the vicinity of Haifa, had received instructions in the beginning of November to prepare for the eventuality of the 'related struggle'. His name was Dan Lanner, although once it had been Ernest Loehner, the son of the exclusive Vienna shopkeeper, Rudolf Loehner, who at the last moment and by pure chance had been plucked from the doomed at Cladovo to accompany a small, lucky group of youngsters to Palestine. Since then he had served as a parachutist-liaison officer in Tito's headquarters during the Yugoslav partisans' war of liberation, and from a Palmach commander he was to rise to the rank of general in Israel's army. The young man who only a few years earlier had been an 'illegal immigrant' himself was now commanding an operation to help secure the arrival of what was left of the victims of Nazi Europe.

18: We Meet in Belgrade

Return now

Borrow for 14 days

Borrow ends at 1:23 PM 

Purchase

cally, Leibl and his carless driver stood on the roadside, waiting for a passing car to stop and take them to Budapest. A Russian officer on a motorcycle with a side-car stopped for them and most obligingly brought them right to the centre of Budapest. That very night Leibl began making contacts.

My 'journalistic' work brought me into contact with the officials of the Yugoslav Government Press Office. Not surprisingly, I met a few who had a sincere respect for our struggle in Palestine, about which they received quite one-sided reports from British sources. But after the war they regarded their former British Allies as having reverted to the stance of imperialist suppressors, and they felt the partisans' affinity for a small people fighting against a superior enemy.

In consultation with Alkalay, I decided to ask for an interview with Moshe Piade, the Speaker of the Federal Parliament and one of the chiefs of the Communist Party. Piade was a Jew, and Alkalay had been in touch with him on matters concerning the revival of Jewish communal life after the war. Alkalay had found him friendly and sympathetic, although he hardly regarded himself as a member of the Jewish community about to be re-established. When I was finally told that Piade was ready to receive me, he asked that I come to see him informally at his home.

'I am, as you may know, of Jewish descent,' he said, 'but I regard myself as a Yugoslav communist and nothing else. This is my country and my people; among them I have grown up and fought my political battles. Till recently I was with them in the mountains fighting against the Nazis. But I want to hear from a primary source about your work, your ideas, you life.'

Moshe Piade's manner made me think he might well be called 'Tito's Berl Katznelson.' He listened with sympathy, interrupting with keen questions as I tried to explain our way of life and our thinking. The organization of the kibbutz – a collective 'from below', as he defined it – interested him most. It was obvious that he pondered the possibilities of a similar movement in the new social reality of the 'People's Democracy'. At the end of the long and stimulating evening I knew we had won a friend.

'You will hear from me again, both directly and indirectly,' Piade said as we parted, and I knew by his tone that I would receive an affirmative reply to my request for permission to organize illegal immigration to Palestine from the shores of the Adriatic.

Leibl returned from his exploration of the Hungarian track full of hopes and more than pleased when he heard that on the diplomatic level things looked good too. But he was not satisfied with one link: he knew, and he had been told once again in Budapest, that many Jews from Poland had moved to Rumania. So he decided to 'open the border' between Rumania and Yugoslavia too. At the frontier post of Kikinda, again by speaking Russian and showing his Polish refugee card, he received assurances from the Rumanian frontier guard that any Jewish refugees wanting to cross into Yugoslavia would be helped.

A few days after my talk with Piade, Slavko Radej, the head of the emaciated Jewish community of Zagreb, came to meet with me. He had survived the war with his vigour and

optimism fully intact and had visions of streams of Jewish refugees from Hungary and Rumania on their way to the Dalmatian coast. Slavko was glad to discover the existence of the Mossad. He had already hoarded food, blankets and boots and had made arrangements for transit quarters on the outskirts of Zagreb. His contacts with the Yugoslav communist administration had been forged while he lived with many of the new leaders as partisans in the mountains, and these friendships facilitated his new task as host to the expected refugees from beyond the Yugoslav borders. As we ate breakfast together in the dining-room of the Majestic, he told me about the arrangements he had made with Leibl for transient refugees from Rumania.

Suddenly the hall-porter came up to me with a telegram. It was from Paris and it read: 'Chief Editor needs you for urgent discussion at once. Ruth'. I turned the telegram over in my hand. There was absolutely no indication of what it was all about, and Slavko shared my curiosity. I explained to him that it could mean that Ben Gurion – who I knew was in Paris – wanted to see me urgently. Or was I imagining things? The quiet atmosphere of our talk suddenly vanished. Slavko suggested that I try to telephone Paris and find out for sure before I made any decisions.

This time the telephone connection worked reasonably fast. I was able to distinguish Ruth's voice faintly over the line, and she confirmed my interpretation of the message. I left with Slavko on the train to Zagreb, after having taken leave of Leibl and of Alkalay.

After a short stop in Zagreb for a visit to Slavko's home and to take up food supplies, I continued on to Vienna. From Zagreb through the snow-covered mountains of Slovenia, as far as I could make out I was the only passenger on the unlit train. It moved with great effort up the steep ascents, and I wondered how long I would be stuck in the bitter cold of the unheated carriage. Passport formalities on the frontier were

('Open the Gates!: A Personal Story of "Illegal" Immigration to Israel', Ehud Avriel, 1975, p. 335)

<https://archive.org/details/opengatesperso00avri/page/335/mode/2up>