



The History of the USSR & the Peoples' Democracies

by
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Chapter 0

Acknowledgements, Methodology, and How to Use the Book

C0S1. Acknowledgements

I would like to thank:

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- (1) ‘Russia Helped 1,750,000 Jews to Escape Nazis, Says James N. Rosenberg’. In: JTA Daily News Bulletin, Vol. 10, No. 153, Jewish Telegraphic Agency (JTA), July 2, 1943, pp. 3-4.
- (2) ‘My Meeting with Chairman Mao’, Memorandum for The President from Henry A. Kissinger, February 24, 1973.
- (3) TURNING POINT: A HISTORY OF GERMAN PETROLEUM IN WORLD WAR II AND ITS LESSONS FOR THE ROLE OF OIL IN MODERN AIR WARFARE, Air Command and Staff College Air University, Shawn P. Keller (Major, US Airforce), Independent Elective Advisor: Dr. Michael May, pp. 5-6.

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an anonymous friend for transcribing some of the screenshots into text. I had taken screenshots of the sources I used and needed the texts in the screenshot images to be transcribed into a kind of text usable in Word documents. Almost all the screenshot texts were transcribed by myself. However, a number of them were done by this anonymous friend.

Disclaimer: The remarks expressed throughout this book do not necessarily represent the views of the people whose contributions were acknowledged.

C0S2. Methodology Outline

This book derives the vast majority of its evidence from the following kinds of sources:

- (1) American intelligence and military, and the related fronts and subordinate organizations
- (2) British intelligence and military, and the related fronts and subordinate organizations
- (3) Nazi German intelligence and military, and the related fronts and subordinate organizations
- (4) Israeli intelligence and military, and the related fronts and subordinate organizations

- (5) Trotskyite enemies of the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies
- (5) the SAVAK
- (6) the media (including speeches, official statements, articles, and memoirs) from the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies.
- (7) the declassified archives of the United Arab Republic (UAR)
- (8) prestigious universities, such as Harvard, Yale, Cambridge, Oxford, etc.

Corroboration of information occurs when the same information is confirmed by more than one source. The validation of an information refers to the case when a piece of information serves as an additional data point in a general trend observed.

Example of validation:

Source 1: Person X is on CIA payroll.

Source 2: Person X provided top secret intelligence to US State Department.

Source 3: Person X closely collaborated with the Ben-Gurion faction in Israel.

The three sources above do not corroborate each other as much but they validate each other; fit together, they logically and dialectically match each other. That is an example of validation. Where they do corroborate each other however is that they all imply that 'Person X' collaborated with American intelligence or with American imperialism.

Another example of validation is with regards to the conclusions arrived at. The conclusions can be validated through an understanding of the laws of dialectics and historical materialism. Consider the following example:

Evidence 1: Person X, who had a position in the Soviet state, was a Nazi intelligence agent who had infiltrated the Soviet government.

Evidence 2: Person X carried out economic sabotage against the Soviet state.

Conclusion: Person X carried out economic sabotage in order to and for the purpose of serving the Nazi objectives.

In the above example, the phrase 'in order to and for the purpose of' would be denounced by anti-dialecticians as 'merely' an 'assumption' that is 'devoid of evidence'. However, someone with even a basic level of dialectical intuition would regard that phrase 'in order to and for the purpose of' as just so highly logical and natural that it would be virtually impossible for such a phrase as 'in order to and for the purpose of' to be incorrect. It follows that – unless there is any strong evidence contradicting the 'in order to and for the purpose of' phrase – the conclusion derived from the two evidence pieces in the above example is validated as true according to the laws of dialectics and historical materialism. Not every phenomenon in physics necessarily needs full data to be proven, since many phenomena can be already well-predicted according to the laws discovered. Much as how empirically collecting the data for acceleration and mass will suffice for calculating the amount of force, without directly going about and measuring the amount of force, so is it also sufficient to use the laws of history, the laws of dialectics and historical materialism, to connect and make sense of the several pieces of evidence in order to arrive at a big picture, an ultimate conclusion, even if one does not find the evidence that directly confirms the ultimate conclusion itself.

There were two directions in which the corroboration occurred throughout this book: (1) checking both US-led bloc and Soviet-led bloc, anti-communist intelligence service and pro-communist intelligence service, etc. sources so to see if the source claims match up more or less; (2) corroboration using two sources from the same alliance (e.g. one source from US intelligence and the other from British intelligence), etc.

As mentioned, this book utilizes the methodology of finding confessions to support conclusions. There were cases in which 'rogue' elements within the anti-Soviet camp made pro-Soviet 'confessions', but that these 'confessions' were by anti-Soviet agents, who, on the overt level, showed sympathies with the USSR. For example, at the instigation of the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB), James Klugmann, an MI6 officer, made numerous 'confessions' in favor of the USSR, even though it is not completely clear if he was genuinely pro-Soviet at heart. Hence although Klugmann's works were and are very valuable, it would not be entirely so easy to cite his pro-Soviet remarks as a 'confession' even though he was an officer of an anti-Soviet intelligence service, the MI6. In addition, there were 'Western' government officials whose sympathies were genuinely with the USSR and the international communist movement. Citing them would not be incomparable to citing Khrushchev's and Gorbachev's 'confessions' against the USSR. Going over the details of all these 'rogue' 'confessors' is beyond the scope of this particular section of the book; however, what can be stated here is that the cases of these 'rogue' 'confessors' has been quite strictly taken into account and duly adjusted for. The use of these rogue 'confessors' has been minimized in this book; as such, the citation of US officials affiliated with the Roosevelt-Kennedy faction or Israeli officials from the Mapam-Palmach faction has been minimized, as these were pro-Soviet currents inside anti-Soviet governments.

One misconception that may arise from the examination of some of the CIA documents presented in this book is from a phrase contained in some of the CIA documents: 'unevaluated information'. The following was the CIA's definition of the term:

Unevaluated information is defined as raw intelligence material ordinarily issued by OO/C and OSO. (Dissemination of CIA Unevaluated Information Reports, CIA, p. 1) (IMG)

The OSO stood for the Office of Special Operations. According to another CIA document:

The mission of the Office of Special Operations is the conduct, under the direct supervision of the Director, of all organized espionage and counterespionage operations outside the United States and its possessions for the collection of foreign Intelligence information required for the national security. Such espionage and counterespionage operations may involve semi-overt and semi-covert activities for the performance of the mission. (Functions of the Office of Special Operations, US Intelligence, October 25, 1946, p. 1) (IMG)

The 'Unevaluated Information' is in fact a type of highly sensitive intelligence content evaluated as accurate or reliable by the CIA spy and some of his handlers and case officers sending the report to the central intelligence offices in the United States. The reason why it is labelled as 'unevaluated' is that it serves as 'raw' data yet to be analyzed and synthesized by the CIA agent's bosses in the United States for a final report to the President and other members of the National Security Council (NSC). Those CIA reports which contain such a phrase are in reference to reports and analyses that the CIA receives usually from individual CIA agents or employees, some of whom are top ranking and in the high command of the CIA and some of whom are medium-ranking or lower-ranking. That they are referred to as 'unevaluated information' simply means that the report cannot so easily be shared with the central analysis offices such as the Directorate of Analysis (DoA), the Office of Current Information (OCI), the Office of Research and Reports (ORR), etc. The documents that are by 'Office of Current Information' or 'Office of Research and Reports' are at times given more

attention by the CIA than the 'unevaluated information', for they bear the organizational prestige of being 'final' reports sent to the President and high-ranking commanders. However, it goes without saying that this too is not always the case since sometimes CIA operatives would be cautious not to share the sensitive intelligence with some of the central analysis offices of the American intelligence service, for so doing could expose the intelligence material to potential moles in the US intelligence offices and thus undermine CIA efforts. This potential was in the minds of the CIA commanders when they devised CIA protocols such that:

[some] unevaluated information reports ... will have a limited dissemination within the IAC [Intelligence Advisory Committee] agency because of local IAC agency responsibility and sensitivity of source. These reports will be distributed not through reading panel units but through one officer designated by each IAC agency and shall be in a separate report series. (Dissemination of CIA Unevaluated Information Reports, CIA, p. 1) (IMG)

The above quote – especially, though not exclusively, the fact that the distribution of the sensitive intelligence is limited to a single IAC-designated officer rather than an entire IAC-affiliated panel – means that the highly sensitive intelligence content cannot be always thoroughly shared with the central offices of the CIA. In such situations, the CIA operatives in countries outside of the US might keep the intelligence among themselves and not share it with people outside of their circle. This in turn means that the central analysis offices of the CIA would not be as informed as some of the CIA operatives lying outside the US, and hence it would mean that the reports of the central analysis offices of the CIA are not always more reliable than the reports of the local operatives. Since, in practice, neither the central analysis directorates of the CIA nor the 'unevaluated information' reports of individual CIA agents are necessarily always regarded as superior to one another, the methodology in this book is to examine documents from all the different segments of the declassified CIA documents, to check the level of their reliability either through corroboration or validation or a combination thereof, to extract from among them the confessions contradicting the propaganda of imperialist reaction, and to thereupon arrive at conclusions. For the purposes of this book, little difference in value exists between a (1) medium-ranking CIA case officer with plenty of access to intelligence sources and networks of spies, and (2) a CIA staff member in a central office tasked with analysis of the intelligence documents – both such CIA employees have plenty of access to vast amounts of intelligence materials, are highly informed, and thus render confessions of almost-equal reliability.

Another point deserving mention is that the CIA has a 'Foreign Documents Division' (FDD) in which the media broadcasts, speeches, articles, etc. of foreign countries are examined, translated, and analyzed. In such a case, the FDD would at times translate an article from the Soviet media and present it in full. Obviously, such articles cannot be cited as 'confessions' by the CIA since they are articles by the Soviet media. And thus, they are not cited as confessions. However, there are FDD documents that present articles/broadcasts from anti-Soviet countries or individuals and those articles are at times cited in this book. There are also CIA FDD documents that analyze and summarize the things mentioned in the Soviet media. In analyzing what is stated in the media of the Soviet-led bloc countries, the CIA actually renders a number of very remarkable confessions and some of them have been cited in this book regarding media freedom in the USSR.

With regards to the kind of corroboration that involves looking at the archives and works of the Soviet Union and then comparing them to what is confessed to by the CIA, MI6, etc., I would like to mention that I have examined the archives and remarks made by the media of the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies much. However, those documents have not always been cited in this work since a major part of the focus of this book is to present the anti-Soviet secret service documents that corroborate or validate the information provided by the Soviets and the Peoples' Democracies. Hence, in case the reader has doubts as to the remarks made in this book using the CIA, MI6, etc. documents, the reader can duly go and check the Soviet, Popular-Democratic, or Comintern-linked sources on their own and to corroborate and validate the information. I warn the reader though that in a relatively small minority of cases, the Soviets published articles for the purposes of psychological warfare instead of exposing the full truth, such as when they presented the Nazis as unwilling to invade the USSR, shortly before the Nazi invasion. That of course does not mean that all of the remarks made by the Soviet media are unreliable; it simply means that a minority of remarks made by the Soviet media deserve extra efforts in validation and corroboration. As some of the remarks made in this book have been controversial enough to need me to present documents on both sides of the conflict, I have presented some of the Soviet-led bloc sources in addition to the CIA-MI6 documents cited.

Sometimes, anti-Soviet intelligence or military sources acknowledge a Soviet or communist claim as true, and they may cite Soviet/communist sources for this. That the anti-Soviet source would cite the Soviet/communist source though does not mean that the confession by the anti-Soviet source cannot be used. Rather, it means that the anti-Soviet intelligence and military source making such a citation has independently, and on its own, validated or corroborated claims by the USSR and its camp as true and points them out. Therefore, yes, it would be fair to cite anti-Soviet sources that in turn cite Soviet sources, as a not insignificant portion of intelligence gathering by anti-Soviet agencies involves dissecting the truth from falsehood from the Soviet media sources.

Some institutions such as the US State Department, German Ministry of Interior, Radio Free Europe, BBC, or Wilson Center are very exclusive and do indeed operate as intelligence services. Those kinds of authors affiliated with such institutions obviously count as affiliates of American, British, or German intelligence agencies. However, there are other kinds of political bodies that are not necessarily intelligence services in themselves although they contain many subsidiaries that operate as intelligence services. An example to this is the European Union (EU). When emphasizing an author's receiving of financial aid from the EU's educational subsidiaries, I am not necessarily implying that the person is an 'EU agent' or a 'German agent'. Rather, by emphasizing that the person's research is funded by the EU, I am implying that the conclusions of the research are under the cooptative pressure of EU funds and thus cannot be automatically regarded as having an anti-EU 'bias'.

If an author has written a book and, after writing the initial edition, has been promoted to an intelligence official position, and after promotion, published a new edition of the book, then this new edition of the book can be cited as remarks of an intelligence official whereas the earlier edition might not be worthy of being cited for such. An example to this is the work of Miranda Vickers who wrote a book on the history of People's Democratic Albania, but was later promoted to serve as a scholar affiliated with the International Crisis Group (ICG), the CIA-MI6-BND front organization, and after such promotion, published a 2014 edition of the book. The 2014 edition can be cited as confessions by an ICG agent whereas the earlier edition might not be confessions of an ICG agent since she was not (necessarily) an ICG agent at the time of writing her first edition.

When I describe something and then present the quote, I am only endorsing those parts of the quote that correspond to or do not contradict my description, and not the whole content of the quote. Therefore, usually though not always, the entirety of the quote I cite does not necessarily represent my views; only parts of it would.

The term 'MI6' was first used to describe British intelligence since World War II; however, in this book, in line with the tradition of other authors, the term 'MI6' will be used to describe the British intelligence prior to World War II as well.

The 'Marxists Internet Archive', a database of left-wing literature, has been abbreviated in this book as 'MIA'.

The title may or may not have quotation marks around it. The quotation marks are there to prevent confusion with the names of the authors. Dots are at the end to separate the terms.

COS3. Citation Format / Titles Format

The style of citation in this book differs with that of the mainstream. The following is the order of the title, publication, volume, contributor, and date used in this book.

[Text of the quote]. ('Title', Publication, Vol. Authors & Editors/Translators, Date, Year)

The phrases 'Bold added' and 'Underline added' respectively mean that bold and underline were added by me. 'Bold original', 'Underline original' and 'Ellipsis original' respectively mean that the bold, underline, and ellipsis were original to quote. The ellipsis in brackets symbol '(...)' which I put in some of the quotations simply means that one or more statements have been omitted such that there would be no change in the meaning. When using the ellipsis sign '...', I have separated such a sign by a space from each word. The template style is thus as follows: 'Word ... words.' It is not 'Words... words', nor is it 'Words . . . words'. Ellipses of other template styles are almost always original to the texts cited and not by me.

When quoting a text within the normal paragraphs, the quote is surrounded by quotation marks. However, in the indented quotes, no quotation marks have been placed, as the indentation of the text and the fact that it is followed by the template citation '(Title', Publication, Vol. Authors & Editors/Translators, Date, Year)' already signals that it is a quote.

The titles of each section are followed by the title code C#S#, which represents the Chapter (C) and Section (S) numbers. In some parts of this book, several generally-related topics have been amalgamated under one section. The topics have been separated by the slash symbol '/'. The slash symbol normally (including in this book) would imply 'or'; however, in the context of the section titles, it is simply a separator of the topic titles and does not imply 'or'.

COS4. The Screenshots/Photos Corresponding to the Sources Cited

Throughout this book, the screenshots/photos of the original sources of the cited quotes have been provided under their relevant titles at the end of the book. The titles above each screenshot series are in turn placed throughout the text, so to guide the reader as to which section of the book the reader shall refer to find the screenshots/photos for the sources to the relevant quotes. The 'IMG' represents the screenshots/photos of the quotes' sources. The template phrase 'IMG-All-{' means that, unless otherwise indicated, the screenshots/photos of the sources to the quote in the text that therein follows are located under their corresponding title. For example, 'IMG-All-{Mongolia}' means that, unless otherwise indicated, the screenshots of all of the quotes that follow are located under the section titled 'Mongolia' in the source photos/screenshots section. Sometimes, almost all quotes of one section of the text may belong to, for example, the 'Mongolia' section of the screenshots but the screenshots of a few particular quotes in that text section are to be found not in the 'Mongolia' section of the screenshots but in another section of the screenshots. In that case, the quote will end with the template phrase '(IMG{' which thereby guides the reader to refer to another section of the screenshots rather than the section of the screenshots to which 'IMG-All-{' refers.

Throughout the text there also exist the '(IMG)' behind most quotes. The reader may ignore those, since those ones are meant to help me keep track of whether the quotes have corresponding screenshots.

To provide information on the degree of reliability of the sources used, the description of each source has also been screenshot; the screenshot of the source description is usually provided next to the screenshots of the source excerpts cited.

For those viewing the book online, finding the screenshots of the relevant sources are far easier. The online readers merely need to copy the code, title, or at times the author name, of the source and then search the code or title or author name, having pressed Ctrl F, so be directed straight to the source screenshots.

Some CIA documents' links have the "/library/" in them. To access such CIA documents online, simply delete the phrase "library/" in the link and thus the reader shall be able to access via the link.

Some of the screenshots involved the use of Google Chrome, in which some extensions were installed. The extensions portion of some of the Google Chrome screenshots have been redacted by me.

Of course, numerous British Foreign Office documents have been cited in this book. The British Foreign Office documents have been amalgamated by their original publishers into series of books categorized by their years. Citing each of those book series would have rendered the quote citations far too long; to shorten the citations, the template phrase 'Foreign Office (dates)' has been used. For example, 'Foreign Office (1945)' refers to the British Foreign Office book of documents for the year 1945.

Some of the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, and Hoxha have been cited but without corresponding screenshots, since the works of those authors are already widely available online and in print.

While seeking to ensure that the text in the screenshots would be visible to the reader, the screenshots have been compacted in size so to take less space in the book. The pages screenshot have not always necessarily been placed in the order of page numbers, since, in some cases, placing them in the order of page numbers may compromise the compacting process. Nonetheless, to prevent confusion regarding the order of pages screenshot, the page numbers of the documents have been screenshot so that the reader can navigate through and read the texts of the screenshots properly.

COS5. On Grammatical/Mechanical Errors in Writing

If the reader notices any mechanical or grammatical errors, please inform me using the email provided on the website sovinform.net.

Chapter 1:
The Blueprint of History

*** IMG-All-{The Blueprint of History}

C1S1. The Foundations of Historical Materialism

One can semi-metaphorically regard materiality as the mass of objects: that which is more material contains more matter and thus bears a higher mass. And the higher its mass, the more the other objects gravitate towards it, giving it a more important role in space. In the same way, the more material a historical factor, the more it matters and has weight in the course of history. The less material, the less its influence over history. The more material factors affect the less material factors more than vice versa, much as how the heavier objects pull the lighter objects more than vice versa and bring such lighter objects into their orbit.

The minds of individuals who seek to determine the course of history are inevitably confined within history itself; the less material (e.g. the individual psyche) is confined within the more material (the military reality, geopolitics, economy, etc.). The less material factors such as the individual psyche can bring about change in the more material conditions only if utilizing, or supported by, a material force sufficient to overpower the material conditions they seek to change.

Materiality, though itself a continuous spectrum, can be divided into echelons or levels of materiality for historical materialist analysis, as summarized in the pyramid below. The more to the bottom the factors are, the more material they are, and thus the more they matter and bear weight as factors in history.

At the very bottom of the pyramid is geography. Marx and Engels in ‘The German Ideology’, under the heading ‘First Premises of the Materialist Method’, wrote:

The first premise of all human history is, of course, the existence of living human individuals. Thus the first fact to be established is the physical organisation of these individuals and their consequent relation to the rest of nature. Of course, we cannot here go either into the actual physical nature of man, or into the natural conditions in which man finds himself – **geological, hydrographical, climatic and so on. The writing of history must always set out from these natural bases** and their modification in the course of history through the action of men. (The German Ideology, Marx and Engels, MIA. Bold added) (IMG)

In a letter to Marx, Engels expressed his agreement with Marx that the geographic set-up in the Orient was a key cause of the difference of the region’s mode of production with that of the Occident:


The absence of landed property is indeed the key to the whole of the East. Therein lies its political and religious history. But how to explain the fact that orientals never reached the stage of landed property, not even the feudal kind? This is, I think, **largely due to the climate, combined with the nature of the land, more especially the great stretches of desert extending from the Sahara right across Arabia, Persia, India and Tartary to the highest of the Asiatic uplands.** (Engels to Marx in London, Manchester, June 6, 1853, evening. In: Marx-Engels Correspondence 1853, Marxists Internet Archive. Original Source: MECW Vol. 39, p. 355. First published in full in MEGA, Berlin, 1929.)

Geography affects the level of the development of the productive forces (industries and technical equipment), which in turn affects property relations and the class character of the state. Advancements in the productive forces lead to the advancements of the progressive classes in society. Historical experience demonstrates that the geographic areas in which the development of the productive forces has been naturally more difficult and slower,

have seen a lower advancement of the progressive classes, and have thus been dominated by reactionary classes. The desert areas (central Arabian Peninsula and much of Mongolia) as well as excessively mountainous areas (parts of western Ukraine and Chechniya), precisely owing to their geographic inability to develop productive forces, have seen a lower advancement of progressive classes concurrent with the low advancement of the productive forces. Such areas have thus been centers of barbaric ultra-reaction. By contrast, the areas more fertile or more resourceful, provided that basic incentives for economic development existed, naturally tended towards higher advancements in productive forces and thus the development of more progressive classes.

The physical/natural environment of a region indeed affects not only the level of the development of the productive forces, but also the very existence of the incentives for economic development – e.g. some societies may not have incentives to move out of hunter-gatherer mode, for the geographic setting they inhabit already provides enough food resources for them not to feel the need to develop sophisticated agriculture. Examples of these were seen in parts of Africa and North America.

The development of productive forces allow society to afford progressing from one type of property relations system to another:



Social relations are closely bound up with productive forces. In acquiring new productive forces men change their mode of production; and in changing their mode of production, in changing the way of earning their living, they change all their social relations. The hand-mill gives you society with the feudal lord; the steam-mill society with the industrial capitalist. (The Poverty of Philosophy, Marx, Abstracts (Chapter 2), 1847)

The development of the productive forces is correlated with the development of new classes, driving out the old classes. The advanced industries possessed by the industrial bourgeoisie renders them economically mightier, allowing them to undercut and drive out the feudal landlords. However, without labouring as much, the bourgeoisie gain a massive profit as the unpaid income of the proletarians, the latter being a class of individuals who

have no private property (as in business property) but have only their labour to sell. Typically, though not always, the proletariat can be found in the densely urbanized areas. Advanced machinery can economically boost cities, thus concentrating a larger population of labourers in the cities. The larger population density in turn results in a greater supply of labour and hence lower wages. The result of such driving down of the price of labour is the great exploitation that gives rise to the proletarian class.

Depending on the context, the interests of some classes align and the interests of some classes are antagonistic. This lays the basis for inter-class alliances in class conflicts. In some classes, there also exist intra-class competitions, just as there can be intra-class cooperation, depending on the contexts. There are individuals within classes that betray their own classes. In the current context, the two main classes in play are the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. There also exist outliers who betray their class.

Society is made up of individual actors (whom we can assume are often 'rational' and in the broad sense, 'self-interested') who, as a result of property relations, line up into different classes. It is indeed property relations which line up competitive-and-cooperative humans into different classes. It is important to make a distinction between the term 'class' and the term 'stratum'. Phrases such as 'the poor', 'the middle class', 'the intelligentsia', 'the mullahs', etc. do not really refer to classes, because such phrases do not really properly define how individual members of these categories are related to the property ownership. Rather, these categories are layers within society, i.e. the strata of society. These strata are nonetheless usually overlapping with or closely related to specific classes; 'the poor' usually refers to the proletariat or non-kulak peasants, the so-called 'middle class' is typically a reference to the petit-bourgeoisie or to white-collar workers, the intelligentsia, due to their bourgeois family origins, are often linked to the bourgeoisie, etc. Strata should be considered in class analysis, but strata are not the same as classes.

The productive forces give rise to classes. Yet, classes wages their struggles by employing the productive forces. The most decisive, the 'heaviest', subcategory of the productive forces, however, is that of the destructive forces: the weaponry, the military-industrial backbone, the means of violence. The extent of dominance over the military as a subcategory-annex of the productive forces affects the extent of dominance over the rest of the productive forces, and thus affects the outcome of class struggle itself. It thus follows that the question of class dominance over the means of violence determines the class character of the state.

The productive forces, the industrial power of a state, lay the basis for the military strength of a state. From there, emerges the military-industrial backbone, the decisive control over which automatically yields the decisive control over the state. The means of violence, as a subcategory of the productive forces, is distinct from the category of the 'Class Character of the State', though the control of the means of violence directly determines the class character of the state. The class character of the state, the question of which class alliance controls the means of violence, in turn determines the directions of the economy and hence the issue of control over the productive forces. The means of violence is therefore that subcategory of the productive forces through which is determined the control over the other sectors of the economy and other subcategories of the productive forces.

In all countries, without exception, the extent of dominance over the means of violence determines the extent of dominance over the means of communication. Whichever class dominates the security and intelligence bodies can, using carrot-and-stick measures, gain dominance over the mainstream media. By dominating the media, the class can propagate a culture favourable to its class interests. Culture in turn nurtures a mindset and psychological behaviour in the individual. Class culture thus affects the individual psyche.

The pyramid can be explained in a reverse way as well. An individual cannot transform society without having behind oneself a subculture, an ideological grouping. A subculture cannot transform society unless through dominance over the means of violence on behalf of the class tendency to which this subculture is affiliated. And productive forces cannot easily advance without the natural resources available by the geographic setting.

An individual can have more influence than a collective if the individual has access to material forces that can help him/her overpower the specific collective's power. Such access to material forces can include sufficient charisma to appeal to the culture of a larger collective so to overpower and outnumber the influence of the smaller collective; such access to material forces can include the support of a state whose character is in line with the views and aims of the specific individual, property relations favorable to the views and aims of the specific individual, productive forces under the influence of or controlled by the individual, etc. As can be seen, the individual in-itself cannot have much influence; he or she can exercise influence only with support from the more material forces so to be able to contradict the other material forces. This renders the individual psyche the least material of the factors listed in the pyramid. A military genius, for example is limited in his/her by the more material forces he/she is surrounded by: the culture of the troops, the quality of the productive forces to produce his/her weapons, the geographic terrain, etc. At the same time, what makes a military genius so, is the genius mind's ability to strategically use the contradictions between the material forces for reaching the desired military outcome. Hence, while material conditions may limit the military genius, they may also be used intelligently as sources of opportunity for reaching the desired outcome. Stalin explained this point well:

Marxism does not at all deny the role played by outstanding individuals or that history is made by people. In Marx's *The Poverty of Philosophy* and in other works of his you will find it stated that it is people who make history. But, of course, people do not make history according to the promptings of their imagination or as some fancy strikes them. Every new generation encounters definite conditions already existing, ready-made when that generation was born. And great people are worth anything at all only to the extent that they are able correctly to understand these conditions, to understand how to change them. If they fail to understand these conditions and want to alter them according to the promptings of their imagination, they will land themselves in the situation of Don Quixote. (Talk With the German Author Emil Ludwig, J. V. Stalin, December 13, 1931)

Theories, as thoughts, in-themselves are not material enough as a force to yield changes in history. However, once a sufficient mass begins to uphold a theory, the theory gains enough material force to bring forth a material change. This is why Marx said:

The weapon of criticism cannot, of course, replace criticism by weapons, material force must be overthrown by material force; but theory also becomes a material force as soon as it has gripped the masses. (Abstract from The Introduction to Contribution To The Critique Of Hegel's Philosophy Of Right, Marx, 1844)

C1S2. The Nature of Imperialism and Fascism / Revolutionary Class Struggles against Fascist Reaction

Unlike industrial capitalism, which profits from the expansion of commodity production, mercantile capitalism generates profits from the exchange of commodities produced. The mercantile bourgeoisie – i.e. the merchant class – operate as middlemen for exchange operations. The middleman sector in the economy, the sector responsible for the exchange, is of critical significance for other sectors for it eases transfers and transactions. It therefore receives high demand from the rest of the economy, generating high revenue for those in control of the middleman sector. On the other hand, the middleman sector does not engage in as much material production as other sectors and is less labour-intensive. The result for middleman

sectors is that, relative to the rest of the economic sectors, high revenues are generated at low labour costs, and hence high profits, but with relatively little production. The high profits without much production create a serious imbalance in the economy, for they allow the middlemen to 'suck' the wealth of the economy, which is precisely what makes mercantile capitalism parasitic. This is to be contrasted with industrial capitalism which, while exploiting the workers, nonetheless does expand production. It is therefore not difficult to understand how mercantile capitalist middlemen can become a parasitic class that 'bites' into production without producing as much. It is this parasitic middleman nature of mercantile capitalism that formed the class basis for pre-modern imperialism. In part IV of *Das Kapital* III, Marx intensively explored the nature of money capital and mercantile capital:

Of course, commerce will ... subordinate production more and more to exchange-value by making luxuries and subsistence more dependent on sale than on the immediate use of the products. Thereby it dissolves the old relationships. It multiplies money circulation.

It encompasses no longer merely the surplus of production, but bites deeper and deeper into the latter, and makes entire branches of production dependent upon it. Nevertheless this **disintegrating effect** depends very much on the nature of the producing community.

So long as merchant's capital promotes the exchange of products between undeveloped societies, **commercial profit not only appears as out-bargaining and cheating, but also largely originates from them.** Aside from the fact that it exploits the difference between the prices of production of various countries (and in this respect it tends to level and fix the values of commodities), those modes of production bring it about that merchant's capital appropriates an overwhelming portion of the surplus-product partly as a mediator between communities which still substantially produce for use-value, and for whose economic organisation the sale of the portion of their product entering circulation, or for that matter any sale of products at their value, is of secondary importance; and partly, because under those earlier modes of production the principal owners of the surplus-product with whom the merchant dealt, namely, the slave-owner, the feudal lord, and the state (for instance, the oriental despot) represent the consuming wealth and luxury which the merchant seeks to trap, as Adam Smith correctly scented in the passage on feudal times quoted earlier. **Merchant's capital, when it holds a position of dominance, stands everywhere for a system of robbery,** so that its development among the trading nations of old and modern times is always directly connected with **plundering, piracy, kidnapping slaves, and colonial conquest;** as in Carthage, Rome, and later among the Venetians, Portuguese, Dutch, etc. (*Das Kapital*, Volume III, Karl Marx, completed by Frederick Engels, p. 225. Bold added.)

Mercantile capitalism, as the dominant force behind imperialism during Marx's time, allowed commercial companies to use trade as means of colonization. As they were the class most associated with colonialism, they profited tremendously from 'plundering, piracy, kidnapping slaves, and colonial conquest'. Whereas the industrial bourgeoisie utilize their money to enhance and expand the production of goods and services through higher techniques, the mercantile bourgeoisie utilize their money for exchanging and trading commodities between distant regions so to earn a surplus in monetary form. Whereas the industrial bourgeoisie aim to expand factories and mining and boost production, the mercantile bourgeoisie do not produce any new materials but rather exchange already-produced goods for profit. The mercantile bourgeoisie have a significant advantage over the rest of the society as they can use the fluctuations of international markets to generate tremendous profits, even when they work little to expand production. Such a parasitic role rendered them the class most associated with imperialism and colonialism at the time, forces hindering the development of the productive forces wheresoever they conquered. They suppressed the revolutionary anti-colonial aspirations of the colonized zone's national-bourgeoisie and proletariat, the classes with the potential to develop the productive forces.

While the mercantile bourgeoisie could operate as the class behind national imperial and colonial expansion, they could also have an alternative role: that of the comprador bourgeoisie. Rather than help their own country conquer other countries, the mercantile bourgeoisie could lead their own country to be colonized by other countries. It is quite simple: the mercantile bourgeoisie could literally sell their own country.

What factor, then, determines whether the mercantile bourgeoisie of a specific country would be predominantly made up of comprador elements vs. predominantly made up of elements loyal to national imperial and colonial expansion? The key factor shaping the strategic orientation of the mercantile bourgeoisie is the level of the development of the productive forces. If the country to which the mercantile bourgeoisie belong has had a high level of development of the productive forces, then the mercantile bourgeoisie of that country would naturally seek to invest in their own country's industries in order to (1) have great influence over their own country's industries, and (2) to expand the military-industrial backbone of their own country so that they can use it to conquer other territories. In this process, therefore, the mercantile bourgeoisie base themselves in their own country, thereby strategically aligning themselves with the national imperial expansion of their own country, and in fact generate the national imperial tendencies of their own country. As a result of this alliance of the mercantile bourgeoisie with the military-industrial backbone of their own country, the imperialist mercantile bourgeoisie can generate enough funds to out-manoeuvre any comprador mercantile bourgeois elements that exist in their country, and thus ensure that imperialist, rather than comprador, merchants dominate. Furthermore, the imperialist mercantile bourgeoisie can make overtures to the merchants of much weaker countries, countries with much lower development in productive forces, and offer those merchants in much weaker countries deals through which the merchants of the weaker countries would generate high profits while selling their own respective countries to the imperialists for cheap. As a result of this process, the comprador elements among the mercantile bourgeoisie of the weaker countries would be strengthened and the national or even anti-imperialist elements of the mercantile bourgeoisie of the weaker country would be largely cast aside. In the era of pre-modern imperialism, the mercantile bourgeoisie served as the key class base of imperialism. The merchants of the economically backwards countries could be bought off and be rendered into comprador mercantile bourgeois tools of the imperialist mercantile bourgeoisie. Hence there existed the comprador mercantile bourgeoisie.

It is worth reminding that any class tendency that seeks to resist imperialism is a friend of the proletariat and hence those national anti-imperialist elements of the mercantile bourgeoisie are allies to the working class; and although these merchants would have their businesses mainly in the exchange sector, they would nonetheless be helpful in the struggle for national liberation and the development of the productive forces. This is why Stalin famously praised those elements among the Egyptian merchants who resisted British imperialism.

In assessing the pre-modern imperialist powers, one must also not lose sight of the fact that some of the so-called 'Empires' were not really imperialist states, for their economy was so state-owned as to overwhelmingly minimize the influence of mercantile capital over the state. It is possible that some of the 'Empires' with the oriental-despotic mode of production belonged to this category of not really being real 'imperialist' states.

All states would seek to develop their productive forces. More powerful mercantile capitalist-imperialist states developed their productive forces faster than others. With the advancement of technology, the productive forces further develop, hence creating the advanced machinery that lays the

material basis for industrial capitalist property relations, moving society away from the backwards feudal system. Under industrial capitalism, workers sell their labour for cheap to produce commodities that generate revenue for their company; the industrial bourgeois stock-owner(s) typically work less than their workers but earn more through profits. Capitalist profits are thus the 'legally stolen' extra wages which the workers would have deserved. The market system allows the bourgeoisie to drive down the wages through having workers engage in competition for jobs.

The expansion of the industrial capitalist mode of production would assist in not only eliminating the feudal property relations, but would also assist in replacing poor-quality technology with a more advanced technology that corresponds to the level of advancement in industrial capitalist property relations. It would also allow for the emergence of an army of proletarians, thereby benefiting the communist forces definitely in the longer term.

Advancements in the productive forces of a reactionary state are always progressive for the longer term and reactionary for the shorter term. They are progressive for the longer term because they promote the rise of the progressive class forces, such as the industrial bourgeoisie and the proletariat, and they are reactionary for the shorter term because they involve a stronger military-industrial backbone under the influence of the reactionary regime. For communists and progressives, insofar as tactical decision-making is concerned, the shorter term comes as a priority in such cases.

While industrial capitalism in its first phase, and despite its exploitative nature, is a progressive force for economic development beyond feudalism, the development of monopolies as a result of the crisis of overproduction in industrial capitalism marks the threshold beyond which industrial capitalism starts to gradually become somewhat reactionary in the specific country experiencing overproduction. The crisis of overproduction marks the stage in which industrial capitalism is industrialized to the point that potential deflationary effects are experienced, certain companies collapse and are devoured by other companies, as a result of which monopolies develop. The development of monopolies concentrates parts of the economy into the hands of centrally planned private microeconomies. Such corporate monopolization and private central planning, by the way, lay the ground for socialized central planning.

Upon establishment, the powerful capitalist monopolies in turn generate the demand for and thus lay the basis for more and more advanced institutions of exchange, represented this time by the more sophisticated banks instead of the merchants. In *Das Kapital*, Karl Marx described the historical link between mercantile capital and the banks, as well as the essential similarities between the banks and mercantile capital, although Lenin went into great depth with regards to how the banks laid the economic basis for modern imperialism. The similarity between finance capital and mercantile capital is not at all difficult to understand: like mercantile capital, finance capital is predominantly concerned with exchange rather than production of commodities. Naturally, this means that much like mercantile capital, the banks play the role of 'middlemen'. There is much demand for the work of these middlemen while these middlemen do not produce much materially, and do not put in as much labour. The high demand – and hence high revenue and high profits – for this sector, combined with the low amount of real material production that this sector involves means that the financial bourgeoisie can generate high amounts of profit without actually contributing as much economically. And thus, much like mercantile bourgeoisie, the financial bourgeoisie gain a parasitic role in the economy.

The financial bourgeoisie of an industrially developed country, a country with industrial capitalist monopolies, would naturally be interested in investing in its own home country, and to merge its businesses with the industrial monopolies. The financial bourgeoisie would provide the investments that help the industrial monopolies operate more smoothly. In exchange, the industrial monopolies would provide the economic backbone for the military with which the finance capital would use in its global war quests. Furthermore, the industrial corporations would start serving as the front companies of the finance capital. The imperialist intelligence service, the arm of imperialist finance capital, would be in charge of the latter point. These industrial corporations, front companies as they are, would go to targeted countries in order to 'invest' in them and 'build' 'factories', 'schools', etc. there. These 'schools' and 'factories' would be built proximate to the host country's military sites or other sensitive areas, so that the front companies can spy on them more closely, and when the front companies are to evacuate the targeted country, the things built by the front company would typically, though not always, be sabotaged or dismantled. Under the cover of 'business contacts', espionage contacts with specific officials are to be established. Etc. The fact that the investments are by the industrial bourgeoisie rather than by banks directly, and the fact that some real industrial development would appear to be happening, makes them appear less suspicious and thus provides cover for the secret service. On the other hand, in countries in which a comprador puppet regime has already been established, the front companies are to go there to strengthen the comprador regime, exploit the natural resources, but to make sure to do so in such a way that the industries do not actually develop too much, or else these advanced industries risk falling into the hands of the revolutionaries if the comprador regime is overthrown. Furthermore, the imperialist conquerors, contrary to the common misconception, are actually keen to prevent the rise of a class of exploited proletarians, for they fear that the rise of a proletarian class would serve to undermine imperialist presence in the colonies. Instead, through neoliberal measures, the imperialists generate widespread unemployment in the colonized area, so that such unemployment would generate a large lumpen-proletarian class – i.e. bandits. The bandit syndicates, the thug networks, would in turn be used by the imperialists as the foot-soldiers with which to suppress the proletarian uprisings or to stage coups against any revolutionary anti-colonial state that may arise in that land. Therefore, because the imperialists are keen to use the lumpen-proletarians as a counter-weight against the proletarians, the imperialist conquerors prefer to un-employ the workers of the colonized land rather than to employ-and-exploit them. Fascist bombing campaigns against civilizations are launched by the imperialists in order to destroy the productive forces that bring forth jobs, that bring forth an army of proletarians, and to yield the rubble that brings forth the army of the unemployed, and consequently, from a select few of the unemployed, an army of lumpen-proletarians. At the same time, the imperialists aim to maximize the exploitation of the natural resources of the colonized land.

Imperialist powers sometimes export industrial capital and develop transportation infrastructure, such as railroads, in the lands they colonize in order to smoothen the links in their vast colonial empire. That does not mean that colonial powers invest for the aim of developing the economies of the colonized zones; it merely means that practical necessities have gotten them to develop infrastructure which they would like to happily destroy when the time of decolonization comes so that minimal amounts of colonially-established infrastructure fall into the hands of the anti-colonial forces. The imperialists also at times assist the industrialization of their imperialist allies. Such was the case with the American economic assistance to West Germany and Japan after World War II. The purpose obviously was to prop up powerful bulwarks against the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies. Such imperialist aid, however, while certainly assisting the development of the productive forces in some specific areas, is detrimental on the global scale for it impedes the anti-imperialist cause; ultimately, it is through anti-imperialism alone that the global development of the productive forces can occur effectively, most quickly, and at low costs.

Finance capital does not always directly engage in the conquest of a country. The more the influence of finance capital in a geographic area, the more direct its influence safely becomes. Depending on the level of control it possesses over a zone, finance capital's colonial influence ranges from the installation of its intelligence agents at the helm of the state, all the way to a takeover via 'industrial' front companies, all the way to direct involvement in engineering debt traps and the like.

It is also worth mentioning that much as how imperialist mercantile capital would make overtures to potentially comprador elements of the mercantile bourgeoisie in colonizable zones, the local financial bourgeoisie of the weaker countries has comprador elements in it as well, and these comprador elements would be willing to sell the whole country if they could. Imperialist finance capital therefore makes overtures to the bankers of the economically much less developed countries and offers them deals with which to betray the less developed country in exchange for high profits, thus encouraging and promoting the comprador tendency among the private bankers of the industrially weaker country. That is why the financial bourgeoisie of the weaker countries are predominantly comprador rather than committed to their weak country's industrial expansion.

The mercantile bourgeoisie and the financial bourgeoisie only choose to become supporters of national imperial expansion if the productive forces of their nation are so mighty as to render that nation a suitable base to be used by the mercantile bourgeoisie or the financial bourgeoisie for world conquest campaigns. If the productive forces of their home country is no longer that strong in comparison to other empires, then the mercantile bourgeoisie and the financial bourgeoisie choose to instead become a comprador force opposed to national imperial expansion. Many formerly mighty empires of the pre-modern imperialist type soon ceased to be imperialist states precisely because their productive forces were no longer comparably/relatively so strong as to render them a heartland in which mercantile capital or finance capital could base itself. This resulted in such empires to cease to be empires and to instead become colonies of mightier empires that had undergone a higher development of the productive forces. The powerful imperialist mercantile bourgeois class had as its allies the feudal class and/or the slave-owner class, much as how modern imperialist finance capital renders the companies of the industrial bourgeoisie into front companies serving the interests of the financial bourgeoisie. With the progression of certain societies towards the modern imperialist phase of capital development, the modern imperialist finance capital has so much of an industrial might as to make it more profitable for the pre-modern imperialist mercantile bourgeois class of the underdeveloped countries to sell out their countries to the mighty modern imperialists. In this phase, the pre-modern imperialist mercantile bourgeois class transforms into a comprador mercantile bourgeois class. The comprador mercantile bourgeoisie retains the feudal lords and slave-owners as its class allies and thus, by extension, the feudal landlords and slave-owner classes assist the modern imperialists in the subjugation and economic terror against the colonized countries. Another reason for the alliance of the slave-owners and feudal landlords with fascist finance capital is their common aim of rolling back the development of the productive forces in the colonized zones.

Anyways, as a result of the control of the financial bourgeoisie over not just their own banks but also over industrial capitalist monopolies, parasitic finance capital is developed – hence modern imperialism. Finance capital is the economic base of modern imperialism and marks the threshold by which the modern imperialist stage is reached. Naturally, owing to its parasitic and imperialist nature, finance capital seeks to conquer the world. In describing finance capital's quest for global domination, Lenin used the term 'exports of capital'. Opportunist elements deliberately misinterpret this phrase as to mean that imperialism is the export of industrial capital, such as factory piece, etc. This is a slander trumpeted against Lenin. Throughout his book 'Imperialism', Lenin made it explicitly clear that by that phrase, he meant exports of finance capital, the parasitic capital that hinders the development of the productive forces in the colonized territories, whereas he vehemently rejected the myth that imperialism is the exports of industrial capital, the kind of capital that progresses the development of the productive forces in the colonized territories. Finance capital, which is the capital of the parasitic middlemen as opposed to the kind of capital that boosts production in unproductive regions, is therefore the class essence of modern imperialism, as Lenin argued. Criticizing the theories of Kautsky, Lenin said:

The characteristic feature of [modern] imperialism is not industrial *but* finance capital. It is not an accident that in France it was precisely the extraordinarily rapid development of *finance* capital, and the weakening of industrial capital, that from the eighties onwards gave rise to the extreme intensification of annexationist (colonial) policy. The characteristic feature of imperialism is precisely that it strives to annex *not only* agrarian territories [in which industrial capital is yet to be developed], but even most highly industrialised regions....

(Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism, Vladimir Lenin, Chapter 7, 1916. From Marxists Internet Archive)

One person who fundamentally opposed Lenin on the issue of finance capital vs. industrial capital, and of the world conquest of finance capital was Leon Trotsky. Condemning anti-imperialist national liberation struggles as 'reactionary', Trotsky openly promoted imperialism as a 'progressive' force for 'economic development' and the building of 'a human economy on a global scale, freeing it from the constraints of the nation and the state'. In so doing, he implicitly stated that the class essence of imperialism is not the parasitic money-capital, but rather the exports of industrial capital, the means of production which bring economic development. In 1915, Trotsky wrote:

Imperialism is a capitalist-predatory expression of the progressive tendency of economic development: to build a human economy on a global scale, freeing it from the constraints of the nation and the state. A naked national idea opposed to imperialism is not only powerless, but also reactionary: it drags human economy back into the diapers of national limitation. (Imperialism and the National Idea, Leon Trotsky, May 6, 1915. Source: Marxist Internet Archive (MIA) available in Russian. Note: the MIA is a Trotskyite website.) (IMG)

The terrorist agent of imperialist secret services as he was, Trotsky's entire political career and movement this infamous quote defines.

Also, Trotsky's claim that imperialism builds a total-global economy was false, as inter-imperialist rivalry generates the fluctuations and intra-imperialist splits that prevent the rise of one imperialist power to total global dominance (more on this later).

Another reason why the phrase that Lenin used helped the diversionaries in misinterpreting what he meant, is that the term 'export' in the phrase 'exports of [finance] capital' could wrongly imply that the home imperialist country 'passes' its finance capital to the colonies, thereby causing finance capital to cease to exist in the home country – when in fact, what Lenin obviously meant by the term 'export' in that context was that finance capital expands its outreach, and takes over new territories outside of the home country. The economic basis for modern imperialism is the development of finance capital which has an inherent *tendency* to expand its outreach (or 'export' itself). This means that if every country in the world managed to successfully resist the 'export' of finance capital by an imperialist country, that does not automatically take away the imperialist power's character as an imperialist power, because the imperialist power still has the tendency to 'export' finance capital even though it has not done so successfully.

Obviously, for its worldwide quest, finance capital seeks to constantly improve its home country's military-industrial backbone, the productive forces upon which it relies. The advancements in the productive forces, however, cause a critical plot twist. The advancements in the productive forces of one country can boost production on the worldwide scale to so high a degree that it would lead to overproduction in the world market. If all the countries of the world were anti-imperialist – not even necessarily socialist although socialism definitely smoothens and de-bureaucratizes the process much more than an anti-imperialist national-bourgeois state would – then the overproduction would have been welcomed for it would have allowed for large amounts of goods and services to be distributed relatively fairly at a very cheap price among the peoples of the world. However, finance

capital, to which the industrial monopolies are subordinate, ‘begs to differ’. To them, overproduction is a crisis that drives prices down. Worse yet, if another power – be it a rival imperialist power, or an anti-imperialist superpower such as the USSR – has had so high a boost in production to have been able to cause such an overproduction on the global market, then the other power would be able to sell its vast amounts of goods for cheap, thereby devastating the monopolies subordinate to the imperialist finance capital, and hence devastating the finance capital in question as well. This, finance capital cannot tolerate. As with every war – inter-imperialist wars or anti-imperialist wars – the primary objective insofar as the productive forces are concerned is to first capture the productive forces and use it for oneself, and if that is not possible, then as Plan B, demolish/sabotage the rival’s productive forces, so to deprive the rival from the productive forces and to drive up the prices of goods. Imperialist powers therefore have a completely natural tendency towards launching wars.

The crises of overproduction prevent the main rival camps of imperial powers from ceasing their rivalry and thus prevent imperial powers from making a lasting peace. This is the reason why the Kautskyite notion of ‘ultra-imperialism’, which preaches that major rivalling blocs of imperial powers can establish a lasting peace with each other is false. The notion of ‘ultra-imperialism’ was firmly rejected by Lenin who said:

The notorious theory of “ultra-imperialism”, invented by Kautsky, is just as reactionary. (...) Kautsky: “... Cannot the present imperialist policy be supplanted by a new, ultra-imperialist policy, which will introduce the joint exploitation of the world by internationally united finance capital in place of the mutual rivalries of national finance capitals? Such a new phase of capitalism is at any rate conceivable. Can it be achieved? Sufficient premises are still lacking to enable us to answer this question.” (...) No matter what the good intentions of ... sentimental Kautsky, may have been, the only objective, i.e., real, social significance of Kautsky’s “theory” is this: it is a most reactionary method of consoling the masses with hopes of permanent peace being possible under capitalism, by distracting their attention from the sharp antagonisms and acute problems of the present times, and directing it towards illusory prospects of an imaginary “ultraimperialism” of the future. (Modern Imperialism, Lenin, chapter 9)

Imperialist leaders are sado-masochistic, no doubt. However, to work for an ‘ultra-imperial’ peace, to work for a peace that drives prices down and destroys all the last hopes for the profits for which the imperialist leaders worked so hard, is far beyond just masochism. An ‘ultra-imperial’ peace would be finance capital’s suicide attempt. An ‘ultra-imperial’ peace is impossible, as well because of the drive, the greed, of the financial bourgeoisie to conquer the world for themselves, rather than to share it with their rivals.

While imperialist powers cannot form a universal alliance with one another, there obviously occur alliances between imperialist powers against each other, such that rival blocs of imperial powers emerge. Furthermore, some relatively weaker imperial powers may seek to shift the balance of power in their own favor by allying with anti-imperialist states. The question of the crises of overproduction also influences the configuration of the alliances. The configuration that the alliance between imperialist powers takes is in accordance to the balance of power. If, for instance, there is one really strong imperialist power against several disproportionately weaker imperialist powers, it would be natural that the weaker imperial powers would ally so to be able to match the power of the stronger imperialist power. Alliances shift in accordance the amounts of power that each imperialist state would have as well as the balances of power between the international alliances. The extent of the ‘power’ of these states is mainly determined by the productive forces, which includes not only the means of production but also the natural resources in the process of being extracted. Secondly (and in some cases more importantly), the power of states is to be assessed also based on the terrain, because having natural defense barriers definitely makes a state more powerful, and based on other miscellaneous factors such as manpower and combat readiness and operational training of individual units. Development of the productive forces generates funds for the training of individual units, and for managing manpower quantity and quality. Of course, what is assumed in listing all of the above factors considered is that they are all actually under the influence of the dominant faction of the state targeted. If for instance, state A has a fifth column within state B, and this fifth column actually has under its influence a part of the productive forces, terrain, and armed forces, then it cannot be said that those fifth column-controlled factors are controlled by state A, even though those productive forces, terrain and armed forces officially/nominally belong within the jurisdiction of state A. Hence, the question of who controls the resources, the question of the dominance of the class tendencies over the productive forces is a fundamental aspect of the assessments. The sources of power – the productive forces, terrain, etc. – is the first dimension to take into account and who has the power and how much – the class forces controlling those productive forces, terrain, etc. – is the second dimension to take into account. Many ‘analysts’ completely ignore or forget the great importance of the second dimension, because they fail to see how class forces that exist in each country can catapult intelligence agents up against the dominant faction in the state.

Some hold the right-deviationist view that as a result of the development of nuclear weapons, nuclear-armed imperialist states will never wage war on each other. This view is distorted. Imperialist rivals wage war on one another, and being nuclear-armed only makes their war covert and shadowy. Covert warfare in this case implies firstly that they would fight via proxies and allies in other zones. It also implies direct assaults on each other, cross-border penetration and aggression against each other, through armies of regulars-disguised-as-irregulars – that is, the highly-trained troops ‘resign’ from the military, form an underground army, and then on behalf of the imperialist state which covertly commands them, invade the other country. Alternatively, an army of irregular militants is trained and used for cross-border infiltration and attacks. Of course, the aggressor power can only go so far with this because if it goes ‘far too far’, then the aggressed nuclear-armed imperialist power will call out the aggression for what it is, would call on the aggressor to take responsibility in helping to clean up these ‘irregular’ troops, and would threaten nuclear retaliation otherwise. Regarding inter-imperialist conflicts, I need not mention false flag terror attacks and fomenting rebellions inside one another’s territories.

It is by no means difficult to understand why capitalism really reaches its ‘highest stage’, the modern imperialist stage, through the crisis of overproduction. At this phase, capitalism is at the climax of its usefulness beyond which it starts to get a destructive, parasitic role. It does not immediately become parasitic as soon as the crisis of overproduction occurs, but certainly the crisis of overproduction is the stage leading to the development of parasitic finance capital. Finance capital is parasitic because it takes the ‘middleman’ role. It is parasitic because it profits from the continued backwardness of the colonized zones and the barbaric terror that promotes backwardness. It is parasitic because it seeks to start wars in order to destroy productive forces instead of promoting it. Parasitic as finance capital, the economic basis of modern imperialism, is, it sponsors the most degenerate, most backwards, and most savage programs in pursuit of profits. Thereupon may arise the terrorist regime of the most reactionary elements and agents of finance capital, of modern imperialism: the fascists. The Comintern thus scientifically defined ‘fascism’ as:

the open terrorist dictatorship of the most reactionary, most chauvinistic and most imperialist elements of finance capital.

(The Fascist Offensive and the Tasks of the Communist International in the Struggle of the Working Class against Fascism: Main Report delivered at the Seventh World Congress of the Communist International, Georgi Dimitrov, August 2, 1935. Citing: Thirteenth Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International. Source: Georgi Dimitrov, Selected Works Sofia Press, Sofia, Volume 2, 1972. From: MIA, Mathias Bismo.)

Finance capital, as was mentioned before, has as its agenda not really the rendering of the colonized populations into exploited proletarians, for the development of a large proletarian class, however much exploited by the financial bourgeoisie, is still a menace to imperialist colonial holdings. Instead, finance capital allies with the other parasitic classes that hinder the development of the productive forces and hinder the numerical rise of a proletarian class. Those parasitic classes include the mercantile bourgeoisie, the comprador bankers, the kulaks, the corrupt bureaucrats, the feudal landlords, the slave-owners, and the bandits (i.e. lumpen-proletarians). Finance capital also allies with those intellectuals family-rooted in the bourgeois or feudal classes, and since that usually constitutes the bulk of the intelligentsia, finance capital allies with the bulk of the intelligentsia. The alliance of finance capital with the parasitic classes and strata that hinder societal development lays the basis of fascism, the reign of terror suppressing the progressive classes and entrenching the ultra-reactionary vestigial classes loyally allied to finance capital.

Bringing mass destruction is natural to the parasitic classes, for the latter seek wars of desertification. The parasitic classes carpet-bomb, level off cities, carry out genocides, burn crops, pour salt on fertile soil, and mass-incinerate not 'just for the Sadistic fun' but to obliterate the productive forces of countries, for with the advancement of the productive forces comes the advancement of the progressive classes and with the obliteration of the productive forces of most of the world comes the massive rollback of the progressive classes. In this midst, there of course exist some ironies too: sometimes fascist assassins build railways, roads, mines, and oil extraction sites in the areas they colonize, so to facilitate their military-industrial production as the launching pad of the wars of desertification in the rest of the areas they colonize. In the imperialist heartland too, even finance capital, itself reliant on the productive forces, takes measures against the productive forces by destroying the overproduced goods so to drive up prices and profits. Yet, imperialist finance capital has not yet prioritized the complete level-off of the cities in its own imperialist heartland because for the while it needs the productive forces of the imperialist heartland for levelling off and desertifying much the rest of the world. To find the geographic areas in which the reactionary classes dominate or can come to relatively easily dominate, search for those areas in which the development of the productive forces, the rise of good agriculture or industry, has been naturally-geographically most difficult: the mountains of Chechniya and western Ukraine, the deserts of the Arabian Peninsula and Mongolia, out of all of which came the darkest and most barbaric among the forces of reaction. Out of such ultra-reaction and barbarism, finance capital benefits in the class struggles against the progressive classes. After such areas with low development of productive forces, imperialism has modeled the societies it colonizes: it seeks to turn areas into deserts with low productive forces, hence weak progressive classes, so that the barbarism, in the true style of the desert nomads of the Arab peninsula and the tribes of Gobi, can assist imperialism in the suppression of the progressive classes. Such are wars of desertification.

Fascism promotes corrupt mysticism at the expense of science, in correlated with its drive to promote feudalism and slavery at the expense of industrial capitalism and scientific socialism. Corrupt mysticism takes infinitely various forms. However, examples of it are Pagan religious-mania, animal worship, bestial behaviour and bloody Sado-Masochism, degeneration of sex, postmodern or anti-Enlightenment philosophy, abstract 'art', and chaotic atonal 'music'. Such trends gained a special boost with the rise of finance capital in the late 19th century. The end of the nineteenth century gave rise to the decadent fin-de-siècle (end of the century) culture, although such cultural corruption existed long before the late 19th century and only gained a new level of riot then.

The fascist forces recruit many of their foot-soldiers from among the petit-bourgeoisie and materially dominate the regions in which the petit-bourgeoisie predominate. The petit-bourgeoisie, unlike the proletariat, have a small business to lose, and, unlike the bourgeoisie, do not have a big business to use as a 'cushion' for taking big risks and competing against finance capital. As the petit-bourgeoisie have too small of businesses to be capable of taking the risk of a vigorous fight against the parasitic classes, the petit-bourgeois areas are materially dominated by the parasitic class forces, the fascist forces. Sometimes, fascist dominance occurs both covertly and overtly – through a blatant rule and open terrorist dictatorship of the fascist forces. At other times, fascist material dominance takes a covert form – what does this mean? If a progressive state territorially encompasses such a petit-bourgeois zone, the fascist spies and saboteurs who disguise themselves as 'supporters' of the progressive state would use these petit-bourgeois areas as their primary regional and social base for fascist subversion against the progressive state. Even if finance capital has been expelled from such a petit-bourgeois zone, the corrupt bureaucrats that form the class base of the crypto-fascist pseudo-progressives still remain in the petit-bourgeois zone and meet little resistance from the petit-bourgeoisie, whereas in the predominantly proletarian-populated zones, bureaucrats of the same kind would be under far greater pressure and would be far more easily susceptible to demotion or purge. Thus, upon these petit-bourgeois zones rely the fascist spies and imperialist secret service infiltrators, traitors to be purged. In a predominantly petit-bourgeois country, the agents and collaborators of fascism very quickly take over and extend their influence over the various institutions and bodies including at times the communist party that is supposed to resist such fascism. The influence of fascism in the communist party would take the forms of Trotskyism, Bukharinism, Kautskyism, Titoism, Maoism, Dengism, etc.

The petit-bourgeoisie do not play any role in generating a fascist tendency, but are nonetheless beguiled by fascist propaganda and recruited as foot soldiers by fascist organizations. From the petit-bourgeoisie, fascism does not emanate, but in them fascism immerses. The beguiling of the petit-bourgeoisie into becoming an electoral base and a soldier recruitment pool of fascism is what has misled many onto the false conclusion that fascism emanates from the petit-bourgeoisie when actually fascism emanates primarily from finance capital and secondarily from the kulaks, bureaucrats, feudal lords, etc. Both the agrarian and urban petit-bourgeoisie bear the same class behaviour. There is, however, a slight psychic difference between them. A difference between the urban petit-bourgeoisie and the rural peasant petit-bourgeoisie is that, as a general pattern and all else constant, the urban petit-bourgeoisie, by residing in cities, is more exposed to the proletariat and hence the proletarian thinking, whereas the rural petit-bourgeoisie, is less exposed to the proletariat and hence to proletarian thinking.

The material control of the parasitic classes over these petit-bourgeois areas also translates to a high level of soft power influence and propaganda dominance in these areas. As such, the petit-bourgeoisie are more susceptible to accepting imperialist propaganda. Petit-bourgeois acceptance of imperialist propaganda again manifests in two forms: one is blatant imperialist propaganda, the direct and explicit belief in the theses promoted by the imperialist mainstream media. This happened in Germany, in which the agrarian petit-bourgeoisie, primarily based in the Bavarian south but also based in other areas, formed the majority, whereas the proletarians of Germany constituted a minority. Germany's petit-bourgeoisie, viciously pro-Nazi, formed the pro-Hitler majority. In Germany and Japan, the economy was semi-industrialized, a factor that led to the rise of finance capital in a society that was largely petit-bourgeois. Such predominance of the petit-bourgeoisie minimized resistance to fascism in Germany and Japan, while

those countries were imperialist powers. As such, owing to their semi-industrial semi-agrarian character, Germany and Japan emerged as imperialist-fascist powers.

A bourgeois-democracy of the pro-imperialist type by contrast is a kind of a state in which fascism would have normally been the 'order' of the day, but, owing to the large class of the proletariat, the fascists have been pushed back and have been forced to accept the increase in and incorporation of the influence of the proletariat over the state through electoral democratization. Such a state therefore is a dictatorship of the fascist finance capital albeit a kind that has been forced to accept the incorporation of elements of the dictatorship of the proletariat. An imperialist bourgeois-democracy is thus the combination of an imperialist-fascist finance capital state with a workers' state, such that the finance capital component forms the main component of the state. Examples of such states are the United States and Britain; they are not fascist states not because the fascist finance capital of those countries was 'nice' and 'democracy-loving' but because the fascist finance capital of those states was under a far more immense pressure of the proletariat.

Even in the United States, the zones not industrially developed and proletarianized have historically been major power bases of fascist reaction. If with the development of the productive forces comes the advancement of the progressive classes, so too with the under-development of the productive forces often comes the decline of the progressive classes. The non-industrial non-proletarian south of the United States was the base of the slave-owners, Confederates, Ku Klux Klan (KKK), 'Dixiecrats', pro-Nazi 'neutrality' lobbyists, etc. The industrial north, the population of which was largely proletarianized, was the base of the anti-slavery activists, the pro-Soviet F. D. Roosevelt faction and Kennedyites, etc. The pro-fascist imperialist bourgeois-democracy in the United States is the 'compromise-state' system that has arisen out of the tug-of-war of these antagonistic class forces.

The political culture of 'tolerance for opposition media' has arisen out of the class antagonisms characteristic of imperialist bourgeois-democracies and absent in the anti-imperialist bourgeois-democracies. The 'tolerance for opposition media' in the pro-fascist imperialist bourgeois-democracies has arisen from the proletariat's imposition of elements of the dictatorship of the proletariat over the imperialist state, the imposition of democratic freedoms for the proletariat's cause within the context of an imperialist pro-fascist state which would have otherwise repressed the proletariat's media. The anti-imperialist bourgeois-democracies are different, however, for they constitute the state alliance of the anti-colonial bourgeoisie and the proletariat, two classes with temporarily convergent class interests. Whereas in the imperialist bourgeois-democracies, the imperial bourgeoisie are forced to tolerate the proletariat's media work, in the anti-imperialist bourgeois-democracies the anti-colonial bourgeoisie and the proletariat need not tolerate each other for they are, after all, allied – indeed, upon firm domination of the state, they naturally will together repress the media outlets of the reactionary classes hostile to the proletariat and the anti-colonial bourgeoisie. As such, in the progressive bourgeois-democracies, only the socialist and progressive bourgeois-democratic media will be permitted to operate, unlike in the imperialist bourgeois-democracies wherein are tolerated the reactionary pro-fascist and progressive anti-fascist media activities. The question is not the level of virtue or vice in the Western-style media freedoms; the matter rather is the capability of such media freedom to, in the first place, survive and thrive. Such a capability is lacking for the longer-term in the West, in which the dictatorship of the proletariat will triumph, nor can it survive in a prosperous bourgeois-democracy of the anti-colonial type.

The same goes for the thriving of the bourgeois-democracies. Imperialist bankers are in a quest to advance the military-industrial backbone of their imperialist heartlands for global conquest; the bankers of the colonizable/non-imperial zones, by contrast, inherit a comprador character and usually seek to undermine their own nation's industries. As such, Western-style democracy – an uneasy and collusive democratic 'compromise' of the proletariat and its financial bourgeois foes – inherits imperialist bankers who advance their own country's industry, whereas Western-style democracy, when implemented in the non-imperialist countries, shall bring a collusive compromise of the proletariat, the class seeking industrial advancement, and the comprador bankers, who aim to impede their country's national industrial expansion. Western-style democracy, when implemented in the non-imperialist countries, empowers the comprador bankers of the non-imperialist country to ruin the latter country's industry and thus bring forth a reign of economic terror. Such is the reason that no prosperous Western-style liberal-democracy has ever arisen in any decolonized country in the modern era.

At the same time, the existence of a proletarian class develops the tendencies that resist fascist finance capital. Such resistance is manifested not only in the form of the development of a communist party but also in the development of pro-democratic and pro-socialist intelligence agents that infiltrate fascist regimes and slow down the work of the fascist faction of the regime, which is the dominant faction of the regime.

While fascism is blatantly anti-democratic, it is not one-man rule, for one-man rule in general cannot exist and has never existed. The fascist dictator has always relied upon a clique, whose loyalty the ruler would need, in pursuing the fascist agenda. Without their support, the fascist dictator cannot rule. And the fascist clique is constituted by the terrorist ultra-reactionary agents of finance capital. Being a 'feared' dictator or changing the laws of the country to officially declare one as the absolute ruler do not actually turn one into the absolute ruler, for one would still need the clique behind oneself to rule absolutely. Furthermore, even then, having a clique behind oneself can help one to rule pervasively, but it cannot help rule absolutely. The latter is impossible because the existence of class antagonisms in society inevitably catapults intelligence agents into the high ranks of the state apparatus against the ruling class tendency. Surely, the state would be the dictatorship of the ruling class, but the enemies of the ruling class can still rebrand and recolour themselves as having the 'same' ideology as that of the ruling class and can then infiltrate the high ranks of the state, precisely thanks to the pressure generated by class forces antagonistic to the ruling class. As a result of such catapulting of agents upwards, the so-called 'one-man ruler' would have absolute 100% control over the state only on paper; in practice, the 'one-man ruler' would have pervasive powers but nowhere near absolute 100% rule; and the 'one-man ruler' would be impeded in one's progress towards one's objectives precisely by these antagonistic intelligence agents catapulted upwards. It follows that even totalitarian regimes can be infiltrated, even if it would appear otherwise.

The proletariat of every country utilize their influence to pressure for the upwards catapulting of proletarian agents into the ranks of the fascist state. The anti-fascist agents of the proletariat would recolour themselves as 'fascists' loyal to the fascist state and would then use proletarian pressures to lobby for gaining a foothold in the means of violence. In the name of fascism, the crypto-anti-fascist agents of the proletariat would sabotage the fascist agenda on all fronts, as steps towards democratization. Similarly, if a fascist movement gains the ability to pull the proletarians towards its cause, the proletarian membership within the fascist movement can indeed be mobilized as pawns for fratricidal wars against the progressive forces, but can also end up as a fifth column that catapults the crypto-socialist and crypto-democratic agents of the proletariat, disguised as 'loyal' 'fascists', onto the high ranks of the fascist movement. Historical experience, demonstrated in this book, emphatically supports such a conclusion. Even the most totalitarian of the fascist regimes can be infiltrated by agents of anti-fascist secret services.

Even if the proletarians in a fascist movement were, in the quasi-impossible scenario, not able to generate a crypto-anti-fascist ideological current within the fascist movement, they sure would have a crypto-anti-fascist role in practice. The class interests of the proletarian and the anti-proletarian classes are simply irreconcilable no matter how much a fascism-beguiled proletarian would seek to think otherwise. The class conflicts that exist

between the working class and the bourgeois class will inevitably be used to engineer splits in fascist ranks; superficially, the class conflict would appear as a conflict between the fascist workers and the fascist capitalists, and would thus appear as to ultimately favor the fascists no matter which side – the fascist workers vs. the fascist capitalists – wins the conflict; yet, even the very sowing of division through such intensification of conflict is an anti-fascist phenomenon, and hence the struggle of the working class – even a working class made up of fascist workers – against the fascist finance capital, on its own is in practice an anti-fascist struggle.

One common fallacy, especially emanating from left-opportunist circles, is the idealist pseudo-‘workerist’ fallacy, which, whether explicitly or implicitly, redefines communism as the ‘aggregate sum of the personal will or personal material interests of the workers’ and the proletarian line as a line entailing the ‘aggregate of individual consciousnesses of proletarians’, and thereupon derives such false conclusions as: {(1) that the Soviet Union should ‘not’ have allied with Britain and USA against the Axis, since after all, the workers in Anglo-American countries suffer from capitalism too. (2) that blue-collar workers should get paid ‘more’ than engineers in socialist states since after all, dictatorship of the proletariat is all about privileging the blue-collar workers over everything and everyone else. (3) that every socialist Party line must be subject to a referendum of the class-conscious and class-unconscious workers.} Idealist pseudo-‘workerism’ confuses the concept of the ‘working class’ with the concept of the aggregate of individual workers’ consciousnesses. Against idealist fallacies, communists mobilize the workers as a class rather than a mere aggregate sum of individuals.

Cases occur in which there would be an anti-imperialist state in country whose majority people adhere to a culture or religious ideology that favors imperialism. That a nation has a culture or religion that favors imperialism does not on its own mean that the people who adhere to that culture are pro-imperialist or will launch colour revolutions on behalf of imperialism. Rather, if a nation that has a pro-imperialist culture, that merely means that the imperialist-fascist secret services would have greater propaganda leverage and greater soft power influence in that country. Greater soft power can serve as a channel for greater intelligence service penetration into the specific country. Greater soft power influence and propaganda leverage also means that the kinds of people who would be exposed to the propaganda and who can afford to act based upon the propaganda, would engage in colour revolutionary activity on behalf of the imperialists. The influence of soft power and culture must not be exaggerated, however, in the face of a much more material factor as class. Even proletarians that have been under the influence of a reactionary pro-imperialist culture will generate a tendency that superficially adopts the rhetoric and cosmetics of the pro-imperialist culture but actually pursues a proletarian internationalist agenda. Similarly, in the case of progressive anti-imperialist cultures, the reactionary classes promote a pro-imperialist and reactionary current that disguises itself with the appearance of the progressive anti-imperialist culture.

Due to the greater influence of the fascist finance capital in the agrarian areas, a government led by the agrarian petit-bourgeois majority would be a government under the influence of finance capital, and would thus yield a ‘democratically elected’ totalitarian fascist state – Hitler was elected by the majority of the Germans, particularly Germany’s petit-bourgeois electorate. By contrast, a government that serves as the rule of the proletariat, even in a country in which the proletariat are a minority of the population, would be objectively more democratic than the ‘rule of the peasant majority’, because the interests of the proletariat are totally irreconcilable with the interests of finance capital and thus finance capital would not be able to render the dictatorship of the proletariat into a fascist regime, even if the workers themselves actually are influenced by the chauvinistic mentality. It follows that the dictatorship of the proletariat is more democratic than other class dictatorships, not because the proletariat would necessarily constitute the majority but because the proletariat have characteristics that inherently oppose fascist finance capital and hence oppose totalitarian rule.

The interests of the proletariat are irreconcilable with the reactionary classes. One of the defining characteristics of the proletariat is that do not own the commodities they produce and instead have only their own labour to sell. This lack of ownership distinguishes the proletariat from the petit-bourgeoisie, as the petit-bourgeoisie are concerned that they may lose their small businesses by risking confrontation with the reactionary classes, whereas the proletariat have ‘nothing to lose but their chains’ and are thus most willing – they have no better choice – to take the risk of confrontation against the reactionary classes. On the other hand, the anti-colonial national bourgeoisie, due to their ownership of big businesses, are capable of using their big businesses as cushion and to take the risk of confrontation against the reactionary classes. This feature of the anti-colonial national bourgeoisie renders them into direct allies of the proletariat, despite they greatly differing features of their class conditions. Another class strongly resembles a combination of the anti-colonial national bourgeoisie and the proletariat: the kolkhozniks, or the cooperativists. The collectivization of the small businesses would amalgamate such small businesses into big businesses, the owners of which can take the risk of confrontation against the reactionary classes. In this respect, the collective/cooperative businesses bear a characteristic of the anti-colonial national bourgeoisie. At the same time, these cooperative big businesses, precisely because of their collectivized character, are employee-owned. The employees are not exactly proletarians, for they own a share of the surplus, hence owning more than their labour; nonetheless, due to the mass distribution of the share of the surplus amongst the employees, the employees do not own greatly more than their own labour, and thus are similar to the proletarians. The cooperativists, the anti-colonial national bourgeoisie, and the proletarians constitute the three main progressive classes of the modern era. The serfs, not to be confused with the petit-bourgeoisie, can be progressive as well, for they would support land reforms that oust the feudal oppressors, strictly provided that such land reforms are properly managed.

Yet, the petit-bourgeoisie contradict the parasitic classes to some extent, even though to a low extent. If managed properly by the fascist secret service, the petit-bourgeoisie will remain docile and submissive to the fascist state. Yet, sometimes, the mismanagement of the situation, the extreme severity of the oppression of the parasitic classes, and, above all, the opening up of space for revolutionary agitation against the reactionary ruling classes, all can allow the revolutionary forces to agitate the petit-bourgeoisie into confrontation with the comprador or imperialist state. The mobilization of the petit-bourgeoisie into confrontations against the armed forces of the reactionary classes will allow the progressive classes – the proletariat, the anti-colonial national bourgeoisie, and the cooperativists – to gain a wider foothold in the struggle for control over the means of violence. If the progressive classes gain decisive leadership over the petit-bourgeois rebels, then all is well. If, however, the petit-bourgeoisie gain leadership of their own uprising, then a long-term disaster is in the making, for the petit-bourgeois rebels against imperialism, per every measure against imperialism, will undertake a measure of the same magnitude in favour of imperialism. The measures in favour of imperialism will be not so much in the form of direct petit-bourgeois alliance with the imperialists but more so through a cultish behaviour that sparks backlash in favour of imperialism. The petit-bourgeois ‘revolutionary’ citizens in China in the 1960s and the Khomeinist ‘revolutionaries’ in Iran are cases in point of such vacillations, such pro-imperialist and anti-imperialist measures, such a heads-and-tails approach to politics. Per every correct measure, they always took an adventurist step that would provoke a backlash favourable to Anglo-American finance capital.

Nonetheless, it remains a fact that the petit-bourgeois mode of production predominates in territories occupied by imperialism and its comprador allies, class forces that hinder the industrial production that would have proletarianized the petit-bourgeoisie. As such, there exists a strong overlap

between petit-bourgeois geographic areas and areas conquered by fascism. This means that in the overwhelming majority of the time, the petit-bourgeois end up as recruits of the agents of finance capital, and not as forces to be mobilized by the progressive classes. This is the reason that such petit-bourgeois ‘revolutions’ have been few, and that anti-colonial revolutions have usually been either national-bourgeois or proletarian. The national bourgeoisie and the proletariat in turn arise from the development of the productive forces in the colonies. Yet, the colonizers hinder the development of the productive forces, and thus aim to hinder the rise of the proletariat and the national bourgeoisie. Where from, then, do the proletariat and the national bourgeoisie grow in strength in the colonies? They grow in strength thanks to the fact of inter-imperialist contradictions, as exploited by the progressive classes for their self-advancement in the colonies and in imperialist heartlands.

The hypothetical global conquest of one imperial power's finance capital leads to a global dominance of a few private sector oligopolies, if not an outright monopoly. Such a phenomenon would hamper the development of productive forces, the material basis for the transition to communism. Such a process is fundamentally parasitic, damaging the economic development of nations. This is a reason for communists to foster inter-imperialist competition, and to support anti-imperialist movements, so to prevent the conquest of the world by one imperial power's finance capital. Nonetheless, it remains a fact that an imperialist alliance can never take over much more than 50% of the world. Why? Even if one single imperialist power defeats all of its major rivals and goes on the path of victory and total dominance of the world, such an imperialist power would be quickly partitioned into two imperialist powers, for each of the imperial elites dominating this imperialist power, out of utmost greed, would seek to conquer the pinnacles of power for oneself and not the other imperial elites. Hence, a segment of the imperial elites dominating this imperialist power would defect to the camp of the enemies of this single world-dominating imperialist power and would use its influence to rally massive parts of this empire with oneself so to pave the way for the partition of this empire. It follows that there cannot ever be a single colonial empire dominating the world. In the same ways, inter-imperialist alliances quickly break up. Precisely when an inter-imperialist alliance gets close to a conquest of the world, precisely when an inter-imperialist alliance begins to trespass the 50% threshold, the inter-imperialist alliance falls apart and the imperialist powers begin to wage colonial wars against each other. As such, inter-imperialist conflict frequently drives the wedge. Inter-imperialist rivalry is the primary contradiction that weakens global imperial dominance and allows for the breathing room, the operational freedom, for the cause of the proletariat, the kolkhozniks, and the anti-colonial national bourgeoisie to rise, exploit inter-imperialist contradictions, and achieve their revolutionary objectives. The inter-imperialist contradiction, the primary contradiction, allows for the proletarian-bourgeois conflict, the secondary contradiction, to result in the victory of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie. Therefore, no matter how much defeat the proletariat face, they will win thanks to the imperialist bourgeoisie ensuring their own defeat. No matter how triumphant an imperialist alliance, it could not and cannot ever get too far beyond the equilibrium threshold of 50%, the percentage share of the world which an imperialist alliance can conquer.

One bloc of imperialist powers allies with the reactionary classes. That is all the more natural since finance capital, the parasitic class, would seek the alliance with the parasitic classes for rolling back the progress of mankind. When I speak of the pro-fascist evils of finance capital, it is this mainstream bloc of finance capital powers, the reaction-aligned imperialist powers, of which I speak.

Yet, another bloc of imperialist powers, in order to combat its menacing rivals, the reaction-aligned bloc of imperialist powers, would strategically align with the progressive classes. This progressive-aligned bloc of imperialist powers would, for the period in which it is allied with the progressive classes, pursue progressive objectives throughout the world, in all directions in space, and even in their own colonies. Class alliances, though temporally limited, are not geographically or spatially limited for the time period in which they exist. On the contrary, they extend in all directions in space, to every corner of the globe, deep under the ground and far beyond the sky. When a bloc of imperialist powers ally with the progressive classes, the alliance is not limited to one geographic zone but extends even to their own colonies. Even in their own colonies, the progressive-aligned bloc of imperial powers would ally with the progressive classes, would embark on the project of strengthening and expanding the productive forces of the areas colonized, expanding the size and power of the proletarian class, promoting real democratization. They would even be extending the influence of the anti-colonial national forces against which these imperialists had been fighting a few years prior. The progressive-aligned imperialists would need to ally with the progressive forces even in their own colonies, for the rival bloc of imperialist powers, the reaction-aligned imperialists, would support the reactionary classes hostile to the progressive classes in the colonies of the progressive-aligned imperialist powers; this in turn leads the progressive-aligned imperialist powers to ally with the progressive classes in their own colonies. There is empirical evidence in support of this, some of which will be presented in this book.

Why, then, did the rival blocs of imperialist powers prior to the rise of Nazi Germany appear ‘equally reactionary’? Why, for example, was the French-led bloc of imperialist powers denounced as being as equally reactionary as the German-led bloc during the First World War? That is because the balance of power between these ‘equally evil’ blocs of colonial states changed so often so quickly that any policy of improving the conditions in the colonies could not gain momentum and stability; one week, the French-led bloc gains greater power and thus its weaker rival, the German-led bloc becomes progressive by virtue of being so much weaker as to be willing to ally with the progressive classes so to resurge its strength; the next week, the German-led bloc gains greater power and thus its weaker rival, the French-led bloc becomes progressive by virtue of being weaker and willing to ally with the progressive classes. The imperialist powers in this phase behave like: (+), (-), (+), (-), (+), (-); progressive, reactionary, progressive, reactionary; they keep changing their dialectical charge. This frequent change of the balance of power which in turn led to the frequent change in dialectical charge prevented any stability in progressive policies from being implemented. As a result, all the colonial powers appeared at face value as ‘equally’ reactionary at the ‘same’ time, even though according to the laws of dialectics, it is impossible for two rival blocs of imperialist powers to be equally reactionary simultaneously. While it is impossible for two rival blocs of powers to be simultaneously ‘equally evil’, there is no doubt that in the longer run, the net effect would be that these colonial powers would be in sum equally reactionary. That is why we correctly state that during the First World War, all the blocs of imperialist powers were equally reactionary – they were equally reactionary in the longer-run sum, in the net effect; but they were not equally reactionary exactly at the same time. This is why the German imperialists wanted the October Revolution, the revolution of the proletariat, to emerge victorious, by which to undermine the French-led bloc, and shortly later, the French imperialists militarily supported the newborn Soviet state in order to undermine the very same German imperialists that had sought the October Revolution to emerge victorious.

Fascist finance capital has as its allies the parasitic classes, which, in the context of the anti-imperialist countries, constitute the comprador classes. Such class allies of finance capital include the feudal landlords, the slave-owners, the comprador mercantile bourgeoisie, the comprador financial bourgeoisie, the kulaks, and the bureaucrats. The kulaks, by owning large businesses, gain the financial ability to debt-trap the poorer peasants, thus operating as rural quasi-bankers, a parasitic class allied to finance capital. The kulaks often partake in economic sabotage – at times covertly, such as through ‘mismanagement’, and at times manifestly, such as through terrorist special operations and armed rebellions. The mercantile bourgeoisie and financial bourgeoisie under a socialist or anti-imperialist state regard the progressive classes as a greater menace and calculate that selling one's own

country would be more profitable than the vain effort to gain control over, and imperially expand, the military-industrial backbone of one's own country. As such, the mercantile and financial bourgeoisie ally with the imperialists, finance wars against the progressive state, provide the imperialists with intelligence by which to target the progressive forces, and lobby for sanctions against their motherland. After socialization and collectivization, with the elimination of private commerce and banking, and with the elimination of the kulak class, the corrupt bureaucrats and the black-marketeers are the only comprador class bases that remain in socialist conditions. The black marketeers can undertake many roles, such as those of merchants, bankers, and kulaks. The bureaucrats, like finance capital, bite into production and oppose the progressive classes. Assisting the bureaucrats and black marketeers are the comprador strata (not to be confused with the comprador classes) which comprise mainly the ideologically parasitic intelligentsia.

Intellectuals from bourgeois or feudal family roots are often influenced by parasitic ideas, even when describing themselves as 'socialists' or 'anti-imperialists', though of course, in extremely rare cases, they may genuinely betray their own class roots and join the side of the proletariat and kolkhozniks. Some bourgeois-rooted intellectuals are well-meaning albeit on the wrong side of history. From among the well-meaning, some may defect to the camp of socialism. Intellectuals from bourgeois family backgrounds, usually influenced by Enlightenment thought, tend to adopt left-deviationism or liberal right-deviationism as their counter-revolutionary ideas. Intellectuals from feudal family backgrounds, usually not influenced by Enlightenment values, tend to promote religiosity and/or mysticism for their counter-revolutionary ideas, for the feudal class seeks to sponsor religiosity and/or mysticism as a counterweight against the secular and scientific ideas that, through technological advancements, yielded the decline of feudalism and brought the rise of the industrial bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The priests are a subcategory of intelligentsia, and, historically, usually came from feudal family backgrounds. At times, feudal-rooted intellectuals adopt a façade of 'socialism' in order to penetrate and sabotage the socialist movement. The ideologically-corrupted university professors as well as the student colour revolutionaries used to come mainly from feudal family backgrounds, but later, with the decline of feudalism, the bourgeoisie became the main family root of such professors and university students. While some may be intuitively inclined towards preferring the bourgeois-rooted liberal or left-opportunist intellectuals over the feudal-rooted intellectuals, historical experience and the nature of the intelligentsia shows an ambiguous picture: these bourgeois-rooted parasitic intellectuals were not necessarily any better than the feudal-rooted parasitic intellectuals. This would make sense, since an ideologically-corrupted intellectual could spread corruption under a conservative/feudal banner, under a liberal banner, or under a left-opportunist pseudo-socialist banner, and the severity of the ideological corruption will not necessarily differ; sometimes, a religio-mystical reactionary intellectual makes remarks more correct than that which a liberal or left-opportunist would say, and sometimes it is vice versa. All such corrupt currents can be so severely harmful that it would become difficult to prefer any of them, though of course any rhetoric that undermines feudalism and religious reaction, even if by liberals or Trotsko-Maoist left-opportunists, should be supported. Intellectuals from proletarian or cooperativist family backgrounds tend to have progressive views, however. A socialist society, by economically elevating the proletariat and cooperativists, gives such families the ability to send their children to good universities so to train good revolutionary intellectual cadres that advance the socialist agenda. The rest of the cadres of a state have stories not dissimilar to that of the intelligentsia. For example, while there do exist a considerable percentage of cases of betrayals of one's own class origin, as a general trend the military commanders from proletarian or cooperativist family backgrounds tend to have progressive views, whereas military commanders from anti-proletarian class origins tend to have reactionary views. The intelligentsia includes doctors, engineers, artists, etc. Within their profession, the intelligentsia may well contribute positively to the society. The socialist state, while not permitting the reactionary-minded intelligentsia to exercise a significant level of political power, shall protect the reactionary-minded intelligentsia if (and insofar as) they can help advance the natural sciences. The reactionary-minded intellectuals, so long as not conspiring to materialize their reactionary ideas, can be protected by the socialist state to advance the arts and sciences. Humiliation of university professors, and terrorist action against doctors, engineers, lawyers, natural scientists, artists, etc. are all left-opportunist measures.

To combat imperialism-fascism, the Party of the proletariat must engage in strategic and tactical alliances with the parties, organizations, and states assisting in the struggle against imperialism and fascism. The Party of the proletariat must ally with that bloc of imperialist powers combating the pro-fascist bloc of imperialist powers. The Party of the proletariat, furthermore, must assess the amount of the influence of the progressive classes – the proletariat, the kolkhozniks, and the anti-colonial national bourgeoisie – in the non-communist parties, organizations, and states. The Party of the proletariat must maximize efforts to increase the influence of the progressive classes in all non-communist parties, organizations, and states. In so doing, the Party of the proletariat strengthens the progressive tendency among the non-socialist parties, organizations, and states, rendering them more susceptible to strategic partnership, a popular front alliance, with the Party of the proletariat against imperialism and reaction. Even those parties, organizations, and states that are vocally anti-communist or right-wing would, as soon as the progressive classes have come to dominate them, render their anti-communism and reactionary stances into a mere veneer underneath of which is a progressive revolutionary tendency emanating from the progressive classes. As such, even those parties that are vocally anti-communist would tone down their anti-communism and would, covertly or blatantly, become allies of the Party of the proletariat. Against those parties, organizations, and states in which the reactionary classes dominate, the Party of the proletariat must pursue the agenda of systematically decimating them. Various different efforts towards sabotaging those parties must be pursued; if it is a war condition, then armed struggle against those parties must be pursued at some point in time; if it is peacetime, then a combination of expressions of diplomatic 'friendliness' for the purpose of infiltration, coupled with economic boycotts, must be pursued. The decimation of the reactionary parties and organizations will roll back the dominant tendency, the reactionary tendency, in such organizations, thereby reducing the lobbying power of the reactionary forces, while catapulting upwards the crypto-progressive agents in those reactionary organizations. This would render the reactionary organization more susceptible to infiltration, which would pave the way for either (1) the annihilation of that reactionary organization, (2) the conversion of that reactionary organization into a progressive organization, or (3) an intra-organizational coup d'états that allows the crypto-progressive forces to fully hijack the command of the reactionary organization, or to coopt the reactionary leaders of the reactionary organization, so to render the troops of that reactionary organization into cannon-fodder used by the crypto-progressives for decimating other reactionary organizations. A 4th course could be that the crypto-progressive agents gain access to the funds of the reactionary organization, take the bigger share of those funds, and then split away from that reactionary organization, so that the reactionary organization would be destabilized and easier to be, in the political-military sense, devoured. More important than reducing the manpower of the reactionary organization as a result of the split, is the crypto-progressive agents' taking away of the funds of the reactionary organization.


Cases occur in which during a struggle against imperialism or fascism, some organizations that collaborate with the imperialist/fascist foes pretend to be struggling against it, so to mislead otherwise genuine anti-imperialists/anti-fascists. In their struggle against imperialism and fascism, the communists can expose such organizations by what I call "alliance offensives" or "invitation offensives." It entails exposing collaborationists through proposing an overt alliance with them. That is, the communists would propose an alliance to this organization for a joint struggle against the

imperialist/fascist occupation. Owing to their collaborationist nature, the collaborationists would not benefit from establishing friendly contacts with the communists for that might expose their collaboration with the enemy. As such, it puts the covert collaborationists into a difficult position:

- (1) If they reject the proposal, they would lose face in front of the public by appearing not serious about combating the enemy occupation. By contrast, the communists would rightly appear serious in combating the enemy occupation. This would tilt the balance more so towards the communists and would expose to many the collaborationist nature of the organization. It would draw many of the genuinely anti-imperialist/anti-fascist supporters of the covert collaborationist organization away from the collaborationists and towards the communist-led popular front.
- (2) If the collaborationist organization accepts the alliance proposal, then they would face two options: (1) break their word/promise/deal and thus risk being exposed as collaborationists. Exposure would have almost the same results as rejecting an invitation in the first place, except it would be more intensively in favor of communists and a more intensive blow at the collaborationists. Option (2) would be that they would actually go through with the deal, carry out their promises, which would indeed harm the imperialist/fascist enemy occupation. This would force the collaborationists into fighting their own imperialist/fascist bosses hence causing division and friction in the enemy camp. All of these cases are wins for the communist-led popular front and losses for imperialism/fascism and collaborationism.

In order to render it harder for the collaborationists to betray their deal, communists shall try to negotiate as precondition, some degree of transparency on the part the collaborationist organization, so that it would become easier for communists to gather intelligence on the collaborationists' potential betrayals of the deal, so to expose the collaborationists' betrayal of the deal more easily. The establishment of transparency measures would be useful in dissuading the collaborationists from betraying their deal in the first place.

Related to this strategy is the "invitation offensive" strategy. Socialist and anti-imperialist states can expose imperialists' Wilsonian hypocrisy by calling for universal disarmament. No one with a basic understanding of class struggles would ever seriously think that universal disarmaments are realistic in the epoch of modern imperialist warmongers. The point though is to show that contrary to their Wilsonian calls for peace and unity, the imperialists are but hypocrites committed to terror. The USSR, the Peoples' Democracies, and the Comintern frequently used the peace offensives strategy.



Diagrammatic Representation of the Outcomes and Processes of Invitation Offensives

Explaining this concept in passing (regarding British politics as the example and case in point), Lenin said ‘If the [Kautskyites] reject a bloc with us on these terms, we shall gain still more, for we shall at once have shown the masses ... that the [Kautskyites] prefer their close relations with the capitalists to the unity of all the workers’:

It is true that the Hendersons, the Clyneses, the MacDonalds and the Snowdens are hopelessly reactionary. It is equally true that they want to assume power (though they would prefer a coalition with the bourgeoisie), that they want to “rule” along the old bourgeois lines, and that when they are in power they will certainly behave like the Scheidemanns and Noskes. All that is true. But it does not at all follow that to support them means treachery to the revolution; If the Hendersons and the Snowdens accept a bloc on these terms, we shall be the gainers.... (...). If the Hendersons and the Snowdens reject a bloc with us on these terms, we shall gain still more, for we shall at once have shown the masses (note that, even in the purely Menshevik and completely opportunist Independent Labour Party, the rank and file are in favour of Soviets) that the Hendersons prefer their close relations with the capitalists to the unity of all the workers. (“Left-Wing” Communism: An Infantile Disorder, Vladimir Lenin, Chapter 10. From: MIA)

One common mistake often made is that the level by which an organization is reactionary or progressive is seen as a continuous, integral, atom-less spectrum not composed of individual parts. In the past centuries someone would have said "substance X is closer to calcium than substance Y is," whereas now, armed with knowledge of atoms, one would say that "substance X has more calcium atoms than substance Y." An equivalent of this can be found in the historical materialist analysis. In saying that a reactionary organization is ‘more reactionary’ than another reactionary organization, what is really meant is that such an organization is more under the influence of the reactionary classes than another reactionary organization is. This subtle conceptual distinction is important as it helps to analyze the class character of organizations using a relatively more quantitative understanding of the class composition of organizations. Instead of treating ideological differences between organizations as mere third, fourth, fifth, etc. opinions, this conceptual distinction categorizes organizations according to their class composition and the level of the penetration of progressive agents vs. reactionary agents in this organization. This helps to treat more quantitatively the class character of the organization. Such a concept can be applied to analyzing the differences between intelligence agents, politicians, etc. There cannot be a fascist politician ‘less fascist’ than another fascist politician. All pro-fascist politicians are fascistic to a virtually equal extent. However, the difference is that some pro-fascist politicians are more coopted by the progressive anti-fascist forces than others, a factor that leads those progressive-coopted pro-fascist politicians to be more favourable to the cause of the proletariat than the other pro-fascist politicians. The Kautskyite agents, for example, are undercover fascist agents tasked with penetrating the proletarian organizations in order to sabotage the labour movement. At the same time, the fact that such Kautskyite agents immerse themselves amongst the proletarians is a factor that allows the agents of the proletariat to encircle such Kautskyite agents hence to coopt the Kautskyite agents into a force to be used against the blatantly anti-proletarian agents. Lenin supported the Labour Party as a counter-weight against the Tories because Lenin was rightly assured that the rise of the Labour Party, however pro-fascist such an organization was, served as a factor increasing the influence of the British proletariat over the British state while weakening British finance capital. The Labour Party, under the pressure of and coopted by the proletarians, could be utilized to roll back the influence of the more reactionary Tories. Lenin wrote:

It is true that the Hendersons, the Clyneses, the MacDonalds and the Snowdens are hopelessly reactionary. It is equally true that they want to assume power (though they would prefer a coalition with the bourgeoisie), **that they want to “rule” along the old bourgeois lines**, and that when they are in power they will certainly behave like the Scheidemanns and Noskes. All that is true. **But it does not at all follow that to support them means treachery to the revolution**; what does follow is that, in the interests of the revolution, working-class revolutionaries should give these gentlemen a certain amount of parliamentary support. (...). On the contrary, the fact that most British workers still follow the lead of the British Kerenskys or Scheidemanns and have not yet had experience of a government composed of these people—an experience which was necessary in Russia and Germany so as to secure the mass transition of the workers to communism—undoubtedly indicates that the British Communists should participate in parliamentary action, that they should, from within parliament, help the masses of the workers see the results of a Henderson and Snowden government in practice, **and that they should help the Hendersons and Snowdens defeat the united forces of Lloyd George and Churchill**. (...). At present, British Communists very often find it hard even to approach the masses, and even to get a hearing from them. If I come out as a Communist and call upon them to vote for Henderson and against Lloyd George, they will certainly give me a hearing. And I shall be able to explain in a popular manner, not only why the Soviets are better than a parliament and why the dictatorship of the proletariat is better than the dictatorship of Churchill ... but also that, with my vote, **I want to support Henderson in the same way as the rope supports a hanged man—that the impending establishment of a government of the Hendersons ... will hasten the political death of the Hendersons and the Snowdens just as was the case with their kindred spirits in Russia and Germany**. (“Left-Wing” Communism: An Infantile Disorder, Lenin, Chapter 9. MIA. Bold added.)

Note as well that Lenin did not support Britain's 'Labour' because 'Labour' was 'left' whereas the Tories were 'right'; he supported Britain's 'Labour' because the latter was more under the pressure of the proletariat whereas the Tories were less under the pressure of the proletariat. He did not explicitly mention this difference but that is clearly what he was implying, which is also why he put the word 'bourgeois' before the ‘[Tory] candidate’ and implied that the Labour Party candidate was ‘less bourgeois’:

We would take part in the election campaign, distribute leaflets agitating for communism, and, in all constituencies where we have no candidates, we would urge the electors *to vote for the Labour candidate and against the bourgeois candidate*. (“Left-Wing” Communism: An Infantile Disorder, Lenin, Chapter 9. MIA. Italics original.)

Lenin called on the British communists to support the ‘Labour Party’ candidate not as a blank cheque support but as a way of, to the extent that the communists had strength, partially coopting the Kautskyite politicians – that is, supporting the Kautskyite politicians in exchange for the Kautskyite fulfilment of certain promises to the Party of the proletariat. The Kautskyite agents of fascism, encircled by the proletarian agents amongst whom they had immersed, would have been compelled to increase the influence of the proletarian agents, who had encircled the Kautskyite agents, over the British imperial state. That is, the electoral rise of the proletarian-coopted Kautskyites brings to office not just the Kautskyite agents of fascism but also the proletarian agents encircling them. The increased influence of such proletarian agents within the Labour Party over the British imperialist state would increase pressures on a British military dominated by British finance capital, thus allowing for more intelligence penetration into the British imperial army’s ranks by the agents of the proletariat. The greater influence of the proletariat over the means of violence would reduce anti-communist conspiracy, allowing the communists to better organize, enlarge their Party, as steps towards the overthrow of the British state – much as how the rollback of the influence of the reactionary classes over the Russian Army brought to power the Kautskyite democratic government of

Kerensky, thus allowing the Party of the proletariat the operational freedom by which to organize the proletarians of Russia and to launch the October Revolution.

Note as well that Lenin did not support the British Labour Party because the latter was 'left-wing' but because it was easier to coopt by the proletarian agents. Indeed, there do occur cases in which the more proletarian-influenced party, the party less under the influence of the reactionary forces, would be at face value 'right-wing' whereas the more reactionary party would be 'left-wing'. Lenin had no problems with allying with right-wing forces so long as they served the agenda of promoting socialism:

When in February 1918 the German imperialist vultures hurled their forces against unarmed, demobilised Russia, who had relied on the international solidarity of the proletariat before the world revolution had fully matured, I did not hesitate for a moment to enter into an "agreement" with the French monarchists. Captain Sadoul, a French army officer who, in words, sympathised with the Bolsheviks, but was in deeds a loyal and faithful servant of French imperialism, brought the French officer de Lubersac to see me. **"I am a monarchist. My only aim is to secure the defeat of Germany," de Lubersac declared to me. "That goes without saying (cela va sans dire)," I replied.** But this did not in the least prevent me from entering into an "agreement" with de Lubersac concerning certain services that French army officers, experts in explosives, were ready to render us by blowing up railway lines in order to hinder the German invasion. This is an example of an "agreement" of which every class-conscious worker will approve, an agreement in the interests of socialism. **The French monarchist and I shook hands, although we knew that each of us would willingly hang his "partner". But for a time our interests coincided.** Against the advancing rapacious Germans, we, in the interests of the Russian and the world socialist revolution, utilised the equally rapacious counter-interests of other imperialists. In this way we served the interests of the working class of Russia and of other countries, we strengthened the proletariat and weakened the bourgeoisie of the whole world, we resorted to the methods, most legitimate and essential in every war, of manoeuvre, stratagem, retreat, in anticipation of the moment when the rapidly maturing proletarian revolution in a number of advanced countries completely matured. (Letter to American Workers, Lenin, August 20, 1918. Bold added)

The proletarians are not concentrated merely in the communist party of the proletariat but are to be found in the other organizations. A shift in rank-and-file membership class composition – so as to increase the influence and percentage membership of the proletariat, the cooperativists, and/or the anti-colonial bourgeoisie over non- communist movements – will assist in rendering that organization more susceptible to cooperation with the socialist forces and confrontation with anti-socialist forces.

Lenin said:

The more powerful enemy can be vanquished only by exerting the utmost effort, and by the most thorough, careful, attentive, skillful and *obligatory* use of any, even the smallest, rift between the enemies, any conflict of interests among the bourgeoisie of the various countries and among the various groups or types of bourgeoisie within the various countries, and also by taking advantage of any, even the smallest, opportunity of winning a mass ally, even though this ally is temporary, vacillating, unstable, unreliable and conditional. Those who do not understand this reveal a failure to understand even the smallest grain of Marxism, of modern scientific socialism *in general*. Those who have not proved *in practice*, over a fairly considerable period of time and in fairly varied political situations, their ability to apply this truth in practice have not yet learned to help the revolutionary class in its struggle to emancipate all toiling humanity from the exploiters. And this applies equally to the period *before* and *after* the proletariat has won political power. ("Left-Wing" Communism: An Infantile Disorder, Vladimir Lenin, Chapter 9. MIA)

As Lenin rightly emphasized, communists and progressives must sow and exploit rifts within imperialism and reaction, to divide and defeat in detail the enemies of the people. Communism necessitates the proletariat's alliance with feudalism against slavery, and with capitalism against feudalism; it necessitates the alliance with anti-imperialist capitalist states against the capitalist-imperialist regimes. It also necessitates the alliance of communists with anti-fascist imperialist powers against the fascist or pro-fascist imperialist blocs. Lenin's remark does not mean supporting both fascists and anti-fascists as a 'divide and conquer' method. Rather, it means supporting those less under the influence of the pro-fascist classes against those more under the influence of the pro-fascist classes.

Lenin's remark emanated from the dialectical concept of so-called 'Negation of Negation', explained in depth by Engels in Anti-Duhring. The application of the so-called 'Negation of Negation' concept to socialist class struggles led to the concept of the 'Salami Tactics' concept of Rakosi. The idea calls for continuously supporting and coopting the forces less under the influence of the reactionary classes against the forces more under the influence of the reactionary classes. Slice by slice, the reactionary forces would be cut and put away, just like a salami, allowing for the greater influence of the communist agents of the proletariat.

As well, the rifts between left-opportunist and right-opportunist agents of reaction must be exploited to the maximum, so to systematically erode their influence and shred their networks. More on this will be mentioned later.

C1S3. The Quasi-Myth of the Third Force & the Tendency for Class Allies to Cooperate in all Spatial Directions

Dialectics rejects the existence of a void or intermediate gray-zone between any and all antagonistic forces. It rejects the narrative that there can exist an intermediate gray-zone between good and evil, progress and reaction, pro-fascism and anti-fascism, etc. Dialectical and historical materialism divides the world into two categories: the tendencies/forces that, willingly or unwillingly, serve progress and the tendencies/forces that, willingly or unwillingly, serve reaction. The notion of 'non-alignment' or the notion of being a 'third force' between progress and reaction, between good and evil, has always been but a fantasy. So-called 'non-alignment', 'third side to the conflict', etc. are all liberal anti-dialectical myths. This was very clearly pointed by Andrei Zhdanov in the so-called 'Zhdanov doctrine' speech. It is worth reminding individuals that the Zhdanov doctrine did not divide the world into the socialist camp and the imperialist camp, but rather divided the world into the anti-fascist 'democratic camp' and the pro-fascist pro-imperialist camp. However, perhaps more interestingly, Egyptian Arab leader Gamal Abdel-Nasser – a leader of the so-called 'Non-Aligned Movement' – agreed with Andrei Zhdanov. In a conversation with Houari Boumediene, Abdel-Nasser said:

non-alignment and impartiality has become empty talk, devoid of any truth! Because today, where is non-alignment to be found? We say be biased neither towards the East nor towards the West, but the West is standing against us and beating us! And we say 'we are neutral between East and West'? So how can I be neutral between the one who hits me and the one who does not hit me?! On the issue of neutrality and non-alignment, we are ready to reach [an agreement to] any extent, even to the point of making a joint defense agreement


with the Soviet Union! (Minutes of the talks between President Gamal Abdel Nasser and Algerian President Houari Boumediene, El-Qubba Palace, Cairo, July 10, 1967, from: nasser.bibalex.org (the archives of Gamal Abdel-Nasser's life), p. 12) (IMG)

A concept closely related to the above is the question of the strategic uniformity and depth of cooperation of the progressive forces in the struggle against the reactionary forces.

The small industrial base of the economically backwards countries renders weak the national bourgeoisie of such lands. In the absence of such a powerful industrial base, and to compete against the anti-colonial national bourgeoisie's imperialist rivals, the national bourgeoisie of the backwards zones seen no choice but an alliance with and reliance upon the proletariat of their country. In this attempt towards an alliance, the national bourgeoisie minimize tensions with the proletariat. A state controlled by the anti-colonial national bourgeoisie relies upon the proletariat for its anti-imperialist agenda. While the state in this context would be a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, it would strengthen the influence of the proletariat over the state through the establishment of a democratic system and advances proletarian objectives via progressive and democratic policies. **Indeed, the joint rule of the proletariat, cooperativists, and the anti-colonial national bourgeoisie is the basis for progressive bourgeois-democracy.** As the national bourgeoisie of the post-colonial countries is often rather weak, it cannot afford to purchase the big industries, thus leaving the heavy industry and many other key sectors in the hands of the progressive bourgeois-democratic state, the state of the anti-colonial national bourgeoisie, the proletariat, and the cooperativists. Through such nationalization, the progressive bourgeois-democratic state prevents these key industries from falling into the hands of the comprador bourgeois classes, and instead elevates the influence of the proletariat and the national bourgeoisie over such key big industries.

As always, one must distinguish between the workers as an aggregate of individual consciousness vs. the workers as a class. While as an aggregate of individual consciousness, the workers of each country would not necessarily hold a proletarian internationalist attitude towards the workers of other countries, the workers of each country as a class have fully convergent interests with the proletariat of other countries and thus have a natural tendency towards proletarian internationalism. Hence, the reliance and dependence of the anti-colonial national bourgeoisie of each country on that land's working class entails the dependence of the anti-colonial national bourgeoisie of each country upon the international proletariat. In a hypothetical vacuum, the national bourgeoisie of the anti-colonial countries would partially compete with one another; however, given that such national bourgeoisie is firmly locked-in to the proletariat as a result of its desperate need to rely upon the proletariat, the national bourgeoisie of each country cannot afford to grossly contradict the internationalist tendency generated by its proletariat. The result of this 'locking in' of the anti-colonial national bourgeoisie to the proletarian internationalism is a consolidated strategic alliance of the progressive bourgeois-democracies with each other and with the workers' state(s). **The anti-colonial national bourgeoisie would not cooperate with the imperialists against the anti-colonial national-bourgeoisie of the other countries.** What does all of this mean? It means that anti-imperialist states, insofar as they are under the influence of the anti-imperialist faction, do not engage in major conflicts against the anti-imperialist factions of anti-imperialist states; any 'fight' that occurs between two anti-imperialist forces is almost always a deliberate deception operation, a division of tasks between two anti-imperialist states aimed at confusing the forces belonging to the imperialist camp. As a law of history, in fact, unless there is a misunderstanding, miscoordination, etc., two governments/movements that have aligned class interests do not struggle against each other. Any struggle that occurs between these forces of the same class alliance would either be a misunderstanding/miscoordination or a deliberate deception operation. I state this not as a matter of some load of theorizing devoid of reality but as something that actually has plenty of empirical evidence in support. Unfortunately, the limited space available does not permit me to provide all the evidence in this book but much of it will be provided throughout this work. Of course, the remarks made about the progressive bourgeois-democracies' alliance with one another are even truer with regards to the dictatorship of the proletariat. The dictatorship of the proletariat would have the maximum tendency to pursue an internationalist and anti-imperialist policy line. And the more consolidated becomes the control of the proletariat over the state, the less the potential for pro-imperialist deviations to emanate from that state.

(Note as well that bourgeois-nationalism is different than the national bourgeoisie. Bourgeois-nationalism refers to the type of nationalism benefiting the parasitic classes, whereas the national bourgeoisie is the kind of the bourgeoisie that supports its own nation's development of the productive forces and struggles against imperialist forces that seek to colonize the nation to which the national-bourgeoisie is loyal.)



The global proletariat have converging interests on every front. The reliance of the thin layer of the national-bourgeoisie of the backwards countries upon the proletariat locks in the national bourgeoisie upon the proletariat and is a factor that prevents the progressive national bourgeoisie from helping the imperialists wage a struggle against each other.

Different than the story of the national bourgeoisie and the proletariat is the story of the 'anti-fascist' petit-bourgeoisie. The petit-bourgeois organizations usually side with fascism; when they side against fascism, such as in the case of the Khomeinist petit-bourgeoisie in Iran or the some of the petit-bourgeois 'Cultural Revolutionaries' in China, they oppose fascism only half of the way, while the other half of the way promoting such monumental stupidity that benefits fascism. The 'anti-fascist' petit-bourgeois organizations do not oscillate – they do not keep switching sides as a way of maneuvering the two sides against each other. Rather, they vacillate – they fight half of the way in favour of the progressive forces, while committing outrageous stupidities that benefit reaction the other half of the way. Historically, the petit-bourgeoisie in the Chinese state collaborated more with the comprador and fascist forces while deviating in favour of the progressive classes in a minority of cases, whereas, due to specific historical circumstances, in Iran the petit-bourgeoisie ended up giving slightly, just slightly, more room to the progressive classes than they did to the reactionary classes. Again, generally, the petit-bourgeoisie side with the fascists, but in some specific spatial settings capitulate to, and behave passively conservative towards, the progressive forces, thus causing such petit-bourgeoisie to adopt a heads-and-tails/progressive-and-reactionary vacillatory behaviour.

The tendency of the progressive bourgeois-democratic states and socialist states to closely align in all spatial directions is also not shared by the imperialist powers, for the imperialist powers compete for global domination and shift their inter-imperialist alliances according to their plans for global dominance. Thus, whereas the progressive and socialist states tend not to oscillate in their strategic relations and remain more firmly on each other's side, the finance capital states frequently oscillate in their strategic relations.

The story of finance capital is fundamentally different than the circumstances of the anti-colonial national bourgeoisie. Imperialist finance capital emerges in highly industrialized economies, rendering it capable of much lower reliance on the proletariat. A bloc of imperialist powers would ally with the proletariat, but are not as dependent upon the proletariat as the anti-colonial national bourgeoisie, and would not be aligned with it for as long a term as the anti-colonial national bourgeoisie would align with the proletariat. Finance capital would only ally with the international proletariat in order to fight the finance capital of other countries, as was the case during the first two years of the Great Patriotic War when Anglo-American finance capital allied with the Soviet dictatorship of the proletariat against the greater enemy, Nazi Germany. Unlike the much-impooverished anti-colonial national bourgeoisie, finance capital can easily afford to defect, betray, and switch alliances, which is why Anglo-American finance capital swiftly turned against its ally the USSR, as soon as the balance of power shifted against Nazi Germany during the Battle of Stalingrad (see C11S1 & C11S2). Nonetheless, when finance capital does form an alliance with a specific class force, it forms such an alliance on the global scale in all spatial directions. Anglo-American finance capital's alliance with the Soviet dictatorship of the proletariat in the first years of the Great Patriotic War was not manifested just in Europe and the Middle East; it was manifested in all the different corners of the planet. Similarly, the Anglo-American finance capital's alliance with the Nazi German finance capital, which came about since the Battle of Stalingrad and continues to this day, has been an alliance in all directions and in all corners of the planet.

No, strategic alliances are not limited to just one specific region, for strategic alliances are class alliances. The alliance goes in all spatial directions, encompasses every part of the Earth, and even every part of the universe that can be accessed by humans (e.g. from 1943 onwards, the Anglo-Americans collaborated with the Nazis and Japanese fascists for the aerospace program as well). Strategic alliances are class alliances and class alliances by nature cannot be spatially limited. The reason is quite simple; deviation from the strategic alliance in one specific zone will assist the growth of the enemies of the strategic alliance in that specific zone and will thereby increase the likelihood of that zone being used by the enemy as a base and a launching pad for launching attacks against the strategic alliance in other zones. It follows that no spatial coordinate can ever be affordably sacrificed for a betrayal of the class alliance.

Antagonisms and alliances between different forces will pervade in all directions and will permeate into all fields, thus entailing an antagonism not only present in the military and intelligence sphere, but also in the economic warfare, cultural warfare, psychological warfare, etc. Similar is the case of alliances. While two allied forces would not necessarily merge, they will nonetheless have the automatic tendency to ally with one another in all directions, in all parts of the world, in all fields of study, in the military and intelligence sector, in economic warfare, in cultural warfare, in psychological warfare, etc. There do exist some key differences, however, in the speed of implementing progressive vs. reactionary agendas. For instance, the proletariat have the natural tendency towards the most friction-less and greatest speed in moving forward for progress, whereas the national bourgeoisie are relatively slower and self-decelerated in pursuing the agenda against the reactionary classes. Nonetheless, as class allies, the anti-colonial national bourgeoisie and the proletariat support each other in all spatial fronts, despite differences in pace, friction, and acceleration.

The countries of the world, even the autarkic countries, are not a set of islands totally separate from one another but constitute a highly interconnected web, especially in the field of intelligence service activities. As a result of such extensive and intensive interconnectedness, any activity in favor of the reactionary forces in one country will constitute an activity in favor of reactionary forces in all other countries, and any activity in favor of the progressive forces in one country will constitute an activity in favor of the progressive forces in all the other countries. For this reason, unless there is the phenomenon of miscommunication-miscoordination-misunderstanding, the progressive faction of a progressive state/organization will not collaborate with the reactionary forces anywhere. Similarly, unless there is the phenomenon of miscommunication-miscoordination-misunderstanding, the pro-reactionary faction of a reactionary state/organization will not willingly collaborate with the progressive forces in any spatial coordinate of the world. Where there does exist such a collaboration, it would either be the case that such a collaboration is a result of miscommunication-miscoordination-misunderstanding, or it is the case that such a 'collaboration' is a delusion deliberately promoted by either of the parties, a delusion aimed at providing a cover for covert operations.

Suppose there are two organizations/states A and B, such that A and B have converging class interests and are thus closely allied to one another. However, it turns out that funds from A are transferred to another organization/state C, and C is hostile to B. In other words, A, an ally of B, has some of its funds transferred to an enemy of B. How is such a contradiction to be understood? In this situation, there will be three main scenarios:

(1) there has been a miscommunication/misunderstanding between A and B, resulting in A and B to be mistakenly on opposing sides on a specific issue: given the advancement of technology in communication however, this first possibility is extremely rare since miscommunication between states and organizations has become rarer.

(2) a fifth column within A, representing class forces antagonistic to the dominant class tendency in A, has been carrying out sabotage against the alliance of A and B, by stealing funds and diverting them to C, so to further weaken B and hence to further weaken A, the ally of B.

(3) A and B are both hostile to C, but have covertly divided their tasks such that B would appear as hostile to C, whereas A would, on behalf of B, infiltrate C under the guise of 'funding' C. That is, A's 'funding' of C would not be real material support for C but would rather be utilized as a channel through which to buy influence in C, and to promote a faction within C that would sabotage C's conflict with B. In such a situation, A's funding of C would often be deliberately in low quantity and quality so to minimize the damage inflicted on B as a result of such funding of C. Though there will inevitably be some small damage inflicted on B as a result of A's 'funding' of C, the benefits that B gains from A infiltrating C on behalf of B are much higher, which is why B would approve of A 'funding' C. Too often, the question of who among A and B should take the role of 'funding' C depends on the level of soft-power influence that either of A and B can have on C. The extent of soft power influence in turn depends on the culture, ethnicity, or ideology of C. For example, if C is a Christian fundamentalist organization, and if A is an organization whose majority of members are Christians, and if B barely has any Christianity in it, it would make sense to say that A can have more soft power influence over the Christian fundamentalist C, because A has Christian appearances whereas B does not. As such, A can infiltrate C more easily using its soft power influence, and thus, A should take on the task of infiltrating C under the cover of 'funding' C.

Advancements in technology of communication have resulted in scenarios (2) and (3) listed above to be the most frequent cases. Especially, (3) is the most common scenario.

In some ways, miscommunication-miscoordination-misunderstanding is to politics what friction is to mechanics. In the presence of friction, many mechanical principles would become close to being true when tested empirically, whereas in the absence of friction, they would be always fully true empirically. Similarly, when there is miscoordination, miscommunication, and/or misunderstanding, the establishment of an alliance between the progressive class forces and the reactionary class forces would be almost always true, whereas in the absence of miscoordination, miscommunication, and/or misunderstanding, such an alliance would be exactly always true. And the technology of communication and coordination is to politics what lubrication is to mechanics. This is why the further we go back in centuries, the more we see miscommunications or miscalibrations and hence the more we may see accidental three-way, four-way, etc. conflicts in history.

C1S4. The Relationship between Military Victories and Secret Service Victories

The means of violence are virtually inseparable from the class agents controlling them. Wherever go the means of violence controlled by the agents of a class, the intelligence presence of that class goes together with those means of violence. This has several important implications.

Not until the proletariat's conquest of the world can a dictatorship of the proletariat entail a total control of the proletariat and the kolkhozniks over the state. Until that phase, until the export of socialist statehood and the socialist mode of production to all areas of the world, the dictatorship of the proletariat would entail the control of the proletariat and the kolkhozniks over the overwhelming majority of the state. As such, the comprador enemies of the proletariat, such as the bureaucrats and those intellectuals representing the interests of the kulaks and feudal landlords, will together be able to catapult their agents into the state of the proletariat so to obstruct and sabotage socialist projects. Most importantly, the catapulting of such anti-proletarian agents would manifest in the control of such anti-proletarian agents over a minority percentage of the means of violence. Hence, the military and intelligence bodies of a socialist state would be infiltrated by the comprador agents allied with fascist finance capital. Yet, as the dictatorship of the proletariat is essentially the control of the working class over the means of violence, the increase in the quantity of the means of violence controlled by the proletariat would – in relative terms – result in a lower quantity of the means of violence available to the class enemies of the proletariat in the workers' state. As such, the percentage 'share' of the means of violence controlled by the comprador agents would reduce, whereas the percentage 'share' of the means of violence controlled by the proletariat-kolkhoznik alliance would increase. With such an increase in percentage 'share' of control over the means of violence, there is also an increase in lobbying power of the agents of the proletariat. This in turn allows the proletariat to lobby for the installation of its agents in a greater number of critically important ranks in the working class state apparatus, thus allowing the proletariat to purge the comprador agents that have been catapulted into the ranks of the proletarian state. Why is this important? It is important because it means that a stronger military controlled by the proletarian-kolkhoznik faction (as in contrast to the comprador faction) of the proletarian state means that the workers' state would be capable of not only suppressing fascist rebels and defending itself against foreign imperialist aggression, but also would be able to pursue a purge against the comprador agents inside the proletarian state apparatus and to plant the proletariat's agents in replacement.

Military victories against anti-proletarian rebels and imperialist aggressors means a lower quantity and quality of the means of violence available to such anti-proletarian military forces, hence – in relative terms – a greater quantity and quality of the means of violence available to the agents of the proletariat, allowing the agents of the proletariat to have greater lobbying power in their secret service conflict against the comprador agents. This is the key factor that correlates the military victories against anti-proletarian rebels and imperialist militaries with the secret service victories over the comprador agents inside the proletariat's military. As such, **if the army of the proletariat achieves military victories against anti-proletarian armies, then the anti-proletarian commanders in the ranks of the army of the proletariat would also be purged.** A large series of tactical victories by the army of the proletariat in the war against an anti-proletarian army would reduce the amount of the means of violence available to the anti-proletarian agents inside the anti-proletarian army, thus – in relative terms – increasing the amount of the means of violence available to the pro-proletarian agents in the anti-proletarian army. Hence, **a large series of proletarian army tactical victories would lead to the demotion of the anti-proletarian commanders in the anti-proletarian army and the upwards catapulting of pro-proletarian spies in the anti-proletarian army.** The reverse is true as well. **Military defeats suffered by the army of the proletariat result in the demotion, if not also the assassination, of the agents of the proletariat in the proletariat's army and the anti-proletarian army while leading to the upwards catapulting of the anti-proletarian agents in both the proletariat's army and the anti-proletarian army.** The point of revolutionary defeatism is to reduce the quantity and quality of the means of violence available to the reactionary forces so that – in relative, not absolute, terms – the quantity of the means of violence available to the revolutionary forces increases, thus allowing the revolutionary forces to become a separate proto-state of their own that then overthrows and replaces the reactionary state. The point of counter-revolutionary defeatism is the reverse. Sending military funds to the pro-proletarian faction of a movement would expand the means of violence, and hence the lobbying power, of that progressive faction, thus allowing the progressive faction to plant its agents in the more important ranks of that movement and to more easily pursue its progressive agenda. Deploying the troops of the dictatorship of the proletariat into a friendly country helps the progressive forces in that country to augment their military, hence to augment their lobbying power, leading to the triumph of the progressive agents over the agents of fascist reaction in the government of the country to which the troops were deployed. In short, military victories yield secret service victories. Inflicting military damage upon an enemy allows for the intelligence penetration into the ranks of that enemy. These very important points are almost always missing in the mainstream political commentary. What has been said about the proletariat's army in the above paragraph can also be said about the progressive bourgeois-democratic armies, the armies representing the alliance of the proletariat, the kolkhozniks, and the anti-colonial national bourgeoisie. The key difference though is that the progressive bourgeois-democratic army is easier to infiltrate than the proletariat's army, because the anti-colonial national bourgeoisie, despite their positive and progressive role, have businesses to lose and are thus not as willing as the proletariat to risk confrontation with imperialism. They are not as militantly anti-comprador as the proletariat, thus rendering the progressive bourgeois-democratic armies relatively more vulnerable to intelligence penetration by comprador agents.

Armed rebel forces are an additional state, with their own means of violence controlled by their class agents, up and against the main central state. The rebel forces obviously aim to replace the central government with their own state, but the rebel forces, upon militarily striking the central state, also reduce the means of violence available to the rebels' class enemies in the central state and thus catapult upwards in central state hierarchy the agents of classes allied to the rebel forces. Such pro-rebel agents inside the state apparatus then secure the tactical sabotage against the central state's military during battles against the rebels. They also try to covertly divert state funds and state arms directly into the possession of the rebels or onto

areas that are easy to be captured by the rebels. The pro-rebel agents inside the state in turn regard the rebels as their own unofficial private army by which to undermine the state whose ranks they have penetrated.

It goes without saying that a military conflict can kill well-trained and loyal staff of an armed force. The killing of the cadres can incur profound costs for the long-term. Military victories and the increased material dominance of the political scene can allow the class forces access to the productive forces by which to train new cadres. However, cases occur in which the damage of the war would be so deep as to prevent the use of the material dominance over productive forces for training and elevating new cadres.

Protesters are similar to an armed force. Human flesh and bones, not arms, are used as the quasi-weapons for confrontation. Peaceful protesters are like a much weaker version of a military force, but they still bear some of the characteristics of a military force confronting a certain faction in the conflict over the means of violence. The peacefulness of a protest can however make it look more moral, hence to draw more supporters to it in some countries, which would lead to the protests being bigger and thus a mightier quasi-military force. Such protests force the security apparatus to reallocate its agents onto opposing, violently or peacefully, the protests, thus reducing state allocation of agents into other security issues; this gives the intelligence agents hostile to the state the room for breath, the operational freedom, to engage in special operations against the state, while the state is bogged down in dealing with the protests. Mass demonstrations, even the peaceful ones, bog down the state security to the attempts to deal with the unrest, hence permitting the anti-state subversives within the ranks of the state apparatus the time and space for subversive anti-state operations from within the state. Explosions of military-industrial infrastructure, demotions or deaths of government loyalist officials, the opening of arms arsenals to the anti-state militants, are but some of the operations that can be easily performed by subversives as a result of protest bog-downs. To achieve success, the planners for the overthrow of a state shall attempt to convince the protesters of the need for maximal self-armament. Before the population's arrival at the conclusion that armed action is necessary for combat, the planners for the overthrow will need to combine peaceful mass protests – for bogging down state security – with support, covert or explicit, for armed struggle against the state. Pro-government protests, on the other hand, bog the intra-state anti-state subversives down to stopping the pro-government protests, thus allowing the state security the room for maneuver against, and purge of, many such subversives.

So long as the armament production sector is controlled by the agents of the proletariat and not the anti-proletarian comprador agents in the workers' state, the expansion of the armament production of the socialist state is the expansion of the influence of the proletariat over the state. In the same ways, so long as the external provision of military funds to a socialist state is designated such that the military funds would end up under the command of the agents of the proletariat and not the comprador agents, the external provision of military funds to a socialist state increases the hold of the proletariat over their state.

In a society ruled by a pro-fascist state, the call for increasing the social welfare budget constitutes a call for reducing funds available to the pro-fascist military. This would undermine the reactionary classes dominating the military, rolling back their influence over their means of violence, thus expanding the influence of the anti-fascist agents of the proletariat, the cooperativists, and the anti-colonial bourgeoisie. The increased influence of the proletariat over the military, and thus over the state, also ensures a weakening of the influence of the parasitic classes over the welfare sector, thus reducing corruption and allowing the progressive classes to exercise greater influence and yield greater efficiency.

By contrast in a country dominated by an anti-fascist military, calls by the comprador or imperialist agents for increasing the welfare beyond the adequate level is an excuse by which the imperialist agents seek to reduce the quantity of means of violence available to the agents of the progressive classes hence reducing the secret service influence and lobbying power of progressive agents over the means of violence, while increasing the secret service influence and lobbying power of the reactionary class agents over the means of violence. The increased influence of the parasitic classes over the means of violence would also result in the greater influence of the parasitic classes over areas beyond the means of violence, such as the welfare sector. The parasitic class agents then use their influence over the welfare sector in order to promote bureaucratic corruption and inefficiency hence reducing the quality of the welfare sector. In other words, by calling for an undue increase in the welfare budget at the expense of the anti-fascist military, the agents of the parasitic classes increase their influence over the anti-fascist military and consequently over the welfare sector, thereby reducing welfare sector quality as well. Beware of such demagogical calls for 'improving' welfare which in fact worsen the quality of welfare.

There exists the infamous Third-Worldist theory of 'bribes'. According to this Third-Worldist narrative, in order to bribe the proletariat into support for colonialism, the colonial bourgeoisie provide the proletarians a share of the 'fruits of colonialism'; furthermore, according to this Third-Worldist narrative, welfare state projects such as free healthcare and education are 'bribes' by which to submit the proletarians into not launching a revolution. Actually, the Third-Worldist theory of 'bribes' is gravely incorrect. When the colonial bourgeoisie steal the wealth of the colonies, the colonial bourgeoisie, far too greedy to deliver anything to the proletariat beyond mere subsistence income, aim to retain the wealth for themselves. However, the class interests of the proletariat are inevitably in conflict with the interests of mercantile capital and finance capital, the class bases of premodern and modern imperialism respectively. As such, whether consciously or not, the proletariat engage in a proletarian internationalist solidarity with the colonized peoples by promoting welfare statist policies that compel the colonial bourgeois state to increase the welfare budget (e.g. healthcare and education budget) at the expense of the colonial military budget. In the context of revolutionary class struggles, more significant than increasing the budget of the welfare of the proletarians is cutting the budget of the armed forces of the sworn foes of the proletariat and the anti-colonial national-bourgeois allies. Forget not: the colonial powers lose much more from the de-budgeting of their own military than they gain from welfare-statist 'bribing' the proletarians. For the colonial bourgeoisie, it is more efficient to suppress them whom they oppress than to bribe the oppressed into loving their colonial bourgeois oppressors. This applies not just to the peoples of the colonies but also to the proletarians living in the colonial heartland itself. It is more efficient to be feared than to be loved if not both. Welfare-statist 'bribes' can bring 'love' for the oppressors but are nowhere nearly as efficient as the low-cost suppressive power that a mighty military brings the colonial bourgeoisie. Had the imperialist bourgeoisie been seriously interested in bribing the proletarians into loving them, then the imperialists would have applied this policy of non-terrorism and non-suppression to all of the people whom the subjugated; all of the anti-colonial warriors would have been 'bribed' into loving the colonizers; capitalism and colonialism would have ceased to exist. No, welfare-statist 'bribes' are not really bribes, but rather constitute an attempt by the proletariat to de-budget the colonial military under the guise of and in the name of expanding the welfare of the citizens. The Third-Worldists, by arguing that the 'First World' proletarians are a type of a sub-bourgeoisie benefiting from colonialism, imply that the proletariat should not be fighting for their own welfare because that is colonial exploitation, a 'bribe', a case of proletarians 'selling out' to the bourgeoisie. Actually, in implying so, the Third-Worldists are sabotaging the proletarian attempts to, using the welfare issue, cut the financing of the colonial state's military. It follows that the Third-Worldist argument is the ally of the colonial militaries. The Third-Worldists are nothing short of a fifth column for the colonizers 'against' whom they whine.

State power comes derives inherently through signing policy papers but rather through enforcing them using law enforcement agencies, the armed forces – the means of violence. A revolution against a reactionary state is the establishment of a proto-state dominated by the progressive classes for the replacement of a state dominated by reactionary classes. As such, a revolution is a process in which the enforcement agencies of two states – the revolutionary proto-state and the reactionary incumbents' state – ban each other and thus engage in militarized clashes. It is a process in which the means of violence dominated by the progressive classes strike the means of violence dominated by the reactionary classes. The means of violence is a spectrum. Some entities, such as bombs and guns, are more strictly under the category of the means of violence, whereas other entities, such as the flesh of a soldier or even of a protester, can be considered a subcategory of the means of violence though to a lesser extent.

Under the conditions of fascist repression, labour strikes may grow horrendously difficult. As an alternative, the revolutionary vanguard cells shall spread among the workers leaflets that call for work slowdowns and purposive “mistakes” in the workplace, tactics of covert industrial sabotage that can wear-and-tear down the fascist-aligned enterprises, inflicting immense costs on the terror regime.

The Party plays a vital role in organizing the proletarian movement. Yet, so wrong it is to assume that a Party of the proletariat can form and operate as a real Party under the conditions of severe repression. Repression forbids the formation of vast networks of proletarian activists, let alone allow for the formation of a coherent mobile Party of the proletariat. If a real Party of the proletariat is formed under the conditions of severe repression, then is it not all the more natural that by amassing the proletarian activists into one amalgam, it renders the revolutionary proletarian network far more visible to the suppressive secret police and thus much easier to hunt down and annihilate in just one move? From here comes the view, absolutely correct, that under conditions of severe repression, when long-term socialist Party activity is impossible, there should instead be cells, sometimes separate and sometimes inter-connected, of socialist activists. Such proletarian cells must engage in armed struggle to roll back the reactionary fascist forces in the regime and to allow for the intelligence penetration of proletarian agents into the regime, so that is opened the path for democratization. The central command of these revolutionary cells shall be the Party located in sanctuaries outside the country or in the remote regions inside the country, such as in mountainous areas. Relative democratization gives these socialist cells the greater operational liberty which allows them to connect with each other and form bigger cells. Armed struggle against the anti-proletarian suppressive secret police must continue until more and more proletarian agents penetrate the ranks of the regime, further democratization occurs, and thus the revolutionary cells can merge more and more to eventually form a more coherent Party of the proletariat under the conditions of bourgeois-democracy. Before the February 1917 revolution, which democratized the Tsarist regime apparatus, proletarian organizations had low operational liberty and the Bolshevik Party inside Russia was a mere multicellular network, not so coherent a Party in that country. Only after the February 1917 revolution did the Bolshevik cells amalgamate to form a real coherent and mobile Party of the proletariat. During the Great Patriotic War, the Red Army partisans behind Nazi Germany lines operated as cells though such stay-behind partisan formations had been formed by the orders of the Party prior to the War. Inside Nazi-occupied Eastern Europe, the communist parties had deliberately split themselves into a mainstream Party wing which operated like a real-enough Party and the multi-cells wing which operated as guerrilla cells at times connected and at times deliberately dissociated with each other so to render harder a Nazi hunt-down of such cells. Party work must be done as much as feasible, but suicide must not be committed; under the conditions of severe repression, a jump from cellularity to full-scale regular Party work can in many cases be a Trotskyite leap that benefits the secret police at the great expense of Party work and the proletarian movement. Under the conditions of a lasting legality of the Party of the proletariat, multi-cellularity would usually be a vestigial and reactionary feature that allows for each cell to operate like a bureau and hence boosting bureaucracy and conspiratoriality in the proletarian movement. The absence of a Party of the proletariat, if Party work is permitted, means the disintegration of the proletarian movement into small shreds incapable of efficient coordinated work. Under the conditions of bourgeois-democracy, the Party of the proletariat can serve as the workers' proto-state unifying the trade unions, cooperatives, and workers' councils into a coordinative revolutionary body that manages the time and place of trade union protests, the deployment of demonstrators to key positions for bogging down regime security, etc.

The struggles of the proletariat, the anti-colonial national bourgeoisie, the kolkhozniks, and/or the progressive-aligned imperialists against a reactionary regime can roll back the influence of the reactionary forces dominating that regime, allow for an expansion of the minority stake of the progressive forces over the means of violence in that state, and thus pave the way for the ascendancy, such as via democratized elections, of a progressive leader to the role of the head of that reactionary state. In such a scenario, the reactionary state has not been overthrown and the reactionary forces still retain dominance over their state, but their weakened influence has been manifested in the rise of a progressive leader as the official head of the state without such a progressive leader having a dominant stake over the regime. If a progressive leader becomes the head of a reactionary state, does that mean that communists should descend into bourgeois reformism and give up revolutionary class struggles in favor of participating in the reactionary government? No. If the official leader of a hostile and reactionary state is favorable to the genuinely progressive and revolutionary forces, that does not mean that communists should give up revolutionary class struggles and descend into bourgeois reformism, the deception of the proletariat into having faith in imperialist regimes' electoral processes. On the contrary, when the leader of a reactionary state is favorable to the progressive and anti-fascist forces, it is the duty of communists to come to the rescue of this progressive leader of the reactionary power, not through descension into bourgeois reformism, but rather through a stronger push for regime change in this reactionary power. Such a push for regime change will undermine the reactionary forces that encircle the progressive leader of the reactionary power and will therefore assist the progressive leader in enacting even a greater quantity and quality of progressive reforms. At a certain stage, if and only if the reactionary forces encircling the progressive leader of the reactionary state are sufficiently undermined, that will create the room for an expanded infiltration of the agents of the proletariat into the top ranks of the state, hence to cause a shift in the state away from its reactionary character and onto a progressive character. This will in turn smoothen the process of launching a proletarian revolution when the correct historical-material conditions arrive. Kautskyite counter-revolutionaries use the excuse of the rise to power of a progressive leader in a reactionary state as means of deluding the working class to give up its revolutionary struggles. In doing so, these Kautskyite counter-revolutionaries actually stab the progressive leader in the back, precisely by using the progressive leader's image and name as a means of sabotaging class struggles against the much more powerful reactionary forces that encircle the progressive leader. The reverse is also true; if a reactionary individual somehow manages to infiltrate the top rank of a progressive state, the imperialist and reactionary forces support this reactionary individual not through providing genuine aid to such a progressive state, but rather through intensifying their struggles against the progressive state, as means of rescuing the reactionary leader from encirclement by progressive elements. Any imperialist or reactionary ‘aid’ going to such a progressive state in such conditions would actually be used by imperialist reaction as a channel for infiltration for the purposes of sabotage, espionage, etc.

The correct policy regarding some bourgeois-democratic revolutionary states is for the socialist state to sponsor them, in part in exchange for the bourgeois-democratic revolutionary state allowing the free activity of the communist Party of that country. This the USSR did with its allied

progressive bourgeois-democratic states. The Party of the proletariat would support the pro-proletarian (including anti-colonial national bourgeois) elements of the anti-imperialist bourgeois state while engaging in confrontations against the agents of the reactionary classes in the anti-imperialist bourgeois state. Such support for the progressive classes in the anti-imperialist state must also involve the use of such support as a channel for buying positions of power and influence for the Party in the anti-imperialist bourgeois state apparatus. At the same time such confrontation with the reactionary classes and their agents in the anti-imperialist bourgeois state must be used to roll back the reactionary classes and to ensure that the Party of the proletariat gains control over at least a part of the series of positions of influence captured from the reactionary class enemies.

The Party of the proletariat must beware of the limitations of non-socialist anti-imperialist forces, to recognize that the agents of fascist reaction would exist not only in the communist organizations of the labour movement but also in the non-communist anti-imperialist organizations. Especially upon the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the respective territory, reactionary elements in the non-socialist movements allied to communists may activate cells to wage a secretive struggle to backstab the dictatorship of the proletariat. Anticipating such a conspiracy, the socialist agents of the proletariat shall utilize their support for non-socialist anti-imperialists as a means of not only confronting finance capital, but also as an intelligence channel through which to strengthen socialist bonds with the anti-imperialist agents in the non-socialist anti-imperialist movements, so to further isolate the reactionary agents in the non-communist anti-imperialist movements. Developing such a strong network and isolating the reactionary infiltrators in the non-socialist anti-imperialist movement would facilitate the suppression of such reactionary elements under the condition of the dictatorship of the proletariat. It would also facilitate the process of integrating non-socialist anti-imperialist elements into the state apparatus, though not into the Party of the proletariat itself since the latter cannot afford to demobilize and decelerate itself in favour of blatantly non-socialist dissenters.

Many incorrectly regard the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat as a purely qualitative question ('is the state a dictatorship of the proletariat or the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie?') when in fact the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat requires the leap from quantity to quality to occur. The decisive quantitative change will be in the percentage of the means of violence controlled, covertly or manifestly, by the proletariat and cooperativists vs. their enemies. The rise to dominance over the means of violence can be gradual, punctuated, or through a sudden once-and-for-all operation. Some Eastern European Peoples' Democracies, such as in Romania, were established through a process of punctuated, multi-phase, revolutionary transformation, rather than a single-step once-and-for-all operation characterizing the insurrection of the October Revolution. Yet, regardless of the process, the foundational question that distinguishes revolutionism from Kautskyite reformism is the question of whether or not the conquest of the command of the means of violence should be prioritized. The class-conscious proletarians shall seek to plant the proletarian agents at helm of the security, intelligence, and military sectors of the state, pursue a steady purge of the anti-proletarian agents within them, so to render ever more defenseless the enemies of the proletariat and to render the proletariat ever more in control of the means of violence. Increased intelligence penetration into the command of the means of violence allows the proletariat to minimize the bourgeois state opposition to the proletarian revolution. Increased influence over the means of violence also translates into increased influence over the means of communication, the media and cultural institutions, so that propaganda would be spread in favour of the cause of the proletariat whereas the anti-proletarian forces would find themselves disabled in agitating against the socialist forces.

Mistaken are they who believe that nationalization, the promotion of cooperatives, and economic centralization lack a socialist character if promoted under the conditions of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. No, the promotion of cooperatives, state ownership and centralization all are steps in the path of the expansion of the socialist mode of production albeit in a capitalist economy. They all contribute to undermining the influence of the bourgeoisie, to crippling the economic base of the class enemies of the proletariat, thus creating the breathing room and the operational freedom for the expanded role of the proletariat. And such an expansion of the role of the proletariat at the expense of the bourgeoisie catapults the agents of the proletariat into the bourgeois state, to the command of the means of violence, to the command of the military, thereby allowing the proletariat to expand their minority stake over the command of the armed forces. Recall that the means of violence entails the military-industrial backbone, the weaponry, the armed forces and the security institutions. As such, not only does the expansion of the socialist mode of production in a capitalistic economy expand socialist influence in the economy itself, it also contributes steps towards the establishment of a workers' state as a replacement of the bourgeois state.

Undoubtedly, changes in property relations, changes in the mode of production, affect the issue of which class controls how much of the means of violence. Undoubtedly, changes in property relations affect the class character of the state. Yet, much more significant is the role of the control over the means of violence in yielding changes in property relations. Among the historical-material factors, the means of violence bears more mass, and thus is more material, than property relations. The greater mass, the greater materiality, of the means of violence renders it into a more influential factor in history than property relations. Understand this: class control over the means of violence affects property relations more than vice versa. This means that the proletariat's conquest of the command of the means of violence is a priority over the expansion of the socialist property relations in the economy. Such was why Marx and Engels, and even more so Lenin and Stalin all laid heavy emphasis on the prioritization of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the control of the proletariat over the means of violence, over such things as welfare statism, nationalizations, formation of cooperatives etc.

In a capitalist economy, every step of the way in favour of nationalization and the formation of cooperatives is favourable to the cause of the proletariat, for such economic measures cripple the material base of the enemies of the proletariat. The reduction of the material influence of the bourgeoisie gives the proletariat greater leverage and allows it more freedom to catapult its agents into the command of the means of violence. Yet, the nationalization and the formation of cooperatives is a lesser priority as compared to the actual and direct focus on the conquest of the command of the means of violence by the proletariat. One of the core treasons committed by the Kautskyites is that they promote the idealist view that reforms in in property relations, a less material factor, are more important than changes in the question of the control over the means of violence, a more material factor. Through such idealism, they reverse the picture of the world, and thereupon reverse the prioritization of the means of violence over property relations. Through such a reversal of priorities, they diametrically reverse the allocation of funds, thus committing systematic economic sabotage against the cause of the proletariat.

C1S6. Economic Centralization vs. the Proliferation of Bureaucracy

An economy cannot efficiently and productively advance unless with the strong coordination of its different sectors for economic planning and operation. Yet, decentralization provides for each microeconomic body to plan and operate independently and devoid of coordination with other sectors. Coordination committees can at times be set up so to 'boost' coordination between such microeconomic bodies, but (1) the power vested in

the hands of the microeconomic bodies will allow them to circumvent or ignore the coordinated plans, and (2) the split of the power of central economic bodies into multiple microeconomic bodies results in multiplicate (i.e. duplicate, triplicate, etc.) agencies with their own multiplicate taskforces, which in turn multiplies the costs of coordination between these multiplicate taskforces. Scientific central planning maximizes coordination between the different sectors and microeconomic bodies, increasing harmony and reducing chaos, disables the microeconomic bodies from circumventing the coordinated plans, and merges multiplicate agencies into fewer agencies so to boost efficiency and to ease supervision.

A core feature of central planning is the system of material balances. The system of material balances involves centrally planning the quantities of inputs corresponding to the specific quantities of outputs: for example, X amount of rubber is needed for producing Y number of wheels for Z number of cars. The precise amounts of inputs and outputs would be calculated and measured, while also planning the production of some extra inputs or outputs to save up for reserves. Central planning through the system of material balances allows for calculating the quantities and qualities of inputs that are to be produced in different sectors of the economy, in a manner that these quantities and qualities of inputs produced in each sector of the economy correspond to the quantities and qualities of inputs produced in the other sectors of the economy. Through material balancing, therefore, the entire production of the whole economy can be planned in an organized manner, helping to minimize waste. A decentralized system works in the opposite direction. Decentralization weakens coordination, hence fomenting economic chaos. The quantities and qualities of production in the different parts of the economy would not correspond to each other. Such a lack of coordination in a decentralized economy increases bureaucratic inefficiency, while the lack of controls over inputs and outputs will reduce control over the supply thus boosting inflation. The system of material balances, through controlling the supply of inputs and outputs, also controls the price of goods derived from the level of supply.

Critics may argue that the centralization of economic decision-making into fewer larger bureaus would fail to account for local needs. What such critics fail to acknowledge, however, is that accounting for local needs is in fact almost *independent* of centralization, and insofar as it is dependent, it is favorably so. Much as how the local bureaus can engage in field work and scientific research on local needs, so too can the central bureaus establish research teams for each specific district regarding the local needs; similarly, just as there is no guarantee that the central planning bureau would feel obliged to consider local needs, there is no guarantee that the local bureau in the district would care for, let alone even research, local needs either. Thus, the argument that centralization ‘inherently’ ‘fails’ to account for local needs is baseless. Regarding information and studies of regional needs, so long as scientific research continues to be conducted for the regional needs, in no way would the centralized large bureau be at a disadvantage when compared to the previously existing regional bureaus. If anything, decentralizing the economy into these local enterprises would strengthen the bureaucrats who can afford to totally disregard local needs (more on this shortly later). Centralizing the economy weakens the corrupt bureaucrats thus reducing the tendency to disregard local needs.

The central planning commission would increase the number of qualitative and quantitative indicators so to force the enterprises to fulfill their requirements. Some critics would argue that reducing the number of qualitative and quantitative indicators in state enterprises would help the managers take initiative from below. This argument, however, does not account for the fact that the enforcement of more and more quantitative and qualitative indicators regarding production actually forces the managers to increase the quantity and quality of production. Remember – the less planned are the details of the economic plan, the wider the absence of coordination between the different economic sectors, and thus the more the resulting mismanagement, misallocations, and abuses. In this case, ‘initiative from below’ is a propagandistic euphemism for cutting coordination. Of course, the day-to-day planning of the enterprise and the tinier details of the enterprise management shall be done by the enterprise manager rather than the central planning commission, not because decentralization of such micro-level tasks to the local management is in-itself ‘good’, but because technology has not advanced to the level of efficiently centralizing the decision-making on micro-level issues. Assuming that technology has advanced to so suitable a level as to allow for the efficient central management of enterprises, then yes, even the tinier details of enterprise management should be centrally planned so to maximize enterprise efficiency. For the while, as technology has not advanced to so high a level, tactical efficiency in managing the details of the enterprise operations is to be maximized by the principle of one-person management – one main manager per each enterprise, aided by vice managers. The proletarians shall be gradually trained in management skills so that the composition of the state enterprises’ managerial cadres would grow proletarian, hence more susceptible to loyalty to communist ideas.

On the other hand, naturally, the absence of coordination in a decentralized economy and the resultant chaos and misallocations allow for many abuses that thus boost corruption and black marketeering. Centralization, by contrast, cuts corruption by reducing the mismanagement and misallocations that results from decentralization. What if the central planners themselves are corrupt? In that case, they would seek to decentralize, for decentralization increases the mismanagement that boosts corruption and multiplies the number of bureaus to so high a number that it would be difficult for anti-corruption counter-intelligence agencies to track their corrupt activities.

The concentration into fewer and fewer bureaus also facilitates anti-corruption supervision. The concentration of the economy into fewer bureaus renders it easier for supervisory bodies to monitor these fewer bureaus, whereas seeking to uncover/discover a case of economic sabotage/corruption in one bureau from among countless bureaus is like endeavouring to find a needle in a haystack. This is the reason that, contrary to the narrative of the bourgeois media, corrupt bureaucrats even in the high command of the economy in fact prefer economic decentralization, for it would help them in covering up their crimes. Money-laundering grows easier with the unnecessary multiplication of the number of bureaus. Some critics, acknowledging that centralizing bureaus into fewer bureaus reduces the number of bureaus, would counter by stating that the centralized bureau, arising out of the merger of fewer bureaus, would be so large that the sum size of these fewer bureaus would ‘equal’ the size of these many bureaus. According to this argument, these fewer but larger central bureaus would produce the ‘same’ amount of bureaucracy as the many but smaller non-central bureaus. Yet, such an argument fails to account for the ‘red tape’ phenomenon. Actually, the merger of a number of bureaus into one eliminates most of the duplicate, triplicate, etc. task units and merges their corresponding taskforces, thereby cutting the number of redundant staff and drastically cutting costs. The merger of bureaus into one and the elimination of duplicate tasks also greatly reduces the amount of paperwork for communication between these bureaus and duplicate taskforces, because, after all, the duplication has been eliminated. This is important as it implies that those notoriously bureaucratic months-long waiting periods for paperwork and formalities to be ‘processed’ would also considerably reduce. Furthermore, the reduction of costs through the elimination of unnecessary functional duplicity impedes money-laundering, since creating fake extra ‘jobs’ is a money-laundering tactic.

The concentration into fewer bureaus facilitates anti-corruption supervision. Yet, a question that arises then is: what if the counter-intelligence officers, who are tasked with supervising the centralized bureaus and purging the corrupt bureaucrats in the centralized economic bureaus, are themselves corrupt? Would that not compromise the anti-corruption purge process, and would centralization in that case not allow more room for the counter-intelligence officer’s corrupt activity? To answer this question, it is necessary to first note that while command structures exist in intelligence services, they are not so rigidly enforced in practice. Rather, intelligence services are networks in which intelligence officers of the same intelligence

service tend to spy on one another if they do not trust each other, even if they are not formally tasked with spying on one another. Lower-ranking intelligence officers would tend to report on their own bosses and would attempt to purge them if they regard their own bosses as unreliable. As such, intelligence services have a self-purging character; if the pro-corruption faction dominates the intelligence service, and so long as the historical-material circumstances are favorable to the pro-corruption faction, the latter will in time remove from power them who affiliate with the anti-corruption faction – and vice versa. Now, back to the question: what if the counter-intelligence officers, who are tasked with supervising the centralized bureaus and with purging the corrupt bureaucrats in the centralized economic bureaus, are themselves corrupt? Answer: decentralizing the economy to numerous bureaus would require numerous counter-intelligence officers to be placed for supervising the activity of each of the numerous local bureaus. By contrast, centralizing the economy into few centralized bureaus would require relatively fewer counter-intelligence officers to oversee these fewer economic bureaus. Supervising the activity of fewer counter-intelligence officers is easier than supervising the activities of numerous counter-intelligence officers. In the decentralized system, monitoring the activities of a hundred counter-intelligence officers is a hundred economic intelligence cases to study, whereas, in the centralized system, monitoring the activities of the counter-intelligence official supervising the centralized economic body is one single economic intelligence case to inspect. The sharp reduction in the quantity of economic intelligence cases to examine is itself a factor tightening the monitoring of the activities of the counter-intelligence officials. Thus, economic centralization not only facilitates the purge of corrupt bureaucrats in charge of the economic bodies but also the purge of corrupt bureaucrats in charge of intelligence matters. The members of the intelligence network unofficially oversee each other's activities even if such overseeing involves spying on an intelligence official higher in rank than oneself. The reduction in the number of bureaus and the consequent reduction in the number of supervisory intelligence officers for this specific task helps in this process of cleansing out the bad counter-intelligence officials and promoting the good ones.

The thesis that decentralizing the economy to the local levels causes the local bureaucrats to 'compete' with each other in the 'market' so to 'expand' production is no realistic argument. The corrupt bureaucrats running the local 'company'-like bureaus function as mafia oligarchs that hamper industrialization through economic sabotage, embezzlement, etc. This is a key reason for the alliance between corrupt bureaucrats and the imperialist secret services, for they both seek to undermine the productive forces of the anti-imperialist countries and countries colonized by the imperialists. In such cases, corrupt bureaucrats may have some personal rivalries much as how mafia bosses may have rivalries that can be exploited by the anti-corruption faction; corrupt bureaucrats may also outwardly denounce each other's corruption in order to present themselves as 'anti-corruption' fighters; however, in the end, these corrupt bureaucrats have a tendency to covertly cooperate with each other. The bureaucrats are a parasitic class hostile to the proletariat, cooperativists, and the anti-colonial national bourgeoisie. In the struggle against the progressive classes, and in the drive to hinder the development of the productive forces in the colonized zones, they make common cause with finance capital. Espionage for the imperialist secret services is their way of self-empowerment, for such espionage would give coordinates to imperialist armies so that the latter strikes the productive forces dominated by the progressive classes. The undermining of the progressive classes brings more power and wealth to the bureaucrats. Fascist finance capital lobbies for the decentralization of the imperialist regime's state-owned sector of the economy, for fascist finance capital seeks to promote bureaucrats in the imperialist heartland too, not just in the non-imperial parts of the world. Yet, the bureaucrats in the reaction-aligned imperialist state seek not to undermine the productive forces, particularly the military-industrial backbone, of the pro-fascist imperialist state, since such productive forces shall assist the bureaucrats in undermining the productive forces of much the rest of the world. Only in those imperialist states aligned with the progressive classes against the reaction-aligned imperialist states – only in the progress-aligned amongst imperialist heartlands will the bureaucrats seek to undermine the productive forces, for the undermining of the productive forces of a progress-aligned imperialist power shall by extension weaken the progressive classes allied to the progress-aligned imperial power, and thus will undermine the enemies of the bureaucratic class. Hence, the same bureaucratic class that, in a country dominated by the progressive classes, seeks to hamper the development of the productive forces under the sway of the progressive classes, promotes the further development of the productive forces, particularly the military-industrial backbone, in the imperialist heartland as a way of assisting the imperialist military defeat of the progressive classes hostile to the bureaucrats.

There exists a widespread misconception that bureaucracy is limited to the state-owned sector; there is no reason to believe such. Private-sector companies are not always necessarily run like bureaucratic mafia empires (though many of them are owned by finance capital, the most supreme mafia), but they sure do inherit elements of bureaucratic mismanagement – in that latter specific respect, they constitute private-sector bureaucracies that compete with each other. Competition for producing a greater quantity and quality of work is absolutely necessary for economic growth; a socialist system indeed promotes economic competition (more on this later). However, the type of a competition existing in the decentralized economy is one in which the companies are almost separate from one another; the companies therefore operate as bureaucracies that fail to coordinate the quantities and qualities of the materials they produce, thus causing economic chaos, massive amounts of waste, and bureaucratic inefficiency. Surely, corporations set up contracts with each other and have agreements in which some coordination occurs, but such coordination encompasses again only a part of the economy; the inherent spirit of bourgeois competition promoted in a decentralized system slashes incentives for a macroeconomy-wide coordination, and inevitably involves corporations attempting to undercut each other and unnecessarily hide information from each other. Hence, in that specific respect, the private corporations certainly constitute private bureaucracies; they simply are not referred to as such in the mainstream media because these corporations are not state-owned. Insofar as these private corporations succeed, it is because such private corporations themselves are extremely centralized. A car-manufacturing company could not have possibly succeeded if it had given autonomy to its tyre-production division and its engine-production division, allowing these divisions to not coordinate the quantities and qualities of their production. Decentralization in these companies would cause one division to produce, for example, 1,000 tyres (to correspond to 250 cars) but the quantities of materials produced for the rest of each car would yield materials for only 150 cars. Hence, there would exist a large discrepancy in production. That is why even these corporations refuse to liberalize their own microeconomies. The nationalization of such private-sector bureaucracies is a major step in the path of centralizing the economy and reducing bureaucracy. However, even broad state ownership alone is not enough in the longer term. A decentralized state-owned economy would eventually proliferate bureaucratic chaos, leaving room for abuse by government officials, thus allowing local state officials to establish their own independent kingdoms. For bureaucracy to reduce, the economy does not suffice to be state-owned – rather it must be further and further centralized. Greater centralization of the state-owned sector enhances the system of material balancing, thus further smoothing the coordination of the quantities and qualities of production.

In the industrial capitalist system, the overproduction of commodities drives prices down, thus causing the collapse of microeconomies. Such is the reason that the bourgeoisie eliminate a part of their own produce, so to drive up profits along with prices. In the socialist system, the absence of a drive for profits eliminates the incentives for such anti-economic measures as the destruction of the overproduced. In the market economy in which the overproduction of goods and services will drive prices down, cause losses in private company profits, and cause economic downturn; by contrast,

a state-owned centralized economy that provides full employment for all able-bodied individuals causes overproduction to be favorable the employees and society at large.

Economic decentralization, and with it corruption, naturally increases the tendency towards an end to full employment. Long-term unemployment in turn yields the rise of thievery as a source of income. It thus gives rise to the lumpen-proletariat, a class of bandits and gangs parasitically undermining production and allied to finance capital. Such bandits can then be mobilized by the fascist secret services into street clashes against the forces loyal to the cause of the proletariat. They can be mobilized for an orgy of terror against the citizens, damaging the production of a country, reducing the influence of the proletariat over the anti-imperialist state, thus strengthening the bureaucrats and paving the way for further decentralization and bureaucratization.

Controlling inflation also requires centralized control over the currency in circulation. Central state control over banking and commerce, the central plan of funds allocated to enterprises, as well as the central plan of the amounts of wages and bonuses paid to employees would all contribute to controls over the currency circulation. Eventually, by the time of the centralization of the entire economy into the control of the workers' state, the time will come for eliminating money itself and replacing it with labour credits. The difference between labour vouchers and money is that the former is based on the amount of labour whereas the latter arises out of a combination of labour and the market fluctuations in prices. Secondly, the labour credits have a one-time use, in that as soon as they are credited for purchasing a good or service, the labour credits cannot be re-used by the seller, whereas when money is used to purchase a good or service, the money can be re-used by the seller. Eliminating the seller's ability to reuse the financial funds used for purchase will help control the supply of financial funds in the economy, thus again contributing to the control of inflation, since the excess flow financial funds, such as excess money exchange, serves as a factor behind inflation. For international trade with the non-socialized or semi-socialized economies, the socialist state can utilize its labour credits to purchase currency reserves – the economy would thus be moneyless internally but money-based for external trade.

The confiscation of private mercantile businesses and the complete state ownership of commerce will also obliterate the mercantile bourgeoisie as a parasitic class allied to finance capital against the proletariat and the cooperativists. The elimination of the mercantile bourgeois mode of counter-production will thus reduce the influence of the comprador intelligence agents within the socialist state apparatus, thus allowing the latter to more easily purge the fascist spies, the spies which rely upon the comprador classes and which provide the imperialist militaries the coordinates for striking the armed forces of the dictatorship of the proletariat. As well, under the guise of imposing sanctions upon an entire state, imperialist-fascist finance capital imposes sanctions upon the progressive forces within that state apparatus, while circumventing their own sanctions so to engage in trade relations with the comprador agents within the sanctions-targeted institutions. The imperialist sanctions ostensibly against the 'entire state' would undermine the progressive classes in the state, whereas the imperialist circumvention of imperialist sanctions, aimed towards covertly boosting trade with the comprador agents, will economically sponsor the comprador classes, allowing them to elevate their influence in the sanctions-targeted state. The comprador agents would in turn provide the imperialist finance capital with information about the progressive agents' routes of circumventing the sanctions, so that the imperialist powers can tighten the siege against the progressive state. Such strategies of class economic warfare are yet more reasons behind the need for the progressive classes to maximize control over the commercial sector, so that, if imperialist sanctions are imposed, the imperialists will not have a way of circumventing their own sanctions and will be disabled from extensive trade relations with the comprador classes (such as bureaucrats with mercantile bourgeois ties) in the socialist or progressive state. The socialist agents within the imperialist state apparatus in turn must maximize efforts to ensure that the imperialist sanctions ostensibly 'also' 'targeting' the comprador parts of the 'entire' sanctions-targeted state will be actually enforced whereas the sanctions targeting the progressive classes will not be enforced. Imperialist sanctions often do increase the propaganda leverage for anti-imperialist elements in the country sanctioned; however, imperialist sanctions clearly provide political, intelligence, economic, and at times, military benefits to the comprador classes in the country sanctioned. And since the benefits that imperialism brings for the comprador agents are objectively more material than the propaganda leverage handed to the anti-imperialist elements through the sanctions, the imperialists and their comprador allies benefit on the net. Furthermore, economic benefits for the comprador classes will be translated partially to propaganda benefits (i.e. financing media campaigns) for the comprador agents, thus allowing the latter to regain the temporarily lost ground in the media wars. Even if they would not be able to directly convince the public that the comprador path is the correct path, their media power, derived from economic power 'thanks' to imperialist sanctions, would allow them to denigrate the progressive agents and to engineer splits among the latter. The anti-proletarian classes ruled by the proletariat, can use their positions in the economy to lobby for the upwards catapulting of anti-proletarian intelligence agents in the high ranks of the workers' state, in the ranks of the socialist state's military and intelligence bodies. Hence, the class enemies of the proletariat will have a significant minority stake over the means of violence. It follows that the more that the workers' state cripples the economic bases of the class enemies of the proletariat, the less will the enemies of the proletariat have a powerful intelligence network within the high ranks of the workers' state, the more the anti-proletarian intelligence agents inside the workers' state will be deprived of the material economic base upon which to rely and using which to lobby for their existence and operations in the ranks of the workers' state. Hence, the consolidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat comes about through the crippling of slavery, then feudalism, then capitalism in that exact order/sequence. A Great Purge in 1937 could not come about had the socialization and collectivization of the vast majority of the economy not occurred in 1936. The NEP weakened the vestiges of feudalism in the USSR, thus allowing for the sharp demotion of the Trotskyite left-opportunists and with them also of the Bukharinite right-opportunists. Hence, the parasitic class forces that exist inside a country assist the foreign imperialist-fascist finance capital in catapulting the agents up to the top ranks of the state. Precisely for this reason is it easier for the socialist state to purge the agents of imperialist-fascist finance capital and the corrupt officials, saboteurs and spies. Through land redistribution and NEP, feudal forces are undermined; through collectivization, the kulak class that has risen in during the NEP can be undermined; through state capitalism, private capitalism awaits; through state ownership of industry, the government extends its control over the economy; through de-marketization, the economic chaos and the parasitic mercantile capitalist forces that operate within the economy are undermined; through gradual centralization of the economy, there comes about greater de-bureaucratization; and by the time the economy becomes overwhelmingly made up of the scientific socialist centrally planned industry and collectivized agriculture – as was the case in the USSR by 1937 shortly before the Great Purge – the class forces that create the pressure from below in favor of the imperialist-fascist agents are so sufficiently weakened that the imperialist-fascist agents would no longer have as strong a base. In such a condition therefore, imperialist-fascist secret service agents would almost entirely rely on thin air. And thereby would come about the time for a great purge, through which the enemy agents can be thoroughly interrogated and duly punished. The more the workers' state gains influence over the mode of production, the easier it becomes for the proletarian faction to purge the counter-revolutionary imperialist agents that have infiltrated the workers' state. The expansion of the socialist mode of production is not just about fulfilling 'socialist ideals'; it is also a counter-intelligence strategy. This is partially why even anti-imperialist bourgeois-democratic states seek to incorporate elements of socialism into their system. This is why successful great purges of counter-

revolutionaries are mostly found in countries that not only have a dictatorship of the proletariat but also have a strongly socialist mode of production; this is to be contrasted with the countries that did not virtually wipe out the capitalist mode of production even if such countries were ruled by the dictatorship of the proletariat; in such latter countries, counter-revolutionary class forces allied to foreign finance capital continued to operate freely enough to create the pressure from below, with which to catapult the imperialist-fascist secret service agents up to the top. One misunderstanding occurring too often is that under imperialist pressure, one 'should' decentralize and liberalize the economy more, so as to 'develop' the means of production. This view is mistaken however, for under the conditions of crises and severe imperialist pressure, the economic situation would resemble war conditions – and even bourgeois states begin to centralize the economy under war conditions or under severe economic downturns. Hence, as acknowledged even by bourgeois states, the decentralization of the economy, far from solving the problem, would actually increase the problem – hence the bourgeois states' need for greater economic centralization in such conditions. Why, then, do the weaker ones from among the socialist states decentralize in the face of imperialist encirclement? The reason for such decentralization, again, is not that liberalizing the economy would actually help counter imperialist encirclement. Such decentralization in socialist states must not be interpreted as the principled communists coming to an 'understanding' that under the 'present' crisis, liberalizing the economy would 'improve' the economy and that liberalizing the economy would be 'necessary'; rather, the real situation is that under imperialist encirclement, the lobbying power of the counter-revolutionary faction – especially the liberal right-opportunist contingent – has increased, thus allowing the liberalizers to lobby for greater decentralization. Of course, as mentioned, greater decentralization and liberalization of the economy would not reduce bureaucracy and corruption, but would rather boost it, hence weakening the military-industrial backbone while getting some among the proletarians unemployed, lumpen-proletarianized, and onto the streets to join the colour-revolution against the workers' state. Sanctions are a method of economic warfare. Like military combat, economic combat is aimed at undermining the faction of a state. Imperialist economic siege and military operations together help weaken the revolutionary faction of a state while strengthening the comprador classes within the society targeted. In such situations, if the military and economic warfare inflict a severe enough damage, the counter-revolutionary faction will gain the lobbying power to impose upon the revolutionaries the project for decentralizing/liberalizing so to strengthen the bureaucrats, weaken the industrial backbone of the military, and un-employ the workers. The long-term unemployment would lead to a large lumpen-proletarian class, an army of bandits and frenzied terrorists rioting in the streets against the revolutionary state. In so doing, the counter-revolutionary lobbyist faction within the party and state apparatus will be able to not only sabotage the economy and the military-industrial complex, but would also create a colour-revolutionary pressure from below by an army of lumpen-proletarians, so to undermine the power of the workers' state, to further rollback the communist faction, and to thereby impose even more decentralization. Likewise, when an anti-imperialist country facing a dire economic situation begins to accept foreign investments by its enemies, the acceptance of the foreign investment by its enemies is not because the anti-imperialist agents in the anti-imperialist country feel 'no choice' for economic growth except for foreign investment by the enemy; rather, it is because the dire economic situation has weakened the hold of the progressive classes over the state apparatus and has elevated the position of pro-imperialist agents in the anti-imperialist country enough so to force the anti-imperialist agents to accept imperialist enemy investments. Note that the 'investments' made by the sworn enemies of an anti-imperialist state could serve as a channel for imperialist-fascist secret services' front companies; the imperialist enemy companies deployed there to 'develop' the productive forces of an anti-imperialist state are there to carry out subversion, espionage, and sabotage. That of course is in reference to imperialist enemies of an anti-imperialist country; cases occur in which the weaker bloc of finance capital powers forges an alliance with the dictatorship of the proletariat and other anti-colonial classes and invests to boost the productive forces under the sway of the progressive classes so that the progressive classes would combat the reaction-aligned imperialist rivals of the progress-aligned imperialist powers. Espionage by reaction-aligned imperialist powers will fail to occur through such imperialist 'investments' only if additional forces are applied, such as proper revolutionary surveillance mechanisms, to ensure that the 'investments' would be realized and that the imperialist agents would not be able to access sensitive information. Even in the USSR, though imperialist investments were partially realized, the imperialist 'investors' tried to engage in intelligence contacts and, to a small though considerable extent, succeeded, unfortunately.

The market system rewards the goods and services more demanded, not the ones more necessary. The reign of the market system sets conditions by which the much-needed engineers get paid less than the much-demanded actors or actresses, the production of alcohol being prioritized over the production of machines and factory pieces. The dictatorship of the proletariat, through central planning, sharply cuts the market to size and prioritizes the sectors more needed – e.g. heavy industry, engineering, technological advancements – over the less-need but more demanded sectors. The lighter object shall revolve around the heavier object. Light industry is in the orbit of heavy industry. The expansion of heavy industry, the sector concerned with producing the factory pieces (producer goods, capital goods, iron, steel), has a multiplier effect on the economy, for it not only expands heavy industry itself but also produces the materials required for setting up the light-industry factories that produce consumer goods. Even in a highly industrialized economy, what is heavier still must be at the center and what is lighter shall be in the orbit. In a highly industrialized economy, perhaps industrial growth can no longer be so extensive but it sure can be very intensive. If investments cannot be made in building new factories, investments can no doubt be made towards upgrading factories. In upgrading factories too, the heavy industry's factories are a priority. In scientific and technological advancements too, engineering, especially though not exclusively the one geared towards advancing heavy industry, is a priority. Simply put, heavy industry is always a priority, not as some temporary practical measure but as a historical law of development.

Unlike in capitalism, outputs, not profits, are the real indicators of enterprise success in a socialist economy. A dictatorship of the proletariat, through a centralized economy, establishes profits, outputs, and several other indicators as qualities and quantities to be fulfilled by the enterprise managers, but places outputs as a priority over profits. Competition should occur, not in the form of allowing state enterprises to operate as semi-independent business competing for profits, but rather in the form of state rewards for whoso performs one's tasks better, is better educated and trained, innovates creative ideas that advance production, etc. The profits generated in state enterprises can be augmented and converted into bonuses for overfulfillment of quotas. Competition in the bourgeois economy fundamentally is competition for maximizing one's profits out of one's private-sector bureaucracy; such a competition stifles production by over-emphasizing profits. By contrast, competition in the socialist system involves competing for more production as the priority.

While one must be forgiving towards genuine errors, cases occur in which counter-revolutionary managers, specialists, bureau employees, and/or ordinary workers (especially workers from bourgeois or feudal family backgrounds) engage in anti-communist industrial sabotage efforts in a variety of ways. While sabotage may take the form of deliberately causing outright explosions, it can also be in the forms of intentionally working slower than normal, misplacement of inputs, etc. Managers can cause sabotage by stealing enterprise funds, being excessively lenient on the employees and reducing discipline, hiring too many workers, over-spending on inputs, under-pricing outputs in cases of trade, false reports on the level of progress

made, acting brutal towards workers so to provoke a worker uprising, all kinds of deliberate mismanagements of schedule, promoting a culture of taking bribes, etc. Workplace specialists can commit sabotage by, for example, presenting the wrong 'information'. Corrupt bureaucrats, allied to finance capital for the objective of undermining the cause of the proletariat and hindering the development of the productive forces in the colonizable lands, are easy recruits for imperialist secret services. Their espionage for the imperialists is seen by the corrupt bureaucrats as a method of informing the foreign imperialist armies to assist the latter in waging the shadow war against the proletariat, the class enemies of the bureaucrats.

As was explained in depth prior, the anti-colonial national bourgeoisie have large businesses upon which to rely for the national-bourgeois combat against the parasitic classes. The petit-bourgeoisie have businesses too small and thus cannot afford to take the risk of standing up to the parasitic classes. The proletariat, alienated from the commodities they produce, have only their labour to sell, and thus have nothing to lose but their chains in the struggle against the parasitic classes. The petit-bourgeoisie, on the other hand, have a small business to lose. As the petit-bourgeoisie have businesses to lose and since their businesses are not so large as to afford for them the combat against the parasites, the petit-bourgeoisie tend to not stand up against the parasites. The collectivization of agriculture, on the other hand, amalgamates the small businesses of the petit-bourgeois farmers into employee-owned large businesses capable of standing up more vigorously against the parasitic classes. The large business character of such cooperatives thus gives the cooperativists characteristics of the national bourgeoisie, whereas the employee-owned character of the business renders it similar to a 'proletarian-owned enterprise'. The cooperativists thus emerge as the second most progressive class, second only to the proletariat. Collectivization, a socialistic centralization of small businesses into bigger businesses, creates a powerful class base that supports on all fronts the combat against the reactionary classes. At the same time, collectivization allows the cooperative peasants to mightily encircle the kulaks, to expand production, to render food resources cheaper, thus bankrupting the kulaks as a first step towards the elimination of the kulak mode of counter-production.

Small farms inherently have a low potential for the production of agriculture. The amalgamation of small farms into bigger farms will yield the synergetic effect of expanding agricultural production to a level higher than the sum production of small farms. Armed with the state provision of mechanical equipment and cheap loans, these collective farms will grow at the expense of the kulaks, and will produce plenty of food, a large part of which can be taken by the proletariat's state in exchange for the state provision of cheap loans and mechanical equipment. The remaining part of the produce can be sold in the market, for collective profits. The socialist state provision of cheap loans and mechanical equipment would in the first place also serve as a way of incentivizing voluntary collectivization. The industrial development of the agricultural sector, and the lift of the rural zones to the level of urban zones, will eventually bring agriculture to the threshold by which the state can gradually purchase more and more shares in the agricultural collectives so to eventually convert them into centrally planned state enterprises. Historically, geographic factors usually caused the rural centers to industrially lag behind the urban centers. Since the degree of the centralization of the economy shall be concurrent with the development of the productive forces, the relatively lower industrialization of the rural areas implies for a lower level of centralization – i.e. centralization in the form of collectivization, rather than centralization in the form of centralized state ownership. Only later, when the productive forces advance so greatly in the rural areas, would the high time come for the state purchase of collective farm shares for eventual state ownership of agriculture.

The centralization of the economy shall be concurrent with the development of the productive forces. The expansion of the productive forces serves as a material support base for the further centralization of the economy, whereas the centralization of the economy boosts the development of the productive forces. Though conceptually distinct, the centralization process and the productive forces are inextricably bound. The left-opportunists and right-opportunists both seek to present the centralization process and the development of the productive forces as two currents rivalling each other. The left-opportunists ignore the need for the development of the productive forces and advocate a dogmatic leap onto 'socialist' property relations, which sabotages the productive forces, the material base that supports centralization. Right-opportunist currents outright ignore the need for class struggle in the sphere of the economy and pseudo-'pragmatically' pretend to 'care' only about economic 'growth'. Ignoring the irrefutable superiority of socialist central planning in the development of the productive forces, the right-opportunists oppose economic centralization, thus promoting mismanagement, non-coordination, bureaucracy, and inflation. In the eyes of some, socialist property relations and the development of the productive forces are not only conceptually distinct but also materially separate. From the view of a scientific socialist, inconceivable is the separation of the struggle for centralization and the development of the productive forces. Note that as Marx and Engels showed, even private industrial capitalism developed through centralization, albeit a private-sector centralization. Modern corporations too are amalgams of smaller companies and are highly centralized in planning. It is inconceivable how industrial capitalism could ever possibly develop without at least some key elements of amalgamation and centralization.

The proletariat's conquest of the world will eventually grow the productive forces to a hyper-expanded level concurrent with the hyper-centralization of the economy. The extremely high level of centralization, which shall come with the extremely high development of productive forces, will eliminate countless duplicate functions and will merge numerous bureaus into a minimal number of large central bureaus. Such elimination of the countless duplicate functions and such mergers and amalgamations of bureaus into fewer and fewer centralized bureaus, will wither away the state. The 'withering away of the state' refers not to a return to anarchy in the age of high levels of production but rather to an extremely high level of centralization of bureaus into an integral whole, a unified single central state body. This utmost unification and centralization will be in the era of the maximal state power of the proletariat, at a time of the absence of classes antagonistic to the proletariat. That is so, because the existence of anti-proletarian classes catapults anti-proletarian agents into the proletariat's state and the absence of anti-proletarian classes will cease the existence of intra-state anti-proletarian agents that seek to block the way for the centralization of economic power under the dominance of the proletariat's state. As such, the conquest of the world by the proletariat and the expansion of socialist property relations, concurrent with the expansion of productive force, all contribute to the process of withering away the state.

C1S7. The Dialectics of Secret Service Conflict

To kill the border guard of a powerful enemy state is to provide the latter a pretext for an invasion of one's own country. To kill a thousand border guards of the powerful enemy state at once may well prevent the enemy state from attacking one's own country. To kill one low-level dissident is to provoke an uprising or backlash from the movement to which that dissident was affiliated; to kill hundreds of such dissidents at once is to spread terror so as to suppress such dissidents. Therein lies the difference between provocative terror and suppressive terror. Suppressive terror is a form of terror, often relatively large in quantity and magnitude, aimed at mightily crushing opposition, whereas provocative terror is a type of terror, often relatively small in quantity and magnitude, which does not crush the opposition but mainly provokes a backlash by such an opposition force. The reactionary classes promote both types of terror. They suppressively terrorize so to maintain their rule; in the name of the progressive forces, they

launch false flag provocative terror operations against certain groupings so to provoke such groupings into action against the progressive classes. Terror takes many tactical forms – killing, torture, and slandering are the most common among them. Killing, torture, and slanders directed towards a certain group can be used both for the suppression of that group or for the false flag provocation of that group into a backlash.

Provocative terrorism by reactionary agents within the ranks of a progressive movement provides the reactionary enemies of the progressive movement the excuse, the pretext, for an offensive. Such provision of pretexts through provocative terror has the effect of boosting morale for, and thus mobilizing and uniting, the opponents of the movement into strong action, while increasing the potential for demoralizing, demobilizing, deactivating, creating doubts and sowing dissension amongst, and reducing unity in the ranks of the supporters of the progressive movement.

To implode a movement from within, the general strategy is to reinforce two tendencies in the cause: (1) the extremists and (2) the liberalizers.

The extremists exhaust the movement and sow division through their hypocritical pseudo-purity. They play as adventurists who advocate the swift export of the cause, the absence of any negotiations or even the slightest compromise with foes, the sectarian refusal to form alliances against the greater enemy, the refusal to pursue divide and defeat strategy as advocated by Lenin, and the rejection of stage-based procession. The extremists may flatter to skies the leading proponent of the movement, while viciously slandering and conspiring against the leading proponent behind his/her back. They engage in both suppressive terror and provocative terror, although they are typically associated to the policy of provocative terror, since the latter sows division, precisely what the extremists desire. Through extremism, they exhaust the movement enough to create the setting for the liberalizers to take over. In revolutionary movements, the extremist wing constitutes the counter-revolutionaries disguised as ultra-‘revolutionaries’. The liberalizers preach equal rights and liberties to the just and the unjust, the friends and foes, while actually aiming to give those rights only to the foes, so as to open up the gates for enemy infiltration. Under the guise of ‘moderation’ and ‘reforms’, they openly challenge the fundamental principles of the movement while pretending to also belong to it. They oppose the purge of corrupt officials, embezzlers, enemy spies and saboteurs. Defeatists, they consistently concede to the enemy or even portray the enemy in a positive light. Ultimately, the liberalizers would ‘open up’ the gates of the fortress to the hordes of fascist barbarians camping outside the walls.

Dialectical inter-connections correlate extremism and liberalism, despite the appearances of contradiction between these two currents. To show extremist behaviour in one direction is to show liberalizer behaviour in another direction. This is why extremism and liberalism are inextricably bound. They are extreme ends of a horseshoe spectrum. Since there is no third side in any conflict between progress and reaction, the alignment of class interests can draw forces of different ideological appearances towards an alliance with one another. The alliance of the liberalizer vs. extremist camps is a case in point: despite the appearances of fundamental differences, the fierce hostility that both extremists and liberalizers will have towards the centrist/moderate faction of the proponents of the movement will orient the liberalizer and extremist contingents towards an alliance even if a covert or tacit alliance. The extremists play well into the hands of the liberalizers, by terrorizing the actual proponents of the movement on their behalf, and by giving liberalizers the excuse to depict the real proponents of the movement and the extremists as one. Upon exhausting the system/movement, the extremists give way to liberalizers who would then open up the system for the enemy to enter and strike. On the other side, the liberalizers would tolerate the extremists giving them the way for terrorist activity and extremism. This renders the liberalizers and extremists natural allies, backed by the enemies of the movement. Should the liberalizers and extremists succeed in gaining enough power, in the ultimate critical stage of the conspiracy though, when the counter-revolutionary coup plan is being finally carried out, the liberalizer and extremist contingents would sharply reduce their outwardly pretensions to hostility and would openly band together for striking the death blow to the cause.

Despite this covert alliance, however, the extremists and liberals, to sound credible, must pretend to be opposed to one another. And to truly appear credible in their opposition, they would not just speak but also partially act against each other. This helps the liberalizer-extremist alliance to diversify risk. Whichever of the two groupings rises to power, the liberalizer-extremist alliance would retain dominance. However, such diversification of options also carries the risk of the exploitation of outwardly differences between liberalizers and extremists by the third grouping: the faction of the proponents of the movement. Indeed, in order to appear credible as liberalizers or extremists, these two groupings have to not just speak but also really take action against one another outwardly, despite their covert conspirational alliance behind the scenes. Hence, the way to defeat this covert band of liberalizers and extremists is to maximize the exploitation of the overt pretensions of hostility between these two covertly-allied networks. The way to compel the two covert allies, the liberalizers and extremists, into acting against each other is through coopting.

In intelligence studies, ‘coopting’ refers to a process in which a bribe-and-blackmail or carrot-and-stick combination is used against a hostile agent in order to encourage-and-compel that hostile agent to fight against other hostile agents. The bribe-and-blackmail can, for example, take the form of offering the targeted hostile agent a promotion in rank (hence higher income) in exchange for that hostile agent accepting the presence of one's ‘advisors’ (i.e. spies) in the hostile agent's office both to help the hostile agent fight against other hostile agents and to ensure that the to-be-coopted hostile agent actually behaves according to how he/she was coopted to behave. The promotion is like a bribe whereas the presence of ‘advisors’ and ‘office assistants’ engaged in espionage against the hostile agent is like blackmail or threats ensuring compliance. As a result of coopting, the agents of the enemy would be compelled to fight against the enemy itself. The policy of coopting is advantageous because it allows one to use a few loyal agents in order to compel some disloyal agents to serve one's cause against the enemy's cause. The disadvantage lies in the fact that, along the way, whenever not being sufficiently surveilled, the coopted agents would use the chance to deliberately betray the mission which they were coopted to fulfill.

The way to purge the extremist and liberalizer agents in the movement is to treat them as if they are two components of a thermostat. When the class struggles need to be intensified, the proponents of the movement can ally with, and coopt, the extremists against the liberals so to intensify the class struggle and speed up the process, while also using such an alliance to purge some of the liberalizers. Subsequently, to keep the excesses of the extremists in check, the proponents of the movement can ally with, and coopt, the liberalizers so to moderate the situation and to form a majority by which the extremist minority is partially purged. Then, when the liberalizers slow things down and there is again a need for intensification, the proponents of the movement would again ally with and coopt the remnants of the extremists to speed things up and to purge some of the liberalizers. And the cycle would go on and on until the movement is purified ‘enough’ from its fifth column, all the while advancing around the optimum speed or mode of class struggle.

When revolutionaries temporarily ally with and coopt the liberalizers to counter the influence of extremists, the extremists would use the opportunity to conflate the revolutionaries and liberalizers, to depict the revolutionaries as ‘liberal’ and ‘counter-revolutionary’, and thus to undermine the revolutionaries. Vice versa is true as well: when revolutionaries ally with and coopt the extremist contingent to counter the influence of liberalizers, the liberalizers would depict revolutionaries as being the same as extremists. One additional way in which the counter-revolutionary faction propagates against the revolutionaries is through exposing the past counter-revolutionary activities (e.g. espionage, torture, terrorism, corruption) of

the liberalizer or extremist elements coopted by the revolutionaries, as means of again conflating the revolutionaries with counter-revolutionaries, hence to depict revolutionaries as spies, torturers, terrorists, corrupt officials, etc.

The demotion of powerful individuals often takes the form of moving them from the military and intelligence sector onto the economic sector and then onto the cultural and media sector. The more a person gets demoted, the more this person will feel compelled, for the sake of one's own political survival, to adopt ideological positions that are similar to those of their powerful demoters. Since the demoted person has become politically weaker, he/she has emerged easier to encircle by agents and thus easier to coopt. Hence, the demoted person would be compelled to help the demoters in purging the lower-importance sector to which the demoted person has been sent. This fact allows the demoters to, on the one hand, remove unfavorable elements from positions of higher importance while also helping to purge the lower-importance sectors.

Consider a case in which there is a power struggle between two dialectically antagonistic historical-material forces: force A, and force B. If force A firmly dominates an organization with force B being in a weak minority in the organization, then force A will obviously be able to pursue an agenda favorable to the interests of force A. In this case, force B would not dominate the organization but would have its infiltrators in this organization; in this situation, force B will maximize its efforts to sabotage the efforts of force A. If the force B's sabotage campaign is high enough, then the force A will be sufficiently weakened, leaving the power vacuum for force B to take over and to dominate the organization so firmly as to be able to reorient the organization from a direction favorable to force A's interests to a direction favorable to force B's interests. In this situation, where a qualitative change in the character of the organization has taken place, force B will cease its campaign of sabotage and will seek to strengthen the organization it dominates, further and further, since the organization's orientation has shifted. In response, force A will begin its campaign of sabotage, and will only cease such a campaign if the quantity of sabotage would be sufficient so as to yield a qualitative change in the form of the reorientation of the organization's line back to one that favors force A.

Into each state, the progressive classes and reactionary classes in each society catapult their respective agents. The agents of the progressive classes in the reactionary state cooperate with the progressive faction of the progressive state, whereas the agents of the reactionary classes in the progressive state cooperate with the reactionary faction of the reactionary state. Part of such cooperation is the transfer of intelligence materials. Such international intelligence cooperation between allied class forces renders espionage networks into partnership networks rather than rigidly-enforced command structures. Since intelligence webs are more like partnership networks as opposed to rigidly enforced command structures, the dominance of one partner over the other partner in the intelligence activity is more so determined by who controls more historical-material factors and forces; whosoever controls more historical-material factors automatically qualifies to become the senior partner in the intelligence service partnership. Intelligence services can however function like rigidly enforced command structures in the spheres that involve work in the intelligence directorates and bureaus, such as bureaus that deal with analysis of intelligence material received, bureaus that examine foreign documents, or directorates involved in psychological warfare and media analysis. There, the intelligence service employee is much more constrained virtually and physically by the environment surrounding them, causing the command structure to be much easier to enforce.

Is there such a thing as a 'former' intelligence agent? No, it virtually never is possible to be a 'former' intelligence agent. Once one becomes an intelligence agent, one remains an intelligence agent for the rest of one's life. (1) Firstly, one must remember that intelligence officers provide extensive compromising information about their own lives to specific intelligence services which they serve. As such, they make themselves extremely vulnerable to the intelligence service which they serve, and would only be able to minimize their vulnerability through systematically lying to and thus betraying their intelligence service. (2) Secondly, one must note that in exchange for service to an intelligence organization, intelligence officers also tend to receive protection from the intelligence service which they serve, although there are exceptions to this. Abandoning security-related work would leave the intelligence officer extremely vulnerable since they probably have shared much personal information to the intelligence service. Hence, such an action is extremely risky. If the intelligence service is able to catch an officer who quit serving it, the betrayer would face the severest punishments. Once an individual becomes an agent of an intelligence service, there is no way back from intelligence work.

There is, however, one way to abandon/betray an intelligence organization, and that is to become a double agent and/or to defect to a hostile intelligence organization. The hostile intelligence organization can provide the network to protect the intelligence officer who betrayed the intelligence service of which he/she was a member. For all practical purposes, therefore, being doubled or defecting is almost the only way to abandon an intelligence service. However in being doubled or defecting, obviously the intelligence officer does not abandon intelligence work in general but merely changes allegiance.

All of this is to say that intelligence agents can change allegiances but, because intelligence agents make themselves extremely vulnerable to secret services, they can virtually never retire from intelligence work, and thus can virtually never become 'former' intelligence agents. This is why, as the former advisor to Margaret Thatcher once said,:

There is of course no such thing as a 'former' intelligence officer. (The New Underworld Order: Triumph of Criminalism, Christopher Story, 2006, p. 185) (IMG)

There can be rare exceptions of course. For example, an intelligence officer may become mentally handicapped and would thus be incapable of doing intelligence work, and would thus become a 'former intelligence officer'. Another way out of intelligence work is to go hide in some highly isolated part of the planet and manage to not be found by the intelligence service which one is serving. Obviously though, these cases are extremely rare and unlikely.

C1S8. The Structure of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat

The dictatorship of the proletariat is essentially the dominance of the proletariat over the means of violence. Yet, it is necessary to clarify the structures and institutions through which this dominance of the proletariat over the means of violence is established.

The dictatorship of the proletariat requires governing bodies that represent the proletariat. Proletarian mass organizations such as factory committees, unions, and soviets (councils) are obvious choices for proletarian mass bodies that would inter-connect to form the democratic structure of proletarian statehood. However, such proletarian mass bodies are not enough. One can regard each proletarian mass body as quasi-bureaus; unions and factory committees have characteristics of quasi-bureaus; so many proletarian mass bodies, so many proletarian-influenced quasi-bureaus, cannot easily coordinate independently. Such a lack of proper coordination would be a factor which would boost bureaucratic chaos, allowing for various abuses. To ensure a proper functioning and coordination of these many proletarian mass bodies, there must be another proletarian body that tightly knits these

many separate proletarian mass organizations into a coherent whole. Therein lies the role of the Party of the proletariat. The Party of the proletariat can serve as the mobile body that entrenches itself throughout society, encompasses the proletarian mass organizations, tightly knits them to each other to minimize bureaucracy, and ensures efficiency in proletarian control over the state.

The Party of the proletariat, a political organization controlled by the revolutionary class-conscious proletarians, will also serve as the body that tightly knits the state ministries and ensures proper surveillance over the cadres of economic institutions by the agents of the proletariat. Inside the ministries, there exist certain bureaucrats. The elevation of a Party of the proletariat over the government ministries allows the proletariat an upper hand over such bureaucrats, leaving the bureaucrats at the potential mercy of the workers' state. The disintegration of the Party, or the demotion of the role of the Party of the proletariat, is a means of reducing the surveillance of the agents of the Party of the proletariat over the ministries, thus a factor allowing the elevation of the bureaucrats. Even a bureaucrat-dominated Party over which the proletariat have a large minority stake would still pose a menace to the corrupt bureaucrats, which is why the bureaucrats dominating such a Party would pursue the agenda of reducing the role of such a Party over the state as a means of reducing even the little influence which the proletarian minority faction in the Party have over the ministries.

Historical experience, large parts of which are documented in this book, shows that the percentage of the membership of proletarians in a party, even a reactionary party, positively and strongly correlates with the influence of the progressive forces in that party. Without the numerical and percentage dominance of the proletariat and its kolkhozniks in the socialist Party membership, the socialist forces would lose their influence over the Party and the latter grows strongly susceptible to dominance by the reactionary classes and strata. In the context of the socialist Party, foremost among these reactionary forces are the bureaucrats and the reactionary intelligentsia. It follows that the membership composition of the Party is vital for ensuring the dominance of the proletariat over that Party. Within the intra-Party class conflicts, the rule of a democratic majority of the proletarian and the kolkhoznik members of the Party can be consolidated via the mechanism of democratic centralism. They who have no capital and have only their labour to sell automatically qualify as proletarians, be they pink-collar (restaurants/cafes) workers or blue-collar (factories and mines) workers. However, the blue-collar workers are employed in the industrial workplaces, at the proverbial 'locomotive' of industry, thus bearing the advantage of closer association to the advancement of the productive forces.

A democratic centralist party is a party in which there is democratic freedom of discussion and intra-party democratic election of the party's leading positions. At the same time, in order to become a serious force to reckon with, a democratic centralist party would present itself to the public as a quasi-monolith in terms of the message it delivers and the policy it pursues. This means that the minority which dissents against the stance of the democratic majority in the party discussions would not publicly challenge the stance of the party, and, when intra-party discussions are finished, would not materially block the path of the Party. In a public presentation by a team of scientists presenting their findings, the sudden rebellion of one team member against the findings and conclusions presented by the rest of the team would be counter-productive, portraying the presentation as unserious and the team of scientists as no force to reckon with. In much the same ways, the publicizing of a rebellion of a minority against a Party line that has been decided by the majority presents the Party to the public as an unserious organization, not a force to reckon with. It reminisces the publicizing of a family feud which needed no publicizing. Democratic centralism adds seriousness to the Party.

There exists another very important reason for democratic centralism. Every party has two factions, the progressive faction and the reactionary faction. In some parties, the progressive faction dominates, and in others, the reactionary faction dominates. The formation of factions is inevitable. However, factions are different than sub-parties. Some promote the view that inside the Party, there should be multiple sub-parties in order to decentralize, and hence allegedly 'democratize', the Party structure. Actually, fracturing the Party into multiple sub-parties, far from 'democratizing' the Party, really entails fracturing the party into multiple parallel bureaucracies, since each sub-party would function as a bureau and bureaucracy of its own. Democratic centralism, which bans the formation of sub-parties, consolidates the Party away from such parallel bureaucracies from which Party bureaucrats thrive, thus ensuring greater efficiency for the Party of the proletariat at the expense of the fortunes of the corrupt bureaucrats in the Party. For the same reason, the existence of multiple Parties of the proletariat in the same state only brings additional parallel bureaucracy. Reduce such bureaucracy by amalgamating all the parties of the proletariat into one single Party of the proletariat. Forget not that decentralization brings more bureaucracy, not more democracy. Even more so – while in a bourgeois-democratic state, the existence of multiple parties representing multiple classes is sound – the existence of multiple parties representing antagonistic classes in a socialist state is against the very purpose of the socialist state. The socialist state is the dictatorship of the proletariat allied with the kolkhozniks, the interests of whom are almost the same; the dictatorship of the proletariat has no time for the representation of anti-proletarian parties in the workers' state.

The enemies of the socialist forces split into multiple currents so that they can hit the socialist forces from different sides. Left-opportunist and right-opportunist currents, which would have otherwise been attacking each other, join up into coalitions and launch a pincer assault, one from the left-opportunist flank and the other right-opportunist flank, against the moderate forces, the socialist centrist forces. Democratic centralism, by banning the formation of sub-parties, bans the formation of coalitions between such left-opportunists and the right-opportunists and thus renders costly the formation of such coalitions. Such coalitions do form covertly anyways, but, by being forced to be covert and secretive, they grow more costly.

For practical matters, democratic centralism would need the close cooperation, if not the complete merger, of the legislative and executive branches. The separation of these branches would foster a two-tier system of parallel bureaucracies in the socialist state, hence promoting inefficiencies and corruption. The separation of the executive branch from the legislative branch practically often results in, and is usually synonymous with, the rise of the Presidential system. The Presidential institution, with its emphasis not on the role of the Party but on the role of the individual leader, is a bourgeois vestigial institution. If the Party of the proletariat is to rule, the role of the Presidency should either be abolished or be nullified into a largely ceremonial role.

C1S9. On the 'Intermediate-Stage' State

Is 'dictatorship of the petit-bourgeoisie' possible? In some ways, yes it is possible: the laws of the state can be established such that they privilege the political rule of the petit-bourgeois organizations over the proletarian or bourgeois institutions. Sure, a state can be controlled by the petit-bourgeois class, a state can be a 'dictatorship of the petit-bourgeoisie'; but what is a 'dictatorship of the petit-bourgeoisie'? Depending on the circumstances, the petit-bourgeoisie either serve the cause of the proletariat and anti-colonial national bourgeoisie against feudal restoration, or end up as the beguiled mercenaries of the enemies of the proletariat. As such, a 'dictatorship of the petit-bourgeoisie' really is a dictatorship of the proletariat, a dictatorship of the anti-colonial national bourgeois allies of the proletariat, or a dictatorship of the comprador/imperialist enemies of the proletariat. It follows that, upon coming into existence, the control over the state of the 'dictatorship of the petit-bourgeoisie' ipso facto immediately falls into the hands of either the proletariat or the (comprador, anti-colonial national, or imperialist) bourgeoisie. Such is why the 'dictatorship of the

petit-bourgeoisie' is possible only if one defines it as a subcategory of either the dictatorship of the proletariat or the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. A 'dictatorship of the petit-bourgeoisie' as a third category separate from dictatorship of the proletariat or the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie is materially impossible and dialectically nonsensical. One must note that although the petit-bourgeoisie themselves are a class separate from the proletariat and the enemies of the proletariat, the class behaviour of the petit-bourgeoisie remains a combination of the binary of the pro-proletarian and (more so) anti-proletarian class behaviours, and not as some 'third' behaviour distinct from the pro-proletarian and anti-proletarian class behaviours. Such is why, although it is possible to have a state controlled by petit-bourgeois institutions representing the petit-bourgeois class, such a state cannot be separate from the binary of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie.

A 'dictatorship of the kolkhoz peasants', owing to its highly progressive socialist-leaning character, immediately, upon coming into existence, ends up either as a dictatorship of the anti-colonial bourgeoisie or as the dictatorship of the proletariat. A 'dictatorship of the intelligentsia', a rule of the council of philosopher kings and philosopher queens, immediately becomes most likely a dictatorship of the comprador bourgeoisie owing to the liberal pro-imperialist orientation of most of the intelligentsia. Historically, owing to the feudal background of many priests, the 'dictatorship of the priests' usually implied the dictatorship of the feudal class. There is no need to mention the dictatorship of the kulak class, the bureaucrats, etc., all of which certainly are variants of the dictatorship of the comprador bourgeoisie.

As the state encompasses the means of violence controlled by the ruling class, there can be no class-neutral state. As such, there is no intermediate stage between the dictatorship of the proletariat and the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. There can be a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie in which the proletariat have a very high level of influence and intelligence penetration – such is bourgeois-democracy. There can be a dictatorship of the proletariat in which the class enemies of the proletariat have a high level of influence over the workers' state – such are the fragile workers' states or states in the initial phases of the socialist transformation. However, ultimately, there can be no such thing as an intermediate state lying in between the state of the proletariat and the state of the class rivals of the proletariat.

The strength of the forces that favor the dictatorship of the proletariat is in part manifested in the battle over the mode of production. Like the struggle for dominance over the means of violence, the battlefield of property relations too is a quantitative gradient composed of a dialectical binary. The extensive and intensive expansion of the socialist sector of the economy entails the strengthening of the manifestation of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the realm of the economy. The more the steps towards the socialist mode of production, the more entrenched over the economy shall be the dictatorship of the proletariat. The weaker the socialist mode of production, the stronger would be the anti-proletarian class forces and hence the weaker would be the dictatorship of the proletariat. Stalin in his report on behalf of the Central Committee to the 14th Congress of the CPSU:

For all that, our system as a whole cannot yet be called either capitalist or socialist. Our system as a whole is transitional from capitalism to socialism — a system in which privately-owned peasant production still preponderates as regards volume of output, but in which the share of socialist industry is steadily growing. The share of socialist industry is growing in such a way that, taking advantage of its concentration and organisation, taking advantage of the fact that we have the dictatorship of the proletariat, that transport is in the hands of the state, that the credit system and the banks are ours — taking advantage of all this, our socialist industry, the share of which in the total volume of national production is growing step by step, this industry is advancing and is beginning to gain the upper hand over private industry and to adapt to itself and take the lead over all the other forms of economy. Such is the fate of the countryside — it must follow the lead of the towns, of large-scale industry. (Political Report of the Central Committee, The Fourteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.), Joseph Stalin, December 18-31, 1925. In: Works, Vol. 7, 1925, Publisher : Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1954. In: MIA)

Almost immediately upon establishment, the dictatorship of the proletariat can nationalize banking and commerce so to better control the flow of currency and to close many of the routes by which the comprador bourgeoisie commercially contact the imperialist powers. Yet, banking and commerce are not the only sectors in which the dictatorship of the proletariat faces obstacles. A workers' state will, in the first stages of socialist transformation, inherently meet a non-socialist economy composed of many parasitic classes. Yet, in time, the balance of power in the gradient of property relations can turn in the favour of the dictatorship of the proletariat and cooperativists at the expense of their class enemies. In time, in the battle over the mode of production, the dictatorship of the proletariat would centralize and socialize industry, further centralize the state-owned sectors, centralize the farms into cooperatives, hence to obliterate the material bases of its class foes and to entrench itself throughout the economy via the proletariat and kolkhozniks. In the middle of such a socialist economic transformation, the property relations 'system as a whole cannot yet be called either capitalist or socialist', as Stalin said.

C1S10. On Dealings with Hostile States

Left-opportunist or left-deviationist currents call for the total cultural, diplomatic, and economic boycott of the reactionary states and organizations. They are wrong.

The socialist state must engage in diplomatic relations with as many states as possible including the most reactionary fascist regimes. Such diplomatic relations open a channel for the establishment of embassies and consulates in the enemy state. These can well serve as intelligence bases for contacts with the freedom forces in the struggle against the reactionary state.

The socialist state must engage in commercial relations with the imperialist and pro-fascist countries as a method of class struggle. If properly managed, socialist commercial relations with the hostile state can assist the workers' state to obtain from its foes the capital goods necessary for the expansion of heavy industry. If there are multiple socialist states with good industries and sufficient supplies of raw materials, then the preference must be given to trade with socialist states and not with capitalist states.

As well, the socialist state can engage in commercial deals with reactionary regimes such that the trade purchases from and thus sponsors certain institutions which continue to remain under the influence of the progressive class forces in the pro-fascist country. Reactionary states do not all eliminate entirely the economic institutions under the influence of progressive classes (e.g. cooperatives). A trade that buys from and thus finances the progressive-dominated economic institutions in a reactionary state can strengthen the economic institutions that can mount opposition to the reactionary state.

Thirdly, commercial relations with a reactionary state must be as well geared towards economically sabotaging the reactionary state through legally cheating (via loopholes) against the reactionary state and using legal con art. Sometimes reactionary regimes make mistakes in their commercial deals. At other times, they are infiltrated by progressive agents which deliberately engage in economic sabotage against the reactionary regime. Such economic sabotage and con trade deals can bring forth much economically for the socialist state at the expense of its reactionary foes.

Commercial relations must also be used as points of contact for recruitment of agents or communications with progressive agents already existing in the reactionary regime apparatus.

If, however, commercial or diplomatic relations with the reactionary enemy state are imbalanced in the favour of the reactionary enemy, then the socialist state must come up with some excuse to severely cut diplomatic and trade relations with its enemies. In other words, diplomatic and trade relations with the anti-socialist state are for the purpose of advancing the proletariat's state at the expense of the sworn enemies of socialism.

The socialist forces must also participate in the institutions of the reactionary state as means of intelligence penetration. The socialist Party's participation in the electoral process, the gaining of parliamentary seats, and the obtaining of cabinet positions or other high-ranking positions especially in the military and security bodies all allow for the intelligence penetration needed for fomenting subversion against the reactionary forces that dominate a reactionary regime, so that these agents in the regime apparatus can serve as the fifth column that opens the gates to the proletarian revolutionaries, neutralizes state opposition to the communist resistance, diverts state funds away from reactionary projects onto communist front organizations, targets the allies of the reactionary regime under the guise of 'serving' the reactionary regime, provides coordinates on whom among the reactionaries to target, and facilitates a communist revolution.

If, however, the conditions for the participation of the socialist Party in the reactionary state are such that the socialist Party materially loses more than it gains from such participation and the anti-communist forces gain more than they lose, then the socialist Party must come up with a reason or excuse to cut participation.

C1S11. People's Democracy

The Peoples' Democracies were essentially of two stages. In the first stage, the People's Democracy was to be a progressive bourgeois-democracy led by the Party of the proletariat, whereas the second-stage People's Democracy was to be a dictatorship of the proletariat. The first stage would emphasize the anti-fascist and anti-imperialist unity of the progressive parties and sub-parties, as well as the promotion of private-sector capitalism against feudalism and state capitalism against private-sector capitalism. Emphasis on socialist transformation would be played down by the Party of the proletariat in favour of progressive bourgeois-democratic transformation. At the same time, in this midst, maximal efforts would be made to boost the Party of the proletariat as the leading political organization in the anti-fascist and progressive popular front, and to ensure the maximal influence of the proletarian agents over the means of violence. As a result of progressive bourgeois-democratic transformation, the feudal and fascist foes of the Party of the proletariat would be eliminated, paving the way for the transition to the dictatorship of the proletariat. Socialization and collectivization would gradually replace state capitalism and private-sector capitalism. Such an elimination of anti-proletarian classes and the promotion of the proletariat and cooperativists would steadily eliminate the economic power base of the reactionary anti-proletarian agents in the Party of the proletariat and in the progressive bourgeois-democratic parties, thus allowing for a purge of such reactionary anti-proletarian agents. The purge would consolidate the influence of the proletariat over the Party of the proletariat and the progressive parties, would glue them more firmly together, and would reduce the barriers between them. The increased influence of the proletariat over the progressive parties would render them more susceptible to the ideological influence of communism, thus paving the way for the conversion to communism of many of their members. Eventually, these parties would merge into a single socialist Party of the proletariat. A classic single-party socialist state, dominated by the communist Party of the proletariat in a republic of councils, would emerge – a dictatorship of the proletariat. The progressives who did not convert to communism could continue to serve as employees of the state apparatus, but not as members of the Party since the Party shall be ideologically pure.

Stalin's views on the first stage of People's Democratic development are instructive, for he too emphasized that socialist rhetoric and symbolism must be played down in this phase. In conversations with the East German leaders, Stalin emphasized the Socialist Unity Party, a merger of Germany's Communist Party and the Social Democratic Party, shall make minimal noises about the plans for socialist transformation, so as to not cause a riot by the anti-proletarian forces:

Comrade Ulbricht says that that would also have its consequences. So far in the GDR we were saying that we stand for democratic Germany, and did not carry out a number of measures that we would need to implement in the process of development in the direction of socialism. We also have never said that we were moving toward socialism.

Comrade Stalin says that this was correct.

Comrade Ulbricht asks whether we should continue this tactic after the deep split of Germany?

Comrade Stalin says that even now they should not shout about socialism. But production cooperatives represent little pieces of socialism. Enterprises owned by people also mean socialism.

Comrade Ulbricht says that so far we have never spoken about it, and did not point out that people's enterprises were socialist. We disguised the social relations that emerged in the GDR to some extent.

Comrade Stalin says that this mask helped you not to scare the middle class of West Germany. However, if you did not have that mask, then maybe you would have been able to pull the lowest strata of the population to your side. The workers would be glad if they found out that you nationalized the industry. Otherwise, they would say that you have the same government as the one in Bonn. One can say that the GDR has a public nationalized industry, whereas separatist capitalists--millionaires who own the industries--represent West Germany. You have to maneuver here; on the one hand, you should not scare the middle class away. But at the same time, you should not offend the workers of the West. We are selling you our joint-stock enterprises. It would be important for the German workers to know that by doing so we increased the scope of nationalized industry. Workers would be very glad to hear that. Of course, you need to maneuver and to disguise it in your relations with the middle class. If you say that you have state industry, it means that enterprises are in the hands of all the people and not in the hands of robber barons-capitalists. However, you should know for yourself that this is socialist production. Production cooperatives in the village are also little pieces of socialism. You should not make noise about it. When production cooperatives function well, all the peasants will see the benefits and the strength of cooperatives, and after that peasants will turn to the workers. But for now, you should not shout about it, because collective farms are not in your pocket yet. In my opinion, you should begin to do it. Although two states are being currently created in Germany, you should not shout about socialism at this point. You should not call these farms collective farms, but call them production cooperatives.

('Conversation between Joseph V. Stalin and SED leadership', Wilson Center, April 07, 1952, pp. 6-7. Conversation between Joseph V. Stalin and SED leadership, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Library of Congress, Dmitri Volkogonov Collection;

Chapter 2

*** IMG-All-{October Revolution & Civil War}

C2S1. The Eve of the Revolution / Bolshevik Popularity

The First World War, a war between two rival blocs of imperialist powers, was fought over (1) the issue of the conquest and exploitation of resources, and (2) undermining the productive forces of their rivals so to resolve the crises of overproduction by driving up the prices. Point 1 is easy to understand. Point 2 basically means that these imperialist powers aimed to destroy each other's military-industrial backbones so that prices would be driven upwards so that these powers could more easily profit while ensuring that their rivals would be kept militarily/industrially weak. In simpler words, point 2 means that they wanted to wreck each other so that they could have more power. The productive forces, the military-industrial backbone, was the key determinant of the amount of power each of these imperialist powers had. Obviously, the war kept changing the amount of power each of these colonial states had, because the militaries and industries of these colonial states were damaged by the war.

Hence, the balance of power in the war frequently tilted in favor of one bloc or the other. Whenever one bloc of imperial powers became weaker, it sought to form an alliance with the proletariat in order to strengthen itself in the war against the more powerful bloc of imperial powers. Against this alliance of the proletariat with the weaker bloc of imperial powers, the stronger bloc of imperial powers aligned itself with the ultra-reactionary class enemies of the proletariat, particularly the feudal landlords, the slave-owners, etc. For a brief period of time during the First World War, the balance had shifted in the favour of the Anglo-Americo-Franco-Russian bloc, which caused the German-led bloc of imperial powers to de facto align itself temporarily with the proletariat in the struggle against the reactionary class enemies of the proletariat whereas the Tsarist Russian state, the enemy of imperialist Germany, entrenched its alliance with the enemies of the proletariat. The successes of the German imperialist war effort against Tsarist Russia, however, destabilized the reactionary class forces dominating the Russian state, rolled back the reactionary class forces dominating Russia, while giving greater operational freedom for the agents of the proletariat. This resulted in the revolution of March 1917, which overthrew the Tsarist government and established a more bourgeois-democratic form of governance. The establishment of a democracy as a replacement for autocracy increased the influence of the proletariat over the Russian state, since democracy 'opens up' the state for the influence of the masses, in this case especially the proletarian masses. Throughout the territory of the Russian Empire, 'soviets' – meaning 'councils' – were established. The soviets were the councils of the workers and the mechanism through which the proletariat was to exercise its influence. Furthermore, the Bolshevik party was able to drastically increase its presence in Russia.

With the overthrow of the monarchy, the Anglo-Americo-Franco-Russian bloc did weaken but not so much as to fully tilt the balance in favour of the German-led bloc of imperial powers. Hence, Germany was still de facto on the side of the proletariat. Further successes in the German war effort only further weakened the reactionary class enemies of the proletariat in the Russian state while giving greater operational freedom for the agents of the proletariat in Russia. The result was the expansion of the influence of the Bolsheviks, the communist party in Russian Empire. October Revolution. The CIA confirmed that the workers and peasant masses were attracted to the Bolsheviks:

In March 1917 the Tsarist government collapsed because reverses suffered in the course of World War I had exposed its inherent incompetence. The moderate coalition government that succeeded it also proved unable to cope with the deteriorating military and domestic situation, and on November 7, 1917, the **Bolsheviks seized power under the slogans of peace, bread, and land for the peasants. The promise of peace appealed to the masses of the proletariat and the peasantry. The promise of bread applied to the city workers, while the poor peasants, many of whom still lacked land, were attracted by the promise of land.** (JOINT ARMY NAVY INTELLIGENCE STUDY EUROPEAN U.S.S.R. PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENT, Joint Army Navy Intelligence Group, (in CIA archives), p. X-3. Bold added) (IMG)

Since Petrograd (later renamed Leningrad) was one of the most industrial, and hence most proletarian-populated, cities in Russia, the Petrograd Soviet emerged as the most prominent of the workers' soviets. The increased operational freedom of the Bolsheviks was manifested in the expansion of Bolshevik propaganda and agitation in the workers' soviets. Quickly, the Party began to grow in influence in the soviets. The Bolshevik hostility to the reactionary war waged by the Russian regime appealed to the general masses, Bolshevik opposition to colonialism appealed to the anti-colonial national bourgeois forces, Bolshevik call for the dictatorship of the proletariat appealed to the proletarians, the Bolshevik call for land reform appealed to the peasants, and the Bolshevik call for a republic of soviets appealed to the soviets.

The CIA document 'THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917' states in its introduction that some of the remarks it makes are 'open to question'. It does not clarify exactly what kinds of remarks it regards as 'open to question', but surely one aspect of the conclusions is not 'open to question': the growth of the popularity of the Bolsheviks amongst the proletarian and peasant masses who participated in the soviets. The Bolshevik popularity is already confirmed by the US Joint Army Navy Intelligence report cited above, whose conclusions are not tentative but rather definitive. As those aspects of the remarks by the 'THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917' document are confirmed and cannot be tentative either, the relevant excerpts will be cited here to describe the process of the growth of the Bolsheviks movement amongst the masses of the Russian Empire.

Already at the time, there was much dissatisfaction with the war and the inefficiency of the Russian regime itself. The US intelligence reported:

The growth of the Party, and more importantly, the growth of its influence, was due to its skillful exploitation of social and economic discontent growing out of the war. The railway transport system had all but broken down and made the already bad food situation even worse. Prices were high. There was a general decline in industrial productivity – and consequently, in workers' incomes – owing to the wearing out of machinery, personnel turn-over, unionization of technical and administrative personnel, declining profits, and a general closing-down of factories by owners unwilling to risk their capital to increasing worker unrest. Continuing military defeats ate into morale. The Bolsheviks sent agitators into the plants and army units and organised the discontent around their slogans for "peace" and "land" and workers' control of production. The regime could not offer what the Bolsheviks demanded and promised. The Bolsheviks harped on these matters and made the regime and the parties supporting it appear both unwilling and unable to better conditions. (THE

ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917, CIA, pp. 4-5. Part of: Clandestine Communist Organization, SECRET, CIA, March 1952) (IMG)

Thus, the Bolshevik line against Russian participation in the imperialist war resonated with the masses. Anti-imperialist demonstrations reached violent proportions in Petrograd early in May. The Petrograd Committee of the Party was responsible for at least one of these. (THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917, CIA, p. 5. Part of: Clandestine Communist Organization, SECRET, CIA, March 1952) (IMG)

The struggle for peace and the rule of the Soviets increased Bolshevik Party representation in the Soviets. Indeed:

Committees in the factories and lower army units began to pass Bolshevik slogans (against the Government, etc.) and to elect Bolshevik delegates to the soviets. Party representation in the soviets grew. (THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917, CIA, p. 5. Part of: Clandestine Communist Organization, SECRET, CIA, March 1952) (IMG)

Throughout the Russian Empire, the Bolsheviks enjoyed popularity in the elections. Indeed, in the words of the US intelligence:

The Party chalked up appreciable gains in factory [committee], trade union, soviet, and municipal elections elsewhere: Finland, Kiev, Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Kronstadt, Urals; Baltic and Black Sea Fleets. (THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917, CIA, p. 9. Part of: Clandestine Communist Organization, SECRET, CIA, March 1952) (IMG)

The "Bolshevik Revolution," the CIA stated,:

was prepared for by organized penetration ... of non-Bolshevik organizations: factory committees of workers, soldiers' committees in army, units (both front-line and garrison), sailors' committees in the fleets, and the semi-official political assemblies of workers' and soldiers' representatives called "soviets." (THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917, CIA, p. 2. Part of: Clandestine Communist Organization, SECRET, CIA, March 1952) (IMG)

For example,:

In elections for district dumas in Moscow, the Party more than doubled its vote, winning about 52% of the total. The "compromisists" Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary Parties lost enormous chunks of their previous vote. Whereas the Socialist-Revolutionary candidates had won 375,000 votes in June, they got only 54,000 in October. Mensheviks dropped from 76,000 to 16,000. Significantly, the bourgeois Constitutional Democrats lost only 8,000 votes. The lower middle class stayed away from the polls, and this accounted for much of the decline of the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary votes. Evidently, considerable numbers in Moscow were either moving to the left or being politically "neutralized." It is also significant that in the Moscow garrison, Bolsheviks won 90% of the vote. (THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917, CIA, p. 8. Part of: Clandestine Communist Organization, SECRET, CIA, March 1952) (IMG)

Bolshevik influence continued to spread throughout the Russian Empire:

The Bolshevik Party, in addition to capturing control of many soviets, was able to put considerable pressure on non-Bolshevik soviets – by getting control of factory committees and having them refuse to support the soviet financially. The Bolshevik soviets similarly refused to support the [pro-regime] "compromisist" Central Executive Committee. (THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917, CIA, p. 9. Part of: Clandestine Communist Organization, SECRET, CIA, March 1952) (IMG)

"During the summer" of 1917, the US intelligence noted,:

a great number of strikes were carried out throughout the country, an increasing proportion of these were engineered by Bolshevik controlled factory committees. In most cases the strikes were local and were called in opposition to trade union leadership, which in many unions remained loyal to the regime right up to the Revolution. (THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917, CIA, p. 9. Part of: Clandestine Communist Organization, SECRET, CIA, March 1952) (IMG)

The Bolsheviks also succeeded in getting the soldiers on their side. Indeed, in the words of US intelligence:

The military success of the October Revolution was largely due to the successful subversion of the Army, particularly of the Petrograd garrison. Bolshevik political and organizing work in the Army and Navy was carried on by a Party auxiliary called the Military Organization of the Bolshevik Party. (THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917, CIA, p. 12. Part of: Clandestine Communist Organization, SECRET, CIA, March 1952) (IMG)

The Russian soldiers began to side with the Bolsheviks against the imperialist war:

On 16 July several thousand machine-gunners threw out their regimental committees, elected a Bolshevik chairman, and discussed the feasibility of an armed demonstration. They organized a provisional revolutionary committee, consisting of two men from each company, to replace the old regimental committee. They sent delegates to other units of the Petrograd garrison, to Kronstadt, and into the factories asking for support for an armed demonstration. One of the principal leaders of the machine-gunners commandeered vehicles from the factories, armed them with machine-guns, posted them at strategic points along the proposed line of march, got promises from other units that they would go with the machine-gunners. He kept the Military Organization of the Bolshevik Party informed of all his activities and sent sentries to guard Kshesinskaya Palace, where the Party had headquarters. (THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917, CIA, p. 5. Part of: Clandestine Communist Organization, SECRET, CIA, March 1952) (IMG)

Large segments of the Tsarist army were compositionally proletarianized. Feeling threatened by the rise of communist sympathies amongst the workers, the anti-proletarian classes dominating pre-socialist Russia had deliberately demoted the communistic-minded workers to the level of being soldiers and sent them to war as cannon-fodder – on the one hand, the rivals of Tsarist colonialism would be killed, and on the other hand the proletarians of the Russian Empire would be expended and killed. While such was the agenda of the regime, and while it did work to a large extent, the defeats of the Russian military weakened the reactionary enemies enough to give room for communist organization of these soldiers who came from proletarian backgrounds. Indeed,:

[one] factor that worked in the Party's favor was the fact that the Monarchy had made a practice of drafting worker malcontents for the army. Many of these had taken part in the 1905 uprising and were generally sympathetic to Bolshevik ideas. The practice also contributed to the further deterioration of economic health and the further expansion of the proletariat: unskilled peasants were brought into industrial centers to replace the drafted workers: they were less productive than the old workers and suffered the more with the economic decline. The "hereditary proletariat" that was drafted naturally sympathized strongly with the development of revolutionary sentiment among the workers who remained in the cities. A large party of the Petrograd garrison consisted of drafted workers. (THE ORGANIZATION OF

THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917, CIA, p. 15. Part of: Clandestine Communist Organization, SECRET, CIA, March 1952) (IMG)

In addition,:

Party work in the army capitalized on the peace and land slogans: the army consisted largely of peasants who, especially since the February Revolution, were easily persuaded that they had no real stake in continuation of the "imperialist war," particularly since they were suffering continual defeats. (THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917, CIA, p. 15. Part of: Clandestine Communist Organization, SECRET, CIA, March 1952) (IMG)

Owing to their petit-bourgeois class mentality, the peasant-background soldiers were less against the fascist war than the proletarian-background soldiers, and they began to doubt the very 'philosophy' of the fascist war only when the Russian Empire began to lose.

"Party agitators," the CIA remarked,:

were sent into the countryside to talk to soldiers on leave and deserters. Peasants were encouraged to seize land and engage in political activities, and to write about it to soldier relatives at the front. Conversely, Bolshevized soldiers wrote home encouraging their families to engage in the political struggle. (THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917, CIA, p. 15. Part of: Clandestine Communist Organization, SECRET, CIA, March 1952) (IMG)

Thus, in the fight for Soviet power:

Wherever Bolsheviks got control of the committee of a military command, they set up a revolutionary committee, which took control of the command, helped local soviets seize power, and prevented commanders from sending reinforcements to the aid of the regime during the uprising. (THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917, CIA, p. 16. Part of: Clandestine Communist Organization, SECRET, CIA, March 1952) (IMG)

In each soviet, there arose revolutionary guards, known as the Red Guards, on which the Bolsheviks had a large influence:

Factories organized and armed detachments of workers (Red Guards) to take part in the demonstration. Seven garrison regiments joined with the machine-gunners and workers' detachments in the march to the Tauride Palace (then the headquarters of the Soviet), carrying the slogan "All Power to the Soviet!" (THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917, CIA, p. 5. Part of: Clandestine Communist Organization, SECRET, CIA, March 1952) (IMG)

Given the overwhelming support which the Bolshevik Party enjoyed in the factory and soldiers' committees:

The Bolshevik Party gradually got control of increasing numbers of factory and soldiers' committees, which elected the members of the Soviet, and thereby got control of Soviets in the Districts of the city, and finally, of the Executive Committees of the Soviets in Petrograd, Moscow, and several other cities. (THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917, CIA, p. 4. Part of: Clandestine Communist Organization, SECRET, CIA, March 1952) (IMG)

Fearing the rise of the communists, the regime began spreading the myth that Lenin was a German agent and claimed that Lenin was financed by the German intelligence. Yet, the regime's claims contradict the intelligence report of its own ally, Britain. In this regard, the memorandum by Sir Robert Hamilton Bruce Lockhart, the prominent anti-Soviet MI6 operative and British Consul General in Moscow, is instructive. Written to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and former British Prime Minister Lord Balfour, the memorandum by the top MI6 operative states:

I shall not enter here into the vexed controversy of the Bolshevik relations with the Imperial German Government. As far as the Bolshevik leaders are concerned and, in particular, Lenin, who is the brain and guiding force of the whole movement, I have never believed in such a combination, and the documentary evidence which has recently been published by the U.S.A. Government only strengthens [my] belief. (MEMORANDUM ON THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN RUSSIA, R. H. B. Lockhart. In: Mr. Lockhart to Mr. Balfour, November 7, 1918, Received: November 8, 1918. In: Foreign Office (1917-1918), p. 36) (IMG)

Lockhart continued:

it is obvious to-day first, that even if Lenin took money from the German Government, he used it for his own ends and not for German ends, and, secondly, that Bolshevism has now gone far beyond the stage of any outside control. It is perhaps no exaggeration to say that Bolshevism is now a far greater danger to Europe than German nationalism. (MEMORANDUM ON THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN RUSSIA, R. H. B. Lockhart. In: Mr. Lockhart to Mr. Balfour, November 7, 1918, Received: November 8, 1918. In: Foreign Office (1917-1918), p. 36) (IMG)

Even Stephen Kotkin, a prominent historian and fellow of the neoconservative Hoover Institute think tank and of the Wilson Center, admitted: Lenin ... was not a German agent; he had his own agenda. ("Stalin: Paradoxes of Power, 1878-1928", Stephen Kotkin, 2014, p. 188) (IMG)

Although the Russian regime succeeded in temporarily dissuading some workers to not join the communist movement, soon enough the anti-Lenin myth was no longer believed in. From then on, the Party grew even more. "Extension of Party control in army committees," the US intelligence reported,:

proceeded exactly as in the factories by political agitation for Bolshevik slogans resulting in the election of Party men to committees of lower units; these agitated for new elections to oust "compromisist" committees of higher units. As committees were won over, more Bolshevik delegates succeeded in being elected to soldiers' sections of various soviets.... (THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917, CIA, p. 15. Part of: Clandestine Communist Organization, SECRET, CIA, March 1952) (IMG)

Then came the historic moment: the Kornilov affair. Reactionary generals, in saving the ruling classes against the coming proletarian revolution, decided to stage a coup ostensibly against the bourgeois-democratic government of Kerensky, but actually against the Petrograd Soviet. On:

July 30, Kornilov had been appointed by Kerensky to replace Brusilov, Commander in Chief of Army. (INTRODUCTION TO THE USSR, CIA, p. 32) (IMG)

Kornilov's plan was to play good cop – bad cop with Kerensky. Kerensky, the 'good cop', would be overthrown by Kornilov, the 'bad cop', and the newly established Kornilov regime would be more suppressive against the communists and the Soviets, than the Kerensky administration was. Under the guise of overthrowing Kerensky's government, Kornilov would actually direct his troops towards defeating the Bolsheviks and the Soviets, all the while covertly assisting Kerensky in pulling the strings in the new Kornilov junta to be set up. According to a document from US intelligence:

Kornilov was surrounded by political opportunists. He intended to get rid, by annihilation, of the Soviet, by military force. He tried to win the cooperation of the provisional government; but if, at the last moment, he found that he couldn't get their cooperation, he intended to get rid of both the provisional government and the Soviet. This was further complicated when a direct split was made evidence on

August 27, at a National Political Conference, attended by Kornilov. Kornilov was applauded by the conservative members. The socialist half of the delegation applauded Kerensky. (INTRODUCTION TO THE USSR, CIA, p. 32) (IMG)

Kerensky would have a place in the new Kornilov government, as confirmed by a lecture in the CIA archives:

Kornilov received the impression that Kerensky was prepared to hand over to him, Kornilov, dictatorial power in Russia, while Kerensky would be satisfied with a place in government. Kornilov agreed. (INTRODUCTION TO THE USSR, CIA, p. 33) (IMG)

Many of the Constitutional Democrats supported Kornilov. Stephen Kinzer of the CIA's anti-Soviet think tank, the 'Hoover Institute', admitted:

By summer 1917, many prominent classical liberal Constitutional Democrats would join forces on both the traditional right and the radical right in seeing a redeemer in General Lavr Kornilov, the Russian army's supreme commander. (Stalin, Vol. 1, Stephen Kotkin, 2015, p. 184) (IMG)

The dialectical laws of history dictate that when two forces have converging interests, they would have a tendency to form an alliance. The alliance between Kornilov and Kerensky was natural, despite the outwardly appearances of fundamental differences: they were both anti-Soviet and anti-Bolshevik. However, in order for an alliance to take place, there must be proper communication, something which was absent in this context. In those epoch-changing days, things were happening far too quickly and there was little time for coordination, little time for proper and thorough communication between Kerensky and Kornilov. Kornilov tried to present his proposal to Kerensky via an intermediary, Lvov. However, it is said that Lvov's transfer of Kornilov's message caused a misunderstanding, leading to the lack of coordination between Kerensky and Kornilov, and thus apparently leading to Kerensky to mistakenly distrust Kornilov:

Then Lvov presented to Kerensky the proposal as an ultimatum from Kornilov. On September 8, Kerensky called Kornilov for confirmation of the report that he had delegated Lvov to convey information of his plans and purposes. Kornilov replied affirmatively, neglecting to ask Kerensky what Lvov said to him. (INTRODUCTION TO THE USSR, CIA, p. 33) (IMG)

There were deeper reasons concerning the Kerensky-Kornilov rift. The Kerensky Administration, as a Kautskyite gang, sought to immerse itself among the proletarian mass bodies so to infiltrate them on behalf of finance capital and its allied comprador classes. In a way, the Kerensky group can be regarded as the Kornilov network's fifth column within the labour movement. Yet, such a Kautskyite immersion amongst the proletarians also meant the encirclement of these Kautskyite agents with proletarian agents. The proletarian encirclement allowed the proletarian agents to successfully coopt the Kerensky gang, forcing the latter to partially engage in policies favourable to the proletariat, one of which inevitably was partial opposition to the Kornilov group. Thus, despite the Kerensky network's alliance with the Kornilov network, the Kerensky network, thanks to cooptation by the proletariat's agents, could not entirely mobilize in favour of the Kornilov group, a factor that ended up favouring the proletariat.

In such a situation,:

Kerensky, on September 9, dismissed Kornilov as Commander-In-Chief. (INTRODUCTION TO THE USSR, CIA, p. 33) (IMG)

However:

Kornilov, on September 10, issued a proclamation to all Russian citizens refusing to give up his post and asked for support against the Provisional Government. At the same time he ordered General Krymov to move the third Cavalry Corps against Petrograd. (INTRODUCTION TO THE USSR, CIA, pp. 33-34) (IMG)

This condition of mutual distrust between two natural potential allies ultimately pushed Kerensky to form a pact with the Soviets and Bolsheviks as means of fighting back against the Kornilov coup:

Kerensky meanwhile joined forces with the left groups of the Petrograd Soviet and ordered the Petrograd garrison to prepare to fight General Krymov.

Propaganda by the Bolsheviks in the ranks of Krimov's forces had an important effect, and Bolshevik railroad workers deflected a number of Krimov's troop trains. When the two forces met, some distance outside of Petrograd, there was more fraternization than fighting. Kerensky ordered Krimov to report to Petrograd. Krimov did so.... Kornilov was arrested. In appreciation for the assistance given to him by the Petrograd Soviet, a number of the Bolshevik leaders ... were released.

(INTRODUCTION TO THE USSR, CIA, pp. 33-34) (IMG)

As mentioned, the immersion of the Kerensky network, as Kautskyite agents of the reactionary classes, amongst the proletarians went both ways: on the one hand, it meant the intelligence penetration of the Kautskyite agents of fascism within the proletarian bodies, and, on the other hand, it led to the proletarian agents' encirclement and cooptation of the Kautskyite agents in the ranks of the labour movement. The fact that the Kerensky Administration, as a pro-fascist Kautskyite anti-socialist cabinet, was compelled to ally with the proletarian mass bodies and with the Bolshevik Party against the Kautskyites' covert ally, the Kornilov group, demonstrates the level of cooptation enforced by the proletariat's agents within the Kerensky movement. It shows that the armament of the Soviet was the result of a pro-Soviet tendency pervading throughout the Kerensky regime, a proletarian current that coopted the Kerensky gang and not only forced the latter to partially democratize the system in favour of the empowerment of the Bolshevik Party but also proactively supported, or compromised the reactionary attempts to block, the armament of such proletarian mass bodies as the Soviets. Thus, even if the Kerensky group's measure against its own covert ally, the Kornilov group, was an 'accident' or strategic 'mistake' committed by Kerensky, the 'mistake' still had the deliberate non-accidental support of and enforcement by the proletarian agents within the regime. The Kautskyites, as fascist agents within the labour movement, can help in the fascist overthrow of socialism, but so too can they, as fascist agents surrounded and thus coopted by proletarians, end up as the unwilling captives used by socialism in the struggle to obliterate fascism.

Hence:

The [Kerensky] Government issued arms to the workers during the Kornilov danger. (THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917, CIA, p. 20. Part of: Clandestine Communist Organization, SECRET, CIA, March 1952) (IMG)

And the Red Guard force:

was legalized by the Kornilov affair.... (THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917, CIA, p. 20. Part of: Clandestine Communist Organization, SECRET, CIA, March 1952) (IMG)

To resist Kornilov, the Military Revolutionary Committee (MRC) was created:

On 9 September, the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet created a "Committee of Struggle against Counterrevolution" to resist Kornilov. The Bolsheviks entered this committee, which was also known as the "Military Revolutionary Committee," as a dominant minority. The district soviets passed resolutions in favor of sending representatives to the committee, establishing control over the commissars of the Government, and of organizing mobile fighting squads to arrest Kornilov's agitators. (THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917, CIA, p. 7. Part of: Clandestine Communist Organization, SECRET, CIA, March 1952) (IMG)

The Red Guards were increasingly under the control of the Bolsheviks, as it was the latter which each of the Soviets elected:

When the Red Guard was legalized, and wherever at any time the Bolsheviks dominated the local soviet, the Red Guard was able to purchase arms out of factory funds. The Military Organization of the Party obtained arms for the Red Guard from the stores of Bolshevized garrison units. (THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917, CIA, p. 20. Part of: Clandestine Communist Organization, SECRET, CIA, March 1952) (IMG)

The Bolsheviks would have already gained access to tremendous amounts of arms even without the Kornilov coup; this was because the Bolsheviks had successfully recruited numerous soldiers, who could not only become excellent fighters for the communist revolution but also had direct physical access to arms caches. The failure of the Kornilov coup did however bolster the Bolshevik-influenced armed forces.

Forget not that a liberal democratic state can directly militarily arm the very forces that shall, briefly after such armament, overthrow it. The Kerensky government's military armament of its Bolshevik and Soviet overthrowers, though as an immediate cause being upon the occasion of the Kornilov coup, bore a deep-rooted longer-term cause. A pro-fascist bourgeois-democracy, a state of an uneasy and fragile "compromise" between the proletariat and the anti-proletarian classes, had been imposed by the proletariat over the Russian regime, thus bringing forth the Kerensky government. Democratization, however, was a mere excuse by which the proletariat semi-unconsciously increased its power. That same proletarian class, ever seeking more power, lobbied to overthrow that liberal democratic order and to replace it with a dictatorship of the proletariat, a state very democratic in favour of the proletariat but not so democratic when facing the proletariat's class foes. When the reactionary classes grow fragile in liberal democracies, the latter, under the increased influence of the proletarian lobby, can go so far as to literally and directly militarily fund the very proletariat that shall violently overthrow the liberal democratic state. This is an important historical fact to remember when examining the methods by which to exploit the irony of liberal democracy.

C2S2. The 'First' Anti-Socialist Treason of Zinoviev-Kamenev Group

Finally came the time of the October Revolution. Lenin called for an insurrection to be launched, but faced the opposition of elements in the Central Committee. The US Congress's 'House Committee on Un-American Activities', an infamously anti-communist congressional body that collected intelligence materials on the communists, reported:

The Bolshevik party was, however, divided by profound divergencies; the idea of seizing power by force was rejected by so many leaders.... Among the best-known leaders of that era ... Stalin sided with Lenin; top leaders like Zinoviev and Kamenev consistently fought [against] Lenin strategy and tactics.... (Facts on Communism, Vol. 2, United States Congress, House. Committee on Un-American Activities, Chairman Francis E. Walter, January 7, 1959, p. 53) (IMG)

Zinoviev and Kamenev were anti-revolutionary spies who leaked the Party's secret to bourgeois forces. Stalin, on the other hand, stood with Lenin on the matter. Hence:

Lenin ... castigated Zinoviev and Kamenev in the sharpest terms because they had publicly (in a non-Bolshevik newspaper) disclosed the Bolshevik schemes. To him, Zinoviev and Kamenev were deserters. (...). Lenin was supported by ... Stalin. (Facts on Communism, Vol. 2, United States Congress, House. Committee on Un-American Activities, Chairman Francis E. Walter, January 7, 1959, p. 57) (IMG)

An excuse that the anti-revolutionary faction in the Party took for criminally delaying the insurrection was that the Congress of the Soviets was necessary to take place. Under the guise of sticking to the formality of the convention of the Congress of the Soviets, the anti-revolutionary faction in the Party was actually seeking to undermine the establishment of the republic of Soviets. Lenin launched polemics against this counter-revolutionary ideological view:

"Delay is criminal," Lenin said the same day in a letter to his Central Committee. Some of his comrades wanted to wait until the Second Congress of Soviets, expected to convene about November 4 [October 20], and then in the name of the congress to start the seizure of power. Lenin, the shrewd strategist, ... preferred to have it face a fait accompli:

To "wait" under such conditions is a crime.

The Bolsheviks have no right to wait for the Congress of Soviets, they must take power immediately. Thus they will save both the world revolution (for otherwise there is the danger of an agreement between the imperialists of all countries who, after the shooting in Germany, will be more agreeable to each other and will unite against us) and the Russian revolution (else a wave of real anarchy may become stronger than we are): thus they will also save the lives of hundreds of thousands of people engaged in the war.

To hesitate is a crime. To wait for the Congress of Soviets means to play a childish game of formality, a shameful game of formality; it means to betray the revolution.

(Facts on Communism, Vol. 2, United States Congress, House. Committee on Un-American Activities, Chairman Francis E. Walter, January 7, 1959, p. 56) (IMG)

No doubt, when the revolutionary situation has not come about yet, it would make sense to try to stick to formalities as much as possible. However, when the revolutionary situation has come, the rules of the game differ since revolution by nature is an illegal act, meaning that the revolutionaries are obliged not so much towards the formalities and more towards the goals of the revolution, the correct path. During the revolutionary transition phase, what is morally right takes precedence over what is formally permissible. Lenin and Stalin acknowledged this, unlike the counter-revolutionary spies, the Zinoviev-Kamenev gang and their followers. Lenin was in the end successful:

On 23 October, Lenin forced the Central Committee to take a definite stand. Only members, Zinoviev and Kamenev, voted against the resolution which made "armed insurrection... the order of the day," and called upon all Party organizations to "consider and decide all practical questions" on the basis of this decision. (THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917, CIA, p. 10. Part of: Clandestine Communist Organization, SECRET, CIA, March 1952) (IMG)

Again, the above excerpt of the CIA document is already backed up by the definitive conclusions of other documents cited.

The Party took leadership of:

the two sections of the population – the city workers, particularly in Petrograd, and the peasant-soldiers – that were potentially strong enough to overthrow the Government. (THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917, CIA, p. 2. Part of: Clandestine Communist Organization, SECRET, CIA, March 1952) (IMG)

The communists also:

got control of the army where it counted most – in the capital. When the revolutionary workers were led by the Bolsheviks to overthrow the Government, the latter found itself without effective defenses. The garrison had been subverted and either stood aside from the struggle or took the part of the workers. Bolshevik control over the workers was obtained through its normal Party apparatus: factory cells, neighborhood and city directing organs. Control over the garrison, however, was achieved by a special, secret auxiliary Party apparatus in the army and navy, the "military organization" of the Bolshevik Party. (THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917, CIA, p. 2. Part of: Clandestine Communist Organization, SECRET, CIA, March 1952) (IMG)

C2S3. The Dissolution of the Constituent Assembly

An article by the US Government's United States Information Agency (USIA) stated:

The Left SRs had already rejected the Provisional Government, agreeing with the Bolsheviks that it must be replaced by a revolutionary socialist government. However, they had felt that it was preferable to wait for the Constituent Assembly to create such a government, counting on the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, meanwhile, to defend their cause. (...). When the Bolsheviks ... succeeded in overthrowing the Provisional Government, the Left SRs were quick to join them. Feeling that the revolution was now in Bolshevik hands, the [SR] Leftists favored collaboration as a means of moderating Bolshevik policy. The rejection of this course by the rest of the party initiated a break which became final when the Leftists refused to join the rest of the party delegation in a walkout from the Congress in protest against the Bolshevik coup [read: revolution]. (The Socialist Revolutionaries, Herbert J. Ellison. In: Problems of Communism, US Information Agency, Abraham Brumberg, November-December 1967, Vol. XVI, p. 6) (IMG)

Unlike the communists/Bolsheviks who represented the proletarian masses, the Social Revolutionaries were widely regarded as the party of the agrarian petit-bourgeois majority. Hence, it was somewhat predictable that:

in any free election throughout Russia the majority of the votes would go to the anti-bolshevik Socialist Revolutionaries. The left wing of this party only became a separate entity after 19 November when its first congress met, less than a week before the date fixed for the elections to the Constituent Assembly. The lists of candidates for the elections had been prepared some time before the party had split. ("The Origin of the Communist Autocracy: Political Opposition in the Soviet State First Phase 1917–1922", Leonard Schapiro, 1954, p. 81) (IMG)

That is according to Leonard Schapiro, a WWII-era commander of the MI6, a British intelligence Lieutenant-Colonel, a member of the General Staff of the War Office and a prominent British intelligence analyst on Soviet affairs. Schapiro's student Geoffrey Swain – who served as the Alec Nove Chair in Russian and Eastern European Studies, and worked for the BBC Monitoring Service – added:

Long promised by the Provisional Government, the elections to the Constituent Assembly took place on 12 November 1917. This gave 52.3 per cent of the votes to the Socialist Revolutionary Party, and 23.6 per cent to the Bolsheviks. However, the allocation of Socialist Revolutionary Party candidates took place before the split in the SR Party and the formation in late October of the Left Socialist Revolutionaries as a separate party. The victory of the Left SRs at the Extraordinary Congress of Peasant Soviets and the Second Congress of Peasant Soviets, both held in November, suggested that they would have secured a large number of seats if able to stand in the Constituent Assembly elections. The Bolshevik-Left Socialist Revolutionary Coalition Government requested that the Constituent Assembly should recognise what it termed the 'right of recall' and allow local soviets to call by-elections where the local SR deputy was not felt to represent the popular will. When the Constituent Assembly met on 5 January 1918 it refused point blank to agree to this, and so was forcibly dissolved. (Trotsky and the Russian Revolution, Routledge, Geoffrey Swain, 2014, p. XIV) (IMG)

As the facts above show, influenced by the ideological line of the Left SR faction of their party, the SRs went ahead towards the elections, but selected the Right SR politicians of their party as the candidates for the Constituent Assembly. In other words, the SR candidates were predominantly from the Right SR, whereas the party line was predominantly shaped by the Left SR faction. During the election to the Constituent Assembly, the peasantry voted for the SR because of its Left SR-influenced party line. Given the peasants were the majority in Russia, the SR party won a decisive victory in the election. The story became complicated when, shortly prior to the elections to the Constituent Assembly, the SR party split into two new entities: the Left SRs and the Right SRs. When the SR party emerged victorious, the Right SRs controlled the seats of the Constituent Assembly but no longer represented their platform which was that of the Left SR. The facts showed, further, that had the Left SRs had their own candidates, they would have decisively won against the Right SRs. The Bolsheviks and the Left SRs who were allies by then, called for the right to recall candidates, so to allow the peasant majority's vote for Left SRs to be represented in the Constituent Assembly. The Right SRs rejected. Hence, the Constituent Assembly lost its democratic legitimacy. It was thus abolished and replaced by a popular front coalition government of the Bolsheviks and the Left SRs:

Subsequently read out of the party by the Rightist leadership, the Left SRs moved toward closer collaboration with the Bolsheviks. By an agreement reached on November 15, the Left SR-controlled peasants' soviets were merged at the top administrative level with the Bolshevik-dominated workers' soviets. Three days later a Left SR, and former head Of the Peasants' Soviet of Kazan province, A. L. Kalegaev, became Commissar for Agriculture. (The Socialist Revolutionaries, Herbert J. Ellison. In: Problems of Communism, US Information Agency, Abraham Brumberg, November-December 1967, Vol. XVI, p. 6) (IMG)

Again, as stated previously, the Bolsheviks and the Left SRs formed a **popular front coalition government** at the time. The MI6 reported:

At the same time several social revolutionary members of the Constituent Assembly from Ufa have come to Moscow and entered into relations with the Bolsheviks. Though their terms were not fully accepted by the Bolsheviks they have agreed to compromise, and these so-called Social Revolutionary leaders appear to have accepted the conditions offered them. (MEMORANDUM ON TWO TENDENCIES IN THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT, Political Intelligence Department, Foreign Office, Russia /020, February 15, 1919. In: Foreign Office (1917-1918), p. 59) (IMG)

Swain too, from the Wilson Center and BBC, reported:

The Bolshevik-Left Socialist Revolutionary Coalition Government requested that the Constituent Assembly should recognise what it termed the 'right of recall' and allow local soviets to call by-elections where the local SR deputy was not felt to represent the popular will. (Trotsky and the Russian Revolution, Routledge, Geoffrey Swain, 2014, p. XIV) (IMG)

Hence,:

When the Constituent Assembly met on 5 January 1918 it refused point blank to agree to this, and so was forcibly dissolved. (Trotsky and the Russian Revolution, Routledge, Geoffrey Swain, 2014, p. XIV) (IMG)

The Constituent Assembly was dissolved and the Bolshevik-Left-SR popular front state as a republic of soviets was firmly established.

C2S4. The Proletarian Composition of the Membership of the Bolshevik Party

The Bolshevik Party was compositionally proletarianized in membership and ranks. The Lenin-Stalin faction of the Party arose with the support of the blue-collar elements of the Party – the industrial proletarians – as well as the cooperative peasants in the struggle against the white-collar elements of the Party, the bureaucrats and intellectuals. The bureaucrats and intellectuals strengthened the Menshevik infiltrators, the Trotskyites and Bukharinites, whereas the percentage membership of the proletariat (blue-collar) was strongly correlated with the degree of influence exercised by the communist faction led by Lenin and Stalin. In the days of the October Revolution and Civil War, such was the case. Neumann, a prominent British historian, wrote:

The changes in the social composition of the Komsomol bore some analogy to those in the Bolshevik Party. Whereas by February 1917 the proportion of blue-collar workers in the party's membership had been around 60 per cent, and the combined proportion of students, intellectuals or white-collar workers about 32 per cent, by 1921 blue-collar workers had decreased significantly to only about 41 per cent. In terms of absolute numbers of members, between March 1918 and March 1921 the number of party members who were blue-collar workers rose by about 35 per cent, whereas the number of students, white-collar workers and intellectuals more than doubled. ('The Communist Youth League and the Transformation of the Soviet Union, 1917-1932', Matthias Neumann, 2011)

The increase in the percentage membership of the white-collar elements – the bureaucrats and intellectuals – was temporary. The early 1920s saw a great transformation of the Party membership in favour of the blue-collar elements. William Tompson, a high-ranking OECD-affiliated anti-Soviet researcher on the USSR and Eurasia, wrote:

Stalin's banner as the struggle to succeed Lenin got under way. The party of the mid-1920s was very different from that which had existed prior to 1917. It had grown enormously before Lenin's death, and it doubled again as a result of the 'Lenin Enrolment', a recruitment campaign initiated in 1924 to commemorate the leader's passing. Thousands of new people moved into the party and into full-time party posts in the 1920s, and they owed their advancement to Stalin. It was to him that they looked for leadership. These new recruits were more likely than the Old Bolsheviks to be workers, and they were distinguished by youth, [and] inexperience.... They had ... little patience for intellectuals and their incessant theoretical debates. Stalin, who managed the party machine, understood these changes better than any of his rivals.

With such a constituency forming within the party, Stalin was able to turn even apparent weaknesses into assets.

(Khrushchev: A Political Life, William Tompson, 2016 (originally published in 1995), p. 21) (IMG)

The 'Lenin Enrolment' had been embraced by Lenin himself in the struggle to maximize the percentage of the proletariat at the expense of the intelligentsia in the Party:

As was stipulated at the XII Congress (2.35), all decisions of a party conference had to be approved by the Central Committee. This Central Committee plenum publicly demonstrated that superior position by approving resolutions, with minor additions, adopted earlier in the month at the XIII Party Conference: on party construction, on the current tasks of economic policy, and on the 'petty bourgeois deviation' (2.38). It also took the occasion of Lenin's death to announce the 'Lenin Enrolment' of ordinary industrial workers into the party (2.39), a policy shift favoured by Lenin which tended to submerge the role of the intelligentsia in the party but also in the long run strengthened Stalin's position in relation to his various rivals. (Resolutions and Decisions of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union – Vol. 2, University of Toronto Press, collected by Richard Gregor, 1974) (IMG)

The following table provides data on the membership composition of the communist Party of the USSR.

Social Composition (in terms of class or stratum) of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in Percentages			
Date	Blue Collar Workers	Peasants	White Collar Workers (Intelligentsia, Officials, etc.)
January 1924	44.0	28.8	27.2
January 1930	65.3	20.2	14.5
July 1932	65.2	26.9	7.9

(Communist Party Membership in the USSR, Princeton University Press, sponsored by: the Russian Institute of Columbia University, published under the auspices of the 'Studies of Russian Institute', author: Thomas Henry Rigby, 1968, p. 325. Citing: Great Soviet Encyclopedia (1st edition), Vol. 11, Col. 534; Partinoye Stroitelstvo, No. 21, November 1932, p. 48; Partinaya Zhizn, No. 1, January 1962, p. 47, No. 10, May 1965, p. 11 and No. 7, April 1967, p. 8; Pravda, March 30, 1966) (IMG{Titoist Coup})

The Gorbachev agent and anti-Soviet author Volkogonov wrote:

The first decrees of the Central Committee after Lenin's death affirmed that the Party leadership 'in its struggle to build the Communist society' would make Lenin's mummy and everything associated with it one of the most important tools for accomplishing the task. A first step was the so-called 'Lenin Enrolment', or the induction into the Party of some quarter of a million factory workers. Henceforth a new element arose in people's lives: the 'struggle for the purity of Leninism' and for its 'development'. (LENIN, Dmitri Volkogonov, 1994) (IMG)

C2S5. The Popularity of the Bolshevik Governance in the Territory of the Former Russian Empire

Sir Robert Hamilton Bruce Lockhart – the prominent anti-Soviet MI6 operative and British Consul General in Moscow – in a memorandum to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and former British Prime Minister Lord Balfour, acknowledged:

Bolshevism and the Soviet idea have entered deeply into the mind of the Russian people and may be difficult to eradicate. (MEMORANDUM ON THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN RUSSIA, R. H. B. Lockhart. In: Mr. Lockhart to Mr. Balfour, November 7, 1918, Received: November 8, 1918. In: Foreign Office (1917-1918), p. 36) (IMG)

The workers, Lockhart continued, were strongly supportive of the communists. In the words of the MI6 operative:

In spite of all reports to the contrary the workmen are still true to their Bolshevik leaders. This ... is ... due ... chiefly to the fact that under the Bolshevik regime the working man is in a peculiarly favoured position. Of such food as is available he has the first choice. He

receives large wages, and his working hours are short. He complains, it is true, of the cost of living and of the dearth of food and manufactured goods. He is, however, better educated than the peasant, has been brought up on Socialistic doctrines, and readily believes that his present difficulties are due to the efforts of the capitalistic Governments of Germany and the Allies to suppress the anti-capitalistic proletariat revolution of Russia. He is inspired to a certain extent by the ideals of Bolshevism and class-warfare. (MEMORANDUM ON THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN RUSSIA, R. H. B. Lockhart. In: Mr. Lockhart to Mr. Balfour, November 7, 1918, Received: November 8, 1918. In: Foreign Office (1917-1918), pp. 35-36) (IMG)

The MI6 official's remarks regarding the communists and Soviet power, in the following paragraph, contained the usual hostile anti-Soviet propaganda. Nonetheless, as can be seen throughout the paragraph, Lockhart indeed admits that the peasants supported the communists:

It would seem at first sight that a regime of this kind would soon render itself hated to a large percentage of the population. (...). Since November of last year practically every Russian politician, and certainly every English expert on Russia, have assured us that the Bolsheviks could not last for more than a few weeks. There have been moments when the Bolsheviks believed themselves that their end was near; for example, after the first Brest peace, after the Czecho-Slovak revolt, after Count Mirbach's murder, and again on the 5th August, when Dr. Helfferich left Moscow for Berlin with the avowed purpose of persuading his Government to suppress the Bolshevik regime in Russia. In spite, however, of numerous crises the Bolshevik Government has maintained its position, and even if one makes the wildest allowances of the terroristic measures by which [the Trotskyite elements of] the Bolsheviks rule, it must be admitted that the success of Bolshevism in Russia is due to some more deep-rooted cause than the mere terrorism of a band of workmen. (...). In Russia the aristocracy and *bourgeoisie* (including the [urban] *petite bourgeoisie*) do not number more than 15 to 20 percent of the entire population and this small percentage is divided against itself into Monarchists, Constitutional Monarchists, Republicans, and [Kautskyite] Socialists. Some 70 per cent of the population, i.e. the majority of the peasantry, remain amorphous and inactive. But this very inactivity is in itself a certain advantage to the Bolsheviks whose influence amongst a non-Bolshevik peasantry is to be ascribed almost entirely to the Brest peace and the land reform. At every congress, at every Soviet election, at every meeting, the Brest peace has saved the Bolsheviks time and again. Condemned as it was by many of the Bolsheviks themselves, the Brest peace from the Bolshevik point of view is a further proof of Lenin's clear-sightedness and sagacity. The peasant is by instinct petit bourgeois, and with certain reservations it seems probable that Russia will become a land of small holdings. The peasant however, must have land. He really requires it to live, and for years almost every party has encouraged him to expect it. The Bolsheviks gave him the land – not exactly as he desired, perhaps, and without any very great security of tenure, but still without any restriction or delay. Skillfully nursed by Bolshevik propaganda, and warned by the concrete example of the Skoropadsky regime in Ukraine, he believes that counter-revolution means the restoration of the land to the landowners, and as all other parties urge him to break the Brest treaty he prefers with his limited understanding a regime which gives him both land and peace to a regime which he does not know, and which will send him back to the trenches. The result of the German occupation in the Ukraine is an example and a warning of what one may expect from a reactionary and purely military intervention in Russia. The peasant, it is true, objects strongly to the Bolshevik requisitions of grain and foodstuffs. This may lead to trouble in the future, but in his present disorganized state it is unwise to hope too much from the peasant as an anti-Bolshevik element. He might welcome a deliverer who would relieve his wants, but he will, and can do little on his own account. And certainly he does not want to do any more fighting either for himself or for anyone else. (MEMORANDUM ON THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN RUSSIA, R. H. B. Lockhart. In: Mr. Lockhart to Mr. Balfour, November 7, 1918, Received: November 8, 1918. In: Foreign Office (1917-1918), p. 35) (IMG)

The Tsarist regime, Lockhart continued, was extremely unpopular among the Soviets:

It is impossible to believe that the Russian people will ever accept Tsardom under its ancient form. Much as we like the educated Russian, we must not close our eyes to the fact that when the British press makes use of the phrase "all the best-thinking Russians," it is referring to a small minority amongst a vast ... population. Nor should it be forgotten that it is largely owing to the inherent weakness and incapacity of this class that we owe the present chaotic condition of Russia. (MEMORANDUM ON THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN RUSSIA, R. H. B. Lockhart. In: Mr. Lockhart to Mr. Balfour, November 7, 1918, Received: November 8, 1918. In: Foreign Office (1917-1918), p. 36) (IMG)

MI6 operative Lockhart was by no means alone in maintaining such stances. Another British intelligence document states that communism appealed to 80% of the peoples of the Russian Empire:

The great mistake made by so many, especially the Russians, is that the combat against Bolshevism merely consists of killing Bolsheviks and conquering the territory they occupy, whereas the fight against Bolsheviks is in reality a struggle against an idea or doctrine. It is a doctrine which appeals to the uneducated classes in Russia of which there are over 80 per cent of the total population. Bolshevism appeals to them by holding out the achievement of the ideal socialistic state in a minimum of time. (Report on the Georgian Government by Major McDonnell, Constantinople, Major McDonnell, January 27, 1919. In: Foreign Office (1917-1919), p. 57) (IMG)

As late as 1922, William Lyon Mackenzie King – who during 1921-1926 served as the Prime Minister of Canada, a member state of the British Commonwealth – admitted in his diaries:

I believe ... that the Soviet Govt. is after all the people's gov't. as vs. the corrupt autocracy and vicious secret service allied to privileged classes. (Diaries of William Lyon Mackenzie King, Saturday, January 28, 1922. Handwritten – p. 28. Item 8076 in the Library and Archives of Canada.) (IMG)

As for the Red Army, it must be stated that thanks to the influence of Lenin's faction, the terrorist activity of the Trotskyites was an anomaly, a deviation from the mainstream. Despite the serious crimes against humanity committed by the Trotskyite elements of the Red Army, the Soviet military had emerged as a force 'not altogether to be despised', as Lockhart admitted:

the Red Army ... to-day ... has become a force which is not altogether to be despised. (MEMORANDUM ON THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN RUSSIA, R. H. B. Lockhart. In: Mr. Lockhart to Mr. Balfour, November 7, 1918, Received: November 8, 1918. In: Foreign Office (1917-1918), p. 37) (IMG)

C2S6. Trotskyite Provocative 'Red' Terror: A Wedge entre the People and the Party

As the territory of the former Russian Empire was mostly agrarian, the peasants predominated. They had recently gotten land by the Soviet state, and this they appreciated immensely. However, the petit-bourgeoisie inevitably bear some class characteristics that can serve as a force of undermining communism. Unlike the proletariat who have nothing to lose but wage-slavery in the fight against finance capital, the petit-bourgeoisie are unwilling to risk their small businesses in the struggle against finance capital. The unwillingness of the petit-bourgeoisie to risk confrontation against finance capital results in a stronger presence of the reactionary anti-proletarian class forces in the agrarian areas, as in contrast to the proletarianized areas. Such a strong imperialist-fascist finance capital presence inevitably strikes the communist movement of the proletariat as well, leading to the intelligence penetration of the agents of fascism into the ranks of the Party of the proletariat. In the context of the Bolshevik revolution, the most important trend representing the intelligence penetration of fascism into the communist party was Trotskyism. More details on Leon Trotsky's intelligence activities for the MI6 will be provided shortly later, but for now, let it be known that Leon Trotsky and his gang were aiming to provoke anti-Bolshevik uprisings by carrying out 'red' terror operations and 'excesses' in the name of communism, under the crimson banner, so that the masses would confuse the Bolsheviks with the Trotskyite terror and hence launch counter-revolutionary uprisings against the Bolsheviks. Once such an uprising takes place, the Trotskyites would then open up the front in the face of such a counter-revolutionary uprising so that the Bolsheviks would be decimated.

Two major MI6 reports at the time make truly enlightening remarks regarding the factional conflict amongst the Bolsheviks. One report is by the Political Intelligence Department of the British Foreign Office, written in early 1919. The other is by Sir Robert Hamilton Bruce Lockhart – the prominent anti-Soviet MI6 operative and British Consul General in Moscow – in a memorandum to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and former British Prime Minister Lord Balfour. Both reports shed light on the fundamental clash between the factions of Lenin and Trotsky. As the Political Intelligence Department report stated:

Recently, ... the cleavage between Lenin's party on the one hand, and the party led by Trotski and Zinoviev on the other, has taken a different form. The cleavage is both on international and on internal policy. (MEMORANDUM ON TWO TENDENCIES IN THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT, Political Intelligence Department, Foreign Office, Russia /020, February 15, 1919. In: Foreign Office (1917-1918), p. 58) (IMG)

MI6 reports prove that whereas the Trotsky-Zinoviev fifth column in the Party advocated savage terrorism, wild orgies of bloodshed, mass extermination of innocents, and summary executions in the name of 'socialism', not to mention arrogant dictatorial behaviour and vicious attacks on freedom of speech and opinion, Lenin stood firmly opposed to such extremist behaviour. Instead, Lenin and his faction advocated the imprisonment of those actively engaged in hostile anti-Soviet counter-revolutionary activity, as well as the confiscation of property – the latter turned many anti-Soviet elite (bourgeois, aristocrat, etc.) families into commoners. No doubt, by confiscation of property, numerous elites-turned-commoners likely began to starve to death; but such deaths cannot be blamed on Lenin's faction of the Bolsheviks per se because extreme starvation was the condition of all the common people of war-stricken Europe, and not just the former bourgeois/aristocrat families of the newly born Soviet state. In fact, as the MI6 report suggests, when these starving Russian elite-turned-commoner families sought refuge in Sweden, even the latter country did not have the sufficient supply of resources to accommodate these individuals. Especially under such horrific conditions of mass starvation, confiscation and redistribution of elite property was the only fair, unlike the savage Trotskyite terror. Anyways, excerpts of the mentioned MI6 reports are below:

The course of events at every stage of the Bolshevik regime shows that the real power has been coming more and more into the hands of adventurers whose one desire is to enrich themselves and maintain themselves in power.

This process became clearly marked as far back as last summer. It then became known that the Central Government, controlled by Lenin, was finding it increasingly difficult to control the Extraordinary Commission under Peters. The Extraordinary Commission was entrusted with the task of combating counter-revolution, speculation, and sabotage, which, literally interpreted, meant that it could get anybody out of the way who was inconvenient. **After the attempt on Lenin's life at the end of August the Extraordinary Commission indulged in a wild orgy of bloodshed, to which Lenin, on his recovery, immediately tried to put a stop.** There seems little doubt that **Lenin's influence helped to keep the terror less savage in Moscow than it was in Petrograd, where Zinoviev was able to give free play to his passions.**

This is, therefore, one point on which **Lenin is more moderate than the extreme Bolshevik leaders, such as Trotski and Zinoviev.** **At the same time it must be remembered that, though Lenin was opposed to the wholesale executions,** he was equally in favour of crushing the bourgeoisie by other methods hardly less brutal, viz, by confiscating the whole of their property and by imprisoning them on the slightest pretext if they refused to work for the Bolshevik Government.

(MEMORANDUM ON TWO TENDENCIES IN THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT, Political Intelligence Department, Foreign Office, Russia /020, February 15, 1919. In: Foreign Office (1917-1918), p. 58. Bold added.) (IMG)

Closely linked up with Lenin's international policy is his present internal policy. Here again he differs from Trotski. It has recently been announced by the Bolshevik wireless that several Mensheviks have accepted the Bolshevik regime, and that their paper "Vperyod" ("Forward") has again been allowed to appear in Moscow. (In this connection it is interesting to note that **in Petrograd, where Zinoviev is Dictator, not even Maxim Gorki's "Novaya Zhisn" has had permission to reappear.**) (MEMORANDUM ON TWO TENDENCIES IN THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT, Political Intelligence Department, Foreign Office, Russia /020, February 15, 1919. In: Foreign Office (1917-1918), p. 59. Bold added) (IMG)

The Bolsheviks have been for some months past in the habit of **summarily executing** their active opponents, i.e. active counter-revolutionaries. Some of these sentences may be said to have been justified, as for example the shooting of the murderers of Uritsky, Mirbach, etc. Executions on a wholesale scale (i.e. systematic murders for which the Bolshevik Government can be held responsible) first began after the murder of Uritsky and the attempt on Lenin's life. On that occasion some five hundred people were shot in Petrograd, some 1920 in Moscow, and a large number in the provinces, many of them innocent people, purely as a measure of revenge and in order to terrorise the opponents of Bolshevism. In this connection, Major Wardwell, of the American Red Cross, possesses an original document of Chicherin's which might be published throughout the civilised world. In spite of their truculent answer to the Neutral Ministers, it appears certain that these executions were not wholly approved of by the Bolshevik leaders, and in particular by Lenin himself. At any rate, soon after Lenin's recovery, this particular form of terror was changed for another which is equally diabolical and even more effective. This terror consists of depriving all opponents of Bolshevism of everything they possess, and is indeed a systematic attempt to destroy every form of *bourgeoisie* in Russia. In Petrograd and Moscow the *bourgeoisie* receives practically nothing to eat. (They are placed on the fourth and lowest category of food cards.) Their houses and flats with the exception of one or two rooms have

been taken away from them and been given to the workmen. Their money has long since been confiscated. Now their very clothes with the exception of one suit, are to be requisitioned. Up to the present they have been enabled to live by selling their art treasures, their furniture, and their jewellery. Of this last resource they have been now deprived by an official decree which is only too likely to be rigorously enforced. At the present moment many *bourgeois* families are literally dying of starvation. Indeed, their situation is too deplorable for words, and what their fate will be during the coming winter defies all description. (...). In this connection I should like to point out that at the present moment it is almost impossible for the *bourgeoisie* to leave Petrograd and Moscow. Even if they succeed in obtaining a Bolshevik foreign passport, the Swedish Government is now refusing *visas* on the ground that **there is no food in Sweden for these unfortunates**. I venture to recommend that His Majesty's Government, in the interests of humanity, and also friendship to a class who did well by us at the beginning of the war, should immediately come to some arrangement with the Swedish Government whereby this obstacle can be overcome. (MEMORANDUM ON THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN RUSSIA, R. H. B. Lockhart. In: Mr. Lockhart to Mr. Balfour, November 7, 1918, Received: November 8, 1918. In: Foreign Office (1917-1918), p. 39. Bold added.) (IMG)

Already a good deal of use has been made of the above **facts** by the Socialist press abroad to show that the Bolshevik Government is now becoming more moderate and that it is receiving more widespread support. (MEMORANDUM ON TWO TENDENCIES IN THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT, Political Intelligence Department, Foreign Office, Russia /020, February 15, 1919. In: Foreign Office (1917-1918), p. 59. Bold added.) (IMG)

The fact that Lenin opposed "summary executions" and terrorism is further evidence corroborating that Lenin was not behind the execution of the Tsar and his family, who after all, were indeed summarily executed. This is further backed up by an article titled "No proof Lenin ordered last Tsar's murder" by the Daily Telegraph, a prominent British and notoriously anti-Soviet newspaper, which reported:

A long-running probe in to the murders of the last Russian Tsar and his family has closed after failing to find evidence that Lenin ordered the killings, the chief investigator has said. (No proof Lenin ordered last Tsar's murder, The Telegraph, January 17, 2011) (IMG)

Thanks to the counter-revolutionary lobbying network which he possessed within the Party, Trotsky had gained command over the Red Army, a critical position. In the Red Army too, Trotsky engaged in abusive terroristic behaviour:

Discipline has been established in the army by the same methods, and the death sentence is as common at the front as in Petrograd and Moscow. In particular, the position of the officer in the Red Army is **painful in the extreme**. Mobilised for service but mistrusted (many officers entered the Red Army some in order to gain their daily bread, others for counter-revolutionary purposes), they are placed at the head of their men find shot for the least failure of their troops. By **a recent order of Trotsky's the wives and children of officers who desert to the Allies or Czechs are thrown into prison**. (MEMORANDUM ON THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN RUSSIA, R. H. B. Lockhart. In: Mr. Lockhart to Mr. Balfour, November 7, 1918, Received: November 8, 1918. In: Foreign Office (1917-1918), p. 37. Bold added.) (IMG)

Many fake quotes were created and attributed to Lenin, in order to make it appear that Lenin endorsed barbaric terrorism against anyone who was not a communist, or anyone not a peasant or worker, etc. For example, some fake quotes were created and attributed to Lenin, in which he allegedly said that prostitutes must be slaughtered! However, at least these quotes counter the accusation:

"I have heard strange things about that from Russian and German comrades. I must tell you what I mean. I understand that in Hamburg a gifted Communist woman is bringing out a newspaper for prostitutes, and is trying to organize them for the revolutionary struggle. Now Rosa a true Communist, felt and acted like a human being when she wrote an article in defense of prostitutes who have landed in jail for violating a police regulation concerning their sad trade. They are unfortunate double victims of bourgeois society. Victims, first, of its accursed system of property and, secondly, of its accursed moral hypocrisy. There is no doubt about this. Only a coarse-grained and short-sighted person could forget this. To understand this is one thing, but it is quite another thing how shall I put it? To organize the prostitutes as a special revolutionary guild contingent and publish a trade union paper for them. Are there really no industrial working women left in Germany who need organizing, who need a newspaper, who should be enlisted in your struggle? This is a morbid deviation. It strongly reminds me of the literary vogue which made a sweet madonna out of every prostitute. Its origin was sound too: social sympathy, and indignation against the moral hypocrisy of the honorable bourgeoisie. But the healthy principle underwent bourgeois corrosion and degenerated. The question of prostitution will confront us even in our country with many a difficult problem. Return the prostitute to productive work, find her a place in the social economy that is the thing to do. But the present state of our economy and all the other circumstances make it a difficult and complicated matter. Here you have an aspect of the woman problem which faces us in all its magnitude, after the proletariat has come to power, and demands a practical solution. It will still require a great deal of effort here in Soviet Russia. But to return to your special problem in Germany. Under no circumstances should the Party look calmly upon such improper acts of its members. It causes confusion and splits our forces. Now what have you done to stop it?" (Lenin on the Women's Question, Clara Zetkin, MIA, chapter 2) (IMG)

C2S7. Trotskyite Secret Service Activities for the British Empire

Trotsky was no doubt an agent of the MI6 since the early days of the October Revolution. Several pieces of evidence when placed together prove this fact. According to a March 1918 US intelligence document sent to President Woodrow Wilson:

Lockhart ... was in daily touch with Trotsky.... (Enclosure, Gordon Auchincloss to Woodrow Wilson, March 16, 1918. In: "Gordon Auchincloss to Edith Bolling Galt Wilson". In: "The Papers of Woodrow Wilson", Vol. 47, March 13 - May 12, 1918, p. 59. From: University of Virginia Press, Rotunda) (IMG)

Another US intelligence document more than a month later added:

Lockhart, who has always been a keen supporter of Trotsky, now seems to think the latter is losing his influence. (Enclosure, Edward Mandell House, London, April 27, 1918. In: "From Edward Mandell House", New York, April 29, 1918. In: "The Papers of Woodrow Wilson", Vol. 47, March 13 - May 12, 1918, p. 465. From: University of Virginia, Rotunda) (IMG)

Thus far it has been established that Lockhart, the top MI6 operative in Russia, (1) established close contacts with Trotsky, and (2) was keenly supporting Trotsky. There is more to this. Trotsky himself actively served the interests of the British Empire knowingly and directly during the Civil

War. Among Trotsky's activities for the MI6 and against Soviet power was the fact that Trotsky advocated the British occupation of the territory that justly belonged to the Soviet Union. As noted by an April 1918 US intelligence memorandum,:

It is to be noted that the British Embassy requested this Government to send a warship to Murmansk about two weeks ago. The Department is informed that the original landing of the British at Murmansk was made with the full consent and approval of Trotsky. (Enclosure: MEMORANDUM: American Warship for Murmansk, Frank Lyon Polk to Robert Lansing, April 2, 1918. In: "The Papers of Woodrow Wilson", Vol. 47, March 13 - May 12, 1918, p. 226. From: University of Virginia Press, Rotunda) (IMG)

Some may argue that Trotsky was merely seeking to exploit inter-imperialist rivalries by getting British assistance against the German forces. This point by these critics is fundamentally wrong for two reasons: (1) back then, the imperialist Germans, who sought peace with USSR so to move troops from the Eastern Front to the Western Front, were less of a threat to Soviet power than the Anglo-American Allies who had invaded the USSR to re-install the warmongering anti-German regime of Kerensky or the Tsar. Furthermore, the balance of power was already against the German imperialists and in favor of the Anglo-Americans. In such conditions, German imperialism favoured strategic partnership with the progressive classes – including the proletariat that ruled the Soviet Union – so to regain the upper hand in the War. (2) Somewhat more obviously, **the USSR and the Germans had already signed the peace treaty of Brest-Litovsk a month prior, on March 3, 1918; the Germans were already moving troops to the Western Front and hence were no longer a threat.** When the German imperialists were no longer a threat, there was no justification whatsoever for receiving the 'aid' of the British imperial rivals of the German imperialists. It thus logically follows that Trotsky's expression of concern about the German 'threat' was merely a cover for his activities on behalf of the MI6 and against Soviet power. As late as three weeks after the March 3, 1918 Brest Litovsk treaty, the top MI6 official Lockhart remarked:

On March 27 I had a very satisfactory discussion with Trotsky, who again mentioned the possibility of allied troops being sent via Siberia to Russia. Trotsky confirmed the remarks made by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and said that Russia would welcome help from the allied countries, now that she is involved in a life and death struggle, even if to obtain this help it should become necessary for the socialist forces to fight in cooperation with the army of the imperialists. Provided that the allies would give guarantees on certain points and that *other allied forces were present* he thought there was no objection to the use of Japanese troops. I do not doubt that it is more than possible to come to an arrangement in this question, but in order to do so we must act with caution. (Enclosure 4: PARAPHRASE of telegram from Mr. Lockhart, Bruce Lockhart, Moscow, March 28, 1918. Italics original. In a US intelligence report to Robert Lansing, April, 2, 1918. In: "The Papers of Woodrow Wilson", Vol. 47, March 13 - May 12, 1918, p. 245. From: University of Virginia Press, Rotunda.) (IMG)

From here, Trotsky's collaboration and service to - not only the MI6 but also - the Japanese imperialist aggressors can be clearly observed. By the time the peace deal with Germany had been established, there was not even the slightest strategic reason for the Anglo-Franco-Japanese-American alliance to occupy the Soviet territory as 'counter-weight' against the German 'threat' because Germany was no longer a threat. Trotsky could not have missed this fact; yet, a traitor as he was, he advocated the occupation of Soviet territory by the Japanese imperialists. The loss of Sakhalin to Japan was 'thanks' to him. On April 18, 1918, the infamous British imperial leader Lord James Balfour wrote to Lord Reading:

Of late a very significant change has come over attitude at any rate of its ... Trotsky towards Allies. For sometime past he has begun to show signs that he recognises that co-operation with Allies in a war to free Russia from German domination is the only hope either for Russia or revolution or possibly for maintenance of his own power. Opinions differ as to Trotsky's honesty but he is evidently a man of decision and of late, whatever may be motives, he has not only curbed anti ally tone of Bolshevik Press but he has approved of allied co-operation at Murmansk and has suggested that British naval officers should assist in restoring discipline in Black Sea Fleet. (Arthur James Balfour to Lord Reading, London, April 18, 1918. In: "The Papers of Woodrow Wilson", Vol. 47, March 13 - May 12, 1918, p. 245. From: University of Virginia Press, Rotunda.) (IMG)

On May 1918, Trotsky once again demanded the Anglo-American-led coalition assistance for his position in the struggle against the Lenin faction, under the pretext and cover of receiving aid against the Germans:

In recent reports from our representative at Moscow you will have noticed a most important change in the attitude of Trotsky, as described in these telegrams, and an even more noticeable alteration in Mr. Lockhart's estimate of the position. The embarrassment in which Trotsky now finds himself is caused by his belief, for which there is only too much foundation, that the Allies even if asked to intervene would not be ready to give him help for a long time, while Germany is in a position to make an immediate attack. His enemies would be able to crush him completely before his friends had been able to put even one division ashore in the Far East. (Enclosure 2: PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM FROM MR. BALFOUR TO LORD READING - MAY 10TH, 1918, Handed to Robert Lansing from Lord Reading, Washington, May 11, 1918. In: "The Papers of Woodrow Wilson", Vol. 47, March 13 - May 12, 1918, p. 607. From: University of Virginia Press, Rotunda.) (IMG)

As can be seen, Trotsky was (1) closely in contact with the top MI6 operative Lockhart, (2) was supported by the top MI6 operative Lockhart, (3) and promoted the British imperial occupation of the territory of the USSR so that he, a loyal agent of fascist reaction, may succeed in the factional conflict against the agents of Soviet power. Trotsky was an agent of the British Empire. Some would argue that, based on the above evidence, Trotsky was indeed treasonously collaborating with the MI6 but that treasonous collaboration with an intelligence service does not mean being an agent of that organization and that rather it only means treasonous partnership!

Such a remark, however, demonstrates an idealistic misunderstanding of intelligence service work. Intelligence services do formally have command structures but in practice such command structures are loosely implemented. Instead, in practice, intelligence services work like partnership networks as opposed to rigidly-enforced command structure networks. The reason for this is explained by the invincible theses of the historical materialist science.

The laws of historical materialism dictate that the power of an intelligence agent is derived from the amount of historical-material factors at the disposal and under the control of the intelligence agent. The more an agent has historical-material forces under his/her control, the more the agent has 'bargaining chips' and leverage in their collaboration with the intelligence service they serve and hence the more power the agent has in the intelligence service network. An ordinary terrorist guerrilla carrying out military operations for the MI6 listens to and accepts the orders of his/her superordinate officers in the MI6 not as much because MI6 protocols dictate such, but more so because the MI6 protocols are enforced by the fact that superordinate MI6 officers have more historical-material forces at their disposal whereas the ordinary terrorist has only a few grenades and guns. By contrast, a major country's Minister of Defense who becomes an agent of the MI6 would have far more historical-material forces at his disposal

and thus can potentially have even more power than the MI6 officer that would formally act as his superordinate officer. This is why Trotsky being a partner, a willing accomplice, and a treasonous collaborator with the MI6 does indeed objectively make him an MI6 agent. Throughout the rest of his life, as shall be seen, Trotsky never really defected away from the MI6 but merely extended his intelligence activities to also serve secret services that were allied to the MI6, such as American intelligence and Nazi German intelligence.

Assisted by Trotsky, the MI6 was able to launch an assassination attempt against Lenin, almost murdering him. The British landed troops in Murmansk, an area close to Arkhangelsk. Trotsky's approval of the British invasion of Murmansk in northern Russia assisted the MI6, especially Trotsky's boss Lockhart, in its plot to assassinate top communist leaders including Lenin. The BBC reported:

In late May, the British decided to send a small military force to Archangel in northern Russia.

The official line was that the troops were going to prevent thousands of tonnes of British military equipment, supplied to the Russians, from falling into German hands.

However, documents from the day suggest that plans were later drawn up for these 5,000 British troops to join forces with 20,000 crack Latvian troops who were guarding the Kremlin but could, it was thought, be turned against the Bolsheviks.

In the summer of 1918, Lockhart sent a telegram to London following a meeting with a local opponent of the Bolsheviks called Savinkov. It read: "Savinkov's proposals for counter-revolution. Plan is how, on Allied intervention, Bolshevik barons will be murdered and military dictatorship formed."

Underneath that telegram is a note bearing the signed initials of Lord Curzon, who was then a member of the British War Cabinet.

It says: "Savinkoff's methods are drastic, though if successful probably effective, but we cannot say or do anything until intervention has been definitely decided upon."

(‘Did Britain try to assassinate Lenin?’, BBC, Mike Thomson, March 19, 2011) (IMG)

The ‘Bolshevik barons’ included Vladimir Lenin, against whom there was an assassination in the summer of 1918. The person who plotted to murder Lenin was a Social Revolutionary. Lenin was severely wounded, and was about to die, but ultimately, survived. It is a well-known fact however, that the assassination plot damaged Lenin's body enough to cause his death in 1924, only at the age of 53.

C2S8. Merger into One Party

Many of the other Social-Revolutionaries, particularly the Left SRs in the popular front coalition government, agreed to merge with the Bolshevik Party to yield a single-party state. The single-party state was not single-party in the sense of excluding and brutally suppressing the non-Bolshevik progressives, but was rather single-party in the sense that it merged the two parties into one party as a means of cutting bureaucracy. Two parties is like two bureaus. Bureaus are needed, but there is no need for parallel bureaus. Owing to their agrarian petit-bourgeois base, fascist intelligence penetration into the Left Social-Revolutionary movement was higher and thus the fascist agents among them later duly purged.

Why was it important that a single-party state in the context of a republic of soviets would be established? Why not just have a party-less state that is controlled by the workers' councils? After all, the councils were democratic bodies and the control of the workers' councils in a manner devoid of the rule of a party could on the one hand ensure the democratization of the state and on the other hand rid the country of a party bureaucracy – no? No. The Party of the proletariat is the key institution that tightly knits the numerous local workers' councils into one coherent workers' state. Without a Party that tightly knits, the workers' state would disintegrate into numerous local semi-independent soviets. The disintegrated internally-partitioned workers state would then be so weak in the face of the enemies of the proletariat that the corrupt bureaucrats – the very enemies who supposedly benefit from the rule of the Party of the proletariat – would be able to take control of much of the state and to render the workers' soviets into de facto bureaucrat-controlled ‘soviets’. Bureaucracy does exist in all institutions including in the Party of the proletariat. However, the way to reducing party bureaucracy is to increase the percentage of the communist blue-collar workers in the membership composition of the party while keeping the percentage of the white-collar workers (bureaucrats and intellectuals) low in the membership composition. And yes, the blue-collar workers percentage membership in the party did greatly increase in the years after the October Revolution. The local soviets represent the government fragments that come together to form the republic of the soviets, whereas the Party of the proletariat is the proletarian institution that glues these fragments together and ensures coherence. Worse yet, the absence of a Party of the proletariat that is accountable to the proletarians will actually enhance the powers of the non-Party-affiliated government ministers and high-ranking ministry officials, and many of these ministry officials would constitute the very bureaucratic class against whom the proletariat shall struggle; the non-existence of a party accountable to the proletariat is the non-existence of a major obstacle in the face of such bureaucrats. The elevation of the Party of the proletariat above the government ministries ensures the accountability of potential bureaucrats towards the Party of the proletariat and hence to the proletariat. It elevates the proletariat above bureaucrats.

C2S9. The Roots of Trotskyism in MI6-backed Fascism and Kautskyism / Trotsky's ties to Ze'ev Jabotinsky

The origins of Leon Trotsky's ties to fascist intelligence networks go back to many years prior to the October Revolution. Besides his extremely suspicious ties to Ze'ev Jabotinsky, who would become known as the ‘founding father’ of ‘Revisionist Zionism’ and would serve as the MI6-backed Zionist aide to the Mussolini regime in the Betar Naval Academy in Fascist Italy, Trotsky cultivated deep ties to the Menshevik Kautskyites. Nikolayev, one of the local Zionist-affiliated Jews in Ukraine, recalled:

After the first pogrom the Jewish community was shrouded in deep mourning.... Two days later my elder brother, an active member of the local Social-Democratic party, told me that the head of the party wanted to talk to me.... It was Trotsky; my brother let me in on a secret, informing me that Trotsky had returned from abroad and was conducting revolutionary activities throughout the Ukraine from Kiev. From time to time he also visited Nikolayev to encourage the local revolutionaries who remained faithful to him from the days—years ago—when he had been their leader, as yet in his former name – Bronstein.... Trotsky invited me into his room and asked me to give him a detailed report of the students' meeting which took place at the Technicum on the day of the pogrom. Instead of showing interest in the details of the pogrom and the reasons for the impotence of the Russian defenders, he asked me to relate to him as fully as I could the speeches and the deliberations of the students, and then, referring to the question of self-defense, informed me contentedly: "You should know that we have entered into an agreement with the heads of the local Zionists with the object of establishing a common self-defense organization. This will consist of your Zionist friends and members of the Russian Social-Democratic party. You and your brother will serve as liaison officers between our forces and those of the Zionists. It is my request that, as soon as new outbreaks occur, you should hasten to my apartment to receive full instructions, as the situation will warrant." Indeed, a week later members of the Black Hundred in our town made an attempt to organize a new pogrom, but this time they were met by strong and well-organized defense

forces.... Trotsky's apartment served as headquarters. The first news we received by telephone was quite encouraging, but at noon the pogromists were joined by a number of policemen and armed cossacks, and the defenders applied to headquarters with a request for more arms Trotsky provided arms to all places attacked.... However, later on disappointment set in, for our belief that our "ally," the Russian Social-Democrats, personified by the great and famous revolutionary Trotsky, would supply us with most of the arms needed for our defense, had been misplaced.... Two days later, when I called again on Trotsky and raised before him the matter of arms supply, he had this advice to proffer: "I am informed from reliable sources that your leader Jabotinsky has successfully organized the Jewish self-defense group in Odessa and that it is provided with plenty of arms. Apply to him and ask him to allot at least part of this supply for your branch organization." Having no alternative, we decided to send a delegation to Jabotinsky without delay asking for his assistance. (My Meeting with Trotsky in Matters Relating to Jewish Self-Defense, HaBoker (Tel Aviv), Nahum Yerushalmi, January 6, 1950. Cited in: 'Trotsky and the Jews', Joseph Nedava, pp. 60-61) (IMG)

While Ze'ev Jabotinsky's death squads and the anti-Semitic pogromists were both agents of fascist finance capital, they did officially oppose each other, because Jabotinsky promoted a Jewish supremacist line and the pogromists were anti-Semitic. The superficial contradiction between the Jabotinsky ideology and the anti-Jew terrorists could be exploited and arms could be obtained from that terrorist for a real self-defense against pogroms. To exploit such a contradiction for anti-fascist purposes is to pursue a correct policy line. However, considering Trotsky's consistently pro-fascist intelligence service activity, the military ties to Jabotinsky are unlikely to have been for self-defense against pogroms and probably had ulterior motives. Forget not that Jabotinsky at some point ended up as a military ally of Petlura, the head of the pogromist White Guards.

Leon Trotsky used his left-opportunist phrase-mongering to spearhead the struggle against communism in an alliance with the right. Indeed, Lenin himself said that Trotsky was the uniter of the (left-opportunist and right-opportunist) enemies of communism:

Trotsky groups all the enemies of Marxism.... Trotsky unites all to whom ideological decay is dear, all who are not concerned with the defence of Marxism; all philistines who do not understand the reasons for the struggle and who do not wish to learn, think, and discover the ideological roots of the divergence of views. At this time of confusion, disintegration, and wavering it is easy for Trotsky to become the 'hero of the hour' and gather all the shabby elements around himself, the more openly this attempt is made, the more spectacular will be the defeat. (Letter to the Russian Collegium of the Central Committee of the RSDLP, Marxist Internet Archive, Lenin, 1910)

Trotsky was infamous for his deliberate vacillations and in the fact that he was the bridge between the rightist Mensheviks and the traitorous elements among the Bolsheviks. Lenin wrote with regards to the year 1903:

At the end of 1903, Trotsky was an ardent Menshevik.... (Disruption of Unity under Cover of Outcries for Unity, Lenin, 1914. MIA) (IMG)

In the period 1904-1905, Trotsky:

deserted the Mensheviks and occupied a vacillating position, ... now proclaiming his absurdly Left "permanent revolution" theory. (Disruption of Unity under Cover of Outcries for Unity, Lenin, 1914. MIA) (IMG)

A CIA Office Memorandum admitted:

Prior to the actual establishment of the Fourth International, the basis for its existence was created by the rift among the leaders in the Russian Revolution of 1917. Pre-revolution maneuvering among the Russian Marxists had produced the right wing Mensheviks and the left wing Bolsheviks, the latter headed by Lenin. Trotsky, in 1910, had placed himself in a position between those extremes. In 1917 he aligned himself with the Bolsheviks.... (THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL, Office Memorandum, CIA, November 15, 1953, p. 1) (IMG)

As confirmed by Lenin, the left-deviationist Trotsky had formed an alliance with the right-deviation as early as February 1917 in order to undermine the so-called 'Zimmerwald Left', the alliance of anti-imperialist progressives and communists. Lenin said:

What a swine this Trotsky is – **Left phrases, and a bloc with the Right against the Zimmerwald Left!!** He ought to be exposed (by you) if only in a brief letter to *Sotsial-Demokrat!* (To: Alexandra Kollontai, Vladimir Lenin, February 17, 1917. Bold added.) (IMG)

Before then, Trotsky had formed a bloc with the right-deviation in the labour movement in 1912:

In the period of disintegration, after long "non-factional" vacillation, he again went to the right, and in August 1912, he entered into a bloc with the liquidators. He has now deserted them again.... (Disruption of Unity under Cover of Outcries for Unity, Lenin, 1914. MIA) (IMG)

As can be seen, **Leon Trotsky, the leftist reactionary, had formed an alliance with the rightist reaction as part of the general secret service strategy of pincer assault on communist centrism.** The left-wing Menshevik Trotsky would attack anti-imperialism from the left, whereas the right-wing Mensheviks would attack it from the right. The leftist reaction would attack it for not being 'communistic enough' whereas the rightist reaction would attack it for being 'too communistic'.

Since Trotsky was a Menshevik who at times made himself appear as a Bolshevik, he could be an excellent channel for Menshevik infiltration into the Bolshevik movement. And since the Mensheviks were serving the MI6 (see, for example, C4S4), what more natural than that Trotsky, the Menshevik infiltrator into the Bolshevik movement, would be an agent of the MI6 as well! And he was. At the time, the Bolsheviks accepted Trotsky's fake 'defection' away from the Mensheviks because through Trotsky, they were able to pit the left-wing Mensheviks against the mainstream, right-wing Mensheviks. Hence, the acceptance of Trotsky into the Bolshevik movement helped to engineer division among the Mensheviks. Therefore, initially, the acceptance of Trotsky was beneficial. It was no mistake. However, the course of the war damaged the Bolshevik movement, thereby giving greater leverage to Trotsky, which is what allowed him to commit his sabotage. The split engineered between the left-wing Mensheviks and the right-wing Mensheviks undoubtedly assisted the Bolshevik war effort, weakened the enemies of the Bolsheviks, and thereby prevented further damage from being caused to the socialist Soviet state.

In any case, in spite of the advantages of securing the defection of the left-wing Mensheviks and containing the left-wing Mensheviks inside the Party of the proletariat rather than allowing the Mensheviks to have a large troop count, the disadvantages obviously existed. Through the MI6 agent Trotsky, a counter-revolutionary anti-Soviet Trotskyite intelligence service continued its operations and was presented as the series of intelligence directorates of the Red Army. In particular, through infiltrating his operatives into the counter-intelligence sector, which was the most critical of the intelligence service branches since it was the branch meant to hunt down spies and traitors, the MI6 agent Trotsky compromised and undermined a portion of the Soviet Union's covert line of defense against enemy infiltration. The CIA reported:

Trotsky ... organized the Red Army and its military and counterintelligence components. (...). His entire adult life in the conspirational underground had been a rehearsal for revolutionary counterintelligence. The bulky folders of his correspondence of 1917 to 1921 include many messages which reveal his dominant position in starting the Soviet secret services. He recruited and placed in the Red Army political commissars as adjuncts or staffers of the military intelligence units. In addition, he commandeered Cheka representatives for joint operations with the political commissars and the Red Army intelligence staffs. ('LEON TROTSKY, DUPE OF THE NKVD', Rita T. Kronenbitter. In: 'STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE', Vol. 16, No. 1, Special Edition, CIA, 1972, pp. 16-17) (IMG)

Thus, when we speak of Trotsky, we speak not of just one man but a faction, a network of agents. And let it be known that they did not distinguish based on class, so long as it was a reactionary class; they served the kulaks, feudal lords, slave-owners, bureaucrats, comprador mercantile bourgeoisie, comprador financial bourgeoisie, imperialist finance capital, imperialist mercantile capital, etc. Ultimately, Trotskyism served finance capital but like all reactionary currents, was not particularly limited to being based on finance capital per se.

Over time, Lenin, who already despised Trotsky, expanded the role of Joseph Stalin. The anti-Soviet Ian Grey, a Naval Intelligence officer of the British Empire and British Parliamentary official, admitted:

At the start of the war, Trotsky had exercised wide independent authority; by the time of the Polish War, he was to be found in Moscow and directly under Lenin's control.

Increasingly, Lenin had come to rely on Stalin, who was in most things the antithesis of Trotsky. He rarely addressed the troops or meetings of any kind, but when he did, he spoke in simple terms. He was the realist, who coldly assessed men and situations, and was usually sound in his conclusions. He remained calm and self-possessed. He was difficult only in his antagonisms toward certain people and when his advice was rejected. While demanding that others obey orders, he himself did not hesitate on occasions to be insubordinate, for he readily set his judgment above that of others. But he learned, too, that in war, a supreme commander, exercising unquestioned authority, was essential to victory. He never forgot this lesson.

(Stalin: Man of History, Ian Grey, originally published 1940, new edition 2017) (IMG)

Trotsky, himself agreeing that Joseph Stalin played a critical role in ensuring the victory of the communists during the Civil War, placed Stalin in charge of many war affairs:

In later years, when seeking every pretext to denigrate Stalin, Trotsky wrote contemptuously of his role in the Civil War. It is clear, however, from contemporary sources, including Trotsky's papers, that he had then rated Stalin high as a military organizer. In times of crisis when party interests and the revolutionary cause transcended personal rivalries, he turned to him. During the Polish War, for example, when anxious about an attack by Wrangel from the Crimea, Trotsky recommended that "Comrade Stalin should be charged with forming a new military council with Egorov or Frunze as commander by agreement between the Commander-in-Chief and Comrade Stalin." On other occasions, he made or supported similar proposals to send Stalin to resolve crucial problems at the fronts. Like Lenin and other members of the Central Committee, he had come to value Stalin's abilities. (Stalin: Man of History, Ian Grey, originally published 1940, new edition 2017) (IMG)

Referring to Stalin's character traits, Ian Grey continued:

Stalin emerged from the Civil War and the Polish War with a greatly enhanced reputation. He had made mistakes but so, too, had others. To the people generally, he was still not well known. He was rarely in the public eye and, unlike Trotsky, he did not court publicity. Within the party, he was known as the quiet and incisive man of action, a leader of decision and authority. In the immense task facing the government, of reorganizing the country after the years of war and revolution, he was clearly a man who would bear special responsibilities. (Stalin: Man of History, Ian Grey, originally published 1940, new edition 2017) (IMG)

The experience of the Civil War made a profound impact on Stalin. It broadened his knowledge of himself and his abilities. For the first time, he had responsibility on a vast scale, and he found that he could carry it and, indeed, was stimulated by it. But this self-knowledge came in conditions of complete brutalization. He had witnessed the bread war when villages and whole towns were wiped out in the struggle to ensure grain deliveries to the north. He had been schooled in the principle that the party's purposes must be pursued, no matter what the cost in human lives. Now he had seen people massacred in thousands in the struggle for the survival of the party and its government. The experience implanted more deeply in him that inhumanity which was to mark his exercise of power. (Stalin: Man of History, Ian Grey, originally published 1940, new edition 2017) (IMG)

C2S10. The 'Permanent Revolution', a Technique of Provoking an Imperialist Invasion / Trotskyite-Bukharinite Sabotage against Brest-Litovsk Peace / Bukharin's Terror Plot against Lenin and Sverdlov

For an invasion of the Soviet Union, the MI6 and other imperialist powers hostile to Soviet power, needed a pretext. The tactic to use for provoking such a pretext was to have the Trotskyite officers in the Soviet military command launch provocations against the USSR's neighbours, so that the imperialist encirclers of the USSR could obtain the excuse to invade the land of proletarian power. This technique of having rogue officers launch such provocations is an ancient technique and has never been limited to the Trotsky faction. However, Trotsky was the most prominent figure to give this ancient counter-revolutionary tactic of provoking invasions a 'communist' theoretical clothing.

A socialist state's refusal to outright invade capitalist or feudal countries, the Trotskyites claimed, was an abandonment of class struggle and hence a betrayal of the revolution. The establishment of socialism in one or few countries was impossible, they argued. The 'Permanent Revolution' this thesis of Trotsky's was called. As early as 1914, Lenin had condemned the vacillator Trotsky's 'Permanent Revolution' thesis as absurdly left-deviationist:

At the end of 1903, Trotsky was an ardent Menshevik, i.e., he deserted from the Iskrists to the Economists. He said that "between the old *Iskra* and the new lies a gulf". In 1904-05, he deserted the Mensheviks and occupied a vacillating position, now co-operating with Martynov (the Economist), now proclaiming his **absurdly Left "permanent revolution" theory**. (Disruption of Unity under Cover of Outcries for Unity, Lenin, 1914. MIA) (IMG)

As further corroboration of evidence, the MI6 report sheds light on the important truth about the clash between Lenin and Trotsky on this matter:

As regards international policy, Lenin holds the view that the best way to secure world revolution is to compromise with the victorious Allies and to make concessions which would lead to the abandonment of intervention. It is for this reason, probably, that he authorised Litvinov to sound the Allies from Stockholm and to communicate with President Wilson. Litvinov has always belonged to the moderate wing, and is essentially one of Lenin's personal followers. Following Litvinov's proposals came the Prinkipo proposal. According to

private information from Stockholm, which was probably an expression of Litvinov's views, the Prinkipo proposal would have the effect of strengthening the moderates represented by Lenin as against the extremists led by Trotski. No details are available about the debates that took place in Moscow before the answer to the Prinkipo proposal was telegraphed to the Allies, but Chicherin's answer would seem to be the expression of Lenin's views.

Lenin's disagreement with Trotski ... hinges ... on the question of tactics. The difference is now almost exactly the same as at the time of Brest-Litovsk. At that time Lenin favoured compromise and a "respite," while Trotski and others favoured violence, refusing to sign peace at all. Trotski now advocates world revolution by means of aggression, i.e., by means of the Red Army carrying the revolution into other countries. It is not that Lenin has changed his views. His desire for the world revolution and the class war is just as strong as Trotski's, but he thinks he can now succeed better by diplomacy and peaceful penetration than by open war.

(MEMORANDUM ON TWO TENDENCIES IN THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT, Political Intelligence Department, Foreign Office, Russia /020, February 15, 1919. In: Foreign Office (1917-1918), p. 58) (IMG)

The MI6 report is in turn corroborated by an American intelligence document detailing the history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: Leon Trotsky was sent to Brest-Litovsk in White Russia to negotiate with the representatives of the Central Powers for an Armistice. Trotsky was perhaps a poor choice. He was a devotee of permanent revolution. He believed that the revolution having been successful in Russia, revolt would follow in rather short order in the great industrial nations of the West. Therefore, Trotsky chose the occasion of the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk to propagandise to the peoples of the West over the heads of their leaders. The Germans, and the Austro-Hungarian representatives listened to Trotsky for a while and then left in disgust. Trotsky left Brest-Litovsk with his famous statement, "Neither War nor Peace." Trotsky may have felt that there could be a situation where they could have "neither war nor peace," but the Germans did not agree with him and the forces of the Central Powers once more began to move to the East, thrusting on into the Ukraine, the Baltic States and West Russia. Lenin realized that peace immediately was absolutely essential to the preservation of his revolution. He therefore acted to persuade the party that Russia must sign [peace] at any cost. (HISTORY OF THE CPSU, CIA archives, p. 27) (IMG)

The attempts to sabotage the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty was a Trotskyite tactic of having the German imperialists bogged down in the Soviet Union, so that on the one hand socialism would be damaged and on the other hand, the British Empire could splendidly 'stand outside' and watch as its Trotskyite agents used the Red Army forces as cannon-fodder against the German imperial rivals of Britain.

It is not difficult to imagine that had Trotsky's 'insane' argument of the military conquest of the world – among his many other insane or reactionary arguments – won out in intra-Party debates, the Soviet state had no chance for survival. And forget not: **that same Trotsky faction which sought to provoke an invasion of the USSR through such left-opportunism was the same Trotsky faction, which, when facing a British invasion, deliberately opened up the front to the British and Japanese invaders. It thus follows that the plan for 'invading' other countries was merely a provocation for actually providing the pretext for the invasion against the USSR much like how opening up the front was for the same purpose.** By contrast, it was precisely Lenin's common-sense call for diplomacy that made Soviet power a menace to imperialism. The MI6 agreed:

To the outsider, knowing Lenin's great intellectual powers, and remembering his skill in dealing with the Germans, it cannot but appear that Lenin's policy, if successful, would be far more dangerous to the stability of Europe than Trotski's. (MEMORANDUM ON TWO TENDENCIES IN THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT, Political Intelligence Department, Foreign Office, Russia /020, February 15, 1919. In: Foreign Office (1917-1918), pp. 58-59) (IMG)

Precisely because Trotskyism helped counter the communist menace to imperialism, did the MI6 and the pro-British faction of the German intelligence as early as 1921, begin subsidizing Trotsky and his network. This is confirmed by an anti-Soviet and anti-Stalin oppositionist Grigori Tokaev who had infiltrated the Soviet state for quite some time and who later defected to Britain, providing his intelligence directly to the MI6. In 1956, when Khrushchev was rehabilitating numerous Trotskyites, Tokaev wrote in his memoirs:

Further, Trotsky, supposed originally to have inspired the formation of the 'bloc', had long since been linked with the Nazi secret service and the British intelligence service! On Trotsky's orders, Krestinsky, former Deputy People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs, had been in the German service since 1921. Rozenholz, former People's Commissar of Foreign Trade, joined the British service in 1926 and the German service in 1932. Rakovsky, one of the big figures of the Revolution, had served the British intelligence service since 1924, and the Japanese since 1934. And so on. All this Bukharin and Rykov had connived at, since they too were foreign agents. (Comrade X, Grigori Tokaev, 1956, p. 87) (IMG)

Among those who have studied Soviet history, it is common knowledge that Krestinsky, Rozenholz, and Rakovsky were all close friends and associates of Trotsky, whereas Rykov was a close ally and associate of Bukharin. Bukharin and Trotsky and Co. had established a covert 'bloc' to conspire against Soviet power.

Since the establishment of the Soviet state, Bukharin too had joined forces with Trotsky in seeking to prevent the peace of Brest-Litovsk, going so far as to try to assassinate Lenin, Sverdlov, and Stalin. Regarding the attempts:

in 1918 to upset the peace of Brest-Litovsk to overthrow the government and to assassinate Lenin, Stalin, and Sverdlov.... (N 1253/26/38, No. 119, Viscount Chilston to Viscount Halifax – (Received March 11), Moscow, March 8, 1938. Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 319) (IMG)

the MI6 station in Moscow reported that Bukharin was the 'actual ringleader' in the scheme:

Bukharin was the actual ringleader though the scheme was first pronounced by Trotski, Pyatakov being designated by Bukharin to succeed learning as head of the proposed new Government of "Left Social Revolutionaries" and "Left Communists." (N 1253/26/38, No. 119, Viscount Chilston to Viscount Halifax – (Received March 11), Moscow, March 8, 1938. Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 319) (IMG)

Viscount Chilston was making such confessions (which were in favor of the USSR) from an anti-Soviet, anti-CPSU, and anti-Stalin perspective. Take the following quote as an example of the anti-Sovietism:

It would however be a mistake to assume that ... those who direct Soviet policy necessarily allow themselves to be influenced to any appreciable extent by purely logical considerations. With them the necessity of keeping up nervous tension inside the country, of providing with an excuse for past and probably also for future atrocities, carries far more weight than the importance of securing ... a

certain standard of efficiency in the administrative and political body, the armed forces and the economic system... (N 1253/26/38, No. 119, Viscount Chilton to Viscount Halifax – (Received March 11), Moscow, March 8, 1938. Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 320) (IMG)

The MI6 agent Robert Conquest too confirmed:

But in the following year, Bukharin had led the "Left Communists" in opposition to the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, in a struggle that at one time reached the point of tentative plans for Lenin's overthrow. (The Great Terror: A Reassessment, Oxford University Press, Robert Conquest, 1990, pp. 16-17) (IMG{Factional Conflict & Great Purge})

In 1917 Lenin had thought of Sverdlov ... as the natural successor.... (The Great Terror: A Reassessment, Oxford University Press, Robert Conquest, 1990, p. 16) (IMG{Factional Conflict & Great Purge})

C2S11. Cooperatives in the Civil War / War Communism vs. Trotskyite Terror and Excesses

Once again, the MI6 document written by the General Staff of the War Office confirmed that Lenin was the moderating force in the Party unlike the terrorist extremist left-opportunist gang of Trotsky and Zinoviev. By promoting cooperatives in the Soviet economy, the Lenin faction was drawing the petit-bourgeois class towards an alliance with the proletariat, something which Trotsky and Zinoviev opposed:

Lenin's efforts to absorb the Co-operative Societies into Bolshevik institutions are of great importance. Evidence is catty on this point, but it appears that some form of working arrangement has been arrived at, which may well be important as the precedent for a "moderate Bolshevik" regime. This is generally accepted. This is generally accepted as being Lenin's present policy ("evolution of the revolution") in opposition to the continued militarist and terrorist policy of Trotsky, Zinoviev, and the Extraordinary Commissions. (An Appreciation of the Internal Situation in Russia, War Office, General Staff April 25, 1919. In: "PEACE CONGRESS: PARIS", Secret, April 25, 1919. In: Foreign Office (1917-1919), pp. 101-102) (IMG)

Again, recall that the petit-bourgeoisie are unwilling to risk their small businesses to combat finance capital. The cooperatives are a means of aggregating the petit-bourgeoisie's small businesses into collectively-owned big businesses. Big businesses can indeed afford to risk standing up against finance capital. Hence, aggregating the small businesses into collectively-owned big businesses was a means of engineering a radical change in the character of the urban shop-keepers, peasants, artisans, etc., not only elevating their material well-being, but also rendering them into a powerful class base for counteracting the agents of finance capital. The Trotsky-Zinoviev group, by contrast, missed no chance to block the road towards promoting cooperatives, for they were afraid of the threat posed by cooperatives to imperial interests. While the policy of 'War Communism' was correct for the war, Trotskyite diversionary wedge-driving terror campaigns nonetheless were prevalent. Trotsky, as the head of the Red Army, interfered and pursued extremist measures in the war economy, some of which are outlined by MI6 operative Ian Grey below:

Faced with the stark problems of the economy and the survival of the Soviet regime, Lenin and his colleagues at first thought the system of war communism would provide the answer. Trotsky was a fanatic exponent of this view. His plan, first presented in Pravda in December 1919, was approved initially by the Central Committee, but many party members argued strenuously against it. The plan provided for "the mobilization of the industrial proletariat, liability for labour service, militarization of economic life, and the use of military units for economic needs." He insisted that labor must be subject to the same strict discipline as the Red Army. Wholly authoritarian in outlook and without the least understanding of or feeling for human needs and emotions, he set about imposing this discipline. The immediate result was an angry storm of protest and rebellion. The Third Red Army was on his orders redesignated "The First Revolutionary Army of Labor" and assigned to labor duties in the Urals. The soldiers deserted. Peasants, infuriated by the takeover of their districts by labor armies, burned the crops as they were gathered.

Trotsky came into direct conflict with the trade unions. He had plunged into the task of restoring the railway system, and overruling the objections of the union, he had mobilized the railwaymen under army discipline. Then, again in the face of union opposition, he had set up his own transport authority, the Central Transport Committee, known as Tsektran. His overbearing treatment of this union and his threats that he would deal likewise with other unions infuriated unionist members of the party.

(Stalin: Man of History, Ian Grey, originally published 1940, new edition 2017) (IMG)

Again, the purpose of the MI6 agent Trotsky from such a campaign of terror was to drive a wedge between the working class and the peasantry on the one hand, and the workers' state on the other hand. It was a conspiracy aimed at provoking uprisings against the Soviet state.

Chapter 3

C3S1. Bolshevism in Murmansk

Referring to "The Political Situation at Archangel and Murmansk," an intelligence report by Britain's General Staff of the War Office admitted:

There is no doubt that there is a certain amount of latent Bolshevik feeling among the inhabitants, which is only restrained by the presence of Allied troops. (An Appreciation of the Internal Situation in Russia, War Office, General Staff April 25, 1919. In: "PEACE CONGRESS: PARIS", Secret, April 25, 1919. In: Foreign Office (1917-1919), p. 108) (IMG)

The British intelligence report continued:

In the Murmansk area evidence of Bolshevik sympathy among the inhabitants has been somewhat stronger. On the 23rd March, the anniversary of the revolutionary massacres in Petrograd, risings on a considerable scale were to have taken place at Murmansk, Kandalashka, Kem, and Soroka, and these were only averted by timely information which enabled the authorities to take precautionary measures. (An Appreciation of the Internal Situation in Russia, War Office, General Staff April 25, 1919. In: "PEACE CONGRESS: PARIS", Secret, April 25, 1919. In: Foreign Office (1917-1919), p. 108) (IMG)

Hence with the backing of the people of Murmansk and Arkhangelsk, Soviet power was established in those zones. Furthermore, referring to "Archangel and ... the region of Odessa", a US intelligence memorandum by anti-Soviet American commander Francis J. Kernan states:

it must be remembered that the Soviet Government claims sovereignty over those areas and its military operations there can be accounted for on the ground of national defense and wholly apart from any schemes of forcible propaganda. (Subject: Suspension of Arms between

Poles and Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia, and some general observations on conditions in Poland. Confidential Memorandum for The American Commission to Negotiate Peace'. A Memorandum by Francis Joseph Kernan, *Confidential*, Francis Kernan from Paris, France. To: Robert Lansing, April, 11 1919. In: "The Papers of Woodrow Wilson", pp. 275-280. From: University of Virginia, Rotunda) (IMG)

C2S13. The Spread of the Revolution to Germany, France, Czechoslovakia / The Case of Hungary's 'Soviet' Republic

Revolutionary class warfare, Lockhart said, was popular in all countries. Communism in particular was a far greater danger to the imperialist powers of Europe:

In the article in the "New Europe" in May of this year, Professor Pares states that there are only two ideas in this war: one, the German idea of world-domination, and, two, the national idea of people's rights and people's frontiers. There is, however, a third idea, which is certainly not novel but which has gained considerable popularity in **all countries** since the war, namely the international idea of class warfare and anti-capitalism. (MEMORANDUM ON THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN RUSSIA, R. H. B. Lockhart. In: Mr. Lockhart to Mr. Balfour, November 7, 1918, Received: November 8, 1918. In: Foreign Office (1917-1918), p. 36. Bold added) (IMG)

Again:

It is perhaps no exaggeration to say that Bolshevism is now a far greater danger to Europe than German militarism. (MEMORANDUM ON THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN RUSSIA, R. H. B. Lockhart. In: Mr. Lockhart to Mr. Balfour, November 7, 1918, Received: November 8, 1918. In: Foreign Office (1917-1918), p. 36) (IMG)

After all, it was Bolshevism that was assisting or even instigating revolutionary proletarian uprisings in Europe, and bourgeois-democratic anti-imperialist uprisings in the colonized world. Hence:

the force of Bolshevism as an idea should not be under-estimated. (MEMORANDUM ON THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN RUSSIA, R. H. B. Lockhart. In: Mr. Lockhart to Mr. Balfour, November 7, 1918, Received: November 8, 1918. In: Foreign Office (1917-1918), p. 36) (IMG)

A top US intelligence memorandum by American general Francis Joseph Kernan, referring to the influence of communism in Europe, stated: Communistic views are not a new thing. The terrific outburst in Russia and the more recent happenings in other parts of Central Europe signify an extraordinary condition of the masses brought about by generations of misgovernment and suddenly intensified beyond further endurance by nearly five years of war. In this view, the great cause of the apparent spread of Bolshevism in Europe is to be found in the despairing and wretched condition of its masses. It is not progressing in these days by force of arms but through propaganda falling upon ground prepared by long years of misery and culminating in the hardships of the great war. Therefore, if the normal life of the world can be restored, accompanied by such bettered living conditions as will enable the masses to have not merely enough bread to keep body and soul together, but some little share in the ordinary happiness of humankind, Bolshevism will be stopped. (Subject: Suspension of Arms between Poles and Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia, and some general observations on conditions in Poland. Confidential Memorandum for The American Commission to Negotiate Peace'. A Memorandum by Francis Joseph Kernan, *Confidential*, Francis Kernan from Paris, France. To: Robert Lansing, April 11, 1919. In: "The Papers of Woodrow Wilson", pp. 275-280. From: University of Virginia, Rotunda) (IMG)

The October Revolution caused a strategic earthquake across the planet. Everywhere emerged communist or progressive anti-imperialist revolutions, covertly and/or overtly backed by the newborn Soviet state:

Whatever may be Lenin's policy as regards Russia herself, it is clear that he looks upon his mother country merely as the most fertile ground for his experiments. A general European revolution on a class basis is, and always has been, his goal, and it is from this angle only that Bolshevism should be viewed. (MEMORANDUM ON THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN RUSSIA, R. H. B. Lockhart. In: Mr. Lockhart to Mr. Balfour, November 7, 1918, Received: November 8, 1918. In: Foreign Office (1917-1918), p. 36) (IMG)

Regarding Germany, the MI6 reported:

[Lenin's] great hope is fixed on the German Socialist party, which is strong and well-disciplined and which might conceivably make a success of social revolution. While his foreign policy has been governed by playing off the Central Powers and the Allies against each other, he has never ceased to endeavour to strengthen his position with the German Socialist party. It was in order to strengthen his position with that party that he maintained such a bitter propaganda against the Allies, and his main task has been to exist until the German Socialists should follow his example. He has done much propaganda in Germany both before and since the revolution, and he has many friends amongst the German Socialist party. In this connection it is significant to note how the British press denounces Lenin as a traitor and in the same breath lauds Liebknecht to the skies as a genuine Socialist, and almost indeed as a hero. It should be recognised at once that Lenin and Liebknecht represent one and the same thing, and that the latter is as great a danger to Europe as the former. (MEMORANDUM ON THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN RUSSIA, R. H. B. Lockhart. In: Mr. Lockhart to Mr. Balfour, November 7, 1918, Received: November 8, 1918. In: Foreign Office (1917-1918), p. 36) (IMG)

The US intelligence too reported:

Liebknecht, Franz Mehring and other ultra-radical socialist leaders in Germany are speaking everywhere denouncing Scheidemann and attempting to incite the German proletariat to immediate revolution. They have sent greetings to the Bolsheviks and Liebknecht has announced that the Soviet Government has promised him all possible assistance. (Subject: The Bolshevik Movement in Europe: A Memorandum, Substance: I. Recent Information Indicating Increase of Bolshevism, by: William Christian Bullitt, To: Mr. Lansing, November 2, 1918. In: "The Papers of Woodrow Wilson", Vol. 51, September 14 – November 8, 1918, pp. 563-567. From: University of Virginia, Rotunda) (IMG)

Communist influence was also increasing in France and Italy:

9. Dr. Herron reports that propaganda agents of the Bolsheviks with millions of dollars at their disposal have been sent to Italy and France.

10. The Milan Chamber of Labor has begun a movement to promote a general strike, which would be Bolshevik in character.

11. At the meeting of the Socialist Federation of the Seine on September 29, the former Minority of the French Socialist Party, which is led by Longuet and is semi-Bolshevist in character, became the Majority, obtaining 5,999 votes for its resolution, whereas the former Majority led by Renaudel obtained only 2,896 votes and the “40” led by Albert Thomas and Varenne obtained only 4 votes.

(Subject: The Bolshevist Movement in Europe: A Memorandum, Substance: I. Recent Information Indicating Increase of Bolshevism, by: William Christian Bullitt, To: Mr. Lansing, November 2, 1918. In: “The Papers of Woodrow Wilson”, Vol. 51, September 14 – November 8, 1918, pp. 565-567. From: University of Virginia, Rotunda) (IMG)

Communism was about to reach the industrial capitalist Czechoslovakia as well. A prominent 1918 US intelligence document written by the militant anti-communist US State Department representative William Christian Bullitt stated:

President Kramarz of the Czecho-Slovak National Council who is now in Berne reports that “there is grave danger of Bolshevism in Bohemia, not from Radical Socialism, but from famine.” (Subject: The Bolshevist Movement in Europe: A Memorandum, Substance: I. Recent Information Indicating Increase of Bolshevism, by: William Christian Bullitt, To: Mr. Lansing, November 2, 1918. In: “The Papers of Woodrow Wilson”, Vol. 51, September 14 – November 8, 1918, pp. 563-567. From: University of Virginia, Rotunda) (IMG)

As one may expect, through a combination of bribe-and-blackmail, the communist labour movements in all those countries were eventually defeated; the most famous case is of course that of the German revolution.

Some may argue that Hungary too experienced a communist revolution at the time. Not true. The MI6 agreed that communism was not really popular in Hungary, and that rather Bela Kun and his gang launched a coup:

Towards the end of March ... Bela Kun and other Bolshevist leaders were released from prison and assumed the control of affairs, and made attempts to establish communication with the Soviet leaders at Moscow.

Hungary, however, is a country even less propitious for the growth of Bolshevism than Germany. The population is mainly agrarian and anti-communistic, and all the evidence tends to show that the outbreak at Budapest was a *coup d'état* engineered from nationalistic motives under the pressure of the treatment of the country at the hands of the Allies.

(An Appreciation of the Internal Situation in Russia, War Office, General Staff April 25, 1919. In: “PEACE CONGRESS: PARIS”, Secret, April 25, 1919. In: Foreign Office (1917-1919), p. 104) (IMG)

Corroborating the above observation, the US intelligence reported:

There have been serious riots in Budapest, but they have not yet become Bolshevist in character. Count Karolyi at present controls the situation,⁶ but the following excerpt from the [Berlin] Vossische Zeitung of October 31 will give some idea of the power of the Budapest mob:

“The Budapest eastern railway station was occupied by the crowd where two battalions leaving for the front joined the mob. Civilians were also arrested by the mob, which having pillaged the arms factory had enormous amounts of arms and munitions. Budapest infantry regiment number 32 mutinied and placed itself at the disposal of the Republic. The military prison was stormed and all political and military prisoners released. The Commandant of Budapest was put in prison by Hungarian soldiers.”

(Subject: The Bolshevist Movement in Europe: A Memorandum, Substance: I. Recent Information Indicating Increase of Bolshevism, by: William Christian Bullitt, To: Mr. Lansing, November 2, 1918. In: “The Papers of Woodrow Wilson”, Vol. 51, September 14 – November 8, 1918, pp. 563-567. From: University of Virginia, Rotunda) (IMG)

C3S2. The Progressive Bourgeois-Democratic State in Bulgaria

On the other hand, there arose a progressive bourgeois-democratic revolutionary government in Bulgaria:

A peasant socialist Republic has been established in Bulgaria under the leadership of Stamboliwsky, a peasant socialist leader who was in jail throughout the Radislavov regime. This new Government of Bulgaria may or may not become Bolshevist in character. (Subject: The Bolshevist Movement in Europe: A Memorandum, Substance: I. Recent Information Indicating Increase of Bolshevism, by: William Christian Bullitt, To: Mr. Lansing, November 2, 1918. In: “The Papers of Woodrow Wilson”, Vol. 51, September 14 – November 8, 1918, pp. 563-567. From: University of Virginia, Rotunda) (IMG)

The new progressive Bulgarian government established friendly relations with the USSR. As confirmed by the infamous American spy Ruth Fischer of the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC),:

Stamboliyski maintained cordial relations with Soviet Russia. Following the line set in November 1922 by the Fourth World Congress of the Comintern, the Bulgarian party under Georgi Dimitrov cautiously avoided the sharpening of the conflict between the restless country and the government. (Stalin and German Communism, Ruth Fischer, 1948, p. 307) (IMG)

The communist faction of Dimitrov was not opposed to the Bulgarian government. However, the Trotskyites opposed it. Giving his usual junk analysis, Trotsky said that the Stamboliyski government was bad, that the communist forces in Bulgaria were the strongest and the bourgeois parties were thoroughly discredited, but that the communists lost anyways:

In the last few days we have had an example of the failure of a revolution for which the premises were favourable. I mean the revolution in Bulgaria. The Bulgarian government, which came to power by a *coup d'etat*, is upheld by Wrangelite bayonets. The political parties which made the *coup d'etat* constitute a very small force. The Communists are strong. The majority of the country and the peasantry, almost 100 per cent, are against the Tsankov government. Given any degree of serious preparation, we could, in the opinion of comrades who know Bulgaria (I also have some knowledge of the country, from personal observation, but that was a long time ago: my last visit to Bulgaria was in 1913) – according to all the evidence, we could have been victorious in Bulgaria, but this has not happened. Why not? The social and political premises were present. The bourgeois parties had thoroughly discredited themselves. They were replaced by the Peasants' Party. The leadership of this party, the Stambolisky Government, discredited themselves. All sympathies shifted Leftward and were transferred to the Communist Party. The enemy's armed forces were infinitesimal. And yet we were beaten. (The Present Situation and Our Tasks in Building The Army: Report to the 3rd All-Union Conference of Political Workers in the Red Army and the Red Navy, Leon Trotsky, October 21, 1923. MIA) (IMG)

Thus,:

On June 9, 1923, the Stamboliyski cabinet was overthrown by an army coup ... led by Professor Alexander Tsankov, who, discreetly encouraged by certain British advisors, had formed the Democratic Entente, comprising ... the intelligentsia, the Social Democratic

Party, and the League of Active Officers (patronized by King Boris II, well known for his pro-German [pro-Nazi] and anti-Bolshevik sympathies. (Stalin and German Communism, Ruth Fischer, 1948, p. 307) (IMG)

That Trotsky would side with the MI6 coup installing a fascist regime is not surprising. Note also the role of the Bulgarian intelligentsia in collaborating with the pro-Nazi Tsar Boris II in overthrowing the Stamboliyski faction.

C3S3. The War in Poland / Trotskyite and Luxembourguite Sabotage / The so-called 'Communist Party of Poland'

The territory which the mainstream media refers to as 'Soviet-occupied' 'Eastern Poland' is more accurately to be described as 'Polish regime-occupied' 'Western USSR'. The facts from US intelligence confirm this. "On December 2, [1919,] with Mr. Polk present," the US intelligence reported, "the Supreme Council approved the following declaration":

The Principal Allied and Associated Powers, recognizing that it is desirable as soon as possible to put a stop to the existing conditions of political uncertainty in which the Polish Nation is placed, and without pre-judging the provisions which must in the future define the eastern frontiers of Poland, hereby declare that they recognize the right of the Polish Government to proceed, according to the conditions previously provided by the Treaty with Poland of June 28, 1919, to organize a regular administration of the former Russian Empire situated to the West of the line described below:

From the point where the old frontier between Russia and Austria-Hungary meets the Bug River, down the Bug northwards to the point where it is met by the administrative boundary between the districts of Bielsk and Brest Litovsk; following that boundary northwards to the point where it forms an acute angle about 9 kilometers north-east of Mielnik; north-eastwards along a line to be determined on the ground, leaving to Poland the villages of Wierpole, Stolbce, Pleszczatka and Wolka, and cutting the Bielsk-Brest-Litovsk railway at the point where it crosses the road between Vysoko-Litovsk and Kleszczeli, reaching the Lesna-Prawa at the point where it is crossed by the north-south forest road passing about 2 kilometers to the west of Skupowo; northwards along a line to be determined on the ground along the above-mentioned forest road to the point where the Narew-Narewka road cuts the Hainowka-Swislocz railway; north-eastwards along a line to be determined on the ground to a point 4 kilometers north of Jalowka where the river passing through that city joins the Swislocz River; following the Swislocz downstream, then the Laszanka and the Likowka upstream to a point about one and one-half kilometers west of Baranowo; north-north-westwards to a point on the Grodno-Kuznitsa railway about 500 meters north-west of the junction of Kielbasin; north-west to a point on the course of the Lososna River about two and one-half kilometers south-west of its confluence with the Niemen; following the course of the Lososna downstream, then that of the Niemen downstream, then that of the Igorka upstream to its source, passing Warwiski; west-south-westwards to a point on the course of the Cheernohanya (Marycha) River near Sztudjanka, along a line on the left bank to be determined on the ground; the course of Chenhanya upstream to a point about two and one-half kilometers east of Zelwa; northwards along a line to be determined on the ground to a point on the Berzniki-Kopciowwa road situated two kilometers south-east of Berzniki; north-westwards along a line to be determined on the ground generally parallel to the line of small lakes situated between Berzniki and Zegary, about 2 kilometers to the east of these lakes; westwards to a point on Galadusya Lake about two kilometers north of Zergaary, crossing that lake to its extreme north-western point, leaving the city of Pusk to Poland, and reaching the northern boundary of the province of Suwalki at the southernmost point of the salient about 7 kilometers north-west of Pusk; northwards along the boundary of the province of Suwalki to the point where it meets the old frontier between Russia and East Prussia.

The rights which Poland may be able to prove over the territories situated to the east of the said line are expressly reserved.

(THE ORIGINS OF THE CURZON LINE, Confidential, Vital Storage, T-462, March 6, 1944, pp. 15-16. From: CIA archives) (IMG)

Though approved on December 2, the declaration was officially announced on December 8:

This declaration, dated December 8, 1919 and signed by Clemenceau, was communicated to the Polish Government.

The line of December 8, which later came to be known as the "Curzon Line", extended southward only as far as the northern border of Eastern Galicia.

(THE ORIGINS OF THE CURZON LINE, Confidential, Vital Storage, T-462, March 6, 1944, p. 16. From: CIA archives) (IMG)

As confirmed by American intelligence, British Foreign Secretary George Curzon and British Prime Minister Lloyd George, the architects of the Curzon line, held that the "legitimate ethnographic frontiers" meant "extending no further east than the [Curzon] line":

While the line laid down by the Peace Conference, afterwards known as the Curzon line because the British note of July 11 was signed by the Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon, was proposed only as an armistice line and not as a final frontier, the references to the withdrawal of Polish armies "from Russian Soil" (i.e., to the line of December 8) and to the defense of Poland "within its legitimate ethnographic frontiers" (i.e., extending no further east than the line of December 8) indicated that the British Government regarded that line as a proper basis for a final frontier settlement between Poland and Russia. Statements made at the time in Parliament by Lord Curzon and Lloyd George confirm that interpretation. (THE ORIGINS OF THE CURZON LINE, Confidential, Vital Storage, T-462, March 6, 1944, p. 19. From: CIA archives) (IMG)

Therefore, even Britain agreed that the territory to the east of the Curzon Line did not belong to Poland. The Polish settler-colonial regime violated international law and refused to accept such a thing. The Polish settler-colonists, led by Pilsudski, envisioned the 'Intermarium', a greater Polish settler-colonial regime emerging out of the Polish conquest of Ukraine, the Baltics, and several Balkan nations. The settler-colonial proto-empire was to be called a 'confederation' in order to get a democratic guise and was to be used as a means of containing the Soviet Union and a Germany that could potentially be a rival to American, British and/or French interests. Although such a project as Intermarium eventually won the support of the Anglo-Americans, the French became most known for supporting it at that time. Indeed:

The French ... were persisting in their attempts to form a "defensive" anti-Bolshevik Alliance including Poland, Rumania and the Baltic nations.... (THE ORIGINS OF THE CURZON LINE, Confidential, Vital Storage, T-462, March 6, 1944, p. 18. From: CIA archives) (IMG)

Like many fascists in Europe, the Pilsudski gang had their roots in the Kautskyite drift-away from Poland's socialist labour movement:

Partly as a result of the Constitutional Manifesto of 1905, which caused a decline in popular support for the PPS and other socialist groups in Russian Poland, the PPS itself split in 1906 into two factions – the PPS "Revolutionary Faction" under the leadership of Jozef

Pilsudski, and the “PPS-Left,” whose program became gradually more analogous to that of the SDKPiL. (SOVIET STAFF STUDY: Gomulka and Polish Communism, Secret, Office of Current Intelligence, CIA, February 28, 1958, p. 4) (IMG)
the Pilsudski “Revolutionary” faction thus drifted away from socialism in its quest for national liberation.... (SOVIET STAFF STUDY: Gomulka and Polish Communism, Secret, Office of Current Intelligence, CIA, February 28, 1958, p. 4) (IMG)
the PPS "revolutionary faction" under Pilsudski became more and more absorbed with the struggle for national liberation, and used the factor of nationalism to gain the support of the majority of the Polish working class. (SOVIET STAFF STUDY: Gomulka and Polish Communism, Secret, Office of Current Intelligence, CIA, February 28, 1958, p. 4) (IMG)

To this end, Pilsudski and his gang advocated ‘Prometheism’, the Polish bourgeois-nationalist attempt to sow division among the nations that would later constitute the USSR. The Pilsudski regime thus embarked upon an aggressive adventure against Soviet power. As described by American intelligence:

Pilsudski planned to support an “independent” Ukrainian state (including former Russian territory but not Eastern Galicia), which was to be federated with Poland and to serve as a buffer against Russia. (THE ORIGINS OF THE CURZON LINE, Confidential, Vital Storage, T-462, March 6, 1944, p. 17. From: CIA archives) (IMG)

Pilsudski had an important ally in Ukraine: the Ukrainian fascist bandits headed by Petlura. In the words of the CIA:

Petlura’s aim was to preserve the independence of the newly styled (Eastern) Ukrainian Republic against the Bolshevik government which, at that time, was fighting against the White armies. (Background, S-Memo #7, SSU, October 15, 1946, p. 1. In: “QRPLUMB VOL. 1_0014”, CIA.) (IMG)

Like Pilsudski, Petlura too emerged from Kautskyite circles in Ukraine, bloody fascist assassins who adopted ‘democratic’ and ‘progressive’ policy lines in order to more easily infiltrate the socialist labour movement. However, Petlura and his gang ended up being far more blatant in their fascism and decided to give up their Kautskyite ‘socialist’ mask. Lacking much popular support among the Ukrainian people, their social base was limited to a hand full of fascist intellectuals and some Eastern Galician troops. Indeed, an intelligence report by the General Staff of the British War Office confirmed:

The Ukrainian Directorate formed by Vinnichenko and Petlura in December, 1918, represented the Left Social Revolutionaries and stood for a nationalistic, anti-Russia and anti-Bolshevist policy, has shown itself entirely incapable. Its national programme proved to be based on nothing but a few intellectuals and a few Eastern Galician troops. Its social programme resulted in a divergence of view between Vinnichenko, who inclined to a compromise with the Bolsheviks, and Petlura, who insisted on complete independence. In these circumstances the Directorate commanded little authority in the Ukraine. (An Appreciation of the Internal Situation in Russia, War Office, General Staff April 25, 1919. In: “PEACE CONGRESS: PARIS”, Secret, April 25, 1919. In: Foreign Office (1917-1919), p. 102) (IMG)

By contrast, Ukraine was a favorable ground for communism:

As has already been indicated, the Ukraine in many respects provides a favourable ground for Bolshevism, and it should be borne in mind that there is at least a possibility of the Bolsheviks seeking in the south for support and fresh inspiration for their *regime*, and of their turning away from Central and Northern Russia, where the practical meaning of “Bolshevism” is now well realised. It is noteworthy that the same organised terrorism [of the Trotsky-Zinoviev group] is not applied to the *intelligentsia* and *bourgeoisie* in the Ukraine as was the case in Central and Northern Russia.... (An Appreciation of the Internal Situation in Russia, War Office, General Staff April 25, 1919. In: “PEACE CONGRESS: PARIS”, Secret, April 25, 1919. In: Foreign Office (1917-1919), p. 102) (IMG)

It is often said that the ethnic Ukrainians were ‘sympathetic’ to fascism and ‘antipathic’ to Bolshevism. The evidence demonstrates the contrary. A minority of Ukrainians residing in the mountainous regions, economically and societally underdeveloped, were staunchly sympathetic to fascism, and were removed from their residence by the Soviet intelligence service during the 1946-1947 Operation VISTULA. The majority of the Ukrainians remained sympathetic to Bolshevism, however. Ukraine, a fertile territory with great potential for the development of the productive forces, had some progressive classes advancing with the advancement of the productive forces. As such, it emerged as a zone favourable to communism. The above-cited document is one example of evidence of Ukraine’s pro-communist potential. As well, a prominent US intelligence document written by the militant anti-communist US State Department representative William Christian Bullitt, summed up reports in 1918 as follows:

Reports from the Baltic Provinces, Poland and Ukraine indicate that an outbreak of Bolshevism is expected when the German army of occupation is withdrawn. (Subject: The Bolshevik Movement in Europe: A Memorandum, Substance: I. Recent Information Indicating Increase of Bolshevism, by: William Christian Bullitt, To: Mr. Lansing, November 2, 1918. In: “The Papers of Woodrow Wilson”, Vol. 51, September 14 – November 8, 1918, pp. 563-567. From: University of Virginia, Rotunda) (IMG)

Information provided by an American intelligence agent were recorded in a US intelligence document, an excerpt of which is provided here. The US intelligence report confirmed that the Polish regime regarded the Galician Ukrainians as the ‘fifth column’ of the Soviets:

The Poles ... believed that the Galician Ukrainians represented a disloyal Soviet fifth column in their midst. (“Subject: Stephen BANDERA and the ZChouN (Foreign Section of the Organisation of the Ukrainian Nationalists).”, From: “SR/W2”, To: “SR/WC/[]. SR/DC/[], EE/SSS/[]”, January 13, 1952, p. 4. In: “QRPLUMB VOL. 1_0011.pdf”, CIA) (IMG{{Poland – 1939}})

Thus, referring to the Ukrainians of ‘Eastern Poland’, another American intelligence document added:

Union with the Soviet Ukraine would seem to be a more natural association for them than a return to Polish rule, which has a long record of bitterness and failure. (POLISH-SOVIET FRONTIER: ALTERNATIVE BOUNDARIES, US Intelligence (in CIA archives), March 26, 1943, p. 10) (IMG{{Poland – 1939}})

In 1940, the British intelligence station in Bucharest reported on the Ukrainians of Bessarabia:

Roumanian rule has been corrupt and unpopular, and the province has been more neglected by the Administration than almost any other [province]. The Russian and Ukrainian element have long wanted “our people” to come and take them over. The Jews, who form a large percentage of the total population of 2 million in the territories transferred, are hated by and hate the Roumanians, and have pronounced tendency to communism. Roumanian officials admit that a good many villages hunt out the red flag and ... according to official communiques, many thousands of people have tried to go back to Bessarabia since it was occupied [by the Red Army]. (N 6751/9/37, Sir R. Hoare to Viscount Halifax, Bucharest, July 2, 1940. Received: August 8, 1940. In: Foreign Office (January to December 1940), p. 251. In: Foreign Office (January 1940 – December 1941), p. 275) (IMG{{Nazi-Soviet Pact Era}})

Back in 1919, the MI6 further predicted that the communists will continue to have the support of the Ukrainian people and the peasantry of the Russian Empire in general:

In the Ukraine, the Bolsheviks have undoubtedly derived large supplies from their newly-conquered territory, and for some time to come it is probable that they will receive considerable support from the lower masses of the peasantry who were deprived by the Germans and Skoropadsky of the lands they had seized. (An Appreciation of the Internal Situation in Russia, War Office, General Staff April 25, 1919. In: "PEACE CONGRESS: PARIS", Secret, April 25, 1919. In: Foreign Office (1917-1919), p. 102) (IMG)

The peasant however, must have land. He really requires it to live, and for years almost every party has encouraged him to expect it. The Bolsheviks gave him the land – not exactly as he desired, perhaps, and without any very great security of tenure, but still without any restriction or delay. Skillfully nursed by Bolshevik propaganda, and warned by the concrete example of the Skoropadsky regime in Ukraine, he believes that counter-revolution means the restoration of the land to the landowners, and as all other parties urge him to break the Brest treaty he prefers with his limited understanding a regime which gives him both land and peace to a regime which he does not know, and which will send him back to the trenches. The result of the German occupation in the Ukraine is an example and a warning of what one may expect from a reactionary and purely military intervention in Russia. The peasant, it is true, objects strongly to the Bolshevik requisitions of grain and foodstuffs. This may lead to trouble in the future, but in his present disorganized state it is unwise to hope too much from the peasant as an anti-Bolshevik element. He might welcome a deliverer who would relieve his wants, but he will, and can do little on his own account. And certainly he does not want to do any more fighting either for himself or for anyone else. (MEMORANDUM ON THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN RUSSIA, R. H. B. Lockhart. In: Mr. Lockhart to Mr. Balfour, November 7, 1918, Received: November 8, 1918. In: Foreign Office (1917-1918), p. 35) (IMG)

Lacking popular support in Ukraine, Petlura could only rely on foreign powers, in this case, the Polish regime backed by France's government:

Petlura ... therefore threw in his lot with the government of the newly emerging Polish republic, whose leaders were also ideologically opposed to the Soviet regime. (Background, S-Memo #7, SSU, October 15, 1946, p. 1. In: "QRPLUMB VOL. 1_0014", CIA.) (IMG)

Petlura established an alliance with the Polish state. In December 1919, Andre LEVITSKY [another prominent Ukrainian fascist] renounced all claims of the Petlura government to the Western (Polish) Ukraine and was promised support by the Poles against Soviet Russia. Petlura, his government, and his army moved into Poland. In April 1920, shortly before the outbreak of the Polish-Bolshevik war, LEVITSKY signed the Petlura-Polish military alliance. Prof. Alexander SHULGIN was instrumental in bringing the alliance about. (Background, S-Memo #7, SSU, October 15, 1946, p. 2. In: "QRPLUMB VOL. 1_0014", CIA.) (IMG)

A top US intelligence memorandum prepared for the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, was written by the prominent anti-Soviet military commander Francis Joseph Kernan, who was based in Paris, France, the country that sponsored Petlura. The American general admitted that the Soviets were not the aggressors in the war, but rather the Polish were the invaders against the USSR:

Although the common report and the common talk in Poland constantly spoke of Bolshevik aggression against Poland, I could get no evidence to that effect whatever. On the contrary, I am satisfied that the desultory skirmishing along the Eastern frontiers of Poland represents an aggressive effort of the Poles to extend their military occupation as far as possible and as quickly as possible into Russia. The ease with which they have done this proves conclusively that no strong organized Soviet force has been opposing the Poles. (Subject: Suspension of Arms between Poles and Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia, and some general observations on conditions in Poland. Confidential Memorandum for The American Commission to Negotiate Peace'. A Memorandum by Francis Joseph Kernan, *Confidential*, Francis Kernan from Paris, France. To: Robert Lansing, April 11, 1919. In: "The Papers of Woodrow Wilson", pp. 278-280. From: University of Virginia, Rotunda) (IMG)

With French blessing:

The Polish campaign in the spring of 1920 was at first successful, and the army of Pilsudski reached Kiev in May. (THE ORIGINS OF THE CURZON LINE, Confidential, Vital Storage, T-462, March 6, 1944, p. 18. From: CIA archives) (IMG)

Along with their Polish allies:

Petlura's troops participated in the Ukrainian campaign against Russia (1920).... (Background, S-Memo #7, SSU, October 15, 1946, p. 1. In: "QRPLUMB VOL. 1_0014", CIA.) (IMG)

However,:

the Bolsheviks, having disposed of the "white" armies of Kolchak and Denikin, were able to turn the tide against the Poles and to drive them back rapidly toward Lwow and Warsaw. Poland then made an appeal to the western powers for assistance. (THE ORIGINS OF THE CURZON LINE, Confidential, Vital Storage, T-462, March 6, 1944, p. 18. From: CIA archives) (IMG)

And according to US intelligence:

Petlura's troops ... were defeated together with the Polish army. At this juncture, the Ukrainian Revolutionary Socialists and Social-Democrats who felt their concept of independence for both the Eastern and the Western Ukraine betrayed, broke with Petlura. The Social-Democrats MAZEPA replaced MK by Viecheslav PROKOPOVICH, and Petlura established his government in Warsaw. Andre Levitsky took PROKOPOVICH's post late in 1920, and moved up to Chief of State after Petlura had been assassinated in Paris (1926) by the Ukrainian Jew SCHWARZBARD who wanted to avenge the pogroms for which he held Petlura's army responsible. Petlura's government-in-exile was recognized only by Finland, Lithuania, Estonia, and Poland. (Background, S-Memo #7, SSU, October 15, 1946, p. 1. In: "QRPLUMB VOL. 1_0014", CIA.) (IMG)

The decision to expel the Polish aggressors was not controversial among the communist leaders, but the decision to launch a counter-offensive towards Warsaw, thus entering Polish soil, did spark controversy.

The problem was not so much with whether or not the Polish peasants were susceptible to communist ideological influence in general; assuming all else constant, the Polish peasants were immiserated to the point that they would accept communism. Nor was the problem the Polish hatred of Russians owing to the long history of Tsarist oppression, since, the Bolshevik movement embodied such mass resentment towards Tsarist Russia, and the Bolshevik revolutionary defeatism and fierce Bolshevik campaigns for secession from the Russian Empire had won over numerous oppressed minority masses over to the Bolshevik cause. Nor was Bolshevik Red Army penetration into the borders of Poland going to be – assuming all else constant – a problem because there were countless peoples in the territories of the former Russian Empire that were joyful towards the entry of the Red Army troops as liberators. As a matter of fact, there is evidence that the Polish people – the peasantry and the workers – were particularly

susceptible to Bolshevik ideas, and that it would have enjoyed some popularity. A prominent US intelligence document written by the militant anti-communist US State Department representative William Christian Bullitt, summed up reports in 1918 as follows:

Reports from the Baltic Provinces, Poland and Ukraine indicate that an outbreak of Bolshevism is expected when the German army of occupation is withdrawn. (Subject: The Bolshevik Movement in Europe: A Memorandum, Substance: I. Recent Information Indicating Increase of Bolshevism, by: William Christian Bullitt, To: Mr. Lansing, November 2, 1918. In: "The Papers of Woodrow Wilson", Vol. 51, September 14 – November 8, 1918, pp. 563-567. From: University of Virginia, Rotunda) (IMG)

The American general Kernan made remarks about the spread of communist ideas to many of the peasants living in Poland. At first, the following quote may appear to state that the Bolsheviks were removing the populations of Poland, but upon a more careful look, it becomes clear that the quote was stating that Bolshevik ideas had spread into Poland, because of the great misery that was inflicted upon the peasant population there for several years when Poland was colonized by Russia. In the words of the American general Francis Kernan, for 'several years', during the time in which Poland was 'Russian Poland', the territories which the Russians colonized had 'been a solitude', and the 'agricultural population' living in Poland, during the ostensibly 'best' days of their lives, lived in utter misery – this fact of misery helped 'explain the spread of Bolshevism', Kernan said. Here is the excerpt from Kernan's words:

When the Russians made their great retreat they drove the people out of a vast area of agricultural land which remains practically without population today and which for several years has been a solitude outside of the larger towns. No acre of ground has been plowed, no seed planted, no domestic animals are there, and practically no population. It is a vast area and it is nearly a desert today. Manifestly no crops can be sowed there this year, but the wretched inhabitants are straggling back slowly, many on foot, shoeless, clothed in rags, their whole worldly possessions carried on their backs. The agricultural villages show here and there a sign of life, and undoubtedly more of the former inhabitants will return as the summer goes on. Since they can raise no crops this year, manifestly they must be fed from outside. It is in this region that the greatest desolation and extremest want prevail. This was Russian Poland. In their best days the lives of this agricultural population must have approximated that of the animals which they worked. These squalid villages explain the spread of Bolshevism better than any other thing which has fallen under my observation. (Subject: Suspension of Arms between Poles and Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia, and some general observations on conditions in Poland. Confidential Memorandum for The American Commission to Negotiate Peace'. A Memorandum by Francis Joseph Kernan, *Confidential*, Francis Kernan from Paris, France. To: Robert Lansing, April 11, 1919. In: "The Papers of Woodrow Wilson", pp. 275-280. From: University of Virginia, Rotunda) (IMG)

It is highly unlikely that the traditional hatred towards Russia could be the factor behind the defeat in Poland.

Rather, the problems in the case of Poland were as follows. The most important factor was that the Pilsudski gang, Kautskyites as they were, had made many Kautskyite promises to the Polish people, and were thus bribing them into submission. The masses of proletarians are always very difficult to bribe, but the members of non-proletarian and non-kolkhoznik classes are easy to bribe by the Kautskyites. The Paris-based anti-Soviet American military General Francis Kernan noted that the Polish people were being provided extensive amounts of economic aid by the Americans, which certainly helped as Kautskyite bribes to prevent a revolt in Poland:

Want of the extremest character prevails in the large cities, in the industrial centers, and in the territory lying between Grodno and Brest Litovsk. There is, I believe, enough food in Poland to tide the population over until the next harvest, assuming the American food supplies to continue flowing into Poland at the present rate. The supply is not evenly distributed but an effort is being made by the Polish authorities in connection with our Food Mission to overcome this difficulty. If raw materials go into Poland and public works are started by the Government so that employment can be given to those not engaged in agriculture, much of the dire distress will be done away with. (Subject: Suspension of Arms between Poles and Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia, and some general observations on conditions in Poland. Confidential Memorandum for The American Commission to Negotiate Peace'. A Memorandum by Francis Joseph Kernan, *Confidential*, Francis Kernan from Paris, France. To: Robert Lansing, April 11, 1919. In: "The Papers of Woodrow Wilson", pp. 275-280. From: University of Virginia, Rotunda) (IMG)

On the other hand, there existed factors of secondary or tertiary importance. For example, the social-fascist 'Polish Communist Party' – the highly treasonous Party that was later duly and rightly dissolved by the Comintern – advocated the continued occupation of Poland by Tsarist Russia, thus intentionally fostering a high level of resentment towards the communists by the Polish peasantry; more details about the 'Polish Communist Party' will be explained in more depth later. All of these factors made Poland's government stronger vis-à-vis the Soviets.

One side in the Soviet leadership was optimistic about a counter-offensive. Referring to "the Soviet leaders," US intelligence stated:

Whatever generosity they showed toward Poland's boundary claims was the result of their conviction that, simultaneously with the entry of the victorious Soviet army, Poland would experience a proletarian revolution, and that the frontier between Soviet Russia and a Soviet Poland would have no political significance. (THE ORIGINS OF THE CURZON LINE, Confidential, Vital Storage, T-462, March 6, 1944, p. 21. From: CIA archives) (IMG)

The British Empire's Naval Intelligence officer Ian Grey remarked:

This vision was shared by many within the party and gave rise to a wave of enthusiasm, as members rallied to the cry "Onwards to Warsaw!" But there were realists, Stalin foremost among them, who saw the dangers of this policy. In June 1920, he wrote that "the rear of the Polish forces is homogeneous and nationally united. Its dominant mood is 'the feeling for their native land.' The class conflicts have not reached the strength needed to break through the sense of national unity." It was a clear warning against accepting Lenin's facile belief that the Polish proletariat was ready for revolution. (Stalin: Man of History, Ian Grey, originally published 1940, new edition 2017) (IMG)

Indeed, the counter-offensive against Poland did not succeed because the rear of the Polish forces was strong, thanks to the promises that the Kautskyite Party, PPS - Revolutionary Faction, had given to the people of Poland. A 1958 CIA report stated:

the PPS "revolutionary faction" under Pilsudski became more and more absorbed with the struggle for national liberation, and used the factor of nationalism to gain the support of the majority of the Polish working class. A key factor in its popularity was the role of Pilsudski and the PPS in the defense of Poland against the Red Army invasion in 1920, when the Soviet forces were stopped by the "Miracle of the Vistula." Here Pilsudski seized the leadership and rallied Polish nationalist feeling to his support. During and after the renaissance of the Polish nation, Pilsudski drifted further and further to the right, and had gradually less in common with the PPS. Nevertheless, the PPS retained its strong hold over the Polish working class during the inter-war period, not only by virtue of its role

during the Polish-Soviet war, but because of its general identification with Polish nationalism. (SOVIET STAFF STUDY: Gomulka and Polish Communism, Secret, Office of Current Intelligence, CIA, February 28, 1958, p. 4) (IMG)

The Polish 'Communist' Party rallied many workers behind Pilsudski by refusing to support Polish right to secession from freedom Tsarist Russia. The US intelligence report continued:

Whereas a key factor in the popularity of the PPS was its role in the defense of Poland against the Red Army invasion in 1920, the role of the Polish Communists on the opposite side in this same invasion identified them in the popular mind as enemies of Poland. Another leading Polish Communist leader, Adolph Warszawski-Warski, a member of the right wing of the KPRP leadership, referred to this cardinal mistake during a KPRP congress in 1923. He said:

He who does not yet understand the causes of our mistake does not understand the reasons of our defeat in 1918-1919, as well as our defeat during the Polish-Soviet war of 1920, and consequently, would not comprehend why the Communist Party of Poland lost then the struggle with the PPS and the "Wyzwolenie" (peasant organization). The peasant masses and the masses of petty bourgeoisie (as well as a large part, even the majority, of the workers), did not follow the proletarian revolution, did not follow the Communist Party of Poland, because they saw in our party the opponent of the independence of Poland. They followed the PPS, the Wyzwolenie and the others, the parties which promised land to the peasants and fought under the banner of the Polish state....

(SOVIET STAFF STUDY: Gomulka and Polish Communism, Secret, Office of Current Intelligence, CIA, February 28, 1958, pp. 5-6) (IMG)

This move by the Polish 'Communist' Party could not possibly be a mistake, but was rather a deliberate act of sabotage against the communist workers' movement and a stab in the back of the Polish people. The malicious intents of the Polish 'Communist' Party leadership were evident by the fact that the Polish 'Communist' Party later supported Pilsudski's MI6-backed coup, the coup that established a fascist regime favorable to Nazi and British interests, a regime that sponsored Trotskyite assassins in the USSR, and which pursued a chauvinist settler-colonial agenda for a greater Polish Empire, the so-called 'Intermarium'. Anyways, well until World War II, the KPP remained unpopular:

As a result of its political outlook and its behavior during the Soviet invasion of 1920, the KPP in the inter-war period obtained little support among the workers and almost none among the peasants, and its attempts to work with other political groups were abysmal failures. (SOVIET STAFF STUDY: Gomulka and Polish Communism, Secret, Office of Current Intelligence, CIA, February 28, 1958, p. 6) (IMG)

In 1920, the Soviets launched a counter-offensive against the Polish regime aggression. While the Polish regime troops were strong due to the reasons mentioned above, there were also stabs in the back committed by the Trotskyites in the Soviet command: there was on the one hand the Trotskyite agent Kamenev, and then there was also Tukhachevsky. During the October Revolution, Trotsky recruited the Tsarist officer Tukhachevsky for the Soviet Red Army. A paper published by the Association of the United States Army stated:

Upon graduation from Alexandrovskii Military College, Tukhachevsky was commissioned into the Semenovskii Guards Regiment, part of the Tsar's Imperial Bodyguard (household troops) By 12 October 1917, Tukhachevsky was back in Russia, as a function of either a sixth escape attempt or formal release. Due to the ensuing Revolution, there was no Tsarist military to which he could return; according to one author, he apparently "thought the thing through and just went home." (..). In 1918 he went to Moscow, met with Trotsky, who was heading the Military Department of the All-Russian Executive Committee, and offered his services to the Communist cause. On 5 April 1918, he became a Communist, and Trotsky appointed him as Military Commissioner at Headquarters Moscow Defense Area." (Mikhail Nikolayevich Tukhachevsky (1893-1937): Practitioner and Theorist of War, The Land Warfare Papers, published in: Association of the United States Army, Christopher Paul McPadden, August 2006, p. 3) (IMG)

During the October Revolution, there were many lower-ranking Tsarist Russian army officers – often from peasant, working class, or revolutionary intellectual origins – who felt sympathetic to communism and as such provided tremendous assistance and skill in establishing and strengthening the Red Army. Andrei Zhdanov was a case in point. Tukhachevsky, however, was not one of these revolutionary-minded officers. The military doctrines of Tukhachevsky and Trotsky entailed launching global wars, and then once the countries invaded fight back, systematically open up the front for those enemy armies so that the Soviet territory will be occupied, and the Soviet Union would collapse. In Trotskyism, Tukhachevsky saw his own imperial ideas expressed in a 'communist' language. Much like Trotsky, Tukhachevsky argued for spreading the revolutionary military too thin by launching constant and aggressive wars on a global scale against capitalist states in order to spread 'socialism' worldwide. As noted by the prominent anti-Soviet Anglo-American military official John Erickson:

Tukhachevsky set out his main ideas which would dominate the 'strategy of civil war'; the 'universal dictatorship' of the proletariat would be its final aim, to which end the socialist state must create adequate military power, recruit its fighters from the ranks of the world proletariat independent of nationality, and postulate the permanent absence of a peaceful frontier with the bourgeois state. The role of the Komintern, in Tukhachevsky's eyes, would be to prepare the proletariat of the world for this coming civil war, for 'the moment of the world attack with all the armed forces of the proletariat on world armed capital'. A 'proletarian army' must be prepared for its first operations; the Komintern must find a place in its programme for the definition of the requisite military principles. Working on the assumption of 'a world-wide civil war in the very near future', Tukhachevsky wanted to see an international General Staff set up under the Komintern, which would occupy itself with studying the potential capitalist enemy, as well as working out a mobilisation plan for the working classes. This would avoid the difficulties which the Red Army itself encountered in fighting a civil war, the duration and intensity of which had come as a shock to the command. In addition, a number of military training centres and staff academies should be opened in Soviet Russia to train a revolutionary military officer corps 'of all nationalities in their languages'. (The Soviet High Command: A Military-Political History, 1918-1941, John Erickson, p. 108) (IMG)

The views held by Tukhachevsky were virtually the same as the theory of Permanent Revolution as advocated by Trotsky. Recall that Trotsky had arguments with Lenin regarding the pace of the revolution, with Trotsky overtly arguing that the USSR must launch a constant global war for the spread of 'socialism', while covertly pushing for the diversionary tactics of destroying the Soviet state. The MI6, as mentioned acknowledged that Trotsky's idea was, relatively speaking, a threat to the Soviet state. As late as 1931, Trotsky continued to argue:

The conquest of power by the proletariat does not complete the revolution, but only opens it. Socialist construction is conceivable only on the foundation of the class struggle, on a national and international scale. This struggle, under the conditions of an overwhelming predominance of capitalist relationships on the world arena, must inevitably lead to explosions, that is, internally to civil wars and externally to revolutionary wars. (The Permanent Revolution, Chapter 10, Leon Trotsky, 1931. MIA)

Furthermore, the aggressive stances taken by Tukhachevsky could lay the ideological basis for him to provoke border clashes with enemies of the Soviet state, so to thereby give the enemies of the USSR the excuse to invade it. Tukhachevsky's Trotskyite diversionism was useful for the sworn enemies of Soviet power. Tukhachevsky, a Tsarist infiltrator, espoused the diversionary views of Trotsky; after all, it would have assisted his objective of destroying the Soviet state. And military sabotage Tukhachevsky did carry out. During the military campaign against the Pilsudski forces, Tukhachevsky and Kamenev carried out strategic and tactical sabotage causing the defeat of the Red Army. The MI6 official Grey wrote:

The Politburo had, however, decided on its policy of [counter-offending] Poland in spite of the opposition expressed by Stalin and others. Stalin had hurriedly rejoined the Southwest Front which covered the southern part of the Polish lines and was at the same time on guard against Wrangel in the south. The Politburo now decided to form a special front against Wrangel under Stalin's direction. A major part of the forces of the Southwest Front would be transferred to Tukhachevsky's Western Front for the advance on Warsaw, and the remaining forces would form Stalin's special front. Angered by these instructions from the Politburo, Stalin replied churlishly that the Politburo should not be concerning itself with such details. Lenin was taken aback and asked for an explanation of his opposition. In his reply, Stalin set out the organizational difficulties which the instructions entailed. Lenin was impressed by his appreciation of the situation and allowed the Southwest Front to retain its previous commitments; only three of its armies were to be transferred to the Western Front.

The basic problem was that Tukhachevsky's Western Front was separated by more than 300 miles of the Pripet Marshes from the Southwest Front. Communications and the prompt transfer of forces over such distances were further complicated by the absence of a strong central command. Trotsky and the Supreme War Council were ignored. Kamenev, the commander in chief, issued directives but could not enforce them. The Politburo and, in particular, Lenin, acting independently, tried to resolve conflicts, but could not be sure that their instructions would be observed. Moreover, Lenin's instructions conflicted on occasions with plans of the commander in chief. Thus Kamenev confirmed that Tukhachevsky should outflank Warsaw from the north and west and take the city by August 12, 1920. This left the large Lublin gap unprotected between the Russian forces and the Pripet Marshes. At this time, Wrangel was moving with some success, posing a threat that alarmed Lenin. On August 11, he instructed Stalin to break off operations against the Poles at Lvov and to embark on an immediate offensive to destroy Wrangel's army and seize the Crimea. On the same day, Kamenev ordered the Southwest Front to send "as large a force as possible toward Lublin to assist Tukhachevsky's left flank."

At this time, it was believed that the Red Army had already won the battle for Warsaw. Stalin and Egorov were planning to send their cavalry not to Lublin, but to the Crimea, and they ignored Kamenev's instructions. On August 13, Kamenev sent orders that both the Twelfth and First Cavalry armies would be transferred to the command of the Western Front on the following day. Egorov felt he had to comply. But Stalin refused to sign the order and sent a telegram angrily reproaching the commander in chief for trying to destroy the Southwest Front. At this time, it was believed that the Red Army had already won the battle for Warsaw. Stalin and Egorov were planning to send their cavalry not to Lublin, but to the Crimea, and they ignored Kamenev's instructions. On August 13, Kamenev sent orders that both the Twelfth and First Cavalry armies would be transferred to the command of the Western Front on the following day. Egorov felt he had to comply. But Stalin refused to sign the order and sent a telegram angrily reproaching the commander in chief for trying to destroy the Southwest Front.

Tukhachevsky's advance had been progressing slowly. But on August 16, the Poles counterattacked, concentrating on the Lublin gap, and within a few days, they had shattered the West Front. On August 19, the Politburo, including Stalin, met in Moscow, still unaware that the Poles were on the point of routing Tukhachevsky's armies. The Politburo, "having heard the military reports of Comrades Trotsky and Stalin," decided that the main concentration of forces should now be directed to the recovery of the Crimea.

Responsibility for the disaster was angrily debated then and later.

(Stalin: Man of History, Ian Grey, originally published 1940, new edition 2017) (IMG)

The anti-Stalin MI6 official Ian Grey further confirmed:

Kamenev and Tukhachevsky must bear the military responsibility since they neglected to ensure protection of their flanks before advancing. Moreover, even if Stalin and Egorov had responded promptly to orders to transfer troops from their front to fill the Lublin gap, it is doubtful whether such troops could have arrived in time and in fighting condition to have withstood the Polish onslaught.

Stalin's concern to maintain the strength of the Southwest Front was understandable. It was facing the Polish forces at Lvov, Wrangel's army to the south, and the possibility of Romanian intervention. All were serious threats, which were causing Lenin and the Politburo anxiety, and the wisdom of detaching any of its armies to reinforce the Western Front was questionable.

(Stalin: Man of History, Ian Grey, originally published 1940, new edition 2017) (IMG)

The formalities would have dictated that Stalin should have listened to such military saboteurs as Tukhachevsky and Kamenev, causing countless Red Army troops to be exterminated. However, Stalin refused to yield to such sabotage and carried out the operations necessary, hence to save numerous lives.

When the Soviet Red Army reached Warsaw in 1920, the French rushed to assist the Pilsudski regime. Hence the French sent their well-known commander Weygand to assist Pilsudski's gang. Indeed, the American intelligence reported:

The French, who all along had been more favorable to, the Polish cause than had the British, had taken no responsibility for the armistice proposals, and had not desired to invite Soviet Russia's participation in a general peace conference, saw their policy vindicated by the Polish victory at Warsaw, to which the French General Weygand contributed, and by Poland's success, after the victory, in securing a peace which satisfied its territorial claims. (THE ORIGINS OF THE CURZON LINE, Confidential, Vital Storage, T-462, March 6, 1944, p. 22. From: CIA archives) (IMG)

At this point, the Polish forces had advanced beyond the Curzon Line and occupied territories with Ukrainian and Byelorussian (White Russian) majorities. Given the critical situation which the Soviets faced, the latter agreed to the peace treaty of Riga imposed by Pilsudski's gang:

Receiving no consistent advice from the western powers, the Poles made peace on their own terms, to which the Bolsheviks, anxious for peace at any price, agreed. By the preliminary treaty of Riga; concluded on October 12, 1920, Poland secured a frontier over one hundred miles east of the Curzon line, running through regions which had clear White Russian and Ukrainian majorities. This frontier was confirmed by the final treaty of Riga on March 18, 1921. (THE ORIGINS OF THE CURZON LINE, Confidential, Vital Storage, T-462, March 6, 1944, p. 22. From: CIA archives) (IMG)

Backed by the imperialist forces, driving the tacit or active support of much of the population, and facing an army whose commanders were Trotskyite renegades, the Pilsudski forces were so obviously going to win. The anti-Soviet MI6 officer Ian Grey further remarked:

there was also an inevitability in the defeat of the Red Army. The troops were near exhaustion. (Stalin: Man of History, Ian Grey, originally published 1940, new edition 2017) (IMG)

In this situation though, Western USSR was occupied by the Polish regime and a policy of settler-colonialism and apartheid was pursued in those territories (see C9S5).

The absence of a high level of development of the productive forces in Poland had kept that country an agrarian society with a large petit-bourgeois population. The proletariat have nothing to lose in the struggle against finance capital and are thus willing to take great steps in the struggle against imperialism. The grand bourgeoisie have a large enough business that they can take the risk of competing with imperialism. The petit-bourgeoisie, on the other hand, unlike the proletariat, have a small business to lose and unlike the bourgeoisie, do not have a big business to use as a 'cushion' for taking big risks and competing against finance capital. This makes the areas that are predominantly populated by the petit-bourgeoisie easier to be taken over by finance capital or the comprador allies of finance capital. The material control of finance capital over these petit-bourgeois areas translates to a high level of soft power influence and propaganda dominance in these areas. As such, the petit-bourgeoisie are more susceptible to accepting imperialist propaganda. In a predominantly petit-bourgeois country, the agents and collaborators of fascism very quickly take over and extend their influence over the various institutions and bodies including at times the communist party that is supposed to resist such fascism. The influence of fascism in the communist party would take the forms of Trotskyism, Bukharinism, Kautskyism, Titoism, Maoism, etc. In order to fight imperialism in Poland, this key feature of the class conditions had to be taken into account.

The great positive intentions of Rosa Luxemburg are to be appreciated. However, she held a number of erroneous views that benefited the sworn enemies of socialism. The left-deviationist Rosa Luxemburg stood against the invincible scientific theses of Marx and Engels. In his letter to Kautsky in 1882, Engels was very clear in calling for decolonization. Every word of the letter serves as a sharp polemical blade against counter-revolutionary pro-imperialist ideas:

You ask me what the English workers think about colonial policy. Well, exactly the same as they think about politics in general: the same as what the bourgeois think. There is no workers' party here, there are only Conservatives and Liberal-Radicals, and the workers gaily share the feast of England's monopoly of the world market and the colonies. In my opinion the colonies proper, i.e., the countries occupied by a European population, Canada, the Cape, Australia, will all become independent; on the other hand the countries inhabited by a native population, which are simply subjugated, India, Algiers, the Dutch, Portuguese and Spanish possessions, must be taken over for the time being by the proletariat and led as rapidly as possible towards independence. How this process will develop is difficult to say. India will perhaps, indeed very probably, produce a revolution, and as the proletariat emancipating itself cannot conduct any colonial wars, this would have to be given full scope; it would not pass off without all sorts of destruction, of course, but that sort of thing is inseparable from all revolutions. The same might also take place elsewhere, e.g., in Algiers and Egypt, and would certainly be the best thing for us. We shall have enough to do at home. Once Europe is reorganised, and North America, that will furnish such colossal power and such an example that the semi-civilised countries will follow in their wake of their own accord. Economic needs alone will be responsible for this. But as to what social and political phases these countries will then have to pass through before they likewise arrive at socialist organisation, we to-day can only advance rather idle hypotheses, I think. One thing alone is certain: the victorious proletariat can force no blessings of any kind upon any foreign nation without undermining its own victory by so doing. Which of course by no means excludes defensive wars of various kinds. (Engels in London to Karl Kautsky in Vienna, September 12, 1882. In: Gesamtausgabe, International Publishers, 1942. In: MIA) (IMG)

According to Lenin, Kautsky for a while advanced Engels's correct theses against the left-deviationist unintentionally pro-imperialist line of Rosa Luxemburg (though, Kautsky later on proved to be an opportunist and adopted a line more pro-imperialist than that of Rosa Luxemburg, and hence Lenin began to support Rosa against Kautsky). Criticizing Rosa, Lenin said:

If, in our political agitation, we fail to advance and advocate the slogan of the right to secession, we shall play into the hands, not only of the bourgeoisie, but also of the feudal landlords and the absolutism of the oppressor nation. Kautsky long ago used this argument against Rosa Luxemburg, and the argument is indisputable. When, in her anxiety not to "assist" the nationalist bourgeoisie of Poland, Rosa Luxemburg rejects the right to secession in the programme of the Marxists in Russia, she is in fact assisting the Great-Russian Black Hundreds. She is in fact assisting opportunist tolerance of the privileges (and worse than privileges) of the Great Russians. (The Right of Nations to Self-Determination, Vladimir Lenin, Chapter 4. No screenshot.)

The CIA too reported on this dispute between Lenin and the left-deviationist stance promoted by Rosa Luxemburg:

The chief theoretician of the SDKPiL was Rosa Luxemburg, a profoundly original thinker whose book on the industrial development of Poland became the bible of the Polish Marxist movement. She was soon to enter into a historic series of ideological arguments with Lenin which were to exert a profound effect on the Communist Party of Poland, especially upon its attitude toward Moscow. In this controversy, Luxemburg strongly disagreed with Lenin's ideas on party organization, especially with the theory of the "dictatorship of the proletariat", and she became involved in the complex ideological disputes between the Russian revolutionaries. But of greater consequence for the Polish Communists was her bitter attack against Lenin's theory on national self-determination. Lenin felt strongly that in the future social[ist] democracy, nations such as Poland which were oppressed by tsarism should have the right to free secession from Russia. Luxemburg, however, refused from the beginning to accept national self-determination as a principle, especially in the case of Poland. Lenin's theories, of course, eventually won out, and the theories of Rosa Luxemburg later became branded as a deviation termed "Luxemburgism," the legacy of which was carried by the KPP up to the time of its dissolution by the Comintern in 1938. (SOVIET STAFF STUDY: Gomulka and Polish Communism, Secret, Office of Current Intelligence, CIA, February 28, 1958, p. 3) (IMG)

And of course, it is well-known that at least for a while, if not till the end of her life, Rosa Luxemburg opposed Party work and held an anarchistic view of political activism:

Luxemburg disagreed with Lenin's ideas of a disciplined party elite as the vanguard of the working class. She also rejected his ideas on the authority which should be accorded to the central committee. She referred to his conception as "His majesty, the central committee." In opposition to Lenin's views, Luxemburg stressed the spontaneous development of the class struggle. Her views were determinist. (SOVIET STAFF STUDY: Gomulka and Polish Communism, Secret, Office of Current Intelligence, CIA, February 28, 1958, p. 3) (IMG)

Rosa Luxemburg also supported the Trotskyite-Menshevik 'Permanent Revolution' theses, underestimating/denouncing the alliance of the proletariat and the peasantry, and thereby adopting a left-deviationist line favorable to Tsarist interests. Stalin mentioned how Rosa Luxemburg was the real inventor of the 'Permanent Revolution' thesis, even though Trotsky was one of its top proponents, and that Luxemburg struggled against Lenin's invincible scientific theses:

The article "The October Revolution" states that in 1905 it was not Rosa Luxemburg, but Parvus and Trotsky who *advanced* the theory of "permanent" revolution against Lenin. This fully corresponds to historical fact. It was Parvus who in 1905 came to Russia and edited a special newspaper in which he actively came out in favour of "permanent" revolution against Lenin's "conception," it was Parvus and then, after and together with him, Trotsky – it was this pair that at the time bombarded Lenin's plan of revolution, counterposing to it the theory of "permanent" revolution. As for Rosa Luxemburg, she kept behind the scenes in those days, abstained from active struggle against Lenin in this matter, evidently preferring not to become involved as yet in the struggle. (...). As for the "Letter to the Editorial Board of Proletarskaya Revolutsia," that treats of *another* aspect of the question, namely, the fact that the theory of "permanent" revolution was invented by Rosa Luxemburg and Parvus. This, too, corresponds to historical fact. It was not Trotsky but Rosa Luxemburg and Parvus who *invented* the theory of "permanent" revolution. It was not Rosa Luxemburg but Parvus and Trotsky who in 1905 *advanced* the theory of "permanent" revolution and actively fought for it against Lenin.

Subsequently Rosa Luxemburg, too, began to fight actively against the Leninist plan of revolution. But that was after 1905. (Reply to Aristov, Stalin, January 25, 1932. In: *Bolshevik*, No. 16 August 30, 1932) (IMG)

The Bolsheviks were correct in outlining the core characteristics of Luxemburgism:

"Luxemburgism" was held by the Bolsheviks to consist essentially of the following:

- a) depreciation of the role of the party as the leader of the class-struggle;
- b) underestimation of the revolutionary role of the peasantry;
- c) misunderstanding of the potentialities of the national problem as a revolutionary factor.

While the first element was important in its later effect on relations between Polish Communists and the CPSU, the latter two attitudes, which were characteristic of many of the early leaders of the SDKPiL and the KPP, were the main reasons for the abject failure of Communism in Poland prior to World War II. As a result of these attitudes, the party failed to establish a popular base among the Polish peasantry and antagonized the strongly nationalist Polish populace.

(SOVIET STAFF STUDY: Gomulka and Polish Communism, Secret, Office of Current Intelligence, CIA, February 28, 1958, pp. 3-4) (IMG)

Although Rosa Luxemburg and her group were fundamentally erroneous in their line, Lenin supported Rosa Luxembourg – for the better. Firstly, her intentions were positive despite making important mistakes. Secondly, the left-deviation was to be temporarily allied with to counter the influence of the then-more-powerful Kautskyite right-deviation. Indeed, when Kautsky came out of the closet as a pro-imperialist right-deviationist, Lenin rightly allied with Rosa Luxemburg and her numerous petit-bourgeois left-deviationist followers so to undermine the imperialist-fascist agenda of the counter-revolutionary alliance of the Kautskyites and the White Guards.

Luxemburgite deviations had a higher influence on the "Communist Workers' Party of Poland" than communism ('Leninism') because the petit-bourgeoisie predominated in Poland, and since the petit-bourgeoisie dare not risk their small businesses in the fight against the mighty finance capital, the petit-bourgeois areas are often materially – in terms of military, intelligence, or financial control – dominated by fascist finance capital, which pushes for increased intelligence penetration by the fascist spies and saboteurs into the organizations based in the agrarian petit-bourgeois areas. The "Communist Workers' Party of Poland" bore no immunity against such fascist infiltration and the crypto-fascism was manifest in Trotskyism branded as Luxemburgism.

The Luxemburgite reactionary line was the line of the "Communist Workers' Party of Poland." The Polish Luxemburgites opposed the efforts to ally the proletariat with the peasantry and de facto sided with the Tsarists by denouncing Polish independence – and they did so in the noble name of 'communism'. 'Thanks' to Luxemburgite errors/sabotage, it should come as no surprise that the patriotic anti-Tsarist peasantry of Poland would despise communism. The CIA stated:

the "PPS-Left" began to move closer and closer to the SDKPiL. Both groups were engaged in similar pacifist activity during World War I, and eventually merged, in December 1918, to form the Communist Workers' Party of Poland (KPRP). At their "unification congress," however, the ideological program of the SDKPiL was adopted as the basis of party policy, thus making the new Communist Workers' Party of Poland the direct heir of the SDKPiL.

The new party program paralleled the Bolshevik program in many respects, and urged unity with the Bolsheviks in the struggle for world revolution. In certain important details, however, the new program of the KPRP was at variance with the Russian party. These differences had already been reflected in the disputes between Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg, one of the main subjects being the attitude toward the national question. The KPRP, like the SDKPiL before it, attacked national self-determination as a principle. This basic mistake of the Polish Communists, which was at the root of their failure to attract any serious support in Poland prior to World War II, was recognized later by leading Polish Communists. Thus Feliks Dzierzynski said later:

Our mistake (that of the SDKPiL) was in repudiating Poland's independence, for which Lenin always rebuked us. We believed that there could be no transitional period between capitalism and socialism and consequently that there was no need of independent states, since there could be no state organization under socialism. We did not understand that there would be a rather long transition period between capitalism and during which, under the dictatorship of the proletariat, classes as well as a proletarian state supported by the peasantry will exist side by side.... As a result of repudiating every independence, we lost our struggle for an independent Poland.

(SOVIET STAFF STUDY: Gomulka and Polish Communism, Secret, Office of Current Intelligence, CIA, February 28, 1958, pp. 4-5) (IMG)

Regrettably, the so-called “Communist Workers' Party of Poland,” was a social-fascist party promoting a pro-imperialist agenda, supported the coup d'état of the Pilsudski gang, the very gang that had openly allied with Petlura's Ukrainian fascists to invade the USSR, the very gang that supported the Trotskyite opposition in the USSR, the very terror gang that had the blessing of Hitler. For this, the Party was condemned by the Comintern:

The party occasionally established cover political groups which managed over the years to elect one or two representatives to the Sejm.

In 1926 the party incurred the displeasure of Moscow by supporting the Pilsudski coup d'état. This move was later condemned by the Comintern as a serious tactical mistake, and became known in Communist history as the "May error." (SOVIET STAFF STUDY:

Gomulka and Polish Communism, Secret, Office of Current Intelligence, CIA, February 28, 1958, p. 3) (IMG)

During the period of the Great Purge of the late 1930s, therefore, the social-fascist pseudo-communist ‘Communist Workers' Party of Poland’ was dissolved by the Comintern, exposed as the party of counter-revolutionary imperialist agents, thoroughly purged, and virtually wiped out. This party of renegades had some renegade survivors, however; one of them was Wladyslaw Gomulka. A Gestapo agent during the Great Patriotic War, Gomulka became a Yugoslav agent after the War, and was installed into power through the 1956 MI6 colour revolution in Poland. Subsequently, he began further serving the British and Israeli espionage services, carried out savage terror against the people of Poland so to provoke anti-state uprisings, and destroyed the economy of Poland so to pave the way for the colour revolution of the 1980s. These will be examined in more depth later in the book.

C3S4. Ukraine's Russian Population

Why did the Bolsheviks decide to keep some of the Russians in Ukraine? This was needed in part because in case Ukraine was to somehow separate from the USSR, the Soviet state would utilize its soft power influence among the Russians in Ukraine in order to agitate for a Russian sovereigntist uprising against the anti-Soviet regime in Ukraine, hence using local disturbances to destabilize the Ukrainian regime, and bring back Soviet influence there.

As indicated by the MI6, the Ukrainians were actually sympathetic towards Bolshevism, contrary to how the Nazi media portrayed the matter. No need to mention Carpatho-Ukraine, whose population as confirmed by the CIA and documented in C3S3, were pro-Soviet and pro-communist. Not as a matter of ‘political correctness’, but as a matter of fact, the UPA/OUN reactionaries did not represent the majority of the ethnic Ukrainians. It is nonetheless true that the UPA and OUN represented the majority of Ukrainians in specific geographic areas of Ukraine. Overall, these bad Ukrainians were a minority among the Ukrainians but they were a ‘loud’ minority, a very dangerous one. The Russian population, among whom the Bolsheviks would have had high soft power influence even if Ukraine separated from the rest of the USSR, could serve as a pro-Bolshevik contingent in Ukraine serving as a useful counter-weight against the bad Ukrainians who formed a loud minority.

C3S5. Tambov

It is alleged that the Bolsheviks carried out terrorist activity in Tambov during the rebellion in Tambov. Firstly, it is important to remind that Lenin emphatically condemned terrorism, mass-murder, and worked to minimize crimes committed by Red Army officers. Secondly, it is worth reminding that the Trotskyites were the ones responsible for terrorism during the Civil War (see C2S6). These are documented by the MI6. With regards to the specific case of Tambov, the Trotsky agent Tukhachevsky was in charge of the operation:

The driving sense of purpose which possessed the party leaders, and the distraction of such internecine disputes, caused them to minimize and even overlook the explosive mood of the people. Uprisings among the peasantry were too frequent to arouse special concern. But now the resourceful anarchist peasant leader Nestor Makhno had plunged the Ukraine into turmoil. Uprisings by peasants in western Siberia disrupted the Trans-Siberian Railways and further aggravated the food shortages in Moscow and other cities. Most serious of all was the rebellion of the peasants of the Tambov region, who were renowned for their turbulence. In April 1921, the Red Cavalry and special army units, commanded by Tukhachevsky, crushed the rebel forces, but it was not until autumn that order was restored in the region. (Stalin: Man of History, Ian Grey, originally published 1940, new edition 2017) (IMG)

The fact that Tukhachevsky was a Trotsky agent and that Trotskyites supported terrorism, of course does not automatically make Tukhachevsky responsible for any alleged terrorist activity in Tambov; however, these facts do shed light on the usual suspects for such alleged terrorism.

C3S6. Spreading the Revolution to Latvia, Lithuania, and Byelorussia

A prominent US intelligence document written by the militant anti-communist US State Department representative William Christian Bullitt, summed up reports in 1918 as follows:

Reports from the Baltic Provinces, Poland and Ukraine indicate that an outbreak of Bolshevism is expected when the German army of occupation is withdrawn. (Subject: The Bolshevik Movement in Europe: A Memorandum, Substance: I. Recent Information Indicating Increase of Bolshevism, by: William Christian Bullitt, To: Mr. Lansing, November 2, 1918. In: “The Papers of Woodrow Wilson”, Vol. 51, September 14 – November 8, 1918, pp. 563-567. From: University of Virginia, Rotunda) (IMG)

The Bolsheviks definitely enjoyed a great level of influence in much of the Baltic zone. As the reader is probably aware, the Lettish language is an alternative term for the Latvian language; the Lettish people are ethnic Latvians forming the vast majority of the population of Latvia. British intelligence reports demonstrated that the Lettish, the vast majority of the Latvians, were overwhelmingly pro-communist. One report by the General Staff of the British War Office stated:

In Latvia a great part of the territory claimed by the Lettish Provisional Government, i.e., roughly, the old Russian Governments of Courland and (most of) Livonia, is controlled by the Bolsheviks, who have established their headquarters at Riga and Dvinsk and maintained themselves in occupation despite their expulsion from Esthonia and northern Livonia. The Bolsheviks have relied mainly on local Lettish and on imported Lettish Bolsheviks; they have passed the usual decrees nationalising the banks, setting up Soviets, and handing the land over to the peasants. The large industrial, unemployed population of Riga proved a suitable ground for Bolshevik ideas, while the peasantry have been given a free hand in venting their hatred of the German landowners. It should be noted that, according to British naval reports from Riga at the end of December, the few Lettish units that were raised to resist the Bolsheviks either mutinied or deserted. (An Appreciation of the Internal Situation in Russia, War Office, General Staff April 25, 1919. In: “PEACE CONGRESS: PARIS”, Secret, April 25, 1919. In: Foreign Office (1917-1919), p. 109) (IMG)

In a report to the British Foreign Office, Stephen George Tallents, the British Commissioner for the Baltic Provinces during the British intervention in that region, admitted:

All their enemies and some of their friends say that the Letts tend naturally towards Bolshevism. (Note on the Present Position in the Baltic Provinces. – (Communicated to Foreign Office, August 8.), Doc. 64 [113472], S. G. Tallents, July 31, 1919. In: Foreign Office (1917-1919), p. 262) (IMG)

Referring to Latvians, Tallents continued:

they undoubtedly regard the Bolsheviks, at any rate those in their midst, with gentler eyes than the Estonians. An Estonian hospital nurse in Wenden one day in June spoke to me sarcastically of the way in which men, who to her knowledge had been leaders in the days of Bolshevik rule in the town, had now again been allowed to return and had been charitably received, though not prominent reinstated, by their fellow-townsmen. (Note on the Present Position in the Baltic Provinces. – (Communicated to Foreign Office, August 8.), Doc. 64 [113472], S. G. Tallents, July 31, 1919. In: Foreign Office (1917-1919), p. 262) (IMG)

The case of Lithuania was not much different than that of Latvia. The same British War Office intelligence report stated:

In *Lithuania*, as in Latvia, the Bolsheviks, with headquarters at Vilna, have been in control of a large portion of the territory claimed as Lithuanian, the unoccupied portion acknowledging the authority of the Provisional Lithuanian Government at Kovno. This Government was remodelled at the end of December and is anti-Bolshevist, but it exercises only very local authority and such prestige as it may have has been much damaged by the conduct of the various (and often rival) Lithuanian organisations abroad. The *Taryba* (Diet) itself (never a very representative body), owing to desertions to the Bolsheviks and enforced absences of various kinds, now numbers only 35 out of a total of 100 members. The Government is also bitterly hostile to the Poles, who have made unsuccessful attempts to be called in as saviours of Lithuania against the Bolsheviks. In this case the Government is certainly supported by the peasants, who are determined to break up the big Polish estates. This economic hostility to the landlords has been the main cause of the easy conquests of the Bolsheviks in these areas. They are reported as having behaved with unusual mildness both at Vilna and Minsk (the White Russian capital), and to have made a good impression; they have trusted mainly to returning Lithuanians from Russia to propagate Bolshevik doctrines, and they have naturally adopted a strongly anti-Polish tone. (An Appreciation of the Internal Situation in Russia, War Office, General Staff April 25, 1919. In: "PEACE CONGRESS: PARIS", Secret, April 25, 1919. In: Foreign Office (1917-1919), p. 110) (IMG)

The British Commissioner for the Baltic Provinces corroborated the popularity of communism among the Lithuanian people by stating:

Big Lithuanian landlords complain to me that the Lithuanian people is Bolshevik at heart, and will soon so declare itself. (Note on the Present Position in the Baltic Provinces. – (Communicated to Foreign Office, August 8.), Doc. 64 [113472], S. G. Tallents, July 31, 1919. In: Foreign Office (1917-1919), p. 262) (IMG)

The peoples of Latvia and Lithuania were held as unwilling captives of their respective imperialist-backed puppet regimes.

The MI6 admitted that the best solution to the problems of the White Russians was to join Russia, which was of course a Soviet state:

The White Russians are extremely illiterate and backward and are without any nascent "national consciousness." As they are so closely allied to the Great Russians, the best solution of their problem would be their reabsorption into Russia. It should be noticed that this is the policy apparently advocated by the Jews of both White Russia and Lithuania; the Jews have contributed largely to the *personnel* of the Soviets in Lithuanian and White Russia. (An Appreciation of the Internal Situation in Russia, War Office, General Staff April 25, 1919. In: "PEACE CONGRESS: PARIS", Secret, April 25, 1919. In: Foreign Office (1917-1919), p. 110) (IMG)

C3S7. The Anarchist Colour Revolution in Kronstadt

Evidence on the real story behind the anarchist colour revolution in Kronstadt is provided by the anti-Soviet anarchist author Paul Avrich. "From internal evidence," Avrich remarks:

it is clear that the plan was drawn up in January or early February 1921 by an agent of the Center located either in Viborg or Helsingfors. (Kronstadt 1921: The Uprising of Sailors at the Kronstadt Naval Base is Examined in the Context of the Political Development of the New Soviet State, Paul Avrich, p. 239) (IMG)

The intelligence memorandum states the following:

Kronstadt had been fortified with anti-Bolshevik Russian troops, acting in concert with the French Command.... (MEMORANDUM ON THE QUESTION OF ORGANIZING AN UPRISING IN KRONSTADT, Top Secret, National Center in Paris, 1921. From: Columbia Russian Archive, translated by Paul Avrich. In: Kronstadt 1921: The Uprising of Sailors at the Kronstadt Naval Base is Examined in the Context of the Political Development of the New Soviet State, Paul Avrich, p. 239) (IMG)

The very title of the intelligence memorandum cited above clearly shows that the Kronstadt anarchist rebellion was indeed engineered by the Finnish intelligence service. Backed by the French Command, and organized by Finnish intelligence, the Kronstadt anarchists were launching a colour revolution against the Republic of Soviets which had elected the Bolsheviks. In their supposed fight against 'tyranny', Kronstadt sailors aimed at overthrowing the popular socialist system and targeted the communists of the Soviets even though the communists had the support of the workers and peasants:

Following a mass meeting of the garrison on March 1, 1921, Kronstadt rang with shouts of "Down with the Bolshevik tyranny!" and "For the Soviets - without the Communists!" The rebels proclaimed themselves to be the liberators of Russia from the new [alleged] Bolshevik autocracy. (Stalin: Man of History, Ian Grey, originally published 1940, new edition 2017) (IMG)

The Kronstadt sailors were duly defeated by the Red Army, with the fighters taking refuge in Finland.

C3S8. Strengthening Democratic Governance / The Further Demotion of the Trotsky Faction

Trotskyite influence fostered divisions in the Party:

Trotsky had provoked conflict with the unions, but there was also growing opposition to the high-handed practice of the central party organs of disregarding democratic elections and making appointments to high offices. Dispute over these fundamental issues threatened to split the party. (Stalin: Man of History, Ian Grey, originally published 1940, new edition 2017) (IMG)

To counter the Trotskyite influence,:

Lenin, supported by ten of the nineteen Central Committee members, including Stalin, Zinoviev, and Kamenev, proposed some moderating of party rule. Immediate abolition of Trotsky's hated Tsektran was to be a first step. Trotsky violently opposed such "liberal" policies. He was supported by Bukharin, Dzerzhinsky, and the three members then in charge of the party Secretariat. The rift within the Central Committee could not be bridged, and it was decided to put the matter to the party at large. Zinoviev, the party leader in Petrograd, led the attack on Trotsky, whom he had always detested, condemning him as a dictator. The debate raged between the factions as all prepared for the Tenth Party Congress, due to meet in March 1921, when these questions would be resolved. (Stalin: Man of History, Ian Grey, originally published 1940, new edition 2017) (IMG)

As was mentioned in C1S7, enemy infiltrators in the communist movement covertly collaborate but overtly may well pretend to oppose one another. At that time indeed, Trotskyite leaders Zinoviev and Kamenev pretended to oppose Trotsky so that they would not lose their position along with Trotsky. Anyways, Lenin and Stalin, as well as Kamenev and Zinoviev campaigned together against Trotsky's line and worked towards greater democratization, popular sovereignty, moderation, and greater freedoms:

Trotsky's proposals for rebuilding the economy by using the methods of war communism were heavily defeated. Lenin's resolutions on the trade unions and democratic centralism seemed to introduce a new spirit of reasonableness. One resolution declared that "it is above all necessary to put into practice ... on a wide scale the principle of election to all organs ... and to do away with the method of appointment from the top." Another resolution emphasized that members must be able to take "an active part in the life of the party" and that "the nature of workers' democracy excluded every form of appointment in place of election as a system." (Stalin: Man of History, Ian Grey, originally published 1940, new edition 2017) (IMG)

Suddenly on the last day of the congress, Lenin moved two new resolutions, one on "Party Unity" and the other entitled "The Syndicalist and Anarchist Deviation in Our Party." The first denounced and outlawed all opposition groups as sources of weakness and danger, and demanded their immediate dissolution or the expulsion of their members from the party. The second resolution rejected the trade-union claims to control industry as "inconsistent with membership of the party." (Stalin: Man of History, Ian Grey, originally published 1940, new edition 2017) (IMG)

Trotsky suffered an ignominious defeat at the congress, and the campaign waged against him by Zinoviev, Stalin, and others seriously damaged his reputation. His plans for the militarization of labor, for the subordination of the trade unions, and for the greater centralization of power had been overwhelmingly rejected. The adoption of NEP had also been a rebuff to his economic policies. His public conflict with Lenin had lowered his standing with members among many of whom he was personally unpopular. In the election of the Central Committee, he nevertheless retained his place, but others who had supported his platform were not re-elected. (Stalin: Man of History, Ian Grey, originally published 1940, new edition 2017) (IMG)

Stalin played an unobtrusive part in the disputes which dominated the Tenth Congress. He was one of the Platform of Ten supporting Lenin's proposals. He was evidently content to leave it to Zinoviev to launch the main attack on Trotsky in the pre-congress debate, but he was active in the campaign. In Pravda, on January 5, 1921, he published an article, entitled "Our Differences," which was his first polemical article against Trotsky. He argued that "democratism" and the use of persuasion among the proletariat were essential now that the war was over and the party had to deal with the complex threats of economic collapse. It was an effective polemic but moderate in tone and without the strident vigor of Zinoviev's attacks. Apparently, however, he was more active in the background. In the course of the congress, one delegate, who was a member of the Democratic Centralist group, referred to the campaign against Trotsky under the generalship of Zinoviev in Petrograd, and in Moscow led by "the military strategist and arch-democrat, Comrade Stalin." (Stalin: Man of History, Ian Grey, originally published 1940, new edition 2017) (IMG)

C3S9. The Intelligentsia Temporarily 'Supported' the Soviet State

The intelligentsias as a stratum often arose out of the privileged family backgrounds, hence their ability to afford high-level education. Education is a virtue, but the feudal and bourgeois family backgrounds of the intellectuals has far more influence on their thinking than education itself; and the field of humanities itself is dominated by intellectuals from feudal and bourgeois family backgrounds, most of whom promote the reactionary anti-communist material.

In the face of the greater threat of British colonialism and Tsarist terror, however, the intelligentsia behaved like fellow-travellers and ostensibly 'sided' with the Party of the proletariat. While the so-called "intelligentsia" were predominantly liberals and romantics, they, for the time being, decided to 'support' the socialist state which stood as the antithesis to their fin-de-siècle beliefs. The MI6 report by the British General Staff of the War Office admitted:

there is evidence that a considerable number of intellectuals, previously anti-Bolshevist, have decided to throw in the lot, at least temporarily, with the Bolsheviks. (An Appreciation of the Internal Situation in Russia, War Office, General Staff April 25, 1919. In: "PEACE CONGRESS: PARIS", Secret, April 25, 1919. In: Foreign Office (1917-1919), p. 101) (IMG)

The communist faction led by Lenin undertook measures to retain the scientists inside the Soviet Union so to advance the industry of the proletariat's state, while engaging in purge campaigns against the rest of the reactionary intelligentsia:

The overwhelming majority of scientists were hostile to the new regime, more hostile than they had been to the old regime, but neither side to the conflict could do without the other. With ... joy Lenin exiled religious philosophers and sociologists like Sorokin, but he repeatedly warned his comrades that natural scientists could not be treated the same way, however deviant their politics might be. (The Lysenko Affair, David Joravsky, 1970, p. 27) (IMG{Soviet Science})

Chapter 4

C4S1. The Establishment of Soviet Power in the Predominantly-Muslim Regions of the former Russian Empire

The peoples of the predominantly Muslim regions of the former Russian Empire were enthusiastic towards the establishment of Soviet power and sympathetic towards communism. A paper by the RAND Corporation stated:

Marxism-Leninism promised so much, if only by implication, to so many in 1918 that it could be portrayed without dissent as a conquering ideology. Many Russians welcomed it and fought under its banner for a better and new world, or at least for satisfaction of their grievances against the hated land owners and the exploitative bourgeoisie. National minorities in the Russian Empire, including Russia's Muslims, also found it convenient to side with the Bolsheviks who espoused this doctrine, for after all, part and parcel of Leninism is the promise of national self-determination. For Muslims, this meant the liberation of the Russian Muslim world. So powerful was the appeal of Bolshevism that converts blindly excused all the "unavoidable errors," tragedies, and brutalities that characterized the new movement from its first breaths. Stalin was later to denounce the perpetration of these "errors" as the work of "leftist deviationists," "Trotskyites," and "traitors," charges that carried the added advantage of allowing the Bolsheviks to eliminate forever some of their most formidable adversaries. ('THE SOVIET UNION AND MUSLIM GUERRILLA WAR, 1920-1981: LESSONS FOR AFGHANISTAN: A RAND NOTE', N-1707/1, The RAND Corporation, Alexandre Bennigsen, August 1981, pp. 25-26) (IMG)

There were many brave Muslims who fought for their own freedom alongside non-Muslims by fighting for the Bolsheviks. The following excerpt of the RAND Corporation document contains much of the usual anti-Soviet bias and propaganda but nonetheless admits much about the participation of Muslims in the Bolshevik revolution:

In 1920, approximately 40 percent of the soldiers and officers of Marshall Mikhail Frunze's VIth Red Army were Muslim, mainly Tatars and Bashkirs. The majority came from the "Muslim army" formed in 1917 by the Tatar nationalists of the Harbi Shura, which was disbanded by the Soviets in 1918. These Muslim officers were highly politicized, albeit more nationalist than Communist, having been trained between 1918 and 1920 in special political-military seminars created by Sultan Galiev under the aegis of the new People's Commissariat for Nationalities. Indifferent to socialist revolution and mainly interested in their own liberation from the reactionary rule of the Emir of Bukhara and from domination by the Russian colonists who had flooded into their native lands, the Muslim units of the VIth Red Army proved to be superb soldiers. Due largely to their presence in the force, the Russian recolonization of Central Asia appeared to be something else entirely; that is, it appeared to be more of a private Muslim affair.

By comparison, the XIth Red Army which invaded Daghestan and Chechnia was an all-Russian army, and its campaign became a typical colonial war for the Russians and a jihad for the fearsome Caucasian mountaineers who fought to the last man. Where the reconquest of Central Asia, on the whole, was a positive experience, the campaign in the Caucasus was a purely negative one. The Daghestani Communist historians who eventually wrote the history of this bloody period drew the necessary conclusions: A war against conservative Muslim insurgents must be conducted by revolutionary Muslim units or, at the very least, with the assistance of such units.

The early Bolshevik thrust has another important dimension that contributed to its success. In Central Asia, but not in the Caucasus, operations consisted primarily of conquering and organizing the territory; much less emphasis was placed on searching out and destroying the rebels. Even when the fighting in Central Asia was conducted by Russian units, pacification and organization of the conquered land was left to Muslim units. In the absence of a local proletariat, Muslim military cadre became the spearhead of the revolution.

('THE SOVIET UNION AND MUSLIM GUERRILLA WAR, 1920-1981: LESSONS FOR AFGHANISTAN: A RAND NOTE', N-1707/1, The RAND Corporation, Alexandre Bennigsen, August 1981, pp. 22-23) (IMG)

Unfortunately, the Trotskyites in the Bolshevik movement got the chance to savagely attack Muslim revolutionaries in order to drive a wedge between the communists and their Islamic revolutionary allies:

Objectively, the period of "War Communism," with its massacres and 'cavalry raids" - brutal attacks by armed bands of Bolsheviks against the Muslim religious establishment - was ... benign.... ('THE SOVIET UNION AND MUSLIM GUERRILLA WAR, 1920-1981: LESSONS FOR AFGHANISTAN: A RAND NOTE', N-1707/1, The RAND Corporation, Alexandre Bennigsen, August 1981, pp. 25-26) (IMG)

It must be remembered that Lenin opposed terrorism, and that the savage terror launched throughout the territories of the former Russian empire by elements in the Bolshevik Party was indeed done by the Trotsky-Zinoviev group against the will of Lenin and his faction, as confirmed by the MI6 documents cited previously, and as stated by Stalin. Knowing that the atrocities of the earlier years of the revolution were not done by the real Bolsheviks, the Muslims of the former Russian Empire, as confirmed by the RAND Corporation, basically continued their acceptance and support of the communists.

Fortunately though, the Lenin-Stalin faction of the Bolshevik Party, which had the backing of the communist blue-collar workers in the Party, promoted the cultural liberality of the NEP in part to counter the Trotskyite left-deviations of the earlier period. As confirmed by the RAND Corporation document:

In Central Asia in the 1920s, the period of terror was followed by a brief but authentic detente promoted by native Communists. ('THE SOVIET UNION AND MUSLIM GUERRILLA WAR, 1920-1981: LESSONS FOR AFGHANISTAN: A RAND NOTE', N-1707/1, The RAND Corporation, Alexandre Bennigsen, August 1981, pp. 25-26) (IMG)

The temporary liberality surely allowed all kinds of revisionist eclectic 'Islamic Communist' tendencies to emerge in the Muslim parts of the USSR. The emergence of such right-deviation though was less a crisis and more an opportunity because it served as a useful weapon by which the communist faction of the Bolshevik movement could counter the Trotskyite left-deviation:

By a series of clever ideological innovations, Communists articulated what has become known as Muslim National Communism: a synthesis of Marxism, Islam, and nationalism. This loose doctrine inverted many tenets of orthodox Marxism.... According to the Muslim National Communists, the cultural and religious bases of native society were to be left largely intact, free from the ... ideological attacks that characterized Russian applications of Marxism-Leninism to their own society. Class war in the Muslim borderlands was to be postponed indefinitely. (In fact, this restriction lasted only until 1928.) Reforms that might antagonize the native populations, such as land reform, destruction of traditional religious education, the confiscation of waqf properties (properties paid to Muslim authorities to support Islamic activities), and, above all, anti-religious campaigns, were put off for the foreseeable future. Local political and economic organs were gradually "nativized," leaving the mistaken impression in the minds of the natives that the Russians were embarked on something more benevolent than colonial reconquest. ('THE SOVIET UNION AND MUSLIM GUERRILLA WAR, 1920-1981: LESSONS FOR AFGHANISTAN: A RAND NOTE', N-1707/1, The RAND Corporation, Alexandre Bennigsen, August 1981, pp. 25-26) (IMG)

None of that is to imply that the 'Islamic communist' eclecticism was a tendency against which not to launch ideological and cultural campaigns. So-called 'Islamic communism' was eclectic and contrary to the principles of scientific socialism, even though temporarily for a few years, it benefited scientific socialist objectives by counteracting the Trotskyite left-deviation.

By the late 1920s, however, the struggle against the eclectic revisionist 'Islamic communist' right-deviation began, and class struggles in the field of the mode of production intensified. While local traditions were accepted, by the mid-to-late-1920s, cultural struggles against backward customs in Central Asia began. A paper by the US National Defense University's Center for Technology and National Security Policy launched the usual propaganda narrative that the processes of bringing change were in the form of 'diktats', but insofar as it pointed out that the mid-to-late-1920s saw the beginning of the intensified cultural struggles, it is correct:

The Soviet era actually began with a nod towards local custom. It was not until the mid-1920s that various diktats were announced which folded local courts and juridical proceedings into the Soviet experience. By the 1930s, the Central Asia region was under Soviet control, although this continued to be a struggle for Soviet officials in the ensuing decades. (In the Tracks of Tamerlane: Central Asia's Path to the 21st Century, National Defense University: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Washington DC, edited by; Dan Burghart & Theresa Sabonis-Helf, 204, p. 71) (IMG)

In addition, the cultural campaign against the totalitarian garment 'Burqa'/'niqab' was launched:

Soviet publications and contemporary studies are replete with accounts of how the Soviet government tried to quickly institute their own legal norms in the region. From the initial "unveiling" campaign in the 1920s, which advocated that women should remove their traditional veils as a sign of modernity, to the legal restrictions placed on Islamic organizations, the Soviet leaders sought to radically transform the concept of law in Central Asia. (In the Tracks of Tamerlane: Central Asia's Path to the 21st Century, National Defense University: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Washington DC, edited by; Dan Burghart & Theresa Sabonis-Helf, 204, p. 71) (IMG)

Turkey's Kemalists, who were funded in all ways by the Soviets, assisted the Bolsheviks in establishing Soviet power in the Caucasus:

In so doing, the Bolsheviks brought the Caucasus into their orbit with the approval and encouragement of Mustafa Kemal and thereby set the stage for an unsuccessful attempt to spread Bolshevism to ... other parts of the Muslim east. (Soviet Muslim Emigres in the Republic of Turkey, External Research Program of the US Department of State, Lowell Bezanis, May 1992, p. 22) (IMG)

Then,:

In December of the same year, agreement was reached between the nationalists and Soviet Armenia as to their common boundary, an agreement which was confirmed in March 1921 by a treaty with the USSR signed at Moscow. In October 1921 the Turkish nationalists formally recognized the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic. At the Conference of Lausanne in 1923, the status of the Straits was agreed upon among the powers concerned. The USSR, however, never ratified the treaty.

On 17 December 1925 Turkey and the Soviet Union signed a pact of friendship, which was extended and amplified exactly four years later.

('Turkey', SR-1/1, For: the Deputy Director, Joint Intelligence Group, & Joint Staff. CIA, December 22, 1948, p. 32) (IMG)

Too often, the Luxemburgites asserted that the Bolshevik support for self-determination and secession from the territory of the former Russian Empire would result in the future socialist state to have so little territory, and would help the bourgeois 'enemies' of the socialist state to rise in those territories. The case of Central Asian SSRs is one of the many cases in point to disprove this assertion. Communist support for the bourgeois-democratic anti-colonial struggles in the Russian Empire won many of the anti-Tsarist and anti-colonial freedom fighters onto the side of the Bolsheviks. Through absorbing the anti-colonial separatist movements into the Bolshevik cause, they were on the one hand able to annihilate the Anglo-Tsarist enemies of Soviet power; on the other hand, they were able to maintain the territorial integrity of the former Russian Empire. This is why the key tribes in Kazakhstan joined the Bolshevik revolution, inviting them to establish Soviet rule, even though these tribes hardly had proletarian origins. The RAND Corporation document stated:

The paradoxical courting of the Muslim tribal aristocracy by Bolshevik representatives that took place during the Civil War in Kazakhstan had excellent results. When a Kazakh batyr, a sultan, or a khan sided with the Bolsheviks, his clan, tribe, or horde followed automatically.' Such was the case with the important Qypchaq tribe and the entire Bukey Horde, whose chieftains, Zhagildin and Ali Khan Bukeykhanov, joined the Russian Communist Party during the Civil War in return for promises of national self-determination.... In the same way and for the same reasons, Ahmed Zeki Validov, the aristocratic and undisputed Bashkir leader, went over to the Reds, taking his entire nation with him. ('THE SOVIET UNION AND MUSLIM GUERRILLA WAR, 1920-1981: LESSONS FOR AFGHANISTAN: A RAND NOTE', N-1707/1, The RAND Corporation, Alexandre Bennigsen, August 1981, pp. 9-10) (IMG)

In pre-revolutionary Kazakh society, a batyr was head of a clan, a sultan was chief of a tribe, and a khan--always a descendant of Genghis Khan--was the ruler of a horde. ('THE SOVIET UNION AND MUSLIM GUERRILLA WAR, 1920-1981: LESSONS FOR AFGHANISTAN: A RAND NOTE', N-1707/1, The RAND Corporation, Alexandre Bennigsen, August 1981, p. 9) (IMG)

The general strategy of the Bolsheviks with regards to many of the progressive workers' or anti-imperialist movements was as follows: the Bolsheviks would absorb non-communist anti-colonial movements into their cause and then would begin a campaign to educate the ordinary members of the non-communist anti-colonial cause with regards to the theses of scientific socialism, historical materialism, and dialectics. Of course, every anti-colonial movement – communist or non-communist – is infiltrated by colonial agents and thus, the Bolsheviks would eventually purge off many of these colonial agents that had joined the Party during the process of the absorbing of such anti-colonial movements.

Many communists from the colonized parts of the world had their roots not as much in the working class communist movements but rather in anti-colonial national-bourgeois democratic movements. Ho Chi Minh is the most famous case in point, but there have been countless other cases. Such cases can be found in Central Asia and the Caucasus regions. Owing to their converging anti-colonial interests, many Islamists were interested in the Bolshevik cause, and invited Soviet rule even when such Islamists had not yet 'converted' to communism. Eventually, many of the Islamists genuinely interested in combatting the imperialists were convinced of the correctness of scientific socialism and thus 'converted', although such a process typically took quite a number of years since it required education in the field of historical materialism and dialectics.

Naturally, during the process of ideological re-education, and in part owing to the petit-bourgeois class forces at play in Central Asia and the Caucasus regions, there arose revisionist eclectic so-called 'Islamic communist' tendencies. Some leaned towards such ideas owing to a misunderstanding of the historical materialist and dialectical sciences. For these people, 'Islamic communism' was a good bridge towards eventually becoming a

communist. On the other hand, there were others who leaned towards such ideas for the purpose of subversion and ideational sabotage aimed at leading people away from communism onto Islam – to be sure, Islam was a progressive force for its own historical time period but to move from communism to ‘Islamic communism’ is to move backwards.

The following excerpt of the RAND report sheds some light on this phenomena of the ‘conversion’ from being an Islamist to a communist, and the admission of numerous anti-colonial patriots into the Party:

In February 1917, there were a few Muslim Communists in Russia. Two years later, several thousand former radical Muslim nationalists were admitted to the Russian Communist Party. The new Communist cadre originated in various strictly nationalist parties such as the Young Bukharans, the Alash-Orda (Kazakh), Milli Firka (Crimean Tatar), and Hummet (Azerbaijani). Because they needed these nationalists-turned-Communists to consolidate their revolution, Bolshevik leaders did not object to the non-proletarian origins of the new Muslim adherents. (In fact, nearly all belonged to the nobility or to the upper levels of the bourgeoisie in their respective societies.) Moreover, for a time at least, the Bolsheviks were prepared to suffer the Muslims' not inconsiderable ideological deviations. At the same time, however, the Bolsheviks submitted them to rigid discipline, much as they treated their Russian comrades. These Muslim Communists played prominent roles in local Communist Parties after 1920.... (‘THE SOVIET UNION AND MUSLIM GUERRILLA WAR, 1920-1981: LESSONS FOR AFGHANISTAN: A RAND NOTE’, N-1707/1, The RAND Corporation, Alexandre Bennigsen, August 1981, pp. 19-20) (IMG)

Again, as a disproof of the left-deviationist views of team Rosa Luxembourg, the anti-colonial line of the Bolsheviks actually won the peoples of the predominantly Muslim regions on to the side of the communists. In fact, there were quite a number of Muslim religious leaders who regarded liberation from Tsarist oppression as a priority, and thus supported the Bolsheviks:

Another paradoxical Bolshevik success during the Civil War was the cooptation of important Muslim religious leaders. This success contributed immensely to the Bolsheviks' final victory over the Muslim guerrillas of Central Asia, the Basmachi. (‘THE SOVIET UNION AND MUSLIM GUERRILLA WAR, 1920-1981: LESSONS FOR AFGHANISTAN: A RAND NOTE’, N-1707/1, The RAND Corporation, Alexandre Bennigsen, August 1981, pp. 12-13) (IMG)

[D]uring this period local Soviet authorities, who often were Muslims themselves, appealed to "progressive" elements among the Muslim clerics. These clerics, who became known as "Red Mullahs," took the lead in attacking more conservative Muslim clerics who opposed the new Soviet regime. (‘THE SOVIET UNION AND MUSLIM GUERRILLA WAR, 1920-1981: LESSONS FOR AFGHANISTAN: A RAND NOTE’, N-1707/1, The RAND Corporation, Alexandre Bennigsen, August 1981, pp. 12-13) (IMG)

Facing the much more reactionary feudal or Tsarist elements, many progressive bourgeois-democratic intellectuals sympathized with the Bolsheviks for their anti-colonialism. As such, many of them began to study Bolshevik ideas, underwent genuine ideological changes, and joined the communist labour movement. Beside these waves of intellectuals who had really changed, were the counter-revolutionary intellectuals who did not undergo real changes, but who decided to opportunistically present themselves as the friends of the workers and as ‘communists’. Thus, the RAND Corporation noted:

In the 1920s, the revolutionary Bolshevik leadership understood that the success of their political program in the borderlands depended to a large extent on their ability to swing the influence of the modern intellectual elite of Soviet Muslim regions to their side. In this they proved very successful and the revolution prospered. Exceptionally sophisticated native intellectuals such as the Kazan Tatars Mir-Said, Sultan Galiev, and Galimjan Ibragimov, the Kazakhs Turar Ryskulov and Ahmed Baytursun, the Uzbeks Abdurrauf Fitrat and Fjvzulla Kojaev, and many others went over to the Bolsheviks, either as full members of the Russian Communist Party or as temporary allies. This important group of intellectuals, most of whom were later liquidated by Stalin, played a major role in bridging the gap between the Russian revolutionaries and the Muslim masses. Through their efforts, the gap between traditional Islamic society and Russian socialism was made to appear much smaller than it eventually proved to be, and it was because of this that the Russian reconquest of Central Asia never assumed the character of a colonial enterprise. (‘THE SOVIET UNION AND MUSLIM GUERRILLA WAR, 1920-1981: LESSONS FOR AFGHANISTAN: A RAND NOTE’, N-1707/1, The RAND Corporation, Alexandre Bennigsen, August 1981, pp. 17-18) (IMG)

A paper by the US National Defense University's Center for Technology and National Security Policy stated:

Bukhara and Khiva, the two remaining protectorates, remained stagnant in their own personality-based systems. The frustration experienced by reform-minded individuals in these territories prompted some to find common cause with various revolutionary and reformist groups in Russia itself, including the radical Bolshevik faction of the Russian Social Democratic and Labor Party – the precursor to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Thus, ironically, the Jadidist reformers came to the conclusion that external assistance would most likely be required to enact change in their countries – and they sought assistance from groups that would eventually result in their downfall. Naturally, there were critical debates within the reformist community and a significant number did not side with the Bolsheviks, either joining the local insurgencies against the Red Army or simply emigrating. (In the Tracks of Tamerlane: Central Asia's Path to the 21st Century, National Defense University: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Washington DC, edited by; Dan Burghart & Theresa Sabonis-Helf, 204, p. 71) (IMG)

It is nonetheless worth reminding that a fair number of these Muslim leaders who joined the Bolsheviks, did so to infiltrate the movement and to undermine it. Fayzullah Khojayevev was an example. He was a right-deviationist eclectic and an agent of the British secret service, purged during the late 1930s. However, in the beginning, even the mere verbal support of such fakes as Khojayevev in support of the Bolsheviks was useful for the cause. Furthermore, the right-deviation of such ecclectics was useful for balancing off against the Trotskyite leftist measures aimed at driving a wedge between Muslims and Bolsheviks through terror against Muslims. All of this is in spite of the fact that the right-deviationist eclectic agents of the British secret service were covertly allied to the Trotskyite left-deviationists whom they pretended to oppose on the overt level.

Of course, there were also many people who chose not to become communists and to remain as non-communist progressives. These people did not belong to the Party in the longer run, but they surely could join the ranks of the Soviet government apparatus. Note that the Soviet government is not to be confused with the Party since the Party ruled over the government and strived to be an exclusive body of communists despite initially having right-deviationist and Trotskyite left-deviationist elements in it. On the other hand, the government, although subordinate to the Party, did not have to have communists in its ranks necessarily. This is why the Red Army, the intelligence service, the economic ministries, enterprise management, etc. all had many non-communists.

The Soviet Revolution was spread to Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. In the words of a document by the US-sponsored UNESCO:

In October 1917 the Bolshevik revolution triumphed in Petrograd, and that victory reverberated in the distant land of Turkistan. By 15 November Soviet power had been established in Tashkent, and by early December in Ashgabat. (HISTORY OF CIVILIZATION OF CENTRAL ASIA, Vol. VI, Towards the Contemporary Period: from the Mid-Nineteenth to the End of the Twentieth Century, UNESCO, Chahryar Adle, p. 318) (IMG)

The communists proclaimed their support for the independence and decolonization of the Central Asian peoples:

In November 1917, ... Soviet power approved two important documents: the Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia; and the Soviet Government's appeal 'To All Muslim Workers of Russia and the East'. These documents proclaimed the main principles of the Soviet policy on nationalities: equality and sovereignty for the large and small nations of Russia; their right to self-determination; free development for the national minorities and ethnic groups inhabiting Russia; and the abolition of any and all national and national-religious privileges and restrictions. In the words of Lenin:

Arrange your own national life freely and without hindrance. You have the right to do this. Know that your rights, like the rights of all the peoples of Russia, are protected by the full force of the revolution and its agencies.

(HISTORY OF CIVILIZATION OF CENTRAL ASIA, Vol. VI, Towards the Contemporary Period: from the Mid-Nineteenth to the End of the Twentieth Century, UNESCO, Chahryar Adle, pp. 318-319) (IMG)

“However,” the UNESCO document stated,:

under the new conditions, the Turkmens encountered many difficulties and contradictions as they tried to establish a national life. (HISTORY OF CIVILIZATION OF CENTRAL ASIA, Vol. VI, Towards the Contemporary Period: from the Mid-Nineteenth to the End of the Twentieth Century, UNESCO, Chahryar Adle, p. 319) (IMG)

After the July coup of 1918 when Junaid Khan seized power, there was a:

civil war that broke out in Transcaspian oblast'.... (HISTORY OF CIVILIZATION OF CENTRAL ASIA, Vol. VI, Towards the Contemporary Period: from the Mid-Nineteenth to the End of the Twentieth Century, UNESCO, Chahryar Adle, p. 319) (IMG)

Junaid Khan's regime was by no means popular let alone effective in resolving the issues. As such, a widespread rebellion broke out and the rebels called for the establishment of Soviet power and assistance of the Red Army:

During this period, the political and economic situation deteriorated sharply in the Khiva khanate, and inter-ethnic tensions increased. (...). One especially noteworthy individual at this time was Junaid Khan, a leader of the Turkmen tribes who seized power in the khanate, although at first he left the Khiva khan on the throne (1918-20). However, Junaid Khan was unable to ease Uzbek-Turkmen relations, which were founded exclusively on the issue of water use. Nor was he able to preserve unity among all the Turkmen tribes. As a result, the economic crisis worsened, and it was not long before upheavals and armed actions began in the khanate. The rebels, among whom Kochmamed Khan, Qulamali, Shamyrat Bagshy and other Turkmen clan leaders distinguished themselves, appealed to Soviet power in Turkistan for assistance. This was a pretext for Red Army units to enter the khanate. With their assistance, the rebels deposed Khiva's khan, Sayyid 'Abdullah Khan, and the actual ruler, Junaid Khan, who retreated with the remnants of his troops deep into the Kara Kum. Subsequently, for nearly 10 years, Junaid Khan waged a relentless struggle to restore his lost power. In 1928 he was defeated, left the republic and crossed into Afghanistan, where he died in 1937. (HISTORY OF CIVILIZATION OF CENTRAL ASIA, Vol. VI, Towards the Contemporary Period: from the Mid-Nineteenth to the End of the Twentieth Century, UNESCO, Chahryar Adle, p. 319) (IMG)

As a result:

On 27-30 April 1920 the first All-Khwarazm Qurultay (Council) of People's Representatives proclaimed the creation of the Khwarazm People's Soviet Republic (Khwarazm NSR) and ratified its constitution. On 13 September of that same year an agreement was reached in Moscow between the RSFSR and the Khwarazm NSR according to which the Government of the Russian Republic recognized the independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Khwarazm and annulled all agreements foisted on the Khiva khanate by tsarist Russia. (HISTORY OF CIVILIZATION OF CENTRAL ASIA, Vol. VI, Towards the Contemporary Period: from the Mid-Nineteenth to the End of the Twentieth Century, UNESCO, Chahryar Adle, p. 320) (IMG)

Bokhara experienced a similar situation as in Khwarazm. An uprising began followed by an appeal to Soviet power and the Red Army, leading to the establishment of a Soviet republic in that region:

Events followed more or less the same scenario in the Bukhara emirate. In the summer of 1920, an armed uprising against the emir began in the emirate's Turkmen areas under the leadership of Abdulhakim Kulmuhamedov and Byashim Sardar. The rebels appealed to the Red Army units standing at the ready in Kagan and on 2 September 1920, through joint efforts by the Red Army units, the First Eastern Muslim Regiment and the rebels, Bukhara's emir, Sayyid 'Alim Khan, was deposed. The commander of the Turkistan front, Mikhail Frunze, telegraphed Lenin: 'Bukhara has fallen. The Red Banner of world revolution is waving victoriously over the Registan.' On 6 October 1920, in Bukhara, the first All-Bukhara Qurultay proclaimed the formation of the Bukhara People's Soviet Republic (Bukhara NSR). (HISTORY OF CIVILIZATION OF CENTRAL ASIA, Vol. VI, Towards the Contemporary Period: from the Mid-Nineteenth to the End of the Twentieth Century, UNESCO, Chahryar Adle, p. 320) (IMG)

Adeeb Khalid, the American regime's distinguished scholar at the John W. Kluge Center at the US Library of Congress, admitted:

Even the harshest critics of Soviet nationalities policy cannot ascribe the separation of Tajikistan from Uzbekistan and its elevation to the status of a union republic to a divide-and-rule policy. It was the result of demands from the Tajik leadership and, if anything, central authorities tried their best to moderate Tajik demands. Rather, the separation had to do with the way in which Tajik and Uzbek elites had internalized the categories of ethnic nationhood and had come to see the historically intertwined sedentary Muslim population of Central Asia as composed of two distinct national and racial groups, each with its own political rights. These conceptions were of prerevolutionary vintage, but they found resonance with classificatory schemes used by the Soviet state. The ethnic disaggregation of the Muslim population of Central Asia was thus the culminating feature of the age of revolution on Central Asia. (“Making Uzbekistan: Nation, Empire and Revolution in the Early USSR,” Cornell University, Adeeb Khalid, 2015 p. 369) (IMG)

C4S2. The Gilan SSR / Soviet Presence in Azerbaijan (Iran) / Baha'i-Trotskyite agents of the MI6

As with many of the other SSRs, the main local elements behind the establishment of the SSRs were former progressive bourgeois-democratic elements who had accepted communism. The progressive bourgeois democrats were not businessmen per se but were rather ideologically bourgeois-

democrats and hence many of them moved away from bourgeois thinking and began to gradually train themselves with the scientific theses of communism. The establishment of the Gilan SSR was a case in point of this fact.

In 1905, along with the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Tsarist Russia, there came about a revolution to turn the monarchy in Iran into a constitutional one. One of the headquarters of the revolution was located in Iran's Azerbaijan region, which, centuries prior, had been also the region that spread Shia Islam to Persia. The revolt had some success but many of its gains were suppressed by the Anglo-Russian colonizers. Against the Anglo-Russian forces, there came about a constitutionalist-turned-republican resistance movements in Iran's 'Jangal-ha' (forests) in the Gilan province in the North. The Islamic Republic of Iran's Institute for Iranian Contemporary Historical Studies wrote:

With the victory of the Constitutional Revolution and in response to the unfulfilled promises of the constitutionalist revolutionaries in Tehran, movements took place around the lands of the forbidden countries of Iran, the most popular of which was the Jungle Movement. Although there is no consensus on the nature of this movement and the political goals of Mirza Kuchak Khan Jangali, Mirza Kuchak Khan can be considered one of the popular contemporary figures who is the legend of resistance against the colonialists. (The Reason Behind Mirza Kuchak Khan's and Ibrahim Heshmat's Popularity, Institute for Iranian Contemporary Historical Studies, Morteza Hafezi) (IMG)

Mirza was a Shia Muslim fighter against British imperialists and was a progressive republican. His movement, the Jangali movement, shared his ideology. He would later invite the Bolsheviks into Iran.

Parallel to the Jangali movement was the Baha'iyeh. In order to understand the character of the imperialist infiltration in Iran's communist movement, and especially with regards to Gilan, one must first understand this cult. Baha'ism (or Baha'iyeh) is an inherently pro-MI6 religion that presents itself as "progressive," "universalist," "internationalist," "pro-democracy," "friendly" towards peoples of other Abrahamic religions (including Islam), and "supportive" of women's rights. The progressive mask which this pro-MI6 religion takes is precisely a key factor for why it is dangerous. There indeed were and are many well-meaning individuals deceived by the propaganda narratives of this religion, but that does not change the fact that the religion is a force for imperialist reaction. Abdul-Baha, the son of Baha'ollah, was one of the core leaders and co-founders of the Baha'iyeh, and openly befriended the British imperialist occupation forces in Palestine, promoted Britain's cause, all the while claiming to represent internationalism and women's rights. The following report published in the prominent American Baha'i magazine "The Star of the West" exposes the details of this matter:

While the league of nations is hailed or attacked here as a Wilsonian project, out in Palestine is a religious leader who claims it first saw the light in the writings of his father fifty years ago. He is Abdul-Baha, the son and successor of BAHÁ'O'LLAH, founder of the modern cult, Baháism.

Abdul-Baha, or Abbas Effendi, as he is widely known in the Near East, counts hundreds of followers in America. He made a tour here in 1912, preaching his doctrine of universal love in churches and halls from coast to coast. Born in Persia in 1844 he went to Acca as a young man. He was imprisoned by the Turks for his teachings, but was released in 1908, the year of the new Ottoman constitution.

Interested in World League.

I met Abdul-Baha lately in his home in Haifa. **He has many friends among the British, including General Ronald Storrs, military governor of Jerusalem, and it was a British officer who took me to him.** His influence is considerable in the Holy Land, but it is almost impossible to reduce it to actual numbers. I went to him curious as to his views of the future of Palestine, but he seemed more eager to talk of a matter of world importance—the league of nations.

He spoke in Persian, a well trained secretary interpreting his low, soft words in good English. Through the open windows of the large sunny salon of his modern house came the trill of songbirds in the Effendi's lovely garden. In white galabieh and turban, he fitted into the summery scene, his voice falling on the silence like a woodland echo. An ancient, venerable patriarch he seemed, with his snowy beard, a kindly patriarch, but with little of the Biblical fire.

Tells of Father's Plan.

"Fifty years ago," he began, "BAHÁ'O'LLAH wrote that there must be a league of nations to establish universal peace. He worked his idea out on practical lines, too. He said every nation must choose representatives, approved by the senate, the cabinet and the ruler of the country. They were to meet to found a universal peace congress to be forever a world court of arbitration.

"BAHÁ'O'LLAH saw even then, half a century ago, that unless universal peace is established, the world of humanity will continue in a state of barbarism. For it is a world of struggle for existence, of sensualism, a world of nature. Only when universal peace comes to stay will it become a world of spirit.

"I went to America myself on a mission of universal peace. I proclaimed seven years ago that Europe was an arsenal that needed but a spark to turn it into a volcano. The world leaders, I urged, must prevent this catastrophe. But they did not heed me. Now that they themselves are working for universal peace and we are soon to have a league of nations, there is no need for me to go to America again.

Message to His Followers.

"Tell my followers," Abdul-Baha continued, "that I am always asking heavenly help for them, and that my deepest desire is that they shall be the source of the enlightenment of humanity and the unity of all the races of mankind. The point of distinction among men, let them remember, is their deeds, not their beliefs or words. I charge my disciples, too, at this time to show love even toward their 'enemies.' They have no 'enemies.' The enemy of man is himself."

His religion, this leader explained, includes the highest principles of its forerunners, with this addition — it fuses them all in the pursuit of one goal, the unity of mankind in universal love. Unlike its Mohammedan neighbor, it teaches the equality of man and woman. "The world of humanity has two wings," is Abdul-Baha's view, "man and woman. If one wing is weak then the bird cannot fly."

He looks to the rebirth of religion as a result of the war. The Bolshevik movement, he believes, will prove an admonition to the religious world and send mankind back to the fold, convinced that religion is the sole source of order and peace. Bolshevism was inevitable, because religion was on the daily decline in Europe, particularly in Russia.

Has Hope for Palestine.

For Palestine Abdul-Baha has the brightest hopes. "It will develop day by day now," he declared, "in industry, in commerce, in agriculture, under an enlightened government. Up to the present the people of this country were like lost sheep. Now they have found their shepherd.

"If the Zionists will mingle with the other races and live in unity with them, they will succeed. If not, they will meet certain resistance. **For the present I think a neutral government like the British administration would be best.** A Jewish government might come later.

"There is too much talk today of what the Zionists are going to do here. There is no need of it. Let them come and do more and say less. "The Zionists should make it clear that their principle is to elevate all the people here and to develop the country for all its inhabitants. This land must be developed, according to the promises of the prophets Isaiah, Jeremiah and Zachariah. If they come in such a spirit they will not fail.

Must Be Open to All.

"They must not work to separate the Jews from the other Palestinians. Schools should be open to all nationalities here, business companies, etc. The Turks went down because they attempted to rule over foreign races. The British are always in power because they keep fair and promote harmony.

(‘Declares Zionists Must Work with Other Races Leader of Baháism believes Neutral Government Like British Is Best for Palestine at Present—Says His Father Advocated League Half Century Ago’, From: The Globe and Commercial Advertiser, New York, July 17, 1919, author: Marion Weinstein. In: ‘THE STAR OF THE WEST’ (American Baha’i publication), Vol. 10, Eizzat 1, 75 (September 8, 1919), No. 10, pp. 195-196. Bold added.) (IMG)

It is not difficult to understand why, considering the fact that this MI6-Zionist reactionary ideology took on a "progressive" cloak, it served and continues to serve to this day as a cult valuable to Anglo-American and Israeli intelligence networks. One Iranian Trotskyite nihilist trained in the Baha’iyeh pro-MI6 network was Ehsanollah Khan Dustdar. Moojan Momen, a leading figure of the international Baha’iyeh network, wrote:

The Baha’i community in the town came to include prominent merchants such as Mirza Muhammad Isma’il Amin al-Tujjar Isfahani, Mirza Muhammad ‘Ali Mushir al-Tujjar Tabrizi (who was a son-in-law of Mirza ‘Inayatullah ‘Aliyabadi) and Hajji Muhsin Kashmiri. Also converted were Aqa Mahmud Sa’atsaz (1280/ 1863–1912), who was engaged in journalism and had been a darugha (police chief) in the town, and the bazaar trader Aqa Mirza Habib Kharazi-furush Isfahani. There were also two physicians who became Baha’is, Aqa Lutf-‘Ali Khan Majd al-Atibba’, who became a Baha’i in 1303/1885 and had extensive property in Arata Bur Khayl, and Mirza ‘Ali Akbar Hafiz al-Sihha (d. c.1313/1895), who was in charge of public health and also had property in Arata. The latter’s four sons later took the surname of Dustdar and the eldest of them Ihsanullah Khan (1884 –c.1944), studied at the Baha’i-run Tarbiyat School and then at the St Louis School in Tehran and later taught French at the schools in Sari (hence the reference to him as “Monsieur” Ihsanullah Khan in the list below).²¹ Majd al-Atibba’s interest in reform is demonstrated by his membership of the Mazandaran branch of the Jamí-yi Adamiyyat (established c.1903), an organization that was inspired by Mirza Malkam Khan’s writings on reform and that promoted the modernization of Iran. (‘The Baha’is and the Constitutional Revolution: The Case of Sari, Mazandaran, 1906-1913’, Iranian Studies, Vol. 41, May 28, 2008, Issue 3, Moojan Momen, p. 348) (IMG)

Characteristic of British intelligence techniques is to self-describe as ‘apolitical’, even if one is so blatantly political. Baha’ism, as an MI6 ideology, is no exception. Ehsanollah Khan Dustdar did precisely what every politically competent Baha’i is religiously obliged to do: infiltrate revolutionary movements on behalf of MI6 intelligence networks. While Momen promoted the myth of Baha’i apoliticism, and hence depicting Dustdar as deviating from Baha’iyah, he did nonetheless mention the fact that the Baha’i operative Dustdar joined an extremist (nihilist and proto-Trotskyite) fringe of the constitutionalist (“reform”) movement, and then went on to join the Jangali movement:

Similarly, a few of the Baha’is seem to have continued to play a part in the Baha’i community but also to have continued some limited political involvement. Aqa Mahmud Sa’atsaz and Mirza Habibullah Kharazifurush, for example, are described as Baha’is and also as having been members of the Democrat Party after 1909. At least one Baha’i, however, Ihsanullah Khan (Dustdar), separated himself from the Baha’i community and threw himself actively into the political process. He moved at first to Tehran where he was politically active after 1909 among the more extreme elements of the reform movement (Kumitih-yi Mujazat which had goals and activities that were radically opposed to Baha’i principles) and then he moved to Gilan province where he became a leading figure in the Jangali Revolt, 1918–21. (‘The Baha’is and the Constitutional Revolution: The Case of Sari, Mazandaran, 1906-1913’, Iranian Studies, Vol. 41, May 28, 2008, Issue 3, Moojan Momen, p. 354) (IMG)

As can be seen, while the Jangali movement was a revolutionary movement, it was infiltrated by the Baha’iyah extremist elements. Mirza Kuchak Khan and the Shia Islamic and progressive republican leadership of Gilan saw in the establishment of Soviet power, the hopes for the liberation of Iran from the yoke of the White Guards, the British colonizers, and the central regime in Iran. As such, the progressive Muslim patriot Mirza invited the Soviet forces into Gilan and helped in the establishment of the Gilan SSR, a Soviet military intervention to which Western media wrongly referred as an “invasion.” Prominent American intelligence official Ralph Cossa wrote:

the Soviets (even before the invasion) had been providing support to an Iranian revolutionary leader, Kuchik Khan, whose movement was dedicated to the overthrow of the central government and to radical social change. Although more a Muslim nationalist than a true Marxist believer, Khan realized that an alliance with Lenin’s forces provided the best means of success for his movement. Within days of the Soviet invasion, therefore, Khan sent a telegram to “Comrade Lenin” in which he proclaimed the formation of the “Persian Socialist Soviet Republic”—more commonly referred to as the Gilan Socialist Republic, since Khan at the time maintained considerable control over Gilan Province. From then until the time of their eventual pullout, Soviet forces were to fight side by side with Khan’s followers. (‘Iran: Soviet Interests, US Concerns’, McNair Papers, No. 11, The Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington DC, author: Ralph A. Cossa, July 1990, p. 21) (IMG)

Along with Gilan, the other major hub of communism in Iran was the Azerbaijan region, which was most enthusiastic of all towards the October Revolution. As Richard Cottam, the CIA operative involved in the 1953 coup in Iran, admitted,:

Nowhere in Iran was the Bolshevik revolution greeted with more enthusiasm than in Azerbaijan. (...). The Bolshevik Revolution meant that at last Azerbaijan would be free of the [Tsarist] Russian troops that had been in occupation since 1909. (Nationalism in Iran: Updated Through 1978, Richard W. Cottam, 1979, p. 122) (IMG)

People in Azerbaijan (in Iran) sought to join the Azerbaijan SSR:

During one of these periods the notoriously antinationalist and pro-Tsarist Tabriz correspondent for the British journal Near East and India, Mirza Firuz Khan, wrote that separatist thinking was sweeping Azerbaijan. (Nationalism in Iran: Updated Through 1978, Richard

W. Cottam, 1979, p. 125. Citing: Russo-Persian Trade Relations, The Near East and India, Mirza Firuz Khan, July 29, 1927, p. 118) (IMG)

The Soviets thus entered Iran in order to undermine the presence of the British imperialists and the White Guards, and to help the people of Northern Iran reach their aim of freedom from imperialist yoke, through the establishment of the SSRs:

in May 1920 Soviet forces penetrated into Iranian territory, ostensibly in pursuit of the remnants of the White Russian Army. Fear of the British provided another justification for the invasion. As the commander of the Red Fleet, F. F. Raskolnikov, observed at the time, Soviet Russia "could not be sure that the British would not make a new attack on Baku from Enzeli" (a British outpost in Iranian territory on the Caspian Sea coast). The invasion was therefore aimed, in part, at "depriving the British [of] their mainstay on the Caspian Sea." It soon became apparent that Moscow's aspirations exceeded merely neutralizing the White Russian and British threats. By the end of the year, Soviet forces had gained control over Iranian Azerbaijan and almost the entire Caspian Sea coast. (See map on p. 20.)

(‘Iran: Soviet Interests, US Concerns’, McNair Papers, No. 11, The Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington DC, author: Ralph A. Cossa, July 1990, p. 19) (IMG)

While the liberation of Iran's north would have been a much-desired outcome, the fact remained that by 1921, the Soviets needed to establish peace agreements with all their neighbors in order to be able to build up their military-industrial capacity, before any further continuation of international class warfare. As such, it became a necessary evil to give up on Iran's north:

By 1921, the pragmatic Lenin came to grips with reality. Weakened by seven years of international and civil war, faced with serious economic challenges at home, and concerned over further confrontation with the British in Iran, the Bolsheviks elected to seek accommodation with Tehran and trade their newly acquired territory for secure borders and diplomatic recognition. In addition, the Gilan leadership by this time had become seriously factionalized.... (‘Iran: Soviet Interests, US Concerns’, McNair Papers, No. 11, The Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington DC, author: Ralph A. Cossa, July 1990, p. 21) (IMG)

In the meantime, as the Bolsheviks were further weakened in northern Iran, the position of Mirza became also less stable. This created greater leverage for a Trotskyite-Bahai saboteurial network in Gilan SSR. Then, in 1921, when the Bolsheviks were on the retreat, Dustdar and his Trotskyite-Bahai clique launched their Trotskyite coup against Mirza and the Gilan SSR. Jamil Hasanli, a prominent Azeri government official serving in the CIA-funded Wilson Center since 2011, wrote:

Despite promises of support, on July 30, 1920, at a joint and secret meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Iran and representatives of the left forces in the government of the Soviet Republic of Gilan, it was decided to overthrow Mirza Kuchak Khan and suppress his supporters. As a result, a new government was established in Gilan on July 31, headed by Ehsanullah Khan at the suggestion of the [Trotskyite] [pseudo-]Bolsheviks in Iran. Mirza Kuchak Khan returned to the forests of Gilan and settled with his colleagues in his former headquarters, Fooman. The communist attempt to besiege and destroy him failed. A fierce battle ensued, resulting in the deaths of about 400 of Mirza's companions and hundreds of [Bolshevik] fighters sent from Azerbaijan and Russia. (‘A Narrative of the Jangali Movement's Relationship with the Soviet Communist Government / The Promises Mirza Kuchak Khan Received from the Soviets’, Jamil Hasanli, Professor of History, Baku State University, Translated to Farsi by: Abtin Golkar. In: Tarikh Irani, June 6, 2012) (IMG)

The Trotskyite-Rightist renegade Chicherin was very happy by the fact that the allegedly 'non-daring', 'non-revolutionary', non-Trotskyite Mirza was defeated by the Trotskyite faction:

on August 3, in the heat of the Gilan affair, Soviet Foreign Minister Chicherin wrote to Kamenev: "There are rumors that Mirza Kuchak Khan is hiding and apparently escaped from the British, which does not matter. His commander-in-chief, who is much more left-wing than himself, has replaced him. The Soviet Republic of Iran will survive without him. Kuchak Khan is useful as a popular figure, but it is also detrimental in part because of his lack of full understanding of revolutionary and sedentary politics. He does not know how to dare, while this is exactly what is needed now ... Overall, our situation in the East is constantly improving. The revolutionary fervor has engulfed the masses of the army, and this means that the whole reactionary structures have been shaken ... a transformation has taken place in which the Iranian movement has been very influential. It is clear that the pace and intensity of our policy in the East depends on our policy towards Britain. It can be emphasized in the negotiations with the British that if they launch a military operation in Europe, they can only seriously injure us with a few pins in the fringes, whereas if we use all our facilities in the East, we can strike immediately. "Introduce the great and irreparable into the whole of Britain's world standing." (‘A Narrative of the Jangali Movement's Relationship with the Soviet Communist Government / The Promises Mirza Kuchak Khan Received from the Soviets’, Jamil Hasanli, Professor of History, Baku State University, Translated to Farsi by: Abtin Golkar. In: Tarikh Irani, June 6, 2012) (IMG)

Years later, Dustdar and his Trotskyite-Bahai gang were purged on charges of being Trotskyite agents of British intelligence:

in Baku, the authorities opened fire on the first group of non-communist Iranian revolutionaries. Led by Ehsanollah Khan Dustdar, the group also included members of the Gilan Revolutionary Committee and later the Komiteh-e Enqelab-e Azadkonandeh-e Iran (Committee for the Revolution Liberating Iran): Ashuri, Ja'far Kangavari, Reza Pashazadeh and Ali Hoseynzadeh.

On 15 December 1937, Ehsanollah Khan was arrested in Baku. He was accused of being: "engaged in anti-Soviet activities, a British and later a German agent, a member of Trotsky-Zinoviev circle, an anti-Comintern and anti-Communist Party of Iran activist". During the early interrogation, ... he utterly rejected all charges. His interrogation in Baku lasted for almost five months. In April 1938, he was sent to Moscow for further interrogation. In Moscow, they repeated the same charges, and he again, as he had done in Baku rejected.... (Iranian Revolutionaries in the Soviet Union, Touraj Atabaki, Reformers and Revolutionaries in Modern Iran, edited by Dr. Stephanie Cronin, 2013, p. 162) (IMG)

Interestingly, Iranian anti-communist propagandists denounce Dustdar as a traitor who destroyed the anti-imperialist movement, but praise him and his group as "great communists" "framed" and "murdered" "by Stalin."

Anyways, by the late 1930s, the Baha'iyah and its intelligence ties to Trotskyite spy networks was publicly exposed and thus the Baha'iyah was de facto banned in the USSR:

the Soviet Union ... confiscated the Baha'i temple in Ashgabat, deported about 1000 Baha'is back to Iran, and shipped most of the rest to prisons and gulags, where hundreds perished. Survivors were scattered across Siberia, where a few were found as late as the 1990s. In the 1930s Iran's government placed many new restrictions on the Baha'is there.... (New Religious Movements and Violence,

C4S3. On the Russian Bourgeois-Nationalist Argument 'Bolsheviks surrendered Russian territory!'

Too often, Russian bourgeois-nationalists foolishly criticize the Bolsheviks for the latter's support for anti-colonial secessionist movements in the former Russian Empire. Are they correct in such 'criticism'? No, they are not correct. The non-existence of such a Bolshevik policy on secessionism would have led to the partition of the territory of the former Russian Empire, whereas the Bolshevik pursuit of the secessionist policy ensured the territorial integrity of that area in a new non-colonial fashion.

Note that in the territory of the former Russian Empire, in the aftermath of an October Revolution, only two options were possible: (1) the Bolsheviks taking over territory from the Tsarist Russians, or (2) the Bolsheviks accepting the continued rule of the Tsarist Russians. The second option was the surrender of the October Revolution to the Tsarist White Guards, and would have resulted in the territories outside of Soviet Russia to be dominated by reactionary states separate from Soviet Russia. Hence, the second option would have resulted in the partition of the territory of the former Russian Empire, precisely the kind of an outcome against which Russian bourgeois-nationalists whine.

Hence remained only the first option. And to pursue the first option was to pursue a revolt against the Tsarist Russians ruling and operating in the territories outside of Tsarist Russia. In some territories, the revolt against the Tsarist Russians could easily take the form of a proletarian revolution, devoid of any 'national' 'secessionist' colorations and strongly proletarian internationalist in rhetoric; in most territories of the Russian Empire, however, the conditions for a proletarian revolution had not yet come, and a Bolshevik revolt against the Tsarist White Guard rule could only take the form of an anti-colonial national-bourgeois revolution absorbed by the Bolshevik movement. Such an anti-colonial national-bourgeois revolution, due to its national-bourgeois rebel character, would have inherently taken on a secessionist rhetoric. The Bolshevik proletarians, by adopting the language of such secessionist causes, were able to take leadership of the anti-colonial movements and to oust the Tsarist White Guards, the Mensheviks, etc. Since the same Bolshevik proletarians took leadership of the many 'centrifugal' secessionist movement, these secessionist movements were glued together; the Bolshevik proletarians constituted the glue that linked all these secessionist causes to each other. The Bolshevik absorption of these anti-colonial bourgeois movements allowed the Bolsheviks to overthrow the reactionary regimes encircling Soviet Russia and to establish Socialist Soviet Republics (SSRs) that then merged together to form the Union of the SSRs.

Imagine if the Bolsheviks would have, as the Russian bourgeois-nationalists desire, opposed the anti-colonial secessionist movements – what would have happened in that case? There were again two options: (A) accept the rule of the Tsarist White Guards over those non-Russian territories, as states separate from Soviet Russia, or (B) make peace with the Tsarist White Guards and come to an agreement with them wherein the remaining territories in which the Tsarist White Guards rule would be incorporated into Soviet Russia, with rights and privileges for the White Guards throughout the new 'Soviet' Russian state in exchange for those territories becoming a part of 'Soviet' Russia. Again, option A entails surrendering territory to the White Guards and letting them rule over their territories. Option B entails allowing the infiltration of massive hordes of MI6 agents, since the Tsarist White Guards were MI6 mercenaries, into the 'Soviet' Russian state apparatus; such a pervasive infiltration would have surely spelled either the restoration of the Tsarists to power throughout the 'Russian Empire', or partition of the territory of 'Soviet' Russia, depending on the worldwide geostrategic situation. Herein can be seen the direct link between the Bolsheviks revolting against the Tsarists and the Bolsheviks supporting proletarian-led secessionist causes throughout the Russian Empire. Ostensibly, proletarian-led secessionism would have resulted in the partition of that territory when in fact, in the context of after the October Revolution, it helped prevent the Tsarist White Guards from partitioning the territory of the Soviet Union.

Take for example the case of Bessarabia. Until the October Revolution, Bessarabia was controlled by the Russian Empire. By the time of the October Revolution, the local government leadership of Bessarabia, loyal to the ancien regime and vehemently anti-Bolshevik, invited the Kerensky regime's Russian army as well as the Romanian military to intervene in Bessarabia against the Bolshevik threat. Jonathan Wilkenfeld – the Principal Investigator in the 'Interstate Behavior Analysis Project' sponsored by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) during the years 1974-1977, the Principal Investigator in the 'Cross-National Crisis Analysis Project' sponsored by DARPA for the period 1977-1978, and the Program Consultant for the Pennsylvania Governor's School for International Studies in the early 1990s – confirmed that Bessarabia was taken over from the Soviet Union by the Romanian military in 1918:

Bessarabia had a long history of foreign occupation, from the time the Bulgars, a Turkic people, settled there in 679 A.D.: the Mongols (1241); Lithuania (1396); Russia (1812); Turkey (1856); and Russia once more (1878).

The breakdown of law and order at the time of the Bolshevik Revolution led the provincial government in Bessarabia in late December 1917 to request both the Romanian government and the Russian army's GHQ to dispatch troops to the area. Romania did so; and its forces occupied Kishinev, capital of Bessarabia, on 13 January 1918. Bessarabia proclaimed its independence on 24 January, but it was not recognized by the powers.

Russia responded to Romania's military intervention by severing diplomatic relations with Bucharest on 13 January and insisting that Romanian troops be withdrawn from Bessarabia. Romania refused; and its military presence was backed by a Note in early February from the senior representatives of France, Greece, Italy, the U.K., and the U.S. to the Rumtcerod, or governing body in Odessa, as a measure designed to restore order; the question of sovereignty over Bessarabia was left open. Tension rose on 27 March and again on 9 April 1918, when the legislatures of Romania and Bessarabia passed an act of union. Chicherin, the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, protested to Bucharest on 27 March. (The events from 13 January to 27 March 1918 constitute a separate

(A Study of Crisis, University of Michigan Press, Michael Brecher, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, 1997, p. 576) (IMG{Nazi-Soviet Pact Era})

The Bolshevik program of promoting revolutionary defeatism undermined the reactionary provincial rulers of the Russian Empire, rulers who lifted the banner of Russia's territorial 'integrity' so to partition, and reduce the geographic size of, the Soviet Union. Such was also why the 'patriotic' Russian emigres closely collaborated with the Georgian separatists, with the same Anglo-American and Nazi German intelligence agencies, and with the MI6 Lavrenti Beria, for partitioning and reducing the geographic size of the Soviet Union.

C4S4. Soviet Involvement in Georgia / Lavrenti Beria, an Agent of the MI6

The US Information Agency confirmed that the Georgian Mensheviks established an alliance with the British Empire:

After the Bolshevik coup in October 1917, the Georgian Menshevik leaders still avowed their allegiance to the Russian Provisional Government. Only after the Bolsheviks' signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in which the Transcaucasian territories were ceded to the

Axis powers did the Georgian leaders declare Georgia's independence, enter into a short-lived Transcaucasian Federation, and then establish a sovereign Georgian republic in May, 1918. The Georgian leaders entered into alliances with European powers (in turn, Germany and Great Britain) and carried out a socialistic reform program. Independent Georgia was recognized by 22 countries. ('ATTITUDES OF MAJOR SOVIET NATIONALITIES: Vol. III: THE TRANSCAUCASUS: Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan' Center for International Studies at MIT, US Information Agency, June 1973, p. 'Georgia – History – 4') (IMG)

In Georgia, the Bolshevik agents were very active and posed a menace to the MI6-backed Georgian Menshevik regime. The MI6 reported:

It is a mistake to think that because Bolshevism is not seen in the Caucasus that it does not exist. Bolshevism in Tiflis is a very real danger, and their agents are working hard. Both Baku and Tiflis are teeming with them. The virulent form felt up in Russia cannot appear until the armed forces are affected. In Azerbaijan and Baku this is at present practically an impossibility, but in Tiflis it is a real danger. Hence one of the great dangers is a change of the present Government, which is able to hold the army together: the Georgians can mobilise about 30,000 men, and have some 700 Lewis guns sent to the Grand Duke's army in 1917. The Georgian outposts on the Georgian road are known to be fraternising with the Bolsheviks, and should be constantly changed or entirely replaced by foreign troops. (Report on the Georgian Government by Major McDonnell, Constantinople, Major McDonnell, January 27, 1919. In: Foreign Office (1917-1919), p. 57) (IMG)

As the following excerpts of an MI6 document prove, Georgian Foreign Affairs Minister Gegechkori, the close relative of Lavrenti Beria's wife Nina Gegechkori, was a staunch Menshevik anti-communist favorable to German interests, and favored by the British:

The actual establishment of the present Georgian Republic came about with the advent of the German troops. M. Gegechkori, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, states that he, as a representative of the then Tiflis Commissariate, applied to Colonel Pike, the representative of the British Mission in Tiflis, for British or Allied assistance in troops and finance, in order to keep the Turk out of Georgia and to establish Georgian independence. On being informed that this was impossible, the Tiflis Commissariate accepted Germany's offer on the 4th December, when news of armistice and the removal of the Turk and German from the Caucasus was confirmed. (...). The Prime Minister, M. Jordani, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs [Gegechkori] are undoubtedly the soundest elements in the Government. They are both former members of the old Russian Duma ... and more democratic than socialist.

(Report on the Georgian Government by Major McDonnell, Constantinople, Major McDonnell, January 27, 1919. In: 188753, India Office to Foreign Office, from: J. E. Schuckburgh, November 14, 1918; received: November 15, 1918. In: Foreign Office (1917-1919), p. 54) (IMG)

As stated above, Evgeni Gegechkori, the foreign minister of the Georgian Menshevik government, made a deal with the British to fight against the Bolsheviks. He asked the British military chief in Tiflis, Colonel Pike, to deploy British imperial troops in order to assist the Georgian government. After the collapse of the Menshevik Regime in Georgia, the MI6 agent Gegechkori escaped to Paris to lead the fascist shadow war against the Soviet Union from there:

E. P. Gegechkori was a prominent leader of the Menshevik Georgian government-in-exile based in Paris..... He was also father of Beria's wife, Nina Gegechkori. (Cold War in the Caucasus: Notes and Documents from a Conference, collected by Svetlana Savranskaya and Vladislav Zubok, Wilson Center, findings of Thom, p. 401) (IMG)

Evgeni Gegechkori was also the uncle to Beria's wife Nina Gegechkori, supporting her materially:

After my grandfather's death, my mother went, accordingly to Tbilisi to live with her uncle Sasha, a Bolshevik. It was another uncle, Evgeni, however, who supported her materially. He was a Menshevik. That may seem odd today but one has to remember that in those days betrayal was not commonplace. Sasha and Evgeni could meet, even during the period when Evgeni was Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Menshevik government of Georgia while Sasha continued his underground activity. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 4) (IMG)

Nina Gegechkori was living with her uncle Sasha, a Menshevik agent among the Bolsheviks, and Nina was backed materially by Evgeni Gegechkori. Nina, with all her Menshevik connections, was to hook up with Lavrenti Beria, another MI6 agent. Lavrenti Beria was a counterintelligence operative of the MI6-backed and MI6-run Islamo-Kautskyite Azeri bourgeois-nationalist party, Musavat. With the assistance of Mir Ja'afar Bagirov, an anti-Soviet intelligence officer who had risen to the ranks of the Bolshevik Cheka, Lavrenti Beria was infiltrated on behalf of the Musavat into the Soviet intelligence service:

Beria joined the party after the tsar's abdication, served in the army, and graduated from high school with honors. He missed the revolution, and spent part of the civil war on the wrong side: the Musavat ("Equality") party of Azerbaijani nationalists had established an independent republic through the meddling of Ottoman and then British occupation forces, and after the British left, Beria joined Musavat counterintelligence. Following the Bolshevik reconquest, he was arrested. A meeting was called and Orjonikidze and others ruled that the party had likely assigned Beria to infiltrate the "bourgeois nationalists." Beria enrolled at the newly established Polytechnic University, on the premises of his old high school, with a state stipend, to fulfill his dream of becoming an engineer, but Mircafar Bagirov (b. 1896), the twenty-four-year-old head of the Azerbaijan Cheka, recruited Beria and, after a few weeks, named him deputy secret police chief, at age twenty-one. ('Stalin: Waiting for Hitler, 1929-1941', Stephen Kotkin, p. 139) (IMG)

Regarding the death of Nariman Narimanov, the CIA states:

It was Bagirov who liquidated ... Narimanov. ('Bagirov, M D/Beria, L P', CIA, August 19, 1953, p. 1) (IMG{Iran})

In the early days of the Bolshevik Revolution:

my father [Lavrenti Beria], who defended himself by appealing to the unity of the Social-Democratic movement, was unable to conceal his sympathy for ... Menshevik policy. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 5) (IMG)

Beria had an:

early sympathy for the Mensheviks.... (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 304) (IMG)

Beria and his wife were both Mensheviks with Georgian bourgeois-nationalist 'ideology' who considered the Bolshevik policy to be 'colonial':

my father showed himself sensitive to Georgian nationalism, if I can believe the testimony of my mother, who had always been a nationalist. Increasingly he realized that the Bolshevik policy was the same as that of the Tsars. It aimed solely at crushing the non-Russian populations and establishing Russian control. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 11) (IMG)

Like all bourgeois-nationalists, Beria savagely terrorized the very nation for which he privately claimed to stand for. Lavrenti Beria utilized his position as an MI6-backed Musavat operative in the Cheka in order to further assist the MI6-backed Mensheviks. When the Georgian Mensheviks rebelled again in 1924:

my father [Beria] then proposed that he should meet a representative of theirs to whom he would prove that he knew where all their caches of arms were located. They sent the former commander of the Georgian Menshevik Guard, Dzhugeli, to him.

This man came to Tbilisi secretly with the aid of my father's agents. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 8) (IMG)

Sergo Beria recalled:

My father took three days to reach Tbilisi on horseback, accompanied by Shariko Tsereteli, prince and officer of the old regime. My mother followed in a car. They passed through the rebels' lines. The rebels did not harm them, though they knew their identity. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 9) (IMG)

Who was Shariko Tsereteli? In that famous excerpt of chapter 6 of Stalin's 'The Foundations of Leninism', Shariko Tsereteli was listed as alongside other Kautskyite agents of imperialism: 'the struggle waged by such "desperate" democrats and "Socialists," "revolutionaries" and republicans as, for example, Kerensky and Tsereteli, Renaudel and Scheidemann, Chernov and Dan, Henderson and Clynes, during the imperialist war was a reactionary struggle....' After the previous quote by Sergo Beria, Sergo B. states that Lavrenti negotiated with other Mensheviks on the order of Sergo Ordzhonikidze. However, the quote does not say that Lavrenti Beria negotiated with Tsereteli on Sergo Ordzhonikidze's order. The rebels were sympathetic to Beria.

The Red Army troops entered Georgia to fight against the Mensheviks that year. Sergo Ordzhonikidze is said to have:

sent my father [Beria] and his comrade to ... negotiate with Cholokashvili, the [Menshevik] rebels' leader. Again and even though they were unescorted, they were allowed to pass unscathed through the rebels' line. At that time there was still a sense of honour in Georgia. Though Cholokashvili refused to meet them, his representatives agreed to lay down their arms on condition that they were promised freedom from persecution. My father replied that he could give them no guarantee, as he was not in control.... Accordingly, he advised the Menshevik officers to flee – for which he [Beria] was blamed.... (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 9) (IMG)

By telling the Menshevik leaders that Beria, a local head of the Cheka had information on all the weapons caches of the Menshevik military in Georgia, Beria may have sought to imply to the Mensheviks that the latter should change the location of its arms or else they may be hit by the Bolsheviks. Of course, Beria provided such information under the pretext of 'scaring' off the Mensheviks and encouraging them to surrender the territory in Georgia – except that Beria, rather than push for the surrender of the Mensheviks, sabotaged the attempts to establish an agreement for the lay-down of the arms by the Mensheviks and instead encouraged the Menshevik officers to escape. Later on, referring to 'the Georgian Menshevik emigres' based in Paris, Lavrenti Beria said:

It's thanks to me that they are still alive. Otherwise they would have been shot down like partridges. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 30) (IMG)

As such, with Beria's blessing, the escape of the Menshevik operatives of the British secret service was organized. Not all these Menshevik operatives escaped the USSR however. Some of them actually formed terrorist sleeper cells that revolted against the Soviet state later on, and Beria once again assisted these Menshevik terrorist sleeper cells. After the flight of the Mensheviks from Georgia,:

In the months that followed my father's fate hung by a thread. The Party authorities looked into his case. Had he not warned the Mensheviks, allowed Dzhugeli to come to Tbilisi, negotiated with the rebels and allowed their leaders to escape? The Armenian Communists ... were the most furious with my father, accusing him of double-dealing ... and of showing complacency towards the Mensheviks on account, especially of his kinship with Evgeni Gegechkori, my mother's other uncle who had been [the pro-British] Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Georgian government. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 9) (IMG)

Beria did not plan to arrest Menshevik spies or agents:

my father already had his own idea of the policy to be pursued in intelligence matters, considering it more worthwhile to keep opponents under surveillance than to arrest them. 'A self-respecting intelligence service', [Lavrenti Beria] said, 'never arrests an actual spy. (...).' According to my mother [Nina Gegechkori], he [Beria] became extremely angry when the Menshevik leader Khomeriki, who ran an underground organization before and during the revolt, was captured [by the Bolsheviks] in Tbilisi. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 10) (IMG)

Even after the escape, Beria continued to have connections with Mensheviks in France. Nina Gegechkori's other uncle was Sasha Gegechkori, as stated before. Sergo Beria recalled:

One of Sasha's nephews was among his go-betweens with the Mensheviks. He always came to see us when he returned from his trips abroad. I remember hearing him pass on to my mother an invitation from Evgeni Gegechkori, who proposed that she come and stay with him Paris. This nephew perished later in the purges, on account of his visits to [Mensheviks in] Paris. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 30) (IMG)

The interviewer who helped Sergo Beria write his memoirs, cites a witness in the 1953 trial who claimed:

Sergo Ordzhonikidze related with indignation that Beria had destroyed the compromising archives of the Menshevik government of Georgia, and that when that government was finally breaking up, Beria, exhorted the Mensheviks to hold on and resist Bolshevik pressure. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 304. Citing: 'Voenno-istoricheskii Zhurnal 3 (1990) 83.) (IMG)

In other words, Ordzhonikidze found Beria to be increasingly suspicious. Sergo, based on his conversations with his mother Nina, said:

Ordzhonikidze, who saw my father as to some extent his disciple, had spoken about him to Stalin. The affair of the Menshevik revolt [however] had caused the first disagreements between them [i.e. Ordzhonikidze and Beria] and it was then that my father experienced his first disillusionments. When tensions became more and more acute between the two men, he asked for permission to appeal directly to Stalin. My mother was present during their conversation and she heard Ordzhonikidze reply: 'Do that and you'll see. You complain about me, but with him you'll know what pain is.' (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 10) (IMG)

Beria had intelligence connections with the Georgian Mensheviks based in Paris even during the Great Purge:

Early in 1937 a wave of arrests swept over the country. The central government by passed the local authorities in order to organise the repression more effectively, and these bodies looked on helplessly as events unfolded.

My friends' parents disappeared. My father's entourage, his family and my mother's family were decimated. Two of her cousins and two of her nephews disappeared at this time. One of them, who was a doctor, acted as an informer for my father through his contacts with the Mensheviks in France. He had confidence in my father and knew that he would never betray him. He was kidnapped, however, on French territory and nothing could be done for him.

I remembered, too, Golubishvili, an old Bolshevik who had been put at the head of the Georgian Government. He was tall and lean and dressed with distinction. He spoke English and German. My father had much respect for him appreciating his culture and erudition. This Georgian nationalist knew Russia well.

(Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 26) (IMG)

Even until the 1950s:

The unfortunate Petr Sharia, the specialist in Hegelian dialectic ... had acted as my father's contact with the émigré Georgian Mensheviks.... ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 271) (IMG)

Indeed, even until the 1950s,:

Beria ran all contacts with the Menshevik exiles in Paris through his personal intelligence network. (Cold War in the Caucasus: Notes and Documents from a Conference, collected by Svetlana Savranskaya and Vladislav Zubok, Wilson Center, findings of Thom, p. 401) (IMG)

At the time, the interests of French imperialism converged with the interests of British imperialism, and hence France harbored these Menshevik exiles. There was, however, a reason why the Menshevik exiles settled mainly in France and not in Britain. France was far more susceptible to Soviet influence than Britain. The French were wary of British interest in eventually reviving German Empire in order to combat the French. And since Britain was an enemy of the USSR, an Anglo-German alliance could draw France and the USSR closer together. Hence, in order to reduce the potential of a Franco-Soviet cooperation, the Mensheviks settled in France in order to (1) make France appear as permanently hostile to the USSR and not just for the while, thus driving a wedge between two potential allies and (2) to operate as MI6 agents in France so that they can strengthen the MI6 lobby in France, so that French imperialists would have to – against their will – yield to British interests; this would mean that if Britain wants Germany to get stronger, the MI6 lobby in France would push for pro-German capitulation by France even though it would be against the interests of French finance capital to capitulate to the Germans. This explains why numerous MI6 agents (and later on, also CIA agents) settled in France as opposed to in Britain. Referring to his father Lavrenti Beria, Sergo Beria said:

He liked France, which he knew well through his Georgian Menshevik networks. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 281) (IMG)

Lavrenti Beria held:

France responsible for all our troubles. If there had not been the French Revolution there would not have been the revolution of 1917. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 281) (IMG)

Describing the later accusations against Beria, the CIA also implicitly acknowledged the fact of:

the espionage Beriya did for foreign intelligence organisations and his anti-Soviet subversive activity in the sphere of Socialist construction. (BERIYA PURGE, CIA, May 28, 1954, p. 4) (IMG{Titoist Coup})

The specific intelligence service which Beria served was the MI6. Since the 1920s, and well until long after then, the MI6 agent Lavrenti Beria collaborated with the MI6-backed terrorist networks of Russian separatists, the Georgian separatists, the Georgian Mensheviks, the Russian Tsarists, etc. :

In the sphere of foreign policy my father very soon became interested in Turkey and France. It was in those countries that he formed networks of agents in the 1920s and 1930s. In Turkey he had agents among the Lazés, while in France he made use of the Georgian Menshevik emigres, whom he prided himself on controlling. 'It's thanks to me that they are still alive. Otherwise they would have been shot down like partridges,' he said. One of Sasha's nephews was among his go-betweens with the Mensheviks. He always came to see us when he returned from his trips abroad. I remember hearing him pass on to my mother an invitation from Evgeni Gegechkori, who proposed that she come and stay with him in Paris. This nephew perished later in the purges, on account of his visits to France. It was in this period, too, that my father concerned himself with Britain, which had been very active in Caucasia in the days when the Caucasian republics were independent. He had networks in France, in Britain and in America and recruited many agents among the Russian princes and princesses in emigration. These people collaborated willingly with him, not through fondness for Bolshevism or from greed but out of patriotism - for the Georgians, love of Georgia, for the Russians, love of Russia. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, pp. 30-31) (IMG)

C4S5. The Struggles of the Emir of Afghanistan

Upon the introduction of Soviet power in Central Asia, however, pseudo-Muslim bandits began waves of terrorist attacks against the state:

In the latter half of 1920 and early 1921, a wave of ... uprisings rolled over the entire country, the so-called Basmachi movement of Central Asia (Muslim insurgents opposing the introduction of Soviet rule in Central Asia)... (HISTORY OF CIVILIZATION OF CENTRAL ASIA, Vol. VI, Towards the Contemporary Period: from the Mid-Nineteenth to the End of the Twentieth Century, UNESCO, Chahryar Adle, p. 320) (IMG)

So discredited were the basmachis that even many of the violently anti-communist clerics who stood against the Bolsheviks did not dare to openly support basmachis:

In the balance, the Bolsheviks also managed to secure the [ostensible] neutrality of the prestigious and very conservative Muslim Spiritual Directorate of Ufa. In spite of his personal abhorrence of "godless Communism," the Mufti of Ufa, Rizaeddin Fahrettdin-oglu, refused to give his blessing to the Basmachis. For this profoundly important abstention, the Bolsheviks eventually rewarded the spiritual leader with execution at the hands of the Cheka, but he had served his purpose. Musa Jarullah Bigi, the greatest of the Tatar jadid (modernist) theologians, also refrained from attacking the Bolshevik regime. Bigi's logic, which was shared by many important Muslim

leaders and which certainly was the product of some intense Soviet propaganda, was that in spite of all its errors and mistakes, Communism could coexist with Islam.

Perhaps because so many members of the traditional Muslim establishment felt this way, the Basmachi movement never acquired the character of a jihad (religious war). In addition, many Muslim soldiers were fighting with the Red Army against the Muslim rebellion. In fact, from time to time Basmachi leaders agreed to negotiate with Soviet authorities and to cooperate with the Red Army, both unthinkable actions if the Basmachi movement had been a true jihad.

(‘THE SOVIET UNION AND MUSLIM GUERRILLA WAR, 1920-1981: LESSONS FOR AFGHANISTAN: A RAND NOTE’, N-1707/1, The RAND Corporation, Alexandre Bennigsen, August 1981, pp. 12-13) (IMG)

The Soviets engaged in a long period of struggle against such terror attacks:

This Soviet-Islamic alliance of mutual interest had a Central Asian flaw. In the aftermath of the revolution, Central Asian Moslems rose in revolt against the reestablishment of Russian rule. The Russian settlers and the Soviets called the rebels sent forces to suppress them. Turkish and Soviet aspirations clashed when Enver Pasha, leader of the Turkish triumvirate during the world war, was sent by the Soviets to Central Asia to organize Moslem forces against the British. Enver went over to the *basmachi* instead but was killed in April 1922 before he could mold an effective force against the Russians. The Red Army drove the *basmachi* out of their city bases at Bokhara and Khiva (sites of the khanates conquered by Russia in 1868 and 1873) and away from the valleys, then gradually suppressed rebellion in the hills. Mopping-up campaigns against the *basmachi* including Soviet forays against sanctuaries in Afghanistan continued until 1931. (SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN, Dr. Seth Singleton. In: Air University Review, Vol. 32, No. 3, US Department of the Air Force, March-April 1981, p. 14) (IMG)

In their efforts against the Basmachis, the Soviets successfully managed to secure the friendship and cooperation of the Amir of Afghanistan, who regarded the USSR as an ally against the British imperialists and Islamic terror groups. “The struggle that the Emir of Afghanistan is waging for the independence of Afghanistan,” Joseph Stalin so famously wrote in his 1924 book *The Foundation of Leninism*,

is objectively a *revolutionary* struggle, despite the monarchist views of the Emir and his associates, for it weakens, disintegrates and undermines imperialism; whereas the struggle waged by such "desperate" democrats and "Socialists," "revolutionaries" and republicans as, for example, Kerensky and Tsereteli, Renaudel and Scheidemann, Chernov and Dan, Henderson and Clynes, during the imperialist war was a *reactionary* struggle, for its results was the embellishment, the strengthening, the victory, of imperialism. (The Foundations of Leninism, Joseph Stalin, 1924, Chapter 6. Problems of Leninism, published in: Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1947, pp. 62-63. Retrieved from: Soviet World Outlook: A Handbook of Communist Statements, United States Department of State Division of Research for USSR and Eastern Europe, Office of Intelligence Research, for the Coordinator of Psychological Intelligence, U.S. Information Agency, April 30, 1954, first published: January 1950, p. 19)

Thus entered the Soviet Union into an alliance with the national-bourgeois Amir of Afghanistan, Amanullah Khan, while the Comintern propagated anti-colonial patriotism in Afghanistan against the British imperialists. According to a document by the US Department of the Air Force’s Air University Review:

Soviet-Afghan contacts began when Amir Amanullah Khan expelled British control during the Third Afghan War, a minor affair lasting some three weeks in May 1919. Amanullah invited Soviet envoys to Kabul and hoped to rely on the new Soviet power as a counter to the British. From the Soviet side, cooperation with Afghanistan was part of the general effort to incite the Moslem world against the British, who were then supplying the White Russian armies in the Russian civil war. The keystone of Soviet policy was alliance with the Turkish nationalist movement of Kemal Pasha, later Atatürk, who, like the Soviets, wanted the British out of Constantinople, the Transcaucasus, Iran, Afghanistan, and even India. Amanullah of Afghanistan thus developed cordial relations with both Kemalist Turkey and Soviet Russia, promoted by the propaganda of the Comintern encouraging nationalism and liberation of the peoples of the East from British imperialism. (SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN, Dr. Seth Singleton. In: Air University Review, Vol. 32, No. 3, US Department of the Air Force, March-April 1981, p. 13) (IMG)

The interests of the Amanullah Khan faction – representing the Afghan national bourgeoisie and the Afghan proletariat – and the Soviets were virtually the same, whereas the basmachi reaction in the USSR was on the same side as the British, also the enemies of Amanullah Khan. Hence, the Soviets and the Amanullah Khan faction deepened bonds:

Amanullah treated with the Central Asian leaders at Bokhara as well as with the Soviets, but the Soviets refused to respond with hostility. The Soviet-Afghan friendship treaty of February 1921 even recognized the independence of Bokhara and Khiva "in accordance with the wishes of the people" – wishes which turned out to be those of the Soviet troops. In return, Amanullah promised not to actively aid the *basmachi*. (SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN, Dr. Seth Singleton. In: Air University Review, Vol. 32, No. 3, US Department of the Air Force, March-April 1981, p. 14) (IMG)

Not aiding the basmachi forces in the USSR was not the only thing that the Khan provided to the Soviets. The Emir of Afghanistan also extended the influence of the Soviet military in Afghanistan. And the USSR provided military, as well as extensive financial and technical assistance to the newly born Afghan state:

Taking Kemal's secular nationalist Turkey as his model, Amanullah attempted reform and modernization in the 1920s with Soviet aid. The 1921 treaty included a Soviet subsidy of a million rubles a year and provisions for technical assistance. The Soviets provided a small air force whose purpose was to put down rebellion by the tribesmen opposed to unveiling of women, secular education, and other reforms. A British official reported that "the so-called Afghan Air Force is to all intents and purposes a Russian service and may indeed be regarded as a Russian advanced base." (SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN, Dr. Seth Singleton. In: Air University Review, Vol. 32, No. 3, US Department of the Air Force, March-April 1981, p. 14) (IMG)

Nonetheless:

Amanullah was overthrown in 1928 by rebellion sparked by announcement of measures against corruption and the local authority of the mullahs and by the unveiling of the queen. The British were probably involved (Colonel T. E. Lawrence was then serving on the northwest frontier under the alias of "Airman Shaw"), and the Soviets did not intervene. (SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN, Dr. Seth Singleton. In: Air University Review, Vol. 32, No. 3, US Department of the Air Force, March-April 1981, p. 14) (IMG)

Nor did the Soviets have a legal responsibility to intervene against the British-backed terrorist rebellion.

All in all, the following point summarizes the nature of the Soviet-Afghan relations:

Richard Newell wrote in 1972 that "Afghanistan has served as a showcase for Russia's good intentions in her dealings with Moslem nations." Further,

Probably most important to Russia have been the political profits gained by treating Afghanistan with generosity and careful respect. Friendly relations and assistance have demonstrated to the rest of the Muslim world, especially Turkey, Iran, and the Arab states, that the Russians are willing to help a Muslim people whom they could easily conquer or exploit.

Newell is not wrong; for the period 1919 to 1978, he is quite right.

(SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN, Dr. Seth Singleton. In: Air University Review, Vol. 32, No. 3, US Department of the Air Force, March-April 1981, p. 13) (IMG)

C4S6. Soviet Support for Kemalists in Turkey

The USSR began sponsoring Kemal Pasha Atatürk's revolution in Turkey:

The keystone of Soviet policy was alliance with the Turkish nationalist movement of Kemal Pasha, later Atatürk, who, like the Soviets, wanted the British out of Constantinople, the Transcaucasus, Iran, Afghanistan, and even India. (SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN, Dr. Seth Singleton. In: Air University Review, Vol. 32, No. 3, US Department of the Air Force, March-April 1981, p. 13) (IMG)

While the Turkish Republic and the Soviet Union are successors to regimes which frequently warred against each other, it was the USSR which provided support to the struggling Turkish nationalists in their efforts to drive the invading Greeks from their soil and to found their republic. In April 1920 the nationalists concluded a pact with the Soviets by which they were to receive military supplies. ('Turkey', SR-1/1, For: the Deputy Director, Joint Intelligence Group, & Joint Staff. CIA, December 22, 1948, p. 32) (IMG)

Details of Soviet military and financial assistance to Atatürk's revolution have been provided by a paper by the External Research Program of the US State Department:

Aside from the sympathy the Bolsheviks won in Turkish nationalist circles by their disclosure of the secret wartime agreements of the Entente and the repudiation of exorbitant Russian claims on Turkey, critical material aid to fight the Greeks and diplomatic support were in the offing. The importance of the Straits question to Moscow made Turkish friendship particularly attractive, as did communist ideological imperatives of the day.

After several rounds of secret and official negotiations, a mechanism for providing the aid required by the Turks was established. Via boats across the Black Sea and a corridor through the Caucasus the Turks received gold, weapons and ammunition supplied by Moscow. (Soviet Muslim Emigres in the Republic of Turkey, External Research Program of the US Department of State, Lowell Bezanis, May 1992, p. 22) (IMG)

C4S7. Soviet Support for Democratic Anti-Colonial Movements in the Arab World (Egypt, Syria, and Hejaz)

Led by the revolutionary contingents of the bourgeois-democratic Wafd Party, patriotic uprisings against British colonial rule in Egypt emerged by the end of the Great War. A document produced by the US Department of the Army described in detail the situation as follows:

Egyptian nationalism was relatively quiescent in the early phases of the war, but by 1917, when the Allied victory began to be visible and after President Woodrow Wilson's pronouncement of the principle of national self-determination, demands for Egyptian independence and for representation at the peace conferences multiplied. By late 1918 a new, broadly based nationalist political organization, the Wafd-al-Misri (Egyptian Delegation), under the leadership of Saad Zaghlul, emerged as the most important Egyptian political party – a position it held for the next generation and a half. The initial purpose of the Wafd was to present the Egyptian case in London. Agitation and unrest continued and heightened after failure to get a hearing at Paris. Finally, when police measures proved abortive, the British government responded by sending a special mission to Egypt under the leadership of Lord Alfred Milner in December 1919.

After its investigation the mission proposed the renunciation of the protectorate, a declaration of Egyptian independence, and a treaty of alliance—all subject to certain guarantees respecting British and foreign interests. Negotiations failed. Acting on the strong recommendation of Field Marshal Lord Edmund Allenby, the liberator of Jerusalem who had succeeded Wingate in 1919 as high commissioner in Egypt, the British unilaterally declared on February 28, 1922, their acceptance of Lord Milner's principal recommendations (except for the treaty of alliance) and set forth certain minimum conditions in terms of which an Egyptian cabinet could be formed. Pending an agreement between the 2 countries, there were reserved to absolute British control the following: imperial communication in Egypt, Egyptian defense, the interests of foreigners, and the Sudan. In tacit recognition of the declaration, Prince Fund assumed the title of king on March 15, 1922. Egypt was thus independent, at least by formal pronouncement of the British government. Egyptian constitution was promulgated on April 19, 1923. It made no claim to Egyptian sovereignty over the Sudan, and this issue was held over for subsequent adjustment between the British and Egyptian governments. In September 1923 the nationalist leader Saad Zaghlul returned from exile. His party, the Wafd, won a sweeping success in the elections of January 1924. Zaghlul went to London to negotiate with the British, but negotiations with the Labor government foundered over the issue of the Sudan, and Zaghlul returned to Egypt, having failed in his mission.

Sporadic rioting occurred in the months after Zaghlul's return. The British governor general of Sudan and commander in chief of the Anglo-Egyptian army, Sir Lee Stack, was assassinated in Cairo on November 19, 1924. The crime climaxed a series of murders of British subjects beginning in 1920. Through Lord Allenby, the British demanded and got compensation, concessions, and removal of all Egyptians from the Sudan. Allenby continued as high commissioner until 1925, after the trial and conviction of persons implicated in Sir Lee Stack's murder. He left the post in May of that year. Meanwhile, Zaghlul, who was under the pressure of bad relations with the palace, had resigned in 1924. He had succeeded in initiating a modicum of parliamentary government in Egypt and in transforming the Wafd into the dominating political force in the country. Upon his death in 1927, Zaghlul was succeeded by Mustafa Nahas, who remained a dominant figure in Egyptian politics until ... 1952....

(Area Handbook for the United Arab Republic (Egypt), United States Department of the Army, American University (Washington, D.C.), Foreign Area Studies, Harvey Henry Smith, pp. 49-50) (IMG)

Egypt's Wafdists had the support of the Soviets. In that famous excerpt of 'The Foundations of Leninism', Stalin wrote that the movement for Egyptian independence:

is objectively a *revolutionary* struggle, despite the bourgeois origin and bourgeois title of the leaders of Egyptian national movement, despite the fact that they are [at the intellectual level] opposed to socialism; whereas the struggle that the [Kautskyite agents of British finance capital in the] British "Labour" Government is waging to preserve Egypt's dependent position is for the same reason a *reactionary* struggle, despite the ... proletarian title of the members of the government, despite the fact that they are "for" socialism. (The Foundations of Leninism, Joseph Stalin, 1924, Chapter 6)

It is worth mentioning that the Labour Party was reactionary only insofar as it was under the influence of British finance capital and other parasitic classes allied to it. Insofar as the British Labour Party was under the influence of its proletarian electoral base, it was neither reactionary nor colonial, which was why Lenin in 'Left-Wing Communism' called on Britain's communists to use the Labour Party as a counter-weight against the Tories (see C1S2).

The USSR actively assisted the Wafd in the revolutionary anti-colonial struggle. The bulletin of the British Society for Middle Eastern Studies (BRISMES), an international Middle East studies organization advising the British government's higher education funding bodies and authorities, quotes instructive documents regarding the Soviet relationship with the Egyptian uprising. According to a declassified MI6 document quoted in the BRISMES bulletin:

Further evidence has accumulated to the effect that cooperation has been established between the revolutionary activities of the Soviet Government on the one hand and Egyptian Extreme Nationalists on the other. It has been ascertained that the principal Agent on the Egyptian side is Abdel Rahman Bey Fahmi [a right-hand man of Sa'd Zaghlul]. He is in direct communication with the Soviet Agency at Jeddah, in connection with some subversive scheme, bearing on the political situation in Egypt and there are now definite indications that the Wafd-Bolshevist coalition is taking a special interest in the Sudan. (Secret Intelligence Report (SIR), No.5, July 31, 1926, in File No. Security 7/1/2, CRO, p. 6. In: "International Communism, the Egyptian Wafd Party and the Sudan," Bulletin (British Society for Middle Eastern Studies), Vol. 16, No. 1, Mohammed Nuri El-Amin, 1989, p. 27) (IMG)

"Already we have received," the MI6 reported,:

warnings from Egypt of an alliance between Bolshevist agents and the Wafd party for the dissemination of anti-British propaganda in the Sudan. (Secret Intelligence Report (SIR), No.1, 26 June 1926, in File No. Security 7/1/2, Central Records Office, Khartoum (CRO), p. 5. In: "International Communism, the Egyptian Wafd Party and the Sudan," Bulletin (British Society for Middle Eastern Studies), Vol. 16, No. 1, Mohammed Nuri El-Amin, 1989, p. 27) (IMG)

As early as 1919, a prominent member of the Wafd admitted, the Soviets had approached the delegates in Paris:

Dr Hafiz Afifi (a member of the Wafd delegation to Paris) was put on record as having given a press conference in his private clinic in Cairo in October 1919, in which he explained how the delegates had been approached by the Russians in Paris and what their response to such approaches was. ("International Communism, the Egyptian Wafd Party and the Sudan," Bulletin (British Society for Middle Eastern Studies), Vol. 16, No. 1, Mohammed Nuri El-Amin, 1989, p. 30) (IMG)

Afifi was quoted by an MI6 document as stating the following:

The Russian Bolshevists promised the Sa'd Delegation simply to help it to drive the English out of Egypt, because every weakening of the English in any part of the globe is an advantage to Sovietism and a defeat for Capitalism. Consequently, they help us without asking anything of us except our assurance that a free and independent Egypt shall have a very radical and very wide labour policy. We naturally promised this, sure as we are that these aspects can be easily obtained by propaganda in favour of pure Islamic ideas, which are the truest and most radical principles of socialism. Consequently, the Bolshevists are helping us in two ways: first, by means of the money they have given to Sa'd-a voice asked, 'How much?' and Afifi answered, 'A great deal'-and by the propaganda which they are making directly and without our interference in Cairo. It is thus that the Syndicalist movement, which did not exist when we left Europe, has been successfully organized without our help during our absence. We have merely promised to produce the same movement among the peasants and a committee of the Delegation in Cairo has a far-reaching programme for this purpose. (Letter No.506, dated 16 October 1919, to Earl Curzon of Kedleston, from the Residency, Ramleh in File No. PRO/FO 141/779 (File No.9065). In: "International Communism, the Egyptian Wafd Party and the Sudan," Bulletin (British Society for Middle Eastern Studies), Vol. 16, No. 1, Mohammed Nuri El-Amin, 1989, p. 30) (IMG)

As the above MI6 document demonstrates, the Soviets provided 'a great deal' of financial aid to Sa'd Zaghlul's bourgeois-democratic revolutionary Wafd uprising, with the promise on Wafd's side that progressive anti-imperialist policies would be pursued by the Wafd. Undoubtedly, this would have assisted Comintern objectives as well since the spread of progressive bourgeois-democracy could provide the democratic freedoms for communist party activists as a first step, and as a second step, allowing the planting of communist party activists within the anti-imperialist Egyptian state apparatus.

Probably to prevent British justification of increased repression against the Wafd, the Soviet aid was covert rather than overt, as evidenced by the fact – thoroughly explained in the BRISMES paper – that neither the Wafd nor the Bolsheviks made much noise about their cooperation with the former sometimes pretending the opposite. The Wafd press reports stated that Egypt's anti-British-colonial 'Al-Hizb el-Watani' (Watani Party), another Egyptian anti-imperialist party with the urban national bourgeoisie as its social base, was financially sponsored by the USSR. In the words of one MI6 report:

Abd al-Hamid Sa'id, the Vice-President of the Watanist [patriotic] Party in Egypt is accused in the Wafdist press of having in 1919 and 1920 been subsidised by the Russian Communist Party.... Sufficient details are given to justify the conclusion that the accusation is founded on fact. Abd al-Hamid Bey Sa'id was at one time the President of a society in Europe for the protection of 'down-trodden Natives in the East', was expelled from Rome and Geneva and is now the life-President in Egypt of a new society, 'The Young Men's Mohammedan Association', the aim of which for the moment is mainly political. (Secret Intelligence Report (SIR), No.22, 15 July 1928, in File No. Security 7/1/3, CRO, p. 12. In: "International Communism, the Egyptian Wafd Party and the Sudan," Bulletin (British Society for Middle Eastern Studies), Vol. 16, No. 1, Mohammed Nuri El-Amin, 1989, p. 32) (IMG)

To conclude, the Soviet policy on Egypt was to support progressive bourgeois-democratic uprisings against British oppression in the colonized lands. An American intelligence document too confirmed that the situation in Egypt was boosting Bolshevik influence:

The disturbance is losing its character as a political demonstration and is rapidly developing into Bolshevism in which law and order are being overborne by the worst element of the population and the movement is showing indications of an animus against all foreigners and their property. (Enclosure, Gary (American Diplomatic Agent in Cairo), March 18, 1919. In: 'From Robert Lansing', March 21 1919. In: "The Papers of Woodrow Wilson", Vol. 56, March 17 – April 4, 1919, p. 154. From: University of Virginia Press, Rotunda) (IMG)

Again, as with other cases of the extension of Bolshevik influence, the expansion of such influence did not occur as much because the people joining the Bolshevik cause were necessarily well-versed in the studies of communism, but because the progressive bourgeois-democratic anti-colonial freedom forces saw in Bolshevik anti-colonialism the path for the freedom of their peoples.

America's ostensible 'denunciation' of colonialism was a means by which to lure the anti-colonial causes fighting against British imperialism onto the camp of American imperialism. And American imperialism, an ally of British imperialism, was going to hand those anti-colonial freedom movements back to the British. This is why Britain's Acting High Commissioner in Egypt called on the US to help in the restoration of order:

The Acting High Commissioner sent for me today. He outlined the situation and stated that at no time since the Araby rebellion in 1862 has the state of (omission) been so critical. He told me that he has fully informed London of all the facts but is unable to elicit instructions and he intimated that he desires me to report the serious conditions to my Government in the hope that it would exert promptly some influence upon his own Government and thus make them appreciate the gravity of the situation. He said that he might have to call upon me to assist in the restoration of order, undoubtedly realizing that on account of the warm relationship that all Egyptians feel for the United States an announcement by the American representative here would have great influence and perhaps prevent the destruction of life and property of foreigners. (Enclosure, Gary (American Diplomatic Agent in Cairo), March 18, 1919. In: 'From Robert Lansing', March 21 1919. In: "The Papers of Woodrow Wilson", Vol. 56, March 17 – April 4, 1919, p. 154. From: University of Virginia Press, Rotunda) (IMG)

The Soviet intelligence's assistance to Arab patriots was not limited to Egypt, however. Throughout Iraq, Levant, and the Hejaz, Soviet intelligence propagated against the Anglo-French imperialists and cooperated with Arab patriots, with Bolshevism winning the praise of Iraq's prominent Shia Iranian cleric Muhammad Taqi Shirazi:

Moscow spread anti-western leaflets and reading materials in Iraq, Syria, and the Arabian Red Sea coast, known as "Hejaz." Persian pilgrims to Najaf and Karbala, as well as Persian students to these Shiite seminaries, brought with them Marxist ideology and literature. In these Shiite cities of Southern Iraq, one could find booklets entitled, *The Fundamentals of Bolshevism*, printed at a press in Aleppo, Syria.

So successful was Russian propaganda that Grand Ayatollah (Marja) and Mohammed Taqi Shirazi, who would be a key figure in the 1920 revolt, would, in 1919, call Bolshevism, "a friend of Islam." The first Bolshevik Society was established in Iraq in 1920, and as early as 1919, Marxist rhetoric began to appear in Iraq's newspapers. British security officials looked with concern as Arab and Turkish nationalists commingled with Bolshevik agents to plan challenges to England's control of Iraq. Among the news circulating was the 1920 communist eviction of British forces from the oil city of Baku and port towns in the Caspian. If the British show weakness in the face of Bolshevism, they show weakness if challenged through Arab nationalism.

("Highlighting the Most Significant Work of Iraq's Social, Political, and Military History," Multivolume Collection of Dr. Ali Al-Wardi, Vol. 1, Part 1, US Navy Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein. In: 'Armor: The Professional Journal of the Armor Branch', Department of the Army, Headquarters, Vol. 118, November-December 2009, pp. 28-29) (IMG)

C4S8. USSR and the Faysal Faction of Saudi Arabia

In an interview with the Saudi regime's newspaper 'Asharq Al-Awsat', Prince Turki Al-Faysal – who had been the head of the Saudi Mukhaberat (intelligence service) for more than two decades and who was the son of former Prince Faysal bin Abdulaziz – revealed many aspects of the onset of Saudi-Soviet relations and his father's role in this matter. Contrary to the usual false narrative that the USSR blocked the Hajj, Muslims' pilgrimage to Mecca, the article reporting on the interview with Turki Al-Faysal reveals that the USSR did not interfere with this matter. The USSR supported Prince Faysal faction's struggle against the British Empire, and established fair commercial deals. The following is the text of the Saudi state article:

In the spring of 1932, King Faisal ibn Abdul Aziz, who was then a 26-year-old prince, led a Saudi delegation to Moscow on a historical visit to bring the two countries together and open a new page in the Kingdom's international relations, said Prince Turki Al-Faisal, former intelligence chief and former Saudi Ambassador to Washington, in an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat.

The then Prince Faisal had previously successfully — at the behest of his illustrious father — negotiated with the British to gain recognition for sovereign Saudi rule in Hejaz and Najd.

At the age of 18, he led a military campaign in the southern province of Asir and was instrumental in uniting the region with the rest of the Kingdom. It was then that his father, King Abdul Aziz, appointed him as his deputy in the region.

Later, he was designated foreign minister to head the Foreign Relations Department, which later became the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. His mission to Moscow, which was the capital of the then Soviet Union in 1932, was no less significant. Russia was the first foreign power to recognize the Kingdom's independence and establish full diplomatic relations.

Despite huge political and ideological differences between the two countries, Moscow supported King Abdul Aziz's efforts to establish a unified and stable state. On the other hand, the Russians would avoid interfering in the Kingdom's domestic matters, something that paved the way for better understanding between the two countries.

King Abdul Aziz, who wanted to strengthen international relations, was aware that strong Russian ties could help settle his differences with Britain, said Prince Turki.

Moreover, Russia was a good trade partner. The Kingdom admired the Soviet Union — unlike Great Britain — for its ability to forge relations on equal terms without trying to dictate terms.

It was planned that the then Prince Faisal would lead a mission to Moscow in 1927. However, the visit did not take place. By 1932, when the Soviet Union had become more established, the Kingdom viewed Moscow as a dependable trade partner.

Revolutions launched with Soviet support in several countries were also on the wane at the time. Although King Abdul Aziz was irked by Russia's hostile stance on religion, he was, nevertheless, confident that good relations with Russia would not have any negative impact on religious issues. He, therefore, decided to send the then Prince Faisal to Moscow in 1932 after visits to France, England, Poland and Turkey.

Prince Turki said the major issues the young Prince Faisal had to sort out during his Moscow visit included the one concerning Muslim endowments (awqaf) in Russia, which had been nationalized. Another issue was the facilitation of Haj for Russian Muslims. The Russian official stance on Haj, then, was that religion was a private affair and the state would not interfere.

The Russian commissioner in Hejaz, Nazir Taryaklov, used to insist that the economic agreements between the two countries should not be linked to the issues of endowment and pilgrimage, Prince Turki said.

On trade issues, Saudi Arabia made it clear that a trade agreement between the two countries should include conditions that Russia does not flood the Saudi market with its goods, Soviet trade activities should not lead to a fall in prices in the market and Soviet goods should be sold at a specified period through state channels.

The Kingdom also demanded that Russia sign a contract to provide commercial credits to the Kingdom. Though the Russian side did not accept the conditions, the two countries continued negotiations. Apparently, Russia hoped that eventually Saudi Arabia would grant more concessions.

These were the tough issues Faisal had to find solutions to during his visit to Moscow in 1932, Prince Turki said. Faisal, accompanied by Deputy Saudi Foreign Minister Foad Hamza and his aide Khaled Al-Ayyoubi, flew from Amsterdam to Berlin on May 18 and from there went on train to Poland and then to Moscow.

On May 29, the day of his arrival in Moscow, the official Russian newspaper Izvestia ran an article highlighting growing Saudi-Russian relations. The article said that Faisal's visit "sought to strengthen the young state's international relations."

It stressed the importance of the rise of Najdi tribes against the oppression of Ottoman rule in the Arab world. It also discussed British exploitation in the region and an European attempt to divide the region as French and British Mandates. It lauded the successes achieved by King Abdul Aziz in unifying the peninsula, describing it as a struggle for national liberation and noted that the Soviet Union was the first country to recognize the Kingdom's independence and establish normal diplomatic relations.

The Russian article pointed out that the Kingdom deserved the recognition by other big powers. It also commended King Abdul Aziz for his pragmatic domestic and foreign policies, and made indications toward the Kingdom's increasing prominence as a hub for unprecedented international trade.

The article signified the importance given by the Russian authorities to the visit. It also described King Abdul Aziz's fight against colonization and said that Russia was seeking to weaken British influence in the Middle East by strengthening relations with Saudi Arabia.

When the train carrying the then Prince Faisal steamed into the main station in Moscow, they were welcomed by the President of the People's Commission for Foreign Affairs Sergie Yastakhov and former Soviet Commissioner in Hejaz, Kareem Hakimov.

The railway station was decorated to mark the occasion with Saudi and Soviet flags flying at several places, with the words "Ahlan wa Sahlan" displayed on walls in Arabic. There were a large number of high-ranking Russian officials to welcome him at the station. The copy of the letter sent by the king to the Russian President Joseph Stalin and the photos of Faisal's visit have been published twice in a book.

King Faisal ibn Abdul Aziz, then foreign minister of Saudi Arabia, is seen at the Moscow railway station in Leningrad. He visited the Soviet Union at the head of a Saudi delegation on May 29, 1932.

(Faisal Laid Foundation Of Strong Saudi-Russian Ties, Arab News, Badr Alkhorayef, Publication Date: Wednesday, May 7, 2008, 03:00, Riyadh. Citing: 'Asharq Al-Awsat' interview with former Saudi Intelligence Chief Turki Al-Faisal) (IMG)

As the above article confirmed, Prince Faysal 'Laid [the] Foundation Of Strong Saudi-Russian Ties'. I will reveal more about Prince Faysal, later to be King Faysal of Saudi Arabia, in another book. However, for this context, let the following facts be known: Prince Faysal headed the rogue elements of the government of Saudi Arabia. He was nothing like the Wahhabi barbarians for which Saudi Arabia is notorious. Faysal, although a Muslim, was heavily influenced by progressive ideas and later on, aimed to render Saudi Arabia into a secular republic allied to the Abdel-Nasser faction and the United Arab Republic, as well as the Hafez Al-Assad faction in Syria. Faysal planted the Nasserist 'Free Princes' at the helm of the Saudi intelligence and security apparatus and promoted Nasserist Free Officers in the armed forces of country. He tried to advance women's rights, to crackdown on the Wahhabi laws of the Saudi regime, and to end the royalist regime. Although Faysal initially paid lip service to the condemnation of Abdel-Nasser, the transcripts of their meetings show that Faysal and Abdel-Nasser were good friends. Faysal was a staunch foe of the SAVAK regime in Iran and the Saddam Hussein group in Iraq. Faysal, who stood up against Kissinger, was assassinated by the CIA in 1975. In Saudi Arabia, he remains the most popular of the Saudi monarchs. The Stalin-era USSR had the honour of establishing a strategic partnership with this martyr and freedom-fighter.

The social power base of the Faysal faction and the Faysalists who picked up Faysal's mantle after his death was the proletarianized areas of Saudi Arabia in the major cities as well as in the Qatif region along the Gulf. However, the Faysal faction was limited because most of Saudi Arabia was desert. The deserts led to the underdevelopment of the productive forces in many areas of Saudi Arabia which in turn led to the low advancement of the progressive class forces in those desert areas. The result was the continued existence of savage ultra-reactionary class forces in those desert areas, which helped undermine the progressive forces in the territory that is called Saudi Arabia. The savage Wahhabi tribes of the central areas of Saudi



Left: Voroshilov with Prince Faysal in Leningrad.
Right: Kalinin and Prince Faysal

Arabia are the descendants of the Pagan barbarians who opposed the Mohammedan forces and later launched the Ridda rebellion against the Caliphate led by Abu Bakr. These ultra-reactionary class forces in the desert tribes are like the SS guards summoned by Anglo-American finance capital to suppress the proletariat in the Qatif region. The upper hand of these reactionary class forces in this predominantly desert country was what prevented King Faysal from getting his land out of the US orbit, and ultimately contributed to his assassination.

C4S9. The Mongolian Revolution *** IMG-All-{Mongolia}

One of the people who has extensively researched the case of the Mongolian revolution and the establishment of the People's Democratic state in Mongolia, is Colonel Trevor Dupuy, who had served in the US Department of Defense's Operations Division during the late 1940s, and who had also served in the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) under Eisenhower during the 1950s. Describing the background and popularity of Sukhe Bator, the Colonel remarked:

The leader of this group was a future hero of the 1921 revolution, Sukhe Bator. Jobless and in poverty, Sukhe Bator was among the first conscripts for the new army when he was called up in 1912 at the age of 19. His lack of wealth and position was more than compensated for by intelligence and vigor. Sukhe Bator's diligence was soon rewarded with a junior noncommissioned officer's warrant. During border clashes with the Chinese, he distinguished himself in combat and was promoted to senior NCO rank. As a member of the machine-gun company, a technical and prestigious assignment for that time, he was closely associated with the Russian instructors and learned some Russian. While nationalist and Communist mythology has magnified Sukhe Bator's attainments, he seems to have been a natural leader, liked and respected by his fellows, and an accomplished practical soldier. (Area Handbook for Mongolia, Vol. 550, Issue 76, Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Washington, D.C., Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Trevor Nevitt Dupuy, pp. 417-418) (IMG)

Sukhe Bator established closer contacts with the Mongolian communist revolutionary Choibalsan, who was closely associated to the Soviet Bolsheviks:

In November 1919 Sukhe Bator's group joined with a similar small group of revolutionaries led by Choibalsan, future MPR commander and Premier, which had formed under the aegis of Russian Bolshevik agents in Urga. In 1920, Sukhe Bator, Choibalsan, some of their followers, and a few revolutionary-minded political leaders escaped to Siberia. Some went on to Moscow and Leningrad for consultations, while Sukhe Bator and Choibalsan remained in Irkutsk for further military training. (Area Handbook for Mongolia, Vol. 550, Issue 76, Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Washington, D.C., Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Trevor Nevitt Dupuy, p. 418) (IMG)

Sukhe Bator and Choibalsan grew in influence and formed the revolutionary national government of Mongolia, as well as the Mongolian People's Party:

In November 1920, Sukhe Bator and Choibalsan moved to the Siberia-Mongolia border town of Kyakhta, recruited followers, and harassed Chinese outposts with their new force of some 50 men. In February 1921, the Mongol delegates to Moscow and those in Siberia met in Irkutsk and then moved to Kyakhta in March, where they formed the Mongolian People's Party and a Provisional National Government. Sukhe Bator was named War Minister. By this time he had enlarged his force to 400 as the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army (MPRA). (Area Handbook for Mongolia, Vol. 550, Issue 76, Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Washington, D.C., Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Trevor Nevitt Dupuy, pp. 418-419) (IMG)

Commenting on the popularity of Choibalsan and Sukhe Bator as late as 1970, Colonel Dupuy said:

The Mongolians are extremely proud of the revolutionary feats of this small band led by Sukhe Bator and Choibalsan. (Area Handbook for Mongolia, Vol. 550, Issue 76, Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Washington, D.C., Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Trevor Nevitt Dupuy, p. 419) (IMG)

In the meantime:

As Bolshevik victories grew, some White Russian troops retreated into Outer Mongolia, where they were supported and encouraged by Japanese forces in Manchuria and eastern Siberia. The largest of these White Russian bands was some 5,000 strong and led by the psychotic Baron Ungern-Sternberg. After an abortive attack on Urga in October 1920, the Baron attacked again in February 1921, drove off the Chinese troops, and declared an independent Mongolia. Mongol leaders in Urga appealed to China; meanwhile the Bolsheviks told Peking that if China sent no soldiers Red Russia would handle the Whites itself. (Area Handbook for Mongolia, Vol. 550, Issue 76, Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Washington, D.C., Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Trevor Nevitt Dupuy, p. 418) (IMG)

Upon invitation of the Mongolian revolutionaries, the Red Army provided its direct military support:

In mid-March, Sukhe Bator drove the Chinese out of Kyakhta and established a provisional capital on Mongolian soil. Ungern-Sternberg's force struck north in May against the new Bolshevik-sponsored government. The provisional Mongolian government, however, had asked the Fifth Red Army for help, which quickly provided a division-sized task force. The White offensive began on 22 May and Kyakhta was attacked on 5 June. The Red Army force divided to meet this two-pronged attack, with a Mongolian contingent in each Red column: one under Sukhe Bator at Kyakhta and the other under Choibalsan. The attacks were repulsed, and in the ensuing pursuit Ungern-Sternberg was captured and shot and his army exterminated. Urga was captured, and on 6 July the Provisional National Government was installed under close supervision of the Russian Bolsheviks. (Area Handbook for Mongolia, Vol. 550, Issue 76, Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Washington, D.C., Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Trevor Nevitt Dupuy, p. 419) (IMG)

As such, Mongolia was liberated after so many years, and an independent people's democracy was established the Mongolian People's Party, and the army which Sukhe Bator and Choibalsan commanded became a patriotic symbol among the Mongolians:

While providing a convenient patriotic symbol to inspire Mongolians and to establish a military tradition, the MPRA of Sukhe Bator and Choibalsan furnished a more tangible heritage over the ensuing 30 years. Not only did it form the nucleus of the eventual MPA, which was to expand to a strength of 10 percent of the population by the late 1930's in answer to the Japanese challenge, but also the MPRA acted as a modernizing force and gave the nation a generation of leaders. Choibalsan led the nation militarily in the 1920's and

1930's, and was Premier from 1939 until his death in 1952. (Area Handbook for Mongolia, Vol. 550, Issue 76, Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Washington, D.C., Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Trevor Nevitt Dupuy, p. 419) (IMG)

Thus:

On every public patriotic occasion, such as the anniversary of the founding of the MPRA on 18 March 1921, considered to be the day Sukhe Bator's force drove the Chinese out of Kyakhta, speeches of national leaders invariably refer glowingly to the events of 1921 and the virtues of the participants, as well as to the fraternal help of the Red Army. Sukhe Bator (whose name means Axe Hero) died suddenly, and some thought, mysteriously, in 1923, still a young man. This tragic fact assisted in his apotheosis as the great young hero of the revolution. A heroic size equestrian statue of him stands in the main square of Ulan Bator (Red Hero), as Urga was renamed after the revolution. (Area Handbook for Mongolia, Vol. 550, Issue 76, Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Washington, D.C., Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Trevor Nevitt Dupuy, p. 419) (IMG)

There was much emphasis on the development of the military and the overlap of the people, the army and the Party. Dupuy wrote that at first, the army received up to 60 percent of the governmental budget in these early years, and rose from 2,560 men in 1923 to 4,000 in 1924, and to 17,000 by 1927. Up to one third of its soldiers were members of the Party, which became the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP) in 1922, while still others belonged to the Revsomol (Revolutionary Youth League). As early as August 1921, a Main Political Administration of the army was established to supervise the work of the political commissars and Party cells in all army units, and to act as a political link between the Party's Central Committee and the army. This politicization of the army served not only to insure its political reliability, but that of the government at large as well. The more leftist members of the government, who were also prominent in the Party, tended to be connected with the army as well. The army was definitely an important political force in the 1920's. With the close cooperation of the Red Army and Soviet and Mongolian secret police, purges of rightists and nationalists were conducted and the Buddhist theocracy severely curtailed. (Area Handbook for Mongolia, Vol. 550, Issue 76, Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Washington, D.C., Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Trevor Nevitt Dupuy, p. 420) (IMG)

A significantly large part of Mongolia was a desert. Climates that are unfavorable to the development of civilization and the productive forces often result in the continued existence of backwards tribes in which the ultra-reactionary class forces predominate. In the territory of Saudi Arabia, the desert tribes outside of the urban areas constituted a major base for Pagan extremism during the early Islamic period and Wahhabism later on. In Mongolia, such a desert ultra-reactionary tribalism was manifested in the form of the Mongol barbarians many centuries prior. For the 20th century, such desert ultra-reaction formed the base for the subjugation of Mongolia by the Tsarist White Guards, and later on, constituted a major socio-economic base for Trotskyism, Mongolian bourgeois-nationalism, and espionage for fascist Japan in that country. The Mongolian communists waged a struggle against these forces. They, for example, struggled against Mongolian bourgeois-nationalism, not the least of which because of its ideological association to the legacy of Genghiz Khan's empire.

Dupuy wrote:

In the ensuing few years, the nationalists were either purged or became Communists. Choibalsan from an early age had been Russian-oriented by schooling and then Communist-influenced by Bolsheviks at the Russian consular compound and print shop in Urga. He cooperated closely with Comintern agents and the Soviet Union, and survived to become Premier. Sukhe Bator was Minister of War and Commander in Chief of the army, and survived the purge of 16 of his Kyakhta comrades in 1922. (Area Handbook for Mongolia, Vol. 550, Issue 76, Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Washington, D.C., Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Trevor Nevitt Dupuy, p. 421) (IMG)

Thanks to the reforms of Choibalsan and other Party members, popular participation in politics grew in People's Democratic Mongolia. The following excerpts the document by Colonel Dupuy shed light on the nature and legacy of the Choibalsan era upon Mongolia even when Mongolia went down the road of Titoization and counter-revolution since the mid-1950s:

The last quarter of a century has seen a major increase in the percentage of the population involved in political life in Mongolia and those more able by virtue of their education and other considerations to take part in their country's politics. A seemingly higher percentage of the population is represented within the power structure of the country than is the case in any other Communist land. This is partly a result of the sparse population of the country, but it also reflects the strides in education and other fields made since 1940. Before that time the emphasis was on the consolidation—indeed, protection—of Communist power. After Choibalsan had firmly established himself in authority, however, his real revolutionary character began to reveal itself in more meaningful deeds than the execution of monks and political rivals.

An important instrument in the popular consciousness of politics has been the army. It has been a key element in both the integration of a onetime largely politically formless society as well as the means for political indoctrination. Indeed, the army's political role is probably more important than its military contribution. It has played a major part in the spread of literacy and of the national language to minority groups. More importantly, it has striven to make convinced Communist cadresmen of the soldiers who return home after their service (see ch. 22, The Armed Forces).

The political awareness of the masses has also been stimulated by the growing availability of newspapers and magazines of various sorts, all, in varying degrees, vehicles of pro-Communist and pro-Soviet propaganda. About one in every ten persons sees a daily newspaper. This is a major accomplishment....

(Area Handbook for Mongolia, Vol. 550, Issue 76, Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Washington, D.C., Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Trevor Nevitt Dupuy, pp. 238-239) (IMG)

The case of counter-revolutionary events in Mongolia during the 1950s has been explored in C20S22.

Anyways, the Mongolian revolution thereby established a lasting relationship between the Soviet people and the Mongolian people. Well during the Great Patriotic War and even after, the Mongols supported the Soviets. As a strong indication of the popularity of the USSR, the Mongolian people raised money for military aid to USSR:

The MPR stayed mobilized, however, at the 80,000-man level to guard its frontiers and discourage the Japanese from a further adventure. Mongolia also devoted heavy efforts to its part of the 1936 Mutual Assistance pact by providing the Soviet armies with winter clothing, wool, hides, leather goods, meat, and almost half a million ponies and horses for draft and remount use from 1941 to 1945. The Mongolian people raised the money for a battalion of tanks, which was named "Revolutionary Mongolia," and a squadron of aircraft named "Mongolian Herdsmen," which were presented to the Red Army. (Area Handbook for Mongolia, Vol. 550, Issue 76, Historical

*** IMG-All-{October Revolution & Civil War}

C4S10. Japanese Occupation of Sakhalin

During the Civil War:

Japan also occupied Sakhalin.... (JAPANESE AGGRESSION IN ASIA (1895-1930): JAPAN'S DREAM OF "HAKKO ICHUO" (EIGHT CORNERS OF THE WORLD UNDER JAPANESE RULE), Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, by: John Yung Rhee, thesis advisor: S. Jurika, Jr. December 1980, p. 17) (IMG)

Recall from C2S7 that the Trotsky faction in the USSR directly invited the Japanese imperialists to invade the Soviet Union and occupy its territories. Later on, during the Great Patriotic War, the USSR was able to recover the Sakhalin and gain the Kuril Islands. The American imperialists, beginning since the Truman era, denied that the Yalta Agreement gave the right to control over the Kuril Islands and the Sakhalin to the USSR. However, the Center for Naval Studies (CNA) – which is a naval studies research and intelligence organization funded openly by US government and is subordinate to the US Navy and US Marine Corps – admitted that the “Yalta Agreement ... stipulated that the Kuril Islands should be handed over to the Soviet Union and that the southern part of Sakhalin as well as all the islands adjacent to it should be returned to the Soviet Union”:

Since the early 1960s, the Japanese government has unwaveringly claimed all four islands to be Japanese territory. Japan's official views on the history of its claims to the Northern Territories are laid out in a pamphlet that is readily accessible on the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Its key provisions are as follows: (...). The Yalta Agreement, which stipulated that the Kuril Islands should be handed over to the Soviet Union and that the southern part of Sakhalin as well as all the islands adjacent to it should be returned to the Soviet Union, did not determine the final settlement of the territorial problem. Furthermore, Japan is not bound by this document, as it was not a party to the agreement. (Japan's Territorial Disputes, CNA Maritime Asia Project: Workshop Three, CNA Analysis & Solutions, Michael A. McDevitt, Catherine K. Lea, June 2013, p. 62) (IMG)

C4S11. Soviet Assistance to China

The Soviet state needed to strengthen its East Asian rear in the face of Anglo-Japanese conspiracies by providing extensive amounts of aid to the freedom forces in China. In this affair, the Soviet state could count on the progressive bourgeois-democratic Kuomintang (KMT; sometimes written as Guomindung and abbreviated as GMD) headed by the well-known Chinese revolutionary Dr. Sun Yat-Sen. The Soviet state and the Comintern also helped establish the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as a vehicle for increasing the influence of the Soviet dictatorship of the proletariat into China. The Soviet state then got the CCP to form a popular front alliance with the KMT so to fight against the counter-revolutionary alliance of Japanese intelligence, the MI6, Chinese fascist warlords, and other criminals. Of course, the dialectical laws of history dictate that the reduction in the presence of the imperialist-fascist secret services in China would have meant greater progressive bourgeois-democratic development. And progressive bourgeois-democracy was indeed Dr. Sun's views. Years prior, Lenin had said:

Every line of Sun Yat-sen's platform breathes a spirit of militant and sincere democracy. It reveals a thorough understanding of the inadequacy of a "racial" revolution. There is not a trace in it of indifference to political issues, or even of underestimation of political liberty, or of the idea that Chinese "social reform", Chinese constitutional reforms, etc., could be compatible with Chinese autocracy. It stands for complete democracy and the demand for a republic. It squarely poses the question of the condition of the masses, of the mass struggle. It expresses warm sympathy for the toiling and exploited people, faith in their strength and in the justice of their cause.

Before us is the truly great ideology of a truly great people capable not only of lamenting its age-long slavery and dreaming of liberty and equality, but of *fighting* the age-long oppressors of China.

One is naturally inclined to compare the provisional President of the Republic in benighted, inert, Asiatic China with the presidents of various republics in Europe and America, in countries of advanced culture. The presidents in *those* republics are all businessmen, agents or puppets of a bourgeoisie rotten to the core and besmirched from head to foot with mud and blood—not the blood of padishahs and emperors, but the blood of striking workers shot down in the name of progress and civilisation. In those countries the presidents represent the bourgeoisie, which long ago renounced all the ideals of its youth, has thoroughly prostituted itself, sold itself body and soul to the millionaires and multimillionaires, to the feudal lords turned bourgeois, etc.

(Democracy and Narodism in China, Lenin, 1912. MIA)

After the October Revolution, Lenin who admired the Chinese revolutionaries, supported an alliance with them. Regarding the CPP-KMT alliance, Bruce Elleman from the US Naval War College wrote:

The signing of the Sun-Joffe pact formally inaugurated the CCP-GMD United Front. This United Front was really an alliance between Guangzhou and Moscow. ('Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989', Bruce A. Elleman, 2005, p. 161) (IMG)

Bruce Elleman is an American scholar on the military and strategic affairs of China, teaching at the US Naval War college, and having received his educational degree there:

Bruce Allen Elleman received at UC Berkeley, the Bachelor of Arts degree in 1982, completed at Columbia University, the Master of Arts and Harriman Institute Certificate in 1984, the Master of Philosophy in 1987, the East Asian Certificate in 1988, and the Ph.D. in 1993. In addition, he completed the Master of Sciences at the London School of Economics in 1985, and the Master of Arts in National Security and Strategic Studies (with Distinction) at the U.S. Naval War College in 2004. His dissertation research on Sino-Soviet diplomatic relations was conducted in Russia (1988-89), PRC (1990-91), Taiwan (1991-92), and Japan (1992-93). (US Naval War College, Est. 1884, Newport Rhode Island, Bruce A. Elleman, PhD) (IMG)

As Elleman points out, the Soviet Union provided military and financial support for the revolutionary Kuamintung:

Sun ... readily admitted that what he wanted was Moscow's support in the form of military and political advisers, weapons and ammunition, and then also direct financial support. In mid-1923, the first Soviet military advisers to Guangzhou were sent by way of Beijing under the dubious disguise of "students." In addition to two million gold rubles in finding, the Soviet Union provided an estimated 8,000 rifles, fifteen machine-guns, four heavy guns, and even "two armored cars." ('Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989', Bruce A. Elleman, 2005, p. 161) (IMG)

A military research paper in the US Marine Corps Development Command at the US Command and Staff College confirms the Soviet military support for the progressive KMT:

As part of their larger Marxist concept of “world revolution,” the Soviets sought to reinforce Sun Yat-Sen’s Chinese revolution. In mid-1923, Soviet interests converged with Sun Yat-sen’s request for Soviet military training and assistance. As a result, Sun Yat-sen that same year sent Chiang Kai-shek to Moscow to study the Red Army’s training system and to plan for a Soviet advisory mission in China. From 1924 to 1927, the Russians deployed some 1,000 advisers to south and north China. About 30 to 60 key personnel worked alongside the KMT in Canton, Kwangtung Province. Most of those advisers participated in the Bolshevik Revolution and graduated from the Red Army’s Military Academy. Yet few were trained Sinologists or Chinese speakers. (‘Advising China, 1924-1948: The Role of Military Culture in Foreign Advisory Missions’, United States Marine Corps, Command and Staff College, Marine Corps University, Marine Corps Development Command, Sean C. Ahern, March 2012, p. 13) (IMG)

It is worth reminding that funding freedom forces outside of the Soviet Union was both morally correct and a strategic need, and that such assistance to the freedom forces was an essential feature of the communist revolutionary mindset. Lenin and Stalin both believed in the thesis of world revolution, but their difference with Trotsky in this matter lied in the facts that (1) Trotsky wanted to quickly invade the entire world with his Red Army, whereas Lenin and Stalin advocated strategic patience, and (2) unlike Lenin and Stalin, Trotsky hated any alliance with peasants and progressive bourgeois-democrats.

Anyways,:

To shore up KMT supplies, the Soviets in 1924 shipped 11,000 rifles to the KMT and later sent an additional 15,000 rifles, machine guns, and artillery pieces. (‘Advising China, 1924-1948: The Role of Military Culture in Foreign Advisory Missions’, United States Marine Corps, Command and Staff College, Marine Corps University, Marine Corps Development Command, Sean C. Ahern, March 2012, p. 15) (IMG)

Unfortunately, China's politics for most of the 20th century was under the influence of the agrarian petit-bourgeois class. This fact surely assisted in the struggle against feudal lords and the fascists, but it also allowed room for anarchist and petit-bourgeois left-deviationist tendencies on the one hand, and petit-bourgeois right-deviationist intellectualism on the other hand. Trotskyism was therefore common in that country.

The Trotskyites kept on denouncing the bourgeois leader Sun Yat-Sen because he was bourgeois, and through their anti-KMT activity, the Trotskyites weakened the Sun Yat-Sen faction, thus assisting the feudal elements in China. In the end, KMT General Chiang Kai-Shek (also written as Jiang Jieshi), an agent of all the reactionary class forces launched a coup inside the KMT and began to undermine Soviet intelligence presence in China. The conflict came to its climax in 1927. In the words of Bruce Porter of the US Senate Armed Services committee:

Dissension between the Communists and the Nationalists in the united front grew steadily, leading to a number of tense situations and incidents, to a split in the Kuomintang, and eventually, in April 1927, to a brutal massacre of Communists in Shanghai by their Nationalist allies. The Shanghai massacre led to a complete break in Soviet-Nationalist relations.... (‘The USSR in Third World Conflicts: Soviet Arms and Diplomacy in Local Wars 1945-1980’, Cambridge University Press, Bruce D. Porter, first published: 1984, reprint: 1988, pp. 10-11) (IMG)

As can be seen, contrary to the Maoist slanders against USSR, the USSR minimized its relations with the KMT from 1927 until the Japanese invasion. Trotskyite and Maoist reactionaries argue that the USSR should have ceased support for the KMT as soon as Dr. Sun Yat-Sen died in 1925. Ending Soviet aid would have meant ending aid to the progressive faction inside the KMT, the faction that operated as obstacles against the Chiang Kai-Shek faction. Ending Soviet advisors' presence in the KMT would have meant reduced Soviet intelligence presence in the KMT and hence greater strength for the Chiang Kai-Shek faction. By stating that the USSR should have put an immediate end to the aid, the Maoists and Trotskyites are indirectly siding with Chiang Kai-Shek, the butcher of Shanghai. Before the massacre at Shanghai, General Chiang had not been able to consolidate power in the KMT, and had not been able to fully yield the leap from quantity to quality to turn the KMT into an army of terror. Since he had not consolidated power and had not fully succeeded in the factional struggles, the Soviet Union should have continued aid to KMT as a means of weakening Chiang. It follows that precisely because the massacre took place in 1927, the Soviet state provided aid until then, and when the massacre occurred thereby consolidating power in the hands of Chiang's gang and bringing the leap from quantity to quality, further friendly relations with the KMT became pointless and ceased.

C4S12. The Founding of the Comintern

The Bolsheviks founded the Comintern in order to spread communist revolutions worldwide, to train communist activists worldwide, to promote those tendencies in the labour movement that favored the interests of the Soviet state, and to spread the influence of the Soviet state as a dictatorship of the proletariat worldwide. The Comintern was funded by the Soviet state and pursued the objectives of the Soviet state. The US intelligence reported at the time:

Moreover, it is within the knowledge of the Government of the United States that the Bolshevik Government is itself subject to the control of a political faction, with extensive international ramifications through the Third Internationale, and that this body, which is heavily subsidized by the Bolshevik Government from the public revenues of Russia, has for its openly avowed aim the promotion of Bolshevik revolutions throughout the world. The leaders of the Bolsheviks have boasted that their promises of non-interference with other nations would in no wise bind the agents of this body. There is no room for reasonable doubt that such agents would receive the support and protection of any diplomatic agencies the Bolsheviks might have in other countries. Inevitably, therefore, the diplomatic service of the Bolshevik Government would become a channel for intrigues and the propaganda of revolt against the institutions and laws of countries, with which it was at peace, which would be an abuse of friendship to which enlightened governments cannot subject themselves. (Washington August 10, 1920, Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby. From: National Security Archives) (IMG)

Some would certainly have a problem with the USSR promoting those tendencies in the labour movement that favored the interests of the Soviet state, because they would think that this would serve as a vehicle for subjugating foreign communist parties, turning them into puppets, and preventing the independence of the labour movement. Such a concern would have been legitimate, had the USSR been a totalitarian state as the West portrayed it; but history showed that the USSR really embodied the dictatorship of the proletariat, and thus served as the manifestation of the working class riding upon a state apparatus as its vehicle. There existed a strong and total dialectical correlation of interests of the progressive bourgeois-democratic anti-colonial forces, the proletarian forces outside the USSR, and interests of the Soviet state. The interests of the Soviet state were also thoroughly and entirely antagonistic to the interests of the reactionary class forces that stood at odds with the interests of the progressive bourgeois-democratic

anti-colonial movements and the working class forces operating outside the physical boundaries of the USSR. It follows that yes, serving the interests of the Soviet state was indeed service to the interests of the workers living outside the USSR or living inside countries whose states were antagonistic to the USSR.

On the other hand, there exists the incorrect view that the Soviet Union could use the Comintern as a means of ordering foreign communists to do certain things as though these communists were pawns. Such a view reflects an incorrect understanding of agency networks, because it fails to account for the fact that the Comintern, although technically an international agency that promoted the interests of the dictatorship of the Soviet proletariat and hence world proletariat, was not a military force in which its 'troops' would be commanded to do certain deeds, but was rather a coalition, a partnership network, made up of people who at least officially were 'like-minded' and who agreed to a friendship and alliance with the Bolshevik Party in the USSR. To achieve its objectives, the USSR could not order those parties to do things, but could only secure their cooperation as partners. Of course, the Soviet state, having vast amounts of historical-material forces at its disposal and morally recognized as the first socialist state, had the upper hand in this partnership, but again could not possibly 'order' the foreign communists to do things, unless those foreign communists had taken refuge or lived in the USSR and thus had to abide by Soviet laws. Even then, the Soviet state never outright ordered entire foreign communist parties that had taken refuge in the USSR, to do certain things, but used the means of purging counter-revolutionary infiltrators in those parties as means of extending its influence in them.

C4S13. Soviet Aid to General Sandino's Campaign

The renowned Nicaraguan revolutionary General Sandino, after whom the Sandinistas were named, has long been hailed by progressive bourgeois-democrats and communists for leading the popular rebellion against American imperialists in Central America. Less known, however, is the Soviet financial support for Sandino's revolution via the All-American Anti-Imperialist League (AAAIL). In the words of a former fellow at the David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies:

The [US] State Department reported that the AAAIL sent \$48,000 to Sandino in April, through Mexico, with an additional \$15,000 from the Soviets directly to Mexico. (The Invaded: How Latin Americans and Their Allies Fought and Ended U.S. Occupations, Oxford University Press, Alan McPherson, 2014, p. 222) (IMG)

During "the Comintern's VIth congress in 1928," the CIA reported,:

a resolution praising the SANDINO revolt in Nicaragua was adopted.... (International Connections of Venezuelan Communism, CIA, January 22, 1959, p. 14) (IMG)

As such, as confirmed by the US State Department foreign service officer Cole Blasier:

The executive committee of the Communist International, attracted by the political turmoil in Central America, urged anti-imperialists everywhere to help Sandino in his fight against "American imperialism" and established the Hands Off Nicaragua committee to oppose U.S. policy. (The Giant's Rival: The USSR and Latin America, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, PA, Cole Blasier, 1983, p. 136.)

Latin American communists affiliated to the Comintern communists formed the Anti-Imperialist League and the Hands Off Nicaragua committee, sending another \$1000 through the latter to Sandino:

The Anti-Imperialist League was founded by the Anti-Imperialist Congress, which met in Brussels in February 1927.... The Latin American delegates included Gustavo MACHADO, as well as Julio Antonio MELLA (Cuba) and Eudocio RAVINES (Peru). A Continental Committee of the League was set up in Mexico with MELLA as its prime mover and MACHADO as a member. (International Connections of Venezuelan Communism, CIA, January 22, 1959, p. 14) (IMG)

Latin American Communists associated with the League organized a "Hands Off Nicaragua" Committee (Manos Fuera de Nicaragua – Mafuenic), which undertook to raise funds for SANDINO. The \$1,000 that was raised was sent to SANDINO by means of MACHADO. (International Connections of Venezuelan Communism, CIA, January 22, 1959, p. 14) (IMG)

When elements in the Comintern and the North American communist movement began pursuing a Trotskyite, left-deviationist, and sectarian line, condemning General Sandino as a 'petty bourgeois adventurer', Joseph Stalin personally held a session with the heads of the Comintern, CPSU, and Latin American communists. According to a Sandinista journal, Stalin opined:

General Augusto César Sandino was a patriot who defended his country from the invasion of foreign troops. (El día que Stalin reivindicó a Sandino, La Voz Del Sandinismo, March 20, 2013) (IMG)

However, Stalin said,:

According to this resolution, he is a vulgar "petty bourgeois adventurer." (El día que Stalin reivindicó a Sandino, La Voz Del Sandinismo, March 20, 2013)

He continued:

Comrades, I would like to know, on behalf of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, who are guilty of such a serious mistake.... (El día que Stalin reivindicó a Sandino, La Voz Del Sandinismo, March 20, 2013) (IMG)

Stalin finally declared:

as regards the Communist Party of the USSR and the Communist International, we will continue to consider General Sandino and his heroic companions as patriots who defend their country against foreign aggressors and that, in our opinion, the decision of the Colonial committee from the Communist Party of USA (CPUSA) is a gross mistake. (El día que Stalin reivindicó a Sandino, La Voz Del Sandinismo, March 20, 2013) (IMG)

Chapter 5

C5S1. The Onset of the NEP and Moves against the Trotskyite Left-Deviation / The End of the NEP and Onset of Campaign against Bukharinite Right-Deviation / Trotskyites and Bukharinites ally with MI6-backed Nazi Germany *** IMG-All-{Factional Conflict & Great Purge}-{October Revolution & Civil War}

By 1922, the MI6's Menshevik agent Trotsky was plotting to establish slavery to the state, so to foster resentment towards the Party of the proletariat, drive a wedge between the masses and the state, and give the Kautskyites (including right-wing Mensheviks) the propaganda weapon they needed for denouncing the USSR as totalitarian. In a book fittingly and unironically titled 'Terrorism and Communism: Democracy versus Dictatorship: A Reply to Kautsky', Trotsky wrote:

The organization of labor is in its essence the organization of the new society: every historical form of society is in its foundation a form of organization of labor. While every previous form of society was an organization of labor in the interests of a minority, which organized its State apparatus for the oppression of the overwhelming majority of the workers, we are making the first attempt in world-history to organize labor in the interests of the laboring majority itself. This, however, does not exclude the element of compulsion in all its forms, both the most gentle and the extremely severe. The element of State compulsion not only does not disappear from the historical arena, but on the contrary will still play, for a considerable period, an extremely prominent part. (Terrorism and Communism: Democracy versus Dictatorship: A Reply to Kautsky, Leon Trotsky, 1922, Chapter 8) (IMG)

Yet labor-power is required – required more than at any time before. Not only the worker, but the peasant also, must give to the Soviet State his energy, in order to ensure that laboring Russia, and with it the laboring masses, should not be crushed. The only way to attract the labor power necessary for our economic problems is to introduce compulsory labor service.

The very principle of compulsory labor service is for the Communist quite unquestionable.

(Terrorism and Communism: Democracy versus Dictatorship: A Reply to Kautsky, Leon Trotsky, 1922, Chapter 8) (IMG)

The economic policies of 'war communism' had already been a leap from feudalism to intensive nationalization and state control. This state of running the economy, while useful for managing the course of the war, was absolutely toxic for peacetime at the time since it marked a Trotskyite leap from feudalism to a left-deviationist pseudo-'socialism'. To better transition the economy, a temporary period of capitalist production relations under the dictatorship of the proletariat were needed as a step forward towards the socialist mode of production. As the US intelligence put it,:

During the ensuing Civil War and the period of foreign intervention, a hastily organized system of communism was established. After the end of the Civil War, the withdrawal of Allied troops, and the termination of hostilities with Poland, Russia was virtually in ruins, and the economic life of the country had reached a primitive level. Lenin, leader of the Bolsheviks, reversed the trend of War Communism in 1921 and introduced the New Economic Policy, which looked to private enterprise to set the economic wheels in motion again while retaining control in the hands of the [workers'] state. (JOINT ARMY NAVY INTELLIGENCE STUDY EUROPEAN U.S.S.R. PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENT, Joint Army Navy Intelligence Group, (in CIA archives), p. X-3) (IMG)

Thus, in the words of an article published by the 'Problems of Communism' journal - which was the organ of the US government's Cold War propaganda agency, the 'US Information Agency' (USIA) - the communist faction of the Bolshevik Party promoted the New Economic Policy (NEP), and in doing so undermined the left-deviation:

The Tenth Party Congress in March 1921, however, marked a decisive downturn in the fortunes of Left communism. Divided between the anarchists and the authoritarians and embarrassed by the Kronstadt rebellion, the Leftists were powerless to stop Lenin's moves to ... the introduction of the New Economic Policy (NEP) and the abolition of factional freedom within the party. Thenceforth any serious effort from the Left to protest against discrepancies between doctrine and practice was held to be a breach of the essence of Leninism [in particular the principle of democratic centralism] and subjected the critics to the irresistible power of the party Secretariat and Central Control Commission. ('The Left Communists', Robert V. Daniels. In: 'Problems of Communism', November, 1967 to December, 1967, Vol. 16, p. 64) (IMG)

The NEP was also an excellent means of dividing the left-deviationist tendency in the Party for it led the anti-Lenin assassin, Nikolai Bukharin, to deflect away from the left opposition:

Bukharin ... had worked with the "Left" tendency until 1921, when he had suddenly become the strongest supporter of the NEP, a line he was to maintain until his fall. (The Great Terror: A Reassessment, Oxford University Press, Robert Conquest, 1990, pp. 16-17) (IMG)

In vain, the left-deviation waged the struggle against the communist line on NEP:

Nevertheless, the onset of Lenin's fatal illness in 1923 enabled the Left Communists to launch a new bid for power, both the purist and authoritarian wings joining forces on a platform of opposition to the NEP and the domination of the party secretariat. ('The Left Communists', Robert V. Daniels. In: 'Problems of Communism', November, 1967 to December, 1967, Vol. 16, p. 64) (IMG)

In the meantime, the MI6 agent Trotsky - an advocate of state-owned slavery - continued his ferocious opposition to the scientific socialist line. The CIA Office Memorandum stated:

In the period from 1917 to 1924, while Lenin was in power, Trotsky was in frequent disagreement with official policies and had expressed himself as being in ideological opposition to the Russian approach to the development of international Marxism. Upon Lenin's death in 1924, Stalin assumed control. Trotsky remained in opposition and made a continuing struggle against what Stalin claimed to be the extension of Lenin's program. (THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL, Office Memorandum, CIA, November 15, 1953, p. 1) (IMG)

Then came the Trotskyite forgery of 'Lenin's Testament'. As confirmed by MI6 agent Robert Conquest:

It was ironically enough Trotsky who had publicly denied the existence of Lenin's Testament. (The Great Terror: A Reassessment, Oxford University Press, Robert Conquest, 1990, p. 115) (IMG)

Nonetheless, as a propaganda weapon of the imperialist media, the document was forged so to catapult Trotsky into power:

Max Eastman published Lenin's "last will" in the New York Times. Trotsky was blamed for giving the document to his capitalist friend, Eastman. ('LEON TROTSKY, DUPE OF THE NKVD', Rita T. Kronenbitter. In: 'STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE', Vol. 16, No. 1, Special Edition, CIA, 1972, pp. 21-22) (IMG)

There were indeed a series of documents that were attributed by the Trotskyite media to Lenin. With the exception of the first document that was hand-written, the rest of the series' documents attributed to Lenin were all typed:

Only typewritten versions of the document are preserved in the archive, with the exception of the first part dated December 23, 1922, which exists in a facsimile manuscript. ('Lenin, V.I., Letter to the Congress, between December 23, 1922 and January 4, 1923', 1000

Documents, Austrian State Archives / Friedrich–Alexander University Erlangen–Nürnberg / Bavarian State Library) (IMG)

Secondly, the document allegedly written by Lenin contains views that are diametrically opposed to what Lenin stood for. One of the key aspects of the document is the focus on the struggle between Stalin and Trotsky, and the document disapproves of the conflict between those two. This is so unlike Lenin, because Lenin and Trotsky were documented by the MI6 to have been in conflict with each other – and of course, conflicts between

those two individuals did increase the chances for a split. This is yet another of the many reasons why it is dubious if the document was written by Lenin in the first place. Stalin himself in his speech 'The Trotskyist Opposition Before and Now', addressed the fact that Lenin was far less tolerant towards traitors.

However, regardless of whether the series of documents really were by Lenin, they were nonetheless documents that generally favored Stalin, which is why Stalin did not deny the authenticity of those documents at the time. Where the document speaks against Stalin, the document is actually self-defeating, but where it attacks Trotsky, the document remains consistent. Pay attention to the wording. Firstly, the document states:

Comrade Stalin, having become Secretary-General, has unlimited authority concentrated in his hands.... (Letter to Congress, Lenin. MIA)

Obviously, the document's author (or authors) was exaggerating when stating that Stalin had 'unlimited authority', because even anti-communist historians state that Stalin did not have as much power until he purged the Trotskyites in the late 1920s. In fact, even the US National Security Council, the high command of the US intelligence, admitted that there was collective leadership:

Stalin ran through a series of collective leaderships:

(Stalin-Zinoviev-Kamenev vs. Trotsky 1924-25); (Stalin-Bukharin-Rykov-Tomsky vs. Trotsky-Zinoviev-Kamenev 1925-27); (Stalin-Molotov-Voroshilov-Mikoyan vs. Bukharin-Rykov-Tomsky 1927-29).

(NSC BRIEFING - 22 MARCH 1956', NSC, March 22, 1956, p. 2) (IMG)

Furthermore, the document warns against a split inside of the Party:

I think that from this standpoint the prime factors in the question of stability are such members of the C.C. as Stalin and Trotsky. I think relations between them make up the greater part of the danger of a split.... (Letter to Congress, Lenin. MIA)

Had Stalin had 'unlimited authority concentrated in his hands', he would have been able to prevent the split by immediately wiping out the Trotskyites. Hence, the document, by claiming that there was the risk of a split, defeats its own claim that Stalin had 'unlimited authority'. Furthermore, elsewhere, Lenin had made it absolutely clear that Trotsky was a key source of factionalism in the Party:

Trotsky behaves like a despicable careerist and factionalist of the Ryazanov-and-Co. [i.e. Russian Mensheviks] type. Either equality on the editorial board, subordination to the C.C. and no one's transfer to Paris except Trotsky's (the scoundrel, he wants to "fix up" the whole rascally crew of Pravda at our expense!) – or a break with this swindler and an exposure of him.... He pays lip-service to the Party and behaves worse than any other of the factionalists. (To G. Y. Zinoviev, Lenin, August 24, 1909. MIA) (IMG)

In 1911, Lenin had called on the communists to ruthlessly expose Trotsky rather than to argue with him:

It is impossible to argue with Trotsky ... because Trotsky holds no views whatever. We can and should argue with confirmed liquidators and otzovists; but it is no use arguing with a man whose game is to hide the errors of both these trends; in his case the thing to do is to expose him as a diplomat of the smallest calibre. (Trotsky's Diplomacy and a Certain Party Platform, Lenin, 1911. MIA) (IMG)

On the other hand, the supposed 'Lenin's Testament' document makes a reference to the counter-revolutionary espionage that Zinoviev and Kamenev carried out in the October Revolution, as well as to the non-Bolshevism of Trotsky:

I will not further characterize the other members of the Central Committee as to their personal qualities. I will only remind you that the October episode of Zinoviev and Kamenev was not, of course, accidental, but that it ought as little to be used against them as the non-Bolshevism of Trotsky. (The Testament of Lenin, MIA)

The document also states that the non-Bolshevik Trotsky had 'outstanding ability' but was also excessively self-assured:

Comrade Trotsky, on the other hand, as his struggle against the C.C. on the question of the People's Commissariat of Communications has already proved, is distinguished not only by outstanding ability. He is personally perhaps the most capable man in the present C.C., but he has displayed excessive self-assurance and shown excessive preoccupation with the purely administrative side of the work. (Letter to Congress, Lenin. MIA)

With the above quotes in mind, it is definitely true that Trotsky was a very capable man in the Central Committee (CC), because he had an outstanding ability to organize a non-Bolshevik network in the Bolshevik Party in order to struggle against the Central Committee, thus leading to a split in the Party. And through the formation of the Joint Opposition, Trotsky did cause a split in the Party. The document calls Stalin 'rude', but Stalin himself acknowledged that he was rude to those rude individuals who were rudely engineering the partition of the Party:

It is said that in that "will" Comrade Lenin suggested to the congress that in view of Stalin's "rudeness" it should consider the question of putting another comrade in Stalin's place as General Secretary. That is quite true. Yes, comrades, I am rude to those who grossly and perfidiously wreck and split the Party. I have never concealed this and do not conceal it now. Perhaps some mildness is needed in the treatment of splitters, but I am a bad hand at that. At the very first meeting of the plenum of the Central Committee after the Thirteenth Congress I asked the plenum of the Central Committee to release me from my duties as General Secretary. The congress itself discussed this question. It was discussed by each delegation separately, and all the delegations unanimously, including Trotsky, Kamenev and Zinoviev, obliged Stalin to remain at his post.

What could I do? Desert my post? That is not in my nature; I have never deserted any post, and I have no right to do so, for that would be desertion. As I have already said before, I am not a free agent, and when the Party imposes an obligation upon me, I must obey.

(The Trotskyist Opposition Before and Now, Stalin, October 23, 1927, MIA)

During the meeting of the Central Committee, Stalin resigned from his position as the General Secretary of the CPSU and the Central Committee unanimously rejected the resignation:

When the Central Committee met to consider the documents ... [t]he Committee decided that the Testament should not be read to the Congress (nor be published), and it was merely read to closed meetings of the delegations from each province, with the comments of the Committee to the effect that Lenin had been ill [and hence may have been unable to correctly judge] and Stalin had proved satisfactory. Stalin submitted his resignation as General Secretary, which was unanimously rejected. ('Stalin: The Breaker of Nations', Robert Conquest, 1991, p. 111) (IMG)

Stalin could afford to resign. The Party had a large blue-collar percentage whereas the intelligentsia were a minority. The blue-collar elements promoted communism and thus elected a Central Committee dominated by people who on the overt level, endorsed the communist line, instead of the Trotskyite line. Hence, the Central Committee already supported Stalin. The General-Secretary's resignation would have raised the vigilance of the pro-Stalin members of the Party, putting them on alert, thus mobilizing their stronger support for the restoration of Stalin to the position of General-Secretary. The enemies of Stalin feared the mobilization of the pro-Stalin blue-collar majority in the Party. They therefore had every reason

to oppose Stalin's resignation. Furthermore, Stalin even had the overt-level support of the Zinoviev-Kamenev group against Trotsky. Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Kamenev all were well-aware that the Lenin 'testament' spoke out against them as well. This was a supplementary reason for the disinterest of Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Kamenev in publishing the document. Hence the document remained secret, was not published, and the Central Committee unanimously voted to reject Stalin's resignation.

As explained prior, the encirclement of the counter-revolutionary agents by revolutionary agents coopts and compels the counter-revolutionary agents to adopt revolutionary rhetoric and practices and to make moves against other counter-revolutionaries. This was clearly manifested in the case of the Zinoviev-Kamenev 'struggle' against Trotsky and in favor of the Stalin faction, even though covertly, the Zinoviev-Kamenev group were agents and allies of the Trotsky faction. The more the Zinoviev-Kamenev group were struggling against Trotsky's group, the weaker the Zinoviev-Kamenev group became. The House on Un-American Activities (HUAC), the Congressional US intelligence body that tracked communist activity in the Americas, reported:

As Stalin went ruthlessly ahead..., Zinoviev and Kamenev, the two junior members of the firm, had cause to wonder about their own future in the Party. They, therefore, launched a move of increased vituperation against Trotsky, and at the same time a sub-rosa move to depose Stalin from the office of General Secretary and make him Commissar of War. But their own offices were now swarming with Stalinite spies and their activities were easily discovered and crushed. Zinoviev tendered his resignation, which was rejected. Too late the two disgruntled members of the second triumvirate discovered with amazement and horror that while they were helping Stalin undermine the political power of Trotsky, he was doing precisely the same thing to them. (Seventh Report of the Fact-Finding Committee on Un-American Activities, California Legislature, Senate, 1953, p. 38) (IMG)

As late as 1929, Bukharin, who had pursued a secretive alliance with Kamenev and Zinoviev, told Kamenev:

Stalin is boasting that he has you and Zinovyev in his pocket. You can decide your own course, but I request that you do not help him destroy us. Stalin will likely seek contact with you, and I wanted you to know what is at stake. ('Politics, Murder, and Love in Stalin's Kremlin: the Story of Nikolai Bukharin and Anna Larina', The Hoover Institute, Paul Gregory, 2010, p. 34) (IMG)

Hence, although allied to the Trotskyites on the covert level, the Zinoviev-Kamenev group were coopted by the Stalin faction and thus launched an overt-level campaign against the Trotskyites:

In June, 1924, a Communist World Congress was held in Moscow under the direction of Zinoviev, and his agents diligently spread the anti-Trotsky propaganda among the Communist delegates from foreign countries. Thenceforth the tempo of the hate campaign was accelerated until its effect was felt in every country where a Communist organization had been planted. Throughout the Soviet Union anyone who expressed pro-Trotsky sentiments was immediately branded as a traitor, a counterrevolutionary and a Party outcast. Gradually the term "Trotskyite" came to carry all the evil significance of a political curse—and was freely applied to anyone who engaged in activities or expressed opinions displeasing to the new triumvirate—which actually meant Stalin. (Seventh Report of the Fact-Finding Committee on Un-American Activities, California Legislature, Senate, 1953, p. 37) (IMG)

Stalin's ability to put Zinoviev and Kamenev in his 'pocket' goes back to the early days of the October Revolution, when Lenin had called for a full-on purge of Zinoviev and Kamenev, thereby reducing the status of those two renegades in the Party. Thanks to Lenin's reduction of the status of those renegades Zinoviev and Kamenev, those renegades had gotten 'small' enough to 'fit' in Stalin's 'pocket'. In other words, so weakened was the Kamenev-Zinoviev gang that the Stalin faction was able to plant agents around them so to coopt them.

In this situation:

The "Declaration of the 46" and Trotsky's "New Course" articles touched off the first acrimonious contest for the succession, a fight in which the Left, however, was quickly beaten. ('The Left Communists', Robert V. Daniels. In: 'Problems of Communism', November, 1967 to December, 1967, Vol. 16, p. 64) (IMG)

Trotsky and his group were rebelling against the principles of democratic centralism in the Party. And Trotsky was defeated:

Trotsky ... counterattacked by calling Stalin the "gravedigger of the revolution." The net result was Trotsky's expulsion from the Politburo.

The Joint Opposition responded with more virulent underground activity. It prepared a political platform for publication.

('LEON TROTSKY, DUPE OF THE NKVD', Rita T. Kronenbitter. In: 'STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE', Vol. 16, No. 1, Special Edition, CIA, 1972, pp. 21-22) (IMG)

A few months afterwards,:

By May 1925 Trotsky was out as the War Commissar. He became deputy to Dzerzhinski, an inferior post in the Council for State Economy. ('LEON TROTSKY, DUPE OF THE NKVD', Rita T. Kronenbitter. In: 'STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE', Vol. 16, No. 1, Special Edition, CIA, 1972, pp. 21-22) (IMG)

A Trotskyite Joint Opposition was re-formed in 1926 and was under constant surveillance by the hidden units of the Soviet counter-intelligence service:

The ultra-Left then went its own ineffective way again, while Trotsky teamed up with the ... rivals of Stalin – Zinoviev and Kamenev – to mount a last desperate stand against the power of the party organization in 1926-27. ('The Left Communists', Robert V. Daniels. In: 'Problems of Communism', November, 1967 to December, 1967, Vol. 16, p. 64) (IMG)

The decisive contest with Stalin began in the summer of 1926 when a Joint Opposition was formed and started sending emissaries to the provinces. These steps were taken sub rosa, but Stalin knew every move ahead of time.... ('LEON TROTSKY, DUPE OF THE NKVD', Rita T. Kronenbitter. In: 'STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE', Vol. 16, No. 1, Special Edition, CIA, 1972, pp. 21-22) (IMG)

By this time the GPU had initiated constant surveillance over Trotsky and his leading followers. The Joint Opposition was forced underground, with meetings in workers' homes, suburban tenements, cemeteries, and forests. Its tenets called for a ... revolution not in one country but throughout the world. In the Politburo the opposition constituted a regular faction. ('LEON TROTSKY, DUPE OF THE NKVD', Rita T. Kronenbitter. In: 'STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE', Vol. 16, No. 1, Special Edition, CIA, 1972, pp. 21-22) (IMG)

One way to promote a specific cause is to organize terrorist attacks on that cause just enough to make that cause appear as 'victimized' but not so far as to strongly hinder that cause. The MI6 agent Trotsky's left-deviationist 'Joint Opposition' (or 'Unified Opposition') was sponsored by the right-opportunist contingent in the CPSU not through overt praises but rather through terrorist attacks by Trotsky's Menshevik supporters. The job was

done by the Menshevik diversionary terrorists headed by Riutin, who later revealed himself as a supporter of Trotsky. The prominent Trotskyite historian Pierre Broue, who had studied the papers and memoranda written by Trotsky in Harvard University, wrote:

Riutin was an old Menshevik teacher, who joined the Bolshevik Party after October. He had been a pillar of the “Right” and had particularly distinguished himself in the struggle against the Unified Opposition in 1926–27 by organising “strong arm” squads, to terrorise everyone likely to sympathise with it. (The “Bloc” of the Oppositions against Stalin in the USSR in 1932, Marxists Internet Archive, Pierre Broue, January 1980) (IMG)

While superficially, it may appear as though Riutin and Trotsky were opposed to each other, in reality, they were on the same side. For start, Riutin and Trotsky both came from the Menshevik network, both infiltrated the Bolshevik movement, and both stood in opposition to the Soviet government. In 1928, the covert alliance between Riutin and Trotsky was semi-exposed. While having the blood of many real or alleged Trotskyites on his hands, Riutin himself declared:

"The Right wing has proved correct in the economic field, and Trotsky in his criticism of the regime in the Party." (The Great Terror: A Reassessment, Oxford University Press, Robert Conquest, 1990, pp. 23-24) (IMG)

The terror campaign that Riutin had launched ‘against’ the Trotskyites actually promoted the Trotskyite cause under the cover of ‘fighting’ it. It fostered around the Trotskyites a halo of victims and martyrs. In the meantime, the Trotskyites established a center for Trotskyite colour revolution against the Soviet state; colour revolutions launched by imperialist-fascist secret services require intensive media work in order to deceive the public – especially the students, the young intelligentsia – and to rally them into street action against the revolutionary state. An underground printing shop was thus established by the MI6-led Joint Opposition and involved the aid of a fascist White Guard officer from the army of Tsarist General Wrangel, the latter being an MI6 agent and a bloody assassin of the communist and progressive anti-colonial freedom fighters. The following are excerpts of session transcripts from America's pro-Trotsky John Dewey Commission, in which Trotsky points out the connection of this White Guard officer to the underground Trotskyite print shop:

GOLDMAN: What were the reasons, what were the pretexts which the Party gave for your expulsion?

TROTSKY: Many of them. There was a story about an officer of Wrangel. We published programmatic documents; they were written on a typewriter.

GOLDMAN: Who is “we”?

TROTSKY: We? The Opposition. The Party papers refused to publish our documents, absolutely loyal documents in which we criticized certain proceedings of the bureaucracy. We published them by mimeograph. It was done by young comrades.... But they then accused us of publishing the documents with the help of an officer of Wrangel. I was absolutely astonished. It was then established that the officer of Wrangel ... approached a young Oppositionist and proposed to get him a mimeograph and ink and service. The young man accepted. It was then the GPU declared that he was not an agent of the GPU, but an officer of Wrangel.

(The Case of Leon Trotsky: Report of Dewey Commission, 1st Session) (IMG)

TROTSKY: The young comrades, they were more impatient. They secured a mimeograph machine. They were discovered. That was the case when the GPU agent, the former Wrangel officer, proposed to get them connections for paper and so on. The GPU accused them of being in an alliance with a White Guard officer.

GOLDMAN: When was the first time that violence was used against the Left Opposition?

TROTSKY: In 1927 were the first arrests officially.

GOLDMAN: Who was arrested?

TROTSKY: I believe it was Mrachkovsky. It was a question of a “conspiracy.” Another agent of the GPU, Tverskoi, was involved. I have all the documents, and I would be glad if the Commission would create a sub-commission to study them. They reveal the embryo of the present frame-up. There was a young man by the name of Shtsherbakov. He had in his room a “printshop,” that is, a hectograph. Another was Stroilov ... the former officer of Wrangel. (...) There was the former officer of Wrangel ... who proposed to get paper for the young Oppositionist. This same former officer of Wrangel was connected with Tverskoi. (...). At the session of the Central Committee Menzhinsky, chief of the GPU, read some papers and documents on the “conspiracy.” That was in 1927. The overwhelming majority of the Central Committee were absolutely perplexed.

(The Case of Leon Trotsky: Report of Dewey Commission, 9th Session) (IMG)

To save themselves against the charges of counter-revolutionary activity, the Trotskyite opposition started claiming that the White Guard officer was also a Soviet intelligence agent. No doubt, it is possible that the White Guard officer had infiltrated Soviet intelligence, since the Soviet intelligence had been shaken due to the rise of Yagoda’s network. However, that would only go on to expose the extent of intelligence penetration by the Trotskyites and White Guard elements into Soviet intelligence and would serve to justify the need for the purges of the Soviet intelligence service. Stroilov himself, the White Guard officer, was purged in the Moscow Trials. Anyways, according to the CIA document,:

In November 1927, Stalin triumphed with the expulsion of Trotsky from the Russian government. (THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL, Office Memorandum, CIA, November 15, 1953, p. 1) (IMG)

The sharp demotion of the Trotskyites by the Soviet state was correlated with the march-ahead of the USSR with the NEP. However, by 1928, the state capitalist policies of the NEP had done their job of centralizing the economy away from feudalism and partially away from private sector capitalism. The economic base for a greater centralization of the economy had been laid. It was high time that socialized industry would see a rapid expansion both in extent and in intensity, and that individual peasant holdings amalgamate into voluntarily-formed agricultural cooperatives. Agricultural collectivization would have gotten the petit-bourgeoisie into employee-owned big businesses capable of taking the risk of intensive class struggles against the kulaks, the comprador class allied to finance capital. The petit-bourgeoisie, with their small businesses, are not able to take the risk of standing up against kulaks, bureaucrats, and other comprador bourgeois forces. Collectivization could strengthen the peasants in this respect. Agricultural collectivization, by amalgamating such small holdings, would have also rendered economic coordination between peasants far more efficient, allowing them to cultivate bigger lands with much more resources, thus increasing economic efficiency. Concurrent with this development in the field of economic class struggles and the development of the productive forces, was the temporary halt to the overt campaign against the Trotskyite left-deviation – who after all agreed with speeding up the pace of economic class struggles – and the onset of the overt campaign against the Bukharinite right-deviation, who operated as the primary obstacle in the path of further economic centralization. Hence, with the halt in the overt campaign against Trotskyite left-deviation, the right-opportunists were no longer of use for cooptation by the communists. As such, there came the Stalin faction’s turn against the right-deviation:

Zinoviev and Trotsky were no sooner defeated than Stalin turned against the Right. Its most influential leader was Nikolai Bukharin. (The Great Terror: A Reassessment, Oxford University Press, Robert Conquest, 1990, p. 16) (IMG)

The British agent Robert Conquest described the key parts of Bukharin's network and his efforts at alliance with the Trotskyite leader Kamenev as follows:

[Bukharin's] main associate was Alexei Rykov, Lenin's successor as Premier, who had worked in the underground top leadership since it first stabilized, but who had consistently tended to compromise with the Mensheviks. With Bukharin and Rykov stood the striking figure of Tomsy, leader of the trade unions, the only worker in the Politburo. He had led one of the earliest of all Soviets, that in Reval, in the 1905 revolution, and had been one of the three representatives of underground organizations at the conference of Bolshevik leaders in Paris in 1909.

Bukharin's Right won men like Uglanov, successor to Kamenev as leader of the Moscow Party; and around Bukharin in particular there grew up a group of younger men, mainly intellectuals, who were perhaps the best minds in the Party in the early 1930s. During the attack on the Left, Stalin strongly censured the idea of "fantastic plans for industry without reckoning up our reserves" and rebuked "people who look on the mass of laboring peasants as an object to be exploited for the benefit of industry." But he now began to take a different line, adopting the left-wing policy in its most rigorous form.

(The Great Terror: A Reassessment, Oxford University Press, Robert Conquest, 1990, p. 17) (IMG)

It was time, high time, for the communist faction to coopt the Trotskyite left-opportunists against the Bukharinite right and to pursue the socialization and collectivization of the economy.

Trotsky himself, ever the outrageous renegade who opposed the NEP and had called for aggressive 'socialization', this time denounced the socialization of the economy just when the economy needed to be socialized. Nonetheless, he also did state that Stalin partially went on to incorporate some of the views of the 'Left Opposition' when the parasitic kulak class carried out its economic sabotage. In an interview with his own newspaper, Trotsky replied:

Simultaneously the Left Opposition in the course of several years carried on a struggle against the Stalinists in favor of collectivization. Only when the kulak refused to deliver grain to the State did Stalin, under the pressure of Left Opposition, accomplish a sharp turn. Being the empiricist that he is, he moved to the opposite extreme, and set as a task for two or three years the collectivization of all the peasantry, the liquidation of the kulaks as a class, and the compression of the Five-Year Plan into four years. The Left Opposition declared that the new tempo of industrialization were above our forces and that the liquidation of the kulaks as a class in the course of three years was a fantastic task. If one wishes to say so, we find ourselves this time 'less radical' than the Stalinists. Revolutionary realism tries to draw the maximum advantage from every situation – that is what makes it revolutionary – but at the same time it does not permit us to set ourselves fantastic aims – that is what makes it realistic. (AN INTERVIEW WITH LEON TROTSKY, The Militant: The Weekly Organ of the Communist League of America (Opposition), New York, April 15, 1933, p. 5. In: CIA archives) (IMG)

Though covertly allied to the Bukharinite right, the Trotskyite left-deviation had no choice but to overtly support the Party line against Bukharinite right-opportunism:

the real forces of the Left were beginning to be reconciled to the Party line, now that it evidently swung their way; Pyatakov capitulated as early as February 1928. By mid-1929, Krestinsky, Radek, and most of the other "Trotskyites" had petitioned for readmission to the Party. Of the leaders, Rakovsky alone held out (until 1934). An observer remarks that Communists who had become involved in the opposition and needed to redeem their past faults were "particularly ruthless." (The Great Terror: A Reassessment, Oxford University Press, Robert Conquest, 1990, p. 17) (IMG)

The correctness of the Party line had the effect of disarming the Trotskyite left-deviation from the excuses with which to criticize the Soviet state, and compelled them to publicly oppose their own covertly allies, the Bukharinite right:

with the launching of the Party into the bitter adventure of sudden collectivization, the effect on any wavering section might be calculated to be a swing to more solidarity. The effect on the Leftists, already opposed to Bukharin's views, would be further to disarm their complaints against Stalin's policies and to make them start thinking of the old Party loyalty in the presence of the enemy. As for the just-defeated Rightists, how could they rock the boat during the crisis? (The Great Terror: A Reassessment, Oxford University Press, Robert Conquest, 1990, p. 18) (IMG)

When criticized for their right-opportunist views, the Bukharinites saw fit to resign. At that point in time, when they were not fully exposed, their resignation would have stirred up unrest from elements in the Party and the populace, and thus would have had a colour revolutionary effect against Soviet power. To disarm the Bukharinites, Stalin began to compromise, stopped denouncing them by name, but kept up the pace of attacks on the Bukharinites in a covert way:

Towards the end of 1928, Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomsy put in their resignations, in anger at Stalin's steady undermining of their positions. It was too soon for Stalin, and he immediately made his usual verbal concessions, passed a Politburo resolution compromising with the Right, and thus obtained "unanimity." Thereafter, the attack on the Rightist deviation went on as before but without any naming of the leaders. (The Great Terror: A Reassessment, Oxford University Press, Robert Conquest, 1990, p. 17) (IMG)

Bukharin, isolated due to this secret service game by Stalin, grew impulsive, incapable of correct assessment of the situation, and prone to strategic error. Impaired in tactical judgement, he saw no choice but to launch blatant slanders on the Soviet state, so to stir up unrest from outside the Party, as means of pressuring the Soviet state. However, such action only antagonized him further in the Party:

In January 1929, Bukharin submitted a declaration to the Politburo protesting against plans to squeeze the [kulak] peasantry and strongly criticizing the absence of intra-Party democracy. It included the remarks "We are against one-man decisions of questions of Party leadership. We are against control by a collective being replaced by control by a person. even though an authoritative one." This, it was charged, was "direct slander of the Party, direct slander of Comrade Stalin, against whom they try to advance accusations of attempting the single-handed direction of our Party." (The Great Terror: A Reassessment, Oxford University Press, Robert Conquest, 1990, pp. 17-18) (IMG)

Isolated further and disgraced by the Party of the proletariat, the Bukharinites lost key positions, and the communist line of the Party was adopted: Stalin's success in organizational detail now bore fruit. The Rightists were supported in the Central Committee by a mere handful of members. That body, meeting in April 1929, condemned the right wing's views, removed Bukharin from his editorship of Pravda and chairmanship of the Comintern, and dismissed Tomsy from the trade union leadership. (...). In April, too, the principles of crash

industrialization and of collectivization were adopted at the XVIth Party Conference. After their views had been condemned, the Rightists submitted. On 26 November 1929 they published a very general recantation of their views on "a series of political and tactical questions." Bukharin now lost his Politburo post. (The Great Terror: A Reassessment, Oxford University Press, Robert Conquest, 1990, p. 18) (IMG)

Correlated with these events is the fact that Riutin was demoted from the position he held:

However, in 1928 ... [Riutin] was relieved of his responsibilities in the Moscow Committee of the Party and as editor-in-chief of Krasnaya Zvezda. (The "Bloc" of the Oppositions against Stalin in the USSR in 1932, Marxists Internet Archive, Pierre Broue, January 1980) (IMG)

The Krasnaya Zvezda was the official media organ of the USSR Defense Ministry. The fact that he had been placed in the least materially significant part of the Defense Ministry – the media sector – was itself evidence that he was regarded by the Stalin faction as a terrorist adventurer to be demoted. The demotion of the terrorist adventurer from the Ministry of Defense at the time of the shift away from NEP meant a reduction in the influence of Bukharinite influence. Obviously, however, it did not put a halt on the terrorist conspiracies of the Riutin gang. Riutin spent his time developing contacts with various counter-revolutionary oppositionists. Key individuals among them were Uglanov, one of the closest associates and agents of Bukharin, as well as the revisionist intelligentsia in the Soviet universities:

It was then that he had formed a group, with P.A. Galkin, the conspiratorial character of which no one denies. In this group were to be found elements from various currents, such as disciples of Bukharin, [supposedly] bright jewels of the Institute of Red Professors, such as Alexander Slepikov and Dimitri Faretsky, as well as little known former "Left Oppositionists" and especially, senior members of the apparatus, such, for example, as Nikolai A. Uglanov, and even prestigious Old Bolsheviks like the metalworker, Kayurov, who led the Vyborg district in Leningrad during the revolution. (The "Bloc" of the Oppositions against Stalin in the USSR in 1932, Marxists Internet Archive, Pierre Broue, January 1980) (IMG)

Bukharin's Right won men like Uglanov, successor to Kamenev as leader of the Moscow Party; and around Bukharin in particular there grew up a group of younger men, mainly intellectuals.... (The Great Terror: A Reassessment, Oxford University Press, Robert Conquest, 1990, p. 17) (IMG)

An alliance network of neo-Mensheviks, Trotskyites, terrorists, Bukharinites, and revisionist intelligentsia had formed long before 1928, since these categories of renegades all had ties to the MI6-sponsored Menshevik networks.

Recall that at the instigation of the MI6 agent Trotsky, Bukharin and Pyatakov had formed an alliance to assassinate Lenin, Stalin, and Sverdlov, and to get Russia to continue the war with Germany. Recall what an intelligence document for the British Foreign Office had stated regarding the attempts: in 1918 to upset the peace of Brest-Litovsk to overthrow the government and to assassinate Lenin, Stalin, and Sverdlov. (N 1253/26/38, No. 119, Viscount Chilston to Viscount Halifax – (Received March 11), Moscow, March 8, 1938. Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 319) (IMG)

The Foreign Office stated that Trotsky was the instigator, Bukharin was the 'actual ringleader' and Pyatakov was the designated leader in the scheme: Bukharin was the actual ringleader though the scheme was first pronounced by Trotski, Pyatakov being designated by Bukharin to succeed learning as head of the proposed new Government of "Left Social Revolutionaries" and "Left Communists." (N 1253/26/38, No. 119, Viscount Chilston to Viscount Halifax – (Received March 11), Moscow, March 8, 1938. Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 319) (IMG)

The MI6 document cited above mentioned that the conclusions it made were stated tentatively, rather than with full certainty, but the remarks of the British intelligence document are actually validated by the fact that Bukharin and Trotsky both engaged in terrorist action aimed at overthrowing the Soviet state and murdering the communist revolutionaries and aimed at getting Russia to wage war on Germany.

Recall the remarks of the MI6 operative Grigori Tokaev who admitted that Bukharin was a foreign agent and that he had connived at the fact that the Trotskyites were agents of the MI6, Japanese fascists, Kautskyite anti-Soviet elements in Germany, and Nazi Germans:

Further, Trotsky, supposed originally to have inspired the formation of the 'bloc', had long since been linked with the Nazi secret service and the British intelligence service! On Trotsky's orders, Krestinsky, former Deputy People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs, had been in the German service since 1921. Rozenholz, former People's Commissar of Foreign Trade, joined the British service in 1926 and the German service in 1932. Rakovsky, one of the big figures of the Revolution, had served the British intelligence service since 1924, and the Japanese since 1934. And so on. All this Bukharin and Rykov had connived at, since they too were foreign agents. (Comrade X, Grigori Tokaev, 1956, p. 87) (IMG)

The dialectical logic of Bukharin being an MI6 agent goes both ways: on the one hand, Bukharin was an MI6 agent because he collaborated with the MI6 agent Trotsky, knowing that Trotsky was an MI6 agent; on the other hand, Bukharin collaborated with the MI6 agent Trotsky because Bukharin himself was an MI6 agent as well. Bukharin's agency for the MI6 was therefore both a cause and a consequence of his knowingly collaborating with the MI6 agent Trotsky.

The tentative remarks of MI6 spy Chilston are also corroborated by the fact that the transcripts of the Moscow Trials made the same kinds of conclusions and that the confessions of the defendants were unlikely to be forced since the ban on physical torture at least, was genuinely enforced in the USSR and was not just on paper (see C5S6). As such, Bukharin, the MI6 agent Trotsky, and the Trotskyite agent Pyatakov had all almost certainly established a Trotskyite-Bukharinite alliance since at least the early days of the October Revolution, so to overthrow the Soviet state and murder its key communist revolutionaries. Thus the roots of the bloc can be traced to long before 1928. Lenin had already pointed out that the left-opportunist Trotsky had formed an alliance with the right-opportunists to undermine the communists as early as February 1917. Nonetheless, the alliance was taking a stronger shape by then and was being further 'formalized'. In the USSR, the Riutin group was indeed correctly regarded as a key circle forming the link between the Bukharinites and the Trotskyites:

And now we come to a case crucial to the Terror – that of Ryutin. Throughout the ensuing years, this was named as the original conspiracy; all the main oppositionists in turn were accused of participating in the Ryutin "plot," on the basis of what came to be called the "Ryutin Platform." (The Great Terror: A Reassessment, Oxford University Press, Robert Conquest, 1990, pp. 23-24) (IMG)

With the development of the Riutin network, the Trotskyites and Bukharinites went one step further and sought to establish contacts for a more thorough coordination in their alliance. Robert Conquest remarked:

On 11 July 1928 Bukharin had a secret meeting with Kamenev, organized by Sokolnikov. Kamenev made a résumé of the conversation which finally leaked and was published abroad. Bukharin had finally seen, as he said, that the political divergences between his own right-wing faction and the left-wing faction of Zinoviev and Kamenev were as nothing compared with the total divergence of principle which separated them all from Stalin. It was not a question of ideas, since Stalin did not have any: "He changes his theories according to the need he has of getting rid of somebody at such-and-such a moment." Stalin had concluded that the advance to socialism would meet more and more ... resistance. Bukharin commented, "That will mean a police state, but nothing will stop Stalin." (The Great Terror: A Reassessment, Oxford University Press, Robert Conquest, 1990, p. 17) (IMG)

When Bukharin said that Stalin 'changes his theories according to the need he has of getting rid of somebody at such-and-such a moment', he was not speaking the truth, but his remark was certainly based on a fact: the purges were concurrent with the evolution in the policy line pursued by the Soviet state in the realm of political economy, in the realm of the economic class struggles and the development of productive forces.

At the same time, an international Trotskyite network had been developed in the Comintern, for the pursuit of counter-revolutionary ideas:

Upon Trotsky's expulsion from the Russian Communist Party his sympathizers within the various national Communist Parties at first gave no indication of an open break. However, as early as 1927 there was clandestine contact among the Trotsky disciples, and there began to appear factions within the national parties and the Comintern. This occasioned expulsion from the Communist Party proper, a fact which was resisted by the dissenters, who considered themselves as leftist opposition groups of parent body. For example, the Americans called themselves "The Communist League of America, Left Opposition of the Communist Party." (THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL, Office Memorandum, CIA, November 15, 1953, p. 2) (IMG)

The USSR however also possessed the ability to turn such Trotskyite-induced crises into an opportunity. The left-opportunist tendencies in the Comintern were used to 'whip' the Bukharinite faction out of power. The prominent British Trotskyite activist Duncan Hallas had written about this matter. Hallas joined the Trotskyite movement in 1941, when he was 16 and when the so-called 'Socialist Workers Party' (SWP) was actively supporting strikes against a British Empire that had allied with the USSR against the Nazis. He was a prominent researcher for the notorious Trotskyite organization:

DUNCAN HALLAS, who died last week, was a lifelong fighter for revolutionary socialism. A whole generation of supporters of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) remembers him as an inspired speaker and teacher of Marxist ideas. Year after year he would fill halls with hundreds of people at the SWP's annual Marxism event as he spoke about a range of topics – historical materialism, the struggle of the working class in Britain, the revolutionary tradition, the origins of humanity.

Duncan was not just a theorist. He was an activist and a fighter. He was born into a working class family in Manchester – his mother started work in the cotton mills at the age of ten – and he went on to get a job in the local engineering industry.

By the age of 16 Duncan was a committed socialist. He joined the Trotskyist movement in the middle of the Second World War, at a time when it was the only political organisation prepared to break the law and support strikes. Conscripted into the army, he was sent to fight in Germany, and then to Egypt, where he was a non-commissioned officer at the end of the war.

('Duncan Hallas 1925 – 2002', The Socialist Worker (the media of the 'Socialist Workers Party'), September 28, 2002) (IMG)

Regarding the Third Period, Hallas wrote:

The swing to ultra-leftism owed something to the need to weaken the impact in the communist parties outside Russia of the opposition criticisms of the previous period's rightist policies, especially after their disastrous outcome in Britain and China. But more important was the need to remove Bukharin's supporters from positions of influence in various communist parties. 'The main danger is from the right,' it was proclaimed, and the by now well-established techniques of bureaucratically eliminating inconveniently independent party members, pioneered by Zinoviev and developed by Bukharin, were now used ruthlessly against the latter's supporters. Genuine leftists purged during Bukharin's reign were not, however, reinstated. Instead 'leaders of a new type' were promoted and then made the objects of a personality cult mirroring that which now centred on Stalin himself in Russia. Prompt and unquestioning obedience and uncritical worship of Stalin and all his works: these were now the requirements. (The Comintern, Duncan Hallas, Chapter 6) (IMG)

Hallas continued:

The leftism of this period was not imposed by the Comintern consciously in order to isolate the communist parties. The leftist policies in fact developed from struggles inside the USSR, where the bureaucracy was now fighting against the right wing around Bukharin. (The Comintern, Duncan Hallas, Chapter 6) (IMG)

In this midst, Stalin began to launch an ideological campaign against Trotsky's theses on fascism. However, much more than undermining Trotsky, those Stalin theses undermined the right-opportunists in the Comintern. Stalin famously declared that 'social-democracy' was objectively the 'moderate wing of fascism'. Politically, this remark by Stalin was within a context of the attacks on the right-deviationist and liberalizer tendencies in the Party. However, in terms of the actual philosophical content behind the remark by Stalin, this remark of his has caused confusions amongst some. Therefore, the following points must be mentioned about it:

(1) In stating so, Stalin obviously did not use the term 'social-democracy' to refer to socialist or progressive bourgeois-democratic causes, but rather spoke of the Kautskyite agents of imperialist-fascist finance capital, who sponsored fascist mass-murderers abroad and at times at home. Fascist assassins like Petlura, Pilsudski, and Mussolini all had Kautskyite roots. The 'corporatist' model, the 'San-Sepolcro' model, etc. which the fascists used all deliberately imported ideas from scientific socialism obviously not in order to advance the communist cause, but to take leadership and hence mis-leadership of a backlash against finance capital, so that the imperialist-fascists secret services can pursue their agenda. They were also meant to create a 'progressive' covering for the fascists. West Germany was a Kautskyite state run directly by Nazi officials.

(2) That Stalin mentioned the Kautskyites does not mean that he meant to single them out, because there were (and are) conservative party or liberal party politicians who serve imperialist-fascist secret services as well, and provide the democratic cover. There are Trotskyites who superficially 'differ' with the Kautskyites, but who are no less agents of imperialist-fascist secret services.

(3) That Kautskyites served to further the interests of finance capital does not mean that when Anglo-American and French imperialists began to contradict the Nazi German finance capital, the Soviet Union should not have allied with the former group. On the contrary, Stalin was very clear in advocating such an alliance, even though that meant an alliance with some of the Kautskyite criminals who had formerly been sponsoring the Axis but who by then had turned against the Axis. Similarly, the popular front strategy of the Comintern

meant that if necessary, the communists shall ally with the Kautskyite agents of Anglo-American intelligence services in order to combat the fascist occupation forces.

(4) State capitalism is simply a variant of the capitalist mode of production used by many – though not all – fascist regimes, and used also by the Kautskyites. That the Kautskyites and many fascists in Europe advocated a form of state capitalism does not mean that state capitalism is fascism. During the New Economic Policy (NEP) period, state capitalism was a major form of property relation.

The communist faction in the USSR sought to transition from the NEP to the process of socialized industrialization and agricultural collectivization. Bukharin's right deviationist group opposed the transition away from NEP, however. Hence, to undermine Bukharin's right-deviation, the communists were compelled to tolerate the left-deviationist elements in the Comintern. This, while a correct strategy, had its obvious side effect: the 'Third Period' line, which was a left-deviationist line denouncing alliances with any force from among the bourgeoisie against more dangerous elements among the bourgeoisie. The left-deviation of the Third Period of the Comintern, while needing to be denounced, was not a line promoted by communists but rather by the left-deviationist elements used by the communist faction against the power bases of the right-deviation. The case of some Latin American 'communists' pursuing a left-deviationist line, using the Comintern line, as their example is a case in point; General Sandino was stabbed in the back by them, although the Stalin faction of the USSR continued the aid. In the context of the USSR however, one must account for the fact that the left-deviation and the right-deviation were covertly allies against the socialist centrists, and that the rise of such a left-deviation against the right-deviation was useful for weakening the MI6 imperialist fifth column which the Nazis eventually recruited. The left-deviation in the Comintern, therefore, was 'ironically' useful in undermining the MI6-backed fascist intelligence network in the USSR, the network which the Nazis later began to support. Back in the USSR, the campaigns were ongoing:

In 1929 [Trotsky] was exiled from the country. (THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL, Office Memorandum, CIA, November 15, 1953, p. 1) (IMG)

There is no way that the Soviet leadership, if given the power to execute Trotsky, would have allowed the MI6 agent Trotsky to move freely out of the Soviet Union. However, at the time, the communists did not have sufficient power to counter the Trotskyite lobby. At the time, through his intelligence network and through his vast network of operatives in the Red Army and to a lesser extent in the Soviet intelligence service GPU, the criminal Trotsky had enough lobbying power not to be jailed and silenced, let alone be fully interrogated and executed. This lobbying power gave Trotsky the ability to instead get exiled to Turkey, as opposed to being executed. The usefulness of the Trotskyites in the campaign against the Bukharinites supplemented the tendency to not execute him.

Upon landing in Prinkipo/Buyukada in Turkey, the MI6 agent Trotsky established his Trotskyite central command headquarters, an anti-Soviet base for intelligence and special operations, hence to weave his worldwide spy web:

Summing up Trotsky's striving "to rally the under-world of Europe to the overthrow of Stalin," Winston Churchill described Trotsky's conspiratorial audacity and demoniac energy. The same characterization was drawn by [America's liberal journalist who denounced the Soviet Union,] John Gunther, who interviewed Trotsky at Prinkipo in Turkey. His description gave the essence of the movement's structure in 1932, which remained about the same until Trotsky's death:

A Trotsky movement has grown up throughout most of Europe. In each country there is a nucleus of Trotskyist agitators. They take orders from Prinkipo direct. There is a sort of communication between the various groups, through their publications and manifestos but mostly through private letters. The various central committees are linked to an international headquarters in Berlin (in Paris, after Hitler's take-over).

Its confidential communications with occasional uses of couriers, safe accommodation addresses, and code names for correspondents gave Trotsky's movement the semblance of an intelligence service.

(‘LEON TROTSKY, DUPE OF THE NKVD’, Rita T. Kronenbitter. In: ‘STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE’, Vol. 16, No. 1, Special Edition, CIA, 1972, p. 18) (IMG)

One must also pay attention to where the Trotskyites overtly established their bases. Kemalist Turkey was militarily allied to the USSR but was coming increasingly under the influence of the British intelligence. Since Trotsky was hated in the USSR, the fact that he landed in Turkey of all places could serve as a means of associating Turkey with Trotskyism, hence to drive a wedge between Turkey and the USSR, precisely what Trotsky and the MI6 wanted. We know that Trotsky's network sought to drive such a wedge based on the fact that the Trotskyites in the Comintern denounced Kemal Pasha as a reactionary. On the other hand, Turkey did not have enough lobbying power to stand up against the will of the MI6, and so Trotsky was able to establish his base there.

Rapallo-era Germany had a common denominator with Turkey in this respect. For a period of time, the USSR militarily allied with Weimar-era Germany, and established military cooperation, as a means of containing Anglo-French imperialism. As stated in the CIA document above, the other overt base of the Trotskyites was Rapallo-era Germany. By establishing their base there, the much-hated Trotskyites were associating themselves to Germany, so to increase pressures on the USSR to cut military cooperation with Rapallo-era Germany. Rapallo-era Germany was too weak in the face of the British, to be able to expel Trotsky.

Once Hitler rose to power, the time had come for the USSR to lure France into an alliance against Nazi Germany; that the Trotskyites 'escaped' to France surely was a part of the plot to overtly 'dissociate' themselves from the Nazis, but it also helped them in driving a wedge between USSR and France. As many MI6 agents had settled in France since World War I, Britain had a large number of intelligence bases in France, and France was too MI6-influenced to undertake immediate action against the Trotskyites. Mexico was still under American influence but was emerging increasingly under the influence of the USSR through the communist-led popular front, and later on, Trotsky established his presence precisely in that country. Since Anglo-American influence in Mexico was high, Mexico did not have sufficient lobbying power against Trotsky. All such measures appear to have been intended, at least in part, to drive a wedge between the Soviet Union and its allies.

The central command base of the Trotskyites in Turkey ran a network of Kautskyites and extremists throughout Europe. The Trotskyite movement established was the movement of the extremists, Mensheviks, Social Revolutionaries, and the Labour Party, albeit with a left-opportunist rhetoric:

Another vulnerability of Trotsky was inherent in the composition of his political movement. The Trotskyites of the 1930's were predominantly former CP members, Social Revolutionaries, Mensheviks, leftist laborites, Spartacus Youth groups, and similar extreme radicals. Their unifying slogans focused on the negation of Stalinism, while with regard to their positive ideal, world revolution, their varied ideological background divided them in all efforts. (‘LEON TROTSKY, DUPE OF THE NKVD’, Rita T. Kronenbitter. In: ‘STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE’, Vol. 16, No. 1, Special Edition, CIA, 1972, p. 19) (IMG)

The Labour Party, a branch of the Kautskyite Second International web and a mass organization controlled by the British espionage service, invited Trotsky to Britain:

On June 5, 1929, the Independent Labor Party, of which Ramsay MacDonald is a member, sent me an official invitation, on its own initiative, to come to England and deliver a lecture at the party school. The invitation, signed by the general secretary of the party, read: "With the formation of the Labor government here, we cannot believe that any difficulties are likely to arise in connection with your visit to England for this purpose." Nevertheless difficulties did arise. I was [not] allowed to deliver a lecture before the supporters of MacDonald.... My application for a visa was flatly refused. (My Life, Trotsky, 1930, chapter 45. MIA) (IMG)

The reason why Trotsky was not allowed is obvious. While the Kautskyite Labour Party members would have liked their Menshevik MI6 agent physically harboured in Britain, the media hype about Trotsky's entry to Britain would have inflicted far too much of a cost on the public image and reputation of the Labour Party, for it would have portrayed them as in cahoots with international communism. Already, Western media, according to Trotsky, was publishing outlandish stories about Trotsky being an agent of Stalin for a Soviet conquest of the Middle East and the loss of Anglo-French colonies in that region:

Newspapers like The Times or Le Temps speak the truth on all unimportant and inconsequential occasions, so that they can deceive the public with all the requisite authority when necessary.

The Times later published reports that I had come to Constantinople by arrangement with Stalin, to prepare for a military conquest of the countries of the Near East.

(My Life, Trotsky, 1930, chapter 45. MIA) (IMG)

In the meantime, when Trotsky was in Turkey, it once again became convenient to launch another wave of political attacks against the Bukharin group so to speed up the pace of economic centralization. Hence came the arrest of Riutin on charges of terrorist activity, a blow to the right-opportunists:

Ryutin was expelled from the Party in September 1930, and arrested six weeks later. (The Great Terror: A Reassessment, Oxford University Press, Robert Conquest, 1990, pp. 23-24) (IMG)

However, by 1930, some Trotskyite left-deviations had been committed in the realm of agricultural collectivization, and many peasants had been quickly forced into 'collectives'. It was necessary to prevent forced 'collectivization' and to ensure that collectivization would be voluntary, within pace, and concurrent with the development of the productive forces. The Trotskyites, the advocates of rushing and forcing, must have been counteracted. To this end, by early 1931, it was necessary for communists to slightly elevate the Bukharin group again so to counteract the Trotskyite influence. Such was why:

on 17 January 1931 the OGPU Collegium acquitted [Ryutin] of criminal intent, and he was released and later restored to Party membership, with a warning. (The Great Terror: A Reassessment, Oxford University Press, Robert Conquest, 1990, pp. 23-24) (IMG)

Upon restoration to Party membership, Riutin's position was overall much weaker than before his arrest, and thus he was coopted by, compelled to cooperate with, the communists in order to 'ensure' his political survival. He was readmitted because the communists aimed to coopt Bukharinite trumpeting against Trotskyite phrasemongering. Of course, the fact of the Trotskyite left-deviations compelled the communists into an overt-level 'alliance' with the Bukharinites again, and hence the Trotskyite left-opportunists created the lobbying force behind Riutin's temporary release from prison. Nonetheless, overall, the trend was in favor of the communist faction, which successfully exploited the overt-level hostilities of the covertly-allied left- and right-deviationists, for the purpose of adjusting the speed of class struggles and the development of the productive forces.

With this new policy line of preventing forced 'collectivization' and slowing down pace,:

The peasants left the kolkhozes. (...). Bukharin, Tomsy, and Rykov ... went out of their way to say that to come out against "the Party," especially with the support of peasants, was unthinkable. (The Great Terror: A Reassessment, Oxford University Press, Robert Conquest, 1990, p. 19) (IMG)

Therefore, through the pursuit of such correct policy, once again the Bukharinite right was coopted and pitted against the Trotskyite leftist advocates of the speed-up in pace. This was in spite of the covert alliance between the Trotskyites and the Bukharinites. Overtly and outwardly, the covert allies had to denounce each other ferociously, thanks to the vigorous correctness of the Party line. However, the weakening of the Trotskyites and the correctness of the Party line also meant that the Bukharinites could no longer have excuses with which to criticize the Soviet state. This meant that they could not have as much of a popular base with which to catapult themselves politically upwards. Instead, the correct line pursued by the Party disarmed them further, leading to their key chess pieces being demoted. Thus,:

Tomsy was removed from the Politburo in July 1930, and Rykov in December. Henceforth, [the Politburo] was ... Stalinist. (The Great Terror: A Reassessment, Oxford University Press, Robert Conquest, 1990, p. 19) (IMG)

Their demotion only increased the severe pressure upon them to adapt to the Party line:

The Rightist leaders privately regarded Stalin's leadership as catastrophic and hoped for his fall, but advised their closest adherents to wait in patience for a change in the Party mood. Bukharin favored working up a general support of the idea of a change without any direct organized struggle for the time being. He is described as having counseled the younger oppositionists to rely on the masses, who must sooner or later realize the fatal consequences of the Stalin line. Patience would be necessary. So he accepted defeat in the vague hope of some improvement later on.

The Trotskyists voiced a similar hope for a change.

(The Great Terror: A Reassessment, Oxford University Press, Robert Conquest, 1990, p. 19) (IMG)

By pursuing forced 'collectivization', the Bukharinite-Trotskyite alliance fomented discontent among the ordinary peasants. The Bukharinites and the Trotskyites also launched kulak rebellions, thus causing the condition of a civil war inside the USSR's agricultural territories, leading to famines in the early 1930s. In so doing, they caused the deaths of the hidden soldiers of Soviet power, the numerous officers who sought to protect the Soviet people from kulak terror. Through the famine, the MI6 gang of Bukharin committed a democide, if not a genocide, against the Soviet people, and committed crimes against humanity, murdering approximately 1.4 million people (see C5S3). The economy of the USSR was damaged although it was able to recover fairly quickly.

In addition to kulak sabotage though, there was industrial sabotage. The hope of the Trotskyites lied in several of their agents throughout the USSR, one of which was the Trotskyite group of Pyatakov, Radek, and Sokolnikov. The ties of Bukharin to Pyatakov reportedly goes back to as early as 1918. It is, furthermore, a well-known fact that Pyatakov was a Trotskyite.

As early as 1931, the MI6-backed Trotskyite group of Pyatakov was engaged in economic sabotage against the Soviet state. The memoirs of John 'Jack' Littlepage are very valuable for understanding the scale of the industrial sabotage occurring throughout the USSR. This American engineer was employed by the Soviet government to work in the development of the mining sector. After the termination of his employment period, Littlepage returned to the United States and wrote his memoirs 'In Search of Soviet Gold'. In it, he detailed the industrial wreckage carried out by a Trotskyite gang led by Radek and Pyatakov:

[In] the spring of 1931, ... I decided to take a quick vacation in Europe.... I requested permission from Serebrovsky, and the latter ... told me a large purchasing commission was headed for Berlin, under the direction of Yuri Piatakoff, who, ... was then the Vice-Commissar of Heavy Industry. The proposed purchases to be made included some expensive mining equipment, and he suggested that I might advise the commission on such purchases.

I agreed to do this, and arrived in Berlin at about the same time as the commission. I found it consisted of about fifty persons, headed by a few prominent Communist politicians of whom Piatakoff was the chief, together with Secretaries, clerks, and technical advisers. There were also two other American engineers, who had come along to give technical advice on other purchases than mining.

The Russian members of the commission didn't seem any too well pleased to have me around at this time; their attitude made me recall the rumors I had heard about ill-feeling between Piatakoff and Serebrovsky, and I decided I was unwelcome because I was regarded as Serebrovsky's man. But I told them Serebrovsky had asked me to approve every purchase of mining equipment, and they agreed to consult me.

Among other things, the commission had put out bids for several dozen mine hoists, ranging from one hundred to one thousand horsepower. Ordinarily these hoists consist of drums, shafting, bearing, gears, etc., placed on a foundation of I- or H-beams.

The commission had asked for quotations on the basis of pfennigs per kilogram. Several concerns put in bids, but there was a considerable difference – about five or six pfennigs per kilogram – between most of the bids and those made by two concerns which bid lowest. This difference made me examine the specifications closely, and I discovered that the firms which had made the lowest bids had substituted cast-iron bases for the light steel required in the original specifications, so that if their bids had been accepted, the Russians would have actually paid more, because the cast-iron base would be so much heavier than the lighter steel one, but on the basis of pfennigs per kilogram, they would appear to pay less.

This seemed to be nothing less than a trick, and I was naturally pleased to make such a discovery. I reported my findings to the Russian members of the commission with considerable self-satisfaction. To my astonishment, the Russians were not at all pleased. They even brought considerable pressure upon me to approve the deal, telling me I had misunderstood what was wanted.

I knew I hadn't misunderstood, and wasn't able to figure out their attitude. I finally told them that if they bought these hoists, they would have to act on their own responsibility, and that I would see to it that my contrary advice got on to the record. Only after I had made this statement did they drop the proposal.

The incident left a bad taste in my mouth. Either these Russians were too proud to admit that they had overlooked this obvious substitution in the specifications, or there was some kind of personal reason involved. It might very well be graft, I thought. If I had not discovered the substitution of cast-iron in the specifications, the commission could have gone back to Moscow and showed how successful they had been in beating down prices for the mine hoists.

At the same time, they would have paid out money for a lot of worthless cast-iron, and it would have been possible for the German concerns to pay over substantial sums privately in graft.

But I had done my duty, and the purchase had not gone through. The commission had purchased the right kind of hoists in the end, and no harm was done. I decided to say nothing about the matter to anybody.

The incident left my mind, and did not come back to me until after I had gone home on sick leave in the spring of 1932. Soon after my return to Moscow, I was informed that the copper mines at Kalata were in very bad condition; production had fallen even lower than it was before I had reorganized the mines in the previous year. This report dumbfounded me; I couldn't understand how matters could have become so bad in this short time, when they had seemed to be going so well before I left.

Serebrovsky asked me to go back to Kalata to see what could be done. When I reached there, I found a depressing scene. The Americans had all finished their two-year contracts, which had not been renewed, so they had gone home. A few months before I arrived, the Communist manager, who had learned something of mining under my direction, had been removed by a commission which had been sent in from Sverdlovsk, Communist headquarters in the Urals. The commission had reported that he was ignorant and inefficient, although there was nothing in his record to show it, and had appointed the chairman of the investigating commission to succeed him – a funny sort of procedure.

During my previous stay at the mines we had speeded up capacity of the blast furnaces to seventy-eight metric tons per square meter per day; they had now been permitted to drop back to their old output of forty to forty-five tons. Worst of all, thousands of tons of high-grade ore had been irretrievably lost by the introduction into two mines of methods which I had specifically warned against during my previous visit.

We American engineers had evolved for some of the mines at Kalata a more productive system of working the stopes, and had managed to introduce it in spite of the persistent opposition of Russian engineers. We knew, however, that this method could not safely be applied to the remaining mines, and I had explained why this was true, carefully and at great length, both to the former Communist manager and to the engineers. To make completely certain that the situation was understood, I left instructions in writing when I left, warning against extension of this method.

But I now learned that almost immediately after the American engineers were sent home, the same Russian engineers whom I had warned about the danger, had applied this method in the remaining mines, with the result that the mines caved in and much ore was lost beyond recovery.

Much discouraged, I set to work to try to recover some of the lost ground. The atmosphere around the place impressed me as unpleasant and unwholesome. The new manager and his engineers were sullen, and made it plain that they wanted little to do with me. The food shortage was at its height in the Urals at this time, and the workmen were in a more ugly mood than I had ever seen them.

Living conditions had been permitted to decline along with production.

I worked as well as I could to get things moving again; but I didn't have seven American engineers and a friendly Communist manager to help me out, as I had before. Then one day I discovered that the new manager was secretly countermanding almost every order I gave. I saw there was no need to stay any longer, and caught the first train I could get back to Moscow. I was so disheartened at that time that I was prepared to resign and leave Russia for good.

When I reached Moscow, I reported exactly what I had discovered at Kalata to Serebrovsky. He brushed aside my resignation and told me I was needed more than ever now, and shouldn't think of leaving. I told him it was no use for me to try to work in Russia, when I could get no co-operation from the men in the mines. "You needn't worry about those men," he said. "They will be attended to."

He started an investigation right away, and in a short time the mine manager and some of the engineers were put on trial for sabotage. The manager got ten years, the maximum prison sentence in Russia, and the engineers lesser terms. The evidence indicated that they had deliberately removed the former manager in order to wreck the mines.

I was satisfied at the time that there was something bigger in all this than the little group of men at Kalata; but I naturally couldn't warn Serebrovsky against prominent members of his own Communist party. It has never been my policy to get mixed up in politics. But I was so sure that something was wrong high up in the political administration of the Ural Mountains that I agreed to stay on in Russia only after Serebrovsky had promised me that I would not be sent back to work in the copper mines of the Urals.

There was another good reason why I had no desire to go back to the Urals. I had gone out one day, during my first visit to Kalata, walking with another American engineer from one mine to another. We stood for a few minutes on a dump of ore near one of the mines, silhouetted against the sky. Suddenly bullets began to whizz past me, and I wasted no time in taking shelter. That was a turbulent period, and it was not uncommon for Soviet officials to be shot at, or even killed, and I didn't suspect that those bullets were intended for me. But as I got to thinking over subsequent events, I began to wonder.

I studied all the information I could get hold of about the trial of the manager and engineers at Kalata. It seemed clear to me at the time that the selection of this commission and their conduct at Kalata traced straight back to the Communist high command in Sverdlovsk, whose members must be charged either with criminal negligence or actual participation in the events which had occurred in these mines. However, the chief secretary of the Communist Party in the Urals, a man named Kabakoff, had occupied this post since 1922, all through the period of great activity in developing the mines and industries of the Urals. For some reason which was never clear to me, he had always commanded the complete confidence of the Kremlin, and was considered so powerful that he was privately described as the "Bolshevik Viceroy of the Urals."

If this man's record was examined, there was nothing to justify the reputation he appeared to have. Under his long rule, the Ural area, which is one of the richest mineral regions in Russia and which was given almost unlimited capital for exploitation, never did produce anything like what it should have done.

This commission at Kalata, whose members later admitted they had come there with wrecking intentions, had been sent directly from this man's headquarters, and yet when this evidence came out at the trial, there was no reflection against Kabakoff. I told some of my Russian acquaintances at the time that it seemed to me there was a lot more going on in the Urals than had yet been revealed, and that it came from somewhere high up.

All these incidents became clearer, so far as I was concerned, after the conspiracy trial in January, 1937, when Piatakoff, together with several of his associates, confessed in open court that they had engaged in organized sabotage of mines, railways, and other industrial enterprises since the beginning of 1931. A few weeks after this trial had ended and Piatakoff had been sentenced to be shot, the chief Party Secretary in the Urals, Kabakoff, who had been a close associate of Piatakoff's, was arrested on charges of complicity in this same conspiracy.

I was particularly interested in that part of Piatakoff's confession which concerned his actions at Berlin in 1931, when he headed the purchasing commission to which I was assigned as technical adviser. It then became clear to me why the Russians around Piatakoff had not been pleased when I discovered that German concerns had substituted cast-iron for light steel in specifications for mine hoists.

Piatakoff testified that anti-Stalin conspirators, headed by Leon Trotsky, the exiled former Commissar of War, needed foreign currency to build up a fund for their work abroad. Inside Russia, with so many conspirators occupying important positions, he said it was easy to get funds, but Soviet paper money was no good abroad. Trotsky's son, Sedoff, according to Piatakoff, therefore worked out a scheme to get foreign currency without arousing suspicion.

At his trial, Piatakoff testified that he met Sedoff in Berlin in 1931 by previous arrangement in a restaurant near the Zoo. He added; "Sedoff said that only one thing was required of me, namely, that I should place as many orders as possible with two German firms, and that he, Sedoff, would arrange to receive the necessary sums from them, bearing in mind that I would not be particularly exacting as to prices."

Questioned by the prosecutor, Piatakoff added that he was not required to steal or divert Soviet money, but only to place as many orders as possible with the firms mentioned. He said that he made no personal contacts of any kind with these firms, but that the matter was arranged by others without any further action on his part than throwing business to them.

Piatakoff testified: "It was done very simply, particularly since I had very many opportunities, and a fairly large number of orders went to those firms." He added that it was easy to act without arousing suspicion in the case of one firm because the firm itself had a fine reputation, and it was simply a question of paying slightly higher prices than were necessary.

The following testimony then was given at the trial:

Piatakoff: But as regards the other firm, it was necessary to persuade and exercise pressure in order to have purchases placed with this firm.

Prosecutor: Consequently, you also paid this firm excessively at the expense of the Soviet Government?

Piatakoff: Yes.

Piatakoff then went on to say that Sedoff did not tell him exactly what the conditions were, what the technique was for this transfer of money, but assured him that if Piatakoff placed orders with these firms, Sedoff would receive money for the special fund.

This passage in Piatakoff's confession is a plausible explanation, in my opinion, of what was going on in Berlin in 1931, when my suspicions were aroused because the Russians working with Piatakoff tried to induce me to approve the purchase of mine hoists which were not only too expensive, but would have been useless in the mines for which they were intended. I had found it hard to believe that these men were ordinary grafters, as they did not seem to be the kind interested in feathering their own nests. But they had been seasoned political conspirators before the Revolution, and had taken risks of the same degree for the sake of their so-called cause.

Of course, I have no way of knowing whether the political conspiracy mentioned in all confessions at this trial was organized as the prisoners said it was. I never attempted to follow the ins and outs of political disputes in Russia, and wouldn't have known what anti-Government conspirators were talking about if they had tried to drag me into their affairs, which none of them ever did.

But I am absolutely sure that something queer was taking place at Berlin in 1931, during the period mentioned by Piatakoff at his trial. I have already said that my experiences at that time puzzled me for years, and that I couldn't figure out any sensible explanation until I read Piatakoff's testimony in the Moscow newspapers at the time of his trial.

Another part of this testimony that some Moscow journalists found it hard to believe was that German firms should give commissions to Sedoff. But I have already mentioned in an earlier chapter that Russian emigres were in the habit of collecting commissions from German firms for using their alleged influence to throw Soviet business in their direction. The managers of these German firms might consider that Sedoff was simply another Russian emigre, and would make the same kind of a deal with him that I know they had been making for years with other emigres.

In such cases, it was the usual procedure for German firms merely to figure the promised commissions into their prices, and if the Russians accepted the prices nothing more was necessary. But in the case of these mine hoists, the commission must have been put so high that the firm had to juggle the specifications in order to clear its profit. When they did this, my attention was attracted and the deal was blocked. Piatakoff testified that he had to exert pressure to have some orders passed, and I have told how pressure was put on me.

The testimony at this trial aroused a great deal of skepticism abroad and among foreign diplomats at Moscow. I talked with some Americans there who believed it was a frame-up from beginning to end. Well, I didn't attend the trial, but I did follow the testimony very closely, and it was printed verbatim in several languages. A great deal of the testimony about industrial sabotage sounded more probable to me than it did to some of the Moscow diplomats and correspondents. I know from my own experiences that a good deal of industrial sabotage was going on all the time in Soviet mines, and that some of it could hardly have occurred without the complicity of highly placed Communist managers.

My story is valuable, so far as this trial is concerned, only as regards the incident at Berlin. I have described what that was, and how, to me, Piatakoff's confession cleared up what had happened.

(In Search of Soviet Gold, John D. Littlepage, pp. 94-104) (IMG)

The Pyatakov-Radek group, which had the backing of the MI6 agent Trotsky, carried out the industrial sabotage in the USSR, and for this they were later tried and purged in the late 1930s. In a formerly classified letter to Washington, George Kennan – the well-known Cold War hawk and US diplomat to the USSR – referred to the purge:

of Pyatakov, former Assistant Commissar for Heavy Industry; Karl Radek, famous journalist and publicist; Sokolnikov, formerly Ambassador in England and subsequently Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs and Commissar for the Timber Industry; and L. P. Serebryakov, a prominent Party official who had held important posts in the Government apparatus, including at one time that of Assistant People's Commissar for Ways of Communication. (861.00/11675, Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union, George Kennan, Moscow, February 13, 1937, In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, 1933–1939. Office of the Historian, p. 362) (IMG)

The activities of the Pyatakov-Radek group went on, with the rise to power of the Nazis in Germany. The Nazi Germans had the backing of the MI6 and thus many Trotskyite agents of the MI6 also began working for Nazi Germany's secret service. The claim that the Pyatakov-Radek group were intelligence agents of Nazi Germany was, according to Kennan, very 'plausible':

Let us start first with the small fry among the defendants, who were accused of espionage, sabotage, et cetera. Some of these were quite probably guilty of a great deal. While the wrecking acts to which they confessed in open court did not all seem very convincing, the espionage connections are plausible enough. It is probable that they had on their consciences certain espionage activities in connection with military industries, which were the real cause of the death sentences. (861.00/11675, Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union, George Kennan, Moscow, February 13, 1937, In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, 1933–1939. Office of the Historian, p. 364) (IMG)

In the footnote of that document, Kennan stated that the connections of the accused to the intelligence service of the Third Reich was 'almost inevitable':

A number of the plants in which these men were employed were chemical plants, said to have been built largely by German engineers. Under these circumstances, espionage – in the Soviet sense – is almost inevitable. (861.00/11675, Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union, George Kennan, Moscow, February 13, 1937, In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, 1933–1939. Office of the Historian, p. 364) (IMG)

Kennan seems to have used the term 'in the Soviet sense' in order to ridicule the Soviet judicial procedures. Kennan was likely implying that the employees were providing information to the German technicians for the purpose of the construction or operation of chemical plants, not for other

purposes. To respond to his point, the following needs to be said: first of all, yes, the German intelligence officers could penetrate Soviet territory under the cover of 'technicians' and sensitive intelligence material could be provided to them by citizens of the USSR under the cover of 'cooperating' with the 'technicians'. Secondly, Kennan himself acknowledged previously that the defendants likely truly had an intention to carry out espionage for Nazi Germany.

Also, during the trial, Kennan noted, along with the accused:

on the defendants' benches, there was a somewhat motley company of other accused persons. These included four other fairly well-known Trotskiists: Muralov, Drobniis, Boguslavski and Livshits, and nine lesser lights. (861.00/11675, Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union, George Kennan, Moscow, February 13, 1937, In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, 1933–1939. Office of the Historian, p. 384) (IMG)

Although he did not fully agree with the verdict of the Moscow trials, Kennan nevertheless acknowledged that at least 'some of' the above four Trotskyite defendants – Muralov, Drobniis, Boguslavski, and Livshit – were 'evidently spies and stool pigeons':

The fact that some of these lesser defendants — evidently spies and stool pigeons — were people whom Radek and the other leading defendants had obviously never seen before in their lives, caused little surprise among the public. (861.00/11675, Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union, George Kennan, Moscow, February 13, 1937, In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, 1933–1939. Office of the Historian, p. 362) (IMG)

The British intelligence agent Grigori Tokaev suggested that firstly, Pyatakov indeed was a criminal and that the Prosecution's statements about him – that he was a saboteur and foreign agent – were factual; secondly, that, by the time of his trials, Pyatakov was no longer a believer in Trotsky's theories; and thirdly that the only reason why he confessed was that he felt shame for his Trotskyite past – he did not confess because of supposed 'torture' (in the USSR, the interrogators were strictly banned from any physical harm on the prisoners. See chapter). Tokaev wrote:

Piatakov ... said, 'I have waived my right to a speech in my defence because the Prosecution is right in its statement of the facts, and in its estimation of my crime. But I cannot reconcile myself to one assertion made by the State Prosecutor, namely, that even now I am a Trotskyite. Yes, I was a Trotskyite for many years; but my only motive for the statements I have made at this trial, was the desire, even now, even when it is too late, to get rid of my loath-some Trotskyite past.'

Nobody acquainted with Piatakov's work could seriously doubt that he was speaking the truth.

(Comrade X, Grigori Tokaev, p. 66) (IMG)

As stated previously, the Trotskyites in the USSR came into the service of Nazi German intelligence, and not just the MI6. The Trotskyites outside the USSR too established intelligence ties to Nazi Germany, promoting Hitler's cause against the USSR. This makes sense since the MI6 at the time was supporting the growth of Nazi Germany against the USSR. The pro-Nazi sentiment was even reflected in Trotsky's writings. During the Dewey Commission hearings, Trotsky claimed that he wrote articles in 1933 denouncing Hitler's real plans and stating that it would not be correct to believe that good relations with Hitler are possible:

TROTSKY: I didn't try to provoke a war. But I showed in my writings how the Soviet bureaucracy in their hopes to remain in good relations with Hitler were absolutely wrong. Then I wrote in the French press in 1933 or 1934 – I wrote a series of articles in the bourgeois press denouncing the genuine plans of Hitler.

(The Case of Leon Trotsky: Report of Dewey Commission, 9th Session) (IMG)

Yet again, Trotsky was blatantly lying, for it was he who promoted the British policy of support for Hitler, the warmonger whom Trotsky boldly hailed as a 'pacifist'. In line with the British intelligence service, which supported Hitler's war to contain Soviet power, Trotsky portrayed Hitler as a force for good. In a 1933 article titled 'Hitler the Pacifist', Trotsky really had the audacity to write:

Hitler wants peace. (Hitler the Pacifist, Leon Trotsky, November 23, 1933. MIA) (IMG)

Unless otherwise stated, all the British intelligence service sources thus far have been anti-communists. However, there was a British secret service officer named James Klugmann, who probably was an anti-communist at heart, but at the time, at least pretended to be a supporter of the USSR. As a 'pro-Soviet' MI6 operative, he also had suspicious ties to the anti-Soviet MI6 spy Tito. Hence Klugmann's testimony against Trotsky would be somewhat biased, but certainly not useless. Klugmann recalled:

In Mussolini's Italy of the 1930s, when it meant long terms of imprisonment, and perhaps torture or even death, to be in any way connected with the Communist Party, and when not only all the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, but the works of all Italian and foreign democrats and progressives were strictly banned from Italian libraries and bookshops, the works of Trotsky, on the 'new kind of Communism', were 'freely' and widely translated and distributed. I remember vividly how in 1938, passing through Italy on the way to meet the anti-fascist and Communist students of Belgrade University, and spending a few hours in Mussolini's Milan, the word 'Communism' caught my eye on a number of books prominently displayed in a bookshop window. They were newly-translated works of Trotsky. (From Trotsky to Tito, Chapter 4, Marxist Internet Archive, James Klugman, 1951) (IMG)

The ties of the MI6 agent Trotsky to Mussolini was not surprising since Mussolini too was an MI6 spy. The British newspaper 'The Guardian' reported:

Documents reveal Italian dictator got start in politics in 1917 with help of £100 weekly wage from MI5. ('Recruited by MI5: the name's Mussolini. Benito Mussolini', The Guardian, Tom Kington, October 13, 2009) (IMG)

Archived documents have revealed that Mussolini got his start in politics in 1917 with the help of a £100 weekly wage from MI5.

For the British intelligence agency, it must have seemed like a good investment. Mussolini, then a 34-year-old journalist, was not just willing to ensure Italy continued to fight alongside the allies in the first world war by publishing propaganda in his paper. He was also willing to send in the boys to "persuade" peace protesters to stay at home.

Mussolini's payments were authorised by Sir Samuel Hoare, an MP and MI5's man in Rome, who ran a staff of 100 British intelligence officers in Italy at the time.

('Recruited by MI5: the name's Mussolini. Benito Mussolini', The Guardian, Tom Kington, October 13, 2009) (IMG)

It remains irrefutable though that Trotsky was an agent of fascism. To get a glimpse into Trotsky's pro-fascist views, here is a case: in a 1939 article for the 'Socialist Appeal' magazine, Trotsky wrote:

Being an irreconcilable opponent not only of fascism but also of the present-day Comintern, I am at the same time decidedly against the suppression of either of them. (Why I Agreed to Appear Before the Dies Committee, Leon Trotsky, March 11, 1939. MIA) (IMG)

Trotsky also claimed that the 'German soldiers ... will in the majority of cases have far more sympathy for the vanquished peoples than for their own ruling caste':

The armies of occupation must live side by side with the conquered peoples; (...). The German soldiers, that is, the workers and peasants, will in the majority of cases have far more sympathy for the vanquished peoples than for their own ruling caste. The necessity to act at every step in the capacity of "pacifiers" and oppressors will swiftly disintegrate the armies of occupation, infecting them with a revolutionary spirit. (On the Future of Hitler's Armies, Marxist Internet Archive, Leon Trotsky, August 1940) (IMG)

It is true that agitation among those German soldiers who came from proletarian backgrounds against the Nazi regime would have been relatively easier. Furthermore, it is true that the class struggles of the fascist-minded workers against the fascist bourgeoisie is objectively an anti-fascist struggle despite the fascistic mindset of the workers involved; such class struggles sow division in the camp of the fascists and hence undermine the fascists, despite the genuinely pro-fascist intentions of those workers. Hence, even if some of Nazi Germany's proletarians loved Hitler, that does not mean that those Nazi German workers could not unintentionally become an anti-Nazi fifth column through their class struggles against the Nazi bourgeoisie, even if such class struggles are for some relatively minor economic rights and some additional welfare benefits. This fact has to be taken into account for it is of tremendous value from a strategic perspective; it is helpful in fomenting discontent and sowing division in the fascist camp, undermining the fascist army from the rear through agitation for such class struggles. However, Trotsky was not arguing such; rather he was saying that the German soldiers would as a matter of supposed 'fact', have sympathy for the people whom they helped conquer – this remark by Trotsky was obviously not true and served as blatant attempt by Trotsky to whitewash the Nazi German occupation forces. One needs not mention the fact that actually, the German peasants, in vast contrast to the German proletarians, were vehemently pro-Nazi and Hitlerian.

When communists or progressive bourgeois-democrats were suppressed under the Fascist regime of Mussolini, the MI6 fascist agent Trotsky roamed freely in the streets of Italy. In his 1960 memoirs, Max Shachtman – Trotsky's 'commissar of foreign affairs', close friend, and co-traveller – recalled his and Trotsky's journey to Fascist Italy, in which the Fascist police welcomed 'Signor Trotsky as a great military commander'. Shachtman wrote:

By the time we got to Naples [Italy] where the ship docked briefly the secret was out. All the newspapers of Europe carried the stories, most of them garbled. The fascist police came aboard, and I must say they, too, were the height of correctness and propriety. Their commander was a young fascist dressed in the standard black fascist uniform, and he assured me, as commissar of foreign affairs for Trotsky, that there would be no incidents whatsoever, that Signor Trotsky and his lady would be perfectly guarded and accorded all the honors of a statesman. I remember he told me "we in Italy honor Signor Trotsky as a great military commander."

And there were no incidents in Naples, you may be sure.

(The Trotsky I knew, Workers' Liberty Website (Trotskyist), Max Shachtman, early 1960s. MIA) (IMG)

Shachtman's remarks have been corroborated extensively. Indeed, Trotsky's visit to Italy became a subject of Western reportage, from The Stanford Daily to the New York Times to the Life Magazine. Trotsky temporarily moved out of his central intelligence base in Prinkipo/Buyukada and traveled to Fascist Italy, remaining under Fascist blackshirt police protection there.

(Leon Trotsky in Italy, The Stanford Daily, December 5, 1932)

TROTSKY GOES TO ITALY.

France Permits Him to Leave on Train as Wife Is Ill.

MARSEILLES, France, Dec. 7 (AP).—Leon Trotsky, his wife, and members of the party that accompanied him on a brief visit to Copenhagen, left today by train for the Franco-Italian border on the way back to Turkey.

This morning the former Bolshevik leader refused to make the trip from here by sea, asserting that Mme. Trotsky was too ill to stand the fourteen-day voyage to Istanbul. The Ministry of the Interior granted permission for him to go by rail.

The New York Times
Published: December 8, 1932

Trotsky, in Naples, Denies Making Up With Stalin

By The Associated Press.

NAPLES, July 22.—Leon Trotsky denied reports of a possible reconciliation with Joseph Stalin as he arrived here today aboard the steamer Bulgaria.

Mr. Trotsky said he would proceed with his five aides to Genoa tonight en route to Marseilles or Corsica in order to take a health cure for his ailing heart. He declined the privilege of debarking here, but Mrs. Trotsky enjoyed a shopping tour.

The former Russian leader's secretary was described to port authorities as a Pole traveling on an American passport.

(TROTSKY GOES TO ITALY, New York Times, December 8, 1932, retrieved from the archives)
(‘Trotsky, in Naples, Denies Making Up With Stalin’, The Associated Press, July 22) (IMG)

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(right) and Trotsky Lenin's death in 1924.

9 Trotsky (arrow), still War Commissar, reviews Red Army in 1924 from Lenin's wooden tomb. Decline begins soon.


10 His exile begins in Grand Vizier's house near Constantinople in 1929. Suspicious fire destroyed it and Trotsky's manuscripts.

11 He stops briefly at Naples, Italy, to see Roman ruins on his first parole from exile in Turkey.

(Blood Murder Ends Great Revolutionary Career of Leon Trotsky, LIFE Magazine, September 2, 1940, p. 20)

There has also been an archival video published online by the Critical Past, a media center which archives old videos. Some screenshots of this video are provided as follows, marked by me using red texts and arrows so to assist the reader in identifying Trotsky and the Fascist Police. Worthy of note is that the man without a hat walking to the right of Trotsky in these images is none other than Max Shachtman. Trotsky is accompanied by the black-coated Italian Fascist police officer.





(‘Former Soviet leader Leon Trotsky, in exile visits ruins of ancient Roman sites with other dignitaries in Naples, Italy’, HD Stock Footage, Critical Past, March 31, 2014) (IMG)

To make Trotsky’s roaming in Italy appear as normal, some critics would raise the objection that Maxim Gorki too went to Fascist Italy and did not get arrested. What these critics fail to account for, however, is that Gorki had the strict diplomatic protection of the USSR, meaning that if any harm was inflicted upon him, an entire state – the USSR – could rush in to confront the Italians; much like how Dimitrov was released from Nazi jails thanks to Soviet diplomatic pressure. Trotsky – while covertly having Britain, Fascist Italy, and Nazi Germany behind him – did not officially have any state behind him. When this fact is taken into account, Trotsky’s free roaming in Italy, not to mention the praise of the Fascist police for him, are all indications of collusion with the Italian Fascist authorities.

Had Trotsky been arrested by the Italian Fascists though, that would not have made him any less of a traitor either, since secret services sometimes protect their agents under the cover of arresting them, get them to pass off intelligence to the secret service under the cover of ‘interrogating’ them, present them as ‘heroic’ ‘victims’ of and ‘resistors’ against the secret service through covertly leaking the false information of having ‘brutally’ ‘tortured’ them, and get them to infiltrate back to their movement under the pretense that they ‘escaped’ from prison. None of that is to make the utterly baseless argument that all cases of torture, prison breaks, arrests, etc. have been and are fake; however, it is to say that when highly suspicious elements or known agents of imperialism, such as Trotsky himself, would get ‘arrested’ by imperialist intelligence services, there is a good chance that the ‘arrest’ is just a secret service game being played.

While Trotsky was developing his networks outside the Soviet Union, he was also further strengthening his network of alliance with the right-opportunist conspirators inside the USSR, the Bukharin network. Outwardly, they continued to denounce each other, since they belonged to the opposite poles of the political spectrum; behind the scenes, more than ever before, they collaborated for undermining the communist faction and the blue-collar contingent which had promoted Stalin to the post of the General Secretary. Evidence to this fact is in the secret letter sent by Leon Trotsky to his son Leon Sedov. In the words of the prominent Trotskyite author with extensive access to the archives of Trotsky’s writings in Harvard University, there was:

an undated letter in German from Trotsky to Sedov, the content of which enables it to be dated towards the end of 1932, in the October or November. (The “Bloc” of the Oppositions against Stalin in the USSR in 1932, Pierre Broue, January 1980. Marxists Internet Archive.) (IMG)

In that letter, Trotsky stated:

The proposal for a bloc seems to me to be perfectly acceptable. I stress that we are dealing with a bloc and not a fusion. (Document No. 2: The Letter from Trotsky to Leon Sedov, Library of Harvard College 13905c and 1010. In: 'The "Bloc" of the Oppositions against Stalin in the USSR in 1932', Pierre Broue, Marxists Internet Archive, January 1980) (IMG)

Trotsky added:

One fights repression by means of anonymity and conspiracy, not by silence. (Document No. 2: The Letter from Trotsky to Leon Sedov, Library of Harvard College 13905c and 1010. In: 'The "Bloc" of the Oppositions against Stalin in the USSR in 1932', Pierre Broue, Marxists Internet Archive, January 1980) (IMG)

In the letter, Trotsky also made it clear that the bloc of the right-opportunists and the Trotskyite left would outwardly appear as 'mercilessly' resisting and critical towards one another, despite the behind-the-scenes collaboration. Indeed, Trotsky wrote:

The bloc does not exclude mutual criticism. Any propaganda by the allies on behalf of the capitulators (Grünstein, etc.) will be inexorably, mercilessly resisted by us. (Document No. 2: The Letter from Trotsky to Leon Sedov, Library of Harvard College 13905c and 1010. In: 'The "Bloc" of the Oppositions against Stalin in the USSR in 1932', Pierre Broue, Marxists Internet Archive, January 1980) (IMG)

Despite criticizing one another though, the main target was the moderate faction of the CPSU, the faction devoid of left- and right-deviations, the faction supporting Stalin's line. Trotskyite extremists accused this moderate faction of being too 'liberal' and 'right-wing' whereas the Bukharinite liberalizers accused this faction of being too extreme and 'left-deviationist'. Soviet power faced a pincer assault.

Trotsky's son Leon Sedov said:

Before everything else we have to drive out the present leadership and get rid of Stalin [because] nothing but their liquidation can bring victory. (The "Bloc" of the Oppositions against Stalin in the USSR in 1932, Marxists Internet Archive, Pierre Broue, January 1980) (IMG)

Trotsky himself admitted that Leon Sedov was actively seeking to 'hunt' tourists and Soviet students and to get them (i.e. bribe-and-blackmail them) to join the Trotskyite intelligence service fighting against the Soviet Union:

During the first years of emigration he engaged in a vast correspondence with Oppositionists in the USSR. But by 1932 ... [it] became necessary to seek fresh information through devious channels. Leon was always on the lookout, avidly searching for connecting threads with Russia, hunting up returning tourists, Soviet students assigned abroad, or sympathetic functionaries in the foreign representations. To avoid compromising his informant, he chased for hours through the streets of Berlin and later of Paris to evade the GPU spies who trailed him. ('LEON SEDOV: Son, Friend, Fighter', Leon Trotsky, 1938. MIA) (IMG)

Trotsky approved of eliminating Stalin, but opposed using it as a slogan, because the 'internal Thermidoreans' – the right-wing concentrated around Bukharin – were sometimes going to attack the Stalin faction, and the Trotskyite left-deviation, while covertly allied to the Bukharinite right-deviation, nonetheless had to attack the 'Thermidorean' right on the overt level and to side with the Stalin faction:

Trotsky opened the discussion about whether the slogan, "Get Rid of Stalin", was appropriate on 17 October. "Get Rid of Stalin", he wrote, "is correct in a well-defined, concrete sense", but contrary to the "allies" and the "right-wingers", he did not think it an appropriate one. In fact, he wrote that this slogan would not be dangerous "if we were strong". But did it not risk being supported by the émigrés, by the Mensheviks and by the "internal Thermidoreans"? He went on: "It is always possible that in a few months Stalin will be obliged to defend himself against the Thermidorean pressure, and that we shall be obliged to support him momentarily". Indeed, "this stage is not yet past and, consequently, this slogan does not correspond to the needs of the movement". (The "Bloc" of the Oppositions against Stalin in the USSR in 1932, Marxists Internet Archive, Pierre Broue, January 1980) (IMG)

Bukharin's group agreed. As already stated several times, Bukharin sought to overthrow the Soviet state and sought to make common cause Kamenev as early as 1928. Before then, he had established covert links to Trotsky's group. Furthermore, according to a book published by the CIA's 'Hoover Institute':

There is even evidence that Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomsky had, in desperation, decided they had no choice but to kill Stalin, whom they had come to consider the next Genghis Khan. ('The Lost Politburo Transcripts: From Collective Rule to Stalin's Dictatorship', The Hoover Institute, Paul Gregory, Norman Naimark, p. 103) (IMG)

For instance:

the Swiss Communist Jules Humbert-Droz, who supported the "Rightists," recalled Bukharin telling him that "they had decided to use individual terror to get rid of Stalin." (The Lost Politburo Transcripts: From Collective Rule to Stalin's Dictatorship. The Hoover Institute on War, Revolution, and Peace. p. 103) (IMG)

Tomsky, a Bukharinite leader of the labour unions, tried to intimidate the Soviet leader by mentioning that the workers will murder him:

Tomsky, for example, told Stalin to his face that workers wanted to murder him. At a party barbecue in Sochi in 1928, Stalin and Tomsky's wife were grilling shashlik together when a "completely loaded" Tomsky walked up and whispered into Stalin's ear, "Soon our workers will start shooting at you, they will." (The Lost Politburo Transcripts: From Collective Rule to Stalin's Dictatorship. The Hoover Institute on War, Revolution, and Peace. p. 103)

Trotsky was forming a Trotskyite bloc with two major left-opportunist figures Zinoviev and Kamenev who:

were expelled in October 1932 at the very moment when the discussions with the Trotskyists were developing. Officially, they were criticized [by the Soviet leadership] for having failed to denounce certain oppositional activities, which the so-called Riutin-Slepov Group had been carrying on over several months.... (The "Bloc" of the Oppositions against Stalin in the USSR in 1932, Marxists Internet Archive, Pierre Broue, January 1980) (IMG)

On July 11, 1928 Bukharin had a secret meeting with Kamenev, organized by Sokolnikov. In that meeting, Bukharin said:

I, Rykov, Tomsky, Uglanov – the *pitertsy* ["Petersburgers," i.e. the Leningraders] are in general with us, but they got scared when talk turned to possibly replacing Stalin, so Komarov disavowed Stetsky's speech, but that night Ugarov came running to me to apologize for Komarov. Andreev is with us. They're removing him from the Urals. Stalin has bought off the Ukrainians by removing Kaganovich from [his post] there. We have great potential strength but (1) the average Central Committee member still doesn't understand the depth of our disagreements; (2) there is great fear of a schism, which is why Stalin's retreat on extraordinary measures has made our attack on

him more difficult. We don't want to act as schismatics, because then they'll smash us. But Tomsy in his last speech at the plenum demonstrated clearly that Stalin is the schismatic. Yagoda and Trilisser are with us. There are 150 cases of such small uprisings. (...). Our task is to gradually clarify the catastrophic role of Stalin and bring the average Central Committee member to support his removal.... (The Kirov Murder and Soviet History, Yale University Press, Matthew Lenoe) (IMG)

And as mentioned before, Bukharin had intelligence ties to the Riutin group; one of the key liaison agents linking Bukharin to Riutin was Uglanov, who was a member of both Bukharin's entourage and the Riutin death squad.

In his letter to Leon Sedov, Trotsky also approved of intelligence cooperation with the other members of the terrorist Trotskyite-Bukharinite bloc against the Soviet state:

How is the bloc going to express itself? For the moment, principally by the exchange of information. The allies keep us informed about what concerns the Soviet Union, as we do for them about what concerns the Communist International. We should agree on very precise arrangements for correspondence.

The allies must send us correspondence for the Bulletin. The editors of the Bulletin undertake to publish the documents of the allies. But it reserves the right to comment freely upon them.

(The letter from Trotsky to Leon Sedov, Document No. 2. In: 'The "Bloc" of the Oppositions against Stalin (Appendix), Pierre Broue. MIA) (IMG)

Hence, the terrorist bloc members inside the USSR were to spy for the MI6 agent Trotsky and Trotsky was to in turn feed them with information with anti-Soviet opposition outside USSR in order to assist in the coordination of efforts against the Soviet state. Embarrassing information from inside the USSR was to be fed to Trotsky's media so to depict the USSR in a negative light.

In order to confront the Stalin faction in the Central Committee more easily, the Bukharinites saw fit to pretend to have 'differences' with Riutin as well. In a manner comparable to the 'humanitarian interventionist' agents of the American secret service who 'criticize' American imperialists for the latter's inability to directly involve in imperialist wars, the Riutin group 'criticized' Bukharin for not being able to combat the Stalin faction of the Party. The point of such criticism was to radicalize the younger Bukharinite intellectuals into a more militant action against the Soviet state, without waiting for Bukharin to cause reforms from the top; through such incitement of radical action, Bukharin's leverage in his political confrontations with the Stalin faction would have been strengthened. Hence the criticism of Bukharin benefited Bukharin in this context. Indeed, the Riutin platform, which criticized the Bukharin group for not standing up to the Stalin faction as strongly, was to strengthen both Trotsky's and Bukharin's influence over the Party. The Riutin platform also called for reduced investments into heavy industry, thereby unofficially advocating the weakening of the USSR's military-industrial backbone, and an opposition to the collectivization of agriculture:

Ryutin, with the help of Slepkov and other young Bukharinites, produced a long theoretical and political document.... (...). It censured Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomsy for their capitulation. It proposed an economic retreat, the reduction of investment in industry, and the liberation of the peasants by freedom to quit the kolkhozes. As a first step in the restoration of democracy in the Party, it urged the immediate readmission of all those expelled, including Trotsky. (The Great Terror: A Reassessment, Oxford University Press, Robert Conquest, 1990, pp. 23-24) (IMG)

The Riutin platform also called for:

the elimination of Stalin.... (The "Bloc" of the Oppositions against Stalin in the USSR in 1932, Marxists Internet Archive, Pierre Broue citing Serge and Bukharin, January 1980) (IMG)

The MI6 agent Conquest wrote:

It was even more notable for its severe condemnation of Stalin personally. Its fifty pages devoted to this theme called forcefully for his removal from the leadership. It described Stalin as "the evil genius of the Russian Revolution, who, motivated by a personal desire for power and revenge, brought the Revolution to the verge of ruin." Ryutin saw, far more clearly than his seniors in the opposition, that there was no possibility of controlling Stalin. It was a question either of submission or of revolt. (The Great Terror: A Reassessment, Oxford University Press, Robert Conquest, 1990, pp. 23-24) (IMG)

On the other hand,:

Zinoviev and Kamenev were expelled in October 1932 at the very moment when the discussions with the Trotskyists were developing. Officially, they were criticized [by the Soviet leadership] for having failed to denounce certain oppositional activities, which the so-called Riutin-Slepkov Group had been carrying on over several months.... (The "Bloc" of the Oppositions against Stalin in the USSR in 1932, Marxists Internet Archive, Pierre Broue, January 1980) (IMG)

It was for failing to denounce the existence or the circulation of this manifesto – which did circulate, according to our evidence, in the factories in Moscow and elsewhere – that Zinoviev and Kamenev were officially excluded from the Party again in 1932. (The "Bloc" of the Oppositions against Stalin in the USSR in 1932, Marxists Internet Archive, Pierre Broue citing Serge and Bukharin, January 1980) (IMG)

In a telegraph to the US Secretary of State, Loy Henderson, the US diplomatic official in Moscow, acknowledged:

Zinoviev and Kamenev and other prominent defendants have had conversations regarding the advisability of assassinating Stalin and regarding their course of action in case of his death. (The Charge in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, August 27, 1936 – noon [Received 2 PM]) (IMG)

For the conquest of power, the Trotskyite-Bukharinite network, as the agents of the comprador classes in the USSR, needed command over the means of violence, the military and the intelligence services. The Trotskyite-Bukharinite imperialist-fascist fifth column exercised *some* influence over the intelligence service and the military through Yagoda and Tukachevsky respectively. Referring to the conspiracy of the Trotskyite-Bukharinite bloc against the Soviet state, the prominent MI6 operative Fitzroy McLean reasoned:

if, in fact, there had been a conspiracy, what more natural than that the thinkers, the ideologists, should have made common cause with the men of action, Tukachevski, Yagoda? What more natural, too, than that to the Tukachevskis and the Yagodas, finding themselves in positions of great power, should come the idea of using that power for their own ends. Tukachevski was known to admire Napoleon. As a soldier? Or as a man? An officer of the Imperial Army, he had shifted his allegiance quickly enough, when his interests demanded it. Might he not do so again? And Yagoda. In the service of the State he had shown himself utterly ruthless and utterly unscrupulous. Might

he not, with the vast power at his disposal, be tempted to pursue a personal policy? And if he did? Was he not the man who held Stalin's own personal security in his hands? It was an alarming thought.

What more natural, too, than that any potential opponents of the regime should seek, and receive, outside support, among the enemies of the Soviet Union? Some of them had, in the course of their normal duties, had contact with foreigners. Tukachevski, in the old days, had had many dealings with the German General Staff; had been to Paris. Krestinski had been to Berlin, Rakovski to London and Tokio. Rosengolts had lunched and dined at the British Embassy. Had these contacts really been innocent?

And the 'wrecking'? Inefficiency? Or stubbornness? Or malice? Or a combination of all three? In any case a phenomenon which the enemies of the regime, if they knew their job, would be bound to exploit. Something which called for the most ruthless countermeasures. Looking at it like that, it was possible to see how, in the minds of those concerned, if not in reality, the idea of a conspiracy might have grown up.

(Eastern Approaches, Fitzroy McLean, 1949, pp. 115-116) (IMG)

Owing to his leadership of the Red Army during the Civil War, Trotsky had influence over the military. In particular, his key man in the military was his protégé Mikhail Tukhachevsky. During the October Revolution, Trotsky recruited the Tsarist officer Tukhachevsky for the Soviet Red Army as shown in C3S3. On the other hand, the agent of the imperialist-fascist secret services inside the Soviet intelligence service was Yagoda, a Bukharin agent.

Regarding Rakovski, the data about his betrayals is as follows. The MI6 spy Tokaev confirmed in his memoirs:

Rakovsky, one of the big figures of the Revolution, had served the British intelligence service since 1924, and the Japanese since 1934. And so on. All this Bukharin and Rykov had connived at, since they too were foreign agents. (Comrade X, Grigori Tokaev, 1956, p. 87) (IMG)

The British Foreign Office reported that Rakovski definitely became a Japanese spy:

when Rakovski visited Tokyo in the following year he was definitely enrolled in the Japanese intelligence service.... (N 1253/26/38, No. 119, Viscount Chilston to Viscount Halifax – (Received March 11), Moscow, March 8, 1938. Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 318) (IMG)

MI6 operative Fitzroy McLean, the real-life James Bond, reasoned:

Krestinski had been to Berlin, Rakovski to London and Tokio. Rosengolts had lunched and dined at the British Embassy. Had these contacts really been innocent? (Eastern Approaches, Fitzroy McLean, 1949, p. 116) (IMG)

Correlated with and affected by the fight for the material bases upon which the intelligence agents of different class forces relied was the struggle for dominance over the intelligence service itself. Conquer the secret service, the counter-intelligence in particular, and the state will be unable to hunt down infiltrators. The MI6 agent Trotsky had thus planted numerous agents within the Soviet secret service:

Trotsky ... never expressed antagonism to the Cheka's successor services. In fact, when an allegedly disenchanted agent, Yacov Blumkin, visited him in Turkey, Trotsky urged him to remain in his OGPU service for the good of the "workers' state." His references to the Soviet secret services and the security of revolutionary movements proved that Trotsky strongly believed in and supported the Cheka's successor services (although not the extent to which they were under Stalin's personal control). ('LEON TROTSKY, DUPE OF THE NKVD', Rita T. Kronenbitter. In: 'STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE', Vol. 16, No. 1, Special Edition, CIA, 1972, p. 17) (IMG)

Trotsky had plenty of influence in the Cheka since the early days of the revolution:

In many ways Trotsky set the pattern for the early practices of the Soviet secret services. He prescribed the role of the Cheka area leaders attached to the Revolutionary War Councils at the front and gave and carried out recommendations on purges and summary courts. He stipulated the requirements in recruiting Cheka leaders and teams for intelligence assignments against counterrevolutionaries and for Bolshevik propaganda. His field messages to the Politburo dealt with the uses of codes, security of communications, methods of suppressing hostile rumors, and the role of the press in misleading foreign governments and organizations. ('LEON TROTSKY, DUPE OF THE NKVD', Rita T. Kronenbitter. In: 'STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE', Vol. 16, No. 1, Special Edition, CIA, 1972, pp. 16-17) (IMG)

Furthermore, as the reader may recall from C2S9, Trotsky also was the founder of the Red Army counter-intelligence service, meaning that the body that was supposed to filter out the enemy agents that sought to infiltrate the Red Army was already partially compromised. The communist agents of the proletariat dominated the command of the Red Army, which was why the Soviet Union was a dictatorship of the proletariat in the first place, but the Red Army was nevertheless penetrated by fascist agents in its high command.

The picture is not as gloomy in the intelligence service either. At the time, since the Cheka and its successor agencies were headed by Dzerzhinsky and Menzhinsky, the communists had enough influence in the organization to not only weaken the imperialist-fascist fifth column in the Cheka, GPU, NKVD, etc. but to also purge the Red Army itself. Popular support for the socialist state allowed for the socialist state to recruit numerous high-quality intelligence officers who would serve as the soldiers of the intelligence war against the fifth column. The planting of communist or pro-communist intelligence officers in the NKVD allowed it to hunt down even the treasonous chiefs of the NKVD who rose to power after the death of Menzhinsky. The sufficient communist and pro-communist influence in the organization also allowed for the thorough political encirclement of numerous traitors in the NKVD and forced those traitors to support the purges and pursue correct policy lines. Most importantly, the dominance of the Party of the proletariat over the military and the Party's hierarchical supervision of the intelligence service decisively turned the balance of power in the favour of the proletariat at the expense of anti-proletarian agents throughout the Soviet security apparatus.

Though officially having strict command structures, intelligence services do not always function as rigidly enforced command structures in practice. Their command structures are always inherently looser than they appear. Intelligence services function more like networks of agents who work together and who, if finding one another suspicious, spy on each other and try to purge each other. This means that subordinate officers can have the power to purge their superordinates. This is why the NKVD purged its own traitorous chiefs, and in these purges, it obviously had the support of the General Secretary of the Party who bore pressure from above on the NKVD chief to help in the purges of the NKVD chiefs. Indeed Lavrenti Beria confirmed to his son that Beria was under Stalin's intense pressure from above to perform properly:

Stalin had always taken care to have the police apparatus under his personal control. My father had had experience of that in 1938-43. 'I couldn't take a step without being watched by him. I tried to get round that by vigilance but rarely did I succeed, and then at great risk.' (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 242) (IMG) (See Titoist Coup Process – Images 1)

For important historical reasons, Stalin did not succeed in eventually purging Beria; nonetheless, he maintained an intensive level of pressure on the traitorous intelligence chiefs such as Yezhov and to some extent also Yagoda, which was why he was able to assist the other NKVD agents in eventually purging them. The Party of the proletariat, through supervision of the NKVD, was the key factor allowing the Stalin faction to purge the counter-revolutionary agents in that intelligence body.

Anyways, through subverting and neutralizing the counter-intelligence service, the imperialist-fascist fifth column would have rendered the Soviet state defenseless against enemy infiltration. Through control over the intelligence service, the imperialist-fascist fifth column could more easily assassinate the revolutionary elements in the ranks of Red Army and replace these elements with imperialist-fascist moles. The military is a more material factor than the secret service, however. Thus, the ultimate prize to win was not the NKVD but the Red Army – yet, the Trotskyites and Bukharinites lost the battle for control over the Red Army, the ultimate means of violence, and then lost the battle for the NKVD as well.

Bukharin was most fit for conquering the intelligence service on behalf of the comprador classes, the fifth column allied to Anglo-German finance capital. Outwardly, Bukharin had denounced Trotsky and Trotskyism. Under the guise of combatting Trotskyite fifth column, Bukharin could access the NKVD and extend his influence there. Hence he could extend the Bukharinite-Trotskyite network's dominance over the intelligence service, under the guise of combatting Trotskyism. Bukharin's key agent in the NKVD was Yagoda. Indeed, according to the British intelligence official Robert Conquest, who had served in the Information Research Department of the British Foreign Office,:

In Kamenev's memorandum of his conversation with Bukharin on 11 July 1928 Bukharin is represented as saying 'Yagoda and Trilisser [Head of the OGPU Foreign Administration] are with us. (...)' (The Great Terror: Stalin's purge of the thirties, Robert Conquest, 1968, p. 545. square brackets by Robert Conquest)

Quite importantly, Trotsky ordered his agent Krestinsky in the USSR to be an agent of German intelligence. Trotsky's agents in the USSR were agents of Anglo-German secret services. Anti-Soviet British intelligence agent Tokaev recalled:

Further, Trotsky, supposed originally to have inspired the formation of the 'bloc', had long since been linked with the Nazi secret service and – the British intelligence service! On Trotsky's orders, Krestinsky, former Deputy People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs, had been in the German service since 1921. Rozenholz, former People's Commissar of Foreign Trade, joined the British service in 1926 and the German service in 1932. Rakovsky, one of the big figures of the Revolution, had served the British intelligence service since 1924, and the Japanese since 1934. And so on. All this Bukharin and Rykov had connived at, since they too were foreign agents. (Comrade X, Grigori Tokaev, 1956, p. 87) (IMG)

As such, Bukharin, in collaboration with the other enemies of Soviet power, became the head of the pyramid of the comprador agents allied to the imperialist secret services. At the helm of the comprador network in the USSR lied Bukharin, who had laid the complete contingent plan for the overthrow of the Soviet state.

The overthrow of a socialist state, the drive to conquer the means of violence in the dictatorship of the proletariat, requires the elimination or demotion of the agents of the proletariat in the command of the military and intelligence bodies. Through the annihilation of hundreds of agents of the proletariat at the commanding positions, a leap from quantity to quality can occur, whenby the fascist reaction will be able to plant its agents in key positions, as a major step to transform the class character and strategic orientation of a state. Thus, the plan for the overthrow of the USSR included the murder of Stalin as a step, but also had, as part of the conspiracy, the plots to murder other leading communists in the USSR.

Menzhinsky, the head of the Soviet intelligence service OGPU, was loyal to Soviet power, unlike his subordinate Yagoda. Through the murder of the Soviet intelligence chief, Yagoda was able to rise to the official leadership of the Soviet intelligence service. Tadeusz "Thaddeus" Wittlin – an official of the British-led 'Anders Army' and a CIA operative and spy-'journalist' affiliated with the Voice of America (VOA) and Radio Free Europe since the 1950s – wrote that the 'inner circle', the most powerful in the heights of the Soviet state apparatus, knew that Yagoda had murdered Menzhinsky:

Vyacheslav Menzhinsky, who organized OGPU into an independent state within a state ... was a highly educated man and a hardworking official. But, as the inner circle knew, Menzhinsky was poisoned by his Deputy, the little pharmacist Yagoda, who took his place. (Commissar: The Life and death of Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria, Tadeusz 'Thaddeus' Wittlin, 1972, p. 175) (IMG)

In using the phrase 'inner circle', Wittlin was also alluding to the MI6 agent Beria:

Although Beria knew Dzerzhinsky had died of a stroke during a quarrel with Stalin, it was generally understood that Menzhinsky had had a heart condition for several years and was under the constant care of the best physicians attached to the Kremlin.

However, Lavrenty, as a well-informed man, was aware that Menzhinsky's Deputy Yagoda was very ambitious and only too happy to take his boss' place. Yagoda was a pharmacist by profession and, thanks to his knowledge of various drugs and poisons, would have been able to accelerate the failure of his superior's heart.

(Commissar: The Life and death of Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria, Tadeusz 'Thaddeus' Wittlin, 1972, pp. 146-147) (IMG)

In May 1934, Menzhinsky, the head of the Soviet intelligence service, was murdered. As the Soviet security came increasingly under the influence of the Anglo-German agent Bukharin's henchman Yagoda, it was by then easier to reduce the security of people like Kirov. Yagoda, as Trotsky admitted and as will be shown shortly later, aimed to deliberately reduce the personal security of Kirov. This was why, by a few weeks after the murder of Menzhinsky and the conquest of the position of NKVD leadership by Yagoda, the plan for the murder of Kirov was hatched:

During the Zinoviev Trial, the planning of the Kirov murder was said to have taken place in the summer of 1934. (The Great Terror: A Reassessment, Oxford University Press, Robert Conquest, 1990, p. 37) (IMG)

According to the British intelligence agent and veteran anti-Stalinist oppositionist Grigori Tokaev, the assassination of Kirov had long been planned by the anti-Soviet opposition within the Soviet state and Party apparatus:

That a 'Demokratov' existed, I knew. This was one of the undercover names used in my particular underground opposition movement, always reserved for a comrade who had proved his worth in an operation involving great personal risk, and who was therefore entrusted with further hazardous tasks. (...). Demokratov too had been arrested the previous autumn. He was a highly-educated young officer with

wide and important connections. These and his hatred of tyranny had set his course in life. Thus a man who in Great Britain could have counted on a brilliant professional and social career, became an unswerving member of an opposition group which long before Kirov's assassination had been forced to contemplate acts of political terror against both Kirov and Kalinin. (Comrade X, Grigori Tokaev, 1956, p. 2) (IMG)

For what it is worth, the CIA also stated:

Thus, on 1 December 1934, Kirov was killed by one Nikolayev, who was, as the official press stated, one of the members of an active anti-Soviet terrorist organization. (Background on The Execution of Abakumov and the Leningrad Case of 1949, CIA, January 14, 1955, p. 2) (IMG{Titoist Coup})

It is not completely clear if by 'as the official press stated', the CIA meant 'as rightly stated' by the official press or 'according to' the official press. Historically, the security of the Soviet officials fell under the control of the Soviet intelligence service. It is not surprising therefore, that Kirov did not have any guards and Nikolayev, the assassin, was easily allowed into Kirov's office. The British agent Robert Conquest wrote:

Late in the afternoon of 1 December 1934, the young assassin Leonid Nikolayev entered the Smolny, headquarters of the Communist Party in Leningrad. The few hours of the city's thin winter daylight were over, and it was quite dark. The lights of the former aristocratic girls' school, from which Lenin had organized the "ten days that shook the world," shone out over its colonnade and gardens, and eastward up the icy Neva. The outer guard examined Nikolayev's pass, which was in order, and let him in without trouble. In the interior, the guard posts were unmanned, and Nikolayev wandered down the ornate passages until he found the third-floor corridor on to which Sergei Kirov's office opened. He waited patiently outside.

Kirov was at home preparing a report on the November plenum of the Central Committee, from which he had just returned. He was to deliver it to the aktiv of the Leningrad Party in the Tavride Palace that evening, and was not expected at the Smolny. However, he arrived there at about 4:00 P.M., and after speaking to his trusted aide, Leningrad's Second Secretary Mikhail Chudov, and others, he walked on towards his own office just after 4:30. Nikolayev moved from a corner, shot him in the back with a Nagan revolver, and then collapsed beside him.

At the sound of the shot, Party officials came running along the corridor. They were astonished at the absence of guards. Even Kirov's chief bodyguard, Borisov, who according to standing instructions should have been with him, was nowhere to be seen, though he had accompanied Kirov as far as the Smolny's front door.

(The Great Terror: A Reassessment, Oxford University Press, Robert Conquest, 1990, p. 37) (IMG)

That Kirov was murdered by Yagoda's network in the Soviet intelligence service is acknowledged by the MI6 agent Leon Trotsky. In his memoirs, Trotsky admitted that the murder of Kirov, so-called "Stalin's viceroy in Leningrad," "was committed under the auspice of the agents of the GPU by direct order of Yagoda" and that it was a "**fact** that the chief of the GPU, Yagoda, ordered" agents not to prevent the murder:

On 1st December, 1934 Stalin's viceroy in Leningrad, Kirov, was murdered. It was **acknowledged** in later trials that the assassination was committed under the auspice of the agents of the GPU by direct order of Yagoda. In the tops of the bureaucracy there were whisperings to the effect that the 'boss' had begun to play with the heads of his closest collaborators. At first I did not suppose that the GPU had actually killed Kirov.... (...). At the session of the [Third Moscow Trial on] 9th March 1938, Yagoda confessed that he gave his subordinates in Leningrad an order ... "Not to interfere with the terrorist acts against Kirov." Coming from Yagoda, the head of the GPU, such a directive was equivalent to an order for the assassination of Kirov. The **fact** that the chief of the GPU, Yagoda, ordered them not to interfere with the attempt on Kirov's life can only be explained by the fact that Stalin found it necessary at any price to establish his alibi.

(‘Stalin: An Appraisal of the Man and His Influence’, Leon Trotsky. Well Red Publications, Editor & Translator: Alan Woods, 2016, p. 622. Bold added.) (IMG)

Again, Trotsky too, seeking to slander Stalin as the culprit of the Kirov assassination, had claimed falsely that Yagoda was affiliated with the Stalin faction, when in fact the then NKVD chief was an agent of Trotsky's ally, the imperialist-fascist agent Bukharin. Regarding the circumstances of Sergei Kirov's death, the British Foreign Office preliminarily concluded:

The murder of Kirov was accomplished by the Trotskyist-Zinovievite group "on a decision by the Right-Trotskyist *bloc*." Yagoda, informed by Yenukidze of the arrangements made for this murder, undertook to see that no obstacle was placed in the way of it, and instructed his subordinate, Zaporozhets, at Leningrad accordingly. (N 1253/26/38, No. 119, Viscount Chilston to Viscount Halifax – (Received March 11), Moscow, March 8, 1938. Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 319) (IMG)

Another target was Gorky. In contrast to the widespread accusation that Gorky had grown hostile to Stalin, Trotsky himself admitted that Gorky was an "unshakable supporter" of the Stalin faction:

Gorky was an unshakable supporter of Stalin's leadership. Bukharin in his testimony called Gorky a Stalinist, a supporter of the Stalinist policy in the Party. Social gatherings in the evening at Gorky's house were the only place where Stalin would come off his pedestal to some extent. (‘Stalin: An Appraisal of the Man and His Influence’, Leon Trotsky. Well Red Publications, Editor & Translator: Alan Woods, 2016, p. 633) (IMG)

The British Embassy in Moscow preliminarily reported that the counter-revolutionary opposition carried out medical sabotage as means of gradually murdering Gorky and his son Peshkov:

Rykov gave orders to a terrorist group under one Artyemenko to "watch the cars of the heads of the Government and party." (...). After attempting without success, through the intermediary of Tomski and Kamenev, to seduce Gorky from his allegiance to Stalin, the *bloc* resolved at the beginning of 1935 to "liquidate" him, this decision being taken on instructions from Trotsky himself. Yagoda arranged the details of the murder, employing two of the Kremlin doctors, Levin and Pletnyov, his own secretary, Bulanov, and Gorky's secretary, Kryuchkov. As Gorky suffered from a trouble of lungs, it was arranged that he should catch cold and that the two doctors give him the wrong sort of treatment. Kuibyshev was also done away with, on Yagoda's instructions, by Levin, Pletnyov and his own secretary, Maximov, similar methods being employed. (...). Peshkov, the son of Gorky, was also eliminated by Yagoda and the Kremlin doctors Levin, Pletnyov and Vinogradov by means of an intentionally wrong treatment for pneumonia. (N 1253/26/38, No. 119, Viscount Chilston to Viscount Halifax – (Received March 11), Moscow, March 8, 1938. Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 319) (IMG)

Many researchers, including the vehement Russian anti-Soviet investigative journalist and lawyer Arkady Vaksberg, have concluded that Gorky was murdered by Yagoda. Many such researchers implausibly claim that the order for the murder came from Stalin, that Stalin and Gorky had grown hostile to each other, a claim debunked by Trotsky's above-cited confession. Furthermore, Yagoda, not a true comrade of Stalin, was a henchman of Bukharin and was affiliated with the hostile anti-Soviet intelligence network in the NKVD. The MI6 agent Tokaev recalled:

On the same day the first step was taken to bring about the downfall of Yagoda. He was removed from the NKVD, and we lost a strong link in our opposition intelligence service. (Comrade X, Grigori Tokaev, 1956, p. 63) (IMG)

Recall that in the secret meeting with Kamenev in the late 1920s, Bukharin had confirmed that in the fight against the Stalin faction,:

Yagoda and Trilisser are with us. There are 150 cases of such small uprisings. (...). Our task is to gradually clarify the catastrophic role of Stalin and bring the average Central Committee member to support his removal.... (The Kirov Murder and Soviet History, Yale University Press, Matthew Lenoe) (IMG)

Wittlin – the CIA operative affiliated with the Anders Army, VOA, and Radio Free Europe – also clearly implied that Gorky had been murdered by Yagoda:

[T]hanks to his former position as a pharmacist, Yagoda had been named Head of the Toxicological Laboratory at the Kremlin. This enabled him to speed up the death of Lenin, who suffered a lot anyway after three strokes. His knowledge of drugs and poisons continued to help Yagoda in his career and got him the then vacant post of Chief of the OGPU, when his superior, Vyacheslav Menzhinsky, had died suddenly. His knowledge of drugs also proved useful in stopping forever Maxim Gorky's painful tubercular coughing. (Commissar: The Life and death of Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria, Tadeusz 'Thaddeus' Wittlin, 1972, pp. 181-182) (IMG)

Also especially notable in the above paragraph is that Yagoda, the hangman and assassin for Bukharin, had also murdered General-Secretary Vladimir Lenin. Sooner or later, the late General-Secretary would have died anyways. Yet, for years, medical scholars, Trotskyites, as well as the supporters of Soviet power, had all expressed suspicion that Lenin's death may have been deliberately expedited by a band of anti-Soviet assassins. The above-cited quote confirms the suspicion as a fact.

It is worth reminding that the murders of Menzhinsky and Kirov occurred in 1934 whereas the murder of Gorky occurred in 1936. The period 1933-1935 was a period of the consolidation of the hold of the Hitler faction over the German state and the end of what remained of the Rapallo era. The pro-Soviet tendency in Germany was being vigorously rolled back during that period and the fascist agents of German finance capital, backed by British finance capital, were consolidating control over the German military and intelligence bodies, swiftly expanding Germany's might. 1934 was also the year in which the Night of the Long Knives, a Nazi terror campaign against pro-Soviet agents in Germany, occurred. During this period, the Soviet state's security bodies were also bogged down in conditions of war against the kulaks. All of these factors together sharply increased the pressure on the Soviet military and intelligence bodies, forcing them to reallocate resources to confronting the Nazi Germans. Such a reallocation made some of the fronts in the intelligence war, such as the security of key personnel, weaker, making it easier for the fascist agents to conquer commanding positions in the Soviet intelligence and paving the way for the elimination of some of major personnel. In spite of this strategic setback, the Soviet state quickly recovered by 1936. The fight against the kulaks saw the triumph of Soviet power, the military-industrial backbone was expanding, the productive forces were developing and flourishing, and thus the leverage of the Stalin faction was increasing in the intelligence war. More on this will be mentioned later.

While engaging in such suppressive terror operations against Soviet officials affiliated with the communist faction, Yagoda also aimed to launch a provocative terror operation "against" Leon Trotsky. According to this plan, in collaboration with the MI6-backed and Gestapo-backed White Guards, and against the will of Stalin, Yagoda and his band of fascist assassins would make a deliberately-failed assassination attempt against Trotsky which would then make a living "martyr" out of Trotsky while painting the Soviet state as a "terrorist" organization. To sabotage this conspiracy by Yagoda, Stalin contacted his comrades in the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) and leaked the White Guard plot to the press. Trotsky, while continuing to employ his usual anti-Stalin propaganda rhetoric, nonetheless admitted the mentioned facts amidst his lies:

On October 31, 1931, the German newspaper Rote Fahne [Red Flag], the central organ of the late Communist Party, unexpectedly published a report that the White Guard General Turkul, at that time operating in the Balkans, was preparing a terrorist attempt on Trotsky, Gorky, and Litvinov. By the contents of this report, by its tone, and finally by its anonymity, it was completely evident that the information came from the very depths of the GPU. The Soviet press did not breathe a word about this warning, and this still more underlined the highly official source of the information in the German Comintern newspaper. L. D. Trotsky was at that time in exile in Constantinople; Blumkin had already been shot for connections with Trotsky. The question naturally arose: what goal was the GPU pursuing in making this printed warning? Gorky and Litvinov were under the protection of the GPU and did not need any printed warning. That their names had been added only as a cover was obvious to any thinking person even then.

The French and German Bolshevik-Leninists contacted the USSR embassies in France and Germany with written declarations something like this: "If you are reporting a planned attempt on Trotsky, that means you know who is planning it, and where and how it is being planned. We demand from you a united front against White Guard terrorists. We suggest collaboration to work out means of defense." There was no answer. Nor did our French and German comrades expect one. They only needed confirmation of the fact that in making its warning the GPU only wanted to ensure its alibi in advance, and not at all to prevent a terrorist act. The French and German comrades then took their own measures: the guard at Prinkipo was considerably reinforced.

Not long ago, during the Plevitskaya trial, this whole episode floated to the surface again. Commissioner of judicial police Roche, according to the newspaper accounts, testified as follows: "Turkul was once a brave general. ... In documents there are indications that at one time he was planning an attempt on Trotsky... General Turkul was displeased not only with Leon Trotsky. He was also dissatisfied with General Miller." Gorky and Litvinov were not mentioned by Roche. Commissioner of judicial police Pigue testified: "Larionov was entrusted with making an attempt on Trotsky. But General Turkul blabbed. And there wasn't any money. They abandoned the project. (Sounds of amazement.)" Not a word about Gorky and Litvinov. Both the commissioners — **freemasons** and "friends of the USSR" — are giving testimony in the interests of the GPU. They are trying to draw attention away from the Kremlin. Hence Roche's far-fetched remark that Turkul was dissatisfied with Miller (that is, Turkul could have kidnapped him). Hence also the remark of Pigue, thrown out as it were in passing, that Turkul's conspiracy failed because of his free talking (that is, Skoblin didn't take part), and for lack of money (that is, Moscow was not financing him). It must also be added that the French police, informed in time about the conspiracy,

did not warn Trotsky at all; they preferred to preserve a benevolent neutrality toward the GPU and the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of the "brave general" Turkul.

Now, however, the real nature of these "internal affairs" have inconveniently leaked out into the open. Skoblin was carrying out secret work inside the White Guard military organization. In this work he was connected with Turkul, in his capacity as a White terrorist. Skoblin was carrying out secret work in the service of the GPU. In this work he was connected through Yagoda with the Kremlin. Stalin knew about the attempt being planned because ... he prepared it himself, through Skoblin. It was a ticklish business. **At that time Stalin did not yet have the fully finished reputation of Cain, which now absolves him from the necessity of taking precautionary measures. He still had traces of revolutionary "prejudices." He understood that the murder of Trotsky would inevitably be ascribed to him. And so, in Rote Fahne it was said straight out that it was Turkul's intention not only to carry out the assassination but also to "lay the blame for the murder on the Soviet government."** That is why, at the same time as supporting the "brave general" Turkul through Skoblin, Stalin prepared an alibi for himself. That was the purpose of the warning (which in fact did not warn about anything). The mechanics of the whole business was clear to us even then. In No. 27 of the Bulletin (March 1932) was printed the declaration from all the sections of the International Left Opposition saying, among other things: "Stalin is in an actual united front with General Turkul, the organizer of a terrorist act against Trotsky. No alibi in the form of disclosures printed in a German newspaper, but concealed from the people of the USSR ... will refute or weaken our accusation..." "Why did Turkul's attempt not take place? Most probably the White Guards did not want to fall under the Mausers of the Bolshevik-Leninists. ('Stalin, Skoblin, and Company', Leon Trotsky, January 30, 1939. In: 'Writings of Leon Trotsky', Vol 11, 1938-1938, New York 1974, p. 179-181. Bold added.)

There is no reason to believe the dialectically invalid narrative that Yagoda was seriously aiming to kill Trotsky. Firstly, may it be born in mind that Yagoda, a foe of the Soviet state, was a hangman for Bukharin and that Bukharin and Trotsky were allied in the struggle against the communist faction led by Stalin. Furthermore, Trotsky, the patron of the White Guard Tukhachevsky, was an MI6 agent, the same intelligence agency that, in collaboration with the Gestapo, sponsored the White Guard terrorists with whom Yagoda was collaborating. Their affiliations with the same international intelligence networks, and their covert alliance via Bukharin, renders implausible the claim that Yagoda was plotting to actually murder Trotsky. Yagoda and his Anglo-German intelligence allies would have plotted the killing of their top ally, Trotsky, mainly in the unlikely event of a defection by Trotsky to the anti-imperialist camp or in the (more likely) event of Trotsky being arrested by the Stalin faction of the Soviet intelligence service or the latter's allies.

Nor were any assassination plots directed against/'against' Trotsky committed by the Stalin faction. We know, as shown in C9S4, that the assassination of Sedov was by the Gestapo, as confirmed by Trotsky. We know furthermore, based on a declassified FBI document presented in C9S4, that Trotsky was killed by the MI6, just when he appeared on the verge of an arrest by the progressive elements of Mexican intelligence. We also know that the second last assassination attempt on Trotsky in Mexico was definitely fake, involving his own cooperation.

For this specific case, as Trotsky admitted, the French secret police refused to disclose to Trotsky the terror plot; this makes sense, because the French imperialists were allied to the USSR against Nazi Germany and thus by then hostile to the White Guards. They could expect that Trotsky, upon receipt of such information from the French secret police, would then transfer the intelligence either to the MI6 or directly to the White Guards, thereby expediting the White Guard terror plot so that the Stalin faction would not have the time to sabotage Yagoda's terror plot. Such a leak to Trotsky would have therefore undermined the Soviet state, the ally of French imperialism in the fight against Nazi Germany. There are reasons to suspect that, prior to the October Revolution, Yagoda was an agent of the Okhrana, the Tsarist secret police. Justifying such a suspicion is that not only Yagoda collaborated with the White Guards after the Revolution but also had faked his pre-Revolution past. The CIA agent Wittlin confirmed:

One year later Mikhail Trilisser, Yagoda's deputy who, for his own purposes, was carrying on an investigation of his boss' past, found out that Yagoda had given false information about himself, entering in the records that he had been an active Communist long before the Revolution. (Commissar: The Life and death of Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria, Tadeusz 'Thaddeus' Wittlin, 1972, p. 175) (IMG)

Trilisser, as stated previously, was another hangman for Bukharin and Yagoda.

In Abkhazia and Georgia, similar anti-Soviet activities were being committed by the Trotskyite agents of Anglo-German secret services. There,:

The leader of the band of counter-revolutionaries seems to have been the late M. Nestor Lakoba, formerly President of the Republic of Abkhazia, who died in December 1936. (N 5720/250/38, No. 536, Viscount Chilston to Mr. Eden, Moscow, November 13, 1937; Received November 19, 1937. Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 231) (IMG)

In his memoirs, Sergo Beria, the son of Lavrenti Beria, remarked:

People still don't know that Lakoba detested the Soviet regime, in which he saw the vehicle of Russian penetration. He 'worked on' my father to get him to slow down and restrict so far as possible the expansion of Russia into Georgia and Abkhazia. Consequently, he was opposed to the building of a railway along the Black Sea coast because for him this meant 'opening the gates to Russia.' He was also against the building of roads over the passes of the Caucasus and he did not want there to be a tunnel linking North Ossetia with South Ossetia, fearing that Abkhazia and Georgia might become a 'holiday resort for Russians.' And he did whatever he could to scupper these projects. (Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 22) (IMG)

Lakoba told Nina Gegechkori, Beria's wife:

'Nina, you don't know the Russians. You've never lived in Russia, but I had that experience before the revolution. They feel at home everywhere and invade everything like locusts.' (Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, pp. 22-23) (IMG)

Lakoba was promoting separatist activity. According to Sergo Beria, what:

mattered for [Lakoba] was the independence of Georgia and Abkhazia from Moscow. (Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 23) (IMG)

Lakoba was pro-German, and had contacts with Turkey, which was a British satellite; the Central Committee of the CPSU was aware of this. As Sergo Beria confirms:

The ... functionaries in the apparatus of the Central Committee of the USSR who agitated behind the scenes, intriguing against Lakoba and my father alike, were convinced that Lakoba ... cherished sympathies with Turkey. He had indeed formed a number of links with that country, and he also felt a certain fondness for Germany. (Beria, *My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin*, Sergo Beria, p. 23) (IMG)

The MI6 supported Nazi Germany against the USSR. This fact was manifested in the collaboration of German and British agents in the USSR. The British intelligence agent Beria and the pro-German Lakoba entered an alliance against the Soviet state:

Lakoba had decided to obtain the support of my mother, being convinced that she had great influence on her spouse. As she herself told me, he confided in her when he saw the opportunity during our annual holiday in Abkhazia. (Beria, *My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin*, Sergo Beria, p. 22) (IMG)

'But how can one resist, in conditions such as ours?' my mother asked. 'By all and every means. It is useless to try for an open confrontation. Things have to be dragged out as long as possible and one must obey only when the knife is at one's throat.' (Beria, *My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin*, Sergo Beria, p. 23) (IMG)

My father did not remain deaf to the advice of this older man [Lakoba], even if it seemed to him impossible for the time being, to stand up against Russia... (...). The two men decided that thenceforth they would co-ordinate their actions and keep each other informed of Stalin's intrigues. Even though my father did not share all of Lakoba's views, he did not betray him. (Beria, *My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin*, Sergo Beria, pp. 22-23) (IMG)

As confirmed by an MI6 document (not to be confused with the other MI6 document whose conclusions were tentative):

In 1933 M. Lakoba, whose ultimate aim was the annihilation of M. Stalin and the return to power of M. Trotski organized his first attempt on the former's life. The attempt was arranged by the chief and deputy-chief of the Abkhazian G.P.U. who, acting under orders from M. Lakoba, instructed a G.P.U. coastguard to shoot at M. Stalin while he was cruising along the shores of the Black Sea in the neighbourhood of Gagri, where he was spending his holidays. M. Stalin's launch, however, kept well out to sea, and the coastguard missed his mark. M. Lakoba seems to have taken advantage of M. Stalin's annual visit to the Black Sea Riviera to organise at least one more attempt on his life, but this also came to nothing. (N 5720/250/38, No. 536, Viscount Chilston to Mr. Eden, Moscow, November 13, 1937; Received November 19, 1937. Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 231) (IMG)

In 1933, there was a failed assassination attempt on Stalin by the Beria's ally Lakoba. Apparently, he plotted at least one other assassination attempt as early as 1934. Both assassination plots failed.

Another person to die was Sergo Ordzhonikidze, undoubtedly among the best of the Bolshevik activists. Sergo Ordzhonikidze, as documented in C4S4, had had profound problems with Lavrenti Beria. He supposedly committed 'suicide' in 1935. However, the CIA stated:

Ordzhonikidze may well have died an unnatural death. (Purge of L. P. Beria, CAESAR-10, CIA, August 17, 1954, p. 14) (IMG)

In her memoirs, Svetlana Alliluyeva, the daughter of Joseph Stalin, stated:

Olga Shatunovskaya told me that the Party people in Georgia were appalled and Ordzhonikidze stubbornly opposed it, but that my father wouldn't give an inch. Once he was First Secretary in Georgia, it didn't take Beria long to reach Moscow, where he began his long reign in 1938. (...). Olga Shatunovskaya has told me that Beria's role in the Civil War in the Caucasus was highly ambiguous. He was a born spy and provocateur. He worked first for the Dashnakists (the Armenian nationalists) and then for the Reds as power swung back and forth. Once the Reds caught him in the act of treason and had him arrested. He was in prison awaiting sentence when a telegram arrived from Kirov, who was chief of all operations in the Caucasus, demanding that he be shot as a traitor. Just then, however, the fighting started up again, and he was such small fry that nobody got around to dealing with him. But all the Old Bolsheviks in the Caucasus knew of the telegram's existence — and Beria himself knew of it. Isn't it perhaps here that one should seek an explanation of Kirov's murder many years later? It was right after Kirov's murder in 1934, after all, that Beria began his climb to prominence and power. It's at least a strange coincidence—the death of the one and the rise of the other. I can't imagine, moreover, that Kirov would ever have allowed Beria's election to the Central Committee.

Sergei Kirov was a great friend of the family from way back, probably from their early days in the Caucasus. He knew the Alliluyevs exceedingly well and was very fond of my mother. I have a photograph of Kirov and Yenukidze at my mother's grave. Grief is written all over their faces—the stern faces of two strong men not given to showing their feelings. After my mother died Kirov would come to see my father at Sochi and they used to take me on outings. I have a pile of photographs taken at about that time, simple family photos with nothing posed about them. (...). Kirov looks relaxed in a long, loose shirt, and my father is wearing a white summer suit. I remember these trips myself. Other people would sometimes come with us, too, perhaps even Beria — I don't remember. But Kirov used to live in our house. He was one of us, an old colleague and a friend. My father liked him and was attached to him.

Kirov spent his last summer, that of 1934, with us as in previous years. Then, in December, Nicolayev shot him. Wouldn't it be more logical to link his killing with the name of Beria rather than with that of my father, as is done by transparent hints today?

I'll never believe my father was involved in this particular death. Kirov was closer to him than the Svanidzes, the Redenses, his other relatives, or most of his other colleagues. Kirov was close to my father and my father needed him. I remember when we got the awful news that Kirov was dead, and how shaken everybody was.

Sergo Ordzhonikidze, another of our old friends, died in 1936. I suspect that this, too, was a result of Beria's machinations.

(Twenty Letters to a Friend: A Memoir, Svetlana Alliluyeva, 1967, p. 107) (IMG)

After the death of Stalin, the communist faction of the MVD and the Red Army posed a strong pressure causing Beria to be purged. During Beria's trials, he was accused of plotting against Ordzhonikidze:

Another new charge was that Beria had intrigued against various "honest" party workers such as Ordzhonikidze who had stood in his way. Ordzhonikidze was thus being held up to those who might be tinged with "bourgeois nationalism" in Georgia, as an example of a good Bolshevik. (...). Kravchenko claimed, "That he died by violence, that his end was not natural, my sources have not the slightest doubt." (Purge of L. P. Beria, CAESAR-10, CIA, August 17, 1954, pp. 14-15) (IMG)

Sergo Beria described Anastas Mikoyan as a:

friend of my father's and ... undertook to protect my father. (Beria: *Inside Stalin's Kremlin*, Sergo Beria, p. 36) (IMG)

That same Mikoyan stated in his memoirs that he believed:

[Lavrenti] Beria was the indirect culprit in the death of Sergo [Ordzhonikidze]. (Memoirs, Anastas Mikoyan, Chapter 47: Power Struggle after Stalin's Death) (IMG)

In the conspiracies for murder, one person who reportedly played an important role was Yenukidze. As was shown previously, the tentatively-conclusive document by Chilston had presented Yenukidze as one of the people who assisted Yagoda in the murder of Kirov. As confirmed by Tokaev, Yenukidze and Sheboldayev were plotting for 'destroying Stalinism' 'root and branch' and for partitioning the USSR. Tokaev remarked:

I myself was never a supporter of Yenukidze's programme, nor was I in his conspiracy. Yet his proposals are of considerable interest, as representing the conception of reformed U.S.S.R.... The plan was outlined to me by one of Yenukidze's closest associates, Sheboldayev, who said that they aimed at destroying Stalinism 'root and branch' and replacing Stalin's 'reactionary U.S.S.R.'.... The country was to be divided at once into ten natural regions:

1. The United Transcaucasian States: Armenia, Azerbaidzhan and Georgia; capital, Tbilisi:
 2. The North Caucasian United States: the republics and regions of the Don, Kuban, Lower Volga, Kalmykia, Karachai, Adygei, Kabardino-Balkaria, North Ossetia, Checheno-Ingushetia, Daghestan, and Kizliarai Kalmykia; capital, Rostov-on-Don:
 3. The Ukraine Democratic Republic: including the Crimea and Moldavia; capital, Kiev:
 4. The Belorussian Democratic Socialist Republic; capital, Minsk:
 5. The United States of the Middle Volga: the republics of Tataria, Bashkiria, Chuvashia, Mordva, Mar and other regions:
 6. The Turkestan Association of Peoples (the present republics of Kazakhstan, Turkmenia, Tadzhikistan, Uzbekistan and Kirghizia):
 7. The Northern Democratic Republic: the provinces of Leningrad, Novgorod, Pskov, Vologda, Arkhangelsk and Murmansk, and the Komi republic; capital, Leningrad:
 8. The Moscow Democratic Republic; the provinces of Veliki Luki, Smolensk, Kalinin, Kaluga, Briansk, Orlov, Riazan, Voronezh, Tambov, Vladimir, Ivanov and some other territories; capital, Moscow:
 9. The Urals Democratic Republic; capital, Sverdlovsk:
 10. The Siberian Democratic Republic; capital, Novosibirsk.
- (Comrade X, Grigori Tokaev, 1956, pp. 20-21) (IMG)

Tokaev named Yenukidze, alongside Beria, Yagoda, and Sheboldayev, and General Osepyan as 'not ... servants' but rather as 'enemies of the [Soviet] regime':

By them, moreover, we knew the power of men like ... or Army General Osepyan, or Yenukidze, or even NKVD bosses Yagoda or Beria, or Regional Secretary Sheboldayev, in their roles not of servants, but of enemies of the regime. (Comrade X, Grigori Tokaev, 1956, p. 7) (IMG)

To the dismay of the Beria family, the Georgian counter-revolutionaries were ruthlessly purged in the 1930s. **The MI6 agent Beria actually belonged to the vast network of Trotskyites and Bukharinites.** He especially belonged to the Trotskyites and had allied with Lakoba. Well until the 1950s, the MI6 agent Beria continued to promote the narrative that Trotsky, Bukharin, and their active supporters were not agents of the foreign intelligence services. **Indeed, as Sergo Beria said, well until 1953 after Stalin's death, Lavrenti Beria:**

wanted, also, to publish the writings of Bukharin and Trotsky, so that people should realize that they presented genuine political tendencies and were not agents recruited by foreign intelligence services. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 254) (IMG)

Years later, when Stalin died, Beria tried to set up a rehabilitations commission to convince people that Trotskyism should be treated as just a political ideology rather than an imperialist-fascist secret service strategy and tendency:

Some time later my father drew up the instructions for the committee charged with rehabilitations. He recommended that all the trials be reviewed, including the pre-war ones, and that Trotskyism be treated as a political tendency and not as spying. Malenkov, Saburov and Pervukhin sided with him [on this].... ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 259) (IMG)

Furthermore, the MI6 agent Beria opposed the purge of the Nazi agent Tukhachevsky as well. When the Nazi agent was purged,:

My father explained to me that Tukhachevsky had nothing against Stalin or the Party, or at least, nothing that would justify his arrest. He could hardly be charged with anti-communism.... (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 39) (IMG)

Beria also vehemently opposed the existence of the Comintern:

My father could not stand the Comintern, 'that nest of intriguers and informers,' he called it. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 89) (IMG)

Beria also stated that the USSR was not a real socialist state but was rather 'state capitalist':

In our country, he [i.e. Beria] explained, what we had was not socialism but a form of state capitalism. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 293) (IMG)

Later in this chapter, the evidence will be presented as to Tukhachevsky's agency for Nazi Germany. Beria could not have missed the irrefutable fact of Tukhachevsky's treason, much as how he could not have been mistaken about Trotsky, who was the recruiter of Tukhachevsky. And yet, he defended Tukhachevsky.

The MI6 agent Lavrenti Beria also staunchly opposed agricultural collectivization. According to Sergo Beria, Lavrenti:

several times tried, in vain, to convince Stalin and his Politburo colleagues that the collective-farm system was the worst possible system for regions like the Baltic provinces, the Ukraine and Caucasia." (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 293) (IMG)

In the letters he sent to Ordzhonikidze, Kirov and Stalin, my father explained that it would be unreasonable to practise this policy in mountainous regions like Caucasia. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 11) (IMG)

Lavrenti Beria carried out economic sabotage against the Soviet agriculture by, as much as possible, pushing the peasants to plant tobacco – which by the way, was a relatively useless crop – and by forcefully trying to prevent the centralization of agricultural holdings into collectives:

the plan for subtropical crops furnished my father with a pretext for defending the existence of private plots of land. He pointed out that such crops required a high degree of technical skill which could not be acquired otherwise than by work on private plots.

Unfortunately, the peasants did not understand this policy. They did not appreciate that, by making them plant tobacco and orange

trees in their gardens, my father was trying to protect their farms, and they resisted as hard as they could. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, pp. 11-12) (IMG)

Sergo Beria further recalled:

Collectivization gave rise to riots, especially in eastern Georgia, in the vine-growing region. The organizers of these movements of revolt, who were usually survivors of the 1924 insurrection, were arrested afresh, and once more, my father took steps to save them from execution by facilitating their flight abroad, as I was told later by Shariko Tsereteli, who himself organised their escape. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 12) (IMG)

Who was Shariko Tsereteli? In that famous excerpt of chapter 6 of Stalin's 'The Foundations of Leninism', Shariko Tsereteli was listed as alongside other Kautskyite agents of imperialism: 'the struggle waged by such "desperate" democrats and "Socialists," "revolutionaries" and republicans as, for example, Kerensky and Tsereteli, Renaudel and Scheidemann, Chernov and Dan, Henderson and Clynes, during the imperialist war was a reactionary struggle....' Furthermore, as was stated in C4S4, Tsereteli had been the Tsarist regime official with whom Beria travelled to the Menshevik rebel territory in order to tell them to escape Georgia: 'My father took three days to reach Tbilisi on horseback, accompanied by Shariko Tsereteli, prince and officer of the old regime. My mother followed in a car. They passed through the rebels' lines. The rebels did not harm them, though they knew their identity.' And in those negotiations with the Menshevik-Tsarist commanders, Beria recommended to them that they flee: 'My father ... advised the Menshevik officers to flee...'. Years later, these Menshevik rebels had been 'arrested afresh' as Sergo Beria stated above, 'and once more, my father took steps to save them from execution by facilitating their flight abroad, as I was told later by Shariko Tsereteli, who himself organised their escape.' Once again, Lavrenti Beria was retaining his collaboration with the anti-Soviet Menshevik terrorists who were working for the British intelligence. The MI6-backed Menshevik kulak sleeper cells thus received the support of Beria.

The Bukharin-Trotsky network had been responsible for agitating for anti-collectivization uprisings. The MI6 agent Beria, a member of this Bukharin-Trotsky network, also assisted the anti-collectivization Ukrainian fascist and Georgian Menshevik rebels by getting several of them to form terrorist sleeper cells that would launch rebellions against the Soviet state later on when the strategically opportune time comes about.

Referring to the rebels that the MI6 agent Lavrenti Beria helped flee, Sergo Beria recalled:

My father gave them [kulak rebels] clearly to understand that the moment had not come to stir up trouble and that it was necessary to save the Georgian nation from destruction. He let them keep their lives but, in return, they had to cease agitation. Implicitly, however, his address to the Georgian nationalists conveyed the following message: preserve yourselves for a more favourable occasion. He was to say the same thing later to the Ukrainian nationalists. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 12) (IMG)

To undermine the Great Purge, the MI6 agent Beria launched a pincer assault on the purges, by on the one hand deliberately going extreme with the purges in order to discredit them and to drive a wedge between the masses and the Party, and on the other hand by preventing the purges of some of the Trotskyites and Bukharinites with whom he sympathized. The following excerpts are instructive:

My mother [Nina Gegechkori] accused my father: 'You are the First Secretary, aren't you? How can you allow these men to be attacked? Aren't you the master here? Are you just Russia's tool?' Replying to these reproaches, my father pointed out that he tried to resist by invoking the official slogans put forward by the regime, particularly stressing that the economy would suffer as a result of the extermination of cadres. He defended himself by saying that he had managed to save several people.... (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 27) (IMG)

The above excerpt hints that Nina Gegechkori regarded Beria as responsible for the extremities in the purges; the above excerpt also confirms that Beria tried to prevent some of the purges. Both claims are true. The same Beria who opposed the purges of the Trotskyites and Bukharinites, promoting them as 'innocent', was the same Beria who launched savage terror campaigns during the Great Purge. The MI6 operative Ian Grey remarked:

Lavrenty Beria, an NKVD officer ... was then serving as first secretary of the party in Transcaucasia. An evil man who managed to insinuate himself into Stalin's confidence, he was one of the principal architects of the terror. (Stalin: Man of History, Ian Grey, originally published 1940, new edition 2017) (IMG)

Where Ian Grey is incorrect is when implying that Stalin trusted Beria; such a claim was not correct. Stalin deliberately promoted Beria for the same reason as why at some point he promoted Yezhov; the reason for the promotion of such elements was to coopt Beria against the Yezhov group, even though Beria was covertly an ally of Yezhov.

The imperialist agents who had risen to the ranks of the Soviet state also fomented separatist tendencies. The Polish intelligence service apparently had a role in this. The MI6 tentatively reported:

The particular agents of the Polish intelligence service in the *bloc* were Grinko, for the Ukraine, and Sharangovich, for White Russia. (...). In Central Asia the agents were Ikramov and Khojayev, but they do not appear to have got beyond the stage of hoping to establish contacts with the British intelligence service and to win support at the price of cession of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. (N 1253/26/38, No. 119, Viscount Chilston to Viscount Halifax – (Received March 11), Moscow, March 8, 1938. Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 318) (IMG)

The Polish secret service was a comprador secret service and a front for MI6. Being an agent of the Polish secret service meant being an agent of the British secret service. Therefore, being agents of Poland does make them agents of the MI6. The only question is whether they established direct contacts with the MI6 or not, and the MI6 document cited above confirms that Ikramov and Khojayev hoped to establish such direct contacts even if not going very far in so doing.

To drive a wedge between the peoples of the USSR, the bourgeois-nationalists of different nationalities banded together to promote chauvinist rhetoric against each others' nationalities so to foster inter-ethnic hatred, thereby fomenting ethnic separatist uprisings. The central command uniting these bourgeois-nationalists that unitedly promoted hate against each others' nationalities to foment inter-ethnic conflict, was the Nazi German intelligence. The Nazi German minister Goebbels confirmed in his diaries that as late as June 1941, the Nazis were working with the Russian bourgeois-nationalists, so to drive a wedge between the Russian SSR and the other SSRs, and as a complementary policy in supporting Russian bourgeois-nationalism, the Nazis were also working with those who sought separatism from the USSR. And thirdly, the Nazis were working with the Trotskyites to overthrow the Soviet state. Goebbels wrote in his diaries:

We are working with three secret stations in Russia. They are: the Trotskyites, the Separatists, and the Chauvinist Russians. All are operating against Stalin's Regime. (June 30, 1941, Goebbels. In: 'Tagebucher 1924 -1945 Vol. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5', The Internet Archive, Joseph Goebbels, p. 1614) (IMG)

Russian chauvinism foments anti-Russian chauvinism and separatism, thus dialectically rendering Russian chauvinism and anti-Russian chauvinist separatism allies. The same Chilston report also stated:

Chernov ... used his official position for agricultural wrecking on a vast scale.... Similarly Grinko and Zelenski worked systematically to undermine respectively the financial positions of the Soviet Union and the planning of such staple products as butter and sugar. (N 1253/26/38, No. 119, Viscount Chilston to Viscount Halifax – (Received March 11), Moscow, March 8, 1938. Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 318) (IMG)

The MI6 operative Grigori Tokaev confirmed that Zelenski was involved in anti-Soviet conspiracies with Yagoda:

The Little Politburo had penetrated the Yenukidze-Sheboldayev and the Yagoda-Zelinsky conspiracies, and broken through the opposition's links within the central institutions of the political police. (Comrade X, Grigori Tokaev, 1956, p. 63) (IMG)

In addition to the infiltrators in the Party, there were Christian fundamentalist terrorist organizations engaged in sabotage on behalf of German and Japanese intelligence services. The British Foreign Office remarked:

In Siberia a band of Orthodox priests engaged in sabotage in the mines and espionage on behalf of the Japanese Intelligence Service, and a group of Evangelists and Adventists acting on behalf of both the German and Japanese Intelligence Services, have been brought to book. (...). Details of these and other "counter-revolutionary organisations" show them as having engaged in anti-Soviet activities on a most impressive scale and as having disposed of considerable material resources. (N 2481/1310/38, Mr. Vereker to Viscount Halifax, Moscow, May 16, 1938; Received May 20, 1938. Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 355) (IMG)

In that famous March 1937 speech, Stalin declared:

Present-day Trotskyism is not a political trend in the working class, but a gang without principles and without ideals, a gang of wreckers, diversionists, intelligence service agents, spies, assassins, a gang of sworn enemies of the working class, working in the pay of the intelligence services of foreign states.

Such is the incontrovertible result of the evolution of Trotskyism in the last seven or eight years.

Such is the difference between Trotskyism in the past and Trotskyism at the present time.

The mistake our Party comrades made is that they failed to notice this profound difference between Trotskyism in the past and Trotskyism at the present time. They failed to notice that the Trotskyites have long ceased to be people devoted to an ideal, that the Trotskyites long ago became highway robbers, capable of any foulness, capable of all that is disgusting, to the point of espionage and the downright betrayal of their country, if only they can harm the Soviet government and Soviet power. They failed to notice this and therefore were unable to adapt themselves in time to fight the Trotskyites in a new way, more determinedly.

(‘Defects in Party Work and Measures for Liquidating Trotskyite and Other Double-Dealers: Report and Speech in Reply to Debate at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.’, Stalin, March 3-5, 1937, Revolutionary Democracy)

Where I disagree with Stalin is when he implies that there was a time period in which Trotskyism was not a fascist secret service tendency, and that there was a time period in which Trotskyism could be treated as an ideological belief. It may have been politically good for Stalin to say that, for he may not have had proof of Trotsky's treasons in the early 1910s; but regardless, the content of that remark is not true, for it is too generous a remark about Trotskyism. No, Trotskyism was never at any point in time a real ideology; it was always an imperialist-fascist secret service tendency, and a set of strategies and tactics of striking the revolution from an ultra-‘revolutionary’ perspective. Since the birth of finance capital and long before the word ‘fascism’ was coined, Trotskyism served as a tool and a tendency of the imperialist-fascist secret services camouflaged with revolutionary phraseology. Well before officially ‘abandoning’ the Mensheviks, Trotsky had the audacity to openly argue that imperialism industrialized the colonized countries whereas anti-imperialism was reactionary and kept countries backwards (see C1S2).

Trotskyism was a sub-trend within the Menshevik movement, and the Menshevik movement was the Russian Imperial branch of what was later referred to as the ‘Kautskyite’ network. Even if the Mensheviks were not spies and mercenaries on the payroll of the Tsarist secret police, the Okhrana, the Mensheviks behaved very much as though they were Okhrana agents. When it suited the Russian secret police, the Mensheviks chanted for liberalism and right-deviation, called for capitulation under the cover of ‘pragmatism’, and supported outright collaboration with the imperialists in order to ‘grow’ industry and ‘enlarge’ the proletariat; on the other hand, when it suited the Tsarist secret police, the Mensheviks were as dogmatic and left-sectarian as they could possibly be, and tried to sow division in the revolutionary movement by refusing to ally the proletariat with the kolkhoz peasantry, and promoted anti-kolkhoznik anti-peasant hate. The fact that the Mensheviks were simultaneously right-opportunist and left-opportunist in favor of the Tsarist regime is what brings from them the smell of the Okhrana. Trotsky, a left-wing Menshevik, was allied to the right-wing, as Lenin pointed out (see C2S9). I dare speculate that the arrest of Trotsky by the Okhrana in the Tsarist years may well have been a means of espionage under the cover of ‘being interrogated’. Get only two slaps in the face and then call it ‘brutal torture’, and thereupon provide all the intelligence material needed as ‘confessions’ during ‘brutal’ ‘interrogations’. Imperialist secret services sometimes utilize jailing as an espionage tactic. Jailing one's own intelligence assets can ensure asset protection against rival intelligence organizations. Jailing one's own spies can be a means of receiving intelligence from one's spies under the guise of ‘interrogation’ and supposed ‘torture’ of one's own spies. Speculating that imprisonment is a cover for espionage for ordinary activists who have been arrested can be an act of toxic slander-mongering, but in the case of Trotsky, since his intelligence activities for the fascists has been voluminously documented, I dare give myself the right to speculate such about his ‘arrest’ by the Tsarist regime. I also refuse to believe that his ‘escapes’ from jail in the 1900s were really ‘escapes’.

It is said that the difference between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks was that the latter called for a bourgeois-democratic revolution prior to the socialist revolution ‘unlike’ the Bolsheviks who allegedly called for a ‘leap’ into socialism. This narrative is a Trotskyite myth. Lenin clearly supported (1) the replacement of tyranny with bourgeois-democracy as a channel for paving the way towards a proletarian revolution, and (2) the bourgeois transformation of feudal society as a predecessor to socialism. Rather, Lenin believed that the bourgeois replacement of the feudal mode of production can occur under the conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat, as he supported the NEP. On the other hand, the Mensheviks

opposed the partnership of the kolkhoz peasantry with the proletariat, supported participation in imperialist wars of desertification under the banner of 'improving' productive forces, aimed to disarm the proletariat by seeking reformist agendas, and waged bloody wars against the proletariat by inviting the British colonizers into the Soviet Union. All of such major differences between the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks have been swept under the rug by the Trotskyite myth that the Bolshevik-Menshevik clash was over whether or not to leap to 'socialism'.

C5S2. Sabotage in and Purges of the Red Army

The MI6 agent Trotsky had his infamous agent Tukhachevsky in the Red Army as well. Tukhachevsky was also an agent of Nazi Germany. As will be recalled from C3S3, Tukhachevsky shared Trotsky's views for anti-Soviet diversionary and provocative military strategy – launch wars against every country in the world, and then once those states are provoked to fight back, open up the front so that they can enter the Soviet territory and duly conquer it. Tukhachevsky was one of the commanders responsible for the defeat of the Soviet Red Army in Poland in 1920 (C3S3). To spread cultural corruption, Tukhachevsky sponsored a musician who composed decadent 'music' (C6S7). In the 1930s, Tukhachevsky was serving as an agent of Nazi Germany, seeking to help that state take over the USSR.

Pierre Fervacque was the biographer of Mikhail Tukhachevsky, who had met him for several times. According to Neil Harvey (PhD) of the University of Glasgow:

Fervacque's memoirs in *Le Chef de L'Armée Rouge* provide arguably the most illuminating insights on Tukhachevsky.... (Mikhail Tukhachevsky in the Russian Civil War, University of Glasgow, Neil Harvey, p. 42) (IMG)

Tukhachevsky's goal was to defeat socialism. Tukhachevsky's biographer:

Fervacque recalled asking Tukhachevsky if he was a socialist. (Mikhail Tukhachevsky in the Russian Civil War, University of Glasgow, Neil Harvey, p. 43) (IMG)

Tukhachevsky responded:

Socialist? Certainly not! What a need for classification you have! Besides, the great socialists are Jews and the socialist doctrine is a branch of universal Christianity. I laugh at money, and whether the land is divided up or not is all one to me. The barbarians, my ancestors, lived in common, but they had chiefs. No, I detest socialists, Jews and Christians. (Mikhail Tukhachevsky in the Russian Civil War, University of Glasgow, Neil Harvey, p. 44; citing Fervacque's *Le Chef de L'Armée Rouge*, pp. 24-25) (IMG)

Prior to that, Tukhachevsky had made his virulent anti-Semitism very explicit in his conversation with Fervacque:

The Jews brought us Christianity. That is enough to make us hate them. And then they are a low race. I do not speak of the dangers which they have brought to my country. You French cannot understand that; for you equality is a dogma. The Jew is a dog, a son of a bitch, who sheds his fleas in every country. It is he who has contributed most to infecting us with the plague of civilisation and who would like to give us his morality, the morality of money and capital. (Mikhail Tukhachevsky in the Russian Civil War, University of Glasgow, Neil Harvey, p. 44; citing Fervacque's *Le Chef de L'Armée Rouge*, pp. 24-25) (IMG)

Alexander Bregman was the:

chief editorial writer for the London émigré daily *Dziennik Polski* [and] the author of several books, [who] contributes regularly to leading American and British periodicals. (East Europe: A Monthly Review of East European Affairs, Vol. 12, January 1963, p. 15) (IMG)

Bregman mentioned that Tukhachevsky passionately aimed to continue to collaborate with the hostile anti-Soviet military of the Third Reich:

As for Tukhachevsky himself, we know from German diplomatic documents how enthusiastic he had always been about the Red Army's cooperation with the German Army and how much he regretted that it came to an end after Hitler's accession to power. There is little doubt that he wanted a resumption of this cooperation. (The Tukhachevsky Affair (Review). In: 'East Europe: A Monthly Review of East European Affairs', Vol. 14, Alexander Bregman, January 1965, p. 54) (IMG)

Another important source of information on Tukhachevsky is John Erickson. Erickson was a prominent British military scholar with extensive intelligence contacts with anti-Soviet treasonous elements and British spies in the Red Army. Under the guise of scholarship, he accessed the Red Army archives and, as confirmed by the Washington Post, aimed to collect sensitive military intelligence from the Red Army generals. He founded the Centre for Defense Studies which received funding from the British government. According to John Erickson, in 1935, amidst the high tensions caused by Hitler's open talk of war against the Bolshevik East, Tukhachevsky told the commander of the French army Maurice Gamelin that he continued to sustain:

relations avec des personnalités de l'armée allemande. (The Soviet High Command: A Military-Political History, 1918-1941, Author and Editor: John Erickson, p. 412) (IMG)

The phrase in French means 'relations with personalities within the Germany army'.

In the late 1930s, Romania's economy was becoming colonially dependent on the Third Reich, as the treasonous monarchical leadership of Romania was selling the economy to the Third Reich for cheap. In this context, when meeting with the Romanian foreign minister, Tukhachevsky advised the foreign minister to look to Romania's colonizers 'for rescue' – i.e. become more dependent on the Germans:

To the Rumanian Foreign Minister Titulescu he [i.e. Tukachevsky] advised the need to look to Germany for rescue. (The Soviet High Command: A Military-Political History, 1918-1941, Author and Editor: John Erickson, p. 413) (IMG)

It is very clear that Tukhachevsky had pro-Nazi sympathies.

Moreover, Erickson referred to reports that:

Admiral Canaris, head of the German Abwehr [intelligence service], had proof of even greater indiscretions by Tukhachevsky, namely that he had entered into contact with emissaries of General Miller, the head of the organisation of Tsarist veterans in exile. This Tukhachevsky was supposed to have done while executing his commission abroad at the funeral of King George V. (The Soviet High Command: A Military-Political History, 1918-1941, Author and Editor: John Erickson, p. 413) (IMG)

Tokaev confirmed that Bukharin:

had certainly considered supporting Yenukidze and Tukhachevsky. (Comrade X, Grigori Tokaev, 1956, p. 96) (IMG)

Bukharin, as will be remembered from C2S10, had allied with the Trotskyites knowing that the latter had been agents of the Anglo-German secret services.

Tukhachevsky was by no means alone in this. Many others in the Red Army shared his pro-Nazi sympathies. Erickson wrote:

There is at least one significant item which confirms that contact of a tenuous but deliberate nature was sustained between German and Soviet officers. Although the collaboration had lapsed, [German Chief of Staff, General Hans von] Seeckt's disciples in the German Army remained interested in possible re-insurances in the east; General Kostring, before taking up his appointment as Military Attaché in Moscow, was instructed by Fritsch and Beck to work – along purely personal lines – for an improvement in relations between the Red and German Armies. That reservoir of good will towards the German generals had certainly not evaporated in the Red Army by the end of 1935. Personal contacts would presumably be subject to personal arrangement. (The Soviet High Command: A Military-Political History, 1918-1941, Author and Editor: John Erickson, p. 411) (IMG)

Well into 1937, the executed Red Army commanders had maintained very close and friendly relations with the Nazi General Ernst Kostring:

The execution of the eight Red army leaders might have been supposed likely to affect adversely the position of General Kostring (see Lord Chilston's despatch under reference), who is believed to have been defended by the Red army against party intrigues, and who was certainly on excellent terms with most of the executed leaders as well as with [some of] the surviving marshals. (N 3648/250/38, No. 319, Viscount Chilston to Mr. Eden, Moscow, July 3, 1937; Received July 16, 1937, Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 145) (IMG)

Lyman Kirkpatrick – the inspector general and executive director of the CIA, as well as a co-founder of several other US intelligence agencies – admitted in his book:

The Abwehr [i.e. German intelligence] had some agents [on senior staffs of the Red Army. (Captains Without Eyes: Intelligence Failures in World War II, Routledge, Lyman B Kirkpatrick Jr, 1987) (IMG)

Referring to Tukhachevsky, a classified report by the British Embassy in Moscow stated:

the foreign press ... have often described him as the Napoleon of Russia.

(Colonel Firebrace to Mr. MacKillop, No. 15, Secret, Moscow, June 14, 1937. Inclosure in Doc. 101 – N 3177/461/38. Foreign Office (1937-1938). p. 135) (IMG)

Napoleon, though himself a progressive military general who overthrew the counter-revolutionary Directory, was described in the mainstream media, and seen by many, as a perpetrator of a coup against a civilian government. The comparison of Tukhachevsky with Napoleon was more so along the lines of Tukhachevsky's coup plots and not of him sharing the views of a progressive freedom-fighter general. The classified British documents reported that there already were:

rumours current ... of the possibility of the Soviet Government being overthrown and replaced by a military national Government under some military leader.

(N 1397/46/38, Viscount Chilston to Mr. Eden – (Received March 12), No. 106. Moscow, March 9, 1937. Foreign Office (1937-1938). p. 57) (IMG)

Recall as well that the MI6 operative Fitzroy McLean, the real-life James Bond, reasoned:

if, in fact, there had been a conspiracy, what more natural than that the thinkers, the ideologists, should have made common cause with the men of action, Tukachevski, Yagoda? What more natural, too, than that to the Tukachevskis and the Yagodas, finding themselves in positions of great power, should come the idea of using that power for their own ends. Tukachevski was known to admire Napoleon. As a soldier? Or as a man? An officer of the Imperial Army, he had shifted his allegiance quickly enough, when his interests demanded it. Might he not do so again? (...). What more natural, too, than that any potential opponents of the regime should seek, and receive, outside support, among the enemies of the Soviet Union? Some of them had, in the course of their normal duties, had contact with foreigners. Tukachevski, in the old days, had had many dealings with the German General Staff; had been to Paris. (...). Had these contacts really been innocent?

And the 'wrecking'? Inefficiency? Or stubbornness? Or malice? Or a combination of all three? In any case a phenomenon which the enemies of the regime, if they knew their job, would be bound to exploit. Something which called for the most ruthless countermeasures. Looking at it like that, it was possible to see how, in the minds of those concerned, if not in reality, the idea of a conspiracy might have grown up.

(Eastern Approaches, Fitzroy McLean, 1949, pp. 115-116) (IMG)

In a letter to the US Secretary of State, Loy Henderson pointed out that he was:

in possession of no information regarding the nature of the evidence advanced during the investigations and the trial. (861.20/390: Telegram, The Charge in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, June 13, 1937 – 11 PM; received June 14 – 12:35 PM. In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, 1933–1939. Office of the Historian, p. 383) (IMG)

Nevertheless, Henderson wrote, there had been contacts between the Red Army and the US Embassy, based on which the US Embassy was able to make judgements on the purges. As Henderson stated,:

The [American] Embassy's opinions ... are based ... upon its observations of the events which have unrolled here during the last 6 months, its own estimation of the officers in question, some of whom were personally known to members of the staff, the reputation of these officers, the foreign observers and Soviet citizens for whose views it has respect. (861.20/390: Telegram, The Charge in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, June 13, 1937 – 11 PM; received June 14 – 12:35 PM. In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, 1933–1939. Office of the Historian, p. 383) (IMG)

Regarding the pro-German sympathies of the Tukhachevsky group, Henderson noted:

Most if not all of the accused would have liked to have seen better relations established between Germany and the Soviet Union under conditions which necessarily would have included certain alterations in Hitler's own policies. They have been known to express their feelings of friendliness for Germany in public. At a farewell party given at the German Embassy 2 years ago for the departing German Counsellor, Tukhachevski in the presence of other guests frankly stated that it was too bad that "the politicians were disturbing German-

Soviet relations". (861.20/390: Telegram, The Charge in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, June 13, 1937 – 11 PM; received June 14 – 12:35 PM. In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, 1933–1939. Office of the Historian, p. 384) (IMG)

There is some truth in the reports which have circulated for years to the effect that the feelings toward Germany of many of the higher officers of the Red Army are friendlier than those held by those responsible for the present Soviet foreign policy. (861.20/390: Telegram, The Charge in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, June 13, 1937 – 11 PM; received June 14 – 12:35 PM. In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, 1933–1939. Office of the Historian, p. 383) (IMG)

Regarding the putschist tendencies of Tukhachevsky's gang, the American charge d'affaires commented:

There is reason to believe that Tukhachevski and at least most of the other condemned had acquired while in Germany a tendency to regard an army as a professional organization standing above politics and untouched by all but the most profound political changes, that they had therefore systematically endeavored to resist the penetration into the army of the agents and provocateurs of the Commissariat for Internal Affairs.... (861.20/390: Telegram, The Charge in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, June 13, 1937 – 11 PM; received June 14 – 12:35 PM. In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, 1933–1939. Office of the Historian, p. 383) (IMG)

Some would attempt to advance the argument that Tukhachevsky aimed to increase Soviet ties with Germany, not as a way of increasing German fascist influence in the USSR but on the contrary as a channel for the intelligence penetration of the Soviet dictatorship of the proletariat into Germany. Such an argument, however, is entirely implausible, in light of Tukhachevsky's alliance with the MI6 agent Trotsky, the renegade anti-communist and anti-Semitic general's tactical and strategic sabotage of the Soviet armed forces during the war with Poland (C3S3), and his excellent relations with the network of reactionary generals headed by Seeckt. Had Tukhachevsky been sincere in using such friendly contacts with the German armed forces for the purpose of Soviet penetration into Germany, he would have pursued increased ties not to Seeckt but to Schleicher, the prominent pro-Soviet commander in the German armed forces (C10S7). Whereas no evidence exists to suggest close ties to Schleicher, there is plenty of evidence of close ties to Seeckt. Last but not least, as shall be shown, the American spy Orlov has confessed that Tukhachevsky and his gang aimed to launch a military coup against the Soviet government and to murder Stalin, acts which clearly would have benefited Tukhachevsky's Nazi German allies. Clearly, Soviet relations with Nazi Germany could not be simultaneously equally beneficial to both Nazi anti-communism and communist anti-Nazism; it could only be either of the two. In this light, it is clear that the good relations with Germany were pursued by the Tukhachevsky gang not as a channel for Soviet influence over Germany but as a channel for German fascist influence over the USSR.

On the assassination and coup plots of the Tukhachevsky network, the American spy Alexander Orlov had access to plenty of intelligence materials, content which he was able to provide to his spymasters in the FBI and the Office of Naval Intelligence. Orlov, a long-time anti-communist and an infiltrator into the ranks of the NKVD and Red Army, had defected to the United States, wherein he provided intelligence to the American imperialists on the Soviet security personnel. The National Counter-Intelligence Center of the FAS, the body linked to the US Congress, provided a background on Orlov:

In 1936 Orlov was sent to Spain as Soviet liaison representative to the Republican Government for matters of intelligence, counterintelligence, and guerrilla warfare. Throughout Orlov's stay in Spain, tales mounted of secret trials, summary executions, and widespread terror in the Soviet Union.

In July 1938, Orlov was abruptly ordered to Paris. While in transit, he stopped to see his family, which was living in France not far from the Spanish border. Orlov discussed with his wife his growing suspicions and his moral revulsion, and then decided to break with Stalin and the Soviet Union. After first enlisting the aid of the Canadians, the Orlovs entered the United States on 13 August 1938. Eighteen years later they were granted permanent residence.

After Orlov's defection, he provided much information to US intelligence on pre-World War II personnel and operations of the Soviet State Security Service. With the publication of his book, *The Secret History of Stalin's Crimes* in 1953, the true history of the Soviet Union from 1934 to 1938 was revealed for the first time. In 1955 and again in 1957, Orlov appeared before the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security. His second book, *The Handbook of Intelligence and Guerrilla Warfare*, was published in 1963.

In April 1973 Orlov died in the United States.

(CI Reader, Vol. 1, Chapter 4, National Counter-Intelligence Center. In: Federation of American Scientists (FAS)) (IMG)

By 1956, when the MI6 agent Khrushchev had 'confessed' that Trotsky's protégé Tukhachevsky and the latter's band of fascist assassins were 'innocent' and 'communist' 'loyalists', the prominent American spy Orlov was able to disclose much about the truth of the Tukhachevsky conspiracy. Tukhachevsky, a 'former' Tsarist White Guard officer and Trotsky's hangman, and his band of collaborators aimed to compromise the communist faction by defaming its leader Stalin as a 'spy' of the Tsarist secret service, the Okhrana. Kossior, Balitsky, Zinovy and others, according to Orlov's intelligence network, contended that Stalin shall first be compromised and defamed using the fabricated evidence, so to be demoted and purged by the Central Committee, whereas Tukhachevsky and his group of generals in the Red Army, more realistic and aware of the overwhelming support enjoyed by Stalin among the blue-collar majority of the CPSU, aimed to launch a military coup, directly murder Stalin, overthrow the Party, install a military dictatorship, and to subsequently accuse Stalin of having been an 'Okhrana agent'. Orlov, himself a long-time imperialist spy within the Soviet security, in fact encouraged such a putsch against the Stalin faction. Below is a part of Orlov's article for the LIFE magazine:

In September 1936 the Politburo sent me to Spain to advise the Republican government of that country on counterintelligence operations and the organization of guerrilla warfare behind Franco's lines. On one of my trips my car went over an embankment and I suffered two broken vertebrae. After some time in a Spanish hospital I was taken to Paris in the middle of January 1937 and placed in a clinic. There I lay flat on my back for over a month.

One day—it was on the afternoon of Feb. 15 or 16, 1937—my bedside telephone rang. It was the NKVD resident in France, Smirnov, and he sounded gay. "Just listen," he said. "I'll give you the surprise of your life." And immediately I heard over the phone another voice which did indeed make me happy.

It was my cousin, Zinovy Borisovich Katsnelson. He had just arrived in Paris and was coming right over to see me.

Zinovy was much more to me than a relative. He had been my childhood friend and our mutual affection had grown deeper with the years. When I enrolled at Moscow University I shared a room with him in his mother's small apartment. During the civil war we served together in the 12th Red army and shared the dangers of the front. Thereafter both of us rose rapidly in the service of the new regime.

Friends among the mightiest men

By 1937 Zinovy was a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU and acting deputy chief of the NKVD in the Ukraine. He had the title of army commander, second rank, and he had close friends among the mightiest men in the land. One of them was a member of the Politburo, Stanislav Kossior. And, as a weekend guest of his chiefs in the secret police, Zinovy had often met Stalin.

(...). ZINOVY went on to tell me, there in the Paris hospital room, that he and Balitsky had promptly revealed the facts to two close friends who were also among the most powerful men in the Ukraine. They were General I. E. Yakir, commander of all military forces in the Ukraine, and Stanislav Kossior, member of the Politburo, secretary of the CPSU and virtual dictator of the Ukraine. (Kossior had also been the boss of a fast-rising man in the Communist hierarchy named Nikita Khrushchev. Liquidated in 1938, Kossior had his name "cleared" at the 20th Party Congress.)

The circle of horrified initiates widened. General Yakir flew to Moscow and conferred with his friend Tukhachevsky, supreme commander of the Red army, whose personal dislike of Stalin was well known. Tukhachevsky took into his confidence the deputy commissar of defense, Gamarnik, a man revered by his intimates for his moral integrity. General Kork was also briefed. These were the men Zinovy named to me. Other army men were apparently told later.

Out of this there developed a conspiracy headed by Marshal Tukhachevsky to end the reign of Stalin. The nightmare of the blood purges then in progress created a climate of distress, moral disgust and soul-searching conducive to conspiracy against Stalin. The sudden realization that the tyrant and murderer responsible for the piled-up horror was not even a genuine revolutionary but an impostor, a creature of the hated Okhrana, galvanized the conspirators into plans for action. Together they decided to stake their lives to save their country by ridding it of the enthroned agent provocateur.

In February 1937 the Red army generals were still in the process of "gathering forces," as Zinovy phrased it. They had not yet reached agreement on a firm plan for the coup d'état. But Tukhachevsky was inclined to the following scheme: some plausible pretext he would persuade Defense Commissar Voroshilov (now the president of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet) to ask Stalin to summon a top-level conference on military problems concerning the Ukraine, the Moscow military district and certain other areas whose commanders were privy to the conspiracy. Tukhachevsky and other conspirators would come with their trusted aides. At a certain hour, or signal, two elite regiments of the Red army would bar the main avenues to the Kremlin in order to block the approach to NKVD troops. At the same moment the conspirators would announce to Stalin that he was under arrest. Tukhachevsky was convinced that the coup could be carried out within the Kremlin without disturbance.

There were two views, Zinovy explained to me, as to how to deal with Stalin thereafter. Tukhachevsky and other generals were of the opinion that Stalin should be killed outright, after which a plenary session of the party's Central Committee should be convened and the police file laid before it. Kossior, Balitsky, Zinovy and others (the nonarmy group, apparently) wanted to arrest Stalin and bring him before the Central Committee plenary session to be confronted with the charges about his police past.

Before leaving, Zinovy told me, in a shy sort of way, "In case of failure, if Elena and I are shot, I want you and Maria to take care of my little girl." Elena was his wife, Maria is my wife. His daughter was then only 3 years old and he loved her with fanatical devotion. His eyes became damp for a moment. It was for his child's sake, I realized, that he had been ready to travel all the way from the Ukraine to Spain, if necessary, to prepare me for the best—or the worst.

"But how can there be any failure?" I encouraged Zinovy. "Tukhachevsky is the respected boss of the army. The Moscow garrison is in his hands. He and his generals have passes to the Kremlin. Tukhachevsky reports to Stalin regularly and is not suspected. He will arrange the conference, alert the two regiments, and that's that."

I went on to say that the usual risk inherent in any plot—the possibility that one of the participants might betray the whole conspiracy—was absent here. Nobody in his right mind would go to Stalin and tell him about the police file, since immediate liquidation would be the reward for such a disclosure.

We embraced, kissed each other on both cheeks, and Zinovy left. I never saw him again.

A FEW days later I returned to Spain. Week after week, then for month after month, I watched the daily papers and used every free moment to tune in my short-wave radio set. It was enough for anyone to ask me, "Have you heard the news?" to give me a start as if I had been stung. I was expecting my news.

On June 11, 1937 I was riding in my car from the French-Spanish border to Barcelona. The weather was beautiful. I was looking at the rolling hills and listening to soft music from a French radio station. Suddenly the music was interrupted and a news bulletin was read in French: "Radio Toulouse! Special announcement! Soviet Marshal Tukhachevsky and a number of other generals of the Red army have been arrested on charges of treason. They will be court-martialed."

The very next morning an official Soviet announcement informed the stunned world that the court-martial had already taken place and that eight ranking military men—Tukhachevsky, Yakir, Kork, Uborevich, Putna, Eideman, Feldman and Primakov—had been put to death. It became known later that Stein, the NKVD officer who had discovered Stalin's Okhrana file, shot himself. Kossior, despite his rank in the Politburo, was executed. Gamarnik committed suicide before the generals were liquidated. Balitsky was shot.

About the middle of July 1937 I received information that my cousin, Zinovy Katsnelson, had been shot. To this day I have heard nothing of the fate of his wife and little daughter.

(THE SENSATIONAL SECRET BEHIND DAMNATION OF STALIN: EX-NKVD GENERAL IS FINALLY FREE TO DISCLOSE DEEDS SO SHOCKING REDS MUST DISOWN OLD IDOL, Life Magazine, Alexander Orlov, April, 23, 1956, pp. 35-38) (IMG)

In the magazine article, an image of Tukhachevsky and his collaborators was shown. Underneath the image of Tukhachevsky, the following was stated:

MARSHAL TUKHACHEVSKY led six men shown at top of page in the 1937 conspiracy on Stalin's life. (THE SENSATIONAL SECRET BEHIND DAMNATION OF STALIN: EX-NKVD GENERAL IS FINALLY FREE TO DISCLOSE DEEDS SO SHOCKING REDS MUST DISOWN OLD IDOL, Life Magazine, Alexander Orlov, April, 23, 1956, p. 37) (IMG)

The 'six men shown at top of page' were described as follows:

CONSPIRATORS banded together in 1937 ... when they learned Stalin had worked for the czar. Politburo member Stanislav Kossior, Ukrainian NKVD boss V. Balitsky, Deputy Defense Commissar Yan Camarnik, plotted with Red army generals I. E. Yakir, A. I. Kork and V. K. Putna under the leadership of Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky (far right of page) When plot discovered, Gamarnik allegedly committed suicide [read: was eliminated by pro-Tukhachevsky elements so that he could not testify]. Others were accused of collaborating with Nazi Germany, tried and executed. At 20th Congress last month Tukhachevsky, Gamarnik, Kossior were rehabilitated" as loyal Communists. (THE SENSATIONAL SECRET BEHIND DAMNATION OF STALIN: EX-NKVD GENERAL IS FINALLY FREE TO DISCLOSE DEEDS SO SHOCKING REDS MUST DISOWN OLD IDOL, Life Magazine, Alexander Orlov, April, 23, 1956, pp. 36-37) (IMG)

Henderson added that the French ambassador Robert Coulondre to Moscow as well as the Lithuanian ambassador Jurgis Baltrusaitis agreed, based on their secret sources in the Soviet Union, that Tukhachevsky, Yakir, and Uborevitch had 'engaged in conversations' 'regarding the desirability of executing some kind of coup d'état for the purpose of ... getting rid of Stalin':

Practically all diplomatic missions and foreign observers believe, however, that one or more of the possibilities listed below is responsible for the destruction of these officers.

(a) The officers had shown a tendency not wholeheartedly to approve certain of Stalin's recent actions and particularly to object to Ins attitude that the welfare of the State was identical with the continued success of his own political career.

(b) The officers had become alarmed at the havoc which the growing disposition of Stalin to distrust and destroy those about him was creating in all spheres of Soviet life and had made remarks to each their showing their disapproval thereof.

(c) In some instances these remarks had develop into conversations regarding the desirability of executing some kind of coup d'état for the purpose of either getting rid of Stalin or curbing his power. (...).

3. The French Ambassador has told me in confidence that he has been given formally to understand from certain Soviet sources that certain military leaders including Tukhachevsky, Yakir and Uborevitch had engaged in conversations along the lines indicated in 2 (c) above and that these discussions were known to but not reported by at least some of the other executed officers. He added that he was convinced that no formal conspiracy had evolved and that he did not believe that the executed officers had formed treasonous contacts with Germany or any other foreign power.

4. The Lithuanian Minister states that some of his Russian acquaintances have given him to understand that several of the executed officers had actually discussed ways and means of seizing power and of converting Stalin into a tool of the Red Army.

(861.20/406, The Charge in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, June 23, 1937 – 5 PM; received June 23 – 2:40 PM. In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, 1933–1939. Office of the Historian, pp. 384-385) (IMG)

And of course, the Czech military attaché agreed as well – at least according to the Cold War hawk and diplomat George Kennan of the Division of European Affairs, who:

In an attached memorandum of March 12, 1938 ... noted: "The remarks of the Czech Military Attaché have a special significance. not brought out in the accompanying despatch. Certain professors in this country, aided by Foreign Affairs (New York; quarterly periodical), have given wide currency to the rumor that the Red Army generals were really guilty of plotting with the Germans....

(Footnote to: 861.20/439, No. 996. The Charge in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, February 18, 1938; received March 9. In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, 1933–1939. Office of the Historian, p. 384) (IMG)

Joseph Davies, the US ambassador to the Soviet Union during the purge of Tukhachevsky, stated that Tukhachevsky and elements in the Red Army: had entered into a conspiracy among themselves, and into an agreement with Germany and Japan to aid these governments in a military attack upon the Soviet Union. They agreed to and actually did co-operate in plans to assassinate Stalin and Molotov, and to project a military uprising against the Kremlin which was to be led by General Tukhachevsky, the second in command of the Red Army. In preparation for war they agreed to and actually did plan and direct the sabotaging of industries, the blowing up of chemical plants, the destruction of coal mines, the wrecking of transportation facilities, and other subversive activities. They agreed to perform and did perform all those things which the German General Staff required should be done by them pursuant to instructions which they received from such General Staff. They agreed to and in fact did conspire and co-operate with the German and Japanese Military Intelligence Services. They agreed to and in fact did cooperate with German diplomatic consular representatives in connection with espionage and sabotage. They agreed to and actually did transmit to Germany and Japan Information vital to the defence of the Soviet Union. They agreed among themselves and with the German and Japanese governments to cooperate with them in war upon the Soviet government and to form an independent smaller Soviet state which would yield up large sections of the Soviet Union, the Ukraine, and White Russia in the west to Germany and the Maritime Provinces in the east to Japan.

They agreed after the German conquest of Russia that German firms were to have concessions and receive favours in connection with the development of iron ore, manganese, oil, coal, timber, and the Other great resources of the Soviet Union.

(FIFTH COLUMNISTS IN RUSSIA: A STUDY IN HINDSIGHT, Joseph E. Davies, 1941. In: 'Mission to Moscow', pp. 181-182) (IMG)

Davies, though said to be affiliated with the pro-Soviet Roosevelt faction, had his remarks corroborated by other officials, as stated previously and as shall be further shown. In spite of Churchill's open anti-Stalinism after World War II, he nevertheless confirmed in his post-War memoirs that pro-German elements existed within the Red Army, to be targeted by the Soviet state during the purges of the military. According to Churchill, once Stalin was informed of the plot of German agents in the Red Army,:

there followed the merciless, but perhaps not needless, military and political purge in Soviet Russia, and the series of trials in January, 1937, in which Vyshinsky, the Public Prosecutor, played so masterful a part. (The Second World War: The Gathering Storm, Winston Churchill, 1948, pp. 288-289, underline added) (IMG)

The Russian Army was purged of its pro-German elements at a heavy cost to its military efficiency. (The Second World War: The Gathering Storm, Winston Churchill, 1948, p. 289) (IMG)

Churchill continued by saying that this purge of the German agents:

was, of course, thoroughly understood by Hitler; but I am not aware that the British and French Governments were equally enlightened. To Mr. Chamberlain and the British and French General Staffs the purge of 1937 presented itself mainly as a tearing to pieces internally of the Russian Army, and a picture of the Soviet Union as riven asunder by ferocious hatreds and vengeance. (The Second World War: The Gathering Storm, Winston Churchill, 1948, p. 289) (IMG)

The MI6, somewhat tentatively, reported:

The work of the *bloc* for the foreign employers included not only espionage and economic aid to Germany and Japan at the expense of the Soviet Union, but also sabotage, diversion, planning to open the front to the enemy on the outbreak of war, undermining the material basis of the Red army, wrecking, particularly on the railways, and the fomenting of discontent among the Soviet population by various methods. (N 1253/26/38, No. 119, Viscount Chilston to Viscount Halifax – (Received March 11), Moscow, March 8, 1938. Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 318) (IMG)

The above document by MI6 agent Chilston presents its conclusions as ‘tentative’ in nature. However, the fact remains that Chilston’s remarks are corroborated by the other sources which are definitive in concluding such.

C5S3. Agricultural Collectivization / Ukraine and Kazakhstan Famine / Death Toll *** IMG-All-{Soviet Collectivization and Ukraine/Kazakhstan Famine}-{Mortality Statistics}

A Joint US Army-Navy intelligence study published in the post-war years described the USSR’s state of agriculture prior to collectivization as follows:

Prior to the 1930’s, when agriculture was collectivized, the USSR was characterized by peasant farming of small individual tracts of land. Even before the revolution of 1917 the peasants owned 70% of all land in European Russia, and they leased a considerable portion of the remaining 30% which consisted of large estates. After the revolution, the estate land, with insignificant exceptions, was divided among the peasants who continued to till it on an individual basis but the state kept title to all land, and private ownership of land was legally abolished.

Most of the peasants lived in villages and not on separate farmsteads as in the United States. Cultivated areas were divided into a number of rather narrow strips, and the holding of each peasant family consisted of strips in each field, which were usually intermingled with strips of other families. The strip system in Russia, as in other European countries, was a result of the attempt to equalize holdings with respect to soil, topography, and distance from the village. Over a large part of Russia, such equalization was associated with the communal, repartitional type of land tenure, under which the land commune (*mir*) allotted holdings to its members on some uniform basis with general or partial repartitions of land at regular or irregular intervals. Under an hereditary system of land tenure, which prevailed in the western provinces of Russia, the strips resulted from successive division of holdings among heirs in the process of inheritance.

This scattered strip system of farming, although conducted on an individualistic basis, was usually associated with a common crop rotation, since it was difficult to plant different strips of the same field with crops of varying growing seasons and maturities, especially since the stubble frequently was used as pasture. Such a system of farming precluded the use of modern power machinery, involved considerable waste of land in boundaries between strips (providing a fertile breeding ground for weeds and pests), and wasted time in traveling from one field to another. During the decade preceding World War I, a strong effort was made by the government to promote consolidation of the scattered strip holdings into a single tract but such consolidated holdings were divided again during the revolution. Another consolidation of scattered holdings, on a much larger scale, occurred in the early thirties when Russian agriculture was collectivized, following a bitter struggle of the Kremlin with the [kulak] peasants....

(“European U.S.S.R. Resources and Trade”, Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Study, published in CIA archives, pp. IX-2 to IX-3) (IMG)

The remedy to this situation of the scattered agricultural holdings was collectivization, which would have:

transformed the narrow strips into large fields, suitable for modern power machinery, especially in the level steppe country. (“European U.S.S.R. Resources and Trade”, Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Study, published in CIA archives, p. IX-3) (IMG)

Collectivization was necessary for the improvement of agriculture because:

the kolkhoz ... represents the pooling of the holdings of formerly independent peasant farmers.... (“European U.S.S.R. Resources and Trade”, Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Study, published in CIA archives, p. IX-3) (IMG)

Thus, the USSR initiated a process of collectivization, which centralized the agricultural sector into cooperatives and contained the kulaks. The kulaks were a class of richer peasants who used their finances in order to act as rural quasi-bankers, exploiting the poorer peasants by, for example, entering them into debt traps. The strengthening of the poorer peasants through the amalgamation of their lands into cooperatives would have rendered the peasantry into a strong force capable of resisting the comprador and parasitic classes, including the kulaks. The petit-bourgeoisie on their own have businesses so small that they cannot take the risk of standing up to the powerful parasitic classes. Yet, when the petit-bourgeoisie amalgamate their small businesses into bigger businesses through the formation of cooperatives, they, like the anti-colonial national bourgeoisie, gain the economic strength and cushion that allows them to take the risk of standing up against the comprador and anti-productive classes. The Soviet state policy therefore was on the one hand economically centralizing and mechanizing agriculture so to render it more efficient, transforming the petit-bourgeoisie into cooperativists, and systematically containing the kulaks.

However, every correct policy always is faced with the pincer assault of liberalizers/capitulationists from the right and the extremists/adventurists from the left. The correct policy of centralizing agricultural sector into cooperatives met on the one hand the resistance of the Bukharinites who favored the kulaks, supported rural uprisings, and blatantly denounced collectivization, and the Trotskyite adventurists who, in the name of the Soviet Union, deliberately carried out forced collectivization so to discredit collectivization and thereby discredit the Soviet state itself. Naturally, the Trotskyites and the Bukharinites – representing the left and right flanks of the pincer assault on collectivization – were covertly allied despite being

'hostile' to each other on the overt level, as documented previously. Furthermore, in a July 11, 1928 conversation with Kamenev, Nikolai Bukharin had remarked:

Stalin has bought off the Ukrainians by removing Kaganovich from [his post] there. We have great potential strength but ... Stalin's retreat on extraordinary measures has made our attack on him more difficult. ('The Kirov Murder and Soviet History', Yale University Press, Matthew Lenoe. Presenting: memorandum of conversation between Kamenev and Bukharin as organized by Sokolnikov.) (IMG)

While the document belongs to the year 1928, it actually reveals Bukharin's thinking. The MI6 agent Bukharin was launching the classic imperialist-fascist secret service strategy of pincer assault on collectivization: on the one hand, he wanted excess 'collectivization' and on the other hand he wanted no collectivization. Covertly, he wanted the pace of the 'collectivization' to be too fast, so that farmers would be forced and terrorized into it, so that collectivization would be discredited and thereby abandoned. He therefore both supported excesses in 'collectivization' and de-collectivization. This is also a reflection of his alliance as a right-deviationist with the Trotskyite left-deviation. On the overt level, however, he simply always presented himself as a supporter of de-collectivization or of a dramatic slow-down in its pace.

Stalin slowed down the pace of revolutionary change, a measure which set him at odds with the Trotskyites who sought to speed things up, and a measure that compelled the Bukharinites yet again to support Stalin on the overt level. In the July 11, 1928 secret meeting with Kamenev, Bukharin said:

Stalin's retreat on extraordinary measures has made our attack on him more difficult. We don't want to act as schismatics, because then they'll smash us. (The Kirov Murder and Soviet History, Yale University Press, Matthew Lenoe) (IMG)

Regarding Stalin's 'retreats', the CIA too stated:

It should be noted, however, that Stalin has manifested caution in making his recommendations, and that in the past he has shown no compunction to retreat in the face of strong opposition. (STALIN'S AGRICULTURAL POLICY, Staff Memorandum No. 313, Office of National Estimates, CIA, January 1953, p. 5) (IMG)

Stalin, it must be noted, was not really retreating as much per se; rather he was slowing down pace in order to contain the Trotskyite attempts which sought to speed up the pace too much in order to provoke rural counter-revolutionary uprisings. And this compelled the Bukharinites to publicly support him, even though the Bukharinites continued their anti-Stalin conspiracies behind the scenes.

Stalin on the other hand, exploited the overt-level hostilities of the Bukharinites and the Trotskyites in order to adjust the pace of collectivization. When collectivization was too slow, he would appeal to the Trotskyites to speed it up, and when collectivization was too fast, he would tacitly 'support' the Bukharinites to slow it down. In so doing, the Stalin faction of the Party was able to adjust the pace of collectivization, carry forward with its politico-economic agenda, while also exploiting the overt 'hostilities' of the Bukharin-Trotsky groups, so to undermine the covert network of alliance of the Bukharinites and Trotskyites. When Bukharin said that Stalin 'changes his theories according to the need he has of getting rid of somebody at such-and-such a moment', he was pointing to this fact albeit in a manner that actually was aimed at distorting the truth. These facts are mentioned in greater detail in C5S1.

With the campaign for agricultural collectivization and industrialization being in full swing, the MI6 agent Nikolai Bukharin emerged as the mastermind of the conspiracy to sabotage the Soviet state's projects every single step of the way. He engineered waves of kulak rebellions throughout the USSR. The Britain-based MI6 spy and former Soviet military official Grigori Tokaev confirmed in his memoirs that the MI6 agent Bukharin:

had organised peasant uprisings, particularly in the North Caucasus, where Slepkov, Eismont, Pivovarov, Beloborodov, Petrovsky, Zaitsev and others had acted in the name of Buryto. (Comrade X, Grigori Tokaev, 1956, p. 96) (IMG)

'Buryto' abbreviated:

the Bukharin-Rykov-Tomsky group. (Comrade X, Grigori Tokaev, 1956, p. 34) (IMG)

The comprador agents in the Soviet state organized death squads that would combat the Soviet government. This is important, for many wrongly assume that officials in the Soviet government were physically 'incapable' of organizing, training and funding fascist death squads that would rise up against the Soviet state. Referring to the activities of the bloc of the Right and Trotskyites, the British Embassy in Moscow reported:

Another form of activity carried out on behalf of the Fascist employers was the organisation of cadres of bandits and malcontents with a view to risings behind the Red army lines in the event of war. This activity was particularly pronounced in Uzbekistan, where the basmachis, the remnants of the kulaks and clergy and common criminals in concentration camps, were enrolled. (N 1253/26/38, No. 119, Viscount Chilston to Viscount Halifax - (Received March 11), Moscow, March 8, 1938. Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 318) (IMG)

The above document by Chilston was stated by Chilston himself to be tentative in its conclusions, though the remarks are already well-corroborated by the other sources that are definitive, rather than tentative, in concluding that organizing anti-Soviet armed revolts was done by the Soviet state officials in the bloc of the Right and Trotskyites.

Documenting the Great Purge of the officials who engaged in the economic sabotage in Georgia, an intelligence report by the British diplomatic corps in the USSR reported:

the trial took place in Tiflis from the 24th to the 26th August before the Supreme Court of the Georgian S.S.R. of eleven members of a Right Wing counter-revolutionary, terrorist organisation with its headquarters at Sinakhi. The trial ended by sentence of death being passed on seven of the defendants, the remainder being condemned to long terms of imprisonment. (...). The defendants ... were minor party and administrative officials in the Signakhi area and almost all ... seem to have been Georgians by race.... (N 4549/250/38, No. 431, Viscount Chilston to Mr. Eden, September 6, 1937; received September 10, 1937. Foreign Office (1937-1938), pp. 187-188) (IMG)

The right-wing terrorists, noted the intelligence document, were engaged in:

wrecking and terrorism designed to undermine the economic and military strength of the Soviet Union and also to hasten the defeat of the Soviet Union at the hands of foreign aggressors. One of their principal lines of attack was through the collective farm organisation. Here they did everything to create chaos in the working of the farms and discontent amongst the workers, deliberately injuring the crops and livestock and showing undue severity in imposing and collecting taxes. (...). In all this they had the support of the local People's Judge. (N 4549/250/38, No. 431, Viscount Chilston to Mr. Eden, September 6, 1937; received September 10, 1937. Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 188) (IMG)

The document above written by Britain's most prominent spy in the USSR at the time, Viscount Chilston, is not to be confused with another document also written by Chilston and cited elsewhere in the book; the latter document presented its conclusions as tentative in character, whereas the remarks in the above document are cited definitively and can be regarded as definitive conclusions by the MI6.

Trotskyite sabotage, and with it the purges of its perpetrators, swept the entire Soviet Union. For instance, in Kirghizstan, Esenomanov, the Commissar for Agriculture:

entrusted the working of the commissariat of Agriculture to wreckers and White Guardsists. In spite of warnings no action was taken against M. Esenomanov, who enjoyed the support of M. Isakeev, the president of the Council of People's Commissars, who had in his time also taken part in the Nationalist movement. M. Isakeev, although his political tendencies were well known in the party circles, was never called upon to give an explanation of his activities and continued to afford material support to wreckers and Nationalists, going so far as to obtain M. Ailchinov, formerly an active Nationalist, the post of secretary of the Central Executive Committee of the Kirghiz S.S.R. (N 4547/250/38, No. 428, Viscount Chilston to Mr. Eden, Moscow, September 4, 1937; received September 10, 1937. Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 185) (IMG)

There was plenty of agricultural sabotage throughout the USSR. In Byelorussia, for instance, a gang of wreckers in the CPSU were, according to the British Foreign Office,:

guilty of such severity towards the collective farmers that the latter have felt discouraged and the proper working of the farms has been interfered with. Yet others have given themselves up to riotous farming. (N 4124/3649/38, No. 374 E., Viscount Chilston to Mr. Eden, Moscow, August 3, 1937; Received August 13, 1937, p. 155) (IMG)

Later on, in the late 1930s, such officials were purged. There was a serious effort to demote incompetent officials to maximize efficiency. For instance:

by a decision of the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee M. A. S. Bubnov has been removed from his post of People's Commissar of Education for the R.S.F.S.R.... (...). As Commissar for Education he was probably a failure; (N 5231/771/38, No. 492, Viscount Chilston to Mr. Eden, Moscow, October 15, 1937; Received October 22, 1937. Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 212) (IMG)

The collective farmers sent letters to the central government of the USSR, thanking the state for the ruthless punishment of the saboteurs. As the British Embassy reported:

the collective farms welcome the decision of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. and the Central Committee of the Communist party (1) to liquidate 138 State farms which were "organized for the purpose of wrecking" and to transfer their lands to the collective farms; (2) to supply all collective farms with homesteads according to a fixed norm; (3) to transfer to the collective farms in perpetuity 480,000 hectares of forests; (4) to lower the rate for milk deliveries by half; and (5) to grant additional privileges to individual farmers joining the collective farms. (N 4124/3649/38, No. 374 E., Viscount Chilston to Mr. Eden, Moscow, August 3, 1937; Received August 13, 1937, p. 155) (IMG)

Again, the four quotes above are from MI6 documents not marked as 'tentative' in conclusion by their authors.

Since the start, the Stalin faction sought to neutralize such conspiracies aimed at systematically sabotaging agricultural collectivization. Regarding the excess speed in the pace of collectivization and the forceful implementation of collectivization in some areas by the early 1930s, the prominent US military official Kenneth Whiting wrote:

The Party began its campaign for collectivization by attacking the kulaks, or richer peasants, as early as the fall of 1928. The program was accelerated in 1929-30.... So rapid was the tempo that by March 1930 some 55 percent of all peasant households had been forced into collectives. At this point Stalin intervened and in his letter "Dizzy With Success" called for a slow-down and leniency. (Background Information on the Soviet Union, Air University, Maxwell Airbase, Alabama, United States Air Force, Documentary Research Division of the Aerospace Studies Institute, Kenneth R. Whiting, 1970, p. 32) (IMG)

Countless hostile anti-Soviet propagandists, Whiting himself included, have claimed that Stalin supported hasty and forced collectivization, and that his remarks in "Dizzy with Success" merely served as a veil of hypocrisy. Indeed, the author goes on to comment that Stalin's warning against unduly hasty collectivization:

was monstrous hypocrisy.... (Background Information on the Soviet Union, Air University, Maxwell Airbase, Alabama, United States Air Force, Documentary Research Division of the Aerospace Studies Institute, Kenneth R. Whiting, 1970, p. 32) (IMG)

Many such propagandists have refused to acknowledge that Stalin seriously meant to stop hasty and forceful collectivization. However, in the words of a US intelligence memorandum from the CIA Office of National Estimates (ONE),:

There are, I believe, strong reasons for taking Stalin's remarks on Soviet agriculture seriously. (...). Stalin cautioned against undue haste and emphasized the gradual introduction of the new policy. (STALIN'S AGRICULTURAL POLICY, Staff Memorandum No. 313, Office of National Estimates, CIA, January 19, 1953, p. 5) (IMG)

Referring to Stalin, the memorandum continued:

in his report to the XVth Party Congress in 1927 he stressed the need to collectivize "by example and persuasion." In that earlier period the lower echelons in bureaucracy pushed collectivization allegedly at a faster pace than the regime desired. (STALIN'S AGRICULTURAL POLICY, Staff Memorandum No. 313, Office of National Estimates, CIA, January 1953, p. 5) (IMG)

In his "Dizzy with Success," Stalin – whose remarks on agriculture were serious (as admitted by US intelligence) – argued:

The successes of our collective-farm policy are due, among other things, to the fact that it rests on the voluntary character of the collective-farm movement and on taking into account the diversity of conditions in the various regions of the U.S.S.R. Collective farms must not be established by force. That would be foolish and reactionary. The collective-farm movement must rest on the active support of the main mass of the peasantry. Examples of the formation of collective farms in the developed areas must not be mechanically transplanted to underdeveloped areas. That would be foolish and reactionary. Such a "policy" would discredit the collectivisation idea at one stroke. In determining the speed and methods of collective-farm development, careful consideration must be given to the diversity of conditions in the various regions of the U.S.S.R. (Dizzy with Success: Concerning Questions of the Collective-Farm Movement, First

Published: Pravda, No. 60, Joseph Stalin, March 2, 1930, Source: J. V. Stalin, Works, Vol. 12, pp. 197-205, Foreign Languages Publishing House: Moscow, 1955. Transcribed/HTML: Kenneth Higham and Mike B. retrieved from: Marxists Internet Archive. NS.)

As a result of Stalin's article which aimed to prevent forced collectivization,:

some 9 million out of the 14 million households dropped out of the collective farms in the first two months of the new policy. The carrot [i.e. persuasion] was now given more prominence than the stick [i.e. force]. (Background Information on the Soviet Union, Air University, Maxwell Airbase, Alabama, United States Air Force, Documentary Research Division of the Aerospace Studies Institute, Kenneth R. Whiting, 1970, p. 32) (IMG)

At this point, the Bukharinite enemies of the Stalin faction, felt compelled to support the Stalin faction since the Bukharinites officially favored the slow-down of the pace of collectivization.

One of the means of persuading the peasants to join the collectives was by the provision of the mechanization services through the machine-tractor stations (MTS), in exchange for a part of the peasants' agricultural produce. This again is in line with the historical materialist thesis that class struggles in the realm of property relations must occur strictly in conjunction with the development of the productive forces. The post-WWII American intelligence document by the US Army and Navy stated:

Tractors, combines, and other important farm implements are not owned by the kolkhozy, but by state machine-tractor stations, which supply the necessary power machinery and operators to the kolkhozy on the basis of annual agreements. For their services the machine-tractor stations are paid in kind by the kolkhozy at specified rates per hectare (2.471 acres). These rates vary with the officially determined crop yields in a district.

The machine-tractor stations usually have repair shops for tractors and combines, and also staffs of mechanics, agronomists, and officials to provide technical assistance and direction of the kolkhozy. Tractor drivers are paid by the kolkhozy on the basis of "labor days" earned, as are other collective farmers, except that minimum amounts of grain and cash per "labor day" are prescribed by law. Combine operators are paid by the machine-tractor stations.

("European U.S.S.R. Resources and Trade", Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Study, published in CIA archives, p. IX-4) (IMG)

The kolkhoz must also pay the state for the field work (plowing, seeding, harvesting) performed by state-owned tractors. ("European U.S.S.R. Resources and Trade", Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Study, published in CIA archives, p. IX-3) (IMG)

In addition:

When their earnings from the kolkhozy were small, the peasants often found it advantageous to work on their little plots and tend their few animals rather than to work in the collective fields, especially if they had the opportunity to sell their produce at good prices on the limited private market in a neighboring town. Kolkhozy members have a legal right to carry on such trade provided they do not use the services of a middleman. ("European U.S.S.R. Resources and Trade", Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Study, published in CIA archives, p. IX-3) (IMG)

"The state continues to own the land," the document continued,:

but each collective farm holds the land it occupies for an unlimited period, "in perpetuity," according to Article VIII of the Soviet Constitution. The title of the kolkhoz to the land is secured by a title deed issued after an official land survey is made. ("European U.S.S.R. Resources and Trade", Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Study, published in CIA archives, p. IX-3) (IMG)

In exchange for the use of Soviet state-owned land, the peasants paid in kind through their produce:

The state is a partner in collective farming and has the first claim on production. A kolkhoz must deliver to the government, at low fixed prices, a specified quantity of crops and livestock products per unit of land. ("European U.S.S.R. Resources and Trade", Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Study, published in CIA archives, p. IX-3)

Soviet policy also ensured that agricultural collectivization would not violate peasants' personal property. As confirmed by a post-WWII American intelligence report:

Only the land [use], horses, and other livestock ... and the farm machinery are collectivized. (...). In addition to their dwellings, each peasant family is entitled, if land is available, to a small plot for a kitchen garden and a small number of personally-owned cattle, hogs, sheep, and goats. But horses, except in nomadic regions, are collective property. A member of a kolkhoz who needs a horse for his own use must borrow it from the kolkhoz. ("European U.S.S.R. Resources and Trade", Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Study, published in CIA archives, p. IX-3) (IMG)

Thus,:

By assuring the peasants of private ownership of their homes, garden plots, livestock, and small tools, giving them preferential treatment in taxes, and setting up machine-tractor stations for the distribution of agricultural machinery, the government succeeded in enticing peasant households into the collective farms. By the end of 1932 some 14 million households were collectivized. (Background Information on the Soviet Union, Air University, Maxwell Airbase, Alabama, United States Air Force, Documentary Research Division of the Aerospace Studies Institute, Kenneth R. Whiting, 1970, p. 32) (IMG)

However, Anglo-American media has argued since the 1930s, collectivization was a means to launch a genocide. Upon Stalin's 'orders', the imperialist press has famously asserted, the Soviet state launched a genocidal campaign of deliberately starving its own population, particularly the peasants of Ukraine and Kazakhstan. Millions of pages have been printed to 'prove' that 'Stalin' – as if the policies of the USSR were all dictated by one man only – deliberately created famine and subsequently covered up 'his crimes'.

By contrast, the explanation of the Soviet government regarding the famines in this period has been that in part they were caused by natural cycles of famine and partly due to sabotage operations by the kulaks, the rich peasants who made up the ruling class of the agrarian zones. The Soviet claims have been implicitly – though clearly – rejected as Soviet propaganda by such professional anti-Soviet propagandists as Robert Conquest, Anne Applebaum, and Norman Naimark:

However, reports of the famine were hard to suppress entirely. The next line of defence is two-fold: that there was indeed malnutrition, and even an increase in the death rate, and that the responsibility for this was the recalcitrance of the peasants who had refused to sow or reap properly. The Soviet Government's need for grain was attributed to the requirements of the Army, a war with Japan being supposedly expected.

The admission of an increase in the death rate was permitted to journalists running a pro-Soviet line, who were, as we have seen, even able to say that there was no famine - only an excess of some two million deaths! This too confused the issue by its implication that such figures did not amount to much. The recalcitrance of the peasantry was, of course, in accord with the official line that kulaks were sabotaging the crop in various ways: it too was made good use of in the West.

Between them, these amounted to an admission that there was indeed something most people would call a famine, but that it was not the Soviet's fault, and was not as serious as malignant propaganda had reported.

(The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine, Robert Conquest, 2002. No Images)

Whereas, in 1921, the Soviet leadership had spoken of starving peasants as victims, in 1933, Stalin switched the vocabulary. Those who were starving were not victims; they were perpetrators. They were not sufferers; they were responsible for their terrible fate. They had caused the famine, and therefore they deserved to die. From this assessment came the logical conclusion: the state was justified in refusing to help them stay alive.

This was the argument that Stalin would advocate for the rest of his life. He never denied, to Sholokhov or to anyone else, that peasants had died from a famine caused by state policy in 1933, and he certainly never apologized. He clearly read Sholokhov's missives, and took them seriously enough to respond. But he never admitted that any important element of his policy – not collectivization, not grain expropriation, not the searches and shakedowns that had intensified the famine in Ukraine — was wrong. Instead, he placed all responsibility for food shortages and mass deaths firmly onto the shoulders of those who were dying.

This is certainly what he told his party. During the Congress of Victors at the beginning of 1934, where Stalin had denounced nationalism, he also predicted further violence. “We have defeated the kulaks,” he declared, but the liquidation was not yet complete. Agents of the old regime – “former people,” as he called them – could still do a good deal of harm. More to the point, the party should expect more resistance from these “moribund classes”: “It is precisely because they are dying and their days are numbered that they will go on from one form of attack to another, sharper form, appealing to the backward sections of the population and mobilizing them against the Soviet regime.”

(Red Famine: Stalin's War on Ukraine, Anne Applebaum, 2017. No Images.)

By contrast, as the crisis worsened in the course of 1933, Stalin, Molotov, Kaganovich, and others in charge of dealing with requisitioning and punishing resistance increasingly tended to blame the Ukrainians for the famine (a shift from blaming the kulaks!). (Stalin's Genocides, Norman Naimark, p. 74. No Images.)

Though none of the above excerpts explicitly claim that the Soviet charges against the kulaks were falsified, it was quite clear that the Soviet narrative on the Ukraine famine was being rejected by the authors.

On the deliberate starvation of the peasant population allegedly committed by the Soviet state, the argument made is that the Soviet state forcibly collected the agricultural produce of the peasants, thereby starving them to death. This is a profound historiographic distortion of Soviet policy. Actually as stated previously, the peasants were to deliver part of their produce to the government **in exchange for** the state provisions of mechanization and tractor services as well as land use rights. This policy was not the cause of the famine.

In contrast to the claims of numerous CIA-funded anti-Soviet publications, the US intelligence itself reported as early as December 1946 – only nine months after Churchill's ‘Iron Curtain’ Speech, the official Anglo-Americans declaration of the Cold War – that the Soviet government was aiming to prevent famines from occurring, whereas the kulaks were the main human factor for the famine.

In May 2003, the CIA publicly released an intelligence document labelled as “Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Study” on the “European U.S.S.R. Health and Sanitation.” Having remained classified for years, its distribution to unauthorized persons was prohibited by the Espionage Act.

The following is an excerpt of the intelligence document:

The food situation has always been a very serious matter in the USSR. Famines occurred about once in every 10 years, and serious crop failures once in 5 years. In the nineteenth century alone, famines occurred in the years 1822, 1833, 1840, 1873, 1880, 1883, 1891, 1892, 1898. and 1899. The disturbance created by civil war, foreign intervention, and boycott, after the Russian Revolution, resulted in the disastrous famine of 1920 to 1922 which cost the country numberless human lives and endless suffering. The famine caused mass migration in a search for food and contributed to the spreading of epidemics.

The Soviet Government decided to solve the problem of food and famine by collectivization and mechanization of agriculture. This proved to be a failure at the end of the first Five-year Plan, and in 1932 the U.S.S.R. experienced a disastrous famine again. The failure was caused by lack of cooperation on the part of the “kulaks” (rich peasants), who openly sabotaged the government's plan. However, in 1933 all forces were mobilized to remedy the kulak situation, and since then the U.S.S.R. has been having record crops and no major problems except those resulting from war and drought.

(Joint Army Navy Intelligence Study European U.S.S.R. Health and Sanitation, CIA, December 1946, pp. XI-5-6) (IMG)

In case the above paragraphs do not make sense to the reader, the following is a break-down.

Referring to the territory of the former Russian Empire and later the Soviet Union, the US intelligence file stated that cyclical:

Famines occurred about once in every 10 years.... (Joint Army Navy Intelligence Study European U.S.S.R. Health and Sanitation, CIA, December 1946, p. XI-5) (IMG)

The previous famine as the document suggests was in:

1922.... (Joint Army Navy Intelligence Study European U.S.S.R. Health and Sanitation, CIA, December 1946, p. XI-6) (IMG)

Therefore, the next natural famine was expected to be in $1922 + 10 = 1932$. 1932 indeed was the year of the famine. However, the intelligence document pointed out,:

The Soviet Government decided to solve the problem of food and famine.... (Joint Army Navy Intelligence Study European U.S.S.R. Health and Sanitation, CIA, December 1946, p. XI-6) (IMG)

The above quote absolutely clarifies that the intention of the Soviet Government was to ‘solve the problem of food and famine’ and thereby prevent those deaths from happening. The US intelligence report, therefore, practically rejects the narrative that the Soviet Government carried out a genocide

because intending to deliberately exterminate an ethnic group is a key component of genocides. The attempt to ‘solve the problem of food and famine’ was through the:

collectivization and mechanization of agriculture. (Joint Army Navy Intelligence Study European U.S.S.R. Health and Sanitation, CIA, December 1946, p. XI-6) (IMG)

However, this attempt:

proved to be a failure at the end of the first Five-year Plan.... (Joint Army Navy Intelligence Study European U.S.S.R. Health and Sanitation, CIA, December 1946, p. XI-6) (IMG)

not because the collectivization and mechanization of agriculture were supposedly bad ideas, but rather because of the:

lack of cooperation on the part of the “kulaks” (rich peasants), who openly sabotaged the government’s plan [for ending the famine]. (Joint Army Navy Intelligence Study European USSR, p. XI-6)

The Anglo-German intelligence agent Bukharin and his gang were responsible for this crime against humanity, because they were the ones who fomented a kulak rebellion against the Soviet state, causing agricultural sabotage. The Britain-based MI6 spy and former Soviet military official Grigori Tokaev confirmed in his memoirs that the MI6 agent Bukharin:

had organised peasant uprisings, particularly in the North Caucasus, where Slepkov, Eismont, Pivovarov, Beloborodov, Petrovsky, Zaitsev and others had acted in the name of Buryto. (Comrade X, Grigori Tokaev, 1956, p. 96) (IMG)

‘Buryto’ abbreviated:

the Bukharin-Rykov-Tomsky group. (Comrade X, Grigori Tokaev, 1956, p. 34) (IMG)

Consequently:

in 1932 the U.S.S.R. experienced a disastrous famine again. (Joint Army Navy Intelligence Study European U.S.S.R. Health and Sanitation, CIA, December 1946, p. XI-6) (IMG)

In short, while a cyclical famine was expected to occur in 1932, kulak sabotage was the main human factor for the Ukraine Famine that year. To put an end to the sabotage:

in 1933 all forces were mobilized to remedy the kulak situation.... (Joint Army Navy Intelligence Study European U.S.S.R. Health and Sanitation, CIA, December 1946, p. XI-6) (IMG)

and:

since [the time of the crackdown on kulaks] the U.S.S.R. has been having record crops and no major problems except those resulting from war and drought. (Joint Army Navy Intelligence Study European U.S.S.R. Health and Sanitation, CIA, December 1946, p. XI-6) (IMG)

Collectivization of agriculture enlarged the lands and thereby allowed room for mechanization. The consolidation of the lands into cooperatives was a major step that centralized agriculture, in conjunction with Soviet state’s industrial assistance (MTS) in order to yield the development of the productive forces. In the words of US Army-Navy intelligence:

The elimination of boundaries transformed the narrow strips into large fields, suitable for modern power machinery, especially in the level steppe country. The peasant families, having thus pooled their holdings, continue to live in their own dwellings in villages. (“European U.S.S.R. Resources and Trade”, Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Study, published in CIA archives, p. IX-3) (IMG)

To summarize: (1) A cyclical, natural famine was to occur 1932. (2) The Soviet government aimed to end the cycles of famine through collectivization and mechanization of agriculture. (3) The central government of the USSR aimed to prevent collectivization from being forced upon the peasantry. (4) Throughout the Soviet Union – especially Kazakhstan and Ukraine – these plans temporarily failed due to the sabotage by the financier peasants also known as the kulaks. (5) Once the kulak situation was remedied and the collectivization and mechanization of agriculture occurred, never again did the Soviet people face a famine except during and briefly after World War II which had temporarily damaged Soviet agriculture.

Another aspect of the hostile anti-Soviet propaganda is the exaggeration of the mortality statistics regarding the famine. To be sure, the exaggeration of the mortality statistics is superficially ‘beneficial’ to the Stalin faction and the Soviet state since it exposes the statistical extent of the crimes against humanity committed by the kulak rebels and the Bukharin intelligence network. Needless to say is that the purpose here is to expose the truth instead of moulding and torturing the facts into a ‘Soviet apologist’ narrative. The Party’s resistance against the Bukharinite-kulak crimes against humanity prevented the death toll from rising to such an exaggerated level. Statistics provided by the CIA’s Office of Research and Reports (ORR) can help debunk the myths regarding the death toll. Of course, in this process, as with any other statistical estimate, there will inherently be some assumptions that are flawed, but which are overall useful. Therefore, it is hoped that the reader, in judging the statistical procedures used here, would take this fact into account.

The territory controlled by Tsarist Russia between 1897 and 1913, though not the same, was similar to the territory controlled by the USSR. The main difference was that Finland and the Baltics were a part of Tsarist Russia at that period as well. Overall, Tsarist Russia’s geography stayed stable. Therefore, it is logical to say that the population and its growth rates would be relatively stable.

In nature, population growth occurs exponentially. Generally, populations do not grow such that 1000 people are added to it every year, but rather grow by being multiplied yearly by an average of, for instance, 2 percent. Hence, the first thing to take into account for the death toll of the famine is the population exponential growth coefficient. Where ‘y2’ is ‘year 2’, ‘y1’ is ‘year 1’, ‘p2’ is population for y2, and ‘p1’ is population for y1, the Population Growth Coefficient ‘r’ would be as follows:

$$\text{Growth Coefficient} = r = \left(\frac{p2}{p1}\right)^{\frac{1}{(y2-y1)}}$$

Example: Growth Coefficient for the period 1897-1900 can be calculated as follows:

$$r = \left(\frac{131.7}{125.6}\right)^{\frac{1}{(1900-1897)}} = 1.01619386$$

The table below shows the population of the territory of the Soviet Union and its Tsarist Russian predecessor (middle column). The statistics for the population is provided by an economic intelligence report of the CIA's Office of Research and Reports, whereas the column on the right represents the population growth coefficient as calculated according to the method shown above.

Year = y	Population (Millions) = p	Growth Coefficient = r
1897	125.6	1.015933728
1900	131.7	1.01619386
1902	136	1.015859713
1913	161.7	0.992695258
1926	147	1.011473219
1939	170.5	

My calculation of population Growth Coefficient (r) based on CIA data.

Note: the 1954 CIA document, upon the statistics of which the estimates are being made here, presents data both for the pre-1954 period and the projected populations statistics for the USSR for all the way to 1975. The document states that the projected population data is calculated by the US Census Bureau. For the pre-1954 period, however, the CIA does not state that that it obtained the data from any other source than the CIA. See the following for the CIA statistics: (LONG-RUN SOVIET ECONOMIC GROWTH, Economic Intelligence Report, Office of Research and Reports, CIA, December 23, 1954, p. 72) (IMG)

The next step would be to use the Growth Coefficient r so to estimate the populations for the years 1932 and 1933, the years of the famine in the USSR. As bolded in the above table, the growth coefficient for the year 1926 is 1.011473219; on the other hand, the CIA did not provide any data for the years in between 1926 and 1939, which is why the populations for the years 1932 and 1933 have to be estimated based on the CIA data. The procedure for doing that is not difficult. Step 1: find the difference in the number of years between 1932 and 1926, and between 1933 and 1926, which would obviously be 6 and 7 respectively. Step 2: have the Population Growth Coefficient 'r' to the power of 6, and also to power of 7, to get r^6 and r^7 . Step 3: multiply r^6 by the population for the year 1926, and multiply r^7 by the population for the year 1926 as well. The point of such a multiplication is obvious enough – by multiplying those 'powered' growth rates by the 1926 population, one is basically multiplying the 1926 population by its corresponding growth coefficient 6 and 7 times in order to find the populations of 1932 and 1933 respectively. The mathematical procedure is shown below. Where 'p_y' is the population for the specific year 'y', we have:

$$p_y = (p_{1926})(r^{n-1926})$$

$$p_{1932} = (147)(1.011473219^{1932-1926}) = (147)(1.011473219^6) = 157.4141124$$

$$p_{1933} = (147)(1.011473219^{1933-1926}) = (147)(1.011473219^7) = 159.2201589$$

The same kind of procedure was repeated for all the years between 1926 and 1939, and has been shown in the table below.

Year	Estimated Population (in millions not rounded)
1926	147
1927	148.6865632
1928	150.3924767
1929	152.1179625
1930	153.8632452
1931	155.6285519
1932	157.4141124
1933	159.220159
1934	161.0469267
1935	162.8946534
1936	164.7635794
1937	166.6539481
1938	168.5660053
1939	170.5

From here, it is necessary to find one yearly natural population growth coefficient in the territory of the former Russian Empire and Soviet Union. The point of finding this one yearly natural population growth coefficient is to find its difference with the growth coefficient corresponding to the 1926-1939 period, which, as bolded previously, is 1.011473219. Such a difference would in turn reflect the amount of decline in the growth coefficient, which can then be multiplied by the population for each of the years 1932 and 1933 so to find the sum {mortality plus the decline in births

resultant from the mortality}, for each of those years respectively; then, the last step would be to add the products of multiplication, so to calculate the total amount of {mortality plus the resultant birth decline} for the years 1932 to 1933. It is worth emphasizing that the figure that would be obtained would not be the mortality but would be mortality in addition to the birth decline, the birth decline in this case reflecting the loss in births caused in the first place by the mortality of adults who would have given birth had they been alive. In other words, imagine if the people who actually died as a result of the famine continued to live on; how many children would these people have given birth to? That represents the birth decline resultant from the mortality.

Again, for all of this, the first step is to find the one yearly natural population growth coefficient. In order for the growth coefficient to be natural (or natural enough), the growth coefficient has to somehow exclude the factors of (1) wars occurring, which would cause an artificial decline in population, (2) Soviet or Tsarist-Russian territory shrinking, which would cause an artificial decline in population, and (3) Soviet or Tsarist-Russian territory expanding, which would cause an artificial rise in population.

Obviously, during the time of the Soviet years prior to the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet territory neither shrank much nor expanded, after the Civil War. And the Civil War itself was a war and hence an artificial factor for the decline of the population; the Civil War also involved the net shrinkage of the territory of the former Russian Empire, such as in Finland and the Baltics, and hence an artificial population decrease. The original CIA data provided the year 1926 as the first datapoint after the October Revolution and Civil War, and the year 1939 as the first datapoint for after 1926. Hence, the CIA data does not provide as much insight on the natural population growth coefficient. For this reason, the Soviet years are excluded. Instead, one has to look at the years of the Russian Empire in the recent centuries.

The period 1897-1913 would be optimum for the calculations here. The year 1913 was the year before World War I, and, compared to the other periods in the Russian Imperial history, the years between 1897 and 1913 saw a relatively high degree of stability in the territorial reach of Tsarist Russia. Russia briefly occupied Manchuria in 1900, but could not absorb that territory into its Empire and was quickly forced into retreat. The fact that the territory of Russia neither expanded much nor shrank could help minimize the factor of territorial change as a cause for population change. The population growth therefore can be regarded as natural enough. Still, it is worth reminding that the slight expansion of the Russian Empire probably would have artificially expanded the population, and that the treatment of such an artificial expansion of population as ‘natural enough’ would lead to exaggerated figures on mortality during the Soviet years. As will be seen later in this section, this period 1897-1913 would actually surprisingly prove to be far more optimum for being used for estimations, than may at first appear.

The next step is to calculate the yearly growth coefficient for the years 1897 to 1913. The data available by the CIA document for period 1897-1913 is only with regards to the years 1897, 1900, 1902, and 1913. This means that the number for each year does not increase in an interval; in other words, it is not the case that the data is presented, for example, for every four years: 1897, 1901, 1905, 1909, 1913. Since such an interval does not exist, there are two main ways to find the population growth coefficient for the years 1897-1913. Method 2 is preferable over Method 1.

Method 1

The first method is to find the ‘weighted average’. This involves the following steps:

Step 1 - Find the growth coefficients for the years 1897-1900, 1900-1902, and 1902-1913. This step has already been taken and the figures have been presented in the table before the above.

Step 2 - Find the difference between each of those years. This is easy; 1900 – 1897 = 3; 1902 – 1900 = 2; and 1913 – 1902 = 11.

Step 3 - Multiply the year differences found in step 2 by the growth coefficients that correspond to those periods found in step 1.

Step 4 - Add the product of those multiplications, and then divide the sum of those products by the number of years between 1897 and 1913 (which is 1913 – 1897 = 16).

The result, which would be the weighted average, can be regarded as the one yearly natural population growth coefficient looked for. As explained previously, this natural population growth coefficient has to be subtracted with the growth coefficient for 1926, the $r_{1926} = 1.011440208$, in order to then be multiplied by the sum of the estimated populations of 1932 and 1933, so to calculate the total population loss for those years. The result would be as follows:

$$\text{Average Growth Coefficient} = \frac{\sum_{1897}^{1913}[(y_2 - y_1)r]}{1913 - 1897} = \frac{(1900 - 1897)(1.015933728) + (1902 - 1900)(1.01619386) + (1913 - 1902)(1.015859713)}{1913 - 1897} = 1.015915359$$

$$(\text{Estimated Population for 1932} + \text{Estimated Population for 1933})(\text{Average Growth Coefficient} - r_{1926}) = (157.414112 + 159.220159)(1.015915359 - 1.011473219) = 1.406533762$$

The calculations based on method 1 and relying on CIA data show that the sum of the mortality and birth decline resultant from the 1932-1933 famine in the USSR (including Ukraine **and** Kazakhstan SSRs) was 1.406534 million, or 1,406,534. Note that the inclusion of the birth decline in the figure indicates that the **mortality figure throughout the Soviet Union was significantly**, though in unknown amounts due to the absence of available CIA statistics on the birth rates, **smaller than 1,406,534**.

Method 2

Method 1 has its obvious merits; it finds the average and ensures that the average is weighted. It therefore helps adjust for the fact that the data from the CIA is not provided in intervals. However, since finding averages inherently deals with summation, average growth coefficient and average growth rate is useful for finding the growth rate for things that grow almost arithmetically; however, in the context of the exponential growth of the population, while certainly the weighted average would still be useful, there is another way to find the one yearly natural population growth coefficient looked for. Thus, the second way, would be to calculate the exponential growth coefficient for the years 1897-1913, without involving the arithmetic methods such as average. To find one yearly natural population growth coefficient while excluding the arithmetic methods, find the growth coefficient

for the years 1897-1913 such that the data for the years during this period – that is, the data for the years 1900 and 1902 – is excluded, because it is that data which creates the requirement for finding the weighted average and hence the incorporation of the arithmetic methods in the first place. Hence, for $y_2 = 1913$ and $y_1 = 1897$, we have:

$$\text{Growth Coefficient} = r = \left(\frac{p_2}{p_1}\right)^{\frac{1}{(y_2 - y_1)}}$$

$$r = \left(\frac{161.7}{125.6}\right)^{\frac{1}{(1913 - 1897)}} = 1.015915353$$

$$\begin{aligned} (\text{Estimated Population for 1932} + \text{Estimated Population for 1933})(\text{Average Growth Coefficient} - r_{1926}) &= (157.414112 + 159.220159)(1.015915353 \\ &- 1.011473219) \\ &= 1.406532 \end{aligned}$$

Comparing the results of the two methods, we find that the one natural coefficient for growth is 1.015915359 for method 1 and 1.015915353 for method two, thus having a difference of only 0.000000006. This shows that both methods result in extremely close answers. The fact of the high level of similarity between the answers of the two methods strengthens the view that the years 1897-1913 chosen for finding the natural growth coefficient are the best years to examine, because had there been dramatic fluctuations in the population growth during those years, the answers for methods 1 and 2 could be radically different.

On the other hand, the sum of mortality and the resultant birth decline as calculated above using method 2 is 1,406,532, whereas for method 1 it was 1,406,534. That marks a difference of 2 persons. Again, note that the figure represents not the mortality from the famine, but rather the {mortality plus the resultant birth decline}. If one is to assume that those who died would have remained alive and as couples would have given birth to two children per couple, that would have meant that the birth decline was half of the 1,406,534 figure, meaning that the other half, the mortality, would have been 703,267. Therefore, the total mortality as a result of the 1932-1933 famine was somewhere in between 703,267 and 1,406,534. This means that the number of people murdered through starvation to death by the British intelligence agent Bukharin, his network within the Soviet Party and state apparatuses, and his kulak rebels, was less than 1,406,534 and most likely above 703,267.

Whereas the Stalin faction of the Soviet government was not at all responsible for a genocide, the Bukharinite agents of the MI6 within the Soviet state and their kulak allies carried out a mass-slaughter – if not a genocide – against the Soviet people. During the time in which they were busy carrying out such an intelligence war of extermination, the Bukharinites had the MI6 agent Trotsky and the Trotskyites as their accomplices. On the other hand, the Soviet state and the Stalin faction, which arose out of the blue-collar workers’ faction of the CPSU, resisted such crimes. Eventually, the Bukharinites and Trotskyites were prosecuted for their crimes against humanity.

Another myth is that collectivization was a means by which the Soviet state ‘re-enslaved’ the peasants. Not true. Agricultural collectives, by the nature of their property relations were not socialized public property but rather cooperativist/collective property. Firstly, unlike in state enterprises in which large factories were run under the principles of one-man management, the kolkhoz peasantry elected their officers. “[T]he kolkhoz,” the US intelligence reported,:

elects its officers by majority vote, and manages its own affair within limits set by government plans and regulations. (“European U.S.S.R. Resources and Trade”, Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Study, published in CIA archives, p. IX-3) (IMG)

Regulated, rather than controlled by, the Soviet state, the cooperatives therefore would engage in market competition and thereby help drive down the price of food for the consumer masses. The cooperative market sales would help provide wages according to the amount of work done by each kolkhoz peasant. The US intelligence reported:

After the obligations to the state are met, seed supplies assembled for the next year's sowing, and other required reserves set up, the remainder is available for distribution by the kolkhoz to its members. The kolkhoz may sell some of its produce to the government at somewhat higher prices than those fixed for compulsory deliveries, and thereby also secure the privilege of purchasing some manufactured products in short supply. It may sell some of its produce on the free private market in the neighboring town at uncontrolled prices, which are usually higher than the prices paid by the state. As no middleman can be legally employed in this process, such trade is limited in scope.

The remainder of the kolkhoz output is distributed in kind among the members, as is the cash income after the necessary expenses of production are met and required appropriations to capital are made. Distribution in kind and in cash is made on a sort of piece-work basis, according to the quantity, skill, and quality of work performed. Work is measured in special units called "labor days." The greater the skill required in a particular task, and the greater the quantity of work done, the larger the payment assessed in terms of "labor days." Bonuses for better quality of work, resulting in higher yields of crops or livestock products, have also been provided in terms of additional "labor days." Inferior quality of work is punishable by reduction in the number of "labor days" assessed. The total number of "labor days" credited to all members of the collective farms are added up at the end of the year, and the income to be distributed, in cash and in kind, is divided by the total number of "labor days."

Each "labor day," therefore, entitles a member of the collective farm to a certain quantity of the product and cash, and, since the number of "labor days" credited to different members of the kolkhoz varies, their earnings also differ. The earnings of individuals and families show considerable variation in the same kolkhoz. There are even greater variations as between different kolkhozy, since the quantities distributed per "labor day" vary from kolkhoz to kolkhoz, depending upon such factors as efficiency of management, fertility of the soil, type of equipment, distance to town markets, and weather conditions, which vary from region to region.

(“European U.S.S.R. Resources and Trade”, Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Study, published in CIA archives, p. IX-3) (IMG)

“The government,” the US intelligence document continued,:

concerns itself directly with problems of seed and forage supply, timely and efficient sowing and harvesting, proper care of livestock, crop rotation, internal organization of the farm unit, and many others. Crop acreages and even yields per acre, and numbers of livestock,

are directed by national plans, establishing the goals for republics and provinces. Local goals are set up by republic and province authorities. ("European U.S.S.R. Resources and Trade", Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Study, published in CIA archives, p. IX-3) (IMG) The kolkhoz peasants, as was mentioned previously, had the right to engage in some personal farming as well, within the regulations set by the government. The US intelligence reported:

In 1937 this personal farming by members of the kolkhozy was estimated to yield over one-fifth of total agricultural production. In 1939 the government decided to limit this type of farming, which competed with collective farming, by fixing a minimum required time for each member to devote to collective work. Members of collective farms, both men and women, who consistently fall below the minimum are liable to expulsion [from the kolkhoz] and loss of their plots of land. ("European U.S.S.R. Resources and Trade", Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Study, published in CIA archives, p. IX-3) (IMG)

C5S4. The Truth about the Corrective Labour Camps ('Gulag') *** IMG-All-{Corrective Labour Camps }

The CIA-funded media presents the Soviet state as having enslaved individuals, sending them to the corrective labour camps, the Gulags. The prisoners were not enslaved, firstly because they had given up their liberty on their own by committing crimes, and secondly because they were materially rewarded for their work in the form of payments or in kind.

A September 1952 US State Department document stated:

The utilization of food, as an incentive to work, to be diminished or increased with the work or performance of the prisoner, is perhaps a unique feature of the Soviet corrective labor system. This principle receives official sanction in the regulation governing corrective labor camps. The Regulations for the Supply of the Ukhta.Pechora NKDV Corrective-Labor Camp, issued in May 1937, states in section 1, paragraph 2, that "in distributing the food supplies a system must be followed whereby the quantity of products issued to the prisoners rises in proportion to the rate of fulfillment (or overfulfillment) of the norm." (Forced Labor in the Soviet Union, US State Department, Division of Publications, Office of Public Affairs, Department of State Publication 4716, European and British Commonwealth Series No. 37, September 1952, p. 50) (IMG)

The September 1952 US State Department document, referring to the prisoner workers in the Soviet corrective labour camps, stated:

Practically all workers, even those engaged in labor where piece-rate determination is difficult, such as snow removal, are judged on a piece-rate basis. Specialists and persons such as electricians, engineers, and doctors are considered as fulfilling 100 percent of the norm. (Forced Labor in the Soviet Union, US State Department, Division of Publications, Office of Public Affairs, Department of State Publication 4716, European and British Commonwealth Series No. 37, September 1952, p. 50) (IMG)

Hence, the US State Department document was confirming that by 1952 the piece-rate wage system was the system of rewards given to all the prisoner workers in the Soviet Union; before then, the prisoners were materially rewarded by the amount of food they received.

The above-cited US State Department document was concerning all of the corrective labour camps, the gulag system in general, in the USSR. However, the CIA provided details of specific labour camps. That the prisoners were paid is also confirmed by the CIA's Office of Research and Report, which is one of the bodies responsible for collecting the different reports by individual CIA operatives, dissecting the corroborated/validated points among them and placing them together into a single report. This fact is important because it means that the remarks by the CIA's Office of Research and Report are based on not just one source, but several sources. In this document, the CIA's Office of Research and Report stated:

Beginning in 1950-51, prisoners in some camps began to, receive wages for their work, and by the end of 1953 this practice had been extended to all camps. Prisoners were paid for their work on the basis of wage rates and norms applicable to free workers, except that forced laborers were not paid the special bonuses for work in areas and for length of service. (FORCED LABOR IN THE USSR 1953-57, CIA, Office of Research and Reports, September 12, 1958, p. 14) (IMG)

The report by the Office of Research and Reports continued:

In 1950-51 the system of *zachet* under which the prisoner was able to reduce his term of imprisonment by overfulfilling his work norm, was introduced in a few camps and was liberalized and extended throughout the camp system during 1953-1954. (FORCED LABOR IN THE USSR 1953-57, CIA, Office of Research and Reports, September 12, 1958, p. 15) (IMG)

Other US intelligence reports pretty consistently corroborate the fact that the Gulag inmates/prisoners were paid for their work. Some of these other US intelligence documents focus on specific camps that were of prime importance. There was one CIA report about the different types of corrective labor camps in the USSR and explains some of the aspects of these camps:

1. The following report mentions several different **types** of forced labor camps in the USSR, viz.:

a. Minlag: A camp maintained by the MGB for political prisoners. Minlag is an abbreviation of ministralnaya lagernaya chast MGB. The meaning of ministralnaya is said to be that the camp is central one with certain responsibilities for dependent camps.

b. Gorlag: A camp maintained by the MGB for political prisoners, at which special precautions against escape are taken. Gorlag is an abbreviation of gosudarstvennyy osobozhimmnyy lager (State special regime camp).

c. OLI: A small camp in a severe climate, maintained by the MGB and believed to be a subdivision of a minlag. OLP is an abbreviation of otdeleniye lagernogo punkta chrezvychaynozhimmnogo lagerya (subsection of a sub-camp of an extreme regime camp).

d. Ozerlag: A camp maintained by the MVD for both political and criminal prisoners with long sentences, at which special restrictive measures apply. Ozerlag is an abbreviation for osobozakrytnyy rezhimmnyy lager (special closed regime camp).

e. Steplag: An MVD camp in the steppe zone, believed to be identical in function with an Ozerlag.

f. ITL: A corrective labor camp maintained by the MVD. The initials stand for ispravitelnyy trudovoy lager (corrective labor camp).

g. KTR: A penal labor camp maintained by the Ministry of Justice. The "K" stands for katorzhnyy (penal), the "T" probably stands for trudovoy (labor), and the "R" may stand for rezhim (regime).

h. Peresyilka: A transit camp (peresylnyy lager)

(FORCED LABOR CAMPS, CIA, December 1, 1954, p. 1. Bold added. Underline original.) (IMG)

Note that the list of the terms above is not referring to individual camp settlements but rather the different types and series of camps throughout the USSR. For, example, the Ozerlag was a chain of camps that stretches from near Moscow all the way to near Vladivostok. Hence, the list above is referring to the chains of camps throughout the USSR, and the different types of camps thereof. While aspects of all the series of Gulag camps will be examined in this section, three in particular will be given special attention because they are the most important ones: Ozerlag, Vyatlag, and

Angarlag. They are important because all of them were among the largest and most extensive of the corrective labour camps in the USSR, and hence provide excellent cases to examine. Describing the history of the Gulag camps in Siberia, Igor Naumov, who was anti-communist collaborator of the Soros agent Jonathan Brent (see the 'Titoist Coup' images section for C19S3.1), listed Ozerlag as being one of the top five:

largest and most horrendous GULAG structures.... (The History of Siberia, Igor Naumov, 2006, p. 202) (IMG)

On the other hand, according to 'Open Democracy' – an Atlanticist publication that as early as 2012, received funding from Soros's Open Society Foundation as well as the CIA's Ford Foundation – the Vyatlag was one of the biggest concentration camps in the Gulag system:

In 1938 a special order from the USSR People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs established Vyatlag, one of the biggest concentrations of forced labour camps in the Gulag system, in the north of the Kirov Oblast, 1000 km north east of Moscow. Its 75th anniversary falls in 2013. During the period 1938-56 more than 100,000 prisoners from 20 countries and of 80 different nationalities were sent here to serve their sentence. 18,000 of them were destined never to see their homes again. (Vyatlag: the Gulag then and now, Open Democracy, Ekaterina Lushnikova, November 9, 2012) (IMG)

One CIA document was particularly concerned with Vyatlag and more important the Ozerlag labour camp because it was the one that was maintained by the Soviet intelligence service for political criminals and ordinary criminals. A CIA document explored the organization of labor camps:

This six-page report provides detailed information on the organization of labor camps.... ('1. FORCED LABOR CAMPS IN THE USSR 2. TRANSFER OF PRISONERS BETWEEN CAMPS 3. DECREES ON RELEASE FROM FORCED LABOR 4. ATTITUDE OF SOVIET PRISON OFFICIALS TOWARD SUSPECTS 1945 TO THE END OF 1955', CIA, February 11, 1957, p. Main) (IMG)

In this CIA document:

The bulk of this information concerns [the] Ozerlag.... ('1. FORCED LABOR CAMPS IN THE USSR 2. TRANSFER OF PRISONERS BETWEEN CAMPS 3. DECREES ON RELEASE FROM FORCED LABOR 4. ATTITUDE OF SOVIET PRISON OFFICIALS TOWARD SUSPECTS 1945 TO THE END OF 1955', CIA, February 11, 1957, p. Main) (IMG)

The Ozerlag was not just one camp settlement but was a large chain of camps stretching across Soviet territory, and was:

maintained by the MVD for both political and criminal prisoners with long sentences.... (FORCED LABOR CAMPS, CIA, December 1, 1954, p. 1) (IMG)

Note again that 'the camp' referred to a long series of camp settlements across the USSR. The CIA provided the data on the per settlement number of prisoners in Ozerlag and other camp types:

The number of prisoners in each labor camp settlement was different, and in Ozerlag ranged from 600 to 2,000. The size of settlements in other labor camps was different; for example, in Vyatlag in 1946-47 there were 1,500 to 3,500 prisoners per settlement, and in Minlag in 1948-49 there were 5,000 to 8,000 prisoners per settlement. ('1. FORCED LABOR CAMPS IN THE USSR 2. TRANSFER OF PRISONERS BETWEEN CAMPS 3. DECREES ON RELEASE FROM FORCED LABOR 4. ATTITUDE OF SOVIET PRISON OFFICIALS TOWARD SUSPECTS 1945 TO THE END OF 1955', CIA, February 11, 1957, p. 2) (IMG)

Another confusion that may arise out of reading the 1957 CIA document is that since the title of a subsection of it is 'Ozerlag, 1951-1955', all the points made in it are solely regarding the period 1951-1955. Although the subsection focuses predominantly on the 1950s, it would be a misconception to assume that the remarks made under it are solely with regards to the 1950s, since the above-cited paragraph, which explains the camps well prior to 1949, is also under that subsection.

Anyways, until 1952, the prisoners were rewarded with food, as opposed to money, according to the CIA. More work, more food. The CIA document reported:

Until 1952 the "guaranteed ration" was distributed to each prisoner, regardless of whether or not he had fulfilled the norm. It consisted of 122 grams of groats, 10 grams of flour, 20 grams of sugar, 75 grams of fish, 10 grams of something made of flour, such as macaroni, 500 grams of potatoes and vegetables, 15 grams of fat, 17 grams of coffee substitute, 1.3 grams of tomato sauce, 45 grams of meat, and 650 grams of bread. From this the following meals were delivered: breakfast – 700 grams of soup and 200 cc of kasha; dinner – 700 cc of soup and 200 grams of bread; supper 700 cc of soup and 200 cc of kasha. In the evening a portion of fish and 200 grams of bread were handed out. All these food products were of extremely low quality. In addition, it was permitted to substitute some products for others; for example, fish could be substituted for meat, cabbage for potatoes, etc. ('1. FORCED LABOR CAMPS IN THE USSR 2. TRANSFER OF PRISONERS BETWEEN CAMPS 3. DECREES ON RELEASE FROM FORCED LABOR 4. ATTITUDE OF SOVIET PRISON OFFICIALS TOWARD SUSPECTS 1945 TO THE END OF 1955', CIA, February 11, 1957, p. 4) (IMG)

An individual who worked more received more food:

The prisoners who fulfilled over 100% of the norm were given a supplementary ration. There were several grades, each including 100 grams of bread, 200 cc of kasha, and 5 grams of sugar more than the next lowest one. ('1. FORCED LABOR CAMPS IN THE USSR 2. TRANSFER OF PRISONERS BETWEEN CAMPS 3. DECREES ON RELEASE FROM FORCED LABOR 4. ATTITUDE OF SOVIET PRISON OFFICIALS TOWARD SUSPECTS 1945 TO THE END OF 1955', CIA, February 11, 1957, p. 4) (IMG)

From March 1952 onwards however, the prisoners were paid/rewarded with money for their work:

Beginning with March 1952 the camp was put on a basis of economic accountability (khozrasset), i.e. the prisoners were paid for their work on the basis of a reduced rate of output (po vyrabotke po ponizhennoy tarifnoy setke). The quantity of food was increased: everyone was given daily an additional 800 grams of bread, 130 grams of groats, 10 grams of flour products, 30 grams of fat, 27 grams of sugar, 3 grams of tomato puree, 350 grams of potatoes, 500 grams of vegetables, 45 grams of meat, and up to 90 grams of fish. The food improved, but the practice of substituting some products for others remained. Moreover, there always was an inadequate amount of green vegetables and the prisoners all suffered from scurvy. ('1. FORCED LABOR CAMPS IN THE USSR 2. TRANSFER OF PRISONERS BETWEEN CAMPS 3. DECREES ON RELEASE FROM FORCED LABOR 4. ATTITUDE OF SOVIET PRISON OFFICIALS TOWARD SUSPECTS 1945 TO THE END OF 1955', CIA, February 11, 1957, p. 4) (IMG)

The prisoners could utilize their money for purchasing the goods at the store:

Stores (lar'ki) where food and tobacco could be bought were opened at the settlements. One could always buy bread at these stores, but the supply of other products was poor. There were expensive products, too expensive for the prisoners to buy, but rarely cheap products. ('1. FORCED LABOR CAMPS IN THE USSR 2. TRANSFER OF PRISONERS BETWEEN CAMPS 3. DECREES ON RELEASE

FROM FORCED LABOR 4. ATTITUDE OF SOVIET PRISON OFFICIALS TOWARD SUSPECTS 1945 TO THE END OF 1955', CIA, February 11, 1957, p. 4) (IMG)

There was a wage differentiation:

The amount of earnings depended on the profession and on the degree of fulfillment of the norms, if there were norms for that particular type of work. ('1. FORCED LABOR CAMPS IN THE USSR 2. TRANSFER OF PRISONERS BETWEEN CAMPS 3. DECREES ON RELEASE FROM FORCED LABOR 4. ATTITUDE OF SOVIET PRISON OFFICIALS TOWARD SUSPECTS 1945 TO THE END OF 1955', CIA, February 11, 1957, p. 5) (IMG)

The CIA provided further details by stating:

Each enterprise where the prisoners worked paid the money earned by the prisoners to the camp. The camp deducted 60% of each prisoner's earnings for the upkeep of the camp. More was deducted from the remaining 40% as the upkeep of the prisoner himself, i.e. for lodging, food, clothing, and services such as light, heating, bath, barber, etc. The remaining money was given to the prisoner. For example: a locksmith ... in a motor vehicle repair shop earned 1,000 rubles a month. The camp reduced 600 rubles for the upkeep of the camp. About 100 rubles of the remaining 400 rubles was deducted for food, 75 rubles for clothing, about 50 rubles for everything else, such as lodging, bath, barber, etc. He was given the remaining money. This was typical of worker who was a specialist. The other workers received an average of 30-40 rubles a month. ('1. FORCED LABOR CAMPS IN THE USSR 2. TRANSFER OF PRISONERS BETWEEN CAMPS 3. DECREES ON RELEASE FROM FORCED LABOR 4. ATTITUDE OF SOVIET PRISON OFFICIALS TOWARD SUSPECTS 1945 TO THE END OF 1955', CIA, February 11, 1957, p. 5) (IMG)

In addition:

Those who were employed in economic services, such as shoemakers, barbers, etc., and also prisoners who worked in the administration, were given a salary of 35 to 100 rubles a month. ('1. FORCED LABOR CAMPS IN THE USSR 2. TRANSFER OF PRISONERS BETWEEN CAMPS 3. DECREES ON RELEASE FROM FORCED LABOR 4. ATTITUDE OF SOVIET PRISON OFFICIALS TOWARD SUSPECTS 1945 TO THE END OF 1955', CIA, February 11, 1957, p. 5) (IMG)

For the physically disabled people ('invalids'), there was a lower deduction from the earnings:

Invalids [i.e. the physically-disabled people] who did production work were paid according to their output. However, only 50% was deducted from their earnings. ('1. FORCED LABOR CAMPS IN THE USSR 2. TRANSFER OF PRISONERS BETWEEN CAMPS 3. DECREES ON RELEASE FROM FORCED LABOR 4. ATTITUDE OF SOVIET PRISON OFFICIALS TOWARD SUSPECTS 1945 TO THE END OF 1955', CIA, February 11, 1957, p. 5) (IMG)

In other words, the physically disabled had the equivalent of a tax break.

The per day working hours for the inmates was 10 hours, i.e. 2 hours more than the Soviet workers' working hours. The CIA stated:

The production norms were in accordance with the All-Union scale and were the same as for free workers. The free workers' norms were calculated for eight working hours. The daily norms for the prisoners, who worked ten hours, were raised proportionately. In 1954 an eight hour working day was introduced for the prisoners also. ('1. FORCED LABOR CAMPS IN THE USSR 2. TRANSFER OF PRISONERS BETWEEN CAMPS 3. DECREES ON RELEASE FROM FORCED LABOR 4. ATTITUDE OF SOVIET PRISON OFFICIALS TOWARD SUSPECTS 1945 TO THE END OF 1955', CIA, February 11, 1957, p. 2) (IMG)

The prisoners were rewarded for their 'over-fulfilment' of the production targets. However, too often, the 'over-fulfilment' was not real:

Ordinarily the norms were overfulfilled, but mainly on paper. Each brigade leader would record for his brigade more output than had actually been produced. All, from the authorities to the prisoners, were anxious to overfulfill the plan, and consequent authorities paid little heed to the accuracy of output records. ('1. FORCED LABOR CAMPS IN THE USSR 2. TRANSFER OF PRISONERS BETWEEN CAMPS 3. DECREES ON RELEASE FROM FORCED LABOR 4. ATTITUDE OF SOVIET PRISON OFFICIALS TOWARD SUSPECTS 1945 TO THE END OF 1955', CIA, February 11, 1957, p. 2) (IMG)

That is, many prisoners got paid for work that they did not do. The brigade leaders in the camps carried an act of sabotage by reporting the production as higher than it was, and the authorities apparently neglected such economic sabotage. Perhaps a reason for such economic sabotage is that the staff of the units of the labour camps were themselves made up of inmates:

The staff of all the units of a labor camp settlement, with the exception of their heads is chosen from the prisoners. An exception is the planning-production unit, the head of which is often [though not always] a prisoner, since apparently there were not enough civilian economists. ('1. FORCED LABOR CAMPS IN THE USSR 2. TRANSFER OF PRISONERS BETWEEN CAMPS 3. DECREES ON RELEASE FROM FORCED LABOR 4. ATTITUDE OF SOVIET PRISON OFFICIALS TOWARD SUSPECTS 1945 TO THE END OF 1955', CIA, February 11, 1957, p. 2) (IMG)

Now to be sure, having the units of a labour camp staffed by inmates benefited the camp by bridging the inmates with the heads of the units, and helped employ the skills of the inmates for productive purposes. However, the obvious downside was the economic sabotage mentioned above. Overall, however, the policy of employing staff from among the inmates certainly was useful in boosting production.

The over-fulfillment of the norms also reduced the sentence of the prisoners:

In addition, for overfulfillment of the norm there were the so-called "zachety" (payments). For overfulfilling the norm by 105%, one day of the sentence was counted as two. ('1. FORCED LABOR CAMPS IN THE USSR 2. TRANSFER OF PRISONERS BETWEEN CAMPS 3. DECREES ON RELEASE FROM FORCED LABOR 4. ATTITUDE OF SOVIET PRISON OFFICIALS TOWARD SUSPECTS 1945 TO THE END OF 1955', CIA, February 11, 1957, p. 5) (IMG)

On other hand:

Those, such as cooks, trailers, etc., who performed work for which there were no norms, were given the type of compensation in accordance with the evaluation of their work: if the evaluation was good, one day of their sentence counted for two; if the evaluation was excellent, one day counted for 2 or 3, depending on their duties. ('1. FORCED LABOR CAMPS IN THE USSR 2. TRANSFER OF PRISONERS BETWEEN CAMPS 3. DECREES ON RELEASE FROM FORCED LABOR 4. ATTITUDE OF SOVIET PRISON OFFICIALS TOWARD SUSPECTS 1945 TO THE END OF 1955', CIA, February 11, 1957, p. 5) (IMG)

The CIA also plausibly claimed that some of the guards abused the laws and murdered prisoners. Such an abuse was put an end to during Stalin's time period:

Until 1952 if a guard prevented a prisoner's escape, he received a month's leave and 300 rubles. As a result it frequently happened that a guard would kill a prisoner for taking one step beyond the boundary of the zapretnaya zone, at work, for example, and then receive 300 rubles and leave. In 1952 this policy of giving leave and money was abolished, and immediately "escape attempts" ceased. ('1. FORCED LABOR CAMPS IN THE USSR 2. TRANSFER OF PRISONERS BETWEEN CAMPS 3. DECREES ON RELEASE FROM FORCED LABOR 4. ATTITUDE OF SOVIET PRISON OFFICIALS TOWARD SUSPECTS 1945 TO THE END OF 1955', CIA, February 11, 1957, p. 3) (IMG)

An indication as to whether the inmates had the mentality of actual criminals or not lies in the fact that, upon the rise to power of the Titoist bloc in the Kremlin, numerous criminals were released from jail, and upon release, the majority of these criminals swiftly committed new crimes. Indeed, the US intelligence reported:

The 1953 amnesty was for ordinary criminals. Approximately one-half per cent of the prisoners in Ozerlag were released. Up to 70% of the prisoners in Angarlag were released. They were released in one grand sweep, in approximately one week. Within the next three months the majority of them were rearrested for crimes which they had newly committed and returned to Angarlag. ('1. FORCED LABOR CAMPS IN THE USSR 2. TRANSFER OF PRISONERS BETWEEN CAMPS 3. DECREES ON RELEASE FROM FORCED LABOR 4. ATTITUDE OF SOVIET PRISON OFFICIALS TOWARD SUSPECTS 1945 TO THE END OF 1955', CIA, February 11, 1957, p. 2) (IMG)

The Angarlag was a very extensive corrective labour camp. According to the Taishet History website, the vastness of the Angarlag camp columns was follows:

Due to production needs, the camp columns of Angarlag were located on the territory along the railway from Taishet to Ust-Kut and even further. (Angarsk Forced Labor Camp, Taishet History) (IMG)

Another US intelligence document deals more specifically with how the prisoners of war captured during the Great Patriotic War were treated. A prisoner of war captured during the Soviet war against the Nazis eventually got released from the Gulag and was able to provide valuable information to the US intelligence regarding the camp conditions. The prisoner testified::

In July 1944, I was captured a second time by the Soviet Army and sent to the prisoner of war camp in Marshansk. (...). The Marshansk camp was a large camp with a capacity for from between 20,00 and 25,000 prisoners. (...). At Marshansk, treatment of the prisoners was generally fair and we were able to walk around inside the camp after returning from working parties. At 5:30 each morning, the roll call was handled by a major and two surgeons who counted prisoners in each barracks and asked each prisoner if he was sick or all right. (...). The treatment of the prisoners inside the camp was not particularly brutal because there were so many prisoners that the Soviets were not able to get mad at any one in particular. On those days that I stayed in the camp, having been excused from work details because of illness, I and other prisoners in the same position had routine duties such as policing the camp and digging what we called "brown coal" from the ground for heating the barracks.

('POW CAMPS: GENERAL CONDITIONS / SECURITY MEASURES/ TREATMENT OF PRISONERS / POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION / INTERROGATION / MEDICAL TREATMENT / WORK ASSIGNMENTS', CIA, January 12, 1954, p. 5) (IMG)

Alexander Solzhenitsyn, the anti-Soviet fiction writer whose idol was General Franco, claimed that the notorious Nazi-collaborationist Vlasov Army, not the Red Army, was the military force liberating Prague from Nazi German occupation. West Germany's Die Welt reported:

Solzhenitsyn writes in "The Gulag Archipelago" that the credit for having driven the Germans from the city belongs to the Vlasov units, i.e. units composed of Russian prisoners of war who were placed under the command of the German Wehrmacht. ('VLASOV SIDED WITH THE CZECHS: Who Took Part in the Prague Rebellion of May 1945?', Die Welt, February 26, 1974, p. 1. In: CIA archives) (IMG)

In the fiction novel "One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich," Alexander Solzhenitsyn, the infamous fanboy of General Franco and the Vlasov Army, naturally spread slanders against the USSR's corrective labour camps system. Yet, even this Vlasovite apologist, so beloved by the CIA, could not hide the fact that in the corrective labour camps, more work brought more material rewards in the form of more food. In the novel 'One Day', the 'protagonist' is Ivan Denisovich Shukhov, the corrective labour inmate 'oppressed' by the 'Stalinist' 'regime', whereas Tyurin is a 'foreman' in the camp. Importantly, the camp prisoners received "rates for the job" upon which "their ration ... depended..." and they could receive "good rates for their work." In the novel, it is stated that "better rates" "meant ... good bread rations..." The following are excerpts of the novel:

now he must have been figuring out how to get them good rates for the job. And their ration for the next five days depended on this. (One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, p. 47)

Shukhov heard Tyurin say in Pavlo's ear : "You stay here and keep 'em at it. I've got to go and fix the work rates."

More depends on the work rates than on the work itself. A clever boss who knows his business really sweets over these work rates. That's where the ration comes from. If a job hadn't been done, make it look like it had. If the rates were low on a job, try to hike 'em up. You had to have brains for this and a lot of pull with the fellows who kept the work sheets. And they didn't do it for nothing.

(One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, p. 63)

Tyurin got "better rates," which meant they'd have good bread rations.... (One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, p. 89)

Shukhov went to sleep, and he was very happy. He'd had a lot of luck today. They hadn't put him in the cooler. The gang hadn't been chased out to work in the Socialist Community Development. He'd finagled an extra bowl of much at noon. The boss had gotten them good rates for their work. (One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, p. 187)

Obviously, the novel was a fiction work and cannot be cited as concrete historical evidence. However, it is remarkable that Solzhenitsyn novels are cited as 'realistic' fiction depicting the Soviet corrective labour camps, and yet even in such an anti-Soviet fiction novel, this fact about the Soviet system is mentioned. It is the consensus of the mainstream anti-Soviet media that Ivan Denisovich Shukhov was one fiction character representing the actual lives of real people who lived in the corrective labour camps. And yet, here came Solzhenitsyn basically admitting in his novel that the camp inmates were receiving rates. The picture that emerges from the US State Department and CIA documents and from the Solzhenitsyn fiction, which is a kind of a fiction considered by anti-Soviet media as reflective of historical truth, is that the corrective labour camps were not slavery but

practically a form of mandatory capitalistic-spirited exploitation inflicted upon criminals in the USSR. The prisoners of the corrective labour camps were punished and made to suffer not from slavery but from a kind of a workplace that inherited the capitalistic spirit – the key difference being that the workplace was owned by a workers' state, rather than privately owned.

Another important issue regarding the Gulags is with regards to the size of its population. Firstly, it is important to note that the CIA too agrees that the huge figures given for the population of prisoners in the Gulags are unrealistic and implausible:

the number of prisoners in the prewar period (about 1941) at 10 million, plus or minus 20 percent, and at 12 million, plus or minus 10 percent, in the postwar period (about 1950). These magnitudes were obtained for each period by assembling all available reports from ex-prisoners who had given the number of prisoners at various forced labor sites, computing an estimate of the average number of prisoners per place and multiplying this average by the estimated total number of places associated with forced labor camps. Because of the nature of the data (observation reports from ex-prisoners) and the methodology used, and in light of information received since 1953, the estimate of 12 million prisoners as of about 1950 appears much too high. As at least 4 out of every 5 prisoners were males in the productive age group (15 to 59), moreover, a prisoner population of such a magnitude would mean that nearly one-fifth of all adult males were imprisoned. So disastrous would be the demographic and economic consequences of such a situation that its existence seems highly implausible. (FORCED LABOR IN THE USSR 1953-57, CIA, Office of Research and Reports, September 12, 1958, p. 20) (IMG)

A document published by the America's 'National Park Service' – a US government agency that not only deals with matters concerning ecology and the parks, but also with museums, historical sites, military history, and preservation of historic materials – fiercely denounced the USSR. It did, however, acknowledge that the maximum number of inmates that the USSR's corrective labour camps had was around 2.5 million:

The camp population grew from 179,000 in 1929 to 2,468,524 in 1953 (reaching its height in 1950 with 2,525,146 inmates). (GULAG FACT SHEET, National Park Service, United States Government, 2017, p. 1) (IMG)

Regarding the death toll in the Gulag, the document admitted that the bulk of the deaths in the Gulags were during the war years, when food, medicine, and other facilities grew scarce for the entire Soviet population, not just the prisoners:

perhaps 1.5 million perished. It is important to remember, however, that in most years more people were amnestied from the Gulag than died in it. Excepting the brutal war years, the most common experience of the Gulag was surviving it. (GULAG FACT SHEET, National Park Service, United States Government, 2017, p. 1) (IMG)

Another CIA document further reported:

Mortality was fairly high at all camps until 1948, in which year conditions became more humane at most camps. From May Day 1952, each prisoner was paid a daily wage though deductions were made for food and clothing, with the result that the only prisoners who ever held any cash in their hands were the few who were able occasionally to exceed their norm. Even these, at that time, were not allowed to have more than 100 rubles in the pockets.... (FORCED LABOR CAMPS, CIA, December 1, 1954, p. 6) (IMG)

Obviously, the high mortality rate was owing to the severe damage caused by the Axis invasion, as a result of which the mortality rates were high whether inside or outside the camps. After 1948 when some success was seen in the reconstruction efforts, the conditions became better. More importantly though, the CIA document has admitted that the Gulag prisoners were paid for their work starting from mid-1952, which was during the Stalin era, and that the prisoners were paid more for more work. The CIA document also confirmed:

In all camps, women had exactly the same conditions as men. (FORCED LABOR CAMPS, CIA, December 1, 1954, p. 6) (IMG)

The persecution of juveniles in the Soviet Union was banned. As confirmed by the British Foreign Office, the USSR had:

the Law of April 1935, forbidding the prosecution of small children on political charges.... (N 1294/233/38, No. 85, Sir W. Seeds to Viscount Halifax, Moscow, March 7, 1939; received March 10, 1939, Foreign Office (1939), p. 67) (IMG{{Factional Conflict & Great Purge}})

There was at least one case in which children were tried as 'fascist' 'agents' by a Yezhovite intelligence official. However, as mentioned in C9S1, that Yezhovite official was purged for his abuse of children.

C5S5. Wage Differentiation in the Soviet Union *** IMG-All-{Wage Differentiation}

In 'The Critique of the Gotha Programme', written by Marx and Engels, and in 'The State and Revolution', written by Lenin, it is very clearly and explicitly stated that under the socialist system, there would be wage differentiation according to the amount of labour performed by each individual. Wage-egalitarianism is a reactionary Trotskyite left-opportunist deviation fought against by Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin. The wage differentiation system existed in the Soviet Union. Referring to the wage system from 1931 to 1956, the CIA reported:

Generally speaking, the basic characteristics of the present Soviet wage and salary system were established in 1931 and 1932 as a result of the major wage reform undertaken in response to directives laid down by Stalin in a speech of 23 June 1931. In this speech he severely criticized the "equalitarian" nature of the then-existing wage system, holding it largely responsible for widespread and excessively high labor turnover, and called for the "destruction" of the old system. During the next several years the entire wage structure was revised, new wage scales were established to provide greater wage differentials between skilled and unskilled jobs, wage and salary rates were changed, and formal job classification manuals were prepared for all industries. (THE CURRENT WAGE REFORM IN THE USSR: Economic Intelligence Report, CIA, Office of Research and Reports (ORR), August 9, 1957, p. 10) (IMG)

Progressive piece-rate wages were established, according to which the enterprise profits would be augmented to finance bonuses for the worker overfulfillment of production targets. Europa Archiv, a prominent West German Frankfurt-based media outlet on economics, was founded by the Wehrmacht Sergeant Wilhelm Cornides. Europa Archiv reported:

Contrary to simple piece wages, which provide the same rate of pay for each finished product or phase of work regardless of the number produced, progressive piece wages provide differing rates which increase relative to the amount of output, the progression starting when a certain predetermined phase in the fulfillment of the quota has been reached.

(MEANS AND WAYS OF INCREASING LABOR PRODUCTIVITY IN THE SOVIET UNION: Appealing to Materialistic Drives by Various Types of Remuneration: Piece Wages and Increase of Productivity: Part 2. In: 'METHODS OF INCREASING LABOR PRODUCTIVITY IN THE SOVIET UNION', Europa Archiv No. 17, Frankfurt A.M., September 5, 1952, p. 1. In: CIA archives) (IMG)

The provision of bonuses was divided into 'steps', defined by the amount of overfulfillment of the production targets. Providing an example of the progressive piece rates, bonuses and their corresponding 'steps', the Europa Archiv stated:

The bonus for exceeding the quota is not everywhere as high as in these illustrations. Other scales of progression prescribe the following percentages as bonus payments:

From one to 10 percent overfulfillment	30% bonus
From 10% to 25 percent overfulfillment	50% bonus
From 25% to 40 percent overfulfillment	75% bonus
From 40% to more percent overfulfillment	100% bonus

(MEANS AND WAYS OF INCREASING LABOR PRODUCTIVITY IN THE SOVIET UNION: Appealing to Materialistic Drives by Various Types of Renumeration: Piece Wages and Increase of Productivity: Part 2. In: 'METHODS OF INCREASING LABOR PRODUCTIVITY IN THE SOVIET UNION', Europa Archiv No. 17, Frankfurt A.M., September 5, 1952, p. 2. In: CIA archives) (IMG)

The Europa Archiv added:

It is the contention of Soviet leaders that a scale providing only one pay increase will not offer sufficient incentives to the worker to exceed the quota further. Nor will too many step increases serve this purpose because in that case, the intervals between the individual steps diminish as the number of steps increases, thus likewise reducing the incentive to the worker to progress from one round of exceeding quota to the next. (MEANS AND WAYS OF INCREASING LABOR PRODUCTIVITY IN THE SOVIET UNION: Appealing to Materialistic Drives by Various Types of Renumeration: Piece Wages and Increase of Productivity: Part 2. In: 'METHODS OF INCREASING LABOR PRODUCTIVITY IN THE SOVIET UNION', Europa Archiv No. 17, Frankfurt A.M., September 5, 1952, pp. 2-3. In: CIA archives) (IMG)

When quantifying the contributions to the production was more difficult, emphasis was laid on qualitative changes, creative ideas that reduce the amount of labour necessary per output produced:

Bonuses are paid in situations where it is not possible to measure real output. A repair gang, for instance, receives a bonus its time wages if the men succeed in lowering the estimated loss of output by painstaking maintenance of the machines; a lubrication team will receive a bonus for thrifty and efficient of the lubricants, etc. In connection with bonus wages, the use of increasing output is likewise specifically stressed, the necessity emphasis being on reducing the number of time wage earners, which reduction is in itself a reason for granting a bonus. (MEANS AND WAYS OF INCREASING LABOR PRODUCTIVITY IN THE SOVIET UNION: Appealing to Materialistic Drives by Various Types of Renumeration: Piece Wages and Increase of Productivity: Part 2. In: 'METHODS OF INCREASING LABOR PRODUCTIVITY IN THE SOVIET UNION', Europa Archiv No. 17, Frankfurt A.M., September 5, 1952, p. 4. In: CIA archives) (IMG)

C5S6. CIA: Virtually No Physical Torture in USSR / Soviet Interrogation Techniques *** IMG-All-{Soviet Interrogation}

American intelligence documents, one after another, corroborate the virtual absence of torture in the USSR. One US intelligence document titled 'Soviet Interrogation Methods' was about the Soviet military intelligence as well as the MGB and the MVD. The document stated:

If captured by the MGB or MVD a prisoner is always turned over to the Intelligence Section of the Military District. From there the information would be reported to the Main Intelligence Directorate in Moscow. The prisoner would go to a distribution point located either in the district or nearest to the district where capture has been made. (SOVIET INTERROGATION METHODS, CIA, October 9, 1953, p. 4) (IMG)

Describing the intelligence section of the Soviet Red Army, and in response to the question 'Can a military translator ever strike prisoner?', a leading CIA officer reported that physical torture was strictly prohibited. The following excerpt of the US intelligence document reveals this fact:

Can a military translator ever strike prisoner?

The Chief of the Intelligence Section of an Army Group, normally prohibits any physical contact between and interrogators and interogatees. Threats, on the other hand, may be used if practicable. (SOVIET INTERROGATION METHODS, CIA, October 9, 1953, p. 3) (IMG)

The document went on to describe:

one instance, however, when violence was used during World War II. A German fighter pilot, who was believed to have military information of vital importance, resisted Soviet interrogators for fifteen days. After torture methods had succeeded in breaking his resistance, he was not mistreated any further. [T]his was an exceptional case and ... as a rule physical violence would be avoided. (SOVIET INTERROGATION METHODS, CIA, October 9, 1953, p. 3) (IMG)

In the words of another CIA document, not only was the use of physical force by the MGB, the main Soviet intelligence organization, officially prohibited, the beating of the prisoners was also banned:

The use of physical force in the organs of the MGB was officially prohibited, and the beating of prisoners was not permitted. Numerous orders and directives on this subject were sent out by the central organs of the MGB. (SOVIET METHODS OF INTERROGATION, CIA, May 14, 1954, p. 3) (IMG)

In cases where interrogators were responsible for torture, they were punished for doing so, which is why so often, the MGB officers did not dare to strike the prisoners:

Not all interrogators, however, adhered to these restrictions, especially case officers of MGB organs located at the "periphery" (in the provinces), where prisoners sometimes were beaten in order to obtain testimony. This type of activity was considered in the MGB in 1948 and 1949 to be illegal, and operational personnel guilty of the use of force were punished through administrative channels. (SOVIET METHODS OF INTERROGATION, CIA, May 14, 1954, p. 3) (IMG)

In very important cases where it was absolutely known that a prisoner was giving false information, especially in espionage cases, the chief of the section (otdel), with the verbal sanction of the chief of the directorate (upravleniye), assumed responsibility and force was used on the prisoner, i.e., he was unmercifully beaten. This application of force was repeated no more than once with each prisoner, since the MGB was afraid to leave traces of the beatings on the prisoner. Actually, such beatings were rare, since everyone in the MGB knew that these "measures" might result in unpleasantness. For example, **if the prisoner brought out in court that he had been beaten and forced to give false evidence wittingly, the chairman of the military tribunal would return the case to the MGB for further**

investigation. The decision of the military tribunal would include the statements of the prisoner on the beatings. The return of a case for further investigation was considered a to be a serious reflection on the work of the MGB, and the Third Chief Directorate of the MGB might **punish those guilty of administering beatings to prisoners.** (SOVIET METHODS OF INTERROGATION, CIA, May 14, 1954, p. 3. Bold added.) (IMG)

According to the same CIA document, the Soviet intelligence had solitary confinement, but only for a maximum of 5 days, with the food and water being provided:

The MGB ... employed ... confinement in small detention cells. In every MGB prison there was a cell of very small dimensions, 1 x 1.5 meters [i.e. larger than a closet], without windows. If, in the opinion of the interrogator, a prisoner was giving false testimony or withholding certain information from the interrogator, the interrogator would write a report to the chief of the directorate saying: "I request the confinement of such-and-such prisoner to the small detention cell. The prisoner has conducted himself in a provocative manner during his interrogation and has given false testimony." The chief would endorse the report as follows: "I sanction a term of 5 days" "According to law", the chief could not confine the prisoner to this cell for more than five days. The chief of the prison, on the basis of the endorsed report, would transfer the prisoner to the detention cell, where he would only have room to stand [Saed's comment: actually, in a room larger than a closet, one can sleep (though uncomfortably) as well; not just stand], and would **receive only bread and water.**

The stratagem in this case centered around the fact that the prisoner did not know for how long a period he was to be confined to this small cell. Prior to incarceration the interrogator would threaten him, saying that he would remain there until he confessed his guilt. "You will rot there," the interrogator would say, "and if you think it over and decide to tell the truth then let me know through the jailer." The prisoner would remain the cell without hope, not knowing that his **confinement there was strictly limited to five days** since his death in the detention cell would render the chief of the prison responsible. The prisoner, of course, would be unable to endure such conditions and therefore would beg to be reinterrogated. If the prisoner were to repeat his original testimony, or give false testimony, he would be returned immediately to the cell to serve the full five-day confinement.

(SOVIET METHODS OF INTERROGATION, CIA, May 14, 1954, p. 4. Bold added.) (IMG)

Five days of solitary confinement however is not torture. This is a well-known fact. According to the Office of the High Commissioner for the United Nations Human Rights, the:

standard of UN rules ... defines solitary confinement as "the confinement of prisoners for 22 hours or more a day without meaningful human contact." Solitary confinement may only be imposed in exceptional circumstances, and "prolonged" solitary confinement of more than 15 consecutive days is regarded as a form of torture. ("United States: prolonged solitary confinement amounts to psychological torture, says UN expert", United Nations Human Rights – Office of the High Commissioner (OHCHR), February 28, 2020) (IMG)

In Western countries, by contrast, not only is there solitary confinement, the period of such confinement is several **years**. In Canada for instance, even as late as 2018, solitary confinements were up to at least two and a half years:

Five years after [the Canadian province of] Ontario vowed to curtail its use of solitary confinement, average inmate stays in segregation cells have grown longer, with one prisoner in Ottawa remaining in isolation for at least 835 days, according to newly released provincial data.

(...). The most glaring figure comes from the Ottawa-Carleton Detention Centre, where government spreadsheets indicate a Muslim man with mental-health issues, between the ages of 35 and 39, was housed in solitary for at least 835 days. Little more is known about him. United Nations guidelines recommend 15 days as a limit for segregation placements to prevent lasting mental and physical harm.

("Length of solitary stays increasing in Ontario prisons, including 835 days for one inmate", Boston Globe, November 5, 2018) (IMG)

It is a well-known fact that West Germany imposed solitary confinement on many dissident elements. There is no need to mention the Americans who are most notorious in the West for this. These facts are widely known and shed light upon the great contrast between a state controlled by the proletariat and the anti-proletarian states.

C5S7.1 Democratization: The Cleansing of the Party and State Apparatuses *** IMG-All-{Democratization}

Finance capital, the primary class base of modern imperialist reaction, seeks dictatorship. Yet, imperialism derives its strength from a military-industrial backbone that generates a massive population of proletarians. The numerical strength of the proletariat imposes upon the dictatorship of finance capital the incorporation of elements of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Such an incorporation yields the imperialist bourgeois-democracy of the kind seen in Britain and USA. In Germany, in which occurred only a partial industrialization, German finance capital emerged, financing fascism. Yet, the medium level of industrialization, thus of proletarianization of the society, yielded a relatively smaller percentage of proletarians in Germany's general population. The relative numerical weakness of the proletariat allowed the dictatorship of German finance capital to overthrow democracy and prevent the influence of the proletariat over the state. A dictatorship of the bourgeoisie grows democratic when it comes under the influence of the proletariat. The less under proletarian influence, the more easily finance capital crushes democracy, the proletariat's avenue for wielding influence over the state. The more the proletariat's influence, the less finance capital can undermine democracy. In the Soviet Union was established the dictatorship of the proletariat. Therein, finance capital was crushed. Inherently, the highest amount of the influence of the proletariat over the state meant the highest quantity of the factor giving rise to democracy. In that respect, the USSR was more democratic than other countries, for it was a dictatorship of the proletariat.

Secondly, there have been rare cases in which the bulk of the population is not proletarian, the state continues to remain under the influence primarily of finance capital, and yet the state remains a bourgeois-democracy. In its initial years, Israel – a comprador bourgeois state that invited the Anglo-American finance capital to colonize the Hebrew, Yiddish and Arab nations – lacked a numerically large proletariat, for it was not yet so industrialized. However, unlike the vast majority of the comprador bourgeois states allied to the Anglo-American finance capital, Israel was a pro-fascist pro-imperialist bourgeois-democracy, rather than a fascist 'autocracy', even in the initial years of its existence. Why? Why did most Anglo-American-backed comprador bourgeois states operate as 'autocratic' fascist 'juntas', but Israel did not? Israel had kibbutzim. Though structured in a generally idealistic fashion, the kibbutzim were a form of cooperatives. Beside the proletariat, the cooperativists constitute another major class that plays a role similar to the proletariat, 'stands up to' finance capital, and imposes democratic governance on the dictatorship of finance capital or of the comprador bourgeoisie. The petit-bourgeoisie have too small of businesses and are unwilling to take risks to stand up to finance capital. Unlike the proletariat, who have nothing to lose but their 'chains' in the struggle against finance capital, the petit-bourgeoisie have much to lose, including their vitally

important small businesses. The cooperatives, on the other hand, amalgamate these small businesses into big businesses capable of taking the risk of competing with finance capital. Owing to their employee-owned character, it is as though they are 'proletarian-owned big businesses' even though cooperative employees, owning cooperative stocks, are not proletarians per se. Due to such factors, the cooperativists acquire characteristics similar to the anti-colonial national bourgeoisie who also have big businesses with which to stand up to finance capital; however, unlike in the case of the national bourgeoisie, the cooperatives are big businesses run by their own cooperativist employees and thus bear a socialistic character. Israel did not become a bourgeois-democracy for colonial self-advertisement purposes, nor did the 'liberal' migration policy towards the 'world Jewry' create the 'openness' that would result in democracy. The agents of Israel's parasitic classes have always resorted to solving the issue of their public image through propaganda and psychological pressure tactics. No, Israel emerged democratic, for despite all the fascistic behaviours emanating from its comprador character, it had a kibbutzim that significantly resisted such finance capital, a kibbutzim whose political influence was elevated because of the damages which the anti-imperialist Arab armies inflicted upon the Zionist army of Anglo-American finance capital. In the USSR, not only did the enemies of finance capital have the upper hand, the agriculture was collectivized into kolkhozy. The kolkhoz peasants had much influence over the state.

The cases of Israel, United States, Britain, and Germany show that the proletariat and the cooperativists are the two most important classes behind democratization. **It follows that through the alliance of the proletariat and the kolkhoz peasants, as well as through the crushing of finance capital and the comprador (e.g. kulak, comprador mercantile bourgeoisie, feudal landlords) allies of finance capital, the USSR maximized the quantity of those class factors that impose democratic governance and minimized the influence of those classes that operated as factors against democratization.**

What exists in the form of imperialist bourgeois-democracy in the 'Western' countries is really a quasi-compromise condition in which the state is ultimately the dictatorship of finance capital but has been forced to accept the influence of the proletariat over the state via the avenue of democratization. Whenever finance capital sees no powerful proletarian or cooperativist rivals standing up to it, it imposes the authoritarian/autocratic dictatorship of the comprador allies of finance capital; whenever, the proletariat and the cooperativists gain control over a state with minimal presence of finance capital and its reactionary class allies, the proletariat and the cooperativists impose the dictatorship of the proletariat and cripple most of the means of agitation and propaganda of the enemies of the proletariat. Whether we like it or not, the 'absolute freedom of speech', the freedom of both the pro-fascists and anti-fascists to agitate, is fragile. The 'absolute freedom of speech' exists in the West merely as a 'quasi-compromise' principle emanating from the 'quasi-compromise' condition in which the regime of finance capital has been forced to accept a degree of state power exercised by the proletariat. Once the proletariat takes decisive control over a state, 'absolute freedom of speech' will vanish, and pro-fascist propaganda will inevitably be cracked down upon, even if the communist leaders of the proletariat have 'good will' and are true believers in the principle of 'absolute freedom of speech'. 'Absolute freedom of speech' will be the order of the day again only in the late-stage communist phase of humanity, when almost the entire world population has chosen to promote speech that promotes the proletariat rather than to promote anti-proletarian speech. After the rise of the global dictatorship of the proletariat, only in the late-stage communist phase will 'absolute free speech' be revived.

By 1936, the class struggles in the Soviet Union had reached a stage in which the private bourgeois classes had mostly diminished and had begun to vanish. The dictatorship of the proletariat controlled most of the economy. The obliteration of the material bases of the parasitic classes in the private sectors of the economy thus weakened the parasitic classes allied to the corrupt bureaucrats, hence the corrupt bureaucrats themselves. The centralization of the state-owned sector further shrank the influence of the corrupt bureaucrats. Far more difficult than monitoring the activities of one large central bureau is the monitoring of the activities of several small local bureaus lacking coordination with one another. This weakening of monitoring would render it easier for the bureaucrats' corrupt activities to go unnoticed. The centralization of the state-owned sector would cut the number of localized bureaus, thus facilitating the anti-corruption monitoring process. A decentralized state-owned sector also reduces coordination between the several individual bureaus; this absence of coordination creates the discrepancies in planning, which result in chaos and mismanagement, a fertile ground for abuses by corrupt bureaucrats. The gradual centralization of the economy resolves that problem. Thus, the centralization of the economy weakens the material base of the corrupt bureaucrats hostile to the proletariat and democracy.

A republic of soviets run by a democratic centralist Party compositionally proletarianized in its membership ensured a high level of control of the proletarian class over the state apparatus, leading not only to the gradual abating of the comprador classes, including the bureaucrats, but also to maximum proletarian control, a 'democratic dictatorship' of the working class.

The Party of the proletariat, a Party compositionally proletarianized and democratic centralist in structure, needs not split into two or more parties. Such a split not only erodes the hold of the proletariat over the state, it also allows for the rise of unnecessary parallel bureaucracies, since each party would function like a bureau. The existence of several bureaus renders more difficult the monitoring of such parties by anti-corruption institutions, while reducing policy coordination. This would strengthen bureaucrats. What surprise is there that the Trotskyite bureaucrats, in the Party of the proletariat in the USSR, called for an end to democratic centralism and a freedom to form sub-parties, 'blocs', all in the name of combatting bureaucracy?

The scientific socialist system, the 'democratic dictatorship' of the proletariat, is inherently anti-bureaucratic. By 1936, most of the private-sector socio-economic base upon which the Bukharinites and Trotskyites could rely so to hold the Soviet economy captive was centralized under the dominance of the proletariat and kolkhozniks. The year 1936 was the year in which the communists could pursue their agenda of a full-scale pincer assault on the bureaucracy inside the Soviet state. The pincer assault came in the form of a simultaneous effort at (1) democratizing the Soviet state and Party apparatus, and (2) centralizing the Soviet state and Party apparatus. Many with a liberal mentality regard centralism and democracy as two diverging, contradictory, and antagonistic tendencies. In reality, centralism and democracy cannot exist without each other because they are both tendencies emanating from the proletariat and antagonistic to finance capital, bureaucracy, and other parasitic class allies. Democracy is opposed to bureaucracy for reasons obvious even for liberals, whereas centralism is opposed to bureaucracy for reasons explained previously. Hence, in 1936, the plans were hatched for a new communist assault against bureaucracy. The 1937 war on bureaucracy intensified in the form of a Great Purge strongly correlated with, and somewhat causally linked to, the democratization program.

In 1937, Party leaders Stalin and Zhdanov made important speeches in which they engaged in a critique of the Soviet government apparatus itself and the Party. The speeches are already available in the internet and can be duly viewed by the reader; however, this section will examine the speech as reported and analyzed by the MI6.

Western media presents the Soviet self-criticism process as dishonest and farcical. However, in reference to Zhdanov's self-criticism session, the British Embassy in Moscow, which was the MI6 station there, also acknowledged that:

Soviet “self-criticism” is not always wholly farcical and dishonest. (N 1714/250/38, No. 120, Viscount Chilston to Mr. Eden, Moscow, March 22, 1937; Received: March 30, 1937, Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 67) (IMG)

The report added:

the practice may often be genuine enough.... Those at the top may well be honestly perturbed at the extent to which the party mechanism has become corrupted.... (N 1714/250/38, No. 120, Viscount Chilston to Mr. Eden, Moscow, March 22, 1937; Received: March 30, 1937, Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 67) (IMG)

As the document rightly stated,:

The main interest of M. Zhdanov’s speeches lies of course in their detailed revelation of the extent to which the party’s own statutes and constitution have for years past been systematically ignored. (N 1714/250/38, No. 120, Viscount Chilston to Mr. Eden, Moscow, March 22, 1937; Received: March 30, 1937, Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 66) (IMG)

Afterwards:

M. Zhdanov goes on to examine the question of internal party democracy, about which an immense amount has been written of late, and enumerates the principal “constitutional” abuses which have crept into the party during recent years. In the first place there has been a very widespread disregard of the rule that elections to the primary organisations and town and district committees should take place once a year and those to the higher organisations once every eighteen months. All the higher organisations, with the exception of five created incidentally as a result of administrative changes, have outlived their allotted span, and many even of the primary organisations date back to the seventeenth party congress, i.e. to the spring of 1934. (N 1714/250/38, No. 120, Viscount Chilston to Mr. Eden, Moscow, March 22, 1937; Received: March 30, 1937, Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 65) (IMG)

In his speech, Zhdanov condemned the undemocratic and non-electoral appointment of Party officials, and named numerous cases of such practices, with:

some of the worst being from M. Zhdanov’s own Leningrad district and city. As regards the actual mechanics of the party pseudo-elections under present conditions, M. Zhdanov gives some equally revelatory facts. He states frankly that the general practice is to avoid uncomfortable criticism on the part of the rank and file of the party by a complicated system of lists of likely candidates, drawn up in the first instance by the secretary of the committee and hustled through a series of preliminary closed conferences “at which the question is settled in a ‘family’ atmosphere without too much ‘trouble’.” Thus “everything revolves itself into a narrow organisational technique, the sole object of which is to shut out the criticism of the party masses.” (N 1714/250/38, No. 120, Viscount Chilston to Mr. Eden, Moscow, March 22, 1937; Received: March 30, 1937, Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 66) (IMG)

Additionally, Zhdanov condemned the unratified appointment of local party leaders and secretaries of party committees. In fact, he stated:

that he could name dozens of such secretaries, who were merely appointed by the committee of the immediately superior organisation without even being actually elected by the organisation to which they were thus attached. (N 1714/250/38, No. 120, Viscount Chilston to Mr. Eden, Moscow, March 22, 1937; Received: March 30, 1937, Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 66) (IMG)

He also condemned the fake ‘self-criticism’ that many Party members engaged in:

M. Zhdanov has some scathing remarks to make on the degeneration of the system of “self-reports” – a practice akin to ordinary “self-criticism.” These reports, he says, are far too largely the result of prying investigations into the private affairs of those concerned, and far too little connected with their activities as party men. He quotes the actual texts of a resolution by a local party committee on one of these “self-reports” by an ex-wife beater. It runs as follows: –

“To permit no more family nonsense.

“To regulate the family relations without delay.”

(N 1714/250/38, No. 120, Viscount Chilston to Mr. Eden, Moscow, March 22, 1937; Received: March 30, 1937, Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 66) (IMG)

Zhdanov’s speech echoed Stalin’s opinion. According to report by the US Embassy, Zhdanov was:

from all indications ... Stalin’s personal favorite.... (861.00 Supreme Soviet/5, First Session of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, January 12–19, 1938. Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Bohlen), In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, 1933–1939. Office of the Historian, January 12-19, 1938, p. 511) (IMG)

On the other hand, Stalin had provided in-depth criticisms of the bureaucracy that existed in the Party and state apparatus. Excerpts of reports by US and British embassies in Moscow are as follows:

On March 5, at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Party, Stalin’s epochal speech was addressed to this situation. He berated the party for having given too much attention to economic development and too little to the welfare of the party machinery. He required that each party member become a vigilant soldier, for the protection of their ideals from capitalistic states, foreign spies, et cetera. He made a definite bid for the support of the agricultural workers and for the workers as against the factory managers and party leaders. All during the months of March and April, and even up to the present time, every vehicle of propaganda press, radio, and popular exhortation has been addressed to the reorganization, cleansing, and revivifying of the party organization. (WHY THEY SHOT TUKHATCHEVSKY No. 457 Moscow, July 28, 1937, Strictly Confidential. TO THE HONOURABLE THE SECRETARY OF STATE, SHOOTING OF THE RED ARMY GENERALS ON JUNE 12, 1937, AND GENERAL CRISIS WHICH FOLLOWED, In: Mission to Moscow, Joseph E. Davies, p. 134) (IMG)

On the question of keeping a proper check on the work of individual members of the party, [Stalin] explains that promises and declarations, and even office statistics, are of less importance than the results of actual work achieved. Moreover, checking from above is not enough in itself; checking from below – i.e., the control exercised by the masses over their leaders by means of congresses and elections – is also essential, and the problem is to combine the two types of control.

M. Stalin goes on to discuss the need for an atmosphere of genuine self-criticism and for the public avowal of mistakes committed. He quotes as examples the mistakes made by the party in the early years of the drive to collectivize peasants. The year 1930 was, he says, one of the most dangerous in the whole history of the party' many party members had forgotten that "the peasants could not be converted to collectivization by administrative pressure," and wished to rush matters through. despite strong resistance, the Central Committee held those hotheads in check, and the attitude of the committee has been justified by the final result. The splendid cadres of collective farm workers could never have been created if the party not realised its mistake and correct it in time. Similarly, during the Schachty period of industrial wrecking there was a disastrous tendency to believe that Socialist industrial construction could be achieved by the employment of hostile bourgeois specialists controlled by party "commissars," who themselves lacked technical qualifications. The campaign for the widespread mastery of such technical qualifications encountered stubborn resistance at first, but subsequent history demonstrated its correctness. It is sheer nonsense to pretend that the frank admission of mistakes might strengthen the hands of the enemies of the regime. On the contrary, it is only much honesty that the party can maintain and enhance its authority in the eyes of the owing masses. It is equally incorrect to suppress public criticism out of regard for the feelings and pride of the cadres; such an attitude is not only fundamentally incorrect, but dangerous to the cadres themselves, and is, indeed, a sure way of ruining them.

M. Stalin then proceeds to speak at length on the dangers of a conceited and bureaucratic attitude in the party leaders, and on their need to keep in intimate touch with the masses, listening to their suggestions and criticisms.

(N 1910/250/38, No. 155, Mr. MacKillop to Mr. Eden, Moscow, April 3, 1937; Received: April 9, 1937. In Foreign Office (1937-1938), pp. 77-78) (IMG)

Akin to the problems listed by Zhdanov and Stalin was the duplication of the Soviet state apparati; local Party leaders had set up their own bureaucracies parallel to the government machinery. The Central Committee of the Party criticized this practice. In his report to Washington, Charles Bohlen – an American anti-Soviet diplomat, and later, the US Ambassador to the Soviet Union – wrote:

Local Party committees have been severely criticized in the press and by decisions of the Central Committee of the Party for exercising governmental and administrative functions in their own name. (861.00 Supreme Soviet/5, First Session of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, January 12–19, 1938. Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Bohlen), In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, 1933–1939. Office of the Historian, January 12-19, 1938, p. 513) (IMG)

To remedy this problem:

the Kremlin [aimed to] do away with this duplication of functions and to return to the system of control by the Communist Party which prevailed in the early days of the Soviet Union, whereby the control was exercised not by the Communist Party in its own name but through its members placed in key positions in the governmental machinery. (861.00 Supreme Soviet/5, First Session of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, January 12–19, 1938. Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Bohlen), In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, 1933–1939. Office of the Historian, January 12-19, 1938, p. 513) (IMG)

And a press campaign against such duplication was launched:

There have been numerous indications in the Soviet press that the Kremlin has been opposed to the growth of the purely Party organs as a separate administrative apparatus. (861.00 Supreme Soviet/5, First Session of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, January 12–19, 1938. Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Bohlen), In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, 1933–1939. Office of the Historian, January 12-19, 1938, p. 513) (IMG)

There were:

A large number of other serious abuses ... enumerated by M. Zhdanov.... (N 1714/250/38, No. 120, Viscount Chilston to Mr. Eden, Moscow, March 22, 1937; Received: March 30, 1937, Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 66) (IMG)

in his late February 1937 speech. Of these:

one [was] the so-called "triangle" composed of the secretary of the local party committee, the works manager and the chairman of the local trade union organisation. These "triangles," he says frankly, have come to be a law unto themselves, and their administrative and merely repressive power is such that no ordinary party member can stand up to them. (N 1714/250/38, No. 120, Viscount Chilston to Mr. Eden, Moscow, March 22, 1937; Received: March 30, 1937, Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 66) (IMG)

Furthermore:

Zhdanov denounced dictatorial behaviour in the management of soviet institutions and state enterprises. ('Life and Times of Andrei Zhdanov, 1896-1948', Kees Boterbloem, p. 151)

While retaining the scientific Taylorist system of one-man management as advocated by Lenin, the Party advocated for greater democratic accountability within the factories as well as the in the entire trade union structure. The system of 'one-man management in our conditions', Zhdanov said:

sharply differs from the administration of enterprises by capitalists, where there is no party organization, where often there are no trade unions, where there is no public opinion (*obshchestvennost'*) and where the director individually is in complete command. ('Stalinism and the Politics of Mobilization: Ideas, Power, and Terror in Inter-War Russia', Oxford University Press, David Priestland, p. 321)

By the time Zhdanov made that statement, considerable progress had already occurred in the field of democratic trade unionism:

With the abolition of the People's Commissariat of Labor in 1933 and the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection in 1934 the functions of the local offices of these bodies were transferred to trade union organizations. These functions consist primarily of checking on managerial observances of those provisions of the Labor Code which deal with the well-being of workers, sanitary conditions, and safety techniques. This control is performed by special "public inspectors" who are elected by trade union organizations. (The

Structure of Factory Control in the Soviet Union, American Sociological Association, American Sociological Review, Vol. 15, No. 2, Alexander Vucinich, April 1950, p. 182) (IMG)

However, the campaign launched by Zhdanov and Stalin brought greater democracy to Soviet trade unionism as well. One month after Zhdanov's speech, there was:

the sixth plenum of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions [which] opened in Moscow on the 28th April and closed on the 15th May. (N 2703/250/38, No. 249, Viscount Chilston to Mr. Eden, Moscow, May 18, 1937; Received: May 21, 1938. Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 106) (IMG)

In that plenum of the trade unions, two representatives from the Party were present; they were Kaganovich and Andreyev who, on behalf of the Central Committee:

opened ... by announcing that "the Central Committee of the party were of the opinion that trade union democracy should be realised starting at the top, with the plenum; and that, if the plenum should see fit to raise the question of recasting the leadership of the council, the Central Committee would in no way hinder the members of the plenum from doing so." (N 2703/250/38, No. 249, Viscount Chilston to Mr. Eden, Moscow, May 18, 1937; Received: May 21, 1938. Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 106) (IMG)

Thus, the campaign for the further democratization of the trade unions had begun. Throughout the plenum, the corrupt elements among the trade union officials were encouraged to self-criticize:

The result of this remarkable invitation was ... "self-criticism" and recrimination. The trade union officials evidently did their best, repeatedly accusing themselves and one another of having completely lost touch with the masses, of reactionary bureaucracy and many other serious offences. (N 2703/250/38, No. 249, Viscount Chilston to Mr. Eden, Moscow, May 18, 1937; Received: May 21, 1938. Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 106) (IMG)

Naturally, some trade union leaders would have self-criticized out of humility, and others did so because they saw in self-criticism a chance for 'disarming' their critics and not losing too much ground, so that they can later continue their corrupt practices. On the other hand, the creation of an atmosphere of criticism and self-criticism increased room for purging the corrupt bureaucrats – linked to Bukharin's group formerly through Tomsky – who had risen to power in the trade unions. As such:

the speeches of the factory workers attending the plenum were characterised by a much greater severity and "real Bolshevik criticism" than those of the officials. They could afford to be, since the speakers were not criticizing themselves. Each of the members and candidates of the whole presidium, and each of the secretaries of the council, were individually discussed by the whole plenum.... (N 2703/250/38, No. 249, Viscount Chilston to Mr. Eden, Moscow, May 18, 1937; Received: May 21, 1938. Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 106) (IMG)

After the criticism of the individual officials, re-elections occurred with some of the top officials being demoted, and replaced by new democratically elected trade union leaders. Thus, at that time:

it was decided to hold by secret ballot an election both to the presidium and to the secretariat. The upshot was the election to both organs of an almost completely fresh personnel – though M. Shvernik [who officially agreed with the need for changes] remains the head.... Two members and two candidate members of the presidium were expelled ... and another member was expelled for the dissolute character of his personal life. In addition, the chief administrative official and the principal financial inspector of the council were dismissed after consideration by the plenum of the findings of a commission, set up during the course of the congress, to investigate what the Pravda describes as the scandalous extravagances of the council in financial matters. (N 2703/250/38, No. 249, Viscount Chilston to Mr. Eden, Moscow, May 18, 1937; Received: May 21, 1938. Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 106) (IMG)

At the end of the plenum, a resolution was passed condemning numerous abuses and calling for the democratization of the trade unions. The following democratizations plans were established by the end of the trade union plenum:

"Co-optation," [in this case referring to appointments without intra-Party electoral processes] and other illegal practices, such as election by voting list, are to cease. All trade union officials are to be re-elected or replaced during the present year, and the elections, like those to the soviets and to the party, are to be by secret ballot. Factory committees and institutions are to hold their elections from the 1st June to the 15th July, district and individual trade unions for the whole Union from the 15th July to the 1st October, and the All-Union Congress of Trade Unions is to be convened on the 20th October. The regional trade union councils of the various grades, from the "rayon" to the Union Republic, are to be abolished as too unwieldy. Various ... measures are prescribed for increasing trade union activity in caring for the material, cultural and political well-being of the workers (the discussions of the congress showed up very clearly the entire failure of the trade union organisations to ensure adequate protection of the workers against avoidable industrial traumatism....). The practice of concluding collective agreements between the trade unions and the employing organisations is to be reintroduced; as also the practice of holding regular conferences on production, to which the broad masses of the workers, employees, engineers and technicians are to be invited. Trade union officials are to be put through various training courses in political ideology. Strict financial discipline and responsibility to be enforced, and it thought necessary to lay down specifically that "embezzlers are to be handed over to the courts." (N 2703/250/38, No. 249, Viscount Chilston to Mr. Eden, Moscow, May 18, 1937; Received: May 21, 1938. Foreign Office (1937-1938), pp. 106-107) (IMG)

According to a study published by the Oxford University Press:

THROUGHOUT THE SUMMER OF 1937, the unions held multi-candidate, secret-ballot elections at every level from the factory to the central committees. The workers took up the campaign for union democracy and swept out the old apparat in one election after another. (Stalinist Terror and Democracy: The 1937 Union Campaign, Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the American Historical Association, The American Historical Review, Vol. 110, No. 5, Wendy Goldman, December 2005, p. 1444) (IMG)

In elections for the highest level of union leadership, the central committees, union members also returned strong votes of no confidence. (Stalinist Terror and Democracy: The 1937 Union Campaign, Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the American Historical Association, The American Historical Review, Vol. 110, No. 5, Wendy Goldman, December 2005, p. 1446) (IMG)

Noteworthy is that the trade union elections, from then on, were multi-candidate. As a result of these democratic changes, the Oxford Press University article stated, the entire apparatus of the trade unions was shaken up, with new democratically elected leaders in charge:

Electoral returns from 116 union central committees showed that more than 96 percent of 5,054 plenum members, 87 percent of presidium members, 92 percent of secretaries, and 68 percent of chairmen had been replaced. Here, too, officials at the apex of the hierarchy retained a greater share of posts than those immediately below them: 96 percent of central committee members were replaced, but only 68 percent of chairmen. Moreover, the new chairmen and secretaries often transferred from other important Party, managerial, or union posts. In about one-third of the central committees, they were former heads of factory committees. The new electoral shake-up provided the greatest benefits to this group, catapulting them from leadership of the factories into positions of national prominence. (Stalinist Terror and Democracy: The 1937 Union Campaign, Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the American Historical Association, *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 110, No. 5, Wendy Goldman, December 2005, p. 1446) (IMG)

The proletarian battle for democracy is an indication of the marriage between the purges and Party unification campaigns and the democratization campaign. They went hand in hand, combatting corruption and elitism while increasing accountability to the working masses.

These practices lasted well into the 1950s. For instance, according to Vucinich, the workers still had ‘production conferences’ up until in 1950:

The trade union members are entitled to hold “production conferences” at which they are informed about the current plans and are called upon to state mistakes and unwarranted acts perpetrated by management. (The Structure of Factory Control in the Soviet Union, American Sociological Association, *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 15, No. 2, Alexander Vucinich, April 1950, p. 182) (IMG)

These practices lasted well beyond Stalin’s death as well. The CIA confirmed this active role of trade unions. The CIA stated:

As a more positive means of creating – and preserving an atmosphere suitable to promote maximum output, the internal enterprise managements attempt to maintain communications systems designed not only to get their point of view to the workers but also to get the point of view to management. Communications channels are inherent in the established chain of command and in the role played by the factory trade union committee (zavkom). In addition, widespread use is made of the production conference, which may be called at the initiative of management, the trade union, or the Party group in the plant. These conferences are held regularly or intermittently to consider reports by management concerning production and workers’ welfare matters and to discuss production problems, operational changes proposed by management, and workers’ suggestions and criticisms. Though some of these arrangements have been subject to criticism, they seem, by and large, to have functioned fairly satisfactorily and to have provided an element of strength in the operation of Soviet industry.

Since it is obvious that wherever employees have to perform work under the direction of superiors, the will of one man is subordinated to that of another, and friction cannot be avoided, irrespective of the prevailing economic, social, and political system, the same conflicts or grievances arise in the day-to-day working relations of Soviet-plant managements and workers as arise between Western employers and their personnel, and similar methods or grievance procedures used to adjust them. The standard method provides for the submission of complaints to successively higher levels until they are adjusted or referred to final decision by a neutral agency. In the USSR the grievance is first presented to the plant trade union organizer, who may take it up with the plant trade union committee or discuss it directly with management. If the matter cannot be adjusted in this stage, it may be submitted in a more formal manner to the plant appraisal and conflicts commission (RKK). This bipartite body is composed of representatives of the union and of management in equal-numbers and may be invoked not only by labor but also by management to obtain, for example, punishment of workers, for violating rules of employment or for damaging enterprise property. Decisions of the RKK, which must be unanimous, are binding. If a unanimous decision cannot be reached or if the complainant is not satisfied with the award, the issue may be referred for final decision to higher levels of the trade union or to the people’s court. The commission, in addition to settling grievances, has the power to decide whether a worker may be discharged for lack of qualification or reasons of health. Without its affirmative decision, such a discharge is not legally valid.

The general practice of attempting to settle issues outside of prescribed channels, already noted in connection with production and supply matters, is also present in the field of labor-management disputes. Workers have complained directly to the Kremlin, the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, and the ministry, not only in matters over which the RKK and the courts have no jurisdiction, but also concerning issues which should have been settled through the grievance procedure. Officials on high administrative levels have accepted such complaints and have channeled them back for investigation. By and large, however, extensive use is apparently made of the grievance machinery. Some sources state that workers have been fairly successful in grievance proceedings, though other observers declare the system to be unsatisfactory. On balance, the operation of the machinery for settlement of disputes probably affects worker morale favorably and thereby contributes to labor productivity.

(Management of the Soviet Industrial Enterprise, CIA, August 7, 1956, pp. 58-59) (IMG)

To maximize the tactical efficiency of running the state enterprises, the USSR embraced the one-person management instead of collective management – one main manager for each enterprise. However, to ensure that the factory managers are held accountable, the democratic rights of the trade unions were to be expanded so to ensure that the workers could criticize the managers for potential errors, shortcoming, or even sabotage. This system would have allowed wreckers, saboteurs, and corrupt elements in the management to be called out more easily. In November 1937, the British Foreign Office reported that managers:

during the past months, ... there are few industrial enterprises of which the managing staff has not changed several times during the last twelve months as a result of arrests and executions. (N 5458/42/38, No. 520, Viscount Chilston to Mr. Eden, Moscow, November 2, 1937; Received: November 5, 1937, Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 225) (IMG)

In addition to the democratization of the Party, of course it was necessary to also democratize the state apparatus as well, as part of the general strategy of pincer assault on bureaucracy. Hence the Party of the proletariat tried to democratize the Soviet government as a whole. In every sphere of the USSR, there came efforts to simultaneously increase democratic accountability – without causing anarchy or disorder – while purging those officials who abused their power. Davies remarked:

It is vital to the [Soviet] government that they should make a strong showing of popular support. The result has been an enormous party activity from the top down, extending into every branch of activity over the entire country. The whole party organization is being shaken

up. (THE RUSSIAN BEAR WADDLES THROUGH, NO. 455, Moscow, July 28, 1937, Strictly Confidential. TO THE HONOURABLE THE SECRETARY OF STATE ALLEGED BREAKDOWN OF SOVIET INDUSTRIAL PLAN, In: Mission to Moscow, Joseph E. Davies, pp. 125-126) (IMG)

A new constitution further democratizing the Soviet system was written. The strength of the workers' state by then was so high as to be able to promote greater democratization. Regarding these democratization efforts, Bohlen's report to Washington is instructive. Although filled with anti-Soviet rhetoric, Bohlen's report contains significant remarks about the status of the separation of powers in the USSR. Bohlen pointed to the aspects of the proceedings afforded interesting indications of the manner in which the Soviet Government would function under the new Constitution. (861.00 Supreme Soviet/5, First Session of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, January 12-19, 1938. Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Bohlen), In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, 1933-1939. Office of the Historian, January 12-19, 1938, p. 512) (IMG)

The Kremlin, Bohlen noted, aimed 'to prevent the concentration' of 'too much power' in 'any governmental body'. Indeed, Bohlen made note of the desire of the Kremlin to increase the efficiency and simplify the machinery of government, as well as to prevent the concentration in any governmental body of too much power. (861.00 Supreme Soviet/5, First Session of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, January 12-19, 1938. Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Bohlen), In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, 1933-1939. Office of the Historian, January 12-19, 1938, p. 512) (IMG)

In fact, according to Bohlen,:

As the proceedings developed it became obvious that there was a real intention of separating and defining much more closely than in the past the powers and duties of the principal governmental bodies and of the individual officials. (861.00 Supreme Soviet/5, First Session of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, January 12-19, 1938. Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Bohlen), In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, 1933-1939. Office of the Historian, January 12-19, 1938, p. 512) (IMG)

Noteworthy is that Loy Henderson – the anti-Soviet US charge d'affaires in Moscow – agreed with virtually all of Bohlen's assessments in that document. The following was written as the footnote of Bohlen's report as declassified by the US State Department:

Transmitted by the Chargé in the Soviet Union in his despatch No. 913, February 2, 1938; received February 19. Mr. Henderson wrote: "I may state that the personal impressions set forth by Mr. Bohlen are similar to those obtained by me and that I agree with the observations set forth in his memorandum." (861.00 Supreme Soviet/5, First Session of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, January 12-19, 1938. Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Bohlen), In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, 1933-1939. Office of the Historian, January 12-19, 1938, p. 509) (IMG)

Such division of power as described by Bohlen (and Henderson) is also backed by evidence from a 1953 CIA document which stated:

The powers the USSR Supreme Soviet [they] are as follows:

- (a) Proclaims the laws of the USSR;
- (b) Elects the of Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, which is the collegiate (collective) president of the country;
- (c) Forms the USSR Government, the USSR Council of Ministers;
- (d) Elects the USSR Supreme Court;
- (e) Appoints the USSR Prosecutor-General;
- (f) Exercises control over the organs of power, which consist of the right of the deputies to address questions to the Government, to appoint committees of investigation and audit, and to remove all officials of the Government;
- (g) Exercises all other functions of the highest State power, i.e., ratifies the most important treaties with foreign powers, declares a state of war. etc.;
- (h) Introduces amendments to Constitution of the USSR by a two-thirds majority vote in each Chamber.
- (i) Each Chamber establishes the conduct of its business, elects its organs, etc.

(Government Structure of the USSR, CIA, Date of Distribution: December 3, 1953, p. 2) (IMG)

Note that for the CIA documents, there are two dates: the date of distribution and preceded by it, the date of information. Although the CIA document was distributed among CIA staff in December of 1953, the date of information – though not declassified – was undoubtedly much earlier. Regardless, the information by the CIA document encompassed the structure of the Soviet state up until then.

Also, nowhere in that document did the CIA ever claim that its remarks are tentative in character; nor did it claim that the above descriptions are merely based on the formal laws of the USSR, that the descriptions may be incorrect. In short, the above claims by the CIA were made definitively and not in a probabilistic manner.

The claims of the CIA are also confirmed by 1937 report and analysis from the British Foreign Office stating that the two chambers of the Supreme Soviet 'enjoy ... the right of legislative initiative' and that the laws of the USSR were 'passed by a simple majority of each House':

The sole legislative body of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a whole is the Supreme Council ("Soviet") of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. It is composed of two Houses, each of about 500-600 members, the Council of the Union and the Council of Nationalities, which enjoy equal status and the right of legislative initiative. Laws are passed by a simple majority of each House. (N 2909/250/38, Guide to the Organisation of the Soviet Government and Communist Party, P. S. Falla, September 7, 1937, Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 176) (IMG)

The Supreme Council has the power to ratify or cancel decrees made by its own Presidium and decisions taken by the Council of People's Commissars or by individual commissars.... (N 2909/250/38, Guide to the Organisation of the Soviet Government and Communist Party, P. S. Falla, September 7, 1937, Foreign Office (1937-1938), pp. 176-177) (IMG)

Once again, the British Foreign Office document did not use a probabilistic language, nor did it describe the formal laws of the USSR; this suggests that the author of the Foreign Office document really meant what was written in the above excerpt. Clearly, the Supreme Soviet played a significant, well-defined role in policy making:

The USSR Supreme Soviet is a legislative organ which forms and controls all organs of administration and justice, and carries out supervision over adherence to the law. (Government Structure of the USSR, CIA, Date of Distribution: December 3, 1953, p. 2) (IMG)

Thanks to the democratization efforts, after the elections, the new deputies to the Supreme Soviet were more lively and intelligent individuals actively engaged in policy-making. In reference to:

the entire proceedings in the sessions of the Supreme Soviet.... (861.00 Supreme Soviet/5, First Session of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, January 12–19, 1938. Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Bohlen), In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, 1933–1939. Office of the Historian, January 12-19, 1938, p. 510) (IMG)

the American diplomat Bohlen admitted:

I received the impression that many of the deputies themselves, ... felt that they were taking an active and responsible part in the government of the Soviet Union. (861.00 Supreme Soviet/5, First Session of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, January 12–19, 1938. Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Bohlen), In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, 1933–1939. Office of the Historian, January 12-19, 1938, p. 510) (IMG)

The Supreme Soviet of the USSR was made up of the Soviet of the Nationalities and the Soviet of the Union. In reference to Soviet of the Union, Bohlen reported that, resultant from the 1936 democratic reforms, there were ‘more intelligent’ deputies to the Soviet of the Union:

In appearance the deputies to the Soviet of the Union were more intelligent and in general seemed to be of a noticeably higher type than the members of the previous Soviet bodies, for instance, the All-Union Congress of Soviets in 1935, which I attended. (861.00 Supreme Soviet/5, First Session of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, January 12–19, 1938. Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Bohlen), In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, 1933–1939. Office of the Historian, January 12-19, 1938, p. 509) (IMG)

Also noteworthy is that given their hard work, the deputies earned approximately four times the average Soviet citizen:

In view of the fact that the average wage in the Soviet Union is apparently between 230 and 250 rubles a month, it is of some interest to note that the deputies were granted salaries of 1,000 rubles a month, a daily allowance of 150 rubles while the Soviet is in session, and a free pass on all railroads. (861.00 Supreme Soviet/5, First Session of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, January 12–19, 1938. Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Bohlen), In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, 1933–1939. Office of the Historian, January 12-19, 1938, p. 514) (IMG)

Similar remarks can be made about the Soviet of Nationalities. There, again contrary to the Western depictions, the deputies were not forcibly ‘Russified’ by the Soviet state; rather, they were able to express their culture freely, and in fact, seemed genuinely engaged in the politics. Bohlen reported:

The deputies to the Soviet of Nationalities, representing thirty-two different races, were of a noticeably more primitive type. The majority of the deputies from the republics of the minor nationalities appeared in their national costumes, giving to the assembly a colorful and varied appearance which was totally lacking in the Soviet of the Union. The body as a whole was considerably more lively, and the deputies appeared to derive considerable simple enjoyment from the proceedings. (861.00 Supreme Soviet/5, First Session of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, January 12–19, 1938. Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Bohlen), In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, 1933–1939. Office of the Historian, January 12-19, 1938, p. 509) (IMG)

Such active engagement by the deputies can be explained by the increase in the democratic spontaneity resultant from the campaign for democratization. The CIA itself confirmed that the governing bodies of the USSR were ‘elected ... from among citizens’ or ‘elected by all the voters’:

The highest governing body in the USSR is the USSR Supreme Soviet, elected for four-year terms from among citizens with a minimum age of 23 and a right to vote. The USSR Supreme Soviet consists of two Chambers.

(a) Soviet of Union which is elected by all the voters in election okrugs, with one delegate chosen for every 300,000 population.

(Government Structure of the USSR, CIA, Date of Distribution: December 3, 1953, p. 1) (IMG)

According to the 1937 British Foreign Office report:

The Council of the Union is elected directly on the basis of one Deputy to 300,000 inhabitants. The Council of Nationalities, which numbers about 150 members, is also elected directly.... (N 2909/250/38, Guide to the Organisation of the Soviet Government and Communist Party, P. S. Falla, September 7, 1937, Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 176) (IMG)

A 1957 CIA document analyzed elections in that country up to 1957. The report makes references both to the Stalin era and to the Khrushchev era. The US intelligence document, having noted the mass-based spontaneous nature of the nomination of candidates for the Supreme Soviet, presented a narrative vastly in contrast to the Western media claims that ‘Stalin’ – or any other ‘despotic’ Party ‘elite’, for that matter – was responsible for ‘handpicking’ the individual candidates for the ‘farical’ Soviet elections.

Moreover, the document pointed to the USSR’s ‘honest conduct of elections’ protected by the ‘Soviet laws’ which aimed to prevent ‘the usual threats’ that may occur against voters during elections. In order to prevent abuses during the elections, electoral committees were set up throughout the Soviet Union, with the membership of these committees being chosen through, in the CIA’s words, ‘spontaneous nominations’ from trade unions, collective farms, etc. The CIA added that the same criteria applied to the candidates to the Supreme Soviet; they too were spontaneously nominated by mass organizations. The following is a paragraph from the document:

Soviet laws condemn the usual threats to the orderly and honest conduct of elections. The administration of elections and the prevention of abuses are in the hands of a hierarchy of election committees, reaching from the voting precinct to the union republic. The administration of elections and the prevention of abuses are in the hands of a hierarchy of election committees, reaching from the voting

precinct to the union republic. These committees are composed of representatives of the organizations which nominate candidates – the Communist Party, trade unions, youth groups, collective farms and so on. The members are selected by the same kind of spontaneous nomination as are candidates for the supreme soviets. (Electoral and Parliamentary Practices in the USSR and Poland, CIA, August 9, 1957, pp. 10-11) (IMG)

The study further confirmed:

There is no evidence to indicate that Soviet elections are not technically honest. (Electoral and Parliamentary Practices in the USSR and Poland, CIA, August 9, 1957, p. 11) (IMG)

As the CIA document correctly stated, the Communist Party participated in the electoral committees, and sometimes choosing the candidates for the elections; it would be a mistake, however, to assume that this means the elections were a farce.

Firstly, thanks to the Lenin Enrolment program, as the reader may recall from C2S4, the Party was overwhelmingly composed of politically educated industrial, blue-collar working class, and not just white-collar intellectuals and bureaucrats. Ambassador Davies reported:

The party heretofore has been dominated by the industrial working class, constituting about 20% of the entire electorate. (THE RUSSIAN BEAR WADDLES THROUGH, NO. 455, Moscow, July 28, 1937, Strictly Confidential. TO THE HONOURABLE THE SECRETARY OF STATE ALLEGED BREAKDOWN OF SOVIET INDUSTRIAL PLAN, In: Mission to Moscow, Joseph E. Davies, pp. 125-126) (IMG)

Secondly, while it was absolutely essential to spread the influence of the Communist Party to every sector of the society as far as possible, it was also important to keep the individual officials within the Communist Party in check by preventing them from becoming a ‘favored aristocracy’ during the elections. Anti-Soviet hawk Henderson wrote:

During the elections no distinction was made between the candidates in or out of the Communist Party. In other words, many observers believed that the leveling off of the political barriers between the Party and the non-Party masses, which has been going on for many months, was accelerated during the election campaign and that actual steps were taken to eliminate the Communist Party as a favored aristocracy. (861.00 Supreme Soviet/1, No. 829, The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, December 22, 1937; Received: January 10, 1938, In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, 1933–1939, Office of the Historian, Document 356) (IMG)

The wording of the above quote implies that the communists may have been trying to weaken the influence of the CPSU, when in fact, they actually sought to expand it. Instead, the effort was to keep the individual CPSU officials in check.

Although the communists in the USSR were successful in most of their campaigns for democratization, there was one area in which they decided to retreat. Initially, the communists in the USSR campaigned for multi-candidate elections. Loy Henderson of the US Embassy reported:

there can be little doubt that it was originally intended to have more than one candidate for each constituency, as was the case on December 12. (861.00 Supreme Soviet/1, No. 829, The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, December 22, 1937; Received: January 10, 1938, In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, 1933–1939, Office of the Historian, Document 356) (IMG)

Let it be clarified once more that multi-candidate elections should not allow for even an inch of deviation away from the dictatorship of the proletariat. Again, the multi-candidate multi-partisan pro-‘absolute freedom of speech’ bourgeois-democratic system existing in the West is a temporary ‘compromise-state’ system resultant from the compromise of the dictatorship of the imperial bourgeoisie with the dictatorship of the proletariat. The imperialist bourgeois-democracies, fundamentally the dictatorships of finance capital, would have imposed fascist dictatorships on their imperial heartlands had they faced no numerically strong proletariat in their countries, but were forced to incorporate elements of the dictatorship of the proletariat through electoral democratization. When faced with no strong proletarian or cooperativist opposition, finance capital has consistently imposed a fascist dictatorship. Likewise, when faced with no strong opposition from the anti-proletarian classes, the proletariat have imposed a dictatorship of the proletariat. Thus, when the ‘compromise-state’ system has ceased to exist, when the tug-of-war has been won by one of the two sides, the triumphant side has allowed no room for the kinds of democratic freedoms that allow the potential resurgence of the defeated. As finance capital has no longer-term future, as the proletariat is destined to conquer the world (assuming the continued life of humanity), there is no future for this ‘compromise-state’ system, the Western-style bourgeois-democracy. Absolutely regardless of whether Western-style bourgeois-democracy is good or bad, the fight for it is a lost cause in the longer term, a futile mission. A multi-candidate election of a kind allowing for the candidacy of anti-proletarian agents thus has no place in the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Rather, the type of multi-candidate election strengthening the dictatorship of the proletariat is one that expands the accountability of officials to the proletarian and kolkhoznik electorate, without allowing for an inch of deviation away from the class interests of the proletariat. In this context, the debate would not be between socialist vs. anti-socialist candidates, nor between socialist vs. crypto-anti-socialist voices. Assuming the existence of the dictatorship of the proletariat as the context, the questions of the grand strategies and macro-level policies of class struggle have already been resolved, and thereupon the electoral contest would be not over the grand strategies and macro-level policies but over such issues as (1) the credentials, leadership skills, technicality, and personality traits of the candidates, and (2) the ability of the candidates to ensure that the material needs of the local proletarians, kolkhozniks, and revolutionary intellectuals are properly accounted for by the scientific central plan. This type of a multi-candidate election in the context of a dictatorship of the proletariat would be endorsed by every communist revolutionary and class-conscious proletarian. It is a type of multi-candidate elections that would not put to question socialism in the slightest, but would maximize the accountability of individual officials to the proletariat and its class allies, thus expanding the dictatorship of the proletariat.

In a famous March 1936 interview with American newspaperman Roy Howard, Stalin spoke of ‘election contests’ through which ‘millions of electors will measure the fitness of candidates, reject the unsuitable, expunge their names from candidates' lists, and promote and nominate the best’:

You are puzzled by the fact that only one party will come forward at elections. You cannot see how election contests can take place under these conditions. Evidently candidates will be put forward not only by the Communist Party, but by all sorts of public, non-Party organisations. And we have hundreds of these. We have no contending parties any more than we have a capitalist class contending against a working class which is exploited by the capitalists.

(...). But there will be, and I foresee very lively election campaigns. There are not a few institutions in our country which work badly. Cases occur when this or that local government body fails to satisfy certain of the multifarious and growing requirements of the toilers of town and country. Have you built a good school or not? Have you improved housing conditions?

Are you a bureaucrat? Have you helped to make our labour more effective and our lives more cultured?

Such will be the criteria with which millions of electors will measure the fitness of candidates, reject the unsuitable, expunge their names from candidates' lists, and promote and nominate the best.

Yes, election campaigns will be very lively, they will be conducted around numerous, very acute problems, principally of a practical nature, of first class importance for the people. Our new electoral system will tighten up all institutions and organisations and compel them to improve their work. Universal, direct and secret suffrage in the U.S.S.R. will be a whip in the hands of the population against the organs of government which work badly.

(Interview Between J. Stalin and Roy Howard, On March 1, 1936, Scripps-Howard Newspaper. Source: Works, Vol. 14. Publisher: Red Star Press Ltd., London, 1978, Marxists Internet Archive) (IMG)

In his speech in February 1937, Zhdanov pointed to the need for the local CPSU candidates to step up their efforts in order to challenge and defeat their rivals during the elections to the Supreme Soviet:

M. Zhdanov goes on to explain that under the new system Deputies and candidates must be prepared for much wider publicity ... and the party organisations must take the lead in criticizing and challenging unsuitable candidates “without waiting for these to be defeated by the secret ballot.” (N 1714/250/38, No. 120, Viscount Chilston to Mr. Eden, Moscow, March 22, 1937; Received: March 30, 1937, Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 65) (IMG)

However, soon there emerged reports by local Party leaders stating that multi-candidate elections are allowing room for infiltration by the counter-revolutionaries. According to a study published by the Cornell University Press:

Once election preparations were underway, local Party and security police officials began to warn that former kulaks and priests were organizing for the elections, and ... that Communists would be voted out in favor of religious leaders. One Party official in March 1937 stated, “The facts in our possession show that counterrevolutionary clergymen and sectarians are very actively preparing to submit their candidacies for the secret ballot.” (Cultivating the Masses: Modern State Practices and Soviet Socialism, 1914-1939, Cornell University Press, David Hoffmann, 2011, pp. 286-287) (IMG)

In this context, in the fall of 1937:

the Central Committee cancelled plans for multicandidate elections in favor of single-candidate elections.... (Cultivating the Masses: Modern State Practices and Soviet Socialism, 1914-1939, Cornell University Press, David Hoffmann, 2011, pp. 286-287) (IMG)

It is worth reminding that multi-candidacy in socialist elections is merely a means of increasing the accountability of elected officials, and not a matter of communism vs. anti-communism. At the time, the Party did not have a strong mechanism for ensuring that the multi-candidate elections would be solely between communism vs. communism rather than communism vs. crypto-anti-communism. As such, the Party cancelled the plan for multi-candidate elections, for the while.

Not that multi-candidacy in the election was too important an issue. Scientific socialism does not see electoral competition as the alpha and the omega. From a liberal perspective, ‘competition’ is the logocentric panacea that resolves all problems – competition between ideas, candidates, parties, businesses, etc. To the liberal, competition is almost everything. To the socialist, the Party of the proletariat, not competition, is the vortex from which arises good governance. The logocentric panacea is the exercise of state control by a socialist-educated democratic centralist Party whose largest membership percentage, if not the overwhelming majority of its membership, is that of industrial workers who own no private property and have solely their labour to sell. As long as a socialistic democratic centralist Party is controlled by its proletariat, and so long as this proletarian-controlled Party decisively controls the state, all of the other macro and strategic issues would be on the path of resolution, which in turn would pave the way for the resolution of the micro, technical, and tactical detail issues. In a socialist state, there could be hundreds of institutions by which to reinforce the accountability of the elected officials, of which multi-candidate elections was only one among many. The absence of multi-candidate elections, the absence of a mechanism by which to reinforce the accountability of officials, certainly had a negative effect, but to a magnitude a thousandth of what the liberal would portray it as. As there were numerous other avenues of boosting accountability, the negative effect of the absence of multi-candidacy was nowhere near a game changer.

Inevitably, the Party of the proletariat had to promote multi-candidate elections, by the time of its further entrenchment, by the time that it could ensure that the electoral contest would not be between revolutionary candidates vs. anti-revolutionary candidates but between skilled revolutionary candidates vs. more skilled revolutionary candidates. Hence, during this time, the ideological seeds of multi-candidate elections were sown:

It is possible that in future elections, ... there may be more than one candidate for each constituency. (861.00 Supreme Soviet/1, No. 829, The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Henderson) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, December 22, 1937; Received: January 10, 1938, In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, 1933–1939, Office of the Historian, Document 356) (IMG)

Soviet elections did not become multi-candidate later on, as the Great Patriotic War severely decimated the membership composition of the Party, and allowed for the rise of a corrupt tendency that seriously damaged the level of influence of the proletariat over the state, rendering nearly impossible any potential promotion of multi-candidate elections under the conditions of dictatorship of the proletariat. However, in spite of the non-implementation of such a program, a state controlled by the proletariat, upon further entrenching itself, would have, as a matter of class interests, inevitably promoted the accountability of its officials, one reinforcing institution for which was and is the multi-candidate elections.

Anyways, the single candidate nominated for each district, though unopposed, was spontaneously nominated by such mass organizations as the trade unions – which had multi-candidate elections – and collective farms – which were inherently run in a democratic fashion (see C5S3). Democratically-run mass organizations were the force behind the nominations of the single candidates.

Historical experience shows that the degree of the ‘openness’ of electoral contests, and how many candidates are involved, etc. are not in themselves the main factors that determine the participation rate. The main factor, rather, is the level of class struggle. The more the class struggle against the bourgeoisie and the liberal strata of society, the more the participation of the workers and peasants will be in the elections. The more liberal and

bourgeois the policies pursued, the more indifferent would the working and peasant masses be to elections and the less they will participate, and the more the intelligentsia and privileged classes will participate in the elections. More importantly, the proletarians and kolkhozniks in the USSR saw the elections as a referendum of whether their class should continue to rule over the state. Almost all of them voted positive in such referendums by voting for the candidates supported by proletarian-kolkhoznik organizations. Thus the election turnout was high. For instance:

In the 1950 election for the Supreme Soviet, 99.98% of the electorate voted and 99.73% cast ballots for the official candidates. The vote for the candidates of the Soviet Nationalities was 99.72% of the total. In 1951 in elections to supreme soviets of the Union Republics similar unanimity was achieved. (Electoral and Parliamentary Practices in the USSR and Poland, CIA, August 9, 1957, p. 9) (IMG)

That the candidates were spontaneously nominated by the democratic organizations of the proletariat and peasantry explains the coherence of Soviet society and politics. Socialist construction in the USSR resulted in the defeat of the capitalist and feudal modes of production and the virtual end of the capitalist and feudal classes as socio-economic entities. Leaving aside the minority corrupt bureaucrats and black marketeers, the rest of the Soviet population, the overwhelming majority, was composed of proletarians and kolkhozniks. As Stalin said during the Extraordinary Eight Congress of the Soviets on November 25, 1936:

in the USSR there are no longer such classes as the capitalists, the landlords, the kulaks, etc. In the USSR there are only two [legal] classes, workers and peasants, whose interests – far from being mutually hostile – are, on the contrary friendly. (Electoral and Parliamentary Practices in the USSR and Poland, CIA, August 9, 1957, p. 7) (IMG)

This reality was reflected also in the business-like process of the meetings in the Supreme Soviet. Unlike the bourgeois parliaments in which extremely long debates and filibusters were and are held, there was no need for such processes within the USSR. The deputies to the Supreme Soviet generally tended to agree with each other, because all of the deputies were nominated by proletarian and peasant organizations, and unless in cases of treason or criminal offenses, represented proletarian and peasant interests. Many of the bureaucrats and corrupt Trotskyite-Bukharinite agents had been purged as well, thus reducing such intense political conflicts between the agents of the bureaucratic oligarchic class, finance capital, and the kulaks vs. the enemies of such reactionary parasitic classes. The conflicts reduced, for the revolutionary class forces already won most of it during the Great Purge. Also, the speeches, although shorter, contained more substance. As Bohlen pointed out:

It was noted, however, that in comparison with meetings of previous Soviet bodies which the Embassy has observed, the sessions of the Supreme Soviet were conducted in a much more businesslike manner. The speeches were shorter and, while containing the usual eulogies to the achievements of the Soviet Union “under the leadership of Stalin”, had considerably more substance than the average Soviet orations. The Soviet press has emphasized the businesslike manner in which affairs of state were disposed of by the Supreme Soviet, in contrast to the long-drawn-out debates and intrigues of bourgeois parliaments. (861.00 Supreme Soviet/5, First Session of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, January 12–19, 1938. Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Bohlen), In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, 1933–1939. Office of the Historian, January 12-19, 1938, pp. 511-512) (IMG)

But in case disagreements would occur between – for instance – the Soviet of the Union and Soviet of the Nationalities, which together made up the two chambers of the Supreme Soviet, there were procedures to resolve such differences. In this regard, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet was instrumental. ‘The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR’, the CIA stated, was a governmental body that consisted:

of people’s representatives, members of both Chambers of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, with a provision ensuring the representation of all Union Republics, large Autonomous Republics, krais, and oblasts. (Government Structure of the USSR, CIA, Date of Distribution: December 3, 1953, p. 3) (IMG)

The Presidium:

Is accountable to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and carries full responsibility for the legality and expediency of its activities. Every member of the Presidium is at all times subject to dismissal by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. (Government Structure of the USSR, CIA, Date of Distribution: December 3, 1953, p. 3) (IMG)

Elected by and accountable to the Supreme Soviet, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet was the body acting on behalf of the former when the former was not in session. This characteristic feature of the Presidium was aimed at maximizing the efficiency of the government. For instance, during the times of war the Presidium had the right to – when the Supreme Soviet was not in session – declare martial law in the specific parts of the USSR affected by war:

Of the amendments to the Constitution, only one was of any importance, i.e., the addition of a clause to Article 49 giving the Praesidium the right, when the Supreme Soviet is not in session, to declare martial law in a part or the whole of the Soviet Union in the interests of national defense or internal security. The present amendment is obviously to provide a legal basis for the use of any measures to put down possible internal disorders or revolt, especially in the outlying regions of the Soviet Union. (861.00 Supreme Soviet/5, First Session of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, January 12–19, 1938. Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Bohlen), In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, 1933–1939. Office of the Historian, January 12-19, 1938, p. 514) (IMG)

As stated, the Presidium played a key role in helping the two chambers of the Supreme Soviet to resolve their potential differences. According to the 1953 CIA document and the 1937 British Foreign Office document:

In the event of a disagreement between the Chambers, the question is referred for settlement to a Conciliation Commission composed of both Chambers in equal numbers. In the event that the Conciliation Commission fails to arrive at an agreement, or if its decision fails to satisfy one of the Chambers, the question is again examined by both Chambers. In the event the two Chambers again cannot agree on a decision, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet dissolves the USSR Supreme Soviet and orders new elections. (Government Structure of the USSR, CIA, Date of Distribution: December 3, 1953, p. 2) (IMG)

Provision is made, in case of disagreement between the two Houses, for reference to a conciliation commission, and in the last resort for the dissolution of the Supreme Council and the holding of fresh elections. (N 2909/250/38, Guide to the Organisation of the Soviet Government and Communist Party, P. S. Falla, September 7, 1937, Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 176) (IMG)

The Presidium had:

no veto power over decisions of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and has no authority to dissolve the Supreme Soviet of the USSR except in the single instance described in the foregoing section on the functions of the Conciliation Commission. (Government Structure of the USSR, CIA, Date of Distribution: December 3, 1953, p. 3) (IMG)

Alongside the Presidium was the ‘Soviet of the People’s Commissars’, which after World War II was renamed as the ‘Council of Ministers of the USSR’ – at times also officially referred to as the ‘Government of the USSR’. The Soviet of the People’s Commissars was the highest executive body of the Soviet state. As the CIA correctly stated:

The highest executive and administrative organ of State power in the USSR is the Government of the USSR, [also known as] the Council of Ministers of the USSR. (Government Structure of the USSR, CIA, Date of Distribution: December 3, 1953, p. 5) (IMG)

That too was elected by and accountable to the Supreme Soviet:

The Council of Ministers of the USSR is appointed by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR at its first session after elections. The Supreme Soviet of the USSR assigns to one of its members who is being considered for the post of Chairman of the Council of Ministers, the task of submitting to the Supreme Soviet his suggestions on the composition of the Government. The Supreme Soviet of the USSR must confirm the appointment of each member of the Government individually, beginning with the Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Members of the Government do not necessarily have to be deputies to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR; they may also be non-deputies. (Government Structure of the USSR, CIA, Date of Distribution: December 3, 1953, p. 5) (IMG)

The Government of the USSR is accountable to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and reports to them. Specifically, the Government as a whole or a separate member of the Government is obligated to give an answer within three days to the question of a deputy. (Government Structure of the USSR, CIA, Date of Distribution: December 3, 1953, p. 5) (IMG)

Decrees and regulations of the Government of the USSR are issued in accordance with and in execution of the laws, and can be revoked by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR or by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. (Government Structure of the USSR, CIA, Date of Distribution: December 3, 1953, p. 5) (IMG)

For example, for the Soviet treaties with Nazi Germany,:

SOVIET German Pact was ratified to-night by Supreme Council after speech by Molotov. (C 12591/15/18, Sir W. Seeds to Viscount Halifax, No. 240, Moscow, August 31, 1939, In: Foreign Office (1939), p. 141) (No Image)

The right to initiate legislation belonged to all the individual members of the above-mentioned bodies:

The right to initiate legislation belongs to both Chambers in the persona of deputies, to the Committees of both Chambers, to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and to the Council of Ministers of the USSR. (Government Structure of the USSR, CIA, Date of Distribution: December 3, 1953, p. 2) (IMG)

There were strict laws advocated by the communists and set up to prevent the overlap between Presidium and the Soviet of the People’s Commissars. In fact, in the Soviet legal system:

it was expressly stated that there shall be no interlocking memberships between the Presidium and the Soviet of People’s Commissars.... (861.00 Supreme Soviet/5, First Session of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, January 12–19, 1938. Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Bohlen), In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, 1933–1939. Office of the Historian, January 12-19, 1938, pp. 512-513) (IMG)

Bohlen points to:

the announcement by Kossior that members of the Soviet of People’s Commissars would not be eligible for election to the Praesidium, and furthermore the statement by Molotov that Vice Presidents of the Soviet of People’s Commissars were not to act at the same time as the heads of any Commissariat. (861.00 Supreme Soviet/5, First Session of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, January 12-19, 1938. Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Bohlen), In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, 1933–1939. Office of the Historian, January 12-19, 1938, p. 512) (IMG)

Thus, the Presidium and the Soviet of the People’s Commissars were kept separate, so to promote the system of checks and balances.

Recall that the Politburo was the council appointed by the Central Committee of the CPSU, and that it was a body distinct from the Presidium and the Soviet of People’s Commissars (later on, the Politburo would be temporarily renamed ‘Presidium’ as well). In 1948, referring to his 1945 meeting with the Soviet leader, Truman publicly remarked:

Joe [Stalin] is a prisoner of the politburo. He can’t do what[ever] he wants to.

(Madera Tribune, Volume LVI, Number 89, June 12, 1948. From: Center for Bibliographical Studies and Research) (IMG)

Even fascist dictators cannot rule without having the consent of their peers in government. In order to be a fascist dictator, one has to have enough agents throughout one’s government so to be able to bulldoze one’s way through. Without the consent of one’s peers in government, and without having planted one’s agents throughout the state apparatus, one cannot rule as a fascist dictator, even if the law officially gives one dictatorial powers. Without fascist enforcement agents, a fascist dictator will be a mere puppet, an ‘absolute’ ‘ruler’ only on paper. One-man totalitarianism has always been but an idealist myth, for the ‘one man’ needs to rely on other men in order to enforce his totalitarianism. This is why Hitler was able to bulldoze his way through when the MI6 supported but him, but once the MI6 turned against him, he was not able to fully pursue his agenda even within his Reich, because the MI6 agent Canaris who was in charge of Abwehr created obstacles in front of him. And that was the case with the Nazi dictatorship! It is worth noting the difference in how the Soviet media referred to the Nazis and how the Americans did; the American media would promote the idealist myth of one-man totalitarianism by using phrases like ‘the German dictator’, ‘Nazi dictator’, ‘dictator Hitler’, etc. whereas the Soviets promoted the historical materialist view using phrases like ‘Hitler gang’, ‘Hitler clique’, ‘the Hitlerians’ which shows that the latter recognized that Hitler, although undoubtedly a dictator, could not rule without a clique behind him.

The narrative that the USSR was a ‘one-man’ totalitarian regime is baseless, as one-man totalitarianism cannot possibly exist anywhere even in the most tyrannical of regimes; it cannot exist, for class forces antagonistic to the ‘one man’ will inevitably catapult their agents up into the ranks of the state, thus limiting the one man.

As with all other leading figures in the USSR, Stalin ran for elections in a district in Moscow, and was thereby directly elected by the people in the district he represented. Furthermore, the Soviet leader’s style of governance was democratic in spirit. Even in his personal behaviour with his coworkers and colleagues within the Soviet government, Stalin was far from autocratic or dictatorial. Among the American diplomatic circles in Moscow, it was:

generally considered that Stalin is ... what we might term the type of “easy boss,” who permits it to appear that his associates make their own decisions. (WHY THEY SHOT TUKHATGHEVSKY No. 457 Moscow, July 28, 1937, Strictly Confidential. TO THE HONOURABLE THE SECRETARY OF STATE, SHOOTING OF THE RED ARMY GENERALS ON JUNE 12, 1937, AND GENERAL CRISIS WHICH FOLLOWED, In: Mission to Moscow, Joseph E. Davies, pp. 131) (IMG)

One thing is for certain: the Soviet leader led, rather than dictate. The archives show that he spoke as though he was the teacher of many of his comrades, but that is because he indeed was a teacher of scientific socialism.

In spite of these realities about the Soviet leader, the overwhelming majority of the policies advocated by him were implemented, back when the blue-collar workers formed the majority of the CPSU. When the blue-collar workers became a minority as a result of the casualties of the Great Patriotic War, and when the intelligentsia and bureaucrats became the majority in the CPSU ‘thanks’ to the Great Patriotic War, Stalin lost the majority in the Party, lost his seat as the General Secretary in late 1952, lost the intelligence war against the imperialist-fascist secret services, and lost his life.

Referring to the December 1937 elections, the MI6 official Ian Grey reported that the Soviet people supported the Party’s General-Secretary and that, even if (hypothetically) the election figures were falsified, the broad fact of a vote of confidence by the overwhelming majority of the electorate was true:

In the elections, 96.6 percent of the electors cast their votes for the party candidates. The press proclaimed this as a massive vote of confidence in Stalin and the Soviet government. The election figures may have been falsified, but there could be no doubt the nation supported Stalin. Somehow he stood above the purges and betrayals; he was the leader to whom all looked. (Stalin: Man of History, Ian Grey, originally published 1940, new edition 2017) (IMG)

In the 1950s, the CIA investigated the level of Stalin’s popularity in the Soviet Union; numerous documents on this topic have been declassified since then. For one example, the Soviet students, almost all from proletarian or kolkhoznik family backgrounds, were asked what their opinion on Stalin and his portraits was. The following is an excerpt of the document:

[Question:] What is their true thinking either pro or con the Party line on... Stalin?

[Answer:] Stalin was a hero to them. They say that they loved him and that the reason there are so many pictures of him is that the people demanded them even against Stalin’s wishes. (‘Student Attitudes toward Current Issues/Observations on ‘Komsomolskaya Pravda’/Soviet Shops and Stores’, CIA, date of distribution: March 5, 1954, p. 1) (IMG)

Another US intelligence document states:

most Soviet workers support the Communist regime. (...). The average worker automatically accepts statements of Stalin as the unquestionable truth. Furthermore, the average Soviet considers his economic position to be greatly improved; he credits his government for this improvement. [T]he workers’ lot has [indeed] improved considerably since the Revolution of 1912. (...). The Soviet citizen firmly believes in the sincerity of the Soviet peace campaign and is convinced that in signing the Stockholm Appeal and similar petitions, he is furthering the cause of peace. It is also my impression, that all but a small percentage of the population believes in the anti-American propaganda campaign. All the Soviets believed that America started the Korean war. There appeared to be a decrease in tension and interest in the war after China’s intervention. The Soviets [population] felt that China could take care of matters and there was therefore little chance of war spreading. They considered Chinese intervention as a normal state action, not an action carried out by volunteers; the Soviets seemed to be proud of it. Politically, the average Soviet [citizen] is much more conversant with world affairs than the average German. (LABOR CONDITIONS AND SOCIOLOGICAL OBSERVATIONS IN THE USSR, CIA, April 21, 1952, p. 4) (IMG)

CIA reports frequently point to the overwhelming popularity of Stalin among the ordinary people:

[T]he majority of the Soviet working class supported the Soviet government.... Their very real dissatisfaction with housing conditions, high prices, and shortages of consumer goods [caused by the Nazi invasion largely] was not directed against the government itself. They rationalized, for example, that present [post-war] conditions did not permit a substantial improvement in living conditions. Stalin was considered a demigod by the average worker, as a man who could make no mistake. (Political Conditions in the USSR, CIA, October 30, 1951, p. 4) (IMG)

[T]he average Soviet citizen was a dye-in-the-wool supporter of the Soviet government. This was particularly true of the younger generation. They certainly appeared to be active supporters of the regime, to judge by their participation in political activities.... (1. Political Attitudes in the USSR 2. Foreign Radio Broadcasts in the USSR, CIA, July 16, 1953, p. 1) (IMG)

[T]he average Soviet citizen greatly respected Stalin.... (...). [T]he average Soviet worker was convinced of the likelihood of achieving communism. (1. Political Attitudes in the USSR 2. Foreign Radio Broadcasts in the USSR, CIA, July 16, 1953, p. 2) (IMG)

Also, the Red Army was:

a branch of government known to be popular with the Soviet people.... (Politics and the Soviet Army, Office of Current Intelligence, CIA, March 12, 1954, p. 4) (IMG{ Titoist Coup})

The cheering for Stalin was, according to the anti-Soviet US State Department official Charles Bohlen, ‘genuinely spontaneous’:

The appearance of Stalin was greeted with ovations which gave all the indications of being genuinely spontaneous. Each delegation felt called upon to lead a cheer in its native language for Stalin, and, with possibly an Asiatic sense of realism, wasted very little time in cheering the other members of the Politburo or the Government, most of whom were present. (861.00 Supreme Soviet/5, First Session of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, January 12–19, 1938. Memorandum by the Second Secretary of

Embassy in the Soviet Union (Bohlen), In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, 1933–1939. Office of the Historian, January 12-19, 1938, p. 509) (IMG)

The cult of personality fostered around Stalin was very reactionary and had persisted. However, the above excerpt provides evidence to show that much (if not all) of the cheering for Stalin by Soviet state officials was genuinely spontaneous, not engineered by Stalin to satisfy himself. An example of how Stalin was not alone in his policies was the purges. One may assume that the Party was opposed to ‘Stalin’s purges’ and that the Soviet leader had to impose the cleansing upon the Party. This could not be farther from the truth. The foreign – including American – diplomats in Moscow agreed that the cleansing of the Soviet state was not particularly Stalin’s idea only, and that rather, it was an idea for which the Party as a whole advocated:

Moreover, generally speaking, in diplomatic circles here responsibility for these executions, in a strictly personal sense, is not attributed to Stalin. (...). The responsibility is generally attributed to the “action of the party”.... (WHY THEY SHOT TUKHATGHEVSKY No. 457 Moscow, July 28, 1937, Strictly Confidential. TO THE HONOURABLE THE SECRETARY OF STATE, SHOOTING OF THE RED ARMY GENERALS ON JUNE 12, 1937, AND GENERAL CRISIS WHICH FOLLOWED, In: Mission to Moscow, Joseph E. Davies, pp. 131) (IMG)

The same can be said about many of the great construction projects in the Soviet Union; while having contributed much to those construction projects, the Soviet leader nevertheless rightly admitted that he was not the sole planner, supporter, or designer of those ideas. Davies recalled:

Meeting Mr. Stalin, I then said, was a great surprise, and that I was very much gratified to have this opportunity. I then went on to say that I had personally inspected typical plants of practically all of the heavy industries of the Soviet Union, as well as the great hydraulic developments of the country; that these extraordinary achievements, which had been conceived and projected in the short period of ten years, had commanded my great admiration; that I had heard it said that history would record Stalin as the man who was responsible for this achievement and that he would be recorded as a greater builder than Peter the Great or Catherine; that I was honoured by meeting the man who had built for the practical benefit of common men.

To this, Stalin demurred and stated that the credit was not his; that the plan had been conceived and projected by Lenin, who had projected the original Dnieperstrogos Dam project; that the ten year plan was not his work; that it was due to the three thousand able men who had planned this work and those others of his associates; and above all that it was the "Russian people" who were responsible, and that he disclaimed any personal credit therefor. He gave me the impression of being sincerely modest.

(Memorandum of Conference Had This Fifth Day of June, 1938, by Joseph E. Davies with Mr. Stalin, President Kalinin, and Premier Molotov, in the Kremlin at Moscow. In: Mission to Moscow, Joseph E. Davies, p. 222) (IMG)

In brief, the policy line for which the democratic Soviet leader advocated were usually implemented, not because they were imposed, but rather because those policy ideas matched the will of the working class as a whole. Similar democratization measures were launched and established in the individual Republics of the USSR. According to the CIA:

The organs of power and administration of the Union and Autonomous Republics are established in absolute conformity with the principles of the establishment of the organs of power in the USSR. (Government Structure of the USSR, CIA, Date of Distribution: December 3, 1953, p. 6) (IMG)

All the citizens of the USSR, 21 years of age or over, having a right to vote, may be deputies to the Supreme Soviet of a Union Republic or an Autonomous Republic. (Government Structure of the USSR, CIA, Date of Distribution: December 3, 1953, p. 6) (IMG)

The key difference was that the Supreme Soviets of these Republics were unicameral, meaning they were not composed of two chambers:

A unicameral Supreme Soviet, elected by the entire population of a Republic, is the highest organ of the State power in each Republic. (Government Structure of the USSR, CIA, Date of Distribution: December 3, 1953, p. 6) (IMG)

In addition, the Autonomous Republics were represented in the Presidia of the Supreme Soviets in each Republic:

The Supreme Soviet of a Republic elects a Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic. In those Union Republics which contain Autonomous Republics, the latter have representation in the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union Republics in capacity of Deputy Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union Republic. (Government Structure of the USSR, CIA, Date of Distribution: December 3, 1953, p. 6) (IMG)

Those Republics were of course divided into various districts as well. For each particular district the rule of law was democratically enforced through the popularly elected ‘People’s Courts’:

The People’s Courts are elected directly by the citizens of the district for a term of three years. (Government Structure of the USSR, CIA, Date of Distribution: December 3, 1953, p. 6) (IMG)

People’s courts are elected, by direct, equal and secret voting of the whole electorate of each region for terms of three years. (N 2909/250/38, Guide to the Organisation of the Soviet Government and Communist Party, Memorandum. Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 178) (IMG)

An MI6 report written by the Frank Roberts, one of the most trusted advisors to Churchill and a prominent British intelligence and diplomatic official, stated:

Instead of wasting time discussing whether the elections were really “democratic,” it ... seems more fitting to examine what the party and the Government have gained from them. Firstly, they have won a striking vote of confidence which is none the less remarkable for being largely a foregone conclusion. This vote of confidence indicates that the authorities have lost none of their skill in leading, inspiring, persuading, cajoling, deceiving and driving the public. It also indicates either that the masses really like the present system or, even at the lowest, that they can see no possible alternative to it. Secondly, the party and the Government have used the elections to celebrate victory and the virtues of the Soviet system, to test the pulse of the ordinary people, to find out something of what they are thinking and saying, to answer their criticism and complaints, and to explain and justify their own policies and measures. This process naturally goes on the whole time. But the elections provided the opportunity for a really thorough and intimate shocktaking from which both the public and the Government feel that they have greatly benefited. Thirdly, the party and the Government were able to turn the elections into a vast campaign for preparing and mobilising the masses for the new Five-Year Plan. If left to themselves the Soviet people

might well have succumbed to war weariness and let their efforts flag. But the election campaign gave them a great stimulus to gird themselves for the tasks ahead, and it is significant that its progress was marked by new labour achievements in the factories and fields, especially after Stalin's speech. (N 3300/24/38, Mr. Roberts to Mr. Bevin, by: Frank Kenyon Roberts February 25, 1946. Received: March 12, 1946, p. 86. p. 92 of British Foreign Office (1946)) (IMG)

C5S7.2. Criticism and Media Freedom in the USSR

Liberal and anarchist models of analyzing the concept of media freedom emphasize the role of structure in promoting media freedom. Create proper structures and there will be more willingness on the side of the media to combat corruption. Liberal and anarchist models therefore propose decentralization of the media and the fostering of competition among media outlets as to which outlet would be more critical and better at tackling corrupt practices and officials' errors.

Undoubtedly, there is truth to these points of theirs. Creating proper structures matter and fostering competition among media outlets does help. The problem is not so much with this point that liberals and anarchists make in-itself; the problem rather is with the fact that they blow the importance of this point out of proportion.

In America, there are numerous media outlets and in theory, they should be engaged in a tough competition as to who is more critical of officials and corrupt practices - they are not. They are all owned by American finance capital's mafia and its intelligence arm, the CIA gangsters. Daring to deviate from the CIA-approved line has severe consequences and so the journalists of these prominent media outlets dare not deviate if they would at all be willing to deviate. The situation is not so different in any of the other Western bloc countries. In anti-imperialist bourgeois-democracies that have a large private sector, there are many corrupt oligarchs and bureaucrats that bully journalists into not exposing their corrupt or saboterial practices. The common denominator behind these events is that there are parasitic class forces that block the path for a critical media, even though there are multiple (private sector) media outlets competing with one another.

Contrast that with the Soviet system. In the USSR, the private sector was abolished and the industrial sector was strongly centralized. There was only one Party and the Party was democratic centralist, with the formation of blocs and fractions in the Party being banned. All of these reduced bureaucracy and assisted in the purge of bureaucrats – how and why the centralization of the economy and democratic centralism cut bureaucracy has been explained in depth in C1S6, C1S8, and C2S8. The purge of bureaucrats and weakening of bureaucracy helped in strongly weakening the corrupt bureaucrats, the last major violent parasitic class force in the USSR which would have terrorized journalists. This allowed for a more critical media. Therefore, as counterintuitive though it may seem, democratic centralism and economic centralization, by fighting bureaucracy, actually helped promote media freedom. Furthermore, the purges against enemy agents and corrupt bureaucrats also cleared the way for the media to be more critical since again there were fewer enemy agents, torturers and assassins that would seek to terrorize journalists into submission. The critical media in turn became the ally of the counter-intelligence officers in their struggle against sabotage and corruption.

All of these allowed the media to ruthlessly criticize and expose poor performance, sabotage, and corruption in the spheres of culture, politics, and economics. The articles on the intelligence and military sector were of course censored, as they involved state secrets. Only the intelligence cases exposed by the state or authorized by the state to be exposed, were exposed in Soviet media; and rightly so. However, everything else was to be ruthlessly criticized.

Western media claims that Stalin forced his media to depict the USSR fully positively and that the supposedly 'totalitarian' features of the USSR – democratic centralism, central planning, and the purges – forever muted the Soviet media criticism. Such Western media assertions are very far from the truth.

The dictatorship of the proletariat, in its historic drive to consolidate the hold of the proletariat at the expense of corrupt bureaucratic class, bears a natural tendency to systematically, ruthlessly, suppress media activities that question the proletariat's exercise of state power, but also to systematically promote media activities that ruthlessly expose and 'rip apart' the influence of the anti-proletarian classes – such as corrupt bureaucrats and black-marketeers – within the proletariat's state. To this end, the socialist state's media, so long as continuously under the influence of the agents of the proletarian class, will naturally promote an ever greater campaign of exposing corruption in the various holes and nests of the socialist state, so to pave the way for the downfall of the corrupt bureaucrats that have penetrated the socialist state. Rather than attempt to regress society by questioning and criticizing the proletariat's right of state power, the proletarian-owned media unapologetically represses such foolish 'critiques' and rather engages in the kind of media criticism useful and necessary, the one that improves society by challenging the position of the class enemies standing in the way of the expansion of the proletariat's state power.

I have spent much time reading Soviet articles translated into English by the CIA's Foreign Documents Division (FDD). Presenting the Soviet media's cases of criticisms would take far too many pages of this work to be effective in showing the data. Instead, I will show below excerpts of a CIA document, also from the Foreign Documents Division (FDD), summarizing the Soviet media criticisms and demonstrating the extent of the ruthlessness. The CIA FDD document, which looks at the criticisms of economic matters in the Soviet media in early February of 1953 (i.e. during the Stalin era), is as follows:

There is some criticism of the operations of the light and consumer industries where mismanagement, corruption, theft and embezzlement are said to be still rampant. Plan-fulfillment figures in these industries are said to be particularly misleading since the totals do not reflect satisfactory performance of every aspect of the plan. A ZYAZDA editorial broadcast from Minsk on 3 February says that last year a "considerable number of enterprises and even entire industries" of Belorussian SSR failed to complete their annual plan. The Republic's fishing industry, for example, has been lagging for years and shows no signs of improvement now:

The question arises: when will the leaders of the fishing industry administration finally overcome their lagging and fulfill the State Plan? Similar production failures are attributed to the Belorussian Electric Power Administration and the Industrial Cooperatives Council which cater exclusively to the consumers. We must not be deceived by the glowing reports of the Ministries which have fulfilled and even overfulfilled their gross production plans. The paper reports that a number of them failed to complete the plan "according to specified items." Among them are the Ministries of light, building materials, food and local industries. Similar failures not reflected in the gross-production reports are said to have been registered in the production of tractors and automobiles, bricks and tiles, lime and woolen textiles.

The Kherson Oblast consumer industry is honeycombed with "swindlers and shaprs" according to NADDNEPRIANSKA PRAVDA of 4 February. Socialist property is being stolen in such large enterprises as the "Main Textile Distribution Administration" ... the "Eighth of March" plant and the river port. The damages sustained through thievery by the Oblast Consumer Cooperative Administration last

year alone amounted to over 1.2 million rubles. The oblast Party and Soviet officials, says the paper, “should have drawn suitable conclusions” from that and looked into the personnel problem. This, however, has not been done, and “incompetent and untrustworthy” officials, instead of being dismissed, are shifted from one responsible post to another. An interesting sidelight on the official attitude toward the consumer is provided by a STALINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA editorial of 6 February. Listing the activities of several officials of the oblast consumer industry who have been fleecing the consumers for a long time, the paper inveighs against their “dishonesty to the State” without even mentioning the consumers. Thus the director of the Kamyshin Meat Combine for example, had “tried to transform that State enterprise into his own property” and systematically deceived the State and the Party by faking the combines performance reports and otherwise engaging in “shady machinations.” The head of the oblast “Gastronome” Bureau, Safonov, having surrounded himself with yes-men and “people of unclean conscience” ... has been violating the retail trade regulations himself and protecting the violations of his subordinates by transferring them from the executive position to another. He, too, is referred to as a bad Communist [Party official] who is “dishonest to the State and the Party.”

In a long TRUD article published on 6 February, the acting chief of the Central Trade Union Housing Administration Bertasov unwittingly testifies to the extent of corruption in the retail trade industry by admitting that licensed “public inspectors” ... are frequently refused admission to the places they are to inspect. It is quite clear, he says, that these inspectors, whose duty it is to see that the customers are well treated, are “a thorn in the flesh” ... of unscrupulous officials who brook no interference in their favorite pastime of “cheating customers”.... It has also been discovered, according to Berrbasov, that where public inspectors cannot easily be kept out of stores and other retail trade enterprises, they are “reported” to their superiors in “anonymous slanderous letters” ... as taking bribes and committing a variety of other crimes in the hope of having them dismissed or “bringing them to terms” with the unscrupulous store managers and other officials.

Misleading total production figures are also the object of an editorial discussion by KOMMUNA broadcast from Voronezh on 5 February. Good industrial production indexes often “conceal stragglers enterprises,” says the paper, and Voronezh oblast is no exception: “Several plants of the oblast remain heavily indebted to the country.” The building-materials industry failed to complete its 1952 plan, is “far behind” in its current program, and the plants of the butter industry trust ... are not producing the prescribed quantities of butter and other foodstuffs. “Solicitude” for the consumer is expressed in a broadcast from industrial Kemerovo of 3 February where the “acute shortage” ... of living space has been the target of criticism for a long time.

Many building organizations are failing to fulfill the house-building plans every year.... Some enterprises of the oblast have slackened their attention toward improving the working and living conditions of the workers.

The communal enterprises such as public baths, laundry transportation and electric supply in the workers’ settlements are said to be functioning very unsatisfactorily. Interruptions in the water supply are frequent in Prokofyevsk, Kiselavsk, Lenin-Kuznetsky and other towns. The network of repair shops is far too inadequate to serve the people, the assortment of consumer goods produced by the local industry is limited and the quality “remains low”.... The oblast Party organizations, the report concludes, must put an end to the “harmful practice of under-estimating the importance of the workers’ material welfare” and devote more time to the daily cultural and other requirements of the people. It is revealed that most of those officials seldom if ever visit workers’ dormitories and other communal dwellings and are not even familiar with the conditions obtaining there: “you cannot learn much by sitting in an office.”

PRAVDA refers editorially (7 February) to a collective letter from the workers of the Zarubino fishing trust, the largest in the Far East, to call attention to the “vicious methods” ... of administration employed by the USSR Fishing Industry. The letter, which was not broadcast, points out that structural defects are frequently found on the fishing vessels delivered by the Ministry, and repair materials for the fishing fleet are usually shipped by the Ministry when it is too late; that is, in the height of the fishing season. Serious shortcomings have been noted also in the oil industry, PRAVDA continues. The Ministry of that industry and its subordinate organizations “are insufficiently familiar with the situation on the spot”.... This is particularly evident in the Tatar ASSR where drilling operations are frequently and unaccountably delayed, and in Bashkir ASSR where “little interest is shown” ... in improving the technical skill of the industry personnel. At the ... Ukrainian Waterway Construction ... where valuable materials are poorly guarded, a group of squanderers and thieves have been operating and causing great losses. Tens of tons of petrol ... have thus disappeared from one sector of that project, the Vasilievsky construction and assembly division. Another gang of swindlers ... is said to have built a nest at the Krasno-Perekopsk sector and engage in squandering ... socialist property.

(INDICATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL VULNERABILITIES, CIA, Information from: Foreign Documents or Radio Broadcasts, Date of Information: February 3, 1953 to February 9, 1953. Date Distributed: March 16, 1953, pp. 6-8) (IMG)

Imperialist media claims that Stalin sought to present the USSR as a completely happy place devoid of problems, that even the slightest media criticism of the state was banned, that Stalin sought to brainwash the Soviet people into thinking that everything was fine with regards to the economy and state affairs, that the workers got no voice in the media, etc. As the above CIA document’s excerpts demonstrate, this was not the case.

Other excerpts of the document show how the critical media was an ally of the anti-corruption and anti-sabotage purge processes and how the critical media called for greater vigilance in order to hunt down saboteurs and corrupt politicians:

A broadcast from Dnepropetrovsk (4 February) cited ... the case of the Sinelnikovskiy Rayon Party Committee which approved a certain Rudenko for the post of collective farm pyramid without realizing that he had been “wanted for investigation” by the same Committee for a long period of time in connection with his questionable behavior. Many swindlers and criminals are still at large, according to the paper, because their friends holding influential positions in the oblast trade union and other organisations “rescue and protect them” by providing suitable jobs for them. G. Alexandrov, State Counsellor for the Justice Department ... writing in LITERARY GAZETTE on 3 February also identifies the swindlers and thieves with such political criminals as spies and diversionists since both of them are “just what the enemy is looking for.” (...). That thieves, rascals and people alien to the Soviet system had been appointed to “materially responsible” jobs was disclosed by SOTSIALISTICHESKIY DONBAS on 5 February. The paper does not mention whether or not such undesirables have already been weeded out but admits that they have already “inflicted great damage” ... to the Socialist economy. The Kurakovka mine of Krasnoarmeisky Coal Trust is said to be one of the casualties but no details are offered. “We must constantly bear in mind” that as long as capitalist encirclement exists the Soviet Union will be the hunting ground for foreign spies, terrorists, saboteurs and diversionists.

Lagging silk production may not in itself be of any political significance but, as indicated in a summarized ZARYA VOSTOKA editorial broadcast from Tbilisi on 6 February, political vigilance is one of the suggested cures for it. Averring that the backwardness of Georgian silk production is “the direct result of liberalism” toward violations of the State plans manifested by Party and Soviet officials, the paper quotes a reference to the subject made by Georgia Party leader Mgeladze....

(INDICATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL VULNERABILITIES, CIA, Information from: Foreign Documents or Radio Broadcasts, Date of Information: February 3, 1953 to February 9, 1953. Date Distributed: March 16, 1953, pp. 3-4) (IMG)

Liberal 'journalists' are scared of the term 'purge' and denounce the call for purges, when in fact it is precisely the moral duty of the media to challenge corrupt politicians and call for their purges.

True, journalists must keep in mind the potential need for occasional tactical retreats and strategic expediency-discernments when facing far more powerful corrupt oligarchs and saboteurs that threaten them. They need to play strategic in their targets for anti-corruption purges. However, to completely denounce purges in general is what corrupt media - not critical media - would do.

On the other hand, it is important to note that imperialist agents and saboteurs seek to use the cover of 'criticism' as a means of launching colour revolutions and spreading lies. The Soviet legal system did not tolerate such a counter-revolutionary agenda.

Akin to the issue of media freedom is the issue of criticism and self-criticism in the CPSU. Regarding this matter, there was another CIA FDD document summarizing the large extent of criticism and self-criticism provided by the Party leaders of the republics and zones of the USSR. The following are excerpts of the CIA document:

Listed below are some of the economic and ideological shortcomings recited on the floor of the Congress by the regional Party bosses. one of the most articulate critics of the Republican as well as all-Union agricultural organizations is Shayakhmetov of Kazakh SSR. The Kazakh livestock industry, he says, is still far behind the planned tempo of development because some of the other branches of agriculture on which it depends are not doing their share. Fodder procurement is far too inadequate, there are not enough cattle sheds and all the work involved in hay processing and stockpiling is still largely unmechanized. The USSR. Ministry of Agriculture has not only lost interest in the Republic's cattle industry and other agricultural organizations but also appears to “restrain their initiative in the mechanization of the stock-breeding industry and the establishment of a stable fodder base”.... The [food] situation is indeed so bad, according to Shayakhmetov, that in a number of places the indispensable “emergency reserves” ... of fodder have not been made available. The machine-tractor stations and the motor pools of the cattle industry, he concludes, will henceforth require the Party's concentrated attention before a higher level of agricultural development can be attained.

Brezhnev of Moldavian SSR complains of the great disproportion ... between the capital investments in the food Industry and then in the construction organizations for house-building purposes. These industries, he says, have been unable to cope with the mentioned problem, which should therefore be solved by the appropriate all-Union bodies: "We are therefore badly In need of the help of the USSR (Food) Ministry and the State Planning Commission.... We are still lagging far behind ... in the utilization of the available machine-tractor stations, Brezhnev concludes....

Muratov of Tatar ASSR speaks of the serious shortcomings in the work of the Republic's oil industry. Accidents and idle drilling equipment ... are referred to as common features of the industry's activities, while the production of building materials and housing construction are said to be beset by great difficulties....

(...). Efimov of Khabarovsk Krai is bitter about the irrational and lopsided administration of the Far Eastern Lumber Industry. The enormous timber resources, he says, are neither processed nor distributed the way they should be. This is particularly evident in the case of Primorye, where the “management” of the lumber industry actually defies common sense. That krai, it is stated, has increased its lumber imports eightfold since 1935 despite the abundant local resources of that raw material, which are more than adequate to meet its requirements. Much of the long haulage of Khabarovsk lumber to the Okhotsk coast, Lower Amur, Kamchatka and Sakhalin, it is claimed, could be similarly dispensed with and should therefore be discontinued.

(...). Razzakov, [from the] Kirghiz SSR, says that the exploitation of the Uzgen Coal Basin, scheduled to begin in the first post war Five Year Plan, is still in the blueprint stage. The coal reserve there, estimated at hundreds of millions of tons, remains in the ground intact because the USSR Ministry of the Coal Industry has for some reason neglected that area. Turning to agriculture, he said that we must not blind ourselves to the “very grave shortcomings” ... in that branch of the Republican economy, particularly in stock-breeding:

Losses through death and squandering of cattle are still permitted in the collective and State farms of the Republic.

(INDICATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL VULNERABILITIES, 19th All-Union Communist Party Congress in Moscow / References to Shortcomings, CIA, Foreign Documents Division (FDD), November 13, 1952, pp. 3-4) (IMG)

In case there is any suspicion that the genuineness of self-criticism started appearing only in late 1952, it is worth reminding the reader that at least in reference to Zhdanov's self-criticism session, the MI6 station in Moscow acknowledged that:

Soviet “self-criticism” is not always wholly farcical and dishonest. (N 1714/250/38, No. 120, Viscount Chilston to Mr. Eden, Moscow, March 22, 1937; Received: March 30, 1937, Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 67) (IMG)

The report added:

the practice may often be genuine enough.... Those at the top may well be honestly perturbed at the extent to which the party mechanism has become corrupted.... (N 1714/250/38, No. 120, Viscount Chilston to Mr. Eden, Moscow, March 22, 1937; Received: March 30, 1937, Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 67) (IMG)

C5S7.3 The Anti-Soviet Agitation Law

Imperialist-fascist secret services use the media as a means of agitating the public into a colour revolution against the state. It was therefore necessary to promote freedom of speech, but not to allow as much freedom of speech as to help the imperialist-fascist secret services in agitating for colour revolutions. Hence, the Soviet criminal code stated:

58.10. Propaganda or agitation containing a call for the overthrow, undermining or weakening of Soviet power or for the commission of certain counter-revolutionary crimes (Articles 582-589 of this Code), as well as the distribution or production or storage of literature of the same content entail - deprivation freedom for a period not less than six months. (MINISTRY OF JUSTICE OF THE RSFSR

CRIMINAL CODE, RSFSR, Official text as amended on July 1, 1950, STATE PUBLISHING, LEGAL LITERATURE, MOSCOW, 1950, p. 42)

The above law was implemented in the USSR in the 1920s, but only slightly changed during the Stalin-era in the 1930s. As with all legal systems, the important factor to take into account was the intention of the authors of the propaganda/agitation piece. A person promoting anti-Soviet propaganda was to be punished only if such a person intended to use the material distributed as a means of overthrowing or undermining Soviet power. This would mean that, so long as the Soviet laws were actually enforced, one who had been misled into genuinely believing that 'Stalin carried out a genocide in Ukraine' and who spread this lie not for the purpose of a deliberate slander of the Soviet state, but for the purpose of improving the situation, was not going to be punished. This is why:

On December 16, 1930, the plenum of the Supreme Court issued a decree stressing the absolute inadmissibility of the broad application of article 58.10. The decree warned that the only activities warranting qualification under this article were those "containing the direct signs stipulated in this article, and bearing a counter-revolutionary character." Despite the admonition of the Supreme Court, the excesses continued, particularly on the part of the OGPU, and a "comradely letter" was sent to procurators responsible for overseeing the OGPU activity. This letter referred to an unacceptably wide application of certain articles concerning state crimes, including 58.10. It recommended that 58.10 should not be applied groundlessly, for example, to cases of critical comments alone. (The crime of "anti-Soviet agitation" in the Soviet Union in the 1930's, Sarah Davis. In: 'Cahiers du monde russe', Vol. 39, no. 1-2, January 1998 to June 1998, p. 151. In: Persee) (IMG)

During the 1920s and before the Great Purge, the Soviet intelligence was obviously heavily infiltrated by Trotskyite left-deviationists who engaged in diversionary terror aimed at driving a wedge between the people and the state, which means that in certain cases, even mere criticism of the state was going to cause some to be arrested. The Soviet judicial system, however, boosted efforts to prevent such provocative terror campaigns of arresting individuals for mere criticism:

From mid-1933, as part of its general policy of internal and external detente, the Soviet regime began to pursue a more "liberal" penal policy. 14 An instruction of May 8, 1933 from the TsK VKP(b) and SNK called for the end to mass repression, and its substitution by mass organizational work.15 On June 20, 1933, the Procuracy of the USSR was established with the aim of strengthening legality. These measures had some effect. In 1934 the number of criminals convicted by the courts fell by 23% to 1,096,358 in the RSFSR. The reduction in numbers convicted for counterrevolutionary crime by the courts was even greater: in 1933, there were 7,303 convictions, in 1934, 3,049. 16 Arrests for counter-revolutionary crime in OGPU/NKVD cases in the USSR also fell from 283,029 in 1933 to 90,417 in 1934. Of these, in 1933, 32,370 were for anti-Soviet agitation and in 1934, 16,788.

By July 1934, the procurator of the Western Siberian krai was able to report to USSR Procurator, Akulov, that mass repression by the OGPU had been extirpated in his region.

(The crime of "anti-Soviet agitation" in the Soviet Union in the 1930's, Sarah Davis. In: 'Cahiers du monde russe', Vol. 39, no. 1-2, January 1998 to June 1998, p. 151. In: Persee) (IMG)

However, note that the ending of the terroristic mass-arrest of people for criticism did not stop the counter-revolutionary conspirators in the Soviet intelligence. This time, the policy of relative liberality was sabotaged by the right-deviationist counter-revolutionary elements in the Soviet counter-intelligence, through showing leniency towards those who spread anti-Soviet agitation! No matter what correct policy gets chosen, excesses are always committed by the saboteurs. If liberality is shown, right-deviationists carry out sabotage and if illiberality is shown, left-deviationists carry out sabotage. The difference though was that through such a process of constantly shifting from liberality to de-liberalization and vice versa, each time the Soviet system was able to weaken more and more of left-deviationist and right-deviationist elements, so that by the end of the Great Purge, the misuse of the anti-Soviet agitation law was dramatically minimized. Hence, the constant shift in the degree of liberality actually helped gradually minimize the misuse of the law, by balancing off the right- and left-deviations and pitting them against each other.

C5S7.4. Condemnation of Discrimination based on Class Origin

According to the OSS, on December 15, 1936,:

Soviet Union: Announcement of a campaign to insure observance of new rights granted under Constitution; action taken against officials who continued to discriminate against persons because of class origin. (Chronology of Principal Events Relating to the USSR Part I, OSS, September 25, 1945, p. 66) (IMG)

C5S7.5. Structure of the Party

It is also worth mentioning the structure of the Party with respect to the relationship between general membership of the Party, the Central Committee, the Politburo, and the General-Secretary. The core idea that caused the distinction between those decision-making levels was with regards to the issue of efficiency and quickness in decision-making. The massive membership of the Party could obviously not meet for making all the decisions. Hence, the Central Committee arose out of the Party membership for making the grand strategic decisions, policy decisions, and tactical decisions on behalf of the Party. The Politburo arose out of the Central Committee for cases in which the decisions – especially tactical decisions and decisions regarding policy details – had to be made relatively more quickly and when the Central Committee could not afford to meet for such a quick decision about the details. The General-Secretary of the Party in turn made the tactical decisions that were to be made even more quickly than the Politburo. Naturally, the General Secretary also was supposed to inform the rest of the Party about policy questions, to promote education about socialism, etc. However, the main feature that distinguished those levels of decision-making was efficiency in making quick decisions.

C5S8. On the Cults of Personality *** IMG-All-{Personality Cult}

The cult of personality was something that unfortunately existed in the USSR, and even more unfortunately continues to exist among many who (wrongly) self-describe as communists. The culture of the cult of personality was a vestige of the culture of agrarian Russia, inherited by the USSR. The peasants with small lands had a natural tendency to not take risks and thus expected a god-like superhero to solve their problems. Collectivization in the USSR made the businesses of the peasants bigger (in a collectivist way) thus causing the kolkhoz peasants to be more willing to take risks and advance in a socialist environment. In spite of the material change, however, the reactionary culture of the cult of personality in that country persisted and its elimination was to take a longer time.

Since the beginning, even before the full success of the collectivization drive, Stalin campaigned against the cult of personality that others sought to form around him. As early as 1926, he gave a long speech in which he stated that such heaping of praise upon him was for the martyrs and not him, and that he was more of a student:

Comrades, permit me first of all to tender my comradely thanks for the greetings conveyed to me here by the representatives of the workers.

I must say in all conscience, comrades, that I do not deserve a good half of the flattering things that have been said here about me. I am, it appears, a hero of the October Revolution, the leader of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the leader of the Communist International, a legendary warrior-knight and all the rest of it. That is absurd, comrades, and quite unnecessary exaggeration. It is the sort of thing that is usually said at the graveside of a departed revolutionary. But I have no intention of dying yet.

I must therefore give a true picture of what I was formerly, and to whom I owe my present position in our Party.

Comrade Arakel* said here that in the old days he regarded himself as one of my teachers, and myself as his pupil. That is perfectly true, comrades. I really was, and still am, one of the pupils of the advanced workers of the Tiflis railway workshops, Let me turn back to the past.

I recall the year 1898, when I was first put in charge of a study circle of workers from the railway workshops. That was some twenty-eight years ago. I recall the days when in the home of Comrade Sturua, and in the presence of Djibladze (he was also one of my teachers at that time), Chodrishvili, Chkheidze, Bochorishvili, Ninua and other advanced workers of Tiflis, I received my first lessons in practical work. Compared with these comrades, I was then quite a young man. I may have been a little better-read than many of them were, but as a practical worker I was unquestionably a novice in those days. It was here, among these comrades, that I received my first baptism in the revolutionary struggle. It was here, among these comrades, that I became an apprentice in the art of revolution. As you see, my first teachers were Tiflis workers.

Permit me to tender them my sincere comradely thanks. (Applause.)

I recall, further, the years 1907-09, when, by the will of the Party, I was transferred to work in Baku. Three years of revolutionary activity among the workers in the oil industry steeled me as a practical fighter and as one of the local practical leaders. Association with such advanced workers in Baku as Vatssek, Saratovets, Fioletov and others, on the one hand, and the storm of acute conflicts between the workers and the oil owners, on the other, first taught me what it means to lead large masses of workers. It was there, in Baku, that I thus received my second baptism in the revolutionary struggle. There I became a journeyman in the art of revolution.

Permit me to tender my sincere comradely thanks to my Baku teachers. (Applause.)

Lastly, I recall the year 1917, when, by the will of the Party, after my wanderings from one prison and place of exile to another, I was transferred to Leningrad. There, in the society of Russian workers, and in direct contact with Comrade Lenin, the great teacher of the proletarians of all countries, in the storm of mighty clashes between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, in the conditions of the imperialist war, I first learnt what it means to be one of the leaders of the great Party of the working class. There, in the society of Russian workers — the liberators of oppressed peoples and the pioneers of the proletarian struggle of all countries and all peoples — I received my third baptism in the revolutionary struggle. There, in Russia, under Lenin's guidance, I became a master workman in the art of revolution.

Permit me to tender my sincere comradely thanks to my Russian teachers and to bow my head in homage to the memory of my great teacher — Lenin. (Applause.)

From the rank of apprentice (Tiflis), to the rank of journeyman (Baku), and then to the rank of a master workman of our revolution (Leningrad) — such, comrades, was the school in which I passed my revolutionary apprenticeship.

Such, comrades, is the true picture of what I was and what I have become, if one is to speak without exaggeration and in all conscience. (Applause rising to a stormy ovation.)


(Reply to the Greetings of the Workers of the Chief Railway Workshops in Tiflis, Iosif. V. Stalin, June 8, 1926. In: "Works", Vol. 8, January-November, 1926, pp. 182-184. Publisher: Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1954. First Published: Zarya Vostoka (Tiflis), No. 1197, June 10, 1926. Retrieved online from: Marxists Internet Archive (MIA). Note: MIA is an openly Trotskyist website) (IMG)

Seven years later, when the 'Society of Old Bolsheviks' tried to organize a mere exhibition to honor the activities of Stalin during the October Revolution and the Civil War, Stalin, in a letter to his secretary Poskrebyshev, expressed his strong disagreement with this move and said:

I am against it, as such undertakings lead to the strengthening of the 'cult of individuals', which is harmful and incompatible with the spirit of our party. (Letter to Poskrebyshev, Stalin, July 2, 1933, p. 1) (IMG)

Charles Bohlen, the US State Department and American intelligence official who was a diplomat to the USSR in the 1930s, was one of the most virulently anti-Soviet American officials at the time. Yet, even he admitted that Stalin was uninterested in the proceedings honoring him and cut short the proceedings. In a 1938 intelligence report to Washington, Bohlen wrote:

Stalin had visibly aged in appearance during the past two years. His face was more deeply lined and his hair had turned gray. He gave an appearance of general weariness and at times even of strain which was not noticeable in 1935. He not only exhibited little interest in the proceedings, but on one occasion,



Stalin's message to Poskrebyshev

with an impatient gesture of his hand, signalled to the presiding officer to cut short the demonstration in his honor. (861.00 Supreme Soviet/5, First Session of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, January 12–19, 1938. Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union (Bohlen), In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, 1933–1939. Office of the Historian, January 12-19, 1938, p. 511) (IMG)

Chapter 6

C6S1. Women's Rights in the USSR *** IMG-All-{Women's Rights in USSR}

Regarding the education of women in the USSR, the Joint Economic Committee of the US Congress reported:

The improvement in the educational level of women has been achieved through the expansion in the enrollment of women at all levels of education. In secondary specialized educational institutions, enrollment increased more than sixfold, from 72,000 in 1927 to 448,000 in 1940. (...). The growth in enrollment in higher education has been equally impressive, rising almost sevenfold from 48,000 in 1927 to 330,000 in 1940. (...). The proportion of women in secondary educational institutions rose from 37.6 percent in 1927 to 54.6 percent in 1940. However, after reaching a wartime peak of almost 70 percent in 1945, the percentage of women has declined to a level between 46 and 49 percent in recent years. In higher education the proportion of women increased from 28.5 percent in 1927 to 58 percent in 1940. (Current Economic Indicators for the USSR: Materials, US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, June 1965, p. 94) (IMG)

Women's participation in the labour force too increased from a fourth to a half of the population of women. The following are data from the Joint Economic Committee of the US Congress, with regards to the employment of women:

Year	1929	1930	1931	1932	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1940	1945	1950	1952	1955
Percentage of Women Employed	27.0	26.7	26.9	27.4	30.0	31.7	33.4	34.0	35.4	38.0	55.0	47.0	48.0	45.0

(Source: 'Total Percentage of Women Workers and Employees, 1929-1955'. In: 'Current Economic Indicators for the USSR: Materials', US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, June 1965, p. 102) (IMG)

A report by the British intelligence also stated:

Special legislation safeguards the position of women, ensuring as far as possible, e.g. by providing for obligatory rest on full pay before and after childbirth, that they should not be at disadvantage as regards employment. (N 2909/250/38, Guide to the Organisation of the Soviet Government and Communist Party, P. S. Falla, September 7, 1937, Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 179) (IMG)

Not only were women promoted as part of the work force, they also got to participate in the military and intelligence sectors. In the words of the CIA,:

The Soviet Government always thought of women not only as mothers and as a work force, but also as a potential reserve for the Soviet Army. As is well known, women in World War II made a great contribution to the defeat of Fascist Germany. A women's army of many thousands carried out the difficult and sometimes impossible work of a front-line soldier on all the fronts. Women combatants were to be found in almost all branches of service, and in almost all units, from platoon to army. The greater percentage of women were in antiaircraft units, communications and medical sections. ('WOMEN IN THE SOVIET ARMY/WOMEN IN THE MVD', CIA, October 28, 1954, p. 1) (IMG)

Women also got to participate in rather important fields such as intelligence, reconnaissance, liaison, sniping, and command:

The work of women in the Army was of great variety. Women worked as radio operators, telegraph operators, scouts, drivers, snipers, aviators, in artillery, with machine guns, etc. Almost all radar stations, ... Air Reconnaissance, Intelligence, Liaison, ... antiaircraft batteries, field post offices, censorship offices, hospitals, headquarters of units and commands were complemented 50-90% by women. ('WOMEN IN THE SOVIET ARMY/WOMEN IN THE MVD', CIA, October 28, 1954, p. 1) (IMG)

In fact:

Women who had a good general education learned their specialized work very quickly and carried out their work sometimes even better than men. ('WOMEN IN THE SOVIET ARMY/WOMEN IN THE MVD', CIA, October 28, 1954, p. 2) (IMG)

Another important point is that since men are on average physically stronger, women were employed also in the rear installations so that a larger number of men could fight in the front:

By using women in rear installations ... the Soviet Command was able to free an enormous army of men for combat at the front. ('WOMEN IN THE SOVIET ARMY/WOMEN IN THE MVD', CIA, October 28, 1954, p. 2) (IMG)

C6S2. Abortion and Contraception in the USSR *** IMG-All-{Women's Rights in USSR}

The USSR banned abortion in 1936, but with the following three conditions: (1) abortion would be allowed in cases where the continuation of pregnancy poses a threat to the life or health of the pregnant woman, and/or involves the inheritance of serious diseases by the child, (2) the state would be obliged to provide the means (i.e. contraceptives) by which to allow individuals to have sex without having to worry about bearing children, and (3) the state would provide welfare benefits to mothers (including unwed mothers) who have more children, so to reduce the burden on the women.

As always, the establishment of the law involved a significant amount of Party-instigated public discussions. The OSS, America's central intelligence organization preceding the CIA, had compiled detailed information of the events in the USSR and prepared a long chronology of such events. As confirmed by this OSS chronology, the new Soviet law on the family (marriage, divorce, abortion, etc.) was 'up for discussion by workers and farmers'. On May 26,:

Soviet Union: Projected law on family, marriage, and divorce put up for discussion by workers and farmers. Abortion was to be made a criminal offense, and premiums were to be offered for large families. (Chronology of Principal Events Relating to the USSR Part I, OSS, September 25, 1945, p. 48) (IMG)

On May 28:

Soviet Union: Nation-wide discussion of projected family welfare law raised various objections; bill expected to be modified in accord with public criticism. (Chronology of Principal Events Relating to the USSR Part I, OSS, September 25, 1945, p. 48) (IMG)

In June, the law was passed, and was as follows:

140. Performing abortions in a hospital or maternity hospital, except in cases where the continuation of pregnancy poses a threat to the life or threatens serious harm to the health of the pregnant woman, as well as in the presence of inherited serious diseases of the parents - entails imprisonment for the doctor performing the abortion for a period of one year or more up to two years. Performing abortions outside hospitals or maternity hospitals in all cases carries the same penalty for the aborting doctor. The production of abortions in an unsanitary environment or by persons without special medical education is a prison sentence of at least three years. [May 10, 1937 (SU No. b, art. 40)].

140-a. Forcing a woman to have an abortion is imprisonment for up to two years. [May 10, 1937 (SU No. 6, Art. 40)].

140-6. An abortion, except in cases where it is permitted by law, entails public censure for the pregnant woman herself for the first time, and a fine of up to three hundred rubles in case of a repeated violation. [May 10, 1937 (SU No. 6, Art. 40)].

(MINISTRY OF JUSTICE OF THE RSFSR CRIMINAL CODE, RSFSR, Official text as amended on July 1, 1950, STATE PUBLISHING, LEGAL LITERATURE, MOSCOW, 1950, pp. 97-98) (IMG)

However:

The situation was not as hopeless as it seems at first glance. Yet another government decision (July 31, 1936) ordered the expansion of the production of condoms, pessaries, and other prophylactics (aluminum uterine caps and some contraceptive gels). A special clause ordered the building of a condom production line in a gramophone record factory at Bakovka. ('Birth Control in Russia: A Swaying Population Policy', authors: Boris Denisov & Victoria Sakevich. In: "If the chemistry is right...": Gender relations and birth control in the age of the "Pill", edited by Lutz Niethammer, Silke Satjukow, 2016, p. 255) (IMG)

The Foreign Manpower Research Office of the US Bureau of Census reported to the US Congress:

it should not be overlooked that as far back as 1936 Soviet doctors gave free advice on contraception and that drugstores continued to stock contraceptives even after the antiabortion decrees of 1936. (POPULATION AND LABOR FORCE: THE POPULATION OF THE SOVIET UNION, John F. Kantner, Foreign Manpower Research Office of the US Bureau of Census. In: 'COMPARISONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND SOVIET ECONOMIES: Papers Submitted by Panelists Appearing Before the Subcommittee on Economic Statistics', Joint Economic Committee of the US Congress, Part I, p. 52) (IMG)

The use of contraceptives against pregnancy poses significantly less health risks to the woman's body than would abortion. Additionally, the Soviet law, as shown in the excerpt from the criminal code, permitted abortion in cases in which continued pregnancy poses serious health risks to the woman. Notice as well that the Soviet criminal code explicitly stated that abortion in cases of 'the presence of ... serious diseases' inherited by the offspring is permitted. By giving the mother the right to abort a fetus that has a serious disease, the Soviet stance against abortion was also in contradiction to the arguments of the so-called 'pro-life' activists, as the latter accuse such a right of being the liberty to 'murder' a 'child' 'just because' the 'child' has a disease.

A National Intelligence Survey (NIS) document by the CIA's Bureau of Economic Analysis acknowledged:

Payments and allowances given to mothers (including unwed mothers) with large families was first instituted in 1936.... (NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 26: SOVIET UNION" THE SOCIETY, CIA, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Social and Economic Statistics Administration, Department of Commerce, research completed: June 1973, published: April 1974, p. 20) (IMG)

A Red Army Medical Corps captain, who defected to the US-led camp countries in 1949 and provided intelligence to the US State Department Office of Intelligence Research about and against the Soviet Union, rendered the following testimony, as paraphrased by US intelligence, about childcare and the conditions of pregnant women:

Child welfare is well organized. There are numerous institutions which care for orphans and homeless children. Food in the institutions for children is better than that consumed by the average Soviet family.

There is prenatal postpartum clinic attached to every large hospital. Mothers may receive prenatal care and instructions there. Pregnant women receive a paid leave-of-absence from their jobs for a period of 30 days prenatal and 34 days postpartum. (...). Since 1944, an unmarried woman who becomes pregnant cannot require alimony from the man who is responsible for her condition. These laws help to strengthen the role of the family and indirectly to raise the moral standards of the people. The government, however, seemingly understands that women will continue to have children without being married and it continues to recognize the need for a large population. The mother of an illegitimate child knows that the state will take care of it. The state is thereby ... affording these children every facility.

(The Soviet Union as Reported by Former Soviet Citizens – Interview Report No. 9, United States Department of State. Office of Intelligence Research, 1955, pp. 19-20) (IMG)

C6S3. Fashion in the Soviet Union ***IMG- All-{Soviet Fashion}

The imperialist propaganda outlets claim that the Stalin faction, by the 1930s, 'repressed' fashion in the Soviet Union and 'promoted' a 'conservative' society. However, the 'Telegraph', the notorious anti-Soviet 'private' media outlet of the British Empire, confirmed that this was not the case. By the 1930s, the Dom Modelei, the Soviet House of Models, was established and pre-revolutionary designers were employed to design fashion. During the period of the strengthening of bonds between the Soviets and the French imperialists against Nazi Germany, the France-based Italian fashion designer Elsa Schiaparelli was welcomed to the Soviet Union for promoting her fashion designs in the USSR, although, allegedly, the Soviet authorities ended up not regarding her designs so useful. The Stalin-era Soviet state rewarded the Stakhanovite female workers with not only extra pay but also luxury clothing, so to elevate the fashion status of the proletarians onto the level of the fashion of privileged classes. The Telegraph reported:

Stalin soon put a stop to the Nep shenanigans, but adopted some of their ideas about femininity and beauty. His mission was to transform Russia into an efficient, industrialised nation as quickly as possible, with the Stakhanovites - the shock workers - as figureheads for his campaign. **The Stakhanovites' relentless productivity was rewarded with money and luxury clothing.**

Bartlett quotes Marusia Marakova, 'a labour heroine' of the Stalingrad factory, saying, 'I'm buying myself ivory-coloured shoes for 180 roubles, a crêpe-de-chine dress for 200 roubles and a coat for 700 roubles.' She spent a fortune on clothes far beyond the reach of her co-workers, a haunting echo of inequality in Soviet Russia's past, and future.

Clothes became an important part of Stalinist myth-making - **the plan was for luxurious, smart dress to be available to every woman, not just the privileged, and to this end Stalin set up Dom Modelei - the House of Prototypes - staffed by pre-revolutionary designers and pattern cutters.**

The Italian fashion designer Elsa Schiaparelli was invited to open the Dom Modelei in Moscow, and was bewildered by the outfits on display: 'I was of the opinion that the clothes of the working people should be simple and practical, but... I witnessed an orgy of chiffon, pleats and furbelows.' Eschewing her own surrealist tendencies, she designed a capsule collection for Soviet women - a simple black dress, a covetable red coat, lined in black, with large pockets and a matching beret. It was entirely suitable for mass production, but the authorities dismissed it as being far too ordinary for Soviet women and moaned that the big pockets would attract the attention of thieves on public transport.

(The Secret History of Soviet Fashion, Telegraph – Fashion, Eithne Farry, October 31, 2010. Bold added.) (IMG)


There is video footage, published online, of the Soviet fashion shows. Screenshots of only one of such videos have been provided here.



A fashion show in the Soviet Union during the mid-1930s, Dom Modelei, the House of Models. Source: ('House of Models and Hairdressers in Moscow, 1935' ('Дом моделей и парикмахерская в Москве, 1935 год'), YouTube, Samsebeskazal Denis, January 27, 2016)

The MIT Press research work cited by the Telegraph article above added important details:

The politically imposed shift in gender representation resulted in a dramatic change in the preferred look of the female Stakhanovite. The imposing Stalinist style, enriched by elements of Western-style luxury, reached even the farthest regions of the Soviet Union. In 1937 the regional journal of the female Stakhanovites from the Urals suddenly started to publish fashion spreads with very smart clothes. (...). The covers of the Udarnitsa Urals (Female shock worker of the Urals) also changed. Instead of hard-working women in work uniforms laboring by their machines, pretty young women, engaged in leisurely sports activities like swimming or just sunbathing in their swimming wear, appeared on the journal's covers, reflecting the way in which a new cultural order was being inscribed on women's bodies. While Stalinism went back to the most traditional versions of feminine looks, the regime made sure that they were practiced in closely controlled social situations. In 1937, for example, Rabotnitsa described how women workers from the subway-building organization Metrostroï rushed to put on makeup and change into evening clothes the moment they took off their overalls at the end of the working day. One of them told the magazine: "If you were to meet one of our female metro-builders at the theatre or a party, you would not be able to guess that she works underground." (...). Long evening dresses presented on polished women, ethnic-motif details embroidered on silk fabric, and showy jewelry—each contributed to a traditional concept of luxury. At the start of the 1950s, the young textile designer Solntseva in Surov's play Dawn over Moscow declares: "**Comrade Stalin told us textile workers: 'Dress Soviet women as princesses, so that the whole world will admire them'**" (Surov 1951, 121) (fi g. 2.20) (FashionEast: The Spectre that Haunted Socialism, MIT Press, Djurdja Bartlett, 2010, p. 94. Bold added.)



(Zhurnal Mod, 1945)

There were photos of female models as well in the magazine. However, for some designs such as the one in the middle, a painting was better suited for presenting the design, since photos would have been black and white, failing to show the details of the dress properly.

There was no specific type of design called the 'Stalinist style' of fashion. That which is referred to as the Stalinist style was merely the luxury Western style

accessed by the Stakhanovite female workers, as Bartlett's research work published by the MIT press reported in detail. There was no single style of fashion propagated either. There were, as stated above, images of 'young women, engaged in leisurely sports activities like swimming or just sunbathing in their swimming wear' but at the other end of the spectrum of designs existed the red headscarves, usually looking like red tichels, in Party-propagated posters and meant to symbolize proletarian feminist liberation. Wearing a head-covering was a tradition common among the women of the Russian Empire, including among Christians. The Bolshevik promotion of red headscarves was not against the culture of hijab-lessness but rather in contrast with the culture of wearing non-red headscarves. Very rarely, if ever, did the images in fashion magazines contain headscarves. The overwhelming majority were devoid of the headscarf.

Soviet men's fashion was typically the suit, tie, etc., much like in the Western countries. For more information, search (in Russian language) for 'Zhurnal Mod', 'Modeli Sezona', and 'Dom Modelei' as the key phrases for fashion during this period. Bartlett's book also contains several images. To access the many Party posters of militant women wearing red headscarves, an online search in Russian would suffice.

C6S4. The Soviet State Attitude towards Sexual Relations *** IMG-All-{Sex in the Soviet Union}

Feudal cultures have long unleashed a pincer assault against sex. One flank of the pincer assault is constituted by the anti-sexual 'moral' 'values', such as the promotion of shame about sex and nudity. The other flank has adopted the form of extreme 'sexualization', such as the reduction of human life to an almost exclusively sexual one. Socialism, in the struggle against such feudal cultural assault, rejects the arguments generated both such flanks of the pincer strike. In the conversation with Clara Zetkin, Lenin rightly condemned both the 'monkish asceticism' and the ultra-sexual lifestyle:

"(...). The youth movement, too, is attacked with the disease of [so-called] modernity in its attitude towards sexual questions and in being exaggeratedly concerned with them." Lenin gave an ironic emphasis to the word modernity and grimaced as he did so. "I have been told that sexual questions are the favourite study of your youth organisations, too. There is supposed to be a lack of sufficient speakers on the subject. Such misconceptions are particularly harmful, particularly dangerous in the youth movement. They can very easily contribute towards over-excitement and exaggeration in the sexual life of some of them, to a waste of youthful health and strength. (...). A revolution in sex and marriage is approaching, corresponding to the proletarian revolution. It is easily comprehensible that the very involved complex of problems brought into existence should occupy the mind of the youth, as well as of women. They suffer particularly under present-day sexual grievances. They are rebelling with all the impetuosity of their years. We can understand that. Nothing could be more false than to preach monkish asceticism and the sanctity of dirty bourgeois morality to the youth. It is particularly serious if sex becomes the main mental concern during those years when it is physically most obvious. What fatal effects that has! (...). I don't mean to preach asceticism by my criticism. Not in the least. Communism will not bring asceticism, but joy of life, power of life, and a satisfied love life will help to do that. But in my opinion the present widespread hypertrophy in sexual matters does not give joy and force to life, but takes it away. In the age of revolution that is bad, very bad.

Young people, particularly, need the joy and force of life. Healthy sport, swimming, racing, walking, bodily exercises of every kind, and many-sided intellectual interests. Learning, studying, inquiry, as far as possible in common. That will give young people more than eternal theories and discussions about sexual problems and the so-called 'living to the full'. Healthy bodies, healthy minds. Neither monk nor Don Juan.... You know, young comrade — ? A splendid boy, and highly talented. And yet I fear that nothing good will come out of him. He reels and staggers from one love affair to the next. That won't do for the political struggle, for the revolution. And I wouldn't bet on the reliability, the endurance in struggle of those women who confuse their personal romances with politics. Nor on the men who run petticoat and get entrapped by every young woman. No, no! That does not square with the revolution.

Lenin sprang up, banged his hand on the table, and paced the room for a while.

"The revolution demands concentration, increase of forces. From the masses, from individuals. It cannot tolerate orgiastic conditions, such as are normal for the decadent heroes and heroines of D'Annunzio. Dissoluteness in sexual life is bourgeois, is a phenomenon of decay."

("Lenin on the Women's Question", Clara Zetkin, MIA)

'Don Juan' and the Catholic monks were products not of capitalism but of feudalism, though finance capital, in an alliance with feudalism, has picked up and continued to weaponize the feudal culture.

The so-called 'Don Juan' lifestyle, i.e. promiscuity, is wrong not for its sexuality in itself but because of its impracticality. Beside the potential emotional damage and potential transmission of diseases, promiscuity also involves a reallocation of time and energy away from aspects of life more important than sex onto sex. A very tiny minority of individuals may be capable of managing to engage in sexual relations with so many partners simultaneously or in sequence, prevent the emotional and physical damages potentially resultant from such a quantity of sexual relations, and to still prioritize the aspects of life much more important than sex. Promiscuity may work fine for that tiny minority and we are in no position to negatively judge them on this if they can address all the numerous problems linked with promiscuity. However, in the case of the vast majority of individuals, such a hyper-sexual life is overwhelming and re-allocative of time and energy away from more useful aspects of life. It brings more harm than benefit. Such reallocation was why Lenin considered the behaviour of the promiscuous among the Komsomol youth excessive and contrasted an ultra-sexual life with a life of strength, expansion of knowledge, and Party work. The CPSU mainstream agreed with Lenin. After the latter's death, the CPSU pursued the same policy line regarding the ultra-sexual life:

Theorizing about free love, Lenin said, was an essentially bourgeois occupation typical of intellectuals; and, in practical terms, too much sexual activity distracted Communists from the Revolution. The leadership after Lenin's death held to the same position. In 1926-1927



Men's fashion – the suit, tie, and coat.

Riga. No. 640 - author Paklevinsky; leotard suit. No. 636 - by Skuya; drape coat. In: Album of Models of the Upper dress adopted at the All-Union Wiewing. March 1945 - Moscow, 1945

the party ran a propaganda campaign, directed mainly at Komsomol members and students, against "decadence" – a pose of cynicism and political disillusionment modeled on the poet Sergei Esenin, bohemianism, and the alleged youth ideology of casual sex without responsibility. ('Sex and Revolution', Sheila Fitzpatrick. In: 'The Cultural Front: Power and Culture in Revolutionary Russia', Cornell University Press, Sheila Fitzpatrick, 1992, p. 69) (IMG)

The scientific socialist fight against irresponsible ultra-sexuality gives no credence to 'monkish asceticism'. It is no secret that feudal culture, while promoting the promiscuous way of life, has, consistent with its pincer assault strategy, also campaigned for shame about sex and nudity. The Soviet state mass-produced contraceptives, so to facilitate sexual relations for the joy of it. Mothers whose children were born of premarital sex were immensely assisted in childcare. Somewhat more interesting, however, is the Soviet attitude towards nudism, which itself does not necessarily involve sexual relations but still speaks much about attitudes towards sex.

C6S5. Nudity in the USSR *** IMG-All-{Nudity}

Not only did the USSR have nudist beaches, such as in Crimea, the nude was portrayed throughout Soviets arts from sculpting to painting. The top Soviet painter and a founding father of socialist realism, Alexander Deineka, produced numerous works of nude art, some of which have been shown here. There also existed statues of nude bodies in Soviet streets (see, for example, the 'Sverdlovsk. Embankment of the city pond. S. V. Dombrovsky. 1945' shown below). The nude bodies of females were featured more than the bodies of males. This was all the more natural, since, insofar as is concerned the immanence of an aura of sexual power and beauty, the female body obviously bears a comparative advantage vis-à-vis the male body. Foremost in this campaign was Alexander Deineka, the Party's most favourite painter alongside Gerasimov.

There existed some rumours that the paintings of the nude were forcibly 'banned' or 'limited' by the Soviet state, that somehow all such paintings were kept in the closet. This could not be farther from the truth. In an article titled 'Nudity in Russian art (PICS)', the vehemently anti-Soviet Russian media outlet 'Russia Beyond' admitted:

Russian artists didn't lag behind recognized international masters in depicting nudity. And Soviet painters were not even shunned for their piquant canvases. (Nudity in Russian art (PICS), Russia Beyond, May 25, 2022) (IMG)

In a research book published by the Yale University Press, Matthew Cullerne – a prominent British anti-Soviet historian of Soviet art – stated that by the time of the announcement of Stalin Prizes, the Soviet academies of arts elevated the importance of the depiction of the nude:

The first higher painting course in Moscow since the closure of VKhuTeIn in 1930 opened at a new Moscow Institute of Visual Art (from 1940, Moscow State Art Institute) in 1936; its training, too, was cast in a solid traditional form. The Moscow Institute did not enjoy anything like the splendid accommodation of the Leningrad Academy (in 1938 it was dispersed on nine separate sites); it had fewer painting students, and the first of these did not graduate until after the outbreak of war; but its fortunes, no less than those of the Academy, were closely followed in the 1930s.

In 1939, in conjunction with the announcement of the Stalin Prizes, the Stalin stipendiums were announced, fifty of which, worth a princely 500 roubles a month, were awarded to Academy students (some, in fact, went to students in Moscow).

At both these institutes the teaching system of Chistyakov, based on the observation of nature, from which students of the Imperial Academy had benefited, was revived in many of its aspects as the basis for the new training; in addition, the use of the undressed life-model (discontinued in Leningrad for moral reasons during the 'proletarian' period) was revived and made central to the educational process (a trace of prudishness remained: in contrast to the practice in many Western schools of art, naked male models wore posing-pouches). There were, however, broad differences in the approach of the Moscow and Leningrad institutes. The Academy, in keeping with its traditions, emphasised the discipline of drawing above all;

(Socialist Realist Painting, Yale University Press, Matthew Cullerne Bown, 1998, p. 138) (IMG)

To thinly veil the works as supposedly 'non-erotic' in nature, to propagate the spirit of athleticism, and to render the bodies looked at much more attractive to viewers, many of the nude bodies were usually set in the context of baths and sports rather than as nudes for the sake of it:

One painting at this exhibition had the impact of a manifesto: Arkadi Plastov's Spring: a nude (plate 340). Plastov's presentation of the naked female figure without an ideological excuse such as sport or bathing after a working day, was a new event in Soviet art. Nudes had been painted for their own sakes in the thirties and forties, but this one was different: it came from a member of the Academy of Arts, a respected member of the establishment; it hung at an exhibition of enormous prestige; and the gratuitousness of the image was emphasised by the fact that the naked woman is flooded with light. (Socialist Realist Painting, Yale University Press, Matthew Cullerne Bown, 1998, p. 308) (IMG)

The paintings of the nude athletes were featured in the Soviet pavilions of the international art competitions:

[The] comparison afforded between Socialist Realist and National Socialist art was striking, emphasised, of course, by the pavilions' placement. In Albert Speer's edifice, models of the Nuremberg stadium and the Haus der Kunst in Munich paralleled that of the Palace of the Soviets; bronzes of naked athletes the Lenin and Stalin sculptures, academic realist paintings, contemporary, mythologised or 'medievalist' replaced the portraits of generals and crowds of peasants, but the state programme for the arts was just as visible. ('Art of the Soviets: Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture in a One-Party State, 1917-1992', Manchester University Press, Matthew Cullerne Bown, Brandon Taylor, 1993, p. 112) (IMG)

Deineka had numerous artworks. However, it seems, he had a roughly equal number of nude men and women in the sum total of his paintings. Gerasimov's paintings of the nude were mostly of women, though he apparently decided not to publish them. The rest of the artists all focused overwhelmingly on nude females. With the exception of Gerasimov who decided not to publish his nude works, Soviet painters' portrayal of the nude were featured throughout the 1930s and 1940s. Hundreds upon hundreds of nude paintings were published during the 1920s, 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s. This trend continued well after the Lenin-Stalin era, with some masterpieces being produced in the 1970s. See the figures below for examples of such paintings. These paintings embraced humanism, celebrated the beauty and sexual power of the human body – especially of the female body – and were aimed towards increasing the citizen's drive towards the perfection of the body through athleticism. Obviously, these works were aimed to be erotic as well, which not only generated positive energy to the mainstream of the society but also excellently disturbed the conservative narrow-minded individuals – for the better.

The Soviet state banned the propagation (though not viewership) of pornographic content, as shown in Article 182 of the RSFSR Criminal Code and its analogues in the criminal codes of other Socialist Soviet Republics. There may have been rooms for improvement in the Soviet policy on the portrayal of the nude, but there sure was no contradiction in the Soviet policy against the propagation of pornography and Soviet art's active

propagation of the nude. There lies a vast contrast between the depiction of the sexual power and beauty of the human body, especially the female body, and the pornographic portrayal. The latter reduces the human body to a mere sexual entity, is imbued with a spirit of savagery and reign of terror, and almost always depicts the woman as – at best-case scenario – the 'sexual' equivalent of fast food, a one-time use toy. Mainstream media refers to both of such content as “pornography,” failing to account for the element of terror in pornography, an element absent in the nude artworks. None of such measures by the Soviet state can be regarded as a defense of a full-scale nudist lifestyle, a lifestyle ridiculously anti-practical and anti-functional characteristic of many anarchistic mini-communities. The nudist beaches were limited to those: beaches. So many other Soviet paintings were of people with clothes. Dresses can bring beauty and basic levels of respect in social interactions. The Soviet state aimed, and partially succeeded, to elevate and enhance fashion for the proletarians, as shown in C6S3. The fashion drew inspiration mostly from the Western style.

Many do not understand that Soviet culture, on so many fronts, was basically modern Western culture of a kind sanitized from Judeo-Christian and fin de siècle influences, and socialized for the cause of the proletariat. Soviet cultural policy, as mentioned in C6S7, embraced the use of the Renaissance and Enlightenment styles for socialist purposes – part of the adoption of the Renaissance and Enlightenment style entailed nude paintings for socialist realist art. Soviet culture was not – contrary to the implications of the imperialist press and the assumptions of some otherwise well-meaning socialists – a ‘socialist’ version of ‘Shariah.’ Though a direct comparison to Islam was not frequently made, the term ‘Stalinist purity’, frequently used in the imperialist press, was employed to slanderously paint the Soviet state by such a Sharianic image in the intuitions of observers. When even the slightest the emission of the aura of sexual power bears no positive effect is usually during the hours of intensive struggle. During the phases of highly intensive activity for socialist construction and revolution, almost anything related to nudity and sex can be a distraction, unless the profession (such as medical research) by nature involves dealing with nude bodies or sex-related matters. In a research book published by the MIT press, Djurdja Bartlett, the vehemently anti-Soviet scholar on women's dress in the USSR, wrote about the 1930s as follows:

The covers of the *Udarnitsa Urala* (Female shock worker of the Urals) also changed. Instead of hard-working women in work uniforms laboring by their machines, pretty young women, engaged in leisurely sports activities like swimming or just sunbathing in their swimming wear, appeared on the journal's covers, reflecting the way in which a new cultural order was being inscribed on women's bodies. While Stalinism went back to the most traditional versions of feminine looks, the regime made sure that they were practiced in closely controlled social situations. In 1937, for example, *Rabotnitsa* described how women workers from the subway-building organization *Metrostroï* rushed to put on makeup and change into evening clothes the moment they took off their overalls at the end of the working day. One of them told the magazine: “If you were to meet one of our female metro-builders at the theatre or a party, you would not be able to guess that she works underground.” (Surov 1951, 121) (fig. 2.20) (*FashionEast: The Spectre that Haunted Socialism*, MIT Press, Djurdja Bartlett, 2010, p. 94. Bold added.) (IMG{Soviet Fashion})


Having some photos of women in the beach was not unacceptable, and, contrary to Bartlett's indirect implication, such magazine covers of women in the beach existed in the 1920s as well (see, for example, the cover of “*Zhenskiyi Zhurnal*” (“Women's Magazine”), No. 7, 1929, which shows a woman in one-piece swimsuit rather than bikini). However, a lie it is to imply that the usual/main theme of the Soviet magazine covers became that of women in swimwear or women sunbathing. In fact, a simple online search (see a screenshot thereof in the Screenshots section) would show that the overwhelming majority of Soviet women's magazine covers actually involved photos of laborious women, female scientists, etc. Although the portrayal of the female body's aura of sexual power is empowering, prioritizing it is disempowering. Anti-socialist are the attempts to prioritize the portrayal of such an aura over the portrayal of women's role as revolutionary activists, Red Army fighters and security officers, laborious workers and *kolkhozniks*, successful well-educated individuals, strong athletes, etc.

Bartlett was not wrong, however, when she implied that Soviet culture limited the type of clothing based on occasion. In the phases of intensive struggle, such as during the hours of labour, there obviously was neither the time nor a reasonable basis for any ‘revealing clothing’ (let alone nudity). In those hours of the day, energy and attention was to be directed to the intensity of the struggle. Distraction away from the intensity of struggle in the moments that mattered would have brought decay. The Soviet state could afford no such thing.

The next two pages contain imagery of the nude in the Soviet Union.



1952. A. Deineka. Bathers. Retrieved from: Gorodskiye Novosti.




Alexander Samokhvalov. After the Cross, 1934–1935. From: Russia Beyond. This is an iconic portrait of a female athlete, believed to have been a Komsomol member.



Alexander Deineka. "Shower. After the battle", 1937-1942. © Kursk State Art Gallery. A.A. Deineka. Retrieved from: BM Digital.


“And the main expert of the nude theme in Soviet painting was the outstanding artist Alexander Deineka. He constantly painted naked people, all of them – women, men and children. And no one forbade him, because nothing can be forbidden to the author of the painting ‘Defense of Sevastopol’, which is included in all school textbooks. Deineka was a big fan of the expressive female figure: he did not draw skinny, quivering young ladies – and the Party liked it [i.e. the Party liked this fact about Deineka’s works]. And ... the people also liked it: at least in a movie or in a picture one could look at a healthy, appetizing female nature. Therefore, the rest of the artists were forced to respond to the request of the public, and fullness for many years became the main fashion mainstream.” (“Sex, drunkenness and satire. How did Soviet artists circumvent forbidden topics in painting?” Gorodskiye Novsti)



Sunbathing in Crimea, 1933. Leonoro Karel russiainphoto.ru user archive. Retrieved from: Russia Beyond.



Sverdlovsk. Embankment of the city pond. S. V. Dombrovsky. 1945. For source of image, see IMG{'Architecture'}.



Alexander Deineka. Competitions. 1936. Retrieved from: Gorodskiye Novosti.



Konstantin Somov. Naked Young Man (B. Snezhkovsky), 1937. Retrieved from: Russia Beyond



Vladimir Lebedev. The Cashier (Nude). 1936

This is an example of a lesser-good artwork. Despite its merits, including the element of realism, it bears no good angle and presents the gloomy face of a woman with her panty in her hands, in contrast to Deineka's works which incorporated the element of humanistic nudity, positive body image, and near-perfect body shapes. The title 'The Cashier' does not really connect much to the picture shown. While not bad, it cannot be regarded as one of the superior works in this genre.



Naked workers at the Proletarian Victory factory on vacation in Crimea, 1932. Leonoro Karel russiainphoto.ru user archive. Retrieved from: Russia Beyond.

C6S6. Soviet Architecture *** IMG-All-{Architecture}

In vast contrast to the left-opportunist reactionary theses of the Maoist barbarians of the 'Cultural Revolution' who openly called for the destruction of almost anything 'old', Lenin said:


Marxism has won its historic significance as the ideology of the revolutionary proletariat because, far from rejecting the most valuable achievements of the bourgeois epoch, it has, on the contrary, assimilated and refashioned everything of value in the more than two thousand years of the development of human thought and culture. Only further work on this basis and in this direction, inspired by the practical experience of the proletarian dictatorship as the final stage in the struggle against every form of exploitation, can be recognised as the development of a genuine proletarian culture. (On Proletarian Culture, Vladimir Lenin, October 8, 1920. Source: Lenin's 'Collected Works', 4th English Edition, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1965, Vol. 31, pages 316-317)

Communism appreciates the works of pre-communist philosophers, artists, etc. so long as the works promote progress in history, even if the works are not ideologically communist in character. Rejection of the 'old' but progressive ideas is but Maoist anti-cultural counter-revolutionism. Upon the invincible scientific theses of Lenin's, the USSR promoted socialist culture, keeping the progressive elements of the 'old' styles of art. The classicist/neo-classicist, renaissance, and Islamic styles of architecture are only some of the many good styles of architecture which the USSR embraced.

Many of the following residential buildings are not fully classicist or neo-classicist in style, but they do incorporate many of its elements, especially the round columns, and at times, also the arches and the preference for blank walls. Elements of Greco-Roman architecture can be seen as added to these residential buildings. On the other hand, many of the official government buildings too had the classicist/neo-classicist style of architecture, along with realistic statues installed beside or at the roof of many of the buildings.



75. Моховая улица. Жилой дом
И. В. Жолтовский. 1934



79. Никитский бульвар. Фрагмент фасада жилого дома
Е. Л. Иохелес.

Left: Mokhovaya Street. Residential building by I. V. Zholtovsky, 1934.
Right: Nikitsky Boulevard. Fragment of the facade of a residential building. E. L. Iokheles




94. 1-я Мещанская улица. Жилой дом
П. А. Нестеров, И. В. Миньков. 1938

94. 1st Meshchanskaya Street. Residential building: P. A. Nesterov, I. V. Minkov, 1938



93. 1-я Мещанская улица. Жилой дом
Г. И. Глущенко. 1938

1st Meshchanskaya Street. Residential building named after G. I. Glushchenko. 1938.




274. Свердловск. Уральский индустриальный институт имени С. М. Кирова. Портик
ВОЛЬФЕНЗОН, ГОРШКОВ. 1938

274. Sverdlovsk. Ural Industrial Institute named after S. M. Kirov. Portico. Wolfenzon, Gorshkov, 1938



10. Советская площадь. Дом Московского Совета депутатов трудящихся.
Реконструирован в 1946 году
д. н. чечулин

10. Sovetskaya Square. House of the Moscow Soviet of Workers' Deputies. It was reconstructed in 1946 by D. N. Chechulin



329. Сочи. Городской театр
Выполнен под руководством академика В. А. ШУКО и В. Г. ГЕЛЬФРЕЙХА, архитекторами
К. Н. ЧЕРНОПУТОВЫМ и В. Н. ЗВОРКОВСКИМ, 1939

Sochi. City theater. Designed under the supervision of academician V. A. Shchuko and V. G. Gelfreich by architects K. N. Chernopyatov and V. N. Zvorkovsky. 1939

One false impression that Western media creates is that the carving and sculpting of the walls was something that was introduced for the first time in the Khrushchev era. Obviously, the sculpted wall shown here debunks this myth.



207. Кинотеатр «Москва». Фрагмент входа
Л. М. ХИДЕКЕЛЬ. 1937—1939

Moscow Movie Theater. A fragment of the entry. L. M. Khidekel, 1937-1939


The All-Union Agricultural Exhibition was a Stalin-era exhibition that celebrated not only the achievements of Soviet architecture, but also promoted the unity of the SSRs and presented the cultures of the Soviet Union. The Pavilion of the Azerbaijan SSR in the All-Union Agricultural Exhibition was a building in Moscow representing Azerbaijan's agricultural production. As can be seen, much as how the classicist architecture of the Pagan Greco-Romans was incorporated into Soviet architecture, the Shia Islamic style of architecture was preserved and promoted in the USSR as well. The image on the left shows three 'mehrabs' on the wall, separated by columns. The mehrab is very clearly an Islamic symbol incorporated into mosques. The image on the right is no less Islamic in style. The carving on door and the sculpting on the wall very much appear in the old-school Middle Eastern, Arabist, or Islamic style. Of course, the building was not a mosque, much as how the classicist-style buildings were not polytheistic temples. The buildings had strictly secular purposes, but the style of architecture which they had, preserved the style of architecture that had been used for religious purposes.

Note also that the mehrabs in the image on the left and the sculpting on the wall and carving on the doors have symbolic imagery, as opposed to some kind of a rigidly realistic representation of the world. This again is proof of the fact that the Soviets were not dogmatic in applying the principles of socialist realism to architecture.



183-184. All-Union Agricultural Exhibition. Pavilion "Azerbaijan SSR". Fragments of the side facade

The following are more images of the Azerbaijan SSR pavilion. Again, socialist realism cannot be strictly applied to all aspects of arts. In the field of architecture, the visual design on the columns, arches, or walls of buildings, would not always necessarily have as high a quality if they merely were realist paintings. Instead, the quality of the visual design on the buildings can be enhanced through symbolic imagery. As can be seen, the building, which is to represent the scientific socialist agriculture of Azerbaijan contains the kind of symbolic imagery typically seen in Islamic architecture (e.g. Mosques), except that the building is for secular purposes as opposed to religious purposes. The aspects of the mosque architecture which the building lacks is the dome and the minarets.



181—182. Всесоюзная сельскохозяйственная выставка. Павильон «Азербайджанская ССР»

Детали портала

All-Union Agricultural Exhibition. Pavilion "Azerbaijan SSR". Portal Details



All-Union Agricultural Exhibition. Pavilion "Azerbaijan SSR": S. A. Dadashev, M. A. Useynov

Soviet architecture also incorporated the ‘Mediterranean’ style of architecture for many of its buildings, especially its residential buildings. The obvious outstanding features of these kinds of buildings are the round columns and the arches, typical of the ‘Mediterranean’ style. One of the residential building series shown below has a large arch, which can be seen in some of the marketplaces of the Mediterranean countries, even though the large arch is actually for a residential building series as opposed to a marketplace.



Ленинградское шоссе. Жилой дом. Фрагмент фасада
З. М. РОЗЕНФЕЛЬД. 1939



236. Улица Стачек. Жилые дома
В. А. КАМЕНСКИЙ, Г. А. ОЛЬ, В. Ф. БЕЛОВ, А. А. ЛЕЙМАН. 1936–1939

Left: Leningradskoe highway. Residential building. Fragment of the facade. З. М. Розенфельд. 1939
Right: 236. Stachek Street. Residential buildings: V. A. Kamensky, G. A. Ol, V. F. Belov, A. A. Leiman. 1936-1939



248. Горький. Жилые дома по Октябрьской улице
И. А. ГОЛОСОВ. 1938

248. Gorky. Residential buildings on Oktyabrskaya street. I. A. Golosov. 1938


The architectural elements in the Georgian SSR pavilion for the All-Union Agricultural Exhibition also contain round columns, arches, and symbolism.




179. Всесоюзная сельскохозяйственная выставка. Зеленый уголок у павильона «Грузинская ССР»
А. С. КОРОВОВ

179. All-Union Agricultural Exhibition. Green doorway at the pavilion "Georgian SSR". A. S. Korobov


The USSR also had a dome building. Perhaps the most remarkable of the secular-purpose buildings that had a dome was the Novosibirsk Opera and Theater House, reportedly the biggest theatre/opera house in the USSR built during the Stalin era. In addition to the dome, the Novosibirsk Opera and Theater House also incorporated elements of neo-classicism, and had numerous statues alongside it. The black and white image (taken during the 1940s) as well as the in-colour photo taken during the current period are shown below.



308. Новосибирск. Театр



The bridges in the USSR too lacked the dogmatic application of socialist realism to the grid designs. As can be seen, the grids have some level of realism in them, but can generally be regarded as symbolic. The vegetation, the wheat and the sickle all are on the midpoint of realism and symbolic imagery.



Left: Maly Kamenny Bridge. Grid Detail. Right: Maly Kamenny most by K. N. and Yu. N. Yakovlev. 1938




Big Stone Bridge. Grid Detail

The interior design in the following image is rather impressive since not only does it have a statue of Lenin located at the center of the front wall, it also has symbolic imagery – including the red star – at the ceiling of the building.




In addition to having realistic statues as well as symbolic imagery on the walls and the floor, some of the buildings had mini-gardens inside them, as can be seen in the following.



25. Концертный зал имени Чайковского. Фойе
Tchaikovsky Concert Hall. The lobby

It is not just the United States that has a statue right beside the water. The following image is of a statue lying beside the water in the Moscow Canal, during the Stalin era.



164. Канал имени Москвы. Башня управления шлюза № 5
Б. Д. САВИЦКИЙ, Ю. А. КУН. 1937

The Moscow Canal. Gateway control tower No. 5. B. D. Savitsky, Yu. A. Kun. 1937

I am not sure what the style of architectural design for the sanatorium in Sochi is called but it certainly is not the 'boring' constructivist or brutalist style which the Western media portrays the Stalin-era USSR as having.



331. Сочи. Санаторий
Б. В. ЕФИМОВИЧ. 1935

331. Sochi. Sanatorium. B. V. Efimovich. 1935

Again, another absurd misconception promoted in the Western media is that the statues depicting the portrayal of the Soviet war heroes did not exist until the Khrushchev era. The following statue of Chepayev and his comrades in the Civil War was built during the Lenin-Stalin era.



There is the arch, in which there is sculpting that makes it look like a cave. Above it are stairs that lead to a realistic statue of someone apparently diving.



113. Центральный парк культуры и отдыха имени Горького. Набережная имени Пушкина
А. В. ВЛАСОВ. 1937

113. Gorky Central Park of Culture and Recreation. Pushkin Embankment. A.V. Vlasov. 1937

And here is how a park in the USSR looked like.



320. Железноводск. Аллея каскадов. 1936

Zheleznovodsk. Avenue of Cascades. 1936

Stalin-era Soviet architecture is accused of brutalism, constructivism, and an absence of the better and more creative variants of architecture. The images shown above debunk such accusations. Actually, 'constructivism', which bore a brutalist spirit, was mostly associated with the culturally liberal 1920s when the reactionary intelligentsia were able to promote their junk. By the 1930s, the 'constructivist' junk went on the decline as well.

Note that all of the above images for Soviet architecture, with the exception of the modern in-colour photo of the Novosibirsk Theatre, were from the book 'Soviet Architecture in the 1930s'. The link to the images has been provided in the images section.

C6S7. Soviet Painting, Sculpting, and Music *** IMG-All-{Soviet Art}

Zhdanov so correctly said:

Comrade Stalin has called our writers engineers of human souls. What does this mean? What duties does the title confer upon you?

In the first place, it means knowing life so as to be able to depict it truthfully in works of art, not to depict it in a dead, scholastic way, not simply as "objective reality," but to depict reality in its revolutionary development.

In addition to this, the truthfulness and historical concreteness of the artistic portrayal should be combined with the ideological remolding and education of the toiling people in the spirit of socialism. This method in belles lettres and literary criticism is what we call the method of socialist realism.

Our Soviet literature is not afraid of the charge of being tendencious." Yes, Soviet literature is tendencious, for in an epoch of class struggle there is not and cannot be a literature which is not class literature, not tendencious, allegedly nonpolitical.

('Soviet Literature - The Richest in Ideas, the Most Advanced Literature', Andrei Zhdanov, 1934. MIA)

Indeed, the superiority of the socialist realist art lies in the fact that it seeks to 'depict reality in its revolutionary development' as opposed to depicting reality in a 'dead, scholastic way'. Socialist realist art would have the 'truthfulness and historical concreteness' but would present it in such a way that it contains 'the ideological remolding and education' of the masses.



Art is a means by which to engineer the 'soul'. This means that art shall serve as a way to disproportionately emphasize certain moral values and ideas over others. As such, art is perhaps the only field in which being ideologically biased, far from being a vice, is actually a virtue. In all the other fields that come to mind, communists, as scientists, must strive to be very strictly objective, unbiased, proportional, and precise in their descriptions of phenomenon and events - e.g. they should be scientifically objective in natural sciences, in history,



in economics, in philosophy. However, for a communist, art is to be treated in a manner that is somewhat different than science. Communist art must be partisan and biased, not in the sense that the artwork should lie to or mislead the audience, but rather in the sense that it should 'bold' or 'zoom' on specific events, so to make specific revolutionary themes and moral values stand out over others.

Socialist realism was the main feature of the more successful, more valued, and more prominent Soviet paintings and sculptures. The following elements were the kinds valued and given prominence to: (1) they would portray the revolutionary class struggles, hence reflecting the historical materialist outlook; (2) reflecting the epistemological materialist outlook, they would be realistic in style, and devoid of the reactionary fin de siècle or expressionist/'formalist' deviations; (3) the figures would be portrayed as mobile as opposed to static, hence to present reality in its development, to give a story to each character through giving mobility to each character; (4) the art, while realistic in style, would be 'partisan' not in the sense that it would lie or misrepresent the situation, but in the sense that it would highlight certain ideas, themes, or moral values above others.



The painting on the top right side by Vladimir Serov is a case in point regarding the incorporation of these elements. The painting on the right is realistic in style, portrays those characters visible to the reader as engaged in some kind of revolutionary-related activity, as having a story within the context of history. The work is also partisan in that it depicts the Soviet revolutionaries' upwards lift of their hands holding guns. It also particularly highlights Lenin's hand stretching, thus presenting Lenin, behind whom stand comrades Stalin and Sverdlov, as the scientific 'preacher' and the teacher of the Soviet revolutionaries.


The painting on the top left side, also by Serov, also incorporates all the four elements, except as much realism. Though it has the basic level of realism, a closer inspection of the work would reveal that the painting also incorporates impressionistic brushstrokes that further beautify the work, add an aura of revolutionary motion to the characters in the painting, and serve as evidence to the non-dogmatism

and non-mechanism of the Soviet artists in applying the realist style.

The well-known 'Worker and Kolkhoz-Woman' sculpture again shows the revolutionary historical class struggles of the Soviet proletariat and peasantry, highlighting the forward and upward trajectory. Yet another prominent Soviet work is the portrayal (bottom left) of Stalin and Voroshilov by the Soviet painter Gerasimov. The entire painting is realist. While Stalin and Voroshilov are portrayed as standing, they are not portrayed as static since they are depicted as though engaged in some revolutionary vision for their class struggles.

Communist art by nature prioritizes political, historical, etc. themes over issues concerning nature. Such prioritizing however, does not imply the

abandonment of the portrayals of the natural environment. The communist outlook extends to the natural sciences through dialectical materialism. No, it would not be anti-communist to portray the natural-physical entities and phenomena, such as the natural habitat, the galaxy, the non-human species, flowers, etc. Art works that did not particularly portray humans or historical development existed in the USSR and were featured. For example, on the left side, there is the statue of a lion holding a ball, which



existed in Elagin in the late 1920s (image source: ‘Soviet Architecture in the 1930s’). Soviet artist Gerasimov created numerous paintings of flowers as shown below. Note that the painting contains some impressionistic brushstrokes. Brush-strokes can be useful for efficiently and quickly painting such things as large swathes of vegetation and trees, in a manner that is realistic enough. Many of Gerasimov’s socialist realist works had impressionistic brush-strokes, which added beauty to the realistic paintings. The fact that Gerasimov was hailed as the top Soviet painter shows that the Soviet cultural policy tolerated, if not promoted, a mild application of impressionist elements in realist works.

The implication of this is that while socialist realist portrayals of historical-material developments and revolutionary struggles were prioritized, the aspects of the world that did not directly involve humans were not abandoned in the field of art. Socialist realism was promoted as the goal in the USSR, but that does not mean that paintings that did not adhere to socialist realist portrayals of history and revolutions were banned; the kinds of works that were rightly banned though were the hostile anti-Soviet colour revolutionary propaganda, or the kinds of works that covertly and subtly but deliberately spread propaganda against Soviet power.

Furthermore, there are fields in art that are inherently unrealistic, such as dance. This is yet another reason why realism should not be, and in the case of the USSR indeed was not, dogmatically applied to every field in and aspect of art. Yet another field in which realism cannot be fully applied is caricature. The Soviet news media had many caricatures and they obviously were not as realistic. Nonetheless a common denominator of the Soviet method in these fields of art that inherently could not have much realism in them was that they minimized the incorporation of fin de siècle tendencies, especially anti-art schools of art such as expressionism.

Fascist finance capital is allied to the feudal class in the struggle for rolling back the progressive forces and the productive forces, in the struggle to desertify world. The feudal class regards industrialization, which brought forth socialism and bourgeois-democracy, as a menace to its interests. Industrialization advanced thanks to technological advancements and technology advanced thanks to science. Reason, a key foundation to science, is thus a threat to feudalism. By targeting reason, the feudal class targets science, hence technology, hence industrialization, and hence socialism and bourgeois-democracy. To promote an anti-reason culture, the feudal class, and its top sponsor fascist finance capital, brought forth irrationalist ‘arts’ – from the ‘formalist’ music of Shostakovich, to the surrealist paintings of Salvador Dali, to the expressionist works of Jackson Pollock. Sometimes – such as in the case of Dali’s works – the paintings were undoubtedly interesting and of high quality, despite the reactionary irrationalist objective lying behind them. Soviet power rightly did not ban irrationalist works, unless in cases of overt anti-Soviet propaganda; yet, the Soviet state supported a cultural campaign against the anti-rational currents in arts. Soviet power thus promoted realism, the Enlightenment, the Renaissance style, and humanism as key features of art.

The decadent fin de siècle ‘art’ is a kind of ‘art’ antagonistic to civilizational development. It is promoted by the fascist secret services. The Nazi Propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels actively sought to encourage expressionist art. In an article titled ‘Joseph Goebbels: Expressionist Dramatist as the Nazi Minister of Culture’, David Barnett, a scholar at the University of Huddersfield writing for the New Theatre Quarterly wrote:


It is also known that Goebbels conveyed his congratulations to the painter Edvard Munch on the occasion of his seventieth birthday in 1933. (Joseph Goebbels: Expressionist Dramatist as the Nazi Minister of Culture, David Barnett, p. 162. In: New Theatre Quarterly 66, Volume 17, edited by: Clive Barker & Simon Trussler Part 2) (IMG)

Edvard Munch’s expressionist ‘art’, such as ‘The Scream’, characterized the Nazi Sado-Masochist themes of depression and suffering as a form of ‘beauty’. To be sure, Munch’s ‘The Scream’ was not the worst of the expressionist ‘art’ types out there; there have been ones far worse than that, such as the CIA-backed Jackson Pollock painting underneath ‘The Scream’ (for more details, see C11S8). The decadent anti-realist expressionist art was sponsored by the Nazis. In July 1933:

an exhibition called ‘Thirty German Artists’ was opened in a private gallery in Berlin which included the work of Nolde. Macke. Barlach, and other Expressionists. It was closed by order of Wilhelm Frick. the Minister of the Interior, after three days, but Reuth Offers convincing circumstantial evidence to suggest that the exhibition had Goebbels' approval. (Joseph Goebbels: Expressionist Dramatist as the Nazi Minister of Culture, David Barnett, p. 162. In: New Theatre Quarterly 66, Volume 17, edited by: Clive Barker & Simon Trussler Part 2) (IMG)

That Wilhelm Frick would close the exhibition does not mean that the exhibition lacked the support of the real Nazis. Goebbels, a true Nazi, supported it. Hitler was a dictator but that does not mean that he had full control of the show; in Germany, class forces unfavorable to Hitler inevitably catapulted elements unfavorable to Hitler up to the ranks of the Nazi regime, and it was not easy for Hitler to wipe them all out at once. Frick, as the Interior Minister, had a significant level of influence in the intelligence bodies, and was thus difficult to eliminate. He belonged to the Strasser faction, a fifth column of the communist forces within the Nazi Party. Naturally, Frick was distrusted by Hitler’s group and was slowly and gradually demoted by Hitler. This is likely why he was hanged by the US in the Nuremberg Trials instead of being recruited as a CIA or BND officer.

Fin de siècle art or so-called ‘modernist’ art (and at times referred to as ‘formalist art’) had the support of the Nazis and later also the CIA, but was condemned by Zhdanov, Stalin, and the official Soviet press, even well before the CIA was established. As confirmed by the US intelligence, on September 2, 1938,:



The Scream



A work by Jackson Pollock

Soviet Union: Izvestiya called for the purification of Soviet art from decadent modernistic influences, urging return to the great painters of the Renaissance as models, and Soviet humanism to be the basis of Socialist art. (Chronology of Principal Events Relating to the USSR Part I, OSS, September 25, 1945, p. 101) (IMG)

It is also known, for instance, that Marshal Tukhachevsky, a Nazi agent, was a sponsor of Shostakovich's music. It would not be an exaggeration in the slightest, nor a Maoist left-deviation, to say that Shostakovich's 'Lady Macbeth of the Mtsensk District' was chaotic, disgusting, and anti-musical, and for that, he was duly denounced in the Soviet press

In the words of the University of Bristol music professor Pauline Fairclough, Tukhachevsky was Dmitry Shostakovich's: powerful friend and protector.... (Dmitry Shostakovich, Pauline Fairclough, 2019) (IMG)

The prominent Russian musicologist and defector to the camp of the US-led countries, Solomon Volkov, also remarked that Tukhachevsky was Shostakovich's:

mentor and patron.... (Shostakovich and Stalin: The Extraordinary Relationship Between the Great Composer and the Brutal Dictator, Solomon Volkov) (IMG)

Tukhachevsky, who lived until mid-1937, remained a staunch supporter of Shostakovich throughout his life. The British state media, BBC, also stated that Tukhachevsky had been Shostakovich's patron:

That same year, many of his closest friends and relatives were imprisoned or executed, including his patron Marshal Tukhachevsky; (Shostakovich: The composer who was almost purged, BBC, Clemency Burton Hill, August 7, 2015) (IMG)

Tukhachevsky agent Shostakovich's most notorious 'musical' work was 'Lady Macbeth of the Mtsensk District', which the famous Pravda article 'Chaos Instead of Music' so rightly denounced. The 'musical' work which was hailed as an 'innovative' work by Atlantic media was not music at all, for it, without exaggerations, made no sense whatsoever. As the Pravda article, which Stalin probably did not write but likely did approve of, stated:

Certain theatres are presenting to the new culturally mature Soviet public Shostakovich's opera Lady Macbeth as an innovation and achievement. Musical criticism, always ready to serve, has praised the opera to the skies, and given it resounding glory. The young composer, instead of hearing serious criticism, which could have helped him in his future work, hears only enthusiastic compliments.

From the first minute, the listener is shocked by deliberate dissonance, by a confused stream of sound. Snatches of melody, the beginnings of a musical phrase, are drowned, emerge again, and disappear in a grinding and squealing roar. To follow this "music" is most difficult; to remember it, impossible.

(Chaos Instead of Music, Pravda, January 28, 1936) (IMG)

I recommend readers to take even a half of a minute to listen to the instrumental version of 'Lady Macbeth of the Mtsensk District' by Shostakovich, so that it becomes clear why the work was counter-music, a kind of 'music' aimed at destroying and corrupting music. Through sponsoring Shostakovich, Nazi agent Tukhachevsky was corrupting the culture of the Soviet people, and was promoting the reactionary intelligentsia against the Soviet state.

By the end of the Great Patriotic War, when the Americans had formed an alliance with Nazi Germany, the US intelligence joined the Nazis in boosting support for expressionist and formalist tendencies in the arts (see chapter 11).

C6S8. Housing in the USSR – Personal Property *** IMG-All-{Housing}

The economics of the construction of housing should be gradually centralized in order to maximize efficiency and reduce bureaucracy. However, of course, the right of housing as personal property (not to be confused with private property which causes exploitation) must be strictly protected in the socialist state. This is why the Soviet constitution enshrined this principle. Article 7 of the constitution stated:

In addition to its basic income from the public, collective-farm enterprise, every household in a collective farm has for its personal use a small plot of land attached to the dwelling and, as its personal property, a subsidiary establishment on the plot, a dwelling house, livestock, poultry and minor agricultural implements - in accordance with the statutes of the agricultural artel. (Soviet Constitution, 1936. MIA)

And article 10 states:

The right of citizens to personal ownership of their incomes from work and of their savings, of their dwelling houses and subsidiary household economy, their household furniture and utensils and articles of personal use and convenience, as well as the right of inheritance of personal property of citizens, is protected by law. (Soviet Constitution, 1936. MIA)

The 1936 constitution was merely a continuation of the policies of the previous years insofar as the right of personal property was concerned. The only main change in the Soviet state policy was that the economics of the construction of housing was centralized and increasingly under the control of the workers' state:

The state's attitude and policies toward new construction in this sector has varied considerably through different periods, with considerable effect on the total housing situation. During the period of the new economic policy (1923-28) private building was openly encouraged through the extension of financial credit, materials, and advice. With this spur to their initiative, private builders were responsible for almost two-thirds of the total living space constructed in the new economic policy period. (Dimensions of Soviet Economic Power: Studies for the US Congress, Part 5: Share of the Citizen, US Congress Joint Economic Committee, 1962, pp. 332-333) (IMG)

By the 1930s, there was a reduction in privatized construction of housing as the economy was further centralized.

There did indeed exist 'shared housing' in the Soviet Union, but this was due to the devastation of housing as a result of wars, and hence there had come a need to sometimes divide a big house among citizens.

In 1948 too the Soviet government reaffirmed the right to personal ownership of housing and elaborated on the rules in this respect:

the regime's decision in 1948 [was] to grant Soviet citizens the right to buy or build, and to own a personal property, a one- or two-story house with one to five rooms with not more than 60 square meters of living space. Sections of land were promised by the Government, at no extra charge, for the perpetual use of homebuilders. Unlimited use of the land was made inseparable from the right of ownership of the building. Thus, the builder or buyer gained ownership of the house in perpetuity, with the right to bequeath it to an heir.

C6S9. On Alcohol Consumption *** IMG-All-{Alcohol Consumption}

In a speech to the Party in 1927, Stalin explicitly endorsed the goal of reducing the production of alcohol to the minimum necessary for technical processes. Stalin said:

6th question. How are the vodka monopoly and the fight against alcoholism linked? [c.231]

Answer. I think it's difficult to link them up at all. There is an undeniable contradiction here. The party is aware of this contradiction, and it went for it deliberately, knowing that at the given moment the admission of such a contradiction is the least evil.

When we introduced the vodka monopoly, we had an alternative:

either go into bondage to the capitalists, handing over to them a number of the most important factories and factories, and receive for this certain funds necessary to turn around;

or introduce a vodka monopoly in order to obtain the necessary circulating funds for the development of our industry on their own and thus avoid foreign bondage.

The members of the Central Committee, including myself, then had a conversation with Lenin, who admitted that, if the necessary loans from outside were not received, they would have to go openly and directly to the vodka monopoly as a temporary means of unusual nature.

This is how the question stood before us when we introduced the vodka monopoly.

Of course, generally speaking, it would be better without vodka, for vodka is evil. But then you would have to go temporarily into bondage to the capitalists, which is an even greater evil. Therefore, we preferred the lesser evil. Now vodka generates more than 500 million rubles in income. To give up vodka now means to give up this income, and there is no reason to assert that alcoholism will be less, since the peasant will begin to produce his own vodka, poisoning himself with moonshine. [c.232]

Here, obviously, serious shortcomings in the cultural development of the countryside play a certain role. I'm not even talking about the fact that an immediate abandonment of the vodka monopoly would deprive our industry of more than ½ billion rubles, which there would be nowhere to compensate.

Does this mean that the vodka monopoly should remain with us in the future? No, it doesn't. We introduced the vodka monopoly as a temporary measure. Therefore, it must be destroyed as soon as new sources for new incomes are found in our national economy for the further development of our industry. And there can be no doubt that such sources will be found.

Did we do the right thing by handing over the production of vodka to the state? I think that's right. If the vodka were transferred to private hands, then this would lead:

first, to the strengthening of private capital,

secondly, the government would be deprived of the opportunity to properly regulate the production and consumption of vodka, and, third, it would make it difficult for itself to abolish the production and consumption of vodka in the future.

Now our policy is to gradually curtail vodka production. I think that in the future we will be able to abolish the vodka monopoly altogether, reduce the production of alcohol to the minimum required for technical purposes, and then eliminate the sale of vodka altogether.

I think that we would probably not have had to deal with either vodka or with many other unpleasant [p.233] things, if the West European proletarians took power into their own hands and provided us with the necessary assistance. But what to do? Our Western European brothers do not want to take power yet, and we are forced to use our own means. But this is no longer our fault. This is destiny.

As you can see, a certain share of the responsibility for the vodka monopoly falls on our Western European friends.

(Conversation with foreign workers' delegations, Stalin, November 5, 1927. MIA) (IMG)

Contrary to the propaganda by the hypocritical drunkard Khrushchev, Stalin was not a drunkard. Stalin is confirmed to not have been an alcoholic. Sergo Beria, the fiercely anti-Stalin son and apologist of MI6 agent Lavrenti Beria, admitted:

Stalin liked simple food, especially soups and fish. He was not an alcoholic. He was happy with a dry wine which he mixed with Georgian lemonade, and never drank vodka with meals. He did not employ servants, even when he had guests. He always had a buffet set out on a big table. Everyone served himself. Some of his guests drank themselves under the table.... (...).

My father never ate the food that was served at Stalin's, as he found it too fatty. He was brought Georgian dishes that were rich in vegetables and herbs, along with his favourite wine, khvachkara. One day Khrushchev grabbed the bottle. 'Let's try this wine that Beria treats himself to all alone!' And he filled a big glass and swallowed it in one gulp, like vodka. My father asked him: 'Did you get the taste?'

'No.'

'Very well, take another glass.' Khrushchev swigged the bottle with the comment: 'It's like vinegar.' This was the typical reaction of a man accustomed to stuffing himself with pork fried with garlic.

(“Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin”, Sergo Beria, 2001, p. 134) (IMG)

A 'dry wine', to which Sergo Beria referred, is a wine that has minimal sugar. On the other hand, a book published by the Oxford University Press stated that Stalin's "usual red wine" was "often diluted with water":

Deane was drinking vodka and Stalin probably his usual red wine, which he often diluted with water. (The Forgotten Bastards of the Eastern Front: American Airmen Behind the Soviet Lines and the Collapse of the Grand Alliance, Oxford University Press, Serhii Plokhy, 2019, p. 14) (IMG)

That Stalin drank red wine is also confirmed by the memoirs of Enver Hoxha (see Hoxha's book 'With Stalin'). It is also well-known that studies one after one another have shown red wine to be the least harmful of the alcoholic beverages:

Recreational alcohol consumption is undoubtedly reactionary, and marks a deviation from communist ethics. Drinking recreational alcohol was an error committed by Stalin. Nonetheless, much as one should be critical of such recreational consumption of alcohol, one must also remember that Stalin's consumption of it involved the least harmful type and in the highly diluted amounts. And he certainly was not a drunkard/alcoholic.

C6S10.1. On Homosexuality *** IMG-All-{Homosexuality}

Male homosexual desire in-itself is not reactionary. The problem arises with the fact that the statistical majority of male homosexuals engage in anal intercourse. Anal sex, the sex with the source of faeces, surely is a corrupt and degenerate practice that must be stopped, all the more so amongst those it is most prevalent: the male homosexuals. Soviet laws duly banned such a corrupt practice as sodomy.

The evidence that anal sex is predominantly found amongst male homosexuals is overwhelming. A study published by the British Medical Journal, a subsidiary of the British Medical Association, admitted:

Two thirds of gay men have anal sex. (ABC of Sexual Health: Homosexual Men and Women, The British Medical Journal (BMJ), Robin Bell, February 13, 1999) (IMG)

The paper also stated:

Ten per cent of heterosexual couples regularly have anal sex. (ABC of Sexual Health: Homosexual Men and Women, The British Medical Journal (BMJ), Robin Bell, February 13, 1999) (IMG)

A 2012 scientific paper on the prevalence of anal sex among heterosexuals vs. male homosexuals stated (note: 'MSM' is abbreviation for 'men who have sex with men'):

In 2001, Smith reviewed literature investigating anal intercourse between men, and between men and women. Reviewing data from the 1990s, Smith commented on the Western focus of the available data. **Reporting on data from the three large national population-based sex studies in the 1990s (US, Britain and France), heterosexual anal intercourse ranged from 26% of men and 20% of women in the US (National Health and Social Life (NHSL) survey, 1990–91), to 15% of men and 14% of women in Britain (National Surveys of Sexual Attitudes and Lifestyles (Natsal), 1990) and 33% of men and 26% of women in France (Analysis of Sexual Behaviour in France, 1992).** Outside of the Western context, varying levels of heterosexual anal sex were found in Africa, and relatively high levels in studies in China and Brazil. Similar to heterosexual anal intercourse, information pertaining to anal intercourse between men mostly came from Western countries. Drawing on data from Australia and several European countries, Smith that concluded **'studies of gay men in western countries indicate that between 70% and 80% have engaged in anal intercourse in the past six to 12 months'**. (p. 28) (Anal Sex Practices in Heterosexual and Male Homosexual Populations: A Review of Population-Based Data, Wendy Heywood & Anthony M. A. Smith, July 6, 2012. In: CSIRO Publishing, Sexual Health, 2012, p. 518. Bold added.) (IMG)

In the above paragraph, the 2012 study was describing a 2001 study by Smith. However, the purpose of the 2012 paper was to update the knowledge and study of the scientific research and to see if the prevalence of anal sex among male homosexuals still held true. Regarding this matter, the 2012 study reported:

The most recent British national sex survey, Natsal 2000, reported levels of anal sex among men who reported one or more male sex partners in the past 5 years. Overall, around 60% of MSM reported anal sex in the past year and 40% reported anal sex in the past 4 weeks. Incidence of receptive and insertive anal intercourse were similar, with just over 50% of men reporting each practice in the past year and roughly 30% reporting each in the past 4 weeks.²⁷ Natsal's findings have also been compared with a British internet-based sample that only looked at men who reported sex with another man in the past year. The prevalence of anal intercourse was higher in the internet sample, with over three-quarters of the online sample reporting anal intercourse in the past 3 months, compared with 70% of Natsal respondents in the past 6 months. Data on anal sex practices in the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland are also available from the Gay Men's Sex Survey. The 2008 version of the survey was the twelfth annual collection of data and reported that around seven in eight men who had a male sex partner in the past year reported anal intercourse. Furthermore, the majority of men who engaged in anal intercourse reported both insertive and receptive anal intercourse in the past 12 months (63% of those who reported anal intercourse).²⁹

In Switzerland, repeated surveys of MSM recruited via gay newspapers and associations reported fairly constant levels of anal sex with steady partners between 1992 and 2000. Roughly three-quarters of respondents reported anal sex with a steady partner in surveys conducted in 1992, 1994, 1997 and 2000. Anal sex with casual partners, however, appears to have increased slightly (especially among men over the age of 30), with 60% of respondents in 1992 reporting anal sex with casual partners compared with 69% of respondents in 2000.

In Australia, data on anal sex between two men were also collected by the ASHR. Men who reported a sexual encounter with a same-sex partner within the past 12 months were asked about the sexual practices they engaged in at their most recent sexual experience with another man. Two out of five men reported insertive anal sex and three in 10 men reported receptive anal sex at their last sexual encounter. A more recent online survey of men in Australia found a much higher prevalence of anal intercourse: of the men who identified as homosexual, 98% reported ever engaging in anal intercourse, 94% reported ever engaging in insertive anal intercourse and 95% reported ever engaging in receptive anal intercourse. When only looking at those who reported sex with another man in the past year, 95% reported anal intercourse in that timeframe and most men reported being versatile (83% reported both insertive and receptive anal intercourse).³² In Australia, the gay community periodic surveys also regularly collect data on gay men's sex practices. These surveys are conducted on a regular basis in metropolitan areas around the country, surveying men who have had sex with men in the past five years. The most recent estimates (2011: Adelaide, Queensland, Sydney and Melbourne; 2010: Perth; and 2009: Canberra) suggest that ~80% of men with a regular partner or partners in the past 6 months has anal sex with this partner(s). Similar proportions of men with casual partners in the past 6 months reported anal sex with these partners.

The Gay Auckland Periodic Sex Survey provides data on sexual practices among MSM in New Zealand. The most recent survey in 2008 reported that over 80% of men with a regular partner engaged in anal sex with this partner in the 6 months before the interview. This finding was similar to information collected in previous surveys (2002, 2004 and 2006). Conversely, anal sex with regular sex partners and casual partners had increased over time: in 2008, over 85% of men with a regular sex partner had anal sex with this partner in the previous 6 months, and 80% of men with casual partners had anal sex with these casual partners in the previous 6 months. For all partner types, the majority of respondents engaged in at least one act of insertive anal sex and one act of receptive anal sex within the period.³⁹ (Anal Sex Practices in Heterosexual and Male Homosexual Populations: A Review of Population-Based Data, Wendy Heywood & Anthony M. A. Smith, July 6, 2012. In: CSIRO Publishing, Sexual Health, 2012, p. 518) (IMG)

As an example of the prevalence of anal sex among male homosexuals in Asia, the paper reported:

Information from Thailand is available from a large convenience-based study. Using venue-day-time sampling at 106 venues across three cities, all men included in the study were over the age of 15 and reported sex with another man in the past 6 months. All analyses were broken down into MSM-only and men who have sex with men and women. Overall, 94% of MSM-only reported ever having anal intercourse with a man. Of these men, the usual anal sex position was evenly distributed between insertive (35%), receptive (35%) and both (30%). Of men who reported sex with both men and women in the past 3 months, 83% reported ever having anal sex with a man. The breakdowns of usual anal sex position in this population were much different, with 81% insertive, 3% receptive and 16% both. (Anal Sex Practices in Heterosexual and Male Homosexual Populations: A Review of Population-Based Data, Wendy Heywood & Anthony M. A. Smith, July 6, 2012. In: CSIRO Publishing, Sexual Health, 2012, p. 518) (IMG)

The facts are very clear: anal sex is most predominant among male homosexuals. One needs not remind that anal sex is sex with the source of faeces. Sex with faeces is what the bourgeois media and their brainwasher-agents in the labour movement seek to present as ‘normal’, ‘acceptable’, and ‘moral’.

No doubt, the that which is referred to as the ‘puritan’ attitude against sex in general is a petit-bourgeois attitude to combat, and there is no basis for shame about sex. However, anal sex is a completely different category; anal sex is a subcategory of sex hostile to sex; it is a degeneration of, an addition of alien filth to, sex. Even though male homosexuality itself is a not a problem, the practice common among male homosexuals, the practice of sodomy, undoubtedly was and remains ultra-reactionary. Not for thing did Engels condemn sodomy. Engels wrote:

The men, who would have been ashamed to show any love for their wives, amused themselves by all sorts of love affairs with hetairai [i.e. courtesans/mistresses]; but this degradation of the women was avenged on the men and degraded them also, till they fell into the abominable practice of sodomy.... (“The Origins of the Family, Private Property, and the State”, Engels)

In a letter to Karl Marx, Engels denounced the ‘Urnings’ (a term for Uranians, i.e. male homosexuals) and described it as being in contradiction to nature. He further denounced the sodomizers’ “power [base] within the state” – nowadays this would be called the sodomizers’ ‘lobby’ – and denounced the so-called ‘scientific’ ideas in favor of sodomy as turning “dirt into a theory.” Engels said:

That is really a very odd 'Urning' you just sent me. Those are just unveilings being extremely against nature. The pederasts begin counting themselves and find that they are forming a power within the state. Only an organisation was missing, but according to this it seems to be already existing in the secret. And as they are counting so important men within all the old parties and even in the new ones, from Rösing to Schweitzer, their victory is inevitable. 'Guerre aux cons, paix aux trous de cul' it will go now. **It is only a luck that we personally are too old to have to fear, this party gaining victory, to have to pay bodily tribute to the victors. But the young generation!** By the way, only possible in Germany that a guy like that appears, **translates the dirt into a theory** and invites: introite, and so on. Unfortunately he was not yet as courageous as to confess openly being 'That', and still has to operate coram publico 'from the front' even though not, from the front into as he once says by mistake. But first wait until the new North-German penal law has acknowledged the droits de cul then it will turn out quite differently. As for poor people from the front like us, with our childish favour for women, things will be going badly enough. If one could make use of that Schweitzer, it was to elicit from this strange man of honour the personal details of the high and the highest ranging pederasts, what surely would not be difficult for him as a congenial person.... (Marx Engels Works vol.32 -German edition - pp. 324-3255. Engels to Marx, June 22, 1869. Bold added) (IMG)

Since the early 1930s, the Soviet state banned male homosexual relations:

The punishment for sexual intercourse between a man and a man (sodomy) is imprisonment for a term of three to five years. (MINISTRY OF JUSTICE OF THE RSFSR CRIMINAL CODE, RSFSR, Official text as amended on July 1, 1950, STATE PUBLISHING, LEGAL LITERATURE, MOSCOW, 1950, p. 102)

The changes in policy regarding homosexuality had to occur such that the changes were affordable. While a ban of sodomy early in the October Revolution would have been morally justified at face value, it was strategically not feasible, for it would have created additional enemies for the Soviet state in Russia. It would have antagonized not just the sodomizers but also would have provoked Russia's scandalous fin de siecle feudally-rooted intelligentsia. The Soviet state could not afford to provoke the Russian intellectuals into a colour revolution against Soviet power. Hence in Soviet Russia, the ban on sodomy was temporarily lifted and was re-instituted in the early 1930s, when there had been enough relative advancements in the development of the productive forces and class struggles in political economy to generate enough funds for Soviet Russia to afford criminalizing sodomy, afford blocking colour revolutionary propaganda aimed at provoking an intellectuals’ anti-Soviet uprising, and afford funding propaganda campaigns against sodomy.

In Azeri, Uzbek, and Georgian SSRs, sodomy faced enough cultural opposition to be widely condemned. The intelligentsia there had other ideological problems but a favorable attitude towards sodomy was not one of them. Therefore, it was feasible to sodomy there, and thus it remained banned since the days of the Civil War - that is well before the 1930s. This is to be contrasted with Russia, Ukraine, and Byelorussia:

The Transcaucasian republics of Azerbaidzhan and Georgia (but not Armenia) had antisodomy articles in their first Soviet penal codes during the 1920s. These articles apparently prohibited consensual and aggravated forms of sodomy between adults. (...). The Uzbek SSR criminal code, first adopted in 1926, contained the most elaborate prohibitions against male same-sex relations of any Soviet republican code, providing eight articles against various practices (articles 276–283). (Homosexual Desire in Revolutionary Russia, University of Chicago Press, Dan Healey, 2001, pp. 159-160) (IMG)

As in the revolutionary penal codes of RSFSR, Belorussia, and Ukraine, sexual crimes in the codes of the Transcaucasian republics were enumerated in a small cluster of articles, in language that did not differ greatly from the Russian example. (Homosexual Desire in Revolutionary Russia, University of Chicago Press, Dan Healey, 2001, pp. 159) (IMG)

And no, the USSR did not oppose sodomy because of ‘sexual conservatism’. The USSR – a country in which nudist beaches were permitted and existed, a country in which nude paintings were promoted – could not possibly be ‘conservative’ on sexual matters. Sodomy was condemned because sodomy was and is problematic.

In the Soviet socialist context, sodomy in particular meant mainly anal intercourse. The instructions sent to the doctors regarding the way to detect potential pederasty were as follows:

In examinations regarding depraved acts, accompanied by rape or not, and as well regarding sexual perversions (with or without the use of force), the expert, . . . examines (in the case of pederasty [pederastiia]) the anal orifice and should note its form (crater- or funnel-shaped), whether it gapes or not, the flabbiness or slackness of the mucous membrane of the rectum, the presence or absence of ray-shaped folds of skin around the anal orifice, of fissures and wounds, the status of the sphincter, levator, the dilation of the ampulla,

prolapsus of layers of the rectum; particular attention is to be paid to the presence of rectal gonorrhoea, especially in victims who are men (or boys).... (Homosexual Desire in Revolutionary Russia, University of Chicago Press, Dan Healey, 2001, pp. 193-194) (IMG)

Some critics would ask: if anal sex in general is reactionary, then why ban it for male homosexuals only, and not heterosexual couples as well? The question is fair, but against it lies an obvious answer. The judicial system cannot punish every single wrong-doing in society; rather, it can examine the statistical patterns of wrong-doings and to prioritize them according their correlations with how much harm they inflict upon society; and thereupon the judicial system can arrive at whose arrest to prioritize and whose arrest not to prioritize. Statistics show that heterosexual couples do not engage in anal intercourse to the same extent that do male homosexual couples, for heterosexual couples have before them 'options' other than anal intercourse. Male homosexuals constitute a tiny minority of every society, and are thus easy to track, whereas the heterosexuals and female homosexuals together form almost 99% of the society. In light of such statistics, establishing a law that requires the police to track the sexual activities of heterosexuals as well would, firstly, stretch the police too thin for covering almost 100% of the society instead of just 1% of the society. Secondly, such a stretch too thin would require additional counter-intelligence measures and technological advancements to ensure that the police units do not bother the majority of heterosexual couples, who do not engage in anal intercourse, and to only track the activities of that minority of heterosexuals who do engage in anal intercourse. The USSR was not so technologically advanced as to yield such a non-totalitarian surveillance program, nor could the Soviet counter-intelligence afford to bother itself with such issues. It was far more feasible, rather, to focus on tracking the activities of a majority of a 1% minority in society – the sodomizer majority among the male homosexual minority – than to track the activities of a minority among a 98% majority of the society, the kinds of heterosexuals engaged in anal intercourse. Yes, heterosexual anal intercourse, just like homosexual anal intercourse, is reactionary, corrupt, and anti-sexual; however, in terms of policy implementation, surveillance over heterosexual anal intercourse would have been ridiculously unfeasible.

The Soviet state's campaign against male homosexuality was not a campaign against the romantic desire itself but rather was aimed at striking male homosexual anal sex in particular, the dirt emanating from it, and the fascist terror and espionage (more on this later) correlated with it. The Soviet state's corrective labour camps were used to punish individuals for homosexual anal sex and the Soviet clinics were used for preventative psychological care for male homosexuals who had not yet committed anal intercourse with other men. To date, I have never seen any evidence that the clinical preventative care was imposed.

What if there are male homosexuals who do not engage in anal intercourse and terror? What if the sexual activity of male homosexuals is limited to fellatio? The Soviet criminal code did not explicitly mention, let alone ban, homosexual fellatio, nor did it specify as to whether homosexual fellatio constituted a subcategory of sodomy. Therefore, understanding the Soviet legal system's response to the issue of homosexual fellatio requires research on how the Soviet court officials approached the issue. My research into the court cases of male homosexuality was mostly based on secondary sources, rather than primary sources. In the overwhelming majority of the cases I studied, the Stalin-era Soviet court cases on male homosexual intercourse were concerned with anal sex in particular and not fellatio. As a result, in my research, I came across very few court cases that involved homosexual fellatio in the first place. Of those few cases, most were not concerned with homosexual fellatio alone but rather involved either homosexual fellatio as applied in the context of homosexual rape, or homosexual fellatio along with anal sex. I know of only one case in which someone was being prosecuted for homosexual fellatio alone (and not being prosecuted for rape, nor for male homosexual anal intercourse, etc.). That specific case was in Leningrad in 1951, and the charges against the defendant were dropped, as the Soviet court and its investigators defined the term 'sodomy' as mainly 'male homosexual' 'anal sex', and did not believe that homosexual fellatio deserves to be defined as a subcategory of 'sodomy'. In other words, homosexual fellatio was not criminalized. Dan Healey wrote:

The desire on the part of many men to be remembered, audible in these inscriptions, forms one side, possibly an entirely positive one, of the story of same-sex relations between working men and Grishin. These tokens of memory also remind us that homosexual relations between these men were desired and consensual. Another photo from the collection projects the ideal of male friendship but also reminds us of the sinister sexual histories that friendship masks (see fig. 3). Two men in civilian outfits and workers' flat caps are turned to smile at each other; on the left is Sergei Denisov, **named as having had oral sex with Grishin in January 1951**. The other is thirty-two-year-old Vladimir Biryukov, who twice raped Babenko and also had consensual relations with her husband. **The friendship of Denisov (charges against him were dropped because he only engaged in fellatio)** and Biryukov (sentenced to fifteen years for rape) looks "normal" despite the careful tearing of the snapshot in two and the policeman's scrawl noting the names of each likeness. ('Comrades, Queers, and "Oddballs": Sodomy, Masculinity, and Gendered Violence in Leningrad Province of the 1950s', University of Texas Press, Journal of the History of Sexuality, Dan Healey, September 2012, Vol. 21, No. 3 (September 2012), pp. 512-513. Bold added.) (IMG)
The status of fellatio in Soviet law was ambiguous and variable. **Investigators in Leningrad in 1951 decided it was not punishable as "sodomy."** ('Comrades, Queers, and "Oddballs": Sodomy, Masculinity, and Gendered Violence in Leningrad Province of the 1950s', University of Texas Press, Journal of the History of Sexuality, Dan Healey, September 2012, Vol. 21, No. 3 (September 2012), p. 513. Bold added.) (IMG)

The one case in Leningrad in 1951 was the only case I saw from Healey's works in which homosexual fellatio was the sole charge directed against the defendant. Those 'variable' cases concerning fellatio, of which Healey speaks, appear to have been those in which the charges of fellatio came along with charges of engagement in sodomy (homosexual anal sex), rape, terrorism, etc. The Soviet court's response is interesting, for it actually lines up with my intuitive views that (1) homosexual anal intercourse spreads dirt and terror and thus must be suppressed, (2) that homosexual fellatio cannot be regarded as a subcategory of sodomy, and (3) that it is oppressive and unjust to prosecute or 'excommunicate' homosexual men merely for liking each other, kissing, holding hands, hugging, or engaging in non-anal sexual activity. Male homosexual desire and relations are not ipso facto problematic. Nor should the state and communities intervene against the considerably large minority of cases in which male homosexual relations are dissociated from anal intercourse. Hence, an alternative way to express the same argument is to state that male homosexuality is not a problem unless in cases of anal intercourse or terrorist networking. The Soviet anti-sodomy law thus targeted anal intercourse and terror networking.

Unlike male homosexuality, female homosexuality cannot involve sodomy and therefore must be totally decriminalized. Hence, the Soviet criminal code indeed rightly excluded female homosexuality from criminalization:

Under Article 121 of the Soviet criminal code, consensual sexual relations between men and sodomy were punishable by up to five years in prison. There were no criminal statutes regarding lesbianism. During the Soviet regime, Western observers believed that 800 to 1,000 men were imprisoned each year under Article 121 (States News Service 28 May 1991; *The San Francisco Chronicle* 18 Oct. 1992).

(“Russia: Information on the treatment of homosexuals in Russia, including imprisonment and involuntary medical treatment, and the situation of HIV-positive citizens of Russia”, RUS98001.zar, US Citizenship and Immigration Services, UCIS Gov, INS Resource Information Center, Washington, DC, May 8, 1998) (IMG)

And as confirmed by Dan Healey – the foremost anti-Soviet researcher on homosexuality, who for his outstanding book ‘Homosexual Desire in Revolutionary Russia’ won the second place in Gladstone Prize of the British Empire’s Royal Historical Society – the Soviet state did not prosecute female homosexuals unless in cases of pedophilia:

While the reconfiguration of male heterosexuality was to a significant degree conducted in courts where men were tried for sodomy, Stalinist ideals of “normal” women’s sexuality were constructed without resort to a legal penalty for same-sex love. Mutual female love occurred in private space, not on the sexualized public terrain occupied by the male homosexual subculture, and did not attract police attention. Yet despite the lack of an explicit prohibition, gender-neutral legislation did anticipate offenses involving relations between adults and “persons not having attained sexual maturity,” and women having sex with girls could be prosecuted. (Homosexual Desire in Revolutionary Russia, University of Chicago Press, Dan Healey, 2001, p. 224) (IMG)

Since male homosexuals who had engaged in sodomy were sent to the corrective labour camps, Dan Healey spent a large part of his research on the case of homosexuals in the Stalin-era corrective labour camps as well. Cases occurred in which female homosexuals – for crimes other than female homosexuality, since female homosexuality was not a crime – were in the corrective labour camps. Regarding the situation of female homosexuals in corrective labour camps, Dan Healey provides interesting details in an interview with Soros-sponsored ‘Open Democracy’ website:

[Interviewer:] **Could gay men and lesbians hold hands, for example, without anyone bothering about it?**

[Interviewee:] I would say that no one would make any fuss about it.... Some memoirs talk about whole barracks-full of lesbians who worked together as couples and “controlled”, as you might say, the situation. Sometimes these couples would divide work between them: the “femme” would cook and clean while her “butch” partner would do the tree felling. It’s also known that protection from a mature, experienced partner was a big advantage for a younger woman.

(Gay life in Stalin’s Gulag, Open Democracy, interviewer: Kirill Guskov, interviewee: Dan Healey, December 11, 2018. Bold original.) (IMG)

Whether male homosexuality is ‘natural’ or not – that is, whether male homosexuals are ‘born that way’ or not – does not change the fact that the banning of sodomy is a necessity. On the other hand, whether female homosexuality is ‘natural’ or not, and even if it were a mental problem, it would still be wrong to criminalize it, for the same kind of reason that it would be necessary to criminalize sodomy.

C6S10.2. Sodomy and Global Fascism

It is wrong to assume that a male homosexual is automatically susceptible to fascism. However, the evidence indicates that there was some correlation between male homosexuality, most likely anal intercourse in particular, and fascist affiliations. More research is needed into the depths of precisely how such a correlation arose, but one may theorize that the anal intercourse found among the statistical majority of homosexual men was strongly linked to Sado-Masochism, a psychological reinforcer of terrorist mentality and hence fascist affiliations. Male homosexual relations could also provide sexual blackmail as a weapon of fascist espionage services. Lastly, male homosexual relations could directly emanate from the fascist men’s Sadistic hatred and degradation of women and thus the natural tendency towards sexual relations with other fascist men. Whatever the precise reason behind the correlation, it is worth examining the fact of the correlation, without implying that male homosexuality is inherently ‘fascist’ or that ‘all’ male homosexuals are ‘potential’ ‘fascist spies’.

The correlation between sodomy and Nazism is one example. Contrasting the USSR and Nazi Germany, Maxim Gorky wrote in an article published by both Pravda and Izvestiya:

Not dozens, but hundreds of facts speak about the destructive, corrupting influence of fascism on the youth of Europe. It is disgusting to enumerate facts, and the memory refuses to be loaded with dirt, which the bourgeoisie fabricates more and more diligently and abundantly. I would like to point out, however, that in a country where the proletariat operates courageously and successfully, homosexuality [particularly sodomy], which corrupts young people, is recognized as socially criminal and punishable, while in a “cultured” country of great philosophers, scientists, and musicians, it acts freely and with impunity. Already there is a sarcastic saying: “Destroy homosexuals and fascism will disappear.” (Proletarian Humanism, Izvestiya & Pravda, Maxim Gorky, 1934) (IMG)

As Gorky put it, this topic is too abhorrent for one to desire to discuss it. However, given the massive propaganda bombardment aiming to revise the history of the Third Reich and the condemnation of the USSR for its correct scientific policy of criminalizing sodomy, it has become necessary to thoroughly expose the truth about sodomy.

Hitler himself was a homosexual – and was simultaneously hyper-masculine and effeminate – as confirmed by the US intelligence service, which stated:

His sex life is dual as is his political outlook. He is both **homosexual** and hetero-sexual; (...); **both man and woman**. While the true Adolf Hitler is elusive to the diagnostician, there are certain facts which prove that his sexual situation is untenable and even desperate. (Biographical Sketches of Hitler and Himmler, Henry Field, Written To: Major John McDonough, December 3, 1943, p. 30. Bold added) (IMG)

Hitler was of course by no means the only male homosexual among the fascists. The Nazis established an international network of fascist male homosexuals serving as spies for the Reich.

Hermann Rauschning was a prominent Nazi Party member, the President of Danzig, and Hitler’s Lieutenant. Hitler told Rauschning:

I will tell you a secret. I am founding an Order. (Hitler Speaks, Hermann Rauschning, 1939, p. 243) (IMG)

The secret occultist Nazi ‘Order’ that Hitler was creating would also serve as an intelligence organization. Hitler said:

What we need is something like the British secret service, an order, doing its work with passion. (Hitler Speaks, Hermann Rauschning, 1939, p. 268) (IMG)

For the creation of this Order, this fascist secret service, Hitler remarked:

I am building up a great organisation of my own. It costs a lot of money, but it gets things moving for me. I have drawn up a questionnaire covering details of the persons I am interested in. I am having a comprehensive card index compiled of every influential person in the world. The cards contain every detail of importance. (Hitler Speaks, Hermann Rauschning, 1939, p. 269) (IMG)

For membership in this Order, he said:

I shall not shrink from using abnormal men.... (Hitler Speaks, Hermann Rauschning, 1939, p. 268) (IMG)

What he meant by 'abnormal men' was male homosexuals. Indeed, among the criteria that the Nazi dictator was looking for was:

Is he homosexual? That is of the utmost value, because it provides close associations that can never be escaped from. (Hitler Speaks, Hermann Rauschning, 1939, p. 269) (IMG)

Male homosexuality would have fostered sexual ties between the members of the Order, causing them to 'have their hearts in the work' for the fascist secret service:

we shall get nothing achieved without a staff who have their hearts in the work. The officials don't like this job; it's too dirty for them. (Hitler Speaks, Hermann Rauschning, 1939, p. 268) (IMG)

As can be seen, Hitler regarded male homosexuality as an intelligence tool. Certainly, the sexual blackmail and the 'heart' would have been a fascist means of keeping their agents enticed.

According to Dan Healey – the foremost anti-Soviet researcher on homosexuality, who for his outstanding book 'Homosexual Desire in Revolutionary Russia' won the second place in Gladstone Prize of the British Empire's Royal Historical Society – it was Stalin who personally endorsed the ban on sodomy:

According to documents from the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation (APRF) published in 1993, after the decriminalization of sodomy by Boris Yeltsin in April of that year, the immediate initiative for the enactment of the antisodomy law in 1933 came from the political police. OGPU deputy chief G. G. Iagoda wrote to Iosif Stalin on 15 September 1933 to argue for the need for legislation against "pederasty" as a matter of state security. Iagoda reported that raids had recently been conducted on Moscow and Leningrad "organizations of pederasts" and that 130 persons had been arrested. Iagoda wrote that they were guilty of


establishing networks of salons, centers, dens, groups, and other organized formations of pederasts, with the eventual transformation of these organizations into outright espionage cells . . . Pederast activists, using the castelike exclusivity of pederastic circles for plainly counterrevolutionary aims, had politically demoralized various social layers of young men, including young workers, and even attempted to penetrate the army and navy.

Stalin forwarded Iagoda's letter to Politburo colleague L. Kaganovich, noting that "these scoundrels must receive exemplary punishment, and a corresponding guiding decree must be introduced in our legislation." Iagoda sent Stalin the text of a draft law on 13 December 1933, with a covering letter outlining the OGPU's arguments in favor of the measure. Iagoda did not mention spying by

the homosexuals who had been arrested earlier that year; instead, he noted that the OGPU had established that organized groups of "pederasts" had operated "salons" for "orgies," engaging in the "recruitment and corruption of totally healthy young people, Red Army soldiers, sailors, and individual students." The OGPU's attention, at least in this letter, appeared after three months to have shifted to the potential security danger that closed groups presented and the threat to "healthy young people" drawn into them. Iagoda's interest was concentrated on male rather than female sociability (which he did not mention). At no point in the subsequent development of this legislation was the question of female homosexuality explicitly raised. (...).


The draft decree for the Presidium of the USSR Central Executive Committee (TsIK) attached to Iagoda's December letter consisted of a proposed wording of the new law, a clause ordering the inclusion of the statute in each union republic criminal code, and a final paragraph confirming the continued validity of laws dealing with rape and prostitution. This draft was approved by the Politburo on 16 December 1933. The following day the USSR All-Union Central Executive Committee adopted virtually the same decree, distributing it to the analogous RSFSR body for the development of corresponding draft decrees.

(Homosexual Desire in Revolutionary Russia, University of Chicago Press, Dan Healey, 2001, pp. 184-185) (IMG)





Through my research online, I came across numerous photos of male Nazi soldiers cross-dressing as women and engaging in Sado-Masochistic ‘erotic’ contact with other Nazi males. However, in the above, I have provided images that are not as provocative and which do not present such male homosexual contacts between men. The researcher Dammann found so many of these photos that he decided to publish them in a book. (The above photos from ‘Soldier Studies: Cross-Dressing in der Wehrmacht’ by Martin Dammann. In: ‘Cross-dressing Nazis: A German artist found so many photos of them he published a book’, National Post, November 28, 2018) (IMG)



Again, the above photos are from Dammann’s research and have been published in a video by Deutsche Welle. (‘Cross-dressing among Nazi-era German Wehrmacht soldiers’ DW Feature, November 24, 2018) (IMG)

The fascist network of male homosexuals also has existed in the Vatican for quite many years. Since its birth, the Vatican regime was itself a massive hub for the Nazis, Italian Fascists, the Ustase, the MI6, and in the post-war years, the CIA. This centre of reaction, the city of killers and rapists until today has been, somewhat famously, also the world’s capital of homosexuality. In his New York Times best-seller, the journalist Frederic Martel exposed the long history of homosexuality in the Vatican. In his New York Times bestseller, the journalist Frederic Martel recalled a conversation with Francesco Lepore, a prominent official in the Vatican, who admitted that 80% of the Vatican was made up of homosexuals. Lepore: was the youngest priest working in the holy see, [and] began living among the cardinals, bishops and old nuncios of the Vatican. He knows them all, has been an assistant to several of them, measures the breadth of their gifts and little foibles, and has guessed their secrets. ‘The people who worked with me lived there, and even Mgr Georg Gänswein, who would become private secretary to Pope Benedict XVI, lived there too, with us.’

(...). So the omnipresence of homosexuals in the Vatican isn't just a matter of a few black sheep, or the 'net that caught the bad fish', as Josef Ratzinger put it. It isn't a 'lobby' or a dissident movement; neither is it a sect of a freemasonry inside the holy see: it's a system. It isn't a tiny minority; it's a big majority.

At this point in the conversation, I ask Francesco Lepore to estimate the size of this community, all tendencies included.

'I think the percentage is very high. I'd put it at around 80 per cent.'

('In the Closet of the Vatican: Power, Homosexuality, Hypocrisy', Frederic Martel, February 21, 2019, pp. 17-18) (IMG)

The Vatican, a viciously misogynistic terror center, separated men and women from one another. The biological urge towards sexual relations thus was manifested in male homosexual and female homosexual relations. The Vatican men's Sadistic hatred of women could render such men closer, sexually.

The fascist Shah of Iran, who was installed back into power in 1953 with the help of the MI6 agent and former Nazi agent General Zahedi, was described as a homosexual as well. This is corroborated by a prominent SAVAK official, Mansur Rafizadeh. In order to suppress research on the October Surprise and the McFarlane Affair ('Iran-Contra Affair'), some of Ronald Reagan's supporters and elements in the CIA have sought to present Mansur Rafizadeh as a lower-ranking SAVAK officer in the United States with little influence in the Shah's intelligence service. However, CIA documents captured through the seizure of the US Embassy in Tehran in 1979 confirm that Mansur Rafizadeh indeed had a widespread network involving many of the prominent CIA operatives. Rafizadeh had access to many Iranian intelligence personnel. Rafizadeh also mentioned several times his role as a head of several SAVAK officers in the United States and his service as a liaison officer with the CIA and the US State Department. His writings were also studied and taken seriously by the staff in the CIA and the US State Department. It is nonetheless the case that Mansur Rafizadeh unofficially belonged to a network of Iranian Nasserist Free Officers, headed by General Mohammad-Vali Qarani, who aimed to overthrow Iran's monarcho-fascist regime. On that basis, some would understandably argue that Rafizadeh had a 'bias' against the Shah. Anyways, Rafizadeh testified to the intensive homosexual life of the Shah, implicitly indicating that the Shah had anal sex with Peron:

General Pakravan [who was an Iranian Free Officer and back then the chief of the SAVAK] had told me that no one was allowed to enter the shah's bedroom without permission except Ernest Peron, another of the shah's boyhood friends. Peron could simply walk in, without even knocking. Princess Ashraf wrote of the long-standing friendship of the shah and his Swiss friend, Peron:

and he also told me about two new friends he had made, diverse as they were. One of these was Richard Helms, who later became director of the Central Intelligence Agency and America's Ambassador to Iran. Another was Ernest Perron (sic), the son of the school handyman, a young man who came to live in Iran and remained my brother's close friend until the day he died in 1961.

General Pakravan had told me that Queen Soraya, the shah's second wife, was very annoyed with Peron. Several times he had barged into their bedroom while she and the shah were in bed. The former queen described their relationship in her autobiography, *Soraya: The Autobiography of the Imperial Highness*:

Another intriguer who complicated my life from the very beginning was a man from western Switzerland by the name of Ernest Peron, the most mysterious figure I have ever encountered at the Court of Teheran. Many people called him "the Persian Rasputin," and although this was certainly an exaggeration he did nevertheless play a sinister role in the Shah's circle.

So far as I could discover he had originally been a gardener, or perhaps a servant, at Rosay College. When Mohammed Riza (the shah) had finished his studies there, he had had this man brought to Teheran. The old Shah [Reza Khan] was very strict and did not tolerate any foreigners at his Court, but he made an exception for this Swiss.

Peron never went home again. He had no official appointment but lived at Court as a personal friend of the Shah. Despite his humble origins he was said to be Mohammed Riza's closest adviser. He visited him each morning in his bedroom for a discussion. No one could say precisely what it was he did. Like many self-educated men he posed as a poet and philosopher. At the same time he acted as a sort of intermediary between the Shah and the British and American ambassadors. Shortly before my arrival in Teheran he had had a mysterious accident of some sort, and from then on he walked with a limp. (...).

When I became Empress, Peron attempted to interfere in my private life as well. He frequently came to see me in my room, and would bring the conversation around to intimate matters which were no concern of his. One evening, when he began to question me in this way about my marriage, I lost my temper and said: "Please do not forget, Mr. Peron, to whom it is that you are speaking. It is unseemly that you should ask me such questions."

He was offended and withdrew. From that time on he never missed an opportunity of saying something disagreeable about me. I was, it was true, not his only victim....

I heard, from several reliable men close to the shah, that Ernest Peron was the shah's sexual partner.

In 1964, after Peron's death, the shah visited the United States to see President Johnson. After their business was completed, the shah and his party went to the Waldorf-Astoria. His minister of court, Assadollah Alam, who had grown up with him and was considered his best friend, accompanied the shah.

That night there was a private party in the shah's suite at the Waldorf, and later in the evening I was ordered to go to Times Square to get the next day's New York Times, which was just coming out. The shah wanted to see what had been written about him and his visit. Around 11.00 P.M. I left to get the paper. Everyone was drunk. The papers were not at the newsstand and I had to wait until 11:30. I purchased several copies and returned to the hotel, arriving about midnight.

Because of my position with SAVAK, no one stopped me as I walked toward the shah's suite. When I entered, it seemed that everyone had gone; there was no one in sight, but the television was still on. To make my presence known to anyone who might still be up, I coughed and deliberately made some noise. There was no response. I walked into the living room and made some more noise. Again there was no response. Then I walked toward the shah's huge bedroom and saw His Majesty and Court Minister Alam, naked and lying in bed, fondling each other.

I was shocked and did not know what to do. I backed away, returned to the living room, and sat down. I began thinking about the many rumors that Peron had had a homosexual relationship with the shah.

Alam, naked, entered the living room to get some gin and saw me. "Oh, are you here?" he asked, startled.

"Yes, Your Excellency. I have the paper."

Alam excused himself, ran to the bathroom, and wrapped a towel around himself. He returned and addressed me again: "You can leave the paper." He paused and then asked, "How long have you been here?"

"A few minutes."

Suddenly I saw the shah, also naked, running from the bedroom toward the living room. Before the shah could say anything, Alam interceded. "Mr. Rafizadeh is here with the paper. You were taking a shower when he arrived."

The shah asked, "Is there anything about us in the paper?"

"One article," I answered.

"Thank you. Leave the paper."

While making a move to leave I politely asked that I be permitted to depart. With permission granted, I left the suite.

I had never seen two men making love before, so what I witnessed was startling, but to have seen the shah making love to Alam, his own prime minister, was more than I could grasp at that moment. I was so confused that I forgot where I had parked my car and wandered around the area until I found it.

Before the shah left the United States, Alam invited me to see His Majesty again, and highly praised me and my work. "Are you being promoted on time?" Alam asked.

"Yes," I answered.

"Do you need any financial help?"

"No, I have enough."

(...). In addition to his homosexual liaisons, the shah led a very active and complicated heterosexual life. He had encounters with several internationally prominent actresses. He also dallied with extremely high-priced call girls who gave a new meaning to the term "high-priced." The shah was known to have paid up to \$250,000 for special services.

Yet, in spite of the shah's vast wealth, power, and endless resource to satiate his sexual appetites, he still needed to fulfill another primitive hunger – his thirst for violence.

(Witness: From the Shah to the Secret Arms Deal, Mansur Rafizadeh, April 1, 1987, pp. 213-216. Note: I have already checked to see if Queen Soraya made those remarks in her autobiography. She did indeed.) (IMG)

Ernest Peron, limping perhaps due to problems in his anus, was openly a homosexual. The CIA operative Abbas Milani wrote that Queen Soraya confirmed that Peron was a homosexual:

Aside from the Shah's mother and siblings, there was another source of tension between Soraya and the Shah, and that was Ernest Perron.

"How can I," she writes with bitterness, "describe this shetun [piece of shit], this limping devil who dragged his leg and spread his poison around the palace as well as in our own quarters?" He was, she says, "a homosexual," who "detested women, all women." (The Shah, Abbas Milani, p. 158) (IMG)

It is also confirmed that Peron was extremely close to the Shah and that he got into the Shah's bedroom almost everyday. They were 'closeted' together as 'companions' for two hours behind closed doors everyday:

His name was Ernest Perron and he was, even as a child, openly gay. Over the next fifteen years, he would remain the King's constant companion. Every day, for about two hours, the two would be closeted together, behind closed doors. (Character as Destiny: The Portrait of the Shah as a young man: Synopsis for Oxford Conference, Abbas Milani, p. 3) (IMG)

The chief of America's fascist secret police, the bloody sponsor of the Ku Klux Klan terrorists, the sworn enemy of communism, was a homosexual man. The title of the ABC News article is itself enough to reveal the life of America's fascist secret police chief: 'J. Edgar Hoover: Gay or Just a Man Who Has Sex with Men?'. The report stated:

One medical expert told Summers that Hoover was "strongly predominant homosexual orientation" and another categorized him as a "bisexual with failed heterosexuality."

Hoover often suppressed his urges, but would break out in lapses that could have destroyed him -- alleged orgies in New York City hotels and affairs with teenage boys in a limousine, according to interviews conducted by Summers.

"He was a sadly repressed individual, but most people, even J. Edgar Hoover, let go on occasion," he said.

('J. Edgar Hoover: Gay or Just a Man Who Has Sex with Men?', ABC News, Susan Donaldson James, November 14, 2011) (IMG)

The report continued:

Ethel Merman, who had known Hoover since 1938, knew his sexual orientation, according to Summers. In 1978 when the actress was asked to comment on Anita Bryant's anti-gay campaign, Merman told the reporter, "Some of my best friends are homosexual. Everybody knew about J. Edgar Hoover, but he was the best chief the FBI ever had."

Harry Hay, founder of the Mattachine Society, one of the first gay rights organizations, confirmed that Hoover and Tolson sat in boxes owned by and used exclusively by gay men at their racing haunt Del Mar in California.

"They were nodded together as lovers," he told Summers.

Another FBI agent who had gone on fishing trips with Hoover and Tolson revealed that the director liked to "sunbathe all day in the nude." Even novelist William Styron told Summers that he once spotted Hoover and Tolson in a California beach house -- the director painting his friends toenails.

('J. Edgar Hoover: Gay or Just a Man Who Has Sex with Men?', ABC News, Susan Donaldson James, November 14, 2011) (IMG)

The rest of the fascist FBI command did not seem to be so different than Edgar Hoover in this respect:

Hoover promoted men inclined to homosexual indiscretions, including Tolson, who had barely 18 months experience with the FBI when he became Hoover's deputy. ('J. Edgar Hoover: Gay or Just a Man Who Has Sex with Men?', ABC News, Susan Donaldson James, November 14, 2011) (IMG)

Hoover also reportedly held hands with Tolson:

Hoover often frequented New York City's Stork Club and one observer -- soap model Luisa Stuart, who was 18 or 19 at the time -- told Summers she saw Hoover holding hands with Tolson as they all rode in a limo uptown to the Cotton Club in 1936.

"I didn't really understand anything about homosexuality at the time," said Stuart. "But I'd never seen two men holding hands. And I remember asking Art [Arthur] about it in the car on the way home that night. And he just said, 'Oh, come on. You know,' or something like that. And he told me they were queers or fairies --- the sort of terms they used in those days."

('J. Edgar Hoover: Gay or Just a Man Who Has Sex with Men?', ABC News, Susan Donaldson James, November 14, 2011) (IMG)

Hoover was actually remarkably similar to Hitler in terms of personality and sexuality:

Psychiatrists have concluded that Hoover "no doubt" had a narcissistic personality disorder, perhaps because of his dependency on a forceful mother who had "great expectations for her son," he said.

"Studies suggest that people with such backgrounds block their feelings and cut meaningful relationships," according to Summers, who said Hoover would have been a "perfect high-level Nazi."

(‘J. Edgar Hoover: Gay or Just a Man Who Has Sex with Men?’, ABC News, Susan Donaldson James, November 14, 2011) (IMG)

Describing Hitler, the US intelligence also reported:

Hitler ... represented, as he does today, the type of egocentric ... Narcissus with the craving for the unfindable woman and occasional hysterical outbursts of a sado-masochistic nature. (Biographical Sketches of Hitler and Himmler, Henry Field, Written To: Major John McDonough, December 3, 1943, p. 30) (IMG)

Another sworn enemy of the USSR was Roy Cohn, also a homosexual man:

Roy Cohn, the lawyer who served as chief counsel to Sen. Joseph McCarthy in his anti-communist campaign of the 1950s and who successfully convicted Julius and Ethel Rosenberg of espionage, denied he was gay, despite an attraction to men. (‘J. Edgar Hoover: Gay or Just a Man Who Has Sex with Men?’, ABC News, Susan Donaldson James, November 14, 2011) (IMG)

A central figure in this campaign, the campaign of portraying sodomy as ‘normal’ or ‘legitimate’, was Alfred Kinsey of the Indiana University. For his work in support of sodomy, Kinsey had actively collaborated with Fritz von Balluseck, a notorious German Nazi Party member, Gestapo officer, a pedophile, and of course a murderer. According to the Sunday Times:

Critics are particularly incensed by [Kinsey’s] research.... It relied in part on the evidence of a Nazi paedophile, Dr Fritz von Balluseck, who was tried for the rape and murder of a 10-year-old girl in 1956. The two men kept up a correspondence, with Kinsey once warning him to "watch out" in case he [i.e. Balluseck] was caught [for his crimes]. (Kinsey Film Stirs Child Sex Outrage, The Sunday Times, Sarah Baxter, September 26, 2004. Note: according to the New York Times, Balluseck was indeed convicted for pedophilia and child sexual abuse but was not tried for the murder of the young girl in 1957. See: ‘Alfred Kinsey: Liberator or Pervert?’, The New York Times, Caleb Crain, October 3, 2004) (IMG)

Basing his pseudo-scientific research on a German Nazi pedophile and murderer, Kinsey made it clear that he regarded pedophilia as completely acceptable, and denounced what he labelled as the ‘hysteria over [pedophilic] sex offenders’. In his 1953 book, Kinsey wrote:

On the other hand, some 80 per cent of the children had been emotionally upset or frightened by their contacts with adults. A small portion had been seriously disturbed; but in most instances the reported fright was nearer the level that children will show when they see insects, spiders, or other objects against which they have been adversely conditioned. If a child were not culturally conditioned, it is doubtful if it would be disturbed by sexual approaches of the sort which had usually been involved in these histories. It is difficult to understand why a child, except for its cultural conditioning, should be disturbed at having its genitalia touched, or disturbed at seeing the genitalia of other persons, or disturbed at even more specific sexual contacts. When children are constantly warned by parents and teachers against contacts with adults, and when they receive no explanation of the exact nature of the forbidden contacts, they are ready to become hysterical as soon as any older person approaches, or stops and speaks to them in the street, or fondles them, or proposes to do something for them, even though the adult may have had no sexual objective in mind. Some of the more experienced students of juvenile problems have come to believe that the emotional reactions of the parents, police officers, and other adults who discover that the child has had such a contact, may disturb the child more seriously than the sexual contacts themselves. The current hysteria over sex offenders may very well have serious effects on the ability of many of these children to work out sexual adjustments some years later in their marriages. (Sexual Behavior in the Human Female, Alfred Kinsey, Wardell Pomeroy, Clyde Martin, Paul Gebhard, 1953, p. 121) (IMG)

It should come as no surprise, therefore, that Kinsey received the financial and ideological support of the Rockefeller Foundation, the well-known auxiliary of the CIA. American finance capital supported Kinsey’s propaganda. In the Acknowledgements section of Kinsey’s book, the contributions of the Rockefeller Foundation were duly acknowledged:

The Rockefeller Foundation has contributed a major portion of the cost of the program during the past six years. Dr, Alan Gregg, as Director for the Medical Sciences of The Foundation, has encouraged a wide-scale, long-time project which would adequately cover all social levels and all aspects of sexual behavior in our society. (Sexual Behavior in the Human Male, Alfred C. Kinsey, Preface by Alan Gregg (Medical Sciences, Rockefeller Foundation), pp. V-VI. First published: January 1, 1948. Ninth Printing: June 14, 1949) (IMG)

James H. Jones:

is a Professor of History at the University of Arkansas. (James H. Jones Interview, PBS)

Confirming that the Rockefeller Foundation funded Kinsey, Jones wrote:

And just as [Kinsey] had planned, the first wave of magazine articles and scholarly reviews emphasized that the NRC and the Rockefeller Foundation had supported [Kinsey’s] research, with much greater stress on the latter than the former. This was no coincidence. When these same journalists had visited Bloomington, Kinsey had shouted his affiliation with the Rockefeller Foundation and whispered his relationship to the NRC. Not that this was anything new. Again, from the moment the grants had started arriving, Kinsey had traded shamelessly on the Rockefeller Foundation's name, attempting to use its prestige and reputation to convince the public and other scientists that his research was rigorous and valid. All that changed in 1947 was that he commandeered a host of reporters to help him broadcast this message to the nation.

“So startling are its revelations, so contrary to what civilized man has been taught for generations that they would be unbelievable but for the impressive weight of scientific agencies backing the survey,” declared Harper’s Magazine. It went on to identify Kinsey's patrons as the NRC which it called “the most authoritative scientific body in the land,” and the Rockefeller Foundation, which it stressed had supported Kinsey's work with a steady stream of grants.

(Alfred C. Kinsey: A Life, James H. Jones, pp. 556-557) (IMG)

What explains the link between fascism and male homosexuality? Such a link could perhaps be explained by the spirit of terrorism. There exists a correlation between male homosexuality, sodomy, Sado-Masochist behaviours in ‘sex’, and fascism. The exact order of the causal relationship is not empirically determined. However, one can infer that since fascists are terrorists, they naturally orient towards the kinds of ‘sexual’ behaviours that

involve terror. Sodomy and some extreme types of Sado-Masochism are the manifestation of such terror in 'sex'. Shared hatred of women could also lead many fascist misogynistic men towards sexual relations with one another.

Susan Sontag, the fellow at Harvard University and one of America's top anti-Soviet intellectuals, propagated the narrative that the Third Reich repressed all male homosexuality. In spite of propagating such a false narrative, Sontag nonetheless also stated that many male homosexuals found and continued to find Nazism as an arousing phenomenon, when she rhetorically asked:

Why has Nazi Germany ... become a gay turn-on? (Fascinating Fascism, New York Review of Books, Susan Sontag, February 6, 1975, republished in: Under the Sign of Saturn, 1980, pp. 73-105. Retrieved from: University of California Santa Barbara, Harold Marcuse) (IMG)

Sontag added that Sado-Masochist sexual behaviour is most visible among male homosexuals and that there is a natural link between fascism and Sado-Masochism:

Of course, most people who are turned on by SS uniforms are not signifying approval of what the Nazis did, if indeed they have more than the sketchiest idea of what that might be. Nevertheless, there are powerful and growing currents of sexual feeling, those that generally go by the name of sadomasochism, which make playing at Nazism seem erotic. These sadomasochistic fantasies and practices are to be found among heterosexuals as well as homosexuals, although it is among male homosexuals that the eroticizing of Nazism is most visible. S-m, not swinging, is the big sexual secret of the last few years.

Between sadomasochism and fascism there is a natural link. "Fascism is theater," as Genet said.

(Fascinating Fascism, New York Review of Books, Susan Sontag, February 6, 1975, republished in: Under the Sign of Saturn, 1980, pp. 73-105. Retrieved from: University of California Santa Barbara, Harold Marcuse) (IMG)

None of this is to condemn every and all categories within 'Sado-Masochist' practices. It is fair to say that there exist some kinds of mildly Sado-Masochistic activities that create a 'moderate' or small amount of pain. Exaggerative is the claim all that these 'moderate'/mild forms of Sado-Masochism are terroristic or 'fascist'. Nonetheless, there do exist certain kinds of Sado-Masochistic behaviour that have a terroristic character; and anal sex is one of them.

Anal sex is itself a Sado-Masochist practice. On the one hand, the tissue in the anal canal is damaged, causing wounds, hence making the penetrated partner the Masochist, and the penetrator the Sadist. On the other hand, the contact of faeces with the penetrator's penis is a psychological harm inflicted upon the penetrator. The use of condoms in anal intercourse might provide physical protection for the penis, but it cannot eliminate the psychological self-torture of 'coprophilia' inherent in anal sex. Therefore, in this respect, the penetrator is the Masochist, the psychological self-torturer, whereas the penetrated is the Sadist. In sum, both partners in the anal sex are Sado-Masochists. And such Sado-Masochism is nowhere near 'mild' or 'moderate'. No, anal sex contains a spirit of terrorism in it.

Engels associated male homosexuality with the (Sadistic) degradation of women and the self-degradation of men:

The men, who would have been ashamed to show any love for their wives, amused themselves by all sorts of love affairs with hetairai [i.e. courtesans/mistresses]; but this degradation of the women was avenged on the men and degraded them also, till they fell into the abominable practice of sodomy.... ("The Origins of the Family, Private Property, and the State", Engels)

According to one paper by the Journal of Sex Research, Sado-Masochism is a result of the onset of male homosexual activity:

The results also indicate that the development of sadomasochistic sexual behavior starts after experience with more ordinary sexual behavior and the establishment of a sexual orientation. Specifically, the exclusively gay male participants became aware of and started practicing their sadomasochistic interests later, which accords well with findings showing that gay male individuals establish their sexual orientation later than heterosexual individuals (Coleman, 1982; Kontula & Haavio-Mannila, 1993). This is also consistent with Kamel's idea of sadomasochism as a reaction to dissatisfaction with the ordinary gay male scene (Kamel, 1983). (Sexual Behavior and Social Adaptation Among Sado-Masochistically-Oriented Males, N. Kenneth Sandnabba, Pekka Santtila & Niklas Nordling, 1999. In: Journal of Sex Research, p. 281) (IMG)

A paper published in the Journal of Homosexuality – which is a publication sympathetic to male homosexuality – showed that the disproportionate majority of individuals engaged in BDSM also showed homosexual/bisexual behaviour or tendencies:

Sexual orientation was evaluated in terms of whether participants self-defined as exclusively heterosexual or bisexual/homosexual. (We were unable to use a more sensitive categorization because we would have had too many cells with expected values of less than 5.) A chi square analysis was significant, ... in that SM participants were overall more likely than non-SM respondents to report bisexual/homosexual orientations. Specifically, 37.0% of the sadists and 47.1% of the masochists, and 67.6% of the switches [i.e. people who were both Sadists and Masochists] and only 18.1% of the control group [i.e. people not engaged in BDSM activity] indicated a non-strictly heterosexual orientation.

It was left up to the participants to define for themselves what constitutes a sexual partner. The sadists, for example, reported numbers from 1 to 1000 sexual partners (M[ean] = 79.3, [Standard Deviation] = 200.8). Thus the mean score did not adequately describe this widely distributed set of responses. Overall sadomasochists reported having had more sexual partners than did the non-SM group. Specifically, sadists (44.0%, n = 11), masochists (38.2%, n = 13) and switches (37.5%, n = 12) all reported more than 15 sexual partners in their lives, in comparison to the group (21.3%, n = 13).

In sum, the sadomasochists in our sample were relatively more likely to be in ongoing relationships than our comparison group, relatively more likely to report bisexual or homosexual proclivities, and tended to report more partners in their sexual histories than the comparison group.

(Understanding Sadomasochism: An Empirical Examination of Four Perspectives, Journal of Homosexuality, Patricia A. Cross (PhD), Kim Matheson (PhD), 2006, pp. 143-144) (IMG)

A 2019 research paper was as follows:

Relationship Between Sexual Orientation and the BDSM Interest

Earlier research mostly included male participants and members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) community, whereas recent research reports on more balanced samples, although men still tend to be slightly overrepresented in BDSM samples recruited online (eg, reference 44, Coppens et al.. This parallels the evolution in the social profile of the (public) BDSM community, because in the 1980s and 1990s, initial clubs were typically part of the gay leather scene. More recently, BDSM-themed clubs seem to attract broader groups of BDSM aficionados. Moreover, the generation of online BDSM-related forums facilitates

interactions with and within the community. This also has significant advantages for research in the field, because it results in a vast increase in the accessibility of the population for research purposes and thereby strongly reduces study population selection bias.

Whereas, in the general population, about 90% declare themselves to be heterosexual, this is the case for only about two-thirds in the BDSM community, with more members self-identifying as being bisexual (23%) or otherwise (17%). Cross and Matheson found almost half of online recruited masochists to be bisexually or homosexually oriented. (...). BDSM-oriented members of the LGBT community also have a significantly higher play frequency than do heterosexuals. Moreover, gay men tended to have a higher ratio of university degrees and primarily held white-collar occupations, whereas the straight respondents held more blue-collar positions (eg, industry and service). Surprisingly, LGBT respondents began their BDSM related activities at a later age compared with their heterosexual peers. Differences were also found in the type of activities they engaged in, because gay men preferred hypermasculine-related activities (use of dildos, anal play) and tended to be more sadistically oriented, whereas heterosexuals rather preferred humiliation-related activities.

(‘Bondage-Discipline, Dominance-Submission and Sadomasochism (BDSM) From an Integrative Biopsychosocial Perspective: A Systematic Review’, Sexual Medicine, Nele De Neef (MD), Violette Coppens (PhD), Wim Huys (MSc), Manuel Morrens (MD, PhD), April-June 2019) (IMG)

Hitler’s fascist regime was full of Sado-Masochists and male homosexuals. Hitler himself said that the German Nazi men, Masochistic as they were, wanted maltreatment:

By all means, punish one or two men, so that these German Nationalist donkeys may sleep easy. But I don’t want the concentration camps transformed into penitentiary institutions. Terror is the most effective political instrument. I shall not permit myself to be robbed of it simply because a lot of, stupid, bourgeois mollicoddles choose to be offended by it. It is my duty to make use of every means of training the German people to severity, and to prepare them for war. (Hitler Speaks, Hermann Rauschning, 1939, pp. 89-90) (IMG)

Describing the German population, Hitler told the former German official and prominent Nazi Party member Rauschning:

Haven’t you ever seen a crowd collecting to watch a street brawl? Brutality is respected. Brutality and physical strength. The plain man in the street respects nothing but brutal strength and ruthlessness – women, too, for that matter, women and children. The people need wholesome fear. They want to fear something. They want someone to frighten them and make them shudderingly submissive. Haven’t you seen everywhere that after boxing-matches, the beaten ones are the first to join the party as new members? Why babble about brutality and be indignant about tortures? The masses want that. They need something that will give them a thrill of horror. (Hitler Speaks, Hermann Rauschning, 1939, p. 89) (IMG)

Indeed, the Nazi project to propagate Sado-Masochism in Germany was very successful. The US intelligence agent Herbert Marcuse reported:

Reliable neutral eye-witnesses were stunned by the evident enjoyment of suffering and sacrifice among the National Socialist youth. There is a hidden truth in the proud declarations of these girls that they love to bear children because they may suffer in doing so, or of these boys that they love to be beaten and killed for the Leader. It is as if this youth has readily responded to Hitler’s dictum that “sufferings and adversities have to be borne in silence”. The point is that the demanded sufferings and sacrifices are conspicuously irrational and unnecessary; they are of a provocative character. The natural attitude of youth in the face of such suffering and sacrifice would be protest and rebellion. National Socialist education has broken this protest and rebellion.... (The State and Individual under National Socialism, Herbert Marcuse, 1941, p. 87. In: ‘Technology, War and Fascism: Collected Papers of Herbert Marcuse’, Vol. 1, Routledge Taylor and Francis, 1st Edition, Herbert Marcuse, First Published 1998, eBook Published on January 14, 2004) (IMG)

The above facts show that there exists a correlation between sodomy, Sado-Masochism, and fascist terror. As mentioned, the link probably is in the form of fascist terrorists seeking severe pain, and sodomy would embody such terrorism and pain. As well, the link likely arises from shared misogynistic attitudes amongst many fascist men. Lastly, homosexuality was used by fascists as a sexual blackmail weapon. Again, none of that is to imply a call to criminalize all male homosexual relations as ‘fascist’, but it is to rather raise vigilance against the links of some male homosexuals to fascist espionage networks and to raise vigilance against the reactionary views likely correlated with anal intercourse between men.

C6S11. Soviet Environmentalism *** IMG-All-{Soviet Environmentalism }

The Anglo-American intelligence documents shed much light on the Soviet projects for ‘saving’ the environment. The CIA reported that the: development of water resources [was] a key element in Soviet doctrine. (Soviet Hydrologic Planning, Engineer Intelligence Study, A Technical Service Intelligence Document, Prepared under the direction of the Chief of Engineers Department of the Army, CIA, October 1959, p. 14) (IMG)

Indeed, Lenin famously advocated for:

the development of hydroelectric power. (Soviet Hydrologic Planning, Engineer Intelligence Study, A Technical Service Intelligence Document, Prepared under the direction of the Chief of Engineers Department of the Army, CIA, October 1959, p. 14) (IMG)

As such, during its first decade, the years:

1917-28 was [dedicated] primarily [to] basic planning and organizing in preparation for future large-scale projects. However, some construction was started to provide the nucleus for the future gigantic schemes. (Soviet Hydrologic Planning, Engineer Intelligence Study, A Technical Service Intelligence Document, Prepared under the direction of the Chief of Engineers Department of the Army, CIA, October 1959, p. 14) (IMG)

During the earlier phases of the socialist construction, some electrical powerplants were built:

In 1921, the first economic plan, known as GOELRO, was introduced, which involved the construction of a series of electric powerplants of limited capacity. (Soviet Hydrologic Planning, Engineer Intelligence Study, A Technical Service Intelligence Document, Prepared under the direction of the Chief of Engineers Department of the Army, CIA, October 1959, p. 14) (IMG)

The second decade of the October Revolution, during the years:

1928-1939 considerable progress was made in the development of water resources. (Soviet Hydrologic Planning, Engineer Intelligence Study, A Technical Service Intelligence Document, Prepared under the direction of the Chief of Engineers Department of the Army, CIA, October 1959, p. 14) (IMG)

Finally, the:

years before World War II were dedicated primarily to experimentation in technical education and training and to the overall study of the hydrologic and economic characteristics of the water resources. (Soviet Hydrologic Planning, Engineer Intelligence Study, A Technical Service Intelligence Document, Prepared under the direction of the Chief of Engineers Department of the Army, CIA, October 1959, p. 14) (IMG)

After Second World War, there was:

a hydrologic survey of the country, showing that previous Soviet water resource development plans had not thoroughly evaluated the water needs for rehabilitating vast areas of the Soviet Union, particularly in Central Asia, and had not given proper consideration to the hydrometeorological changes that had taken place. (Soviet Hydrologic Planning, Engineer Intelligence Study, A Technical Service Intelligence Document, Prepared under the direction of the Chief of Engineers Department of the Army, CIA, October 1959, p. 21) (IMG)

The general survey of these water resources made by Professor Davydov in 1945-48 that water was lacking for the proposed extensive reclamation and irrigation projects. (Soviet Hydrologic Planning, Engineer Intelligence Study, A Technical Service Intelligence Document, Prepared under the direction of the Chief of Engineers Department of the Army, CIA, October 1959, p. 15) (IMG)

As the map indicates, the Eurasian waters in the Soviet Union extended to much of the Soviet Union. However, Central Asia was one of the regions to which the Eurasian rivers did not extend to a significant degree. Part of the concern of Davydov and many Soviet scientists and leaders was that the Central Asian region of the USSR would not be developed. Hence, plans were laid to address this issue.

On November 1948, the British Foreign Office reported on the October 1948 resolution by:

the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), expounding in detail a grandiose plan for the, afforestation of the part of the European part of the U.S.S.R.

(N 12211/599/38, No. 47, Soviet Afforestation Plans, Sir M. Peterson to Mr. Bevin, Received 15th of November. From: British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print, General Editors: Paul Preston and Michael Partridge, Part IV. Series A. The Soviet Union and Finland 1948. Editor: Anita Prazmowska, Vol. 5: Soviet Union and Finland, January 1948-December 1948, p. 258) (IMG)

The Soviet plan, the Foreign Office stated, called for the following:

- (1) The planting of protective forest strips along watersheds, boundaries of crop-rotation fields, gullies and ravines, banks of rivers and lakes, as well as the afforestation and stabilisation of sandy soils.
- (2) A correct organisation of territory by the introduction of rotation grass sowing and fodder crop rotation, as well as rational use of arable land.
- (3) A correct system of soil cultivation, care of growing crops and, first and foremost, the wide application of black fallows, autumn-ploughed land and the breaking up of stubble fields.
- (4) A correct method of applying organic and mineral fertilisers.
- (5) The sowing of selected high-yielding grades of seed adaptable to local conditions.
- (6) The development of irrigation based on the use of local supplies of water by the construction of ponds and reservoirs.

(N 12211/599/38, No. 47, Soviet Afforestation Plans, Sir M. Peterson to Mr. Bevin, Received 15th of November. From: British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print, General Editors: Paul Preston and Michael Partridge, Part IV. Series A. The Soviet Union and Finland 1948. Editor: Anita Prazmowska, Vol. 5: Soviet Union and Finland, January 1948-December 1948, p. 258) (IMG)

Such plans however, were not limited to the European part of the USSR. There was a strong effort to develop the environment of the Asian part of the USSR as well. The resolution gave:

precise details on the extent, location and types of trees to be used in the “creation of a system of large State protective forest strips.” These strips, to be cultivated during the years 1950-65, will be designed to overcome the disastrous influence of dust storms on agricultural crops and the erosion of fertile soil in the Volga region, tile North Caucasus and the central black-soil oblasts and to improve the hydrographic and climatic conditions of these regions. The main strip will extend from Saratov to Astrakhan for a distance of 900 kilom., 100 metres wide, along both banks of the Volga. The types of trees planted will include oak, birch, ash, poplar, maple and, in some more southerly localities, acacia, woodbine, tamarisk, eucalyptus....

(N 12211/599/38, No. 47, Soviet Afforestation Plans, Sir M. Peterson to Mr. Bevin, Received 15th of November. From: British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print, General Editors: Paul Preston and Michael Partridge, Part IV. Series A. The Soviet Union and Finland 1948. Editor: Anita Prazmowska, Vol. 5: Soviet Union and Finland, January 1948-December 1948, p. 259) (IMG)

Soviet Professor Dayvdov argued that the:

retention of the present CASPIAN Sea level is absolutely essential for balanced climatic conditions of the southern U.S.S.R. and for the water supply of Soviet Central Asia and Western Siberia. (Soviet Hydrologic Planning, Engineer Intelligence Study, A Technical Service Intelligence Document, Prepared under the direction of the Chief of Engineers Department of the Army, CIA, October 1959, p. 21) (IMG)

Davydov called for:

the comprehensive development of the Arctic rivers and the diversion of surplus water to Soviet Central Asia and the CASPIAN Sea. (Soviet Hydrologic Planning, Engineer Intelligence Study, A Technical Service Intelligence Document, Prepared under the direction of the Chief of Engineers Department of the Army, CIA, October 1959, p. 21) (IMG)

It was regarded by the:

Soviet oceanographers, such as Apollov, Gyul, Shlyamin, and others, [as] ... the only solution for the CASPIAN problem and, in general, for the water shortage problem in Soviet Central Asia. (Soviet Hydrologic Planning, Engineer Intelligence Study, A Technical Service Intelligence Document, Prepared under the direction of the Chief of Engineers Department of the Army, CIA, October 1959, p. 21) (IMG)

Not every aspect of Davydov's plan was accepted:

When published in 1948, the Davydov Plan was considered fantastic, impossible to execute. (Soviet Hydrologic Planning, Engineer Intelligence Study, A Technical Service Intelligence Document, Prepared under the direction of the Chief of Engineers Department of the Army, CIA, October 1959, p. 21) (IMG)

Nevertheless, his:

study led to the formulation of a hydrologic policy based on the overall management of water resources, known as the "Great Stalin Plan for the Transformation of Nature. In 1948, this plan was incorporated into official economy policy by decree. It provides for essential changes in the regime of rivers by means of radical physical changes in the land surface and drainage pattern, transfer of streamflow between watersheds, crop rotation, and reforestation of arid areas. (Soviet Hydrologic Planning, Engineer Intelligence Study, A Technical Service Intelligence Document, Prepared under the direction of the Chief of Engineers Department of the Army, CIA, October 1959, p. 15) (IMG)

In addition, one key aspect of the Davydov Plan was accepted – the Turkmen Canal. According to the CIA,:

Because of the extreme water shortage, however, one feature of the [Davydov] plan, the TURKMEN Canal ... was made part of the Fourth and Fifth 5-Year Plans. (Soviet Hydrologic Planning, Engineer Intelligence Study, A Technical Service Intelligence Document, Prepared under the direction of the Chief of Engineers Department of the Army, CIA, October 1959, p. 21) (IMG)

The Canal was perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the Soviet environmentalist plan. The goal of the construction of the Turkmen Canal was: to carry surplus water from the ARAL sea to the Caspian. It was to be a canal 500-km long following the dry bed of the UZBOY River, which once connected the two seas. (Soviet Hydrologic Planning, Engineer Intelligence Study, A Technical Service Intelligence Document, Prepared under the direction of the Chief of Engineers Department of the Army, CIA, October 1959, p. 23) (IMG)

The Soviet plan was to use the electrical energy generated by the Amu-Darya River flow to pump the River's water into the Turkmen Canal. As a 1953 CIA report remarked:

The main Turkmen canal begins ... 160 km from the Aral Sea. Here the Amu-Darya River (160 miles from the mouth of the Aral Sea) is blocked by a dam forming a reservoir. At the dam a hydroelectric station, the energy of which will be used for pumping the water of the Amu-Darya into the canal, will be constructed. (...) It is calculated that 400-650 cubic cm of water will be pumped from the Amu-Darya into the canal. (The Volga-Don and Main Turkmen Canals, CIA, March 19, 1953, p. 2) (IMG)

Afterwards,:

The canal will go west.... At 400 miles from the beginning, the canal will go along the dried-up bed of the ancient Uzboi River and will follow this riverbed for 700 km. (The Volga-Don and Main Turkmen Canals, CIA, March 19, 1953, p. 2) (IMG)

This was so that water would be flowing through the dried up areas as well.

The irrigation would come from:

the upper part of the Kara Kum desert, which is blocked by two dams with hydroelectric stations ... [and] two big reservoirs. From these reservoirs, from other parts of the canal and from the Takhia-Tasha dam on all sides stretch the irrigation and water supply canals reaching out for a distance of 1200 km and a network of pipelines totaling 1000 km in length. (The Volga-Don and Main Turkmen Canals, CIA, March 19, 1953, p. 2) (IMG)

The Canal would be responsible for the following two sets of regions:

Kara-Kalpak province, the uninhabited parts of the Amu-Darya delta and, below this, the northern district of Turkmen, sometimes called Khoryezum. (The Volga-Don and Main Turkmen Canals, CIA, March 19, 1953, p. 2) (IMG)

The Pre-Caspian plain of southwestern Turkmen. On the west this region is bounded by the Caspian Sea, on the north by the Bolshoy and Maly Balkhan Mountains, on the east by the Kyuren—Dag Mountains and on the south by the Atrek River and the Iranian frontier. (The Volga-Don and Main Turkmen Canals, CIA, March 19, 1953, p. 2) (IMG)

For the first set of regions, the Turkmen Canal was:

calculated to irrigate 800 thousand hectares mainly for medium-fibrous cotton and its companion in crop rotation, alfalfa (its appearance will bring about the possibility of an increase per head in livestock production). (The Volga-Don and Main Turkmen Canals, CIA, March 19, 1953, p. 2) (IMG)

Hence, the Canal was tremendously beneficial for the region's agriculture as well. For the second set of regions listed,:

A large canal branching off from the main Turkmen canal will go [through] this district. On the right side of this district, protected by the Kyuren-Dag Mountains from the Kara-Kum dry summer winds and the cold eastern winter wind, 500 thousand hectares will be irrigated. (The Volga-Don and Main Turkmen Canals, CIA, March 19, 1953, p. 2) (IMG)

Once again, this project would have tremendously benefited the Soviet agriculture, as the CIA suggests:

The climate of the locality plus the availability of water makes it highly favorable for agriculture. Counting the 500 thousand hectares of land which will be irrigated and the land which is already under irrigation, it may well be that not less than one million hectares of land will be planted to cotton in this area. This makes up nearly 60% of all the cotton acreage at the present in the USSR. In this way the construction of the Canal will make possible the irrigation of 1,300,000 hectares of land.... (The Volga-Don and Main Turkmen Canals, CIA, March 19, 1953, p. 2) (IMG)

The socialist scientific central planning system employs technical expertise for planning not just the production of goods but also advancing the conditions of the ecological landscape for the purpose of boosting production.

The Kara-Kum Desert in Turkmenistan would have almost ceased to be a desert. As the CIA report explains:


with the help of the resurrected Uzbek River nearly seven million hectares of the Kara-Kum desert will be supplied with water. (The Volga-Don and Main Turkmen Canals, CIA, March 19, 1953, p. 2) (IMG)

As a feature of the Soviet support for environmentalism, the Turkmen Canal would have expanded forestation in the Soviet Union:

Along both sides of the Main Turkmen canal, its irrigation and drainage canals, along the edges of cases, around the industrial centers and the population points will run a protective wooded covering. These protective wooded strips will have a width of at least two kilometers. (The Volga-Don and Main Turkmen Canals, CIA, March 19, 1953, p. 2) (IMG)

Eventually:

The canal, when ... navigable, will flow into the Caspian Sea.... (The Volga-Don and Main Turkmen Canals, CIA, March 19, 1953, p. 2) (IMG)



DISCHARGE GRAPH OF MAJOR RUSSIAN RIVERS

Map of the Discharge of the Eurasian Rivers (Soviet Hydrologic Planning, Engineer Intelligence Study, A Technical Service Intelligence Document, Prepared under the direction of the Chief of Engineers Department of the Army, CIA, October 1959, p. 37) (IMG)



Labelled/Annotated Map of the Volga Don Development Region. Original map from Google Satellite.



Soviet poster 'We Will Triumph over the Drought!'

By December 28, 1950:

decision of the Council of Ministers of the USSR ... the construction of the Volga Don steam navigation canal was projected. (The Volga-Don and Main Turkmen Canals, CIA, March 19, 1953, p. 1) (IMG)


The goal was to create the sufficient level of the

Water supply [for] the supplying of water for drinking, industrial uses and for the irrigation of large areas of land. (The Volga-Don and Main Turkmen Canals, CIA, March 19, 1953, p. 1) (IMG)


The Volga Don Canal:

begins at Kalach on the upper part of the Don.... (The Volga-Don and Main Turkmen Canals, CIA, March 19, 1953, p. 1) (IMG)

and would stretch all the way till the Tsmilyansk Station, which was located on the Don River, in the Rostov Oblast, West of Stalingrad. At that station, according to the plan, the Don River:



(Untitled', U.S.S.R.: The Main Turkmen Canal, CIA) <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP07-02247R000200180001-0.pdf>



SKETCH OF THE GREAT VOLGA DEVELOPMENT

The Sketch of the Great Volga Development (Soviet Hydrologic Planning, Engineer Intelligence Study, A Technical Service Intelligence Document, Prepared under the direction of the Chief of Engineers Department of the Army, CIA, October 1959, p. 41)(IMG)

is blocked by a dam, 13 km long, made of earth and concrete. The dam has spillways and an electrical power station. Raised 26 meters above its normal level the Don has formed a great reservoir, the "Tsimlyansk Sea," 180 km long and 30 km wide. The Tsimlyansk reservoir will serve the hydroelectric station which has a power production potential of 160,000 kw. Part of this energy will go for the general economic needs of the area.... (The Volga-Don and Main Turkmen Canals, CIA, March 19, 1953, p. 1) (IMG)

As with the Turkmen Canal, another:

part [of the water] will go for irrigation. In the deserts and dry regions of Rostov and Stalingrad provinces 750 thousand hectares are irrigated and two million hectares are supplied with water. (The Volga-Don and Main Turkmen Canals, CIA, March 19, 1953, p. 1) (IMG)

Therefore, the water was to be utilized for irrigating the desert regions:

The irrigation and water supply system, composed of 568 km of canals, forms a canal network on the left bank of the Don. This network operates from the main canal which is 190 km long and which takes water from the reservoir at a rate of 250 cubic meters of water a second. (The Volga-Don and Main Turkmen Canals, CIA, March 19, 1953, p. 1) (IMG)

Another benefit was that:

the navigable depth [of the upper part of the Don River] has been increased by the construction of the Tsimlyansk dam. (The Volga-Don and Main Turkmen Canals, CIA, March 19, 1953, p. 1) (IMG)

Furthermore, transportation by water was facilitated by the water network created. For example:

A steamship, going from the Black Sea, will pass through the Sea of Azov and the Tsimlyansk reservoir to the port of Kalach. (The Volga-Don and Main Turkmen Canals, CIA, March 19, 1953, p. 1) (IMG)

Afterwards, the steamship:

going across three big reservoirs, ... is raised by the locks 44 meters above the Don, and from there (88 meters above Volga) it will go down through nine locks to.... (The Volga-Don and Main Turkmen Canals, CIA, March 19, 1953, p. 1) (IMG)

an area near Moscow.

Exploring each and every single aspect of the project in detail is of course beyond the scope of this chapter. However, to summarize, by 1955, the following:

large hydraulic projects ... were either in operation or nearing completion:

- (1) BALTIC-WHITE Sea (Stalin) Canal...
- (2) Great DNIEPER Development:
 - (a) ZAPOROZH'YE Hydropower Center...
 - (b) KAKHOVKA Hydropower Center...
 - (c) South UKRAINE Canal System...
 - (d) North CRIMEA Canal and Irrigation System...
- (3) Great Volga Development
- (4) OB'-IRTYSH Hydropower Development
 - (a) UST'-KAMAOGOEK Power Development...
 - (b) BUKHTARMA Power Development...

(Soviet Hydrologic Planning, Engineer Intelligence Study, A Technical Service Intelligence Document, Prepared under the direction of the Chief of Engineers Department of the Army, CIA, October 1959, p. 15) (IMG)

However, not every aspect of this project was implemented; much of it was abandoned by the network of Titoist agents who anti-democratically seized power in Moscow in March 1953. Led by Beria and Khrushchev, this Titoist gang set about to dismantle every accomplishment of the Soviet Union in the name of 'fighting Stalinism'. Among the projects that were dismantled by the Titoists since 1953 was the Plan for the Transformation of Nature. A 1954 CIA report stated:

Since Stalin's death in March 1953 and the subsequent reorganization of the little mention has been made of afforestation in the USSR. Presumably, after a large investment in the afforestation of about 2.6 million hectares, the "Stalin Plan for the Transformation of Nature" was dropped along with the Turkmen Canal and other ambitious projects. (Developments in Forestry and Forest Products in the Soviet Bloc, 1953. Office of Research and Reports, CIA September 10, 1954, p. 12) (IMG)

Another 1954 CIA report confirmed:

In addition, in 1953 a number of the grandiose Stalin projects, including the Main Turkmen Canal and the afforestation program, were abandoned as well as other investment projects which were not expected to produce initial returns for several years. (Brief Guide to the Economies of the Soviet Bloc, Provisional Intelligence Report, Office of Research and Reports, CIA, November 5, 1954, p. 20) (IMG)

A year later, another CIA report confirmed:

In November 1953, some work on the small canals was still going on, but the main part of the Chief Turkmen Canal project had been abandoned. Approximately 200 excavators were standing Idle [in Turkmenistan]. (Suspension of the Chief Turkmen Canal Project, CIA, May 16, 1955, p. 1) (IMG)

It further emphasized that the project:

was given up after the death of Stalin in order to concentrate on [other] projects.... (Suspension of the Chief Turkmen Canal Project, CIA, May 16, 1955, p. 1) (IMG)

To be sure, some of the projects did go through. However, some of the key projects were abandoned by this gang of Titoist wreckers.

Chapter 7

C7S1.1. On 'Nation'

The definition of the term 'nation' is more or less the definition which Stalin provided as follows:

A nation is a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture. (Marxism and the National Question, Stalin. MIA)

Essentially, a nation would truly become a nation if its population is 'together', bound by each other linguistically, economically, psychologically, culturally, etc. This use of the term 'nation' was fundamentally necessary for resolving border disputes in general, especially those of the Socialist Soviet Republics (SSRs). For the same reason, according to the above definition of 'nations' by Stalin, no doubt the rise of industrial capitalism directly contributed to the rise of nationhood. The unifications of Italy and Germany came about as a result of the expansion of the productive forces and the decline of the land-thirsty feudal class forces that prevented the reunification of lands. That is why Stalin stated that nations developed further as a result of the rise of industrial capitalism. It was also why the Nazis opposed the rise of the concept of nationhood, for they regarded nationhood as a cultural weapon arising from industrial capitalism, the revolutionary force which rolled back the feudal and slave-owner classes that constituted a contingent of the Nazis' class base. Hitler himself candidly spoke:

The conception of the nation has become meaningless. The conditions of the time compelled me to begin on the basis of that conception. But I realised from the first that it could only have transient validity. The 'nation' is a political expedient of democracy and Liberalism. We have to get rid of this false conception and set in its place the conception of race, which has not yet been politically used up. The new order cannot be conceived in terms of the national boundaries of the peoples with an historic past, but in terms of race that transcend those boundaries. All the adjustments and corrections of frontiers, and of regions of colonisation, are a ploughing of the sands. (Hitler Speaks, Hermann Rauschning, 1939, p. 229) (IMG)

Hitler further stated:

Politics to-day is completely blind without a biological foundation and biological objectives. Only National Socialism has recognised this. My policy ... draws its criteria and its objectives from a complete and comprehensive recognition of the essential nature of life. (Hitler Speaks, Hermann Rauschning, 1939, p. 243) (IMG)

Stalin too said:

Can the Hitlerites be regarded as nationalists? No, they cannot. Actually, the Hitlerites are now not nationalists but imperialists. As ... the Hitlerites ... seized foreign territories and enslaved European nations – the Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, Norwegians, Danes, Netherlanders, Belgians, the French, Serbs, Greeks, Ukrainians, Byelorussians, the inhabitants of the Baltic countries, etc. – and began to reach out for world domination, the Hitler party ceased to be a nationalist party, for from that moment it became an imperialist, predatory, oppressor party. ('Speech on the Twenty-Fourth Anniversary of the October Revolution, to the Moscow Soviet and Representatives of Moscow party and Public Organizations', Joseph Stalin, November 6, 1941. Cited in: A Documentary History of Communism and the World: From Revolution to Collapse, 3rd Edition, University Press of New England, Robert V. Daniels, pp. 88-89. Cited in: The Cold War: Interpreting Conflict through Primary Documents [2 volumes], edited by Priscilla Roberts, p. 105) (IMG{Gestapo Agent Tito})

Hence, for the 'National'-'Socialists', nationality was not the real issue although they initially used that card for their imperialist-fascist agenda. The Nazi agenda was the agenda of the finance capital, which utilized racism as its weapon for driving a wedge amongst proletarians. The Nazis recognized that the concept of nationhood had emerged triumphant as a result of the rise of industrial capitalism which economically crippled the land-hungry feudal landlords and thus paved the way for the unification of lands, such as the ones in Italy. The Nazi ideology's promotion of 'the Germans' was not concerned as much with the German nation, as it was with the German race. In that context, 'nationalism' was a smokescreen for 'racism' and even 'racism' was merely an excuse for the Nazi agents of finance capital and allied reactionary classes.

'Racism' too was a smokescreen for the eventual explicit introduction of tribal barbarism as 'civilization', when the time was ripe. Fascist finance capital accepted no boundaries for reaction. Eventually, in the fantasized case of a fascist global dominance, the Nazis would have denounced racism as 'too progressive' when compared to barbaric tribalism, much as how they aimed to replace so-called 'nationalism' with racism. They would have instead promoted societies styled after the desert tribes – the Mongol barbarians and the pre-Mohammedan Arab Pagan tribes that viciously sought to spill blood and later launched the Ridda Wars. And for such barbaric tribalism of the deserts to rise, most of the world had to be levelled off into deserts, as the low development of the productive forces in the deserts was correlated with the low civilizational advancement and minimality of the progressive classes. When the 1944 AK-commanded rebellion in Warsaw took place,:

'Mein Fuhrer,' Himmler said, 'the timing is unfortunate. But from a historical point of view it is a blessing that the Poles are doing this. We will get through the four or five weeks [it will take] and then Warsaw, the capital city, the brain, the intelligence of this sixteen - to-seventeen-million-strong Polish nation will have been obliterated. This nation, which has blocked our path to the east for seven hundred years and since the first battle of Tannenberg, has always been in the way. Then the historic problem will no longer be a major one for our children, for all those who come after us, or for us either.' Hitler, ever the opportunist, agreed.

He and Himmler drafted the Order for Warsaw that evening. It stands as one of the most chilling documents of the war.

Warsaw was to be razed to the ground - 'Glattraziert' - so as to provide a terrifying example for the rest of Europe. Himmler passed the order on to General Heinz Reinefarth personally. It read: '1. Captured insurgents ought to be killed regardless of whether they are fighting in accordance with the Hague Convention or not. 2. The part of the population not fighting, women and children, should likewise be killed. 3. The whole town must be levelled to the ground, i.e. houses, streets, offices - everything that is in the town.'

In one evening Himmler and Hitler had decided that the entire population remaining in one of great capital cities was to be murdered in cold blood. Then the city — which Himmler referred to as 'that great abscess' — was to be completely destroyed. Hitler had often talked before about the utter destruction of cities — Moscow, Leningrad, Minsk — but this was the first and only time he was actually able to put his insane ideas into practice. Tragically, this order was largely fulfilled.

('Warsaw 1944: Hitler, Himmler and the Warsaw Uprising', Alexandra Richie, p. 3) (IMG{Poland})

The Nazi Pagans' program of systematic mass-destruction, a deliberate step in the path of the desertification of much the world, was a step towards the promotion of desert-based barbaric Pagan tribalism as a replacement for racism. The fact that the Nazis promoted Paganism as a replacement for Judaism and Christianity, along with their systematic destruction programs and the smuggling of tribalist propaganda into the racist propaganda, all overwhelmingly point to this conclusion.

Note as well that a 'nation' is different than 'nationality'. Stalin said that a 'nation is a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, [and] **territory**' (bold and underline added). However, if a national migrates to another country and emerges physically isolated from the 'territory' of own nation, that does not render that national no longer a member of his/her nation. Though physically not within his/her nation, he/she still belongs to that nation and has the nationality of that nation. The fact that there is a massive Kurdish diaspora in Europe, separate from the main zones inhabited by the Kurds in the Middle East, does not de-Kurdify those diaspora Kurds, nor does it imply that the Kurds have lost their Kurdish nationality. The Kurdish nation is in the Middle East, but people of Kurdish nationality can be found in different areas of the world such as in Germany. Stalin, a Georgian national, continued to be so 'even' when he was in Moscow. Therefore, the phrases 'stable community of people' and 'formed on the basis of a common ... territory' in Stalin's remark should not sow the misunderstanding that leaving the 'common ... territory' of one's nation means being or no longer being of that nation.

C7S1.2. National Cultures in the USSR *** IMG-All-{National Cultures in the USSR}

The cultures of the nations of the USSR were respected and were allowed to flourish during the Lenin-Stalin era. Even as late as August 1937, the British Foreign Office reported:

Strong national feelings certainly survive in many of the remoter parts of the Soviet Union. In this respect it has been the policy of the Soviet Government, in contrast to their Tsarist predecessors to give an outlet of these feelings in actively encouraging not only the use of native languages, but also the development within certain limits of native arts and culture. (N 4363/250/38, No. 404, Viscount Chilston to Viscount Halifax, Moscow, August 20, 1937, Received: August 27, 1937, Foreign Office (1937-1938), pp. 168-169) (IMG)

An EU-funded research published by the Harvard University Press stated:

Under Stalin, the Soviet Union began to highlight and indeed enforce the national particularities of its peoples, celebrating itself as "the world's first state to institutionalize ethnoterritorial federalism." (THE NAZI-FASCIST NEW ORDER FOR EUROPEAN CULTURE, Harvard University Press, Benjamin George Martin, October 2016, p. 121) (IMG)

Take the example of Latvia. According to an MI6 document:

The Russian language is not being imposed on Latvia: street signs and public notices and instructions are in Latvian, infrequently flanked by the Russian equivalent. Theoretically, Latvian, Russian and German may be used in public and Government offices and our unofficial representative gets on very well with German still his main language. In practice, Russian is almost universally understood in Riga. (N 15687/ 8873/59, Mr. Roberts to Mr. Bevin, Moscow, No. 791 Confidential. October 29, 1945. Received: November 16, 1945. Enclosure in No. 26. Report by Mr. Sharman on a Visit to Riga. October 1945, In: Foreign Office (1945), p. 403) (IMG)

C7S1.3. On the Jewish Autonomous Oblast and the 'Jewish Nation'

Prior to the rise of significantly large Israeli communities in the territory of 'historic Palestine', and prior to the establishment of the Jewish Autonomous Oblast, Stalin, in 'Marxism and the National Question' (1913), pointed out that the 'Jewish nation' could not be real nation due to the language and geographic barriers:

For, I repeat, what sort of nation, for instance, is a Jewish nation which consists of Georgian, Daghestanian, Russian, American and other Jews, the members of which do not understand each other (since they speak different languages), inhabit different parts of the globe, will never see each other, and will never act together, whether in time of peace or in time of war?!

No, it is not for such paper "nations" that Social-Democracy draws up its national programme. It can reckon only with real nations, which act and move, and therefore insist on being reckoned with.

(Marxism and the National Question, Stalin, 1913. MIA)

During the Stalin era, the USSR established the Jewish Autonomous Oblast in the USSR's Far East. The idea originated from individuals like Lenin who supported the call for the autonomy for the Yiddish people, the distribution of propaganda and literature in Yiddish, the satisfaction of the local needs of the communities that were predominantly Yiddish, etc.:

"Autonomy" under the Rules adopted in 1898 provides the Jewish working-class movement with all it needs: propaganda and agitation in Yiddish, its own literature and congresses, the right to advance separate demands to supplement a single general Social-Democratic programme and to satisfy local needs and requirements arising out of the special features of Jewish life. In everything else there must be complete fusion with the Russian proletariat, in the interests of the struggle waged by the entire proletariat of Russia. As for the fear of being "steam-rolled" in the event of such fusion [i.e. the fear of Jews being so assimilated as to not exist anymore and their culture getting extinct], the very nature of the case makes it groundless, since **it is autonomy that is a guarantee against all "steam-rolling" in matters pertaining specifically to the Jewish movement**, while in matters pertaining to the struggle against the autocracy, the struggle against the bourgeoisie of Russia as a whole, we must act as a single and centralised militant organisation, have behind us the whole of the proletariat, without distinction of language or nationality, a proletariat whose unity is cemented by the continual joint solution of problems of theory and practice, of tactics and organisation; and we must not set up organisations that would march separately, each along its own track; we must not weaken the force of our offensive by breaking up into numerous independent political parties; we must not introduce estrangement and isolation and then have to heal an artificially implanted disease with the aid of these notorious "federation" plasters. ('Does the Jewish Proletariat Need an "Independent Political Party"?', Lenin, 1903, MIA. Bold added.)

Language rights are a part of national rights. That the Oblast did not become a union republic does not negate this fact of the Yiddish nationality, for there existed many autonomous oblasts such as the ones for the Ingush and the Chechens which never became union republics. Ineligibility to become a union republic was largely a practical matter, because some nationalities were either too small or far too 'encircled' by other nationalities, thus rendering futile their right to secede or become union republics.

The 'Jewish people' emerged as real nations when they amassed into the same geographic boundaries and began to share a language and culture, such as Hebrew in Israel and Yiddish in the Jewish Autonomous Oblast. Even then, the 'Jewish people' were two nations, the Yiddish nation and the Hebrew nation.

Against this Soviet idea arose two MI6-backed currents: Zionism and Bundism. Both such currents disregarded the importance of a common language as the basis of nationhood, and deliberately mixed up religion, race, culture, etc. The Bundists seem to have behaved even more obsessively than the Zionists in this respect, for they started claiming, much as how they claimed that the believers in the religion of Judaism all over the world were the same 'nation', that Lenin and other atheist comrades in the RSDLP were 'Christians'. Lenin recalled:

It is this task of "organising impotence" that the Bund serves when, for example, it uses such a phrase as "our comrades of the 'Christian working-class organisation.'" The phrase is as preposterous as is the whole attack on the Ekaterinoslav Committee. We have no knowledge of any "Christian" working-class organisations. Organisations belonging to the R.S.D.L.P. have never distinguished their members according to religion, never asked them about their religion and never will—even when the Bund will in actual fact "have formed itself into an independent political party." ('Does the Jewish Proletariat Need an "Independent Political Party"?', Lenin, 1903, MIA)

Like a true tool of the MI6, during the war of liberation against the Nazis, the Menshevik Bund stood by and beheld as the socialist revolutionaries and the Nazis bled each other white. While the Yiddish revolutionaries of the PPR (communist-led) and the Hashomer Hatzair (a pro-Soviet 'Socialist Zionist' movement) were waging the war against the Nazis during the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising,:

The largest Jewish socialist party, the Bund, was much less inclined to use violence. (Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin, Timothy Snyder, p. 283) (IMG)

The above is a quote from Snyder, a scholar affiliated with the CIA's Council on Foreign Relations (CFR).

At a certain time, the British colonial empire promoted Zionism as a counterweight to its German-backed Ottoman rivals. In this plan, the MI6 promoted the myth of the 'Palestinian nation' and separated southwestern Syria, so-called 'Palestine', from mainland Syria. Unfortunately, the majority of the people of 'Palestine' allowed themselves to be deceived by the MI6 propaganda and seriously absorbed the mythical isolation of themselves from original Syria. From then on, unfortunately, the myth of 'Palestine' slowly emerged as a self-fulfilling prophecy, no longer a myth. Later on, having fractured the Ottoman Empire, the MI6 promoted Zionism for a new purpose: as a means of shifting the Yiddish people's centre of gravity away from the Soviet Union and rendering the Yiddish proletarians the subjects of a new regime in MI6-controlled 'Palestine'. While opposing Zionism, the USSR firmly pursued the correct policy of continuing its friendship with the people of Israel. Knowing that a large number of Israelis were 'Socialist Zionists' sympathetic to the dictatorship of the proletariat, the USSR aimed to establish a new socialist revolutionary state in Israel (more on this in C16S6).

C7S2.1. The Opium of the Masses

A religion is a mental cage imprisoning many willing captives. Belief in a religion by nature requires blind faith in specific institutional intermediaries or parameters, vestigial and unnecessary. Despite claims to the contrary by its proponents, religion inherently sanctifies unscientifically-'justified' parameters, promotes sets of commandments in whose alleged 'righteousness' to have absolute faith, and assumes the virtual infallibility of preached words and scripture. What if there exists a 'religion' not containing such unnecessary unscientifically-'justified' parameters in which to believe? Then such a 'religion' is a non-religion.

The religious scholars of a creed may incorporate empirical findings, philosophy, logic, etc. so to support specific beliefs and phrases in the scripture or by the preacher; and though the incorporation of such empirical findings and logic may well contribute to rendering the appearance of religion more 'reasonable', such empirical evidence and logic is a mere augmentation of a religion with science, not a scientific justification for religion the enemy of science. Even if religions repeated word for word all the scientific discoveries, religions are still inherently anti-scientific, for the religious methodology – which rests on faith in the parameters, intermediaries, and commandments – is radically opposed to the scientific methodology. In the following excerpt, Marx was not arguing that the socialist state shall not promote irreligiosity and atheism, but that an individual's belief in irreligious content through a religious methodology is still a religious act:

It follows, finally, that man, even if he proclaims himself an atheist through the medium of the state – that is, if he proclaims the state to be atheist – still remains in the grip of religion, precisely because he acknowledges himself only by a roundabout route, only through an intermediary. Religion is precisely the recognition of man in a roundabout way, through an intermediary. (On the Jewish Question, Marx, 1943. Bold added.)

Indeed, much as how a word-for-word repeat of scientific discoveries by a religion still does not change the fact of the anti-scientific nature of the religious methodology, so too does the use of religious methodology, the blind faith in the intermediary, for arrival to conclusions bearing an irreligious content, constitute a religious act. In the eyes of these mentally imprisoned individuals, ethics cannot be calculated by dialectics and historical materialism but can be 'determined' by the literary interpretations of texts and speeches. For the religious, ethics is a literary analysis rather than a scientific calculation.

C7S2.2. Persuasion, rather than Terror, for Campaign against Religion

The campaign against religion is to be pursued through ideological and cultural persuasion rather than coercion. As early as 1905, Lenin had remarked:

Religion must be declared a private affair. In these words socialists usually express their attitude towards religion. But the meaning of these words should be accurately defined to prevent any misunderstanding. We demand that religion be held a private affair so far as the state is concerned. But by no means can we consider religion a private affair so far as our Party is concerned. Religion must be of no concern to the state, and religious societies must have no connection with governmental authority. Everyone must be absolutely free to profess any religion he pleases, or no religion whatever, i.e., to be an atheist, which every socialist is, as a rule. Discrimination among citizens on account of their religious convictions is wholly intolerable. Even the bare mention of a citizen's religion in official documents should unquestionably be eliminated. No subsidies should be granted to the established church nor state allowances made to ecclesiastical and religious societies. These should become absolutely free associations of like-minded citizens, associations independent of the state. Only the complete fulfilment of these demands can put an end to the shameful and accursed past when the church lived in feudal dependence on the state, and Russian citizens lived in feudal dependence on the established church, when medieval, inquisitorial laws (to this day remaining in our criminal codes and on our statute-books) were in existence and were applied, persecuting men for their belief or disbelief, violating men's consciences, and linking cosy government jobs and government-derived incomes with the

dispensation of this or that done by the established church. Complete separation of Church and State is what the socialist proletariat demands of the modern state and the modern church. (Socialism and Religion, Lenin, 1905)

Unfortunately, during the early years of the Soviet revolution, there were grave crimes committed against religiously-indoctrinated citizens. The Bolsheviks, as mentioned in C4S1, actually curbed many such left-deviationist excesses. By the late 1930s, many of those responsible for such crimes were purged. In fact, the period of the Great Purge actually marked a greater fight for religious freedom, since the demotion and cleansing of the Trotskyites meant lower Trotskyite attacks on religious freedoms. The events are no coincidence. On May 8, 1937, according to an OSS report:

Anti-Religion: Communist Party made known its disapproval of excesses in the fight against religion, suggesting that intensified propaganda should be used instead of overt coercion. (Chronology of Principal Events Relating to the USSR Part I, OSS, September 25, 1945, p. 73) (IMG)

Notice how proximate was the announcement of the Party to the purges. On May 11, 1937, according to the OSS report:

Marshal Tukhachevsky, Vice-Commissar of Defense was demoted to an insignificant post. He was succeeded by Yegorov, Chief of the General Staff. (Chronology of Principal Events Relating to the USSR Part I, OSS, September 25, 1945, p. 73) (IMG)

On May 15, 1937:

Purge: State Prosecutor Vyshinsky intervened in the over-zealous hunt for “wreckers” by local authorities which had resulted in many unjust dismissals and prison sentences. (Chronology of Principal Events Relating to the USSR Part I, OSS, September 25, 1945, p. 73) (IMG)

Having said that, the USSR did not regard all religions as equally good or equally problematic. In fact, certain religious institutions furthered the interests of the imperialist-fascist secret services. The USSR virtually wiped out the Baha’i faith centers, which were hubs for pro-MI6 activities (see C4S1), and, while promoting dialectical materialism against religion in general, launched a campaign to promote Orthodox Christianity and Islam as a counter-weight against the influence of the MI6-backed fascist Vatican influence (see C15S7). Liberal is the view that all religions are equally good or bad. Obviously, while Orthodox Christianity and Islam were supported against the Catholic Church, the USSR also launched campaigns of ideological persuasion to move the peoples of the USSR away from the religions of Islam and Orthodox Christianity onto dialectical materialism. It would take too much space in this book to explain the following fact in detail, and so the evidence will not be presented here: however, it is worth noting that for a brief period of time, the Catholic Church publicly took a stance against Mussolini and the Germanic Pagan Hitler, and during that time period, the Catholic Church was praised by the Comintern and Soviet-affiliated institutions.

C7S3.1. Dialectical Materialism: What the ‘Materialism’ Means

Owing to its highly confusing nature, the terminology of ‘dialectical materialism’ has misled so many into anti-dialectical and anti-materialist conclusions. ‘Dialectical materialism’ therefore deserves a very clear explanation so to eliminate the confusions.

Both ‘mechanical materialism’ and ‘dialectical materialism’ state that all that exists within the context of the laws of the universe is matter; but ‘mechanical materialism’ and ‘dialectical materialism’ have radically different definitions of the word ‘matter’. The ‘mechanical materialist’ definition of ‘matter’ is more or less what one typically thinks of as ‘matter’: entities that have mass, are made out of atoms, can be directly observed, and/or cetera. While dialectical materialism agrees that ‘matter’ as defined by mechanical materialism is a type of ‘matter’ as defined by dialectical materialism, and hence is material, it rejects the narrowing down of the definition of matter to those. **‘Matter’, of the kind defined by dialectical materialism, means nothing but the reality that exists outside of the thoughts.** As such, the term ‘matter’ as defined by dialectical materialism encompasses the ‘matter’ defined by mechanical materialism and used in everyday language, but it is not limited to it. Again, all that ‘matter’ means according to the dialectical materialist definition is the reality out there, the actual existence. In the context of dialectical materialism, the term ‘physical’ basically entails the matter (as defined by dialectical materialism) and the laws of the universe.

From here, in order to more easily distinguish between ‘matter’ as defined by dialectical materialism vs. mechanical materialism, **the term ‘dialectical matter’ will be used to refer to matter as defined by dialectical materialism, and ‘mechanical matter’ to be used for referring to matter as defined by mechanical materialism.**

In the same way, the word ‘materialism’ in the phrase ‘dialectical materialism’ simply means what a non-philosopher would typically think of as the meaning of realism: **that there exists an objective reality outside of the mind, and furthermore that the mind is influenced by the objective reality outside the mind.** The materialism in dialectical materialism is therefore merely a rejection of the idealist view that the objective reality existing outside of one’s mind is mere a delusion, a dream, a series of thoughts produced by the mind of one or more persons. Thoughts, according to dialectical materialism, are all created by the dialectical matter and not vice versa. Mind is created by the dialectical matter. Contrary to the ‘materialism’ in ‘mechanical materialism’, the ‘materialism’ in ‘dialectical materialism’ does not mean that all that exist are entities bearing a mass, made of atoms, impenetrable, directly observable, and/or cetera. The mechanical materialists – who define matter as defined in everyday language, and who state that all that exists is such matter – have thus been so lost in the directly observable, the outer appearances, the transitory and the finite physical objects, that they have been referred to by Engels and some dialectical materialists as ‘metaphysical’. The dialectical materialist definitions of ‘metaphysics’ and ‘metaphysical’ – which refer to the inability to see beyond the outwardly, transient, finite, directly observable physical entities – are therefore virtually the opposite of the mainstream philosophy’s definition of ‘metaphysics’ and ‘metaphysical’. It is also worth noting that dialectical materialism and historical materialism are different kinds of materialisms though dialectical materialism lays the foundation to historical materialism. The materialism of dialectical materialism is concerned with whether or not there is a reality outside the mind, whereas the materialism in historical materialism deals with such historical-material factors (explained in C1S1) as geography, productive forces, means of violence, property relations, etc.

There is much evidence to support the explanation for dialectical materialism, provided thus far. One case in point is the following passage from Lenin’s “Materialism and Empirio-Criticism”:

When the physicists say “matter disappears” they mean that hitherto science reduced its investigations of the physical world to three ultimate concepts: matter, electricity and ether; now only the two latter remain. For it has become possible to reduce matter to electricity; the atom can be explained as resembling an infinitely small solar system, within which negative electrons move around a positive electron with a definite (and, as we have seen, enormously large) velocity. It is consequently possible to reduce the physical world from scores of elements to two or three elements (inasmuch as positive and negative electrons constitute “two essentially distinct kinds of matter”, as the physicist Pellat says—Rey, op. cit., pp. 294-95). Hence, natural science leads to the “unity of matter” (ibid.) — such is the real meaning of the statement about the disappearance of matter, its replacement by electricity, etc., which is leading so many people astray.

“Matter disappears” means that the limit within which we have hitherto known matter disappears and that our knowledge is penetrating deeper; properties of matter are likewise disappearing which formerly seemed absolute, immutable, and primary (impenetrability, inertia, mass, etc.) and which are now revealed to be relative and characteristic only of certain states of matter. **For the sole “property” of matter with whose recognition philosophical materialism is bound up is the property of being an objective reality, of existing outside the mind.**

The error of Machism in general, as of the Machist new physics, is that **it ignores this basis of philosophical materialism and the distinction between metaphysical materialism and dialectical materialism.** The recognition of immutable elements, “of the immutable essence of things”, and so forth, is not materialism, but **metaphysical, i.e., antidialectical, materialism.** That is why J. Dietzgen emphasised that the “subject-matter of science is endless”, that not only the infinite, but the “smallest atom” is immeasurable, unknowable to the end, inexhaustible, “for nature in all her parts has no beginning and no end” (Kleinere philosophische Schriften, S. 229-30). That is why Engels gave the example of the discovery of alizarin in coal tar and criticised mechanical materialism. In order to present the question in the only correct way, that is, from the dialectical materialist standpoint, we must ask: Do electrons, ether and so on exist as objective realities outside the human mind or not? The scientists will also have to answer this question unhesitatingly; and they do invariably answer it in the affirmative, just as they unhesitatingly recognise that nature existed prior to man and prior to organic matter. **Thus, the question is decided in favour of materialism, for the concept matter, as we already stated, epistemologically implies nothing but objective reality existing independently of the human mind and reflected by it.**

But dialectical materialism insists on the approximate, relative character of every scientific theory of the structure of matter and its properties; it insists on the **absence of absolute boundaries in nature**, on the transformation of moving matter from one state into another, that from our point of view is apparently irreconcilable with it, and so forth. However bizarre from the standpoint of “common sense” the transformation of imponderable ether into ponderable matter and vice versa may appear, however “strange” may seem the absence of any other kind of mass in the electron save electromagnetic mass, however extraordinary may be the fact that the mechanical laws of motion are confined only to a single sphere of natural phenomena and are subordinated to the more profound laws of electromagnetic phenomena, and so forth — all this is but another corroboration of dialectical materialism. It is mainly because the physicists did not know dialectics that the new physics strayed into idealism. They combated **metaphysical (in Engels’, and not the positivist, i.e., Humean, sense of the word) materialism and its one-sided “mechanism”,** and in so doing threw out the baby with the bath-water. Denying the immutability of the elements and of the properties of matter known hitherto, they ended by denying matter, i.e., the objective reality of the physical world. Denying the absolute character of some of the most important and basic laws, they ended by denying all objective law in nature and by declaring that a law of nature is a mere convention, “a limitation of expectation”, “a logical necessity”, and so forth. Insisting on the approximate and relative character of our knowledge, they ended by denying the object independent of the mind, reflected approximately correctly and relatively-truthfully by the mind. And so on, and so forth, without end. (Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Lenin. Bold added.)

Lenin also said:

The materialist elimination of the “dualism of mind and body” (i.e., materialist monism) consists in the assertion that the mind does not exist independently of the body, that mind is secondary, a function of the brain, a reflection of the external world. The idealist elimination of the “dualism of mind and body” (i.e., idealist monism) consists in the assertion that mind is not a function of the body, that, consequently, mind is primary, that the “environment” and the “self” exist only in an inseparable connection of one and the same “complexes of elements”. (Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Lenin.)

Again Lenin said:

The fundamental distinction between the materialist and the adherent of idealist philosophy consists in the fact that the materialist regards sensation, perception, idea, and the mind of man generally, as an image of objective reality. The world is the movement of this objective reality reflected by our consciousness. To the movement of ideas, perceptions, etc., there corresponds the movement of matter outside me. The concept matter expresses nothing more than the objective reality which is given us in sensation. (Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Lenin.)

Such remarks by Lenin constituted no innovation. Engels made the same point albeit more briefly:

what we are dealing with here is solely forms of being, of the external world, and these forms **can never be created and derived by thought out of itself, but only from the external world.** But with this the whole relationship is inverted: the principles are not the starting-point of the investigation, but its final result; they are not applied to nature and human history, but abstracted from them, it is not nature and the realm of man which conform to these principles, but the principles are only valid in so far as they are in conformity with nature and history. **That is the only materialist conception of the matter....** (Anti-Duhring, Engels. Bold added.)

One subtle example establishing a clearer boundary between dialectical materialism vs. anti-dialectical materialism vs. idealism is with regards to the relationship between one’s imaginations and the reality outside of the mind. To argue that one can create an object outside the mind (e.g. a cat) merely by imagining such an object outside the mind is to advance an idealist argument. One cannot produce such an object (cat) merely by thinking it. However, consider the following hypothetical case: there is a special process – e.g. highly advanced technology – that ‘grabs’ the electricity in the neurons that make up thought, and channels this electricity to outside of the body, then converts the electrical energy into material pieces that compose the material object (e.g. cat), and thus creates the material entity outside the mind; in this case, stating that thoughts, through this special process described, create the material entity outside the mind, does not contradict dialectical materialism, for it is describing a dialectical-material process, as opposed to one’s thoughts merely on their own ‘creating’ the reality outside the mind. Dialectical materialism recognizes the possibility of ‘strange’ or ‘extraordinary’ phenomenon, so long as the laws of the universe are not disregarded in favor of the idealist view that thoughts by themselves yield the reality outside the mind. An anti-dialectical materialist or a mechanical materialist would not necessarily be willing to recognize the possibility of such a ‘strange’ process of turning the electricity that make up the thoughts into a material object outside the mind.

Having introduced the concept of dialectical matter, a number of its associated concepts shall be hereby introduced. **Dialectical matter is spatio-temporally infinite.** (1) **Dialectical matter has always existed;** some mistake this to mean that dialectical materialism rejects all the different versions of the big bang theory. Actually, saying that dialectical matter has always existed is basic common-sense. After all, logically it would be absurd to claim that ‘for a while’, existence was non-existent and then suddenly, through a special initial first impulse, existence came to exist. It

would be absurd to claim that reality was unreal for a while and then became real. It would be absurd to claim that the ‘something’ came out of absolute nothing. (2) **Dialectical matter will always exist**; this cannot be proven, but it is a fair and completely logical assumption, much as how the existence of the reality outside the mind cannot be proven, but constitutes a realistic assumption. It would be absurd to think that existence will, through an existing process, cease to exist. Absurd it is to believe that reality, through a real process, suddenly ceases to be real. Absurd it is to delude oneself that everything suddenly becomes absolutely nothing. (3) **Dialectical matter is spatially infinite**; after all, nonsensical it is to believe that there can exist somewhere in which existence is non-existent. In this context, the term ‘spatial’ is not limited to the mere mechanical space measured in centimeters, meters, kilometers, etc. but bears a much broader meaning. (4) **Dialectical materialism also completely reasonably assumes that there are infinitely many knowable things**, and that we cannot ever know everything.

Note also that in the context of dialectical materialism, the term ‘universe’ is sometimes employed synonymous with the term ‘dialectical matter’. Hence, in this context, ‘universe’ – as defined by dialectical materialism – is not limited to that which is ordinarily defined as ‘universe’. By dialectical materialist definition, therefore, the universe is spatio-temporally infinite in all directions, never came to be but rather always existed, exists, never ceases to exist, and bears no boundaries. In the spatio-temporally boundless universe – as defined by dialectical materialism – there arise spatio-temporally limited finite boundaries ordinarily referred to by the mainstream as ‘universe’. That kind of a spatio-temporally finite boundary that the mainstream refers to as ‘universe’ did not necessarily always exist and could possibly have come into existence through the big bang; however, it would still be incorrect to say that the ‘universe’ – as defined not by the mainstream but by dialectical materialism – arose through the big bang.

There are infinitely many spatio-temporally finite entities throughout the spatio-temporally infinite dialectical matter. Owing to the relative character of everything existing within the context of dialectical matter, every spatio-temporally finite entity is connected to everything else. From here, one arrives at the notion of the interconnectedness of all spatio-temporally finite entities. And since there are infinitely many interconnections and since every single thing can be defined in terms of everything else, one arrives at the conclusions that (1) there is a common-denominator substance that constitutes everything, and (2) every single thing is not only a part of an interconnected whole, but is also a part of an integral and unified whole. In other words, all spatio-temporally finite entities are all different detailed manifestations of one single integral unified oneness of being, a unity of dialectical matter. And as dialectical matter is both a oneness and spatio-temporally infinite, it follows that dialectical matter – reality, existence, etc. – is made up of a spatio-temporally infinite oneness.

C7S3.2. ‘God’? / Dialectical Materialism and the Infinite Oneness

Philosophical contemplation more than once about God is a massive waste of time, as it is contemplation on the one hand about a concept devoid of real-life existence and on the other hand contemplation about a series of grand universal concepts far too obviously true to need to be discussed, too trivial for us to think about when we wake up in the morning. Even the following text about God and infinite oneness which I have written, I wrote reluctantly, for I considered philosophical ‘preaching’ about God and God-related concepts a waste of time. Nonetheless, as the topic arises frequently, and due to widespread confusion about the communist stance on it, I was bogged down into writing about it.

The purpose of this section is to use the works of Engels, Lenin, Stalin, and Zhdanov to dispel some of the confusion about the dialectical materialist stance and Soviet stance on ‘God’ and God-related concepts. In this section, it will be concluded that the dialectical materialist stance unequivocally rejects the existence of God but retains as true and factually existent some of the sub-concepts that compose the monotheistic concept of God.

Communist atheism obviously arises out of dialectical materialism. The basic logic of dialectical materialism has already been explained in the previous section. The dialectical materialist theses explained previously are either proven as correct or are very reasonable assumptions. Nonetheless, it would be useful to provide textual support for the claims made about dialectical materialism, not for the purpose of treating the texts as ‘holy writ’, but rather for the historiographical portrayal of the dialectical materialist concepts promoted by Engels and adopted by the Soviet leaders Lenin, Stalin, and Zhdanov. Some of the arguments of dialectical materialism would also need further explanation and so they shall be provided in this section.

Monotheism is an idealist perspective, though of a kind which promotes some dialectical materialist views, especially concerning the spatio-temporal infinity and oneness of being. Forget not the following remarks by Lenin:

Marxism has won its historic significance as the ideology of the revolutionary proletariat because, far from rejecting the most valuable achievements of the bourgeois epoch, it has, on the contrary, assimilated and refashioned everything of value in the more than two thousand years of the development of human thought and culture. Only further work on this basis and in this direction, inspired by the practical experience of the proletarian dictatorship as the final stage in the struggle against every form of exploitation, can be recognised as the development of a genuine proletarian culture. (On Proletarian Culture, Vladimir Lenin, October 8, 1920. Source: Lenin’s ‘Collected Works’, 4th English Edition, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1965, Vol. 31, pages 316-317)

Some left-deviationist tendencies regard everything in monotheism as wrong, and seek to launch a reactionary Maoist ‘cultural revolution’ to destroy its every single component. Dialectical materialism rejects monotheism not because the latter’s every idea is purely false, but because it is a type of idealism. Philosophical idealism itself is not purely wrong, but is rather *largely* wrong as it is an exaggerated and one-sided view of the world. Lenin himself said:

Philosophical idealism is only nonsense from the standpoint of crude, simple, metaphysical materialism. From the standpoint of dialectical materialism, on the other hand, philosophical idealism is a one-sided, exaggerated, *überschwengliches* (Dietzgen) development (inflation, distention) of one of the features, aspects, facets of knowledge into an absolute, divorced from matter, from nature, apotheosised. Idealism is clerical obscurantism. (‘Philosophical Notebook’, Lenin)

Philosophical idealism, as Lenin correctly stated, describes some actual ‘features, aspects, facets of knowledge’ but exaggerates it.

Partially for the same reason as why dialectical materialism rejects the notion that reality (i.e. dialectical matter) is a thought created by the mind, an image imagined by an imaginer, dialectical materialism rejects the existence of a personal, anthropomorphic, and/or humanoid God, for such a supposed personal/anthropomorphic God is like a subjectivity, a mind that imagines the universe and thus ‘creates’ the universe. Note that a personal God includes but is not limited to being a God physically in human form. A personal God is more broadly a God that literally has feelings, thoughts, speech, etc. Communism rejects the belief in such a personal God.

Important questions arise with regards to the communist and dialectical materialist advancement of atheism; according to many schools of spirituality and religion, ‘God’ has two fundamental characteristics: (1) on the one hand, God is a personal God, meaning that it can think, speak, feel, etc.; (2) on the other hand, God is the spatio-temporally infinite entity immanent throughout reality, bringing about the ‘oneness of being’, the entity that links all to all else, the cause of everything and the determinant of fate, and setting the eschatological path for the eventual liberation of humanity.

Surely dialectical materialism and communist atheism reject the first characteristic ascribed to the personal God, and thereby reject the belief in the personal God altogether. However, does dialectical materialist and communist atheism encompass complete disbelief in the second characteristic ascribed to the personal God? In better words, does dialectical materialism reject the belief in the existence of a spatio-temporally infinite oneness? Does it reject belief in the oneness of being, the concept that reality is an interconnected, integral whole? Does it reject the belief that humanity will be eventually liberated? Does it reject belief in any kind of ‘fate’ or ‘necessity’ in nature? No, it does not reject those facts.

In his review of the ‘Past and Present’ by Thomas Carlyle, the British romantic philosopher who had criticized the atheism of the bourgeois era, Frederick Engels was more specific about the kind of ‘atheism’ that dialectical materialism advocates. Engels said:

we have seen what Carlyle calls atheism: it is not so much disbelief in a personal God, as disbelief in the **inner essence**, in the **infinity of the universe**.... (“A review of *Past and Present*, by Thomas Carlyle”, London, Frederick Engels, 1843. Bold added)

Engels then commented:

If however Carlyle’s pantheistic definition of atheism were correct, it is not we [communists] ... who would be the true atheists. (“A review of *Past and Present*, by Thomas Carlyle”, London, Frederick Engels, 1843. Bold added)

Engels, as a top author on dialectical materialism, rejected the disbelief in the ‘inner essence’ and disbelief in the ‘infinity’ of dialectical matter. In his later works, Engels went into greater detail about his dialectical views. **It is the goal of this section, therefore, to clear up the confusion regarding dialectical materialist atheism, and to explain in depth how dialectical materialism promotes the belief in the existence of a ‘spatio-temporally boundless oneness’ – a characteristic ascribed to the personal God – while also rejecting the idealist notion of the existence of a personal God.**

Fundamentally, distinct entities get reduced into a oneness, individual entities are ‘dissolved’ into a universal, finite entities merge and get ‘dissolved’ into an infinity, transitory entities ‘dissolve’ into the eternal. Simultaneously, the oneness ‘un-reduces’ (i.e. the reduction is reversed) to distinct entities, the universal forms the inner essence of the individual entities, the infinite is to be found in the finite, and the eternal is to be found in the transitory. Recall – and for a reminder, refer back to – Lenin’s discussion of the ‘elimination’ of mechanical matter. Therein, Lenin agreed that such a matter can be eliminated, but stated that scientific findings corroborate more and more the fact that dialectical matter is reducible to a uniform oneness. Indeed Lenin said:

Hence, natural science leads to the “unity of matter”.... (Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Lenin)

Describing the foundations of dialectical materialism, Stalin remarked that dialectical matter (‘nature’) is reducible to an integral whole:

Contrary to metaphysics, dialectics does not regard nature as an accidental agglomeration of things, of phenomena, unconnected with, isolated from, and independent of, each other, but as a connected and **integral whole**, in which things, phenomena are organically connected with, dependent on, and determined by, each other.

The dialectical method therefore holds that no phenomenon in nature can be understood if taken by itself, isolated from surrounding phenomena, inasmuch as any phenomenon in any realm of nature may become meaningless to us if it is not considered in connection with the surrounding conditions, but divorced from them; and that, vice versa, any phenomenon can be understood and explained if considered in its inseparable connection with surrounding phenomena, as one conditioned by surrounding phenomena. (Dialectical and Historical Materialism, Stalin, 1938. Bold added. I checked the original Russian version of Stalin’s work; the Russian word for ‘integral’ could be alternatively translated as ‘unified’.)

According to the Soviet view, existence was also infinite. In Lenin’s words:

nature is infinite, but it infinitely exists. And it is this sole categorical, this sole unconditional recognition of nature’s existence outside the mind and perception of man that distinguishes dialectical materialism from relativist agnosticism and idealism. (Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Lenin. Note: in this context, ‘agonistic’ refers more broadly to the refusal to take a position between materialism and idealism.)

Regarding the view that dialectics includes not only the finite but also infinity in space and time, Lenin described this view as “a very interesting, clear and important **outline of dialectics**” [bold original]. In his *The Philosophical Notebooks*, Lenin remarked:

There follows a very interesting, clear and important **outline of dialectics**.

...“Besides generally appearing as contingent, dialectics usually has this more detailed form, that when in respect of any particular object, e.g., the world, motion, point, etc., it is shown that it has any particular determination—e.g. (in the order of the above-mentioned objects) finitude in space or time, presence at this place, absolute negation of space — it is, however, shown further that it has with equal necessity the opposite determination, e.g., infinity in space and time, non-presence at this place, and a relation to space, consequently spatiality. (Conspectus of Hegel’s Science of Logic — Book III (Subjective Logic or the Doctrine of the Notion), Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. Bold original. Underline added.)

However, dialectical materialism holds that spatial and temporal infinity means infinity in all the possible directions. As Engels put it:

Eternity in time, infinity in space, signify from the start, and in the simple meaning of the words, that there is no end in any direction neither forwards nor backwards, upwards or downwards, to the right or to the left. This infinity is something quite different from that of an infinite series, for the latter always starts from one, with a first term. The inapplicability of this idea of series to our object becomes clear directly we apply it to space. The infinite series, transferred to the sphere of space, is a line drawn from a definite point in a definite direction to infinity. Is the infinity of space expressed in this even in the remotest way? On the contrary, the idea of spatial dimensions involves six lines drawn from this one point in three opposite directions, and consequently we would have six of these dimensions....

(Anti-Duhring, Engels)

Furthermore, the oneness is not infinitely expanding, but absolutely infinite in space. This view of the oneness being infinite is also reflected in the rhetoric of Zhdanov as well. Criticizing decadent philosophies smuggled into science, Andrei Zhdanov said that there exists a finite limited sphere in the universe – which is what students of science typically think of and define as the universe – and then there is the ‘actual’ universe which is infinite. In other words, there is the limited ‘pseudo-universe’ (if one may call it such) as part of the infinite, ‘real’ universe – so went Zhdanov’s statement:

Contemporary bourgeois science supplies clericalism and fideism with new arguments which must be mercilessly exposed. We can take as an example the English astronomer Eddington’s theory of the physical constants of the universe, which leads directly to the Pythagorean mysticism of numbers which, from mathematical formulæ, deduces such ‘essential constants’ as the apocalyptic number 666, etc. Many followers of Einstein, in their failure to understand the dialectical process of knowledge, the relationship of absolute and

relative truth, transpose the results of the study of the laws of motion of the finite, limited sphere of the universe to the **whole infinite universe** and arrive at the idea of the finite nature of the world, its limitedness in time and space. The astronomer Milne has even ‘calculated’ that the world was created two billion years ago. It would probably be correct to apply to those English scientists the words of their great countryman, the philosopher Bacon, about those who turn the impotence of their science into a libel against nature. (On Philosophy: Speech at a Conference of Soviet Philosophical Workers, Andrei Zhdanov, 1947. Bold added.)

From here, when applied to the case of the uniform oneness of the universe, dialectical materialism arrives at the overlap of infinity, eternity, and universality on the one hand, vs. finitude, transitoriness, and individuality on the other. Dialectics describes the relationship between infinity-eternity-universality and finitude-transitoriness-individuality. Note what Lenin mentioned here:

the individual exists only in the connection that leads to the universal. The universal exists only in the individual and through the individual. Every individual is (in one way or another) a universal. Every universal is (a fragment, or an aspect, or the essence of) an individual. Every universal only approximately embraces all the individual objects. Every individual enters incompletely into the universal, etc., etc. Every individual is connected by thousands of transitions with other kinds of individuals (things, phenomena, processes), etc. Here already we have the elements, the germs, the concepts of necessity, of objective connection in nature, etc. (‘Philosophical Notebook’, Lenin)

On the other hand, Engels remarked

"We can know only the finite, etc." This is quite correct in so far as only finite objects enter the sphere of our knowledge. But the statement needs to be completed by this: "**fundamentally we can know only the infinite.**" In fact all real, exhaustive knowledge consists solely in raising the single thing in thought from singularity into particularity and from this into universality in seeking and establishing **the infinite in the finite, the eternal in the transitory.** The form of universality, however, is the form of self-completeness, hence infinity; it is the comprehension of the many finites in the infinite. (The Dialectics of Nature, Engels. Bold added.)

These remarks by Engels and Lenin very much apply to such basic truths as $2+2=4$, as they are universally applicable. However, they can also be – and indeed were – utilized to describe the infinite, eternal, and universal uniform oneness and its relation to the finite, transitory, individual entities. In ‘Anti-Duhring’, Engels stated that the distinct entities and dialectically contradictory elements found throughout the world belong, at the most fundamental level, as ‘parts’ of an integral, unified oneness, and that those entities that appear distinct are, upon closer examination of reality, confounded or regarded as one. Engels remarked:

To the metaphysician, things and their mental reflexes, ideas, are isolated, are to be considered one after the other and apart from each other, are objects of investigation fixed, rigid, given once for all. He thinks in absolutely irreconcilable antitheses. “His communication is ‘yea, yea; nay, nay’; for whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil.” [Matthew 5:37. – Ed.] For him a thing either exists or does not exist; a thing cannot at the same time be itself and something else. Positive and negative absolutely exclude one another, cause and effect stand in a rigid antithesis one to the other. At first sight this mode of thinking seems to us very luminous, because it is that of so-called sound common sense. Only sound common sense, respectable fellow that he is, in the homely realm of his own four walls, has very wonderful adventures directly he ventures out into the wide world of research. And the metaphysical mode of thought, justifiable and even necessary as it is in a number of domains whose extent varies according to the nature of the particular object of investigation, sooner or later reaches a limit, beyond which it becomes one-sided, restricted, abstract, lost in insoluble contradictions. In the contemplation of individual things it forgets the connection between them; in the contemplation of their existence, it forgets the beginning and end of that existence; of their repose, it forgets their motion. It cannot see the wood for the trees. (...). **Further, we find upon closer investigation that the two poles of an antithesis positive and negative, e.g., are as inseparable as they are opposed and that despite all their opposition, they mutually interpenetrate.** And we find, in like manner, that cause and effect are conceptions which only hold good in their application to individual cases; but **as soon as we consider the individual cases in their general connection with the universe as a whole, they run into each other, and they become confounded** when we contemplate that universal action and reaction in which causes and effects are eternally changing places, so that **what is effect here and now will be cause there and then, and vice versa.** None of these processes and modes of thought enters into the framework of metaphysical reasoning. (Anti-Duhring, Engels. Bold and Italics added)

Pay special attention to the phrase “... they run into each other, and they become confounded...” The German version of the statement was: *sowie wir den einzelnen Fall in seinem allgemeinen Zusammenhang mit dem Weltganzen betrachten, Zusammengehn, sich auflösen in der Anschauung der universellen Wechselwirkung...* (Anti-Duhring, Engels, German version)

This phrase can alternatively be translated as:

as soon as we consider the individual cases in their general connection with the world as a whole, they merge and dissolve in the perception of the universal interaction... [Underline added]

From this German version of the work, it is clarified that when Engels said that the individual entities “run into each other, and ... become confounded,” he meant that the individual entities “dissolve” into “the world as a whole” and “merge” with it. A mathematical metaphor can describe the infinite oneness with the following simple equation: $1 \times \infty = \infty$. On the other hand, the relationship of the finite individual entity to the infinite universal oneness can be metaphorically represented by: $\frac{1}{\infty} = 0$. Much as how 1 divided by infinity is virtually equal to 0, the “individual cases in their general connection with the world as a whole ... merge and dissolve in the perception of the universal...” That is, the individual entity gets ‘dissolved’ into the universal, the finite gets ‘dissolved’ into the infinite, the transitory gets ‘dissolved’ into the eternal, and the distinct merge and hence ‘dissolve’ into a oneness.

Remember too that as Engels pointed out, infinity in the universe means infinity in all the possible directions, and that dividing infinity by two (or any other number, really) does not take away the infinity in all the directions. For the same reason, Engels pointed out that the assumption – such as in math problems – that an infinite time has a beginning is an assumption (albeit a useful one), that the notion that time is finite at its beginning but infinite for the rest – i.e. a ‘halved infinity’ of time – is again an assumption (a useful assumption). Engels said:

As applied to time, the line or series of units infinite in both directions has a certain figurative meaning. But if we think of time as a series counted from one forward, or as a line starting from a definite point, **we imply in advance that time has a beginning: we put forward as a premise precisely what we are to prove.** We give the infinity of time a one-sided, halved character; but a one-sided, halved infinity is also a contradiction in itself, the exact opposite of an “infinity conceived without contradiction”. We can only get past

this contradiction if we assume that the one [point] from which we begin to count the series, the point from which we proceed to measure the line is any one in the series, that it is any one of the points in the line, and that it is a matter of indifference to the line or to the series where we place this one or this point. (Anti-Duhring, Engels)

Infinity, though, is composed of an infinite number of finites, and hence an infinite number of finites belong to an infinity. The infinite number of individual entities compose the infinite universality, and the infinite interconnections between the distinct entities integrates them into a oneness. Lenin and Engels respectively mentioned that the universal is to be found in the individual entity and that the infinite is to be found in the finite, the eternal in the transitory. Hence according to Lenin, the universal forms the essence of the individual. Owing to the infinity of matter and the ‘unity of [dialectical] matter’, the essence of all reality is the infinite oneness. Here one can already see what Engels meant when he said that “If ... Carlyle’s pantheistic definition of atheism” – which is “disbelief in the inner essence, in the infinity of the universe” – “were correct, it is not we [communists] ... who would be the true atheists.” The unfortunate ones fail to understand the inner essence of the universe, of the uniform oneness which is infinite and eternal. In Engels’s words:

And all unfortunate peoples, like all unfortunate individuals, have answered the question wrongly, **have taken the semblance for the truth, have abandoned the eternal inner facts of the universe in favour of transient outer appearances**, and England too has done this. (“A review of *Past and Present*, by Thomas Carlyle”, London, Frederick Engels, 1843. Bold added)

There is more to dialectics, however. Owing to the relative character of reality, in between the infinitesimally small and the infinitely large, in between the two ‘magnitudes’ in which the uniform oneness can be more clearly observed, there exist the finite, transitory, individual entities. Owing to their relationship to the infinite oneness, these finite transitory individual entities are deeply interconnected. Recall that as Stalin said,:

Contrary to metaphysics, dialectics does not regard nature as an accidental agglomeration of things, of phenomena, unconnected with, isolated from, and independent of, each other, but as a connected and integral whole, in which things, phenomena are organically connected with, dependent on, and determined by, each other.

The dialectical method therefore holds that no phenomenon in nature can be understood if taken by itself, isolated from surrounding phenomena, inasmuch as any phenomenon in any realm of nature may become meaningless to us if it is not considered in connection with the surrounding conditions, but divorced from them; and that, vice versa, any phenomenon can be understood and explained if considered in its inseparable connection with surrounding phenomena, as one conditioned by surrounding phenomena. (Dialectical and Historical Materialism, Stalin, 1938)

Lenin too stated:

There is no doubt that there exists a natural, objective interconnection between the phenomena of the world. (Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Lenin)

Elsewhere, Lenin again stated:

Every individual [thing, phenomenon, process, etc.] is connected by thousands of transitions with other kinds of individuals (things, phenomena, processes), etc. Here already we have the elements, the germs, the concepts of necessity, of objective connection in nature, etc. (‘Philosophical Notebooks’, Lenin)

Note that while Lenin stated that each individual entity is connected in ‘thousands’ of ways to other individual entities, the more precise way to express his point is to say that the connections are infinite, because: (1) the universe is infinitely large with infinitely many processes, transitions, and phenomena, hence infinitely many connections between these; and (2) the above quote from Lenin was when he was describing the existence of the universal in the individual. Thus, the infinitely many connections implies universal and general connections between individual entities. After all, it would be foolish to think that Lenin believed that entities can be connected to one another solely in thousands of ways, and not in millions, billions, ..., or xillions of ways.

Indeed, if it was merely ‘thousands’ of connections, then dialectical matter would be limited, not spatio-temporally infinite. As Engels pointed out, it would be impossible to know all the interconnections of the universe because the interconnections are unlimited, i.e. infinite. He wrote:

The perception that all the processes of nature are systematically connected drives science on to prove this systematic connection throughout, both in general and in particular. But **an adequate, exhaustive scientific exposition of this interconnection**, the formation of an exact mental image of the world system in which we live, **is impossible for us, and will always remain impossible. If at any time in the development of mankind such a final, conclusive system of the interconnections within the world – physical as well as mental and historical – were brought about, this would mean that human knowledge had reached its limit**, and, from the moment when society had been brought into accord with that system, further historical development would be cut short – **which would be an absurd idea, sheer nonsense**. Mankind therefore finds itself faced with a contradiction: on the one hand, it has to gain an exhaustive knowledge of the world system in all its interrelations; and on the other hand, because of the nature both of men and of the world system, this task can never be completely fulfilled. But this contradiction lies not only in the nature of the two factors – the world, and man – it is also the main lever of all intellectual advance, and finds its solution continuously, day by day, in the endless progressive development of humanity, just as for example mathematical problems find their solution in an infinite series or continued fractions. Each mental image of the world system is and remains in actual fact limited, objectively by the historical conditions and subjectively by the physical and mental constitution of its originator. (Anti-Duhring, Engels. Bold added.)

Indeed, describing “the elements of dialectics,” Lenin said that dialectics holds that:

the relations of each thing (phenomenon, etc.) are not only manifold, but general, universal. Each thing (phenomenon, process, etc.) is connected with every other. (‘Philosophical Notebooks’, Lenin)

Explaining the foundations of dialectics, Lenin stated that a core concept in dialectics is:

the entire totality of the manifold relations of this thing [individual entity] to others. (‘Philosophical Notebooks’, Lenin)

The concept of the Oneness of Being, the dialectical view that all of reality can be regarded as a part of a unified whole, is shared by the monotheists but is also misinterpreted by them to render nonsensical contradictions ‘logical’ through the view that God is the ‘divine unifier of the contradictory views’; as a result, from their view, any invalid and illogical statement becomes ‘logical’ when applied to the case of ‘God’ since ‘God’ is ‘the unifier of the Aye and Nay’. This misinterpretation of the Oneness of Being concept, particularly its misapplication to the case of ‘God’, renders it difficult to lift some out of the trap of monotheism. The dialectical concept of the Oneness of Being states that contradictory parts of the universe are all part of an integral unified whole; it obviously does not imply that logical contradiction is logical unification, unlike monotheism which does so imply.

It would be nonsense to think that the infinite universal essential uniform oneness would be mobile, much as it would be ridiculous to say that $2+2=4$ is mobile. However, the finite, transitory, individual parts of dialectical matter are inherently in motion indeed. Even the resting and equilibrating finite entities in the universe are resting and equilibrating in their cases examined narrowly, but upon view in a grander scheme, it emerges that owing to the relative character of reality, even the resting are moving – and hence, directly or indirectly, all dialectical matter is in motion. This is why Engels said:

Motion is the mode of existence of matter. **Never anywhere has there been matter without motion**, nor can there be. Motion in cosmic space, mechanical motion of smaller masses on the various celestial bodies, the vibration of molecules as heat or as electrical or magnetic currents, chemical disintegration and combination, organic life – at each given moment **each individual atom of matter in the world is in one or other of these forms of motion**, or in several forms at once. **All rest, all equilibrium, is only relative, only has meaning in relation to one or other definite form of motion.** (...). Matter without motion is just as inconceivable as motion without matter. Motion is therefore as uncreatable and indestructible as matter itself; (...). A motionless state of matter is therefore one of the most empty and nonsensical of ideas – a "delirious fantasy" of the purest water. (Anti-Duhring, Engels. Bold added.)

The term 'motion', according to Engels, includes the different types of energy. Dialectical materialist philosophy has treated 'motion' as almost synonymous with 'energy':

But the motion of matter is not merely crude mechanical motion, mere change of place, it is heat and light, electric and magnetic stress, chemical combination and dissociation, life and, finally, consciousness. (Dialectics of Nature, Engels)

Throughout 'The Dialectics of Nature', Engels time and time again implied energy as almost synonymous with motion and employed the terms almost interchangeably. One example of this interchangeable use of the terms motion and energy lies in the following context:

But what is the position in regard to change of form of motion, or so-called energy? (Dialectics of Nature, Engels)

Engels was concerned that utilizing the term energy would imply the separation of energy from matter, and thus preferred to broaden the term 'motion' so to more accurately describe his idea. However, energy and motion have been used virtually synonymously in the context of dialectical materialist philosophy. The individual cases observed throughout the universe involve cause and effect; in the scale of the entire infinite universe, every cause is an effect and every effect a cause. The infinitely many finite things, phenomena, etc. are all causally interconnected to one another by infinite ways. Held in the context of the whole infinite universe, cause and effect are confounded. The individual, supposedly separate, cases are 'dissolved' into infinity of the universe, thus becoming parts belonging to an infinite oneness. Such was why Engels said:

cause and effect are conceptions which only hold good in their application to individual cases; but as soon as we consider the individual cases in their general connection with the universe as a whole, they run into each other, and they become confounded when we contemplate that universal action and reaction in which causes and effects are eternally changing places, so that what is effect here and now will be cause there and then, and vice versa. (Anti-Duhring, Engels. Bold added.)

Dialectics indeed holds that universally, there is:

not only the unity of opposites, but the transitions of every determination, quality, feature, side, property into every other. ('Philosophical Notebooks', Lenin)

For the same reason, and as every finite entity has a determinate, universal, and infinite causal relationship to every other finite entity, there arises 'necessity' in nature. To re-quote Lenin:

Every individual [thing, phenomenon, process, etc.] is connected by thousands of transitions with other kinds of individuals (things, phenomena, processes), etc. Here already we have the elements, the germs, the concepts of **necessity**, of objective connection in nature, etc. ('Philosophical Notebooks', Lenin. Bold added)

In the discourse of dialectical philosophy, 'necessity' basically implies fate or destiny, whereas 'freedom' in this context means 'free will'. Engels dedicated an entire chapter of the Anti-Duhring to the question of necessity vs. freedom, so to answer the question of whether or not humans bear any moral responsibility. If free will ('freedom') is to in turn be defined as a subjectivity making a decision beyond the inescapably causally-interconnected reality, such a free will is an idealist construct and is nonexistent. Indeed, as Lenin remarked:

In actual fact, men's ends are engendered by the objective world and presuppose it, — they find it as something given, present. But it seems to man as if his ends are taken from outside the world, and are independent of the world ("freedom"). (The Philosophical Notebooks, Lenin)

To understand this point, imagine the following thought experiment: there is a room inside of which there is a near-complete absence of gravity from outside of the room. The room is completely closed by its walls, and hence devoid of any holes (e.g. windows, doors). Within the room, there lies a vacuum (in the spatial sense) and hence no friction. The only objects that exist in the room are a set number of balls in motion. The balls obviously can bounce on one another and on the walls of the room. In this case, the motion of the balls is determinate, the velocity, acceleration, and direction of each ball is determinate.

The essential idea behind this thought experiment can be applied more broadly to explain the realm of material existence. The tiny material particles all act, react, and interact in a determinate and definitive way – though not necessarily so observably or measurably since the process of human observation/measurement can itself affect the outcome of the interaction of these materials. The tiny material particles interact with one another in a definitive and determinate way, much as how the balls bounce and move in the thought-experiment room in the determinate and definitive way. The behaviour of them all is conditioned by one another, and hence determined. Such interaction causes the formation or transformation of larger and larger material objects, and as such interaction is determinate/definite, the behaviour of the larger and larger material objects is also determinate/definite. It follows that the entire material existence is determinate, and by necessity. Take the simple example of human existence: atoms determinately make molecules, molecules determinately compose cells, and cells determinately bring forth larger biological entities. Molecules also determinately compose the non-biological aspects of the ecosystem. Among such biological beings, there exist humans who have brains. The brains have nerve cells that permit perception, emotion, intuition, reasoning, and other psychological abilities. External and internal stimuli determinately arising out of the determinate interaction of the material particles lead the nerve cells to determinately interact such as to lead to certain determinate behaviours and determinate 'decisions'. Thus, in the most strictly material sense, there is no real free will, provided that free will is defined as freedom from the objective, determinate, definite, and necessary occurrences, from the causally-interconnected reality. Referring to the question of free will ('freedom'), Engels said:

Freedom does not consist in any dreamt-of independence from natural laws.... (Anti-Duhring, Engels)

The finite entities react and interact, yielding changes throughout the universe. From such finite entities, there arise stars and planets, amongst which would come about the Earth. Within the Earth, living beings and sentient beings arise. Through evolution come the sapient sentient beings, humans. Again, humans cannot possibly have free will if free will is defined as independence from the existing reality. If a 'miracle' is to be defined as breaking the laws of the universe, 'miracles' are not possible.

However, if free will is defined as the ability to yield changes through knowledge of necessity, then such a free will by necessity exists, for necessity gave rise to humans and hence gave rise to knowledge and hence to free will. In Engels's words:

Hegel was the first to state correctly the relation between freedom and necessity. To him, freedom is the insight into necessity (die Einsicht in die Notwendigkeit).

"Necessity is blind only in so far as it is not understood [begriffen]."

Freedom does not consist in any dreamt-of independence from natural laws, but in the knowledge of these laws, and in the possibility this gives of systematically making them work towards definite ends. This holds good in relation both to the laws of external nature and to those which govern the bodily and mental existence of men themselves – two classes of laws which we can separate from each other at most only in thought but not in reality. Freedom of the will therefore means nothing but the capacity to make decisions with knowledge of the subject. Therefore the freer a man's judgment is in relation to a definite question, the greater is the necessity with which the content of this judgment will be determined; while the uncertainty, founded on ignorance, which seems to make an arbitrary choice among many different and conflicting possible decisions, shows precisely by this that it is not free, that it is controlled by the very object it should itself control. Freedom therefore consists in the control over ourselves and over external nature, a control founded on knowledge of natural necessity; it is therefore necessarily a product of historical development. The first men who separated themselves from the animal kingdom were in all essentials as unfree as the animals themselves, but each step forward in the field of culture was a step towards freedom. On the threshold of human history stands the discovery that mechanical motion can be transformed into heat: the production of fire by friction; at the close of the development so far gone through stands the discovery that heat can be transformed into mechanical motion: the steam-engine. – And, in spite of the gigantic liberating revolution in the social world which the steam-engine is carrying through, and which is not yet half completed, it is beyond all doubt that the generation of fire by friction has had an even greater effect on the liberation of mankind. For the generation of fire by friction gave man for the first time control over one of the forces of nature, and thereby separated him for ever from the animal kingdom. The steam-engine will never bring about such a mighty leap forward in human development, however important it may seem in our eyes as representing all those immense productive forces dependent on it – forces which alone make possible a state of society in which there are no longer class distinctions or anxiety over the means of subsistence for the individual, and in which for the first time there can be talk of real human freedom, of an existence in harmony with the laws of nature that have become known. But how young the whole of human history still is, and how ridiculous it would be to attempt to ascribe any absolute validity to our present views, is evident from the simple fact that all past history can be characterised as the history of the epoch from the practical discovery of the transformation of mechanical motion into heat up to that of the transformation of heat into mechanical motion.

(Anti-Duhring, Engels)

The same kinds of points are to be seen by Lenin in his 'Materialism and Empirio-Criticism'. Even when the second definition of free will (i.e. human knowledge of natural laws and the choice to yield changes through them) becomes a reality through the rise of sapient sentient beings, the first definition of free will (i.e. total or partial independence from reality) would not and cannot possibly be a reality. Lenin summarized this fact in the following statement:

necessity does not disappear, when it becomes freedom.... (The Philosophical Notebooks, Lenin)

Assuming a future for humanity, no doubt the future will be a communist one. However, the transition to communism, firstly requires the continued existence of humanity and the exercise of free will (as in the second definition of free will) by humans, a conscious effort by the collective of conscious human decision-makers, in a struggle led by the proletariat. Failure to understand that communism is not predetermined, and that communism will not happen on its own in a self-moving manner, can lead one to all kinds of left- and right- deviations and revisionisms. It can mislead individuals into not struggling for communism, under the assumption that communism will happen no matter what. This existence of free will (of the second definition) is what gives humans moral responsibility. As such, fatalism is absolutely correct if the first definition of free will is to be used and very incorrect if the second definition is to be used. If the second definition of free will is to be used, humans exercise their free will but do so within the context of their historical-material conditions explained in C1S1, conditions that limit or empower one, depending on how they are utilized. Hence, by the existence of an infinite uniform oneness, there comes about the inner essence of the finite entities, and due to the infinite uniform oneness, there exists an interconnection, especially a causal interconnection, between the infinitely many finite entities, the result of such causal interconnection being the necessity of nature, which in turn gives rise to second-definition 'free will'.

Note the conclusions arrived at thus far: there exists a oneness, spatio-temporally infinite, universal, formative of the inner essence within, and yielding the particular spatio-temporally finite entities throughout a spatio-temporally infinite universe. Such a oneness serves as the interconnector of the particular spatio-temporally finite entities, through the causal interconnection of these finite entities automatically yields necessity in nature, and through the causal interconnection of these finite entities brings about the natural processes, evolution, and the rise of human beings as species. Then, via the objectively-arising historical-material conditions, dialectical contradictions, and second-definition 'free will', there comes historical materialism and the processes of class struggles that serve to move humanity towards a communist outcome. In the beginning of this section, the following questions were asked: does dialectical materialist and communist atheism encompass disbelief in the existence of a spatio-temporally infinite oneness? Does it reject belief in the oneness of being, the concept that reality is an interconnected, integral whole? Does it reject the belief that humanity will be eventually liberated? Does it reject belief in any kind of 'fate' or 'necessity' in nature? As has been shown here, the answer to these questions is: no.

C7S3.3. From Dialectical Materialism onto Historical Materialism

The dialectical materialist concept of the spatio-temporally infinite oneness obviously deals with the extremities of the universe as a whole, as opposed to the societal events on planet Earth. **In between the extremely/infinately large and the extremely/infinately small scopes, metaphysical thinking (as defined by Engels) actually starts to make more sense and becomes necessary for historical materialist analyses.** When observed from an extremely large or extremely small scope, dialectical matter is a oneness; however, when observed in between in a scope that lies in between the

extremely large and extremely small scopes, the distinct parts that make up reality would appear; the distinct parts that are separate from one another even though still connected, line up along with or against each other, and hence the dialectical conflicts emerge. With the emergence of humans, the dialectical conflicts take the form of historical conflicts to be analyzed from the lens of the historical materialist science. Recall that Engels wrote:

To the metaphysician, things and their mental reflexes, ideas, are isolated, are to be considered one after the other and apart from each other, are objects of investigation fixed, rigid, given once for all. He thinks in absolutely irreconcilable antitheses. "His communication is 'yea, yea; nay, nay'; for whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil." [Matthew 5:37. – Ed.] For him a thing either exists or does not exist; a thing cannot at the same time be itself and something else. Positive and negative absolutely exclude one another, cause and effect stand in a rigid antithesis one to the other. (Anti-Duhring, Engels)

After advancing the above point, Engels noted:

the metaphysical mode of thought, **justifiable and even necessary as it is in a** number of domains whose extent varies according to the nature of the **particular** object of investigation, sooner or later reaches a **limit**, beyond which it becomes one-sided, restricted, abstract, lost in insoluble contradictions. (Anti-Duhring, Engels. Bold added.)

Dialectics as applied to historical materialism indeed divides the world into two camps only: the good and the evil, the progressive and the reactionary, the forces that act for imperialism-fascism and the forces that act against it, the forces that move society forward and the forces that seek to halt such a process. Dialectics as applied to historical materialism implies that the enemy of one's enemy is one's friend, the enemy of one's friend is one's enemy, the friend of one's enemy is one's enemy, and the friend of one's friend is one's friend. Dialectics as applied to historical materialism also means that the fundamental class character of statehood in post-feudal societies can be divided into two categories only, in between which there exists nothing: the dictatorship of the proletariat or a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie.

In a scope that lies between the extremely/infinately large and the extremely/infinately small scopes, events throughout the world would not appear as infinitely interconnected. For example, if observed in a scope that lies between the two extremities mentioned, it becomes obvious that prior to the European landing in the Americas, the so-called 'Old World' and the so-called 'New World' were certainly not as connected, and what occurred in the so-called 'Old World' did not necessarily affect what occurred in the so-called 'New World'.

C7S3.4. Anti-Dialectical Atheism

The anti-dialectical atheism promoted by bourgeois thinking – and criticized by Engels – is indeed the kind of atheism that leads to mechanical materialism and absurdism, the dark and decadent mentality of the bourgeois society.

Anti-dialectical atheism rightly rejects the idealistic aspects of monotheism, and hence anti-dialectical atheism in this way 'promotes' materialism. However, anti-dialectical atheism also regards the world as devoid of a oneness of being and devoid of spatio-temporal boundlessness; hence anti-dialectical atheism promotes anti-dialectical materialism, a so-called 'mechanical' materialism, a sort of a materialism that is mixed with absurdism, for it regards the universe as a series of isolated material objects with no meaningful relation to one another whatsoever. And such absurdism, the outright philosophical insanity most famously represented by Albert Camus, is precisely the "despair of the intellect and the truth" which Engels denounced. One way that anti-dialectical atheists save themselves from the outright insanity of absurdist materialism is through existentialism: according to existentialists, the world is meaningless, but it is the individual's mind that gives meaning to it. Already, in this way, existentialism has served as the bridge that takes the anti-dialectical atheist from absurdist materialism onto an idealist pseudo-materialism. This quote from Camus exposes the idealist character of Camus's thinking, when he says that mankind is "the creator" of the universe:

A man devoid of hope and conscious of being so has ceased to belong to the future. That is natural. But it is just as natural that he should strive to escape the universe of which he is the creator. (The Myth of Sisyphus, Albert Camus)

That is not to imply that Camus believed humans were literally the creators of the universe, nor did he officially espouse philosophical idealism. The views he promoted were unofficially idealistic, nonetheless. He de facto made the individual mind the new 'god' of the supposedly 'absurd' universe, and thus went down the path of idealism. Such existentialist idealist pseudo-materialism in turn leads one to two 'solutions' for life: the first one is to take a leap of blind faith and become religious again, so to use religion as a pain-killer against absurdity, having already denounced reason and science. Describing the views of religious existentialists, Camus said:

Now, to limit myself to existential philosophies, I see that all of them without exception suggest escape. Through an odd reasoning, starting out from the absurd over the ruins of reason, in a closed universe limited to the human, they deify what crushes them and find reason to hope in what impoverishes them. That forced hope is religious in all of them. (The Myth of Sisyphus, Albert Camus)

Anti-dialectical atheism leads to religion. However, the hollowness inherent in the religious blind faith only serves to lead back to anti-dialectical atheism. Not for nothing did Engels say that anti-dialectical atheist decadence is inextricably bound to and allied to religion:

Carlyle complains about the emptiness and hollowness of the age, about the inner rottenness of all social institutions. The complaint is fair; but by simply complaining one does not dispose of the matter; in order to redress the evil, its cause must be discovered; and if Carlyle had done this, he would have found that this desultoriness and hollowness, this "soullessness" this irreligion and this "atheism" have their roots in religion itself. ("A review of *Past and Present*, by Thomas Carlyle", London, Frederick Engels, 1843)

Lacking awareness and at the same time faith, man can have no substance, he is bound to despair of truth, reason and nature.... ("A review of *Past and Present*, by Thomas Carlyle", London, Frederick Engels, 1843)

Hence, as Engels pointed out, this anti-dialectical atheism, which is allied to religion, thus causes the:

despair of the intellect and the truth; ("A review of *Past and Present*, by Thomas Carlyle", London, Frederick Engels, 1843)

There is a second 'solution', an irreligious 'solution', to such absurdism: that is to waste time and engage in futile 'struggles'.

Engels too agreed that absurdism leads either to the 'relapse into faith' or into pure, thoughtless (and hence likely futile) practice:

The English have ... merely scepticism; the conclusion of all English philosophising is the despair of reason, the confessed inability to solve the contradictions with which one is ultimately faced, and consequently on the one hand a relapse into faith and on the other devotion to pure practice, without a further thought for metaphysics, etc. ("A review of *Past and Present*, by Thomas Carlyle", London, Frederick Engels, 1843)

It is the duty of all communists to combat such anti-dialectical atheism, and its resultant anti-dialectical deviations. In the words of Engels:

we too are concerned with combating the lack of principle, the inner emptiness, the spiritual deadness, the untruthfulness of the age; we are waging a war to the death against all these things, just as Carlyle is.... ("A review of *Past and Present*, by Thomas Carlyle", London, Frederick Engels, 1843)

C7S3.5. On ‘Souls’

It would be somewhat strange to believe in the existence of ‘souls’ while not believing in the existence of ‘God’. This is why typically, communists would reasonably reject the existence of ‘souls’ in the traditional sense of the term. If by ‘souls’, one refers to things outside of dialectical matter and independent of the laws of the universe, then one can reasonably state that souls do not and cannot exist. The philosophy of dialectical materialism completely reasonably rules out the possibility that anything can exist outside of the context of dialectical matter. There could however be scientific discoveries about, for example, quantum materials and special energy being released by one’s cells after one dies and this special energy would allegedly store information about the person’s life and affect the world after one dies. These kinds of theses in support of the alleged existence of the human soul do not promote the view that something exists outside of dialectical matter and so do not necessarily contradict dialectical materialism. I am not implying that these theses are necessarily correct; I am simply clarifying that the stance against the existence of souls is a stance against the belief that a thing can exist outside of dialectical matter, and that a kind of a ‘soul’ that is described by scientists as existing within the context of dialectical matter does not inherently contradict scientific socialist views on the universe.

In some contexts, the word ‘soul’ is used somewhat symbolically. Marx, Stalin, Zhdanov, and many others sometimes used the word ‘soul’ in the context of referring to a deeper-level/higher-level psyche. Some people who become familiarized with Soviet/communist discourse are sometimes surprised by the use of phrases that would ordinarily be used by theists as opposed to communist atheists. For example, in ‘The Illegal Party and Legal Work’ (1912), ‘The “Disarmament” Slogan’ (1916), and ‘The Prophetic Words’ (1918), Lenin used the phrase ‘thank God’. In the ‘Reply to the Discussion on the Report on “The Social-Democratic Deviation in our Party”’ (November 3, 1926), Stalin used the phrase ‘thank God’. If one glances at the context of that phrase in such speeches, and takes into account the fact that Lenin, Stalin, and many other Soviet officials who used that phrase were clearly atheists, it becomes obvious that such phrases are not used seriously in a theistic/religious sense in Soviet discourse. There can be no doubt that Lenin and Stalin did not believe in such a myth as the ‘existence’ of ‘God’, nor can there be any doubt in these cases, such ‘spiritualist’ and ‘religious’ phrases are not used in the literal sense. By the way, the Trotskyites and Maoist ‘cultural revolutionaries’ who ‘in the sacred name of Lenin’ condemn the non-literal use of theistic phrases should take note of the fact that Lenin non-literally used such phrases.

C7S3.6. Ethics

The beauty of scientific socialist ethics is that it turns the questions of ethics into questions to be resolved scientifically and strategically. Scientific socialism determines the correct path and the ethical procedures based on dialectics and historical materialism, rather than based on specific ‘sacred’ scriptures or lists of ‘divine’ commandments. Through dialectics and historical materialism, the policies, strategies, and tactics for the pursuit of progressive objectives can be determined, and so long as the policies, strategies and tactics do materially – and not just superficially – advance the world towards those communist objectives, those policies, strategies and tactics are moral. On the other hand, owing to the dialectically relative nature of the world, those ‘same’ policies, strategies and tactics in other contexts would become reactionary and against morals if they favor the imperialist-fascist reaction and working in a direction opposed to the revolutionary objectives. How does one determine when and where specific policies, strategies and tactics would serve progress vs. reaction? One determines them through a careful observation and study of the dialectical and historical-material laws of the world, and through such an understanding of the laws, one will begin to understand how different forces and factors interact with each other and counteract against one other; this in turn will allow for the determination of the policies, strategies and tactics for the pursuit of specific objectives. Upon determining the strategies and tactics, some – such as MI6 – choose to pursue reactionary objectives, whereas others – like communists worthy of the name – pursue progressive objectives.

At first, giving up dogmatic adherence to scriptural commandments would appear risky, because in the absence of a rigid and dogmatic adherence to a specific scripture, there could grow room for abuse by right-opportunist and liberalizer tendencies. In such contexts, as with all the other struggles, the revolutionaries would be the target of a pincer assault by on the one hand the dogmatic adherents to scripture, and on the other hand by the right-opportunists who seek to liberalize the cause under the guise of ‘fighting dogmatism’. The solution to such a pincer assault though is to ‘ally’ with dogmatic tendencies in order to keep the right-opportunists in check whenever the latter gains too much strength and severely impedes the pace of the revolutionary cause, and then to ‘ally’ with right-opportunists to counteract the influence the dogmatists who seek to impede the revolutionary cause through their fundamentalism.

Another problem that some would have with relying on dialectics and historical materialism instead of a list of scriptural commandments as the basis of morals, is that in the absence of scriptural commandments, one’s psyche would become ‘rootless’ because – the critics allege – there would no longer be a specific set of principles to adhere to. Contrary to what these critics assume, however, dialectics and historical materialism help in discovering the laws of history and hence determine the analytical principles to adhere to in determining the correct path vs. the incorrect path. Hence, dialectics and historical materialism promote both a rigidly principled and a ruthlessly pragmatic attitude towards moral questions. And of course, in this midst, one of the many that unites left-wing dogmatists and right-opportunists is their denial of the existence of such a thing as being simultaneously principled and pragmatic. The open-mindedness resultant from the absence of dogmatic adherence to any scriptural commandments, if combined with a thorough understanding of the historical materialist science and dialectics, will help in devising strategies to undermine the class enemies from channels they least expect, and penetrating enemy strongholds through means unimaginable to them. Insofar as by ‘rootlessness’, the critics would mean the wiping out of one’s cultural background, the critics again have an incorrect assumption, because the Stalin-era USSR waged campaigns against rootless cosmopolitanism and maximized its efforts to preserve the cultures of different nations. Preserving culture and combatting rootlessness was both morally noble and strategically necessary. By contrast, the Nazi secret services, the CIA, the Yugoslav intelligence, the ‘critical theorists’ and ‘modernists’ sponsored by the CIA, and the ‘cultural revolutionary’ Maoist stooges of imperialism actively propagated in favor of rootless cosmopolitanism and the destruction of cultures.

While there are no scriptural commandments for people to follow, there are dialectical and historical-material laws that one has to always take into account for determining the course of action, and there are also virtues that revolutionaries would need to retain as much as possible – virtues such as selfless devotion, ruthlessness towards traitors, utmost vigilance, strategic pragmatism, having a step-by-step approach instead of adventurism, remaining wary of left- and right-deviations, etc. Through all kinds of ways, these ethical virtues too are all rooted in dialectics and historical materialism, and were thus emphasized in the Lenin-Stalin-era USSR.

C7S4. Science in the Soviet Union *** IMG-All-{Soviet Science}

As with everything correct, science was the victim of a pincer assault on the one hand by the liberalizers who sought to 'open up' science to idealism and anti-dialectical views, and on the other hand by extremists who sought to mechanically and dogmatically torture the facts into their phoney 'communist' pseudo-'materialist' ideas.

Undoubtedly, there exist malicious elements in the field of science who seek to question the irrefutable facts of dialectics, such as the interconnectedness of things, the concept of the leap from quantity to quality, etc. An attack on these dialectics is an attack on science and logic, as Engels explained in *Anti-Duhring*. However, there were those who sought to first distort dialectical materialism and then convert it into a religion with which to impose dogma. Science therefore was to be defended against the pincer assault of its enemies.

Generally agreed-upon amongst scientists are the principles of freedom of discussion. In spite of this, left-opportunist elements in the USSR worked to suppress discussion in the academia and impose their ostensibly 'Marxist-Leninist' dogma on scientific inquiry. Against such views, Lenin said in a message to the Soviet Minister of Education Lunacharsky:

"Communism cannot be built without a fund of knowledge, technology, culture, but they are in the possession of bourgeois specialists.

Among them the majority do not approve of the Soviet regime, but without them we cannot build Communism." (Lenin to Lunacharsky.

In: 'The Lysenko Affair', David Joravsky, 1970, p. 27) (IMG)

The Russian Empire's scientists were, in the overwhelming majority, vehemently anti-communist, for most such scientists were intellectuals from bourgeois or feudal family backgrounds. Nonetheless, the Lenin faction undertook measures to retain the scientists inside the Soviet Union so to advance the industry of the proletariat's state, while engaging in purge campaigns against the rest of the reactionary intelligentsia:

The overwhelming majority of scientists were hostile to the new regime, more hostile than they had been to the old regime, but neither side to the conflict could do without the other. With ... joy Lenin exiled religious philosophers and sociologists like Sorokin, but he repeatedly warned his comrades that natural scientists could not be treated the same way, however deviant their politics might be. (The Lysenko Affair, David Joravsky, 1970, p. 27) (IMG)

Western press, however, has specifically ascribed such suppression of discussion and imposition of dogma to Joseph Stalin. Ethan Pollock confirms otherwise. As a fellow of the history of sciences in the George Washington University and of Russian Studies in Columbia University, as well as a scholar of the prestigious "Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences" in Stanford University, Pollock has conducted extensive research on the history of science in the USSR. Financially sponsored by the Woodrow Wilson Center's Kennan Institute, the Columbia University's Harriman Institute, and the US government's Fulbright-Hays, Pollock presented his research in his book "Stalin and the Soviet Science Wars," published by the Princeton University Press. In it, the anti-Soviet scholar concluded that Joseph Stalin intervened in the sciences for no other reason than to **prevent** the imposition of dogma on and suppression of discussions in science. Referring to Stalin, Pollock remarks:

It is, of course, ironic that he would decree from on high the benefits of free and open discussions. But his statements on behalf of "objective" knowledge represent the tentative and awkward first steps toward accepting science as a subject beyond the Party's ideological reach. As a result, the seeds of science's rising prestige in the Soviet Union in the post-Stalin decades were planted during the twilight of Stalin's reign. The process could get under way in earnest only after Stalin's death, when the personal embodiment of the union of ideology and science disappeared. Subsequent Soviet leaders did not share Stalin's compulsion to be an expert in all things. Khrushchev, Brezhnev, and Gorbachev did not assume the label "coryphaeus of science." The Party continued to control decisions about the direction of scientific research and occasionally intervened in scientific disputes, but never with the energy or consistency with which it had done so through the 1940s. By backing away from the sweeping and aggressive claims of that era, it could reestablish its legitimacy on more solid ground. Faith in the objectivity and universality of science became more pronounced. Scientists took advantage of this trend and carved out for themselves "little corners of freedom" and "islands of intellectual autonomy" isolated from Party decrees. That these safe havens germinated during Stalin's time is not easy to reconcile with the brutality and capriciousness of his regime. But even as Stalin dictated fundamental truths, he gradually came to accept scientists' authority to ascertain laws that were beyond human ability to create or control. (Stalin and the Soviet Science Wars, Princeton University Press, Ethan Pollock, 2006, pp. 221-222) (IMG)

Pollock adds that Stalin:

also attacked scientific monopolies and insisted that science could flourish only in an atmosphere of open discussion. He elaborated these contentions in his writings on political economy, declaring that scientific laws were "objective" and universal. Again, he determined that a discussion in which people "argued and tested one another" was the best format for working out the details. Again and again in meetings at the Kremlin, Stalin insisted that political economists were supposed to be scientists, not apologists for the Party's policies. (Stalin and the Soviet Science Wars, Princeton University Press, Ethan Pollock, 2006, pp. 216-217) (IMG)

In his famous interview/article 'Marxism and Problems of Linguistics', Stalin remarked:

It is generally recognized that no science can develop and flourish without a battle of opinions, without freedom of criticism. But this generally recognized rule was ignored and flouted in the most unceremonious fashion. There arose a close group of infallible leaders, who, having secured themselves against any possible criticism, became a law unto themselves and did whatever they pleased. (Marxism and Problems of Linguistics, Joseph Stalin, June 20, 1950, pp. 29-30)

Some would argue that Stalin's call for freedom of discussion and an objective view of science were mere facades of democracy-mindedness covering up his alleged authoritarianism. Against this view, Pollock says the following:

How seriously can we take Stalin's proclamations on behalf of "objective" science and "free and open discussions"? Some historians have questioned whether Stalin wrote his essays at all. That can now be settled definitively. The archives are full of drafts of essays, notes, and editorial comments, all in Stalin's handwriting. Others have suggested that Stalin's articles were motivated by political goals and therefore their content is practically irrelevant. While political infighting and personal vendettas played a role in some battles, Stalin's persistent concern for the details of scholarship suggests that there was more at stake than power politics. Why else would Stalin depend on elaborate, time-consuming, and sometimes unpredictable scientific discussions rather than simply dictate policy? He took himself seriously as a thinker and was clearly pleased that others took him seriously as well. Long after the institutional and personal issues had been settled, he read the countless letters addressed to him and the Central Committee asking for clarifications and elaborations of his ideas. His interest in science was too thorough and consistent across time to be about politics alone. Newly accessible documents

make this all the more clear. They reveal a man more engaged in the substance of the discussions in private than he had appeared to be in public. The issues mattered to Stalin. (Stalin and the Soviet Science Wars, Princeton University Press, Ethan Pollock, 2006, p. 217) (IMG)

In his article, Joseph Stalin goes on to give an example of the abuses made by the “scientific” elites in the academia:

To give one example: the so-called "Baku Course" (lectures delivered by N. Y. Marr in Baku), which the author himself had rejected and forbidden to be republished, was republished nevertheless by order of this leading caste (Comrade Meshchaninov calls them "disciples" of N. Y. Marr) and included without any reservations in the list of text-books recommended to students. This means that the students were deceived a rejected "Course" being suggested to them as a sound textbook. If I were not convinced of the integrity of Comrade Meshchaninov and the other linguistic leaders, I would say that such conduct is tantamount to sabotage.

How could this have happened? It happened because the Arakcheyev regime established in linguistics cultivates irresponsibility and encourages such arbitrary actions.

The discussion has proved to be very useful first of all because it brought this Arakcheyev regime into the light of day and smashed it to smithereens.

But the usefulness of the discussion does not end there. It not only smashed the old regime in linguistics but also brought out the incredible confusion of ideas on cardinal questions of linguistics which prevails among the leading circles in this branch of science. Until the discussion began the "disciples" of N. Y. Marr kept silence and glossed over the unsatisfactory state of affairs in linguistics. But when the discussion started silence became impossible, and they were compelled to express their opinion in the press. And what did we find? It turned out that in N. Y. Marr's teachings there are a whole number of defects, errors, ill-defined problems and sketchy propositions. Why, one asks, have N. Y. Marr's "disciples" begun to talk about this only now, after the discussion opened? Why did they not see to it before? Why did they not speak about it in due time openly and honestly, as befits scientists?

Having admitted "some" errors of N. Y. Marr, his "disciples," it appears, think that Soviet linguistics can only be advanced on the basis of a "rectified" version of N. Y. Marr's theory, which they consider a Marxist one. No, save us from N. Y. Marr's "Marxism"! N. Y. Marr did indeed want to be, and endeavored to be, a Marxist, but he failed to become one. He was nothing but a simplifier and vulgarizer of Marxism, similar to the "proletcultists" or the "Rappists."

(...). N. Y. Marr introduced into linguistics an immodest, boastful, arrogant tone alien to Marxism and tending towards a bald and off-hand negation of everything done in linguistics prior to N. Y. Marr.

(Marxism and Problems of Linguistics, Joseph Stalin, June 20, 1950, pp. 30-31)

Atlantic media has ridiculed Stalin for his article, asserting that Stalin expressed opinions on a topic on which he lacked expertise. Such Atlantic propaganda is of course a blatant distortion. The first paragraph of the article by Stalin was a clear admission that he was “not a linguistic expert” and that he was only specifically talking about the involvement of “Marxism in linguistics”:

A group of younger comrades have asked me to give my opinion in the press on problems relating to linguistics, particularly in reference to Marxism in linguistics. I am not a linguistic expert and, of course, cannot fully satisfy the request of the comrades. As to Marxism in linguistics, as in other social sciences, this is something directly in my field. I have therefore consented to answer a number of questions put by the comrades. (Marxism and Problems of Linguistics, Joseph Stalin, June 20, 1950, p. 3)

In other words, Stalin himself agreed that he was not an expert on linguistics per se, but rather on the involvement of communism, his area of study, in the field of “linguistics, as in other social sciences.” This remark by Stalin unmistakably serves to demonstrate his cautiousness in statements, for caution is a fundamental criteria for scientific behaviour.

In assessing the role of communism in linguistics, Stalin, far from reinforcing the toxically cultish ‘Marxist’ dogma imposed on linguistics, ruthlessly attacked it. In the article, he directly denounced Marr for the latter’s reported left-deviationist drive to forcefully smuggle such communist concepts as ‘superstructure’ and ‘class character’ into linguistics. Asked if it is “true that language is a superstructure on the base,” he answered:

No, it is not true.

The base is the economic structure of society at the given stage of its development. The superstructure is the political, legal, religious, artistic, philosophical views of society and the political, legal and other institutions corresponding to them.

Every base has its own corresponding superstructure. The base of the feudal system has its superstructure, its political, legal and other views, and the corresponding institutions; the capitalist base has its own superstructure, so has the socialist base. If the base changes or is eliminated, then, following this, its superstructure changes or is eliminated; if a new base arises, then, following this, a superstructure arises corresponding to it.

In this respect language radically differs from the superstructure. Take, for example, Russian society and the Russian language. In the course of the past thirty years the old, capitalist base has been eliminated in Russia and a new, socialist base has been built. Correspondingly, the superstructure on the capitalist base has been eliminated and a new superstructure created corresponding to the socialist base. The old political, legal and other institutions, consequently, have been supplanted by new, socialist institutions. But in spite of this the Russian language has remained basically what it was before the October Revolution.

(Marxism and Problems of Linguistics, Joseph Stalin, June 20, 1950, pp. 3-4)

He thus concludes:

N. Y. Marr introduced into linguistics the incorrect, non-Marxist formula that language is a superstructure, and got himself into a muddle and put linguistics into a muddle. Soviet linguistics cannot be advanced on the basis of an incorrect formula.

N. Y. Marr introduced into linguistics another and also incorrect and non-Marxist formula, regarding the "class character" of language, and got himself into a muddle and put linguistics into a muddle. Soviet linguistics cannot be advanced on the basis of an incorrect formula which is contrary to the whole course of the history of peoples and languages.

(Marxism and Problems of Linguistics, Joseph Stalin, June 20, 1950, pp. 31)

As the above quotes demonstrate, Stalin expressed his opinion on specifically the influence of communist concepts in linguistics – and not linguistics in general. Hence, he presented views on a topic which he as the leader of the CPSU maintained a deep understanding of. Furthermore, the comments that he made on the influence of communist concepts in linguistics were aimed at denouncing, rather than reinforcing, the left-deviationist pseudo-communist dogma imposed on the sciences. As Pollock puts it:

his essays on linguistics rejected the notion that all thought was somehow part of either the economic base or the ideological superstructure. (Stalin and the Soviet Science Wars, Princeton University Press, Ethan Pollock, 2006, p. 216) (IMG)

In his drive to combat such dogmatism Joseph Stalin was not alone. In fact:

Other members of the Party and state elite also tried to draw a line between science and ideology. In preparation for the aborted physics conference, the minister of education, Sergei Kaftanov, insisted that there was a distinction between the validity of a scientific concept (which was a matter for scientists to decide) and its philosophical implications (which was a matter for philosophers and the Party.) Stalin pushed the issue further, and in a public forum.... (Stalin and the Soviet Science Wars, Princeton University Press, Ethan Pollock, 2006, p. 216) (IMG)

Hence the evidence shows that Stalin and his comrades in the CPSU, at least in the years after the Great Patriotic War, opposed this petit-bourgeois dogmatism. Contrary to Pollock's claims, however, this stance of Stalin's did not suddenly emerge in the post-war years, but was rather a stance taken well prior to the Great Patriotic War. In 1938:

Stalin delivered one of his rare public speeches on the 17th May on the occasion of the reception given at the Kremlin for representatives of the educational workers of the universities and technical high schools. (N 2740/26/38, Mr. Vereker to Viscount Halifax, Moscow, May 24, 1938; Received: June 7, 1938. No. 254. In: Foreign Officer (1937-1938), p. 360) (IMG)

Detailing Stalin's address to scientists, the British Embassy in Moscow reported:

Stalin said that there had been men of science who, in spite of opposition, had succeeded in breaking down old traditions and creating new ones in their place; such were Galileo, Darwin and Lenin. New paths in science and technical knowledge were often opened up by men completely unknown in the scientific world and without any special scientific qualifications, such as MM. Stakhanov and Papanin. These were the representatives of "go-ahead" Soviet science. In conclusion, M. Stalin proposed the health of "go-ahead" science and of Lenin, Stakhanov, Papanin and their followers. (N 2740/26/38, Mr. Vereker to Viscount Halifax, Moscow, May 24, 1938; Received: June 7, 1938. No. 254. In: Foreign Officer (1937-1938), p. 360) (IMG)

Hence, Stalin spoke out against blind obedience to the academic elites in the field of science, and in favour of the right to scientifically discuss, question, or challenge the dominant paradigms, more than three years before the Great Patriotic War.

One of the points most brought up regarding the freedom of scientific inquiry in this period is the ideas of Trofim Denisovich Lysenko, a prominent figure in Soviet biology until 1952. Through Lysenko, the Western media claims, Stalin outright banned genetics and Darwinism! Such a claim is but a ridiculously blatant myth. Far from banning Darwin's ideas and genetics, Lysenko explicitly endorsed those ideas, despite criticizing aspects of the former. The following quotes by Lysenko are a testament to this fact:

Genetics is an interesting and practically important part of agrobiolgy. It is the science of the regularities of inheritance and variation of plant and animal organisms. The more, and the more truly, we discover these laws, i.e., the better we master in practice the development of the organism, the more quickly and radically we will be able to improve and to adapt living nature, the varieties of plants, the breeds of animals, to the demands of our socialist land.

I do not know of any biologist who has so deeply penetrated the laws of inheritance and variation of plant organisms as I. V. Michurin. He found practical solutions to some of the deepest questions of theory. By this step he got a splendid confirmation of his theoretical assertions. It would be the grossest error to deplore that I. V. Michurin gave us, the Soviet land, only hundreds of good varieties, but not his theory, not the method of their derivation. Michurin wrote many excellent substantial works, which are in constant demand in our country. It is with these works that we must approach that science which is called genetics. The work of the Stakhanovites in animal husbandry, and the experiments of scientific workers disclose the inaccurate basis of Mendelism-Morganism. Moreover it is not a secret even to the representatives of Mendelism-Morganism that if vegetative hybrids are possible, then the only thing left of the so-called Morgan chromosome theory of inheritance is the chromosomes, and the entire theory of Morganism falls to the ground.

(...). No one of us has said or says that the chromosomes do not play a great biological role in heredity. But Morganism-Mendelism forbade studying the biological role of chromosomes. They transformed cytology into cyto-genetics, i. e. instead of studying the cell as such, the Morganists reduced everything to the count and the morphology of the chromosomes alone. The study of the biological role and significance of the chromosomes is a most necessary matter, and as president of the V. I. Lenin Academy of Agricultural Science I am bound to aid it in every way. And it is only on my initiative that the cytologist, comrade Chernoyarov, appeared and spoke at this meeting. For a long time he has been struggling against cyto-genetics, which diverts a science from a genuinely biological understanding and study of the, cell and its constituent parts.

In conclusion, I may say the following: It is in vain that the Mendelian comrades declare that we preach the end of genetics. For our socialist practice, for our agricultural science, and especially important for such an institution as the V. I. Lenin Academy of Agricultural Sciences, genetics is necessary, and we fight for its development.

(Genetics in the Soviet Union: Three Speeches From the 1939 Conference on Genetics and Selection, Science and Society, Volume IV, No. 3, Summer 1940, Marxists Internet Archive, May 2002) (IMG)

The Michurinists, in their investigations, take the Darwinian theory of evolution as their basis. But in itself Darwin's theory is absolutely insufficient for dealing with the practical problems of Socialist agriculture. That is why the basis of contemporary Soviet agro-biology is Darwinism transformed in the light of the teaching of Michurin and Williams and thereby converted into Soviet creative Darwinism. Many problems of Darwinism assume a different aspect as the result of the development of our Soviet agro-biological science, of the Michurin trend in agro-biology. Darwinism has not only been purified of its deficiencies and errors and raised to a higher level, but--in

a number of its principles--has undergone a considerable change. From a science which primarily explains the past history of the organic world, it is becoming a creative, effective means of systematically mastering living nature, making it serve practical requirements. Our Soviet Michurinist Darwinism is a creative Darwinism which poses and solves problems of the theory of evolution in a new way, in the light of Michurin's teaching.

(Soviet Biology – Report by Lysenko to the Lenin Academy of Agricultural Sciences, Trofim Lysenko, The Situation in the Science of Biology (Address delivered by Academician Trofim Denisovich Lysenko at a session of the All-Union Lenin Academy of Agricultural Sciences, 31 July – 7 August 1948); Published: Birch Book Unlimited, 1950; Online Version: Sally Ryan for the T. D. Lysenko Reference Archive (marxists.org) 2002.) (IMG)

Some may argue, possibly correctly, that Lysenko de facto went against the idea of genetics by promoting some incorrect arguments; I am no biologist and can neither confirm nor deny the content of Lysenko's theses but even if the allegation of de facto denunciation of genetics by Lysenko is true, it still remains a fact that genetics was not banned and Lysenko was not blatantly denouncing genetics.

Nonetheless, clashes between different ideas among biologists did occur. On the one hand were those who challenged Lysenko's views; on the other hand, those siding with the prominent Soviet biologist Lysenko made fierce counter-attacks. An example of this has been provided by David Joravsky, a fellow at the Wilson Center from 1977 to 1978, and a trustee of the "National Council of Soviet and Eastern European Research" (NCSEER). The latter organization during those years received funding by the US government, especially the CIA and the military. "Toward the end of 1952," Joravsky wrote.:

N. V. Turbin, who had been dean of biology at Leningrad University since 1948 and one of the most virulent Lysenkoites, published one of the first major criticisms of Lysenko's theory of species formation." (The Lysenko Affair, David Joravsky, August 15, 1986, p. 156) (IMG)

The effects of Stalin's campaign for freedom of speech is clearly reflected in this context. In Joravsky's words:

When the Lysenkoites responded to their critics with savage name calling and demands for suppression, the critics invoked Stalin's words on freedom of criticism and the Lysenkoites were obliged to calm down. (The Lysenko Affair, University of Chicago Press, David Joravsky, August 15, 1986, p. 156) (IMG)

It is also stated that Zhdanov was a dogmatist who sought to 'impose' communist 'dogma' on science. Evidence points to the contrary. At the very least, Zhdanov, in his official rhetoric, denounced dogmatism in the field of natural sciences and quoted Engels in this regard:

Here is a colossal field of activity for our philosophers, who should analyse and generalise the results of contemporary natural science, remembering the advice of Engels that materialism 'with each epoch-making discovery, even in the sphere of natural science... has to change its form...' (On Philosophy: Speech at a Conference of Soviet Philosophical Workers, Andrei Zhdanov, 1947)

Zhdanov opposed attempts to smuggle idealist or mechanical materialist pseudo-science into science. In our era, time and time again, we face the highly dubious attempts by the bourgeoisie to smuggle anti-dialectical and anti-materialist views into science. One example of such an attempt is the attempt by the bourgeoisie to establish pseudo-scientific arguments in support of sodomy.

The bottom line is the following: communism stands for science. If the class enemies of the communist cause try to cheat in their 'scientific' 'inquiries' and smuggle idealism into science, then such smuggling must be fought against and ruthlessly exposed for being pseudo-science. On the other hand, a dogmatic left-deviationist misinterpretation of 'dialectical materialism' shall not be imposed on science.

C7S5. Zhdanov on Big Bang

There exists some confusion on the Soviet stance on the Big Bang. Pay attention to the following quote from Zhdanov:

Many followers of Einstein, in their failure to understand the dialectical process of knowledge, the relationship of absolute and relative truth, transpose the results of the study of the laws of motion of the **finite, limited sphere of the universe** to the **whole infinite universe** [i.e. dialectical matter] and arrive at the idea of the **finite nature of the world** [i.e. dialectical matter], **its limitedness in time and space**. The astronomer Milne has even 'calculated' that the world [i.e. dialectical matter] was created two billion years ago. It would probably be correct to apply to those English scientists the words of their great countryman, the philosopher Bacon, about those who turn the impotence of their science into a libel against nature. (On Philosophy: Speech at a Conference of Soviet Philosophical Workers, Andrei Zhdanov, 1947. Bold added.)

The confusion about the Soviet stance on Big Bang arises out of the fact that Zhdanov used the term 'universe' to describe dialectical matter and used the phrase 'the finite, limited sphere of the universe' in a manner that implied the limited 'sphere' which mainstream science indeed calls 'universe'. In other words, Zhdanov used a different definition of the 'universe' than what one would normally use that term for. In that context, Zhdanov's use of the terms 'universe', 'world', 'nature', etc. all referred to dialectical matter. As mentioned before, the argument – promoted by Zhdanov, Engels, and dialectical materialists in general – that dialectical matter is spatio-temporally infinite is a very reasonable argument even if it cannot be fully 'empirically proven'.

Therefore, contrary to what is often stated, Zhdanov did not rule out Big Bang Theory in general. Rather, he ruled out the view that dialectical matter – not 'universe' as defined by mainstream scientists – was spatio-temporally limited. In doing so, he ruled out the view that dialectical matter had a beginning before which it did not exist, that dialectical matter could come into existence through a Big Bang.

Chapter 8

C8S1. Soviet Peace Offensives *** IMG-All-{USSR and Disarmament}

A document by the Division of International Security Affairs of the US State Department confirmed that even though the Soviets energetically put concrete proposals in every possible occasion for the disarmament, the Soviets were not so naive to expect imperial powers to accept universal disarmament; despite the seriousness in disarmament efforts, the Soviets were pursuing an invitation offensive (see C1S2) so to expose the Wilsonian

hypocrisy of imperialist states who preached disarmament but were not seriously committed to it. The excerpts of the State Department document are as follows:

The Soviet Government from 1921 to 1932 by declaration and participation in international conferences indicated a great interest in the problem of disarmament. At the Moscow Disarmament Conference in 1922, the Fourth and Fifth sessions of the Preparatory Commission for the General Disarmament Conference in 1927-28, and at the First Session of the General Disarmament Conference in 1932, the Soviets, led by M. Litvinoff, presented concrete proposals for immediate and partial disarmament.

In the area of political action the Soviet record appears clear and consistent. On every possible occasion, from the Genoa Conference to the Geneva Arms Conference, the Soviets energetically stressed the urgent need for total disarmament. In the area of political thought, however, where one finds those presumed highly inflexible guides and justifications for political action, derived from the dogma of Marx and Lenin, the Soviet Government appears in a different light in respect to disarmament. The Communists state that disarmament is possible only in a socialized world. Thus they say that all proposals stemming from non-Soviet countries should be viewed as hypocritical gestures for the oppressed masses of the capitalistic states, insincere and meaningless. The Communists state further that any Soviet proposal for disarmament should be considered as a sharp weapon to cut away the camouflage and disclose to the world the insincerity of the capitalist states. All of this is clearly presented in the Resolutions of the Sixth Congress of the Communist International meeting in Moscow in August, 1928.

("THE USSR AND DISARMAMENT 1921-1932", Prepared from public documents by the Regulation of Armaments Branch of the Division of International Security Affairs, SD/A/C.1/366, RAC Ref 1/2, US Department of State, August 1946, p. 1. In: CIA archives.) (IMG)

C8S2.The MI6 Supports Nazi Germany against USSR *** IMG-All-{Britain Attitude to Nazi Military }

The British regard the European theatre as a zone in which to constantly pit the forces against one another: strengthen imperialist Germany as a rival against imperialist France, and then strengthen imperialist France as a rival against imperialist Germany, all the while be splendidly geographically isolated from the rest of Europe and reap the benefits of conflicts between these. From the lens of the MI6, the rise of the USSR meant that a Pan-Europe hostile to French imperialist interests had to be established such that this Pan-Europe would engage in a cold war against the Soviets. Nazi Germany (and later on West Germany) was to be the leader and primary force behind this MI6-backed Pan-Europe. It was during this episode also that the Trotskyite agents of the MI6 boosted their intelligence cooperation with Nazi Germany, although their alliance with the MI6-linked elements of the German secret service dated to several years prior. It was during this period that the British supported every project that the Nazis supported, and opposed every project that the Nazis opposed, in Spain, in Finland, in the Baltics, in Hungary, in Czechoslovakia, in Bulgaria, in Romania, in Iran, in Turkey, in China, etc. It was also during this period, that the imperialist Germany that sought to establish this Pan-Europe, promoted propaganda in favor of rootless cosmopolitanism.

Wesley Wark:

is a visiting professor at the University of Ottawa's Graduate School of Public and International Affairs. He ... retired from the University of Toronto's Munk School of Global Affairs, where he had taught since 1988. He served for two terms on the Prime Minister of Canada's Advisory Council on National Security (2005-2009) and on the Advisory Committee to the President of the Canada Border Services Agency from 2006 to 2010. His most recent book is an edited volume: *Secret Intelligence: A Reader* (2009). He authored a classified history of the Canadian intelligence community in the Cold War and has published extensively in the field of intelligence and security studies over the past 30 years. He is currently completing a book on *Spy Power – a history of intelligence and international relations from 1900 to the present*. His essay on "Cyber-Aggression and its Discontents," appeared in the journal *Global Brief* in its Fall 2012 edition (online at www.globalbrief.ca). Professor Wark writes and comments extensively for the Canadian and international media on issues relating to intelligence, national security and terrorism. (Biography, Wesley Wark, Human Rights Research and Education Center, University of Ottawa) (IMG)

The leading circles in the British military regarded the USSR as the greatest threat, while the Third Reich was assessed as a bulwark against the Bolsheviks. Wesley Clark wrote:

For one thing, German rearmament did not, in the War Office view, make Germany an abnormal state.... Instead, the German General Staff was believed to be engaged in the normal task of trying to achieve adequate national security.... This understanding of the German position led naturally toward the formulation of a second expectation that the goals of German rearmament would be moderate and reasonable. (...). Finally, from the War Office point of view, Germany had an obvious enemy in the U.S.S.R., which was likely to absorb all her military energies. The Soviet Union had, throughout the 1920s, featured in War Office planning because of Britain's traditional concern about Russian threats to the Middle East and the position of India. This concern, along with prevalent anti-Bolshevist attitudes, no doubt encouraged a degree of fellow feeling by the British general staff toward their German counterparts. ('The Ultimate Enemy: British Intelligence and Nazi Germany, 1933-1939'. Wesley Wark, p. 89) (IMG)

War Office attitudes towards Nazi Germany, particularly the tolerant attitude in the MI Directorate toward a German *Drang nach Osten* [meaning 'Drive to the East' or 'Push Eastward'] against the Bolsheviks, may have been loosely shared in some government circles.... ('The Ultimate Enemy: British Intelligence and Nazi Germany, 1933-1939'. Wesley Wark, p. 91) (IMG)

In June 1935:

The most radical and complete expression of the War Office's alternative policy was compiled by Major Whitefoord, head of [the British intelligence service] MI3(b), in a paper entitled "Germany and British Security in the Future." In it, he argued that Britain must avoid a "life and death struggle with Germany which would bring ruination." Instead the [Nazi concept of] *Drang nach Osten* should be allowed to run its course. Whitefoord believed that German expansion in the East would not greatly increase German strength, since "the annexation of purely Slav districts would weaken the racial cohesion of the Reich." Sooner or later, German expansion would bring her into conflict with Russia. Here, Whitefoord reiterated a favorite personal theme: "From a conflict between Germany and Russia, which would probably ruin our two potential enemies in Europe, we have little to lose, and might even gain considerably." Five points from

Whitefoord's twelve-point program for foreign policy, concerned the necessity for Britain to eschew ... commitment ... in Eastern Europe. ('The Ultimate Enemy: British Intelligence and Nazi Germany, 1933-1939'. Wesley Wark, pp. 87-88) (IMG)

Two to three months later, the Director of Military Operations and Intelligence:

General [John] Dill summed up the War Office's outlook in a report of an amiable visit of inspection in Germany in September 1935. The German army, he wrote, "appears to have escaped the danger of political infection ... and is now probably the most important factor in stabilising conditions inside Germany." ('The Ultimate Enemy: British Intelligence and Nazi Germany, 1933-1939'. Wesley Wark, pp. 86-87) (IMG)

Indeed, to the British intelligence service, the Third Reich was seen as a very 'stabilizing force. 'Stabilization' here meant the destruction of the Bolshevik labour movement in particular, and the revolutionary working class struggle in general.

Hence, for the British military staff:

the thirty-six division peacetime strength announced for the army by Hitler was not seen as a strategic threat to the European balance. ('The Ultimate Enemy: British Intelligence and Nazi Germany, 1933-1939'. Wesley Wark, p. 86) (IMG)

Britain's drive towards maintaining a 'European balance' between socialism and barbarism, required the eastward expansion of the German Empire so to bring about the violent clash against the workers' state via the fascist state. This explains why:

The War Office's attitude toward Nazi Germany was not [by any means] a result of defeatist notions about the future of the European balance of power. ('The Ultimate Enemy: British Intelligence and Nazi Germany, 1933-1939'. Wesley Wark, p. 89) (IMG)

With the German army legitimized ... the War Office came under a ... spell of complacency regarding German rearmament. The team of Major General Sir John G. Dill [and] Colonel [Bernard] C. T. Paget [as well as] Major P. G. Whitefoord ... collectively responsible for German intelligence in the War Office during 1933-36, were prepared to be accommodating toward the rebirth of the German army. ('The Ultimate Enemy: British Intelligence and Nazi Germany, 1933-1939'. Wesley Wark, p. 86) (IMG)

In late 1936, the War Office confidently asserted:

that "we have ample evidence to show that the desire for friendship with this country is as strong in Berlin as it is at the German embassy in London, though repeated rebuffs have weakened this impulse and we have lost the best of the opportunities to profit by it." ('The Ultimate Enemy: British Intelligence and Nazi Germany, 1933-1939'. Wesley Wark, p. 88) (IMG)

More than ever before:

the German military attaché in London, Colonel Geyr von Schweppenburg, ... found himself received at the War Office with "hearty good fellowship and plain speaking." ('The Ultimate Enemy: British Intelligence and Nazi Germany, 1933-1939'. Wesley Wark, pp. 86-87) (IMG)

To foster their covert alliance with the Third Reich:

A deal would have to be made, the War Office realized, to convince Germany that Britain would not insist on maintenance of the existing territorial map of Europe. ('The Ultimate Enemy: British Intelligence and Nazi Germany, 1933-1939'. Wesley Wark, p. 87) (IMG)

British Prime Minister Chamberlain shared the vision of the British army staff. To conceal Britain's support for German expansion, Chamberlain and the Empire's military fostered the infamous concept of 'appeasement' with the Third Reich.

The War Office began to search for an alternative foreign policy that would downplay the inevitability of Anglo-German conflict. The results of this search were not impressive. The War Office simply began to echo some of the schemes already circulating in Whitehall for the appeasement of Germany. ('The Ultimate Enemy: British Intelligence and Nazi Germany, 1933-1939'. Wesley Wark, p. 87) (IMG)

As a primary step, the:

War Office ... turned to the idea of bringing Germany back to the League of Nations. ('The Ultimate Enemy: British Intelligence and Nazi Germany, 1933-1939'. Wesley Wark, p. 87) (IMG)

The Director of Military Operations and Intelligence:

General [John] Dill, in a lecture to the annual military attachés conference in June 1936, suggested ... acquiescence in the German annexation of Austria. ('The Ultimate Enemy: British Intelligence and Nazi Germany, 1933-1939'. Wesley Wark, p. 87) (IMG)

Only two years later, in March 1938, under Prime Minister Chamberlain's infamous cloak of 'appeasing' the Third Reich, the British plans for the unification of Austria and Germany would be realized.

C8S2. Rootless Cosmopolitanism: Pan-Europeanist Propaganda and the Cultural War against USSR *** IMG-All-{Nazi Pan-Europeanism }

With the backing of the MI6, Nazi Germany was to expand and establish a Pan-Europe that would contain Soviet influence. For such a Pan-Europe to be established, the Nazis needed to eliminate the sense of nationhood and to promote the concept of the superiority of the German race. Of course, race is not to be confused with nationality, for while the concept of nationality can include the concept of race to some extent, it also includes things like language, cultural advancement, etc. Hitler did pay attention to the importance of language and culture, but insofar as the Nazi propaganda was concerned, his objective was to promote the concept of the 'superiority' of the German race rather than of the German nation.

To the Nazi-era German official Hermann Rauschning, Hitler said:

The conception of the nation has become meaningless. The conditions of the time compelled me to begin on the basis of that conception. But I realised from the first that it could only have transient validity. The 'nation' is a political expedient of democracy and Liberalism. We have to get rid of this false conception and set in its place the conception of race, which has not yet been politically used up. The new order cannot be conceived in terms of the national boundaries of the peoples with an historic past, but in terms of race that transcend those boundaries. All the adjustments and corrections of frontiers, and of regions of colonisation, are a ploughing of the sands. (Hitler Speaks, Hermann Rauschning, 1939, p. 229) (IMG)

Fascism is the open terrorist dictatorship of the most reactionary and most chauvinistic elements of finance capital. Due to its economic basis upon finance capitalism, fascism is founded upon and arising from modern imperialism. However, the ultra-reactionary ideological content of fascism much predates even capitalism and involves feudalism, slavery and tribalism. Such reactionary ideological content is in turn used as a weapon of finance capital for the pursue of imperialist objectives, and for rendering more backwards the countries taken over by finance capital, so that they

grow easier for finance capital to subjugate. The fact that a class base of Nazism was slavery and tribalism means that even the concept of nationhood was far too progressive for them.

The Nazi plans for a Pan-Europe were ones of settler-colonial mastery over Germany's neighbours, and inevitably along with it, the extermination and enslavement of foreign populations. To weaken a colonized nation's morale to resist extinction and enslavement, settler-colonial powers regard it as imperative to destroy the victim country's very sense of nationhood. This explains the Axis efforts to uproot the rich cultures of individual nations in Europe and to replace them with a Pan-European identity.

Joseph Stalin too attacked the myth that the Hitler gang were nationalists, exposing the fact that they were hostile to so-called 'nationalism'. In a 1941 speech, Stalin said:

Can the Hitlerites be regarded as nationalists? No, they cannot. Actually, the Hitlerites are now not nationalists but imperialists. As ... the Hitlerites ... seized foreign territories and enslaved European nations – the Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, Norwegians, Danes, Netherlanders, Belgians, the French, Serbs, Greeks, Ukrainians, Byelorussians, the inhabitants of the Baltic countries, etc. – and began to reach out for world domination, the Hitler party ceased to be a nationalist party, for from that moment it became an imperialist, predatory, oppressor party. ('Speech on the Twenty-Fourth Anniversary of the October Revolution, to the Moscow Soviet and Representatives of Moscow party and Public Organizations', Joseph Stalin, November 6, 1941. Cited in: A Documentary History of Communism and the World: From Revolution to Collapse, 3rd Edition, University Press of New England, Robert V. Daniels, pp. 88-89. Cited in: The Cold War: Interpreting Conflict through Primary Documents [2 volumes], edited by Priscilla Roberts, p. 105) (IMG{Gestapo Agent Tito})

Even the so-called 'nationalism' of the Hitler group prior to the 'reunification' of the German territories was fake, for such as a current as 'nationalism' in its classless meaning bears no material reality and Hitler himself violently betrayed the German nation anyways as explained in C10S7.

'It is necessary to develop', Zhdanov said during the Great Patriotic War,:

the combination of a ... correctly understood patriotism with proletarian internationalism. Stalin made it clear that between internationalism properly understood and proletarian patriotism there can be no contradictions. Rootless cosmopolitanism, which denies national sentiments, and the notion of a fatherland, has nothing in common with proletarian internationalism. This cosmopolitanism makes fertile the soil for the recruitment of spies and foreign enemy agents. (Andrei Zhdanov, May 1941. Quoted in: The Russian Nation in the Twentieth Century, Alexander Ivanovich Vdovin, 2018) (IMG)

Throughout its reign, the Nazi Reich pursued the policy of spreading rootless cosmopolitanism in Europe, in particular, a German-led Pan-Europeanism. The establishment of a German-dominated European Union could serve to strengthen Germany's hand as a bulwark against Soviet power. As early as 1915, Lenin had denounced the imperialist Pan-European idea:

Of course, *temporary* agreements are possible between capitalists and between states. In this sense a United States of Europe is possible as an agreement between the *European capitalists* ... but to what end? Only for the purpose of jointly suppressing socialism in Europe.... (...). Compared with the United States of America, Europe as a whole denotes economic stagnation. On the present economic basis, i.e., under capitalism, a United States of Europe would signify an organisation of reaction to retard America's more rapid development. The times when the cause of democracy and socialism was associated only with Europe alone have gone for ever. (On the Slogan for a United States of Europe, Sotsial-Demokrat, Vladimir Lenin, August 23, 1915, Source: Lenin Collected Works, Progress Publishers, Moscow, Volume 21, pages 339-343. MIA)

The Nazi Reich's project for a European Union was thus a weapon with which the German-led Europe, under the 'New Order' for a 'New Europe', would be able to pursue the conflict with Soviet power. The Pan-European 'international' cultural program were to this end. This is clearly demonstrated by the extensive research done by Dr. Benjamin George Martin who:

From 2010 to 2017 was [the] director of the Euroculture Program, an Erasmus Mundus MA program on contemporary European society, politics, and culture in global perspective. (Biography, Benjamin George Martin, benjaminmartin.com)

As:

A graduate of the University of Chicago (A.B.) and Columbia University (PhD)... since 2010, Martin [has] work[ed] at Uppsala University as researcher in the Department of History of Science and Ideas, with support from a grant from the Swedish Foundation for Humanities and Social Sciences. (Biography, Benjamin George Martin, benjaminmartin.com)

The 'Euroculture' receives the funding of the European Union:

The "Erasmus Mundus Master of Excellence" label has been granted to the Euroculture programme by the European Commission three consecutive times: in 2005, 2011 and 2017. This sign of recognition confirms Euroculture's outstanding quality as a top joint-master programme. (Home/About/Erasmus Mundus. Euroculture: Erasmus Mundus Master of Arts, euroculturemaster.eu)

Published in the Harvard University Press, the EU-funded research shows that Nazi Germany aimed to propagate the idea of a European Union. Indeed, in the eyes of the Nazi leaders, the drive to establish an:

empire in Europe required a New Order for European culture. (THE NAZI-FASCIST NEW ORDER FOR EUROPEAN CULTURE, Harvard University Press, Benjamin George Martin, October 2016, p. 1) (IMG)

A 'New Order' (Neuordnung) for a 'New Europe' (Neuropa) was the officially stated German plan. This plan entailed the creation of Pan-European economic, political, and cultural bloc in which the cultures of nations in Europe vanish in favour of a German-led Pan-European identity. The struggle for the cultural solidarity of Europe towards the formation of 'a German-led European empire' emerged as the German agenda:

Beginning in the mid-1930s and accelerating during the war, Nazi leaders created transnational organizations for European filmmakers, writers, composers, and other intellectuals under the aegis of a German-led European empire. (THE NAZI-FASCIST NEW ORDER FOR EUROPEAN CULTURE, Harvard University Press, Benjamin George Martin, October 2016, p. 4) (IMG)

On the one side, there was the intellectual and high-cultural influence of France that served as a barrier to the Third Reich's drive for cultural dominance over Europe. The Third Reich sought:

to "be leading in the cultural-political field," seizing this position from France. (THE NAZI-FASCIST NEW ORDER FOR EUROPEAN CULTURE, Harvard University Press, Benjamin George Martin, October 2016, p. 1) (IMG)

On the other side, the barrier to the Hitlerite cultural imperialism was the communist vision of proletarian internationalism exemplified by the multi-ethnic USSR and the Comintern, whom the oppressed peoples of Europe regarded as friends against Axis aggression. As such, against the proletarian

internationalism of the USSR and Comintern, was set the fascist ‘internationalism’, the project for the ‘unification’ of Europe under the banner of German colonialism. Spearheading the cultural efforts in this front was Nazi Propaganda Minister Goebbels, who was:

in charge of Nazi propaganda but also of German music, film, literature, and the fine arts.... (THE NAZI-FASCIST NEW ORDER FOR EUROPEAN CULTURE, Harvard University Press, Benjamin George Martin, October 2016, p. 6) (IMG)

Goebbels was responsible for the creation of such ‘international’ organizations as:

the Union of National Writers (founded in 1934), the Permanent Council for International Cooperation among Composers (1934), the International Film Chamber (1935), and the European Writers Union (1941). (THE NAZI-FASCIST NEW ORDER FOR EUROPEAN CULTURE, Harvard University Press, Benjamin George Martin, October 2016, p. 6) (IMG)

One of the key features of this ‘internationalism’ was that it propagated for an ‘international’ ‘unity’ of almost-exclusively European countries, organizations, intellectuals, and artists:

Beginning already in 1934, Germans and Italians reshaped the forums and institutions through which continental cultural elites interacted, recast the legal and economic structures that controlled the transnational market in cultural goods, and redefined ideological attitudes about what “European culture” was or should be. This project – what might be called the soft power of Nazi and fascist imperialism – formed an important element of both regimes’ efforts to achieve hegemony in Europe. It succeeded in mobilizing supporters across the continent. (...). Reworking institutions and ideas in the fields of film, classical music, and literature, the Nazi-fascist cultural New Order marked a crucial episode in the history of the idea, and the reality, of European culture. (THE NAZI-FASCIST NEW ORDER FOR EUROPEAN CULTURE, Harvard University Press, Benjamin George Martin, October 2016, pp. 1-2) (IMG)

The core of this campaign was a sustained effort to remake the international structures of European cultural life, creating a rival network of institutions and individuals from across Europe in a radical right-wing form of international cultural cooperation. Supported by Mussolini and Hitler’s Axis partnership, Germans and Italians used these institutions successfully to rally intellectuals and cultural producers from across the continent around an ultraconservative, nationalist vision of European culture by addressing the practical interests and most deeply held values of national elites throughout Europe. (THE NAZI-FASCIST NEW ORDER FOR EUROPEAN CULTURE, Harvard University Press, Benjamin George Martin, October 2016, p. 4) (IMG)

[T]he totalitarian internationalism of the Nazi-fascist Axis offered the specter of something else: a model of transnational cooperation based on the values of the most intense, aggressive, and racist national spirit. (THE NAZI-FASCIST NEW ORDER FOR EUROPEAN CULTURE, Harvard University Press, Benjamin George Martin, October 2016, p. 7) (IMG)

It was against this background that Nazis and fascists cooperated in cultural institutions which, even when they used the word “international” in their names, pursued Europeanist aims. They gathered almost exclusively European participants, streamlined and standardized intra-European exchanges, and enacted protectionist measures against non-European agents. They articulated a matching set of cultural ideas, aggressively promoting a self-styled European cinema and European literature. This was a cultural order designed to correspond to and support a future European “great space,” integrated and autarchic, suggesting a harmony of interests among its members while ultimately serving Germany’s domination of the continent. As given form by Axis-led institutions, “European culture” played a major role in the practical and ideological construction of an imperial space of political domination and economic exploitation. (THE NAZI-FASCIST NEW ORDER FOR EUROPEAN CULTURE, Harvard University Press, Benjamin George Martin, October 2016, p. 7) (IMG)

Combining a celebration of Europe’s high-cultural values and achievements with a nationalist and anti-Semitic vision of Europe as composed of “pure” national traditions, these and other institutions enacted a cultural model calibrated to appeal to the concerns of conservative elites across the continent. (THE NAZI-FASCIST NEW ORDER FOR EUROPEAN CULTURE, Harvard University Press, Benjamin George Martin, October 2016, p. 6) (IMG)

The Soviets thoroughly understood the Axis motives, and thus fought against the spirit of rootless cosmopolitanism promoted by the Pan-European Nazis. It is for this reason that according to an Israeli scholar, “from the second half of the 1930s” – when the Germans began their Greater Europe project – in the USSR,:

it was increasingly emphasised that cosmopolitanism was an ideology alien to Marxism-Leninism. (The Soviet Government and the Jews 1948-1967, Ben-Gurion University of Negev, Cambridge University Press, Benjamin Pinkus, p. 496) (IMG)

The Soviets attacked rootless cosmopolitanism, the weapon of fascist Pan-Europeanists. The communist anti-fascist threat impeded the Nazi ‘New Order’ plans for a Pan-Europe. Furthermore, the menace of fascism was exposed by the Soviets. ‘Not as a German, but as a European’, Goebbels remarked. The Nazi Propaganda Ministry stepped up its cultivation of the theme of a united Europe engaged in a Crusade against the USSR:

The Germans’ attention to the theme of Europe increased with Hitler’s invasion of the Soviet Union. At Goebbels’s secret daily press briefing on June 27, 1941, he instructed the German press to articulate the changed meaning of the war in continental and cultural terms: “Europe marches against the common enemy in unique solidarity and rises up against the oppressor of all human culture and civilization. This birth hour of the new Europe takes place without demand or coercion from Germany.” (THE NAZI-FASCIST NEW ORDER FOR EUROPEAN CULTURE, Harvard University Press, Benjamin George Martin, October 2016, p. 187) (IMG)

“NOT AS A German, but as a European!” This was the way Joseph Goebbels presented himself to the representatives of continental Europe’s film industries gathered in the grand auditorium of the Reich Propaganda Ministry building in Berlin on July 21, 1941. Their meeting with the propaganda minister came at the end of a weeklong stay in Berlin, during which delegates from seventeen European nations officially refounded the International Film Chamber. (THE NAZI-FASCIST NEW ORDER FOR EUROPEAN CULTURE, Harvard University Press, Benjamin George Martin, October 2016, p. 180) (IMG)

The Soviets made note of the Pan-European propaganda of the Third Reich. For instance, the Soviet novelist Aleksandr Fadeyev, recalled:

‘The German invaders were deliberately encouraging rootless cosmopolitanism, which stems from the so-called idea that everybody is a “citizen of the world”, that nation and homeland are actually outlived concepts.’

(A. Fadeev, ‘O sovetkom patriotizme i natsionalnoi gordosti narodov SSSR’, pod znamen marksizma, 1943, no. 11, p. 34, as quoted in Choseed, ‘Reflections on the Soviet Nationalities Policy in Literature’, p. 373. cited by: The Soviet Government and the Jews 1948-1967, Ben-Gurion University of Negev, Cambridge University Press, Benjamin Pinkus, p. 496) (IMG)

The European Regime was at war with the USSR. Lenin had spoken of such a scenario in 1915. In his words, the:

United States of Europe is ... an agreement between the *European capitalists* ... for the purpose of jointly suppressing socialism in Europe.... (On the Slogan for a United States of Europe, Sotsial-Demokrat, Vladimir Lenin, August 23, 1915, Source: Lenin Collected Works, Progress Publishers, Moscow, Volume 21, pages 339-343. MIA)

Hitler's goal, German intelligence chief Walter Schellenberg recalled, was to:

achieve the domination of Europe and integrate all the forces of the conquered peoples in this great endeavor. He would win the East as a new colonial space for this united Europe.... (Hitler's Secret Service, Original title: The Labyrinth, Walther Schellenberg, Introduction by Alan Bullock, Translation by Louis Hagen, first published: 1956, p. 109) (IMG)

The term 'Greater Europe' or 'New Europe' referred to the Nazi 'Pan-Europe'. Anyways, for the task of creating the Pan-Europe,:

Hitler took the task of planning Europe's future away from the Foreign Ministry and handed it over to Göring and Economics Minister Walter Funk. Göring himself was the most important of that group of figures in the Third Reich whose vision for Europe was based on older, pre-Nazi ideas of continental German economic hegemony rather than on Himmler's fantasies of racial purity. It was in keeping with such ideas that he told Funk – who had previously proved his reliability supervising the Aryanzation of the German economy, and helping to organize the rearmament effort – to prepare proposals for a 'central European economic bloc'. Criticizing Versailles for having split European markets up into a mass of unviable smaller units, separated by customs barriers and economic nationalism, Göring looked forward to the 'large-scale unification of Europe' under Germany's leadership into a bloc....

Funk was a seedy, indolent former business journalist but in July he made a grandiloquent speech that attracted international attention. Announcing that 'gold will have no future role' as basis of the European monetary system, Funk talked about European reconstruction, German pragmatism, planning for the continent as a whole and creating a 'stronger sense of economic community among European nations'. Just as Germany had shown the world how to emerge from the Depression, so it would now lead 'a united Europe' to prosperity and higher living standards. In private, of course, his emphasis was slightly different: winning the war and serving German interests came first. Behind closed doors, Funk had rejected the thought of making the unification of Europe a priority. He was more concerned about getting the economy moving again after the war and ensuring that Berlin became the centre of the continent's financial and trading system. A working group inside the Economics Ministry consulted widely with German, Dutch, Belgian and Swedish business leaders and recommended a unified transportation system, free capital flows and the establishment of a 'European economic union' based chiefly on arrangements between business and trade groups rather than between governments. An undercurrent of mistrust towards the Nazi leadership ran through these ideas. Afterwards, many of them seemed uncannily prescient: the stress on establishing common tariffs on imports from outside Europe, on finding areas of complementarity among different European economies, and on the need to be guided by business interests – these and other themes would be picked up again after the war, when many of these men played important roles in helping to build the Common Market.

(Hitler's Empire: Nazi Rule in Europe, Mark Mazower, Originally Published: January 31, 2008) (IMG)

Mark Mazower is a Board member in the European Association of History Educators (EUROCLIO):

On the 3rd of December, EUROCLIO was present at Theater Diligentia in The Hague, to attend the annual Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR) Lecture. On this occasion, Columbia University professor and EUROCLIO Honorary Board member Mark Mazower shared his thoughts on the topic "Europe in Crisis: Looking Ahead from a Historical Perspective." (WRR Lecture "Europe in Crisis" with Mark Mazower and Beatrice de Graaf, EUROCLIO: European Association of History Educators, Jaco Stoop, December 17, 2015) (IMG)

For 2014 to 2017, for instance, the EUROCLIO received an EU grant of:

€800,000.... (Participatory Spaces for Europe's Citizens: Success Stories from Beneficiaries of Operating Grants Framework 2014-2017, Europe for Citizens, p. 16) (IMG)

As a Columbia University professor whose organization receives funds from the EU, Mark Mazower has demonstrated throughout his works, that he is a pro-EU historian.

And yet, Mazower de facto admitted that the modern European Union was a Third Reich creation. German economics minister Walther Funk called for:

a 'unified European *Grossraumwirtschaft* under German leadership'.... (Hitler's Empire: Nazi Rule in Europe, Mark Mazower, Originally Published: January 31, 2008) (IMG)

The following plans for the European Union were explicitly mentioned by Funk in his 1940 speech:

1. By concluding long-term economic agreements with European countries it will be possible to assign a place for the German market in the long-term production planning of these countries, i.e. as a safe export outlets will be found to exist for German goods in European markets.
2. By creating stable exchange rates a smooth working system of payments must be assured for the carrying on of trade between individual countries. In so doing we shall link up with the existing payments agreements, which will be expanded to include a greater volume of trade on the basis of stable exchange rates.
3. By an exchange of experience in the field of agriculture and industry a maximum production of foodstuffs and raw materials must be our aim, and a rational economic division of labor must be achieved in Europe. By the appropriate use of all economic resources available in Europe, the living standards of European nations must be raised, and their safety in face of possible blockade measures from outside Europe must be increased.
4. A stronger sense of economic community among European nations must be aroused by collaboration in all spheres of economic policy (currency, credit, production, trade, etc.). The economic consolidation of European countries should improve their bargaining position in dealings with other economic groups in the world economy. This united Europe will not submit to political and economic terms dictated to it by any extra-European body. It will trade on the basis of economic equality at all times in the knowledge of the weight which carries in economic matters.

The coming peace-time economy must guarantee for Greater Germany a maximum of economic security and for the German nation a maximum consumption of goods to raise the level of the nation's well-being. The European economy must be adapted to achieve this aim.

(The Economic Reorganization of Europe, Walther Funk, July 25, 1940, pp. 9-10. Original Documents Retrieved from: Quellen Zur Neuordnung Europas, Profit Over Life (an organization dedicated to exposing the crimes of IG Farben). Translation by: EU Facts) (IMG)

Dr. Benjamin George Martin – a historian who was in charge of ‘Euroculture’, an EU funded organization – wrote:

After Hitler’s crushing victory over France in June 1940, the Nazi leadership planned a radical reorganization of Europe. At a secret meeting of German officials in Berlin on July 18, Joseph Goebbels’s close collaborator, Leopold Gutterer, outlined the Propaganda Ministry’s vision of the future. “Germany,” he announced, “ will take over the new ordering of Europe, especially its political leadership” and “ will give new stimulus to the decayed economic situation.” This, his listeners knew, was the “New Order” in Europe (*Neuordnung Europas*) that was already the subject of intense speculation across the continent. With France crushed, Britain apparently close to defeat, and neither the United States nor the Soviet Union yet involved in the conflict, Hitler’s Germany appeared already to have won the war, and was in a position to dictate the New Order that would define the peace. Economists reignited long-standing visions of an integrated European economy, perhaps with a single currency. Jurists and political theorists outlined schemes for a European “Great Space,” unified by an expanded German Reich and cordoned off by a “European Monroe Doctrine.” But a political or economic New Order, Gutterer explained, would not be enough. (THE NAZI-FASCIST NEW ORDER FOR EUROPEAN CULTURE, Harvard University Press, Benjamin George Martin, October 2016, p. 1) (IMG)

Nazi Germany, lacking an empire or a large domestic market, responded to global economic crisis by imposing controls on currency exchange and erecting a continent-wide system of barter trade. The basis was thereby laid for an autarchic European bloc, that is, a self-sufficient economic entity. The pro-Nazi jurist Carl Schmitt influentially outlined a future order dominated by a small group of “ Great Spaces.” (THE NAZI-FASCIST NEW ORDER FOR EUROPEAN CULTURE, Harvard University Press, Benjamin George Martin, October 2016, p. 7) (IMG)

And thus, beginning in the mid-1930s, the USSR and the Comintern began a campaign against this reactionary project of the Third Reich for the spread of rootless cosmopolitanism.

Midway through Operation BARBAROSSA, the German intelligence chief Walter Schellenberg pondered of ways to establish a Pan-European alliance in order to maintain the German Empire. Referring to this ‘New Europe’ in late 1942, Schellenberg said to Himmler:

“(…). Czechia and Slovakia will each be governed by their autonomous governments, but economically integrated with the Reich. I believe this ought to apply also to all southeastern Europe, including Croatia, Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, and Rumania.”

At first Himmler did not agree, but after a discussion he admitted these areas could hardly be integrated into the framework of a new Europe in any other way.

(Hitler’s Secret Service, Original title: The Labyrinth, Walther Schellenberg, Introduction by Alan Bullock, Translation by Louis Hagen, first published: 1956, p. 310) (IMG)

Schellenberg’s and Himmler’s vision of a federation of Europe led by Germany would come true more than seven decades later when the European Union that Hitler and he envisioned expanded its reach to the Balkans.

When the Nazis invaded the USSR, their project for a pan-European alliance continued. The Hitlerian Regime took new steps for consolidating its hold over the New United Europe. To Hitler, the Vichy French leader Laval said:

“Herr Hitler, you are conducting a great war in order to build a new Europe. But you should first build a new Europe in order to conduct your great war.” (Hitler’s Secret Service, Original title: The Labyrinth, Walther Schellenberg, Introduction by Alan Bullock, Translation by Louis Hagen, first published: 1956, 311)

On October 20, the Nazi economics minister Walther Funk even utilized the ‘leftist’ slogan of ‘social justice’ in a ‘united Europe’:

During a visit to Rome ... Reich Economics Minister Walther Funk repeated his rosy predictions for the continent’s postwar economic future, [and] now spoke of “Europe”.... “A united Europe,” he announced, “based on social justice and cultural development ... is the goal of Germany and Italy.” (THE NAZI-FASCIST NEW ORDER FOR EUROPEAN CULTURE, Harvard University Press, Benjamin George Martin, October 2016, p. 187) (IMG)

As further encouragement, the Third Reich furthered its attempts to consolidate the alliance between the United Europe and the East Asian Co-Prospersity Sphere, the Empire of Japan. On the 25th of November, the German:

Foreign Minister Ribbentrop made the renewal of the Anti-Comintern Pact (first signed in 1936 but defunct since the Hitler–Stalin pact of August 1939) into the basis of a new “European” anti-Soviet alliance. The signing ceremony on November 25, 1941, including representatives of Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Romania, Slovakia, and Spain (as well as Japan and its mainland puppet states), was billed as the “First European Congress.” (THE NAZI-FASCIST NEW ORDER FOR EUROPEAN CULTURE, Harvard University Press, Benjamin George Martin, October 2016, p. 187) (IMG)

C8S3. Soviet Relations with Czechoslovakia (1930s) *** IMG-All-{Czechoslovakia, Munich – 1938}

As part of the effort to counter the German – and indirectly, the British – threat, the USSR aimed to enter an alliance with European nations hostile to Reich power. Among them were France and Czechoslovakia who had already established an alliance against Germany in the 1920s.

By early 1935, the USSR entered negotiations with Czechoslovakia in this regard. By May 15, 1935, a US intelligence report explained, the:

Czechoslovak-Soviet mutual assistance treaty [was] signed at Prague. (Chronology of Principal Events Relating to the USSR Part I, OSS, September 25, 1945, p. 28. Note: the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) is the CIA Predecessor) (IMG)

The two nations promised to stand by each other against foreign belligerents. ‘At the same time’, the treaty entailed:

the two Governments recognise that the undertakings to render mutual assistance will operate between them only in so far as the conditions laid down in the present Treaty may be fulfilled and in so far as assistance may be rendered by France to the Party victim of the aggression. (TREATY OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE BETWEEN THE CZECHOSLOVAK REPUBLIC AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS. SIGNED AT PRAGUE, MAY 16TH, 1935, retrieved from: Forst Ungarisches Institut) (IMG)

Therefore, in the event of a foreign aggression, Moscow and Prague would militarily assist each other,:

provided [that] France did likewise. (Chronology of Principal Events Relating to the USSR Part I, OSS, September 25, 1945, p. 92) (IMG)

This clause was part of the Czechoslovak effort to strengthen its bonds with France.

Half a month after the signing of the mutual defense agreement, another:

agreement was signed in Prague by which a group of [Czechoslovak] banks extended credit of 250 million crowns to the Soviet government to finance exports to the USSR. (Chronology of Principal Events Relating to the USSR Part I, OSS, September 25, 1945, p. 29)

On June 8:

Benes arrived in Moscow and exchanged ratifications of the Mutual Assistance Pact, and of the Trade Agreement signed on 25 March. (Chronology of Principal Events Relating to the USSR Part I, OSS, September 25, 1945, p. 29) (IMG)

This was followed the next day by:

Conversations between Benes, Stalin and Molotov. (Chronology of Principal Events Relating to the USSR Part I, OSS, September 25, 1945, p. 29) (IMG)

resulting in:

An official statement [that] acknowledged that the pacts and the agreements concluded by both Governments created a firm basis for continuation of collaboration, as well as successful development of economic relations. (Chronology of Principal Events Relating to the USSR Part I, OSS, September 25, 1945, p. 29) (IMG)

In 1938, Germany was increasingly threatening Czechoslovakia's territorial sovereignty. In response, Moscow promised:

that the USSR would go to the aid of Czechoslovakia if she were attacked.... (Chronology of Principal Events Relating to the USSR Part I, OSS, September 25, 1945, p. 92) (IMG)

The interests of French finance capital completely contradicted the Nazi German finance capital interests, and thus, in this situation, it was natural for France to try to aid Czechoslovakia. The problem though was that the British had a strong intelligence influence in France; and Poland and Romania – two satellites of Britain – refused to permit the Red Army troops from crossing their territories to aid the Czechoslovaks. All of this increased leverage for pro-Nazi and pro-German elements in the French state to make the latter country betray its treaty with Czechoslovakia. Through Romania and Poland, therefore, the British strengthened the lobbying power of the pro-Nazi elements that existed in the French state.

That Poland and Romania refused to permit Soviet Red Army troops has been noted by Gerhard Weinberg. Having served in the US Army during the years 1946-1947, Weinberg was responsible for training the American military's GI units on history and government. From 1951 to 1954, the German-American scholar worked as a Research Analyst in the War Documentation Project, a project initiated by the US Air Force in a contract with Columbia University, for research in the captured German World War II documents. Subsequently Weinberg taught at the US Air Force Academy and has frequently lectured for the Extension Program of the Naval War College as well as at the Marine Corps University and West Point. In 1956-57 he established a program to microfilm the German documents. As Weinberg stated, by acting as geographic barriers lying in between USSR and Czechoslovakia:

Poland and Romania separated Czechoslovakia from Russian territory, and neither was willing to allow Russian troops to cross [their territories].... (Hitler's Foreign Policy 1933-1939: The Road to World War II, Gerhard L. Weinberg, p. 352) (IMG)

Weinberg added:

There was, in fact, the real possibility that Poland would join Germany if France tried to pressure her into allowing Russian troops into the country. (Hitler's Foreign Policy 1933-1939: The Road to World War II, Gerhard L. Weinberg, p. 352) (IMG)

Actually, Poland already was on the side of Nazi Germany, for the MI6 was already on the side of Nazi Germany. On the other hand, there was Romania, another MI6-backed regime. British intelligence documents corroborate that Romania refused to allow the passage of Soviet Red Army troops through its territory:

My Czechoslovak colleague also hinted at the possibility of an understanding between Soviet Union and Roumania for passage of Soviet troops across Roumanian territory. Roumanian Minister however assured me not long ago that anything of the kind was quite out of the question. (Viscount Chilston (Moscow) to Viscount Halifax, September 4, 1938; Received: September 4, 1938, No. 165 Telegraphic [C 9186/1941/18], in: Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, Series 3, Vol. II, The Internet Archives, p. 229) (IMG)

Roumania will *not* permit Soviet aeroplanes to fly to Czechoslovakia's assistance over Roumanian territory. (Sir E. Phipps (Paris) to Viscount Halifax, September 6, 1938, Received: September 7, 1938, No. 573 Saving: Telegraphic [C 9289/1941/18]), in: Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, Series 3, Vol. II, The Internet Archives, p. 255) (IMG)

Similarly, the MI6 confirmed, the ruling circles of the Polish Regime antipathized with Czechoslovakia:

There is little sympathy here with the Czechoslovaks as a people, or with the Czechoslovak Government in its present predicament. Any community of feeling as between two Slav peoples is conspicuous by its absence, except as regards the aspirations of the Slovaks. (Sir H. Kennard (Warsaw) to Viscount Halifax, September 10, 1938; Received: September 13, 1938, No. 73 Saving: Telegraphic [C9648/5302/18], in: Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, Series 3, Vol. II, The Internet Archives, p. 287) (IMG)

While the Polish peasants were hostile to Nazism, the ruling circles of Poland were not concerned by the Third Reich threat:

Nor do the Poles feel the same horror of Nazism as is felt in democratic countries. No doubt there is such a feeling among socialists and peasants, but this does not extend to the ruling classes; and even among the peasants there is a dislike of Jews which counterbalances the disgust with which other countries regard the manifestations of German anti-Semitism. (Sir H. Kennard (Warsaw) to Viscount Halifax, September 10, 1938; Received: September 13, 1938, No. 73 Saving: Telegraphic [C9648/5302/18], in: Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, Series 3, Vol. II, The Internet Archives, p. 287) (IMG)

The Polish ruling class was openly backed by the MI6 and since the MI6 was not opposed to Nazi Germany, the Polish ruling class had no problem with Nazi Germany either. Poland too, therefore, would have blocked Soviet attempts from crossing its territory to help Czechoslovakia:

The one eventuality which might throw Poland into the German camp would be any attempt by the U.S.S.R. to send help to Czechoslovakia across Poland, for the U.S.S.R. is violently disliked and distrusted by the governing classes in Poland. The Soviet regime is identified in their minds with (1) the hated Russian oppressor; (2) the Komintern; (3) Jewry; and (4) anti-Christ. The proximity of the

U.S.S.R. and its supposed influence in Czechoslovakia therefore complicates the problem, even for those Polish circles which are pro-French and pro-British. In my view, should the U.S.S.R. attempt to send help to Czechoslovakia through Poland this would be sufficient to ensure the Polish Government unitedly deciding to oppose the advance of Russian forces. It is argued that once Soviet armies were on Polish soil another war would be necessary to turn them out even if Poland and Russia were members of an anti-German alliance. Should Russian help be confined to sending aeroplanes across Poland the effect on public opinion would be equally bad, and active measures would probably be taken to prevent any such passage. (...) I may add that the French Ambassador agrees in general with these views and I took the opportunity of a visit from him this morning to suggest that it was essential that every effort should be made in Moscow to prevent the Soviet Union taking any measure which might determine Poland to throw herself into the German camp. (Sir H. Kennard (Warsaw) to Viscount Halifax, September 10, 1938; Received: September 13, 1938, No. 73 Saving: Telegraphic [C9648/5302/18], in: Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, Series 3, Vol. II, The Internet Archives, pp. 288-289) (IMG)

On September 23, 1938, the USSR warned Poland against an invasion of Czechoslovakia:

The Soviet Foreign Office warned Poland that the Soviet-Polish non-aggression pact of 1932 would be denounced if Poland attempted to invade Czechoslovakia. (Chronology of Principal Events Relating to the USSR Part I, OSS, September 25, 1945, p. 103) (IMG)

The reports of Polish-German collaboration were not unfounded in the slightest. As a matter of fact, the Polish Regime remained on the side of Nazi Germany, collaborating with the Reich in the annexation of sovereign Czechoslovak territories. In 1938, as the pro-Western Polish nationalist activist Jan Karski recalled:

the Fuhrer, against domestic pressure, agreed that the Czechoslovak Bohumin region should belong to Poland. (...). In Poland, the government-controlled press and mass demonstrations hailed the annexation. (The Great Powers and Poland: From Versailles to Yalta, Jan Karski, p. 194) (IMG)

Hence, the MI6-backed regime in Poland participated in the aggression against Czechoslovakia. With Czechoslovakia in the hands of the Nazis, leverage for the Nazis in the Balkans increased. Thus, less than a year later, the Romanian Regime signed:

a Berlin-Bucharest economic agreement [that] rendered the Romanian economy dependent on the Third Reich. (The Great Powers and Poland: From Versailles to Yalta, Jan Karski, p. 194) (IMG)

The Nazi Germans knew that eventually the interests of German finance capital would come into clash with the interests of the British finance capital. As such, the Nazis established their own parallel intelligence network in Romania that for the while collaborated with and joined the MI6, but would have later turned against the MI6. Remarkably, French intelligence did not have as much of a strength in Romania during those years, despite the cultural affinity of Romania and France. The cultural orientation of Romania towards France meant that France could use its soft power as a vehicle for increased intelligence presence and at the same time, as a weapon with which to rally Romanians for colour revolutionary purposes. However, with increased Nazi German influence in Romania, such potentials for France were weakened.

The narrative that French finance capital collaborated with Nazi German finance capital in the conquest of Czechoslovakia is baseless, not the least of which because French finance capital was a rival of Nazi German finance capital at the time. By the laws of historical materialism, it is absolutely impossible that French imperialism could have betrayed Czechoslovakia at the time, for French imperialism had nothing to gain from such collaboration with the Nazis. Rather, the case was that the external pressure yielded by the MI6-backed regimes Poland and Romania increased the leverage power of those capitulationist elements in the French state who favored capitulation to the Nazis. Also, the Anglo-Americans supported Germany against Soviet power, but it is also well-known that the British fostered close ties with the French state at the time, ties that were to detriment of the French state, for the pro-Nazi MI6 could utilize these ties to France as a channel for strengthening the pro-Nazi capitulationist lobby in France. Therefore, yes, the French government did capitulate to the Nazis on this matter, but the capitulation occurred as a result of pressures by rogue elements in the French government, the capitulationist elements alien to the interests of French finance capital. Those who trumpet the narrative of 'French imperialist collaboration with Nazi Germany' with regards to Czechoslovakia either do so for psychological warfare purposes (such as some officials in the USSR) or are guilty of parroting the Kautskyites in their promotion of the myth of 'ultra-imperialism', the myth that two imperialist rivals hostile to one another can come to terms with one another and can have common interests on any or all spatial coordinate of the world. The pro-Nazi elements in the French government deserve to be blamed for such a betrayal, but not the French imperialists. The international condemnation of the French imperialists for 'betraying' Czechoslovakia also further isolated French imperialism, thereby advancing the interests the Nazi German finance capital.

C8S4. Soviet Aid to the Spanish Republic *** IMG-All-{Spanish Civil War}

Colonial Spain was a pre-modern imperialist power, a state of the mercantile bourgeoisie. The mountainous terrain of Spain, however, rendered the growth of the productive forces in that area relatively difficult compared to some of the other countries in Europe. This factor had a number of effects. Firstly, it resulted in the low development of the progressive classes that rise concurrently with the development of the productive forces. Worse yet, the reactionary classes that benefited from such under-development could utilize the mountainous range as a terrain for terrorist guerrilla activities against progressive forces such as the Napoleonic army. The mountainous terrain generated the same kinds of ultra-reactionary behaviours seen in the mountainous and reactionary Chechniya. Another effect of the low development of the productive forces is that Spain eventually ceased to be an imperialist power. The kinds of capital resting upon exchange – mercantile and finance capital – only choose to serve their homeland country's imperial expansion if their homeland country has the mighty productive forces upon which mercantile and finance capital could rely in order to develop a powerful military-industrial complex for a world conquest campaign. Clearly, the low development of the productive forces in Spain vis-a-vis the other colonial powers had resulted in Spanish mercantile and finance bourgeoisie to not see Spain as an industrially powerful base upon which to rely for global colonial conquest. Therefore, eventually, by the 1930s if not by a few years earlier, the Spanish mercantile and financial bourgeoisie saw more profit in adopting a comprador role. Spain thus ceased to be a colonial and imperial power.

Of course, a large part of Spain was suitable for a quick development of the productive forces and thus of the progressive classes. Eventually, by the 1930s, a Spanish Republic was established, bringing the alliance of the proletariat and the anti-colonial national bourgeoisie onto dominance. The popular front alliance included the progressive bourgeois-democratic organizations – organizations composed of an alliance of the proletariat and the anti-colonial national bourgeoisie – and the Party of the proletariat itself, the Communist Party. Yet, due to the strong presence of the reactionary

classes in Spain, in turn resultant from the low development of the productive forces, such a new republic was fragile. The comprador classes, under the leadership of General Franco waged their campaign for the conquest of Spain on behalf of Anglo-German finance capital. The imperialist-fascist war on Spain officially began in 1936. Immediately, the USSR commenced preparations for the extensive military and financial aid for the defense of the Republic. According to the historiography of the Office of Strategic Relations (OSS; CIA predecessor) almost two weeks after the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War:

A levy on the wages of all employees of USSR [was] announced, to form a fund for aid to the Spanish Republic. (Chronology of Principal Events Relating to the USSR Part I, OSS, September 25, 1945, p. 53) (IMG)

And the:

Soviet press published many articles in support of Spanish Communists; trade unions organized demonstrations throughout the USSR. (Chronology of Principal Events Relating to the USSR Part I, OSS, September 25, 1945, p. 53) (IMG)

By August 7, 1936, the:

State Bank of USSR [began] to hand the Spanish government 36,435,000 French francs collected for the Defense of the Spanish People Fund. (Chronology of Principal Events Relating to the USSR Part I, OSS, September 25, 1945, p. 53) (IMG)

Referring to October 1936 the OSS (in point format) stated:

Spain: Dispatch of further food supplies from Odessa [USSR] revealed. (Chronology of Principal Events Relating to the USSR Part I, OSS, September 25, 1945, p. 59) (IMG)

On October 15, 1936:

Stalin telegraphed to the Spanish Communist Party, declaring that the workers of the USSR would merely fulfil their duty in rendering the revolutionary masses of Spain every possible assistance. (Chronology of Principal Events Relating to the USSR Part I, OSS, September 25, 1945, p. 60) (IMG)

Two days later, there were more demonstrations in support of the Spanish Republic throughout Soviet cities:

Meeting and demonstrations in many Soviet cities in support of the Spanish workers; resolutions passed demanding to stop aid to Franco, or enable the Loyalists to acquire arms and munitions. (Chronology of Principal Events Relating to the USSR Part I, OSS, September 25, 1945, p. 60) (IMG)

The USSR provided extensive military support for the Spanish Republic as well. On October 30, the sending:

of tanks of Soviet manufacture on approaches to Madrid [were] announced by the rebel headquarters. (Chronology of Principal Events Relating to the USSR Part I, OSS, September 25, 1945, p. 62) (IMG)

Already the Soviet Union had sent weapons to the Spanish Republic. On November 2, unfortunately there was:

The capture of four Russian tanks announced by the rebels. (Chronology of Principal Events Relating to the USSR Part I, OSS, September 25, 1945, p. 62) (IMG)

Six days later:

The Soviet Consul in Barcelona pledged the USSR aid to Catalonia in case of foreign intervention by Fascist nations. (Chronology of Principal Events Relating to the USSR Part I, OSS, September 25, 1945, p. 60) (IMG)

Citing German reports published around September 20, 1936, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in its historiography of the 1930s stated:

200 Soviet planes, manned by Russians had arrived in Barcelona. Gen. de Llano stated that 47 Soviet planes had landed in Spain, 37 of them at Valencia. (Chronology of Principal Events Relating to the USSR Part I, OSS, September 25, 1945, p. 57) (IMG)

Then in October 25, 1936, there emerged:

Reports from Turkey alleging the passage of 12 Soviet vessels carrying war materiel for Spain. (Chronology of Principal Events Relating to the USSR Part I, OSS, September 25, 1945, p. 61) (IMG)

In December 13, 1936 there occurred more:

detentions of Soviet ships by the [Phalangist] rebels disclosed by the Tass Agency [Soviet press]. Steamer Komsomol sunk by Spanish rebels. (Chronology of Principal Events Relating to the USSR Part I, OSS, September 25, 1945, p. 66) (IMG)

The archives of the German embassy in Turkey reveal the extent of Soviet arms transfers. It is worth noting that the Soviets provided weapons that were manufactured in a number of other countries as well. Donald Cameron Watt, an MI6 official who served as a head of the Austria post of Britain's Intelligence Corps and served as an acting sergeant in Field Security during the Cold War, was among the first to read the Nazi German intelligence and German Foreign Office documents on the MI6's behalf. In his research, he:

encountered two reports by the German military attaché in Ankara, which purport to give a complete picture of Soviet arms shipments to Spain between September 1936 and March 1938. The information which is extremely detailed and gives figures for each month, can by its nature only have come from some German agent with access to Turkish records. (Soviet Military Aid to the Spanish Republic in the Civil War 1936-1938, The Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. 38, No. 91, the Modern Humanities Research Association and University College London, School of Slavonic and East European Studies. D. C. Watt, June 1960, p. 537) (IMG)

The following table published by Watt present the monthly arms shipment from the USSR to the Spanish Republic from 1936 to 1937. The information is based exclusively on the German archives found in Turkey.

MONTH ¹	SHIPS	NATIONALITY ²	CARGO						MEDICAL STORES, ETC.	MEN	
			<i>Air-planes</i>	<i>Guns</i>	<i>A.A. Guns</i>	<i>Tanks³</i>	<i>Trucks</i>	<i>War material in tons</i>			<i>Ammunition⁴</i>
1936 Sept. ⁵	3	Soviet	—	—	—	—	—	500	1,000	—	—
Oct.	17	16 Soviet 1 Spanish	25	66	—	58	240	2,150	4,850	3,414 petrol 450 clothing 100 med. stores	—
Nov. ⁶	7	2 Soviet 4 Spanish 1 British	24	40	—	147	—	5,700	6,850	—	100 officers ⁷
Dec.	6	2 Soviet 3 Spanish 1 Mexican	—	57	—	34	35	5,500	—	75 med. stores ⁸	—
Jan. 1937	8	3 Soviet 5 Spanish	6	35	—	12	—	3,150	3,250	—	—
Feb. ⁹	10	Spanish	12	210	—	135	100	10,750	1,800	100 rifles and machine guns	750 men
March	8	Spanish	48	180	—	165	75	10,200	725	500 Howitzer & machine gun material	50 med. stores
April	5 ¹⁰	Spanish	26	40	—	75	55	5,000	1,000	100 med. stores	—
May	14	Spanish	27	—	—	—	120	11,300	2,950	—	—
June	11	Spanish	30	40	12 ¹¹	37	150	5,650	4,550	—	—
July	6	Spanish	14	15	15	42	20	2,450	1,250	—	70 Air F'ce officers
Aug.	5	4 Spanish 1 French	16	20	—	26	—	2,300	900	—	—
Sept. ¹²	Nil	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Oct.	1	Soviet	6	—	—	—	—	1,700	—	—	—

(Soviet Military Aid to the Spanish Republic in the Civil War 1936-1938, The Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. 38, No. 91, the Modern Humanities Research Association and University College London, School of Slavonic and East European Studies. Donald Cameron Watt, June 1960, p. 537) (IMG)

According to the OSS, the figures published for the year 1937 showed:

exports to that country [Spain] in the past four months were valued at over 40 million rubles. In January Spain had imported 32,000 tons of Soviet coal, 317,000 tons of oil fuel, and 1,000 tons of motor lorries. (Chronology of Principal Events Relating to the USSR Part I, OSS, September 25, 1945, p. 71) (IMG)

The USSR furnished the Republican forces with aerial combat vehicles, giving them aerial superiority over the Axis until early 1938. In the words of a report by the Maxwell Air Force Base's Directorate of Documentary Research Division stated::

In aircraft, Soviet assistance came to over 1,000 planes plus support equipment. The Red Air Force was under direct Soviet control and, to some extent, was a training facility of Soviet pilots to get combat experience. Soviet aircraft made up over 90 percent of the Republican air force in early 1937, and the Loyalists [i.e. Republicans] had air superiority until late 1937 when the Nazis equipped their Condor Legion in Spain with ME-109 fighters and JU-98 dive-bombers which were superior to the Soviet I-15 and I-16 fighters. Neither side tried to apply a strategic air doctrine, and the Russians did not even send their heavy bombers (TB-series) to Spain. Both the Germans and the Russians opted for boosting close support aviation as a result of their experience in Spain. ('The Development of the Soviet Armed Forces, 1917-1977', Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, Air University, Air University Library, Directorate of Documentary Research Division, Kenneth R. Whiting, 1977, p. 32) (IMG)

In August 1937, at the instigation of the Falangist rebels who aimed to intercept Soviet ships, the Italians resorted to piracy and naval blockade in order to prevent the shipment of Soviet arms to the Spanish Republic:

In mid-August, prompted by the Spanish nationalist leaders, the Italian government secretly instituted a submarine blockade in scale on the Mediterranean high seas, in the course of which submarine attacks were made on a number of merchant ships.... An international conference to discuss measures to deal with this 'piracy' was called at Nyon and under stringent patrolling, the Italian authorities thought it advisable to interrupt the activities of their submarines. (Soviet Military Aid to the Spanish Republic in the Civil War 1936-1938, The Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. 38, No. 91, the Modern Humanities Research Association and University College London, School of Slavonic and East European Studies. D. C. Watt, June 1960, p. 539) (IMG)

The Italian Fascist pirates prevented the Soviet Union from providing the extensive arms shipment that it used to provide. USSR simply had no choice, given that almost all of the pathways to send the arms had been blocked. Hence:

the extraordinary impact of the Italian 'piracy' of August 1937.... (Soviet Military Aid to the Spanish Republic in the Civil War 1936-1938, The Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. 38, No. 91, the Modern Humanities Research Association and University College London, School of Slavonic and East European Studies. D. C. Watt, June 1960, p. 538) (IMG)

caused the Soviets':

marked decrease in deliveries of war material ... after August 1937, except for a handful of airplanes and trucks. Deliveries of general war material fall off very noticeably. (Soviet Military Aid to the Spanish Republic in the Civil War 1936-1938, The Slavonic and East

European Review, Vol. 38, No. 91, the Modern Humanities Research Association and University College London, School of Slavonic and East European Studies. D. C. Watt, June 1960, p. 538) (IMG)

Presumably the USSR no longer shipped military supplies to the Spanish Republic that large in scale. There simply was not much way for the USSR to provide such assistance, although the Soviets may have found some covert or hyper-clandestine means of transferring funds.

All of that did not stop the Soviets from continuing to provide financial support for the Spanish Republic, in spite of the fact that military support was no longer an option:

[T]he Republic did not receive any significant foreign financial assistance, except a Soviet credit in 1938 (around 70 million dollars). (War and Economics: Spanish Civil War Finances Revisited, Pablo Martín-Aceña (Universidad de Alcalá), Elena Martínez Ruiz (Universidad de Alcalá), María A. Pons (Universidad de Valencia), p. 14)

Not to mention the diplomatic support – for instance on late September 1938 when the Soviet foreign minister:

Litvinov in a speech before the political commission [of the League of Nations] defended Loyalist Spain, stating that the latter was entitled to the benefit of self-determination. (Chronology of Principal Events Relating to the USSR Part I, OSS, September 25, 1945, p. 103) (IMG)

Furthermore, the Soviet Union continued to train the communist or progressive guerrillas during the Spanish Civil War, all the way till the end of the War. The Comintern called for communist volunteers worldwide to go to Spain and help defend the Spanish Republic from the Phalangist-Axis forces. The guerrilla training of the volunteers – Spanish or international – was by the Soviet security service, the NKVD which conducted several operations against the rebels. US military research papers shed light on the extent of the Soviet NKVD involvement. A research paper by Barton Whaley was ‘sponsored by the Advanced Research Project Agency of the Department of Defense ... and monitored by the Air Force Office of Scientific Research (AFOSR) ...’. The paper was released in the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC, an American military intelligence organization). According to the paper:

The initial step taken by the NKVD in developing partisan operations was their creation of two guerrilla warfare schools, in Madrid and in Benimamet (near Valencia), each with about 200 trainees. Four more NKVD guerrilla schools were later established, including one in Barcelona with nearly 600 trainees. (GUERRILLAS IN THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR, Center for International Studies Massachusetts Institute of Technology Cambridge, Massachusetts, Research Program on Problems of International Communication and Security, Advanced Research Project Agency of the Department of Defense, Air Force Office of Scientific Research (AFOSR), Barton Whaley, 1969, p. 55) (IMG)

We do know that [Leonid] Eitingon [who was the Deputy Chief of NKVD guerrilla operations] and his subordinates remained at their headquarters in Barcelona until literally on the eve of its fall on 26 January 1939 and crossed into France [the imperialist power allied to Soviet power against Anglo-German imperialism] in early February 2 on their way back to Moscow. It is not plausible that the NKVD would have given up their efforts to control the guerrilla warfare that we know did continue throughout the Civil War. (GUERRILLAS IN THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR, Center for International Studies Massachusetts Institute of Technology Cambridge, Massachusetts, Research Program on Problems of International Communication and Security, Advanced Research Project Agency of the Department of Defense, Air Force Office of Scientific Research (AFOSR), Barton Whaley, 1969, p. 55) (IMG)

As noted, the training capacity of the NKVD's six guerrilla warfare schools was over a thousand men [and women]. Candidates were recruited mainly among Spanish regulars but included some Germans and Britons, three Americans, 2 at least two Finns – and possibly one Canadian – all from the International Brigades – plus some 80 former Czarist officers who hoped by this service to regain their Russian citizenship. Some – perhaps all – of the recruits from the International Brigades were assigned to a special unit of the I4th Guerrilla Corps designated the International Diversionary-Partisan Section. Recruitment of these men began sometime in early 1937 when an official (Army?) order directed each battalion to nominate men for the guerrilleros. (GUERRILLAS IN THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR, Center for International Studies Massachusetts Institute of Technology Cambridge, Massachusetts, Research Program on Problems of International Communication and Security, Advanced Research Project Agency of the Department of Defense, Air Force Office of Scientific Research (AFOSR), Barton Whaley, 1969, p. 56) (IMG)

The Soviets, therefore, trained over 1,000 units in six guerrilla warfare schools all the way till the end of the war, as shown in the document by the Advanced Research Project Agency of the US Department of Defense's Air Force Office of Scientific Research (AFOSR). The Soviet Union rendered ‘the revolutionary masses of Spain every possible assistance’ – in words and in deeds, moral and military, economic, and diplomatic. Numerous generals, anti-fascist operatives, and advisors were also sent by the USSR. In fact:

Stalin did send some high-powered personnel to man the top spots in the Spanish war. Berzin, head of the Red Army Military Intelligence, was sent to direct operations in Spain; Kleber, a *nom de guerre* for Stern, headed the International Brigade; D. G. Pavlov, leading general in the Soviet armored forces, directed tank operations ... in Spain. (...). Malinovsky, later Minister of Defense in the Soviet Union, was in Spain... (‘The Development of the Soviet Armed Forces, 1917-1977’, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, Air University, Air University Library, Directorate of Documentary Research Division, Kenneth R. Whiting, 1977, p. 32) (IMG)

The above facts were summed up as follows by a 1948 CIA report:

For the defense of the Republic, the USSR sent officers, political commissars, and arms, using the Spanish Communist Party as the vehicle of its aid. Thus this party, which had numbered only a few thousands, when the rebellion broke out, became increasingly powerful and rapidly more numerous in the Republican Zone. Volunteer International Brigades were recruited abroad by Leftist sympathizers. (AN INTERPRETIVE ACCOUNT OF RECENT SPANISH HISTORY: SUPPLEMENT TO SR-11 (SPAIN), Joint Intelligence Group, Joint Staff, CIA, November 15, 1948, p. 29) (IMG)

In spite of all the generous Soviet aid, the embargo placed on the Spanish Republic and the difficult conditions that the Soviet Union faced in sending aid to them caused the Republican forces to be defeated by the Phalangist-Axis units in 1939. With the collapse of the Spanish Republic, the Spanish fascists, also known as the Phalangists, rose to power and on March 27, 1939, the:

Anti-Comintern Pact [was] signed by [Phalangist rebel leader] Gen. Franco. (Chronology of Principal Events Relating to the USSR Part I, OSS, September 25, 1945, p. 112) (IMG)

Chapter 9

C9S1. Yezhovschina *** IMG-All-{Factional Conflict & Great Purge }

The British intelligence agent and member of the anti-Stalinist opposition Grigori Tokaev confirmed that Yagoda, prior to being purged, was a key figure and collaborator with Tokaev in intelligence operations against the Soviet government:

On the same day the first step was taken to bring about the downfall of Yagoda. He was removed from the NKVD, and we lost a strong link in our opposition intelligence service. (Comrade X, Grigori Tokaev, 1956, p. 63) (IMG)

Indeed, the demotion of Yagoda and his replacement with Yezhov undermined the counter-revolutionary network in the USSR. True, Yezhov belonged to the enemy's intelligence network within the Soviet intelligence service, but Yagoda was very experienced and had built a large counter-revolutionary intelligence infrastructure, something that Yezhov somewhat lacked.

The Great Purge of the Trotskyites and Bukharinites largely occurred during the Yezhov era. However, in order to undermine the purges, Yezhov and his gang too decided to promote large-scale terror, a phenomenon known as 'Yezhovschina', in order to discredit the purges, drive a wedge between the Party and the masses, and provoke an uprising against the Soviet state. Excesses were committed by the Yezhov gang.

British intelligence agent Robert Conquest provided some examples of the excesses:

Individual denouncers operated on an extraordinary scale. In one district in Kiev, 69 persons were denounced by one man; in another, over 100. In Odessa, a single [individual] denounced 230 people. In Poltava, a Party member denounced his entire organization. (The Great Terror: A Reassessment, Robert Conquest, p. 253) (IMG)

There were even uglier cases. In one case, although, as confirmed by the British Foreign Office, the USSR had:

the Law of April 1935, forbidding the prosecution of small children on political charges.... (N 1294/233/38, No. 85, Sir W. Seeds to Viscount Halifax, Moscow, March 7, 1939; received March 10, 1939, Foreign Office (1939), p. 67) (IMG)

Certain counter-revolutionary rings within the OGPU led by an officer named Savkin, abused their positions, broke the law of April 1935, and brutally harassed the public by accusing very young school-children of espionage and terrorism, and thereby gained the excuse to arrest those children! The British Foreign Office document continued:

Once the children had been arrested, they were thrown into prison, where they were herded together with all kinds of criminals in cells where no bedding was provided. (N 1294/233/38, No. 85, Sir W. Seeds to Viscount Halifax, Moscow, March 7, 1939; received March 10, 1939, Foreign Office (1939), p. 67) (IMG)

The claim that in the USSR, children were abused by the police is not incorrect. Nevertheless, those responsible for such criminal excesses were ruthlessly purged:

By all accounts the moving spirit was M. Savkin, from whose admissions it appears that he was in the habit of representing any naughtiness on the part of the local school-children as counter-revolutionary terrorism and any group of two or three school friends as a terrorist organisation, to be dealt with under article 58 of the Criminal Code, which concerns espionage and counter-revolutionary activities in general. (...). Article 58, M. Savkin boasted, was the only article of the Criminal Code which he knew, and he frankly admitted that he sought to give a "political flavour" to every case which came within his reach. (N 1294/233/38, No. 85, Sir W. Seeds to Viscount Halifax, Moscow, March 7, 1939; received March 10, 1939, Foreign Office (1939), p. 67) (IMG)

The British Foreign Office reiterated that the accusations against Savkin's group were legitimate and accurate:

Nor is there reason to doubt the accuracy of these revelations. (N 1294/233/38, No. 85, Sir W. Seeds to Viscount Halifax, Moscow, March 7, 1939; received March 10, 1939, Foreign Office (1939), p. 67) (IMG)

Savkin was duly purged:

My Lord, I HAVE the honour to report that the trial was held on the 20th, 21st and 22nd February at Novosibirsk, before the Military Tribunal of the Troops of the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs in the District of Western Siberia, of M. Lunkov, the former chief of the Leninsk-Kuznetsk Section of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, of two of his former subordinates, MM. Savkin and Byelousov, and on of the former public prosecutor of Leninsk-Kuznetsk, M. Klipp, on the charge of having grossly violated Socialist justice. (N 1294/233/38, No. 85, Sir W. Seeds to Viscount Halifax, Moscow, March 7, 1939; received March 10, 1939, Foreign Office (1939), p. 66) (IMG)

Referring to the excesses of the purges, the British Foreign Office agreed that:

the OGPU ... is mainly responsible.... (N 466/26/38, No. 41, Viscount Chilton to Mr. Eden, Moscow, January 25, 1938; received January 28, 1938. British Foreign Office, p. 300) (IMG)

The Bolsheviks opposed such excesses. Therefore:

At the 18th Party Congress, ... the "excesses" of the Purge period were being belatedly and peripherally criticized.... (The Great Terror: A Reassessment, Robert Conquest, p. 253) (IMG)

Tokaev implicitly points out that Stalin was opposed to the excess, hence why Beria gained his trust:

It was Beria's diagnosis of the danger of Yezhov's excesses that had induced Stalin to trust him and brought him to power. (Comrade X, Grigori Tokaev, 1956, p. 119) (IMG)

The communist faction in the USSR seriously fought against the extremist behaviour and excesses in the purges. According to the Office of Strategic Services (OSS; CIA predecessor), on May 15, 1937:

State Prosecutor Vyshinsky intervened in the over-zealous hunt for wreckers" by local authorities which had resulted in many unjust dismissals and prison sentences. (Chronology of Principal Events Relating to the USSR Part I, OSS, September 25, 1945, p. 73) (IMG)

On August 6, 1937,:

Vyshinsky condemned severe penalties imposed on peasants for trivial offences and blamed anti-government groups. (Chronology of Principal Events Relating to the USSR Part I, OSS, September 25, 1945, p. 78) (IMG)

On April 20 that same year:

Decrees were issued ordering the cessation of the purges of collective farms. (Chronology of Principal Events Relating to the USSR Part I, OSS, September 25, 1945, p. 93) (IMG)

As another instance, Stalin made it clear that he opposed the excesses in the purges of managers. Referring to the excesses in the purges of managers, the British Foreign Office stated:

M. Stalin no doubt hopes to remedy this deplorable state of affairs.... (N 5458/42/38, No. 520, Viscount Chilston to Mr. Eden, Moscow, November 2, 1937; Received: November 5, 1937, Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 225) (IMG)

Stalin gathered leading figures in the factories and gave a speech to boost their morale:

On the 29th October a reception was held at the Kremlin for 400 directors, engineers, shop stewards, foremen and Stakhanovite workers of the iron, steel, and coal industries, at which M. Stalin made one of his comparatively rare utterances. M. Stalin, who attended the reception in company with M. L. M. Kaganovich, People's Commissar of Heavy Industry, and other members of the Government, opened his speech by proposing the hearth of the lesser leaders of industry. Upon these, he said, although they passed almost unnoticed, production in every branch of industry depended. Unfortunately, they did not always understand what an honour it was to have gained the confidence of the working class. In the days of capitalism, leaders of industry, managers and foremen, had been hated by the workers as the watchdogs of their capitalist masters. Now they were managing industry in the interests of the working class, whose confidence they enjoyed. This confidence was a great, for while leaders came and went the people went on for ever. The people alone was immortal; everything else was transitory. In conclusion, M. Stalin proposed the health of those leaders of industry who had a proper understanding of their high vocation, of M. Stakhanov and other champions of the Stakhanovite movement, and finally, of the champion blast furnace workers, in particular the Korobov family, who appear to have achieved special distinction in this branch of industry, and to whom considerable publicity has been given during these last few days. (N 5458/42/38, No. 520, Viscount Chilston to Mr. Eden, Moscow, November 2, 1937; Received: November 5, 1937, Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 225) (IMG)

The purpose of this speech by Stalin, the Foreign Officer noted, was to promote the understanding:

that the purge is nearing its close. (N 5458/42/38, No. 520, Viscount Chilston to Mr. Eden, Moscow, November 2, 1937; Received: November 5, 1937, Foreign Office (1937-1938), p. 226) (IMG)

Regarding the purges in general, the Foreign Office noted:

Nevertheless, there are signs that the peak of this particular wave is past. The decisions of the party plenum ... are themselves such a sign; and although they only refer to the situation within the party, i.e., to one-hundredth part of the population, they may be expected to discourage to a certain extent the practice of wholesale denunciation and persecution to which the non-party masses have also been subjected. (N 466/26/38, No. 41, Viscount Chilston to Mr. Eden, Moscow, January 25, 1938; received January 28, 1938, p. 300) (IMG)

Thousands of those purged from the Party were reinstated back to their positions. On January 18, 1938:

A decree was issued ordering ... the examination and reinstatement of many thousands of people recently expelled.... (Chronology of Principal Events Relating to the USSR Part I, OSS, September 25, 1945, p. 87) (IMG{Baltic-Finland})

The workers' state ensured that the cases of the purges were reinvestigated and the victims of Yezhovschina were compensated:

Beria's first acts as head of the NKVD, were the arrest of Yezhov and the issue of orders quashing an enormous number of sentences and recently-started proceedings. People who had been unjustly repressed were even indemnified by the State. Special commissions enquired into the past of convicted persons. (Comrade X, Grigori Tokaev, 1956, p. 119) (IMG)

The formation of such commissions was confirmed by the British Foreign Office, which reported:

There are fewer arrests and commissions are even going through the prison camps re-examining cases and freeing prisoners. (N 1294/233/38, No. 85, Sir W. Seeds to Viscount Halifax, Moscow, March 7, 1939; received March 10, 1939, Foreign Office (1939), p. 68) (IMG)

With these measures by the Soviet state, the Foreign Office concluded:

There can be no doubt that the wholesale "purge" which raged throughout the Soviet Union in 1937 and 1938 has abated. (N 1294/233/38, No. 85, Sir W. Seeds to Viscount Halifax, Moscow, March 7, 1939; received March 10, 1939, Foreign Office (1939), p. 68) (IMG)

During the Moscow Trials, some of the defendants reportedly 'confessed' that they were conspiring against Yezhov as well. This was true, insofar as they claimed that they wanted oust Yezhov, for Yezhov at the time was highly encircled by Stalin faction agents, and thus the ouster of Yezhov would have been a blow to the Stalin faction. However, the narrative that these Trotskyite or Bukharinite conspirators were aiming to assassinate Yezhov was baseless. If some of the defendants did indeed claim such, such a 'confession' was undoubtedly a result of the combination of the pressure of Yezhov as well as the desire of these defendants to make Yezhov, their ally, appear as a 'victim' so to promote Yezhov. During the Doctors' Plot Case too, Beria was rumoured to have been a target of the killer-doctors when in fact the killer-doctors were in service to the gang of Beria. It is also worth looking at what Nikita Khrushchev said about Stalin's attitude when Nikita Khrushchev admitted to Stalin that Khrushchev had Trotskyite deviations in the 1920s. Another important part is where Khrushchev states that the people being arrested seemed to really have been enemies of the Soviet state. The following is a part of his memoirs written long after Stalin's death:

In 1923, when I had been a student at the workers' school, I had been guilty of certain waverings in a Trotskyist direction. I expected that this matter might be raised at the conference or after the conference, and it would be very difficult for me to give the proper explanations. So I decided to tell Stalin about it. (...) I called up Stalin. He said: "Come on over." When I entered his office, he was there with Molotov. I told Stalin everything the way it had been. The only thing he asked was: "When was that?" I repeated that it had probably been before the Thirteenth Party Congress. I had been misled by a man named Kharechko, a fairly well-known Trotskyist. Back before the revolution I had heard that there was a certain Kharechko from a peasant family in the village of Mikhailovka, a student. I knew that village. There were a lot of Kharechkos there. I knew he was a revolutionary, but I didn't know he was a Social Democrat.

I had absolutely no idea about the different tendencies in the [socialist movement or in the] Social Democratic Party back then, although I knew that he was a man who before the revolution had fought for the people, for the workers and peasants. When he moved to Yuzovka I naturally felt sympathy with Kharechko and supported him. Stalin heard me out. “Kharechko? But I know him. Oh, he was an interesting man.”

“And so I want to ask you what I should do at the provincewide party conference? Should I tell everything the way I’ve just told you, or should I limit myself to the fact that I’ve told you about it?”

Stalin said: “Probably there’s no need to say anything. You’ve told us, and that’s enough.”

Molotov objected: “No, it would be better if he told about it.”

Then Stalin agreed: “Yes, better to tell about it, because if you don’t tell, someone might grab hold of it, and you’ll be hounded with questions, and **we’ll get a pile of denunciations.**”

I left. When I returned to the conference I found the following scene. Discussion of the candidates who had been nominated for the province party committee was under way. (...). My turn came. The Russian alphabet placed me at the end of all the lists. [The letter Kh stands near the end of the Russian alphabet.] I told the conference my story, as Stalin had advised, but I made no reference to Stalin. When I finished there were no questions. Somehow everyone was shouting at once: “Leave him on the voting list.” I was elected then by an absolute majority of votes. All these things disposed me favorably toward Stalin. It was pleasing to me that Stalin had taken a considerate attitude toward me, had not criticized me, had asked only one or two questions, and even had suggested at first that I say nothing about all this at the conference. I considered it correct that he had recommended I tell everything. Actually, that’s why I went to see him. I wanted Stalin to know that Khrushchev had gone to the conference and told about those aspects of his biography. I didn’t consider it tactically advisable to do this without warning the general secretary of the Central Committee as long as I had the opportunity to do so. **All this further strengthened my confidence in Stalin and gave rise to a feeling of certainty that those who were being arrested really were enemies of the people, although they had operated so skillfully that we had not been able to notice it—because of our inexperience, political blindness, and gullibility. Stalin repeatedly told us we were too gullible. It was as though he himself had risen to a higher position from which he could see everything and know everything, judge people’s actions fairly, defend honest people and support them, while punishing untrustworthy people and enemies.**

(Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev, Vol. 1: Commissar (1918-1945), Nikita Khrushchev, pp. 127-129. Bold added) (IMG)

It is a documented fact, as will be seen, that Stalin wanted to eventually purge Nikita Khrushchev as well (see C19S2), for he knew that Khrushchev was a traitor. However, at that stage, since the purges needed to be concurrent with the development of the productive forces and advancements in class struggles for centralization of the economy, launching a Second Great Purge was not feasible. Furthermore, compared to other traitors in the Party, Khrushchev was actually one of the stupider ones, which meant that he was weaker, and hence easier to encircle with agents and to find compromising material against him, so to compel him into supporting the communist faction against the other much-smarter traitors. Khrushchev was objectively useful for the communists in that respect. At that stage, therefore, not only would a purge of Khrushchev have been tactically and strategically wrong, it would have been utterly insane. It would have disarmed the communists from coopting a stupid easy-to-control traitor onto their side, thus assisting the smarter harder-to-control traitors.

C9S2.1. Statistics on the Great Purge in the CPSU in USSR *** IMG-All-{Mortality Statistics}

A declassified 1974 CIA document revealed that during the Great Purge between 1934 and 1939, the number of CPSU members and candidates expelled was approximately 600,000. Note that expulsion from the Party does not automatically signify death or imprisonment. Furthermore, upon the purge of the Yezhov gang, thousands of Party members were liberated from the excesses of the purges and thereby reinstated back to their positions.

As demonstrated in C2S4, the 1923 Lenin Enrolment program ensured that the educated blue-collar workers maintained a democratic majority throughout the Party. Naturally, the blue-collar workers were overwhelmingly hostile to the Trotskyite-Bukharinite faction, the minority bloc that received the support of the intelligentsia, bureaucratic, and kulak class enemies of the proletariat and campaigned against the Lenin Enrolment program. As such, the democratic and proletarian majority found its interests at odds with the minority oppositionist networks. This explains the fact that at the height of the Great Purge, a majority of two million people remained in the Party whereas only a network of approximately 600,000 people were expelled.





FIGURE 3. Growth of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1918-72 (U/OU)

Above: whole graph's screenshot from the CIA report. The graph that is fully shaded represents the population of the Party. (see: U.S.S.R., National Intelligence Survey, No. 26, CIA, April 1974, p. 7) (IMG)
 Below – a zoom onto the graph, with red lines clarifying the data point coordinates
<https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP01-00707R000200090032-1.pdf>



A zoom onto the previous image presented with brightness and contrast increased – the red lines are to more easily clarify the data points above
 The y axis figures on the right in millions of members or candidates. The x axis represents the years.

As the above graph shows, between the period ‘Beginning of Purges’ and ‘End of purges’, the Party membership was in between 2 million and 3 million, with the net decline being approximately three-fifths of 1 million – that, is 600,000.

C9S2.2. Statistics on Purges throughout the Soviet Society during the Great Purge *** IMG-All-{Mortality}

A 1955 CIA report:

was prepared as part of the US contribution to a NATO study comparing economic trends in the Free World and in the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

(Soviet Economic Development: 1928-1954: Part II: Manpower and Physical Production, CIA, July 26, 1955, page: front cover) (IMG)

The CIA report prepared for NATO provided the following data regarding the labour force, not to be confused with the general population, of the USSR:

Year	Labour Force (Millions; as of beginning of the year)
1928	75.2
1937	86.9
1940	90.4

(Soviet Economic Development: 1928-1954: Part II: Manpower and Physical Production, CIA, July 26, 1955, p. 8) (IMG)

Before proceeding any further a few points and caveats need to be mentioned about the data so to minimize confusions and misunderstandings.

Firstly, it must be noted that this section examines the statistics of the Soviet labour force and population as from the lens of the US intelligence.

Therefore, the statistics provided by the CIA’s study for NATO are estimates and by the CIA’s own account, subject to a wide margin of error:

Estimates of the Soviet labor force are subject to a wide margin of error. This is due to the difficulty of defining employment in agriculture during a period when shifts of labor from agriculture to other economic sectors were extremely rapid. (Soviet Economic Development: 1928-1954: Part II: Manpower and Physical Production, CIA, July 26, 1955, p. 2) (IMG)

The fact that the data are estimates by the US intelligence certainly adds value to the data as it makes it devoid of a possible ‘pro-Stalin’ or ‘pro-Soviet’ ‘bias’. On the other hand, the wide margin of error obviously adds flaw to the use of the data provided by the CIA. The margin of error does not mean that the data cannot be analyzed, nor does it mean that the data should be discarded. After all, if the CIA data is to not be used, then there are two main alternatives: (1) gathering the data directly from the Soviet archives, and believing whatever the Soviets said regarding the death toll from the Great Purge; this method has its merits, but anti-communists will understandably denounce the Soviet archives as being biased in favor of the USSR, and they will never be convinced; (2) the other alternative is to completely abandon altogether the question of estimating the death toll. Using sources from the Mossad, MI6, Nazi German intelligence, or the SAVAK will most certainly not be any more useful in this respect than the CIA’s data. It follows that despite the inherent flaw with the CIA data, they are the best data that can be utilized such that the data would not be denounced as having a ‘pro-Soviet’ or ‘pro-Stalin’ bias. To sum it up, the CIA data is not excellent, but it is arguably the best one available in this respect. Precisely because the CIA data is flawed and has limits, the methodology that will be used here is also inherently flawed, but, against potential critics, I pre-emptively defend it as the best method available given the limits we face.

The second point that needs to be mentioned does not really imply the existence of an additional flaw with the data, but only needs to be mentioned to prevent any confusion: the labour force is the portion of the population that seeks employment but may or may not be employed. In the USSR,

unlike in capitalist countries, the population of the labour force was almost equal to the population of the employed because almost everyone who wanted a job had one.

Thirdly, note that the above figures for the total labour force in the USSR also include forced labour in the corrective labour camps as well. Listing the ‘individual economic sectors’ as ‘Agriculture’, ‘Industry’, ‘Other Specified Non-agricultural’, and ‘Military’ and showing the respective figures for the labour force for each of those categories during the specific years, the CIA also defined ‘Unallocated’ labour as such:

The “unallocated” labor force is the difference between the estimated total labor force and announced or estimated employment in individual sectors. It includes forced labor, artisans and other persons engaged in the village economy but not in agriculture as such, and persons in school but probably employed on a part time basis. None of these could be allocated to the individual economic sectors.

(Soviet Economic Development: 1928-1954: Part II: Manpower and Physical Production, CIA, July 26, 1955, p. 2) (IMG)

In Table 2 of page 8 of the same document, the CIA made it clear that the figures for the ‘Total’ labour force shown in the table account for the ‘Agriculture’, ‘Industry’, ‘Other Specified Non-agricultural’, ‘Military’ as well as the ‘Unallocated’ labour. In brief, the labour force data shown above does include the forced labour.

Fourthly, as a descriptive footnote for the data provided, the CIA stated that for the year 1940, the figure of 90.4 million excludes the populations gained by the USSR through the USSR’s territorial expansion after 1939. The CIA then stated that:

new territories ... added about 7 million agricultural workers and 3 million non-agricultural workers to the Soviet labor force. (Soviet Economic Development: 1928-1954: Part II: Manpower and Physical Production, CIA, July 26, 1955, p. 8) (IMG)

Hence, if the population of the new territories is to be accounted for, the population of the USSR for the 1940 would have been 100.4 million. For the purposes of the estimates in this section though, there is no point in using the data for the population of the new territories because although purges occurred there too, the ‘Great Purge’ did not happen there; rather, the Great Purge happened inside the boundaries of the pre-September-1939 USSR.

Not counting wars, conquests of new territory, and immigration, populations tend to grow exponentially – i.e. tend to multiply by a coefficient, rather than grow steadily and arithmetically. However, the general population grows as soon as new births occur whereas the labour force does not immediately grow when new children are born. Therefore, the labour force does not necessarily grow exponentially. It is difficult to account for precisely how the labour force in the USSR grew. For this reason, both method 1, which assumes an arithmetic and steady growth, and method 2, which assumes an exponential growth, will be used for estimates.

Method 1

According to the report, from 1937 to 1940, the labour force of the Soviet Union increased by 3.5 million people, an average increase of **1.1666...** million people per year. Between 1928 and 1937, there was an increase of 11.7 million people in total, an average increase of **1.3** million people per year. Comparing the two periods, there occurred a decline in the average yearly labour force increase. Therefore, during the 1937-1940 period, the average yearly labour force increase declined by:

$$1.3 \text{ million} - 1.1666... \text{ million} = 0.1333... \text{ million} = 133,333.333...$$

According to this method of estimation, therefore, from the start of 1937 to the start of 1940, the per year mortality in the USSR was 133,333.333..., meaning that mortality for the three years of the period 1937-1940 was 400,000 people.

An alternative way is to find the labour force for 1940, assuming that the per year increase was that of the period 1928-1937, that is 1.3 million per year. Thus, knowing that the labour force for 1937 was 86.9 million, accounting for the three years between 1937 and 1940, and assuming a per year increase of 1.3 million people, the population in 1940 would have been calculated as follows:

$$(1.3 \text{ million} \times 3) + 86.9 \text{ million} = 90.8 \text{ million}$$

As the CIA data for the labour force in 1940 was 90.4 million, we have: 90.8 million – 90.4 million = 0.4 million = 400,000.

Method 2

Recall that as shown in C5S3, the formula for finding the annual population growth coefficient ‘r’ is as follows:

$$\text{Growth Coefficient} = r = \left(\frac{P_2}{P_1}\right)^{\frac{1}{(Y_2-Y_1)}}$$

In simple terms, the annual population growth coefficient represents the number by which to multiply the current population in order to obtain the estimated population of next year. Using the above formula, we find the ‘r’ for the periods 1928-1937 and 1937-1940:

Year	Labour Force (Millions)	The ‘r’ for the periods 1928-1937 & 1937-1940
1928	75.2	1.016197198
1937	86.9	
1940	90.4	1.01324908

Sample calculation for 1928-1937:

$$\left(\frac{P_2}{P_1}\right)^{\frac{1}{(Y_2-Y_1)}} = \left(\frac{86.9}{75.2}\right)^{\frac{1}{(1937-1928)}} = 1.016197198$$

As the above table demonstrates, the $r = 1.016197198$ for 1928-1937 declined during the period 1937-1940, the period encompassing the Great Purge, and went down to $r = 1.01324908$. In order to estimate the mortality resultant from the purges between 1937 and 1940, one must: (1) first predict what the labour force population would have been in 1940 if the 'r' had not declined beyond the year 1937; in other words, first predict what the labour force population would have been in 1940 if the 'r' had continued to be 1.016197198 for the period 1937-1940 as well, and not just for the 1928-1937 period. (2) Then subtract that number, the predicted labour force population, from the actual labour force population for 1940, so to account for the changes in the labour force population.

Where:

PP_{1940} = The Predicted Labour Force Population for 1940 if the 'r' for 1937-1940 was the same as the 'r' for 1928-1937

PA_{1940} = The Actual Labour Force Population for 1940 = 90.4

PA_{1937} = The Actual Labour Force Population for 1937 = 86.9

then:

$$\begin{aligned} PP_{1940} &= PA_{1937} \times (\text{the 'r' for 1928 to 1937})^{(1940-1937)} \\ &= 86.9 \times (1.016197198)^3 = 91.1913731 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Death Toll for 1937 to 1940} &= PP_{1940} - PA_{1937} \\ &= 91.1913731 - 90.4 = 0.791373097 \text{ million} = 791,373 \end{aligned}$$

Estimating based on CIA data, 400,000 to 791,373 people from the Soviet labour force died between the start of 1937 and the start of 1940. However, it remains a fact that typically, the labour force grows arithmetically, almost as a straight line. The graphs provided by the World Bank, the screenshots of which are available in the 'Mortality' images section of this book, show that the labour force – not to be confused with percentage labour force participation – for the EU as a whole, Latin America as a whole, Canada, USA, Britain, and France have grown as almost straight lines. The clear implication of the straightness of these lines is that labour force grows arithmetically, rather than exponentially. This makes sense because the labour force grows as a process of individual human biological growth, parental upbringing, and education, unlike the population as a whole which can grow exponentially according to a certain birth rate. The straightness of the lines in the World Bank's graphs means that Method 1, the arithmetic method of estimate, is the one more suitable, and that **the figure of 400,000 is more realistic**.

Late 1939 saw wars on a number of fronts: the Winter War against Finnish aggression and the skirmishes against fascist terror organizations in the Baltic zone. The Soviets were winning the war against the Finnish aggressors, though the imperialist mainstream media presented the conflict as a 'defeat' inflicted upon Soviet power. According to the Russian Federation's official state media, the Soviet Union's official figures for losses were as follows:


The official figures for the losses of Soviet troops in the war were made public at the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on March 26, 1940: 48,475 dead and 158,863 wounded, sick and frostbite. ('The Mannerheim Line is the Main Line of Defense in the Winter War', RIA Novosti, April 21, 2009. Note: RIA Novosti is Russia's state-owned media)

Anti-Soviet sources, seeking to present the Winter War as a 'defeat' 'suffered' by the Red Army, put the number of Soviet troop deaths as high as 168,000. Accounting for the casualties of the Winter War starting from November 1939 implies that the number of people executed as a result of the Great Purge was tens of thousands lower than 400,000 or than 791,373. Yet, the Winter War ended in mid-March 1940, two and a half months after the start of the year 1940. Therefore, precisely how many tens of thousands lower than the 400,000-791,373 range was the death toll of the Great Purge, remains ambiguous, at least for me, because I do not know the casualties for between November 1939 and January 1st, 1940. Note again, however, that the figure of 400,000 deaths, calculated by the arithmetic method, was far more realistic than the figure of 791,373, calculated by the exponential method. Therefore, accounting for the casualties of the Winter War, **the death toll of the Great Purge was significantly below 400,000**. The CIA data (see C5S3) showed that in 1939 the Soviet population was approximately 170.5 million. This means that the Great Purge killed **0.2% of the population of the USSR**.

Undoubtedly, Yezhov's group was able to portray the purges in a negative light through the abuse of power and through the launching of terror campaigns against ordinary individuals. However, contrary to how the liberal media portrays the matter, the fact that some people were unjustly killed is proof that there still existed renegades in the Soviet state, deserving to be purged so that fewer people would be killed. For one, recall that the MI6 agent Beria himself was a Yezhov agent not just formally but also in the sense that he launched Trotskyite terror during the Great Purge, as means of helping the Yezhov gang in discrediting the Great Purge. Beria had Trotskyite agents in the Politburo and Council of People's Commissars, and girls in Moscow were victims of his predatory behavior. Nonetheless, it is an irrefutable fact that at that specific time period, another Great Purge should not and could not have happened, and that the Second Great Purge was to be left for another time. There was still room for expansion in collectivization and mechanization of agriculture particularly in the territories newly added to the USSR, as well as room for greater centralization of the state-owned sectors of the economy in order to cut bureaucracy. Through the greater centralization and collectivization of the economy, the socio-economic bases that catapulted imperialist agents up to the ranks of the Soviet state could be duly eliminated, thereby leaving imperialist agents without a material base inside Soviet economy with which to strangle the Soviet state. It follows that the Second Great Purge could not and should not have happened until another wave of advancements in the realm of the economic class struggles and the development of the productive forces, when the Baltic zones, the Polish-occupied parts of Western USSR ('Eastern Poland'), and other territories were collectivized in agriculture, and at least partially socialist-industrialized. Unfortunately though, the Great Patriotic War severely damaged not only the productive forces, but also the composition of the CPSU and the Soviet counter-intelligence apparatus, hence allowing black-marketeers and bureaucrats to grow in the Soviet economy and inside the Party itself, to the point of being able to conquer the Party by 1956. All of these combined to prevent the Second Great Purge from occurring. As such, a 1957 CIA report stated that the USSR had:

death rates which rank among the lowest in the world. (CHARACTERISTICS AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE POPULATION OF THE USSR, Office of Research and Reports, CIA, October 25, 1957, p. 2) (IMG)


This referred not only to the period after 1953, but also to 1950s and 1953, during which the USSR had less than 10/1,000 = 1% annual mortality rate. Between 1950 and 1953, there were purges in the USSR, such as the Mingrelian Purge – targeting Beria’s vast network of corrupt Menshevik-linked MI6 infiltrators in the Georgian SSR – as well as the less numerically significant Doctors’ Plot case, which was meant to be a prelude to a Second Great Purge. Of course, none of these purges was a match to the Great Purge,



A death rate of almost 0.9% per year between 1950 and 1953

(‘NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY, Country Profile. studying: The Society, Government and Politics, The Economy, Transportation and Telecommunications, Military Geography, Armed Forces, Science of the USSR’, CIA April, 1974, p. 19)

US and USSR: TOTAL POPULATION, SELECTED YEARS, 1941-76
(In millions)



As the above graph shows, the Soviet population grew at an almost constant slope from 1946 onwards.

(CHARACTERISTICS AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE POPULATION OF THE USSR, Office of Research and Reports, CIA, October 25, 1957, pp. 4-5) (IMG)

C9S3. The Rise of the Beria Network *** IMG-All-{Factional Conflict & Great Purge}

As mentioned in C4S4, Beria was an MI6 agent closely collaborating with the British intelligence via the Georgian Mensheviks since the 1910s. Furthermore, I remind the reader that as late as the 1950s, Lavrenti Beria:

wanted, also, to publish the writings of Bukharin and Trotsky, so that people should realize that they presented genuine political tendencies and were not agents recruited by foreign intelligence services. (Beria: Inside Stalin’s Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 254) (IMG)

For during the 1930s, the MI6 agent Beria opposed the purge of the Nazi agent Tukhachevsky as well. When the Nazi agent was purged,:

My father explained to me that Tukhachevsky had nothing against Stalin or the Party, or at least, nothing that would justify his arrest. He could hardly be charged with anti-communism.... (Beria: Inside Stalin’s Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 39) (IMG)

Describing the later accusations against Beria, the CIA also implicitly acknowledged the fact of:

the espionage Beria did for foreign intelligence organisations and his anti-Soviet subversive activity in the sphere of Socialist construction. (BERIYA PURGE, CIA, May 28, 1954, p. 4) (IMG{Titoist Coup})

The intelligence service he served first and foremost was the MI6. Later on in the 1940s, he began to serve the Mossad as well, and through the Mossad, he also served the US intelligence because the Mossad was subordinate to the CIA back then.

Beria had a number of close allies. One of them was Nikita Khrushchev, an ally of Beria since the early 1930s. In his memoirs, Khrushchev admitted:

After my first meeting with Beria, we became fairly close. I liked Beria. He was a simple, straightforward person, but also quite witty. We often sat side by side at plenums of the Central Committee, exchanging opinions, and now and then we would make fun of the speakers. I liked Beria so much that in 1934, when for the first time I vacationed in Sochi, I went to visit him in nearby Georgia. I arrived in Batum in southwestern Georgia by steamship (there was no railroad back then) and traveled from Batum to Tiflis [Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia] by train. I spent Sunday at Beria's country place. The entire Georgian leadership was there. The country houses of the members of the Council of People's Commissars of Georgia and the Central Committee of Georgian party were there on a mountainside. On my return journey, I took the historic Georgian Military Road and caught a train at Beslan station [on the northern side of the mountains]. As I see it in retrospect, the beginning of my acquaintanceship with this treacherous person was quite peaceful. (Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev, Vol. 1: Commissar (1918-1945), Nikita Khrushchev, p. 135) (IMG)

Like Beria, Nikita Khrushchev held Trotskyite views. Khrushchev admitted in his memoirs:

In 1923, when I had been a student at the workers' school, I had been guilty of certain waverings in a Trotskyist direction. (...) I had been misled by a man named Kharechko, a fairly well-known Trotskyist. (Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev, Vol. 1: Commissar (1918-1945), Nikita Khrushchev, pp. 127-129) (IMG)

On its own, having 'certain waverings in a Trotskyist direction' does not make one a Trotskyite, for every communist has at some point unintentionally had left-deviations that benefit the enemies of the proletariat, and such left-deviations constitute Trotskyite deviations. However, in the particular case of Khrushchev, there are several aspects to his life that, taken along with the above quote, leave no doubt that he was basically a Trotskyite. For start, Khrushchev himself mentioned, he had been closely tied to 'Kharechko, a fairly well-known Trotskyist', although Khrushchev unreliably claims that he was not aware of Kharechko's Trotskyite character:

Back before the revolution I had heard that there was a certain Kharechko from a peasant family in the village of Mikhailovka, a student. I knew that village. There were a lot of Kharechkos there. I knew he was a revolutionary, but I didn't know he was a Social Democrat. I had absolutely no idea about the different tendencies in the [socialist movement or in the] Social Democratic Party back then, although I knew that he was a man who before the revolution had fought for the people, for the workers and peasants. When he moved to Yuzovka I naturally felt sympathy with Kharechko and supported him. (Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev, Vol. 1: Commissar (1918-1945), Nikita Khrushchev, pp. 127-128) (IMG)

There hardly is any reason for believing his narrative that he was unaware of the Trotskyite nature of Kharechko. Khrushchev claimed that he 'knew that' Kharechko 'was a man who before the revolution had fought for the people, for the workers and peasants'. Khrushchev used the phrase 'workers and peasants' in a different sense of course. The kinds of 'workers' that Khrushchev favored were the white-collar workers, and the kinds of 'peasants' that Khrushchev favored were the kulaks. Khrushchev favored the kinds of 'workers' who were allied to the bourgeoisie. As William Taubman of the CIA front think tank Wilson Center put it,:

Also, [Khrushchev's] claim that he determined his ideological position immediately after October 1917 is just plain false. In fact, Khrushchev probably felt closer to the Mensheviks... After all, the Mensheviks' main constituency was better-off workers with something to lose, and Khrushchev was one of them. As long as the moderates were in control, he had plenty to gain. Only after the Bolsheviks took control and seemed the most likely to beat back attempts at counterrevolution did Khrushchev come down on their side. (Khrushchev: The Man and His Era, William Taubman, 2003, pp. 47-48) (IMG)

More importantly, forget not the countless Trotskyite stances that Khrushchev took in the 1950s and beyond, stances explored in detail in later chapters. As for the 1930s, Khrushchev was an infamously zealous politician. Even in the 1930s, Khrushchev was infamous for his fanatical rhetoric:

It is not without interest that the next important attack on Yenukidze was an article in the Moscow Worker of June 14th and 15th, 1935, by a young fanatic named Khrushchev. (Comrade X, Grigori Tokaev, 1956, p. 20) (IMG)

Khrushchev's Trotskyite-style fanatical behaviour is manifested in the fact that, against the will of Stalin who opposed personality cults, Khrushchev promoted a personality cult around Stalin as means of de-emphasizing the importance of dictatorship of the proletariat and collective leadership and exaggerating the importance of individual leadership. Khrushchev later 'attacked' the cult of personality which he promoted, albeit without admitting that he had promoted it. William Taubman of the CIA front think tank Wilson Center wrote:

Before, during, and after the trial, Khrushchev served as one of the most voluble cheerleaders for the Stalinist line. He exhorted Moscow party workers to "educate the masses in hatred for the enemy, hatred for the counterrevolutionary Trotskyite-Zinovievites, hatred for the rightist deviationist heretics, and love for the party of Bolsheviks, love for our boss and teacher Comrade Stalin." Three days before the trial's end, he demanded death for Zinoviev and Kamenev. "Everybody who rejoices in the successes achieved in our country, the victories of our party led by the great Stalin, will find only one word suitable for the mercenary, fascist dogs of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite gang. That word is execution."

In January 1937 another show trial got under way. This time Khrushchev called for blood in a speech to some two hundred thousand Muscovites gathered in frigid cold on Red Square: "The Trotskyite clique was nothing but a gang of spies and mercenary murderers, diversionist wreckers, and agents of German and Japanese fascism. The stench of carrion rises from the vile, base Trotskyite degenerates."

(Khrushchev: The Man and His Era, William Taubman, 2003, p. 98) (IMG)

The greatest crime of 'Judas Trotsky and his band', Khrushchev declared, was:

"their evil-doing hand against Comrade Stalin ... the beacon of all that is good and progressive in humanity. Stalin is our banner! Stalin is our will! Stalin is our victory!" (Quote from: Khrushchev: The Man and His Era, William Taubman, 2003 p. 98) (IMG)

Years later, the same Khrushchev who had exaggerated the importance of individual leadership so to make the latter cast a shadow over the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat, attacked the 'cult of personality' around Stalin – which Khrushchev had himself promoted – in order to undermine the dictatorship of the proletariat. It is interesting to see what a SAVAK document, three decades later, stated regarding this. A SAVAK spy, referring to Khrushchev, stated:

He violated the laws of the evolution of human societies and fell in love with the heads of state.

It is as if the fate of humanity can be determined by the heads of state.

(The Interrogation session of Mr. Parviz Nikkhah [Jalaseh Bazjuyi az Aqaye Mohandes Parviz Nikkhah], SAVAK, Parviz Nikkhah, Khordad 22, 1344 / June 12, 1965. Source: 'Parviz Nikkhah According to SAVAK Documents' [Parviz Nikkhah be Revayat e Asnad e SAVAK] book, page 187. In: The Center of Historical Documents Survey) (IMG{Khrushchev – Political})

He was referring to how Khrushchev failed to take into account the role of structure and material forces surrounding one, and instead presented the fate of humanity as being in the hands of the state leaders.

Besides Beria, another close ally of Khrushchev was Malenkov. In fact, it was Malenkov who had elevated Nikita Khrushchev within the Soviet state and Party. The MI6 agent and former Bukharin ally Grigori Tokaev recalled that in the mid-1930s,:

Khrushchev was only Secretary of the Moscow Party organisation; he had been brought to the fore by Malenkov when the latter was head of the cadres section of the Moscow Committee. (Comrade X, Grigori Tokaev, 1956, p. 67) (IMG)

Like Khrushchev, Malenkov was a Trotskyite. Tokaev wrote:

Not that Malenkov has ever been a very precise [Bolshevik] ideologist. In 1917, as a young Cossack near Orenburg, he found himself – more by chance than choice – on the side of 'the Reds'. He did not become acquainted with the theories of Bolshevism till 1920, when he was sent on a two-months' study course, hardly a thorough grounding, before he joined the Party. However, in 1924 he became secretary of the Party branch of the Moscow Technical Institute, then one of Trotsky's bastions. In those days Malenkov signed many an anti-Stalin, Trotskyist resolution; not by deep conviction, but rather by sheer inertia. (Comrade X, Grigori Tokaev, p. 67) (IMG)

By the late 1930s, when the Great Purge was nearing its end, Malenkov was about to be not elected in the Party. Khrushchev came to the rescue of his ally. Indeed, in his memoirs, regarding the late 1930s, Khrushchev admitted:

Discussion of the candidates who had been nominated for the province party committee was under way. Specifically they were discussing Malenkov. Malenkov was standing up [in front of the assembly] making explanations. They told me that he had already been up there for an hour or more, and each answer gave rise to new questions about his party loyalty and his activity during the Civil War. The story he was telling was not clear-cut and didn't hang together very well. A situation had taken shape in which Malenkov might fail to be elected. As soon as Malenkov finished and stepped down from the speaker's platform, I stood up and spoke in support of him. I said: "We know him very well, and his past provides no reason for us to have any doubts or suspicions. He's an honest person and has given everything he has to the party, to the people, to the revolution." Malenkov remained on the list of candidates. (Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev, Vol. 1: Commissar (1918-1945), Nikita Khrushchev, p. 128) (IMG)

Beria's appointment as the head of the Soviet security and intelligence apparatus also intensified the British agent's conflict with Zhdanov. Not for one second did the latter trust Beria. Referring to Beria's promotion as the head of the NKVD, Sergo Beria stated:

Zhdanov was against it. (Svetlana, Stalin's daughter, was to confirm this to me later, having heard it in Zhdanov's family circle.) Zhdanov had begun to intrigue against my father while we were still in Georgia. He already saw in him a dangerous rival. (...) As soon as we were installed in Moscow Zhdanov put my father under surveillance by his personal guard. My father noticed this, and even discovered that people working for him were spying on him for the benefit of the Central Committee and reporting to Zhdanov. None of this prevented the maintenance of a facade of outward cordiality. Zhdanov pretended to be pleased with my father's promotion. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 36) (IMG)

Zhdanov supported Beria's promotion as a counter-weight against the Yezhovschina but Zhdanov also opposed Beria, knowing the true face of that man. Stalin too closely surveilled the activities of Lavrenti Beria:

All that he had was Ignatiev, the head of State Security. Stalin had always taken care to have the police apparatus under his personal control. My father had had experience of that in 1938-43. 'I couldn't take a step without being watched by him. I tried to get round that by vigilance but rarely did I succeed, and then at great risk.' (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 243) (IMG)

In this covert conflict between Zhdanov and Beria:

Malenkov was also involved. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 36) (IMG)

Malenkov too was an ally of Beria, as will be revealed later on. They were both old allies of Khrushchev, but did not really need Khrushchev to be the bridge between them. As is well-known, Malenkov's assistant shadow was Bulganin. Meanwhile, Beria and Mikoyan maintained favorable relations with each other. Regarding the promotion of Lavrenti Beria in the late 1930s, his son Sergo Beria wrote:

Mikoyan, too, ... had formerly been a friend of my father's and ... undertook to protect my father. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 36) (IMG)

Hence came the team of Beria, Malenkov, Khrushchev, Mikoyan, and Bulganin. Such a team proved to be strategically important by the late 1940s. There were also many Beria agents that were directly elevated with and by Beria himself. One such person was Dekanozov. As the CIA put it:

Former Commissar (Third Rank) of State Security, Chief of the First, Chief Directorate NKGB (where he worked for a short while in 1941-42), was Vladimir Georgiyevich Dekanozov. The employees of the Second Chief Directorate who worked with him were amazed at his rudeness and arbitrariness. Dekanozov literally terrorized the workers in the Chief Directorate, calling many of them, without cause, "spies" and "traitors". His behaviour indicated that he had solid support in the top circles. Dekanozov was not interested in operational work and did not engage in it. (BERIYA PURGE, CIA, May 28, 1954, p. 5) (IMG{Titoist Coup})

Dekanozov was very much a Yezhov agent, just like Beria. He was a terrorist who attacked anyone he disliked with slanders of 'traitor' and 'spy'. Beria himself was a predator of girls:

during the time which Beriya had lived in Moscow (since 1938) he had seduced a great number of Moscow girls.... (BERIYA PURGE, CIA, May 28, 1954, p. 3) (IMG{Titoist Coup})

The girls who, in spite of the persuasions, refused to give in to him, which happened seldom, were subjected to threats and terrorized. (BERIYA PURGE, CIA, May 28, 1954, p. 3) (IMG{Titoist Coup})

notations of cynical nature made by Beriya on the feminine charms of the objects of his desire. These notes were also found during the search of his private belongings. (BERIYA PURGE, CIA, May 28, 1954, p. 3) (IMG{Titoist Coup})

Years later, the Stalin faction of the Soviet judicial system confirmed the fact of the degeneration of sex by the fascist gangster Lavrenti Beria. There are naïve individuals who regard as ‘improbable’ the allegations directed against Beria regarding the degeneration of sex, even if acknowledging that Beria was an MI6 agent and traitor to Soviet power. Of course, in accusing Beria of such a thing, one would need evidence (and the ample evidence has already been provided by both the CIA and the judicial ruling done by the remnants of the Stalin faction in 1953), for it would be criminally unjust to accuse someone of such a crime without good-quality evidence. Nonetheless, one should have been surprised if Beria had not been a corruptor of sex. Historical experience has shown that people who betray the freedom forces on so vast a scale have a natural tendency towards corrupting sex. Committing treason on such a vast scale is dialectically correlated with the degeneration of sex. Many interrogators know this fact about the dialectical correlations, which is why during interrogation sessions, the high-ranking traitors are questioned on the wildest of corrupt deeds, ranging from pedophilia to neo-Pagan ‘black magic’ rituals to festivals of cannibalism.

There were numerous other Beria agents, many of whom will be mentioned in other chapters. However, as a summary, the following quote is instructive:

if Beria’s rule was more liberal than Yezhov’s, it was only at the cost of introducing new forms of corruption into Soviet life. (Comrade X, Grigori Tokaev, 1956, p. 122) (IMG)

Beria had misused the period of the Great Purge in order to carry out Yezhov-style terror so to discredit the Great Purge. The same Beria supported Trotsky, Bukharin, Tukhachevsky, as well as Malenkov, Mikoyan, Khrushchev, and Dekanozov among others. Under Beria’s authority, corruption grew in many kinds of ways: financial corruption, degeneration of sex, military sabotage, etc.

C9S4. The Assassination of Trotsky *** IMG-All-{Factional Conflict & Great Purge}

Dan La Botz, a prominent Trotskyite author and prominent member of the officially Trotskyite ‘Solidarity’ group, describes the role of the communist party in Mexico as such:

During the Comintern’s Third Period, the PCM had at first characterized Cárdenas as a “fascist.” But by mid-June 1935 the line had changed and he had become a progressive deserving of Communist support. At the same time, the new president ended the government’s repression of the Communist Party whose prisoners were liberated from the penitentiaries. Communists could now organize openly and they built significant worker and peasant organizations in the midst of a national working class upheaval comparable to those in Spain, France, and the United States in the same period.

The Mexican Communist Party played a key role in the emerging National Union of Petroleum Workers and its clash with Standard Oil and Royal Dutch Shell, a conflict used as the pretext by Cárdenas to buy and to nationalize all of the foreign oil companies in Mexico. The PCM also supported and participated in Cárdenas’ expropriation of hacienda land and its distribution to indigenous and peasant ejidos, state-owned lands leased in perpetuity to those who worked them.

The Popular Front strategy called upon the Communists to become part of a political alliance, such as it had done in France in May of 1936 in forming part of the coalition that elected Léon Blum. In Mexico, however, Cárdenas had reorganized and renamed the ruling, now calling it the Party of the Mexican Revolution (PRM). The PRM was based on the four pillars of the labor unions, the peasant leagues, the public employees and self-employed, and the army. Unlike France, there was no parliamentary coalition, so the PCM did not fit into this schema.

There was no popular front to join and in any case the Communists had no parliamentary delegates and no way to directly influence the PRM leadership or shape the PRM program. The Communists did run for office though some were elected as member of the Confederation Mexican Workers (CTM), not as Communists. Even then they succeeded in electing just two federal delegates and several local delegates. Nevertheless, the Mexican Communists enthusiastically supported Cárdenas, who rewarded them with secondary government posts in a few government agencies, such as the Education Department.

By 1938, the Communists had nearly 20,000 members, most of them industrial workers, teachers, peasants, students and government employees. The Communists represented a real force in the labor movement,

(‘The Mexican Communist Party: Founded 100 Years Ago – Gone Since 1981’, Dan La Botz, December 18, 2019) (IMG)

As La Botz has admitted, the PCM gained a significantly greater influence during the reign of Lazaro Cardenas. To the wrath of the British, the Mexican government provided funds to the Spanish Republic. To the wrath of the Anglo-Americans, the Mexican government took control of the oil industry formerly owned by the Anglo-American imperialists. To the wrath of the British, Mexico was coming increasingly under the influence of the Soviet-friendly forces, meaning that in a not-so-distant future, Mexico could be the country that would hand Trotsky over to the Soviet intelligence, thereby paving the way for the thorough interrogation of Trotsky. While much of Trotsky’s network of agents and collaborators had been purged, there still unsurprisingly remained some of Trotsky’s agents in the USSR. Thus, handing Trotsky over to the USSR would have seriously undermined not only German intelligence, but also British intelligence, influence in the Soviet Union. Trotsky’s death on the other hand, could bury with Trotsky many of the secrets known to him.

Plan A therefore was to undermine the influence of the Mexican Communist Party, the pillar helping to uphold the Cardenas administration. The weakening of communist influence would have surely reduced the chance of a thoroughly Soviet-friendly (not necessarily socialist) government rising to power in Mexico, hence reducing the chances of Trotsky from being handed over to the Soviet intelligence. The way to undermine the Mexican Communist Party and Soviet influence was to falsely link them to terrorism. The British agent Trotsky therefore decided to assist US intelligence in achieving this goal.

Trotsky established contacts with the proto-McCarthyite US Special Committee on Un-American Activities, also known as the Dies Committee, which was a US intelligence front organization officially established by the US Congress, and had the task of tracking communist activists inside and outside the USA. Trotsky admitted that he collaborated with the notoriously anti-communist Dies Committee:

In the Mexican press yesterday, dispatches from the United States reported that I might appear as a witness before the Dies Committee of the House of Representatives of the United States and make depositions concerning the activities of the Mexican and Latin American Communists, particularly in connection with the oil question. These dispatches are so worded as to imply that for several years I have turned documents over to the agents of this committee, that I was visited in Mexico by the committee's representatives, and so on. These implications represent a pure invention from beginning to end.

On October 12, I received the following telegram from the committee:

"Leon Trotsky, Mexico City,

"Dies Committee of the United States House of Representatives invites you to appear as witness before it in the city of Austin, Texas.

City designated with view to your personal

convenience. . . . The Committee desires to have a complete record of the history of Stalinism and invites you to answer questions which can be submitted to you in advance if you so desire. Your name has been mentioned frequently by such witnesses as Browder and Foster.

H8 This Committee will accord you opportunity to answer their charges. . . .

"J. B. Matthews, Chief Investigator, Special Committee on Un-American Activities."

Independently of the political tendency of the chairman of this committee, I could not find it permissible to avoid appearing as a witness in a public investigation. My answer

was:

"I accept your invitation as a political duty. . . ."

It was a matter thus of my testimony about the "history of Stalinism"....

(The Dies Committee, Leon Trotsky, December 7, 1939, p. 1. In: Leon Trotsky Collected Writings, 1939-1940. In: archive.org) (IMG)

None of Trotsky's activity in support of US intelligence was enough to destabilize communist presence in Latin America. The imperialist-fascist agent Trotsky therefore launched a terror attack against himself. Describing the terrorist attack, Trotsky stated that the terrorists entered his room at some point, fired **200 shots** including at his mattress and he did not die! Based on such outrageous remarks by Trotsky, many came to the conclusion that Trotsky was not present in his own room during the terrorist attack. Here is what Trotsky wrote:

The attack came at dawn, about 4 A. M. I was fast asleep, having taken a sleeping drug after a hard day's work. Awakened by the rattle of gun fire but feeling very hazy, I first imagined that a national holiday was being celebrated with fireworks outside our walls. But the explosions were too close, right here within the room, next to me and overhead. The odor of gunpowder became more acrid, more penetrating. Clearly, what we had always expected was now happening: we were under attack. Where were the police stationed outside the walls? Where the guards inside? Trussed up? Kidnapped? Killed? My wife had already jumped from her bed. The shooting continued incessantly. My wife later told me that she helped me to the floor, pushing me into the space between the bed and the wall. This was quite true. She had remained hovering over me, beside the wall, as if to shield me with her body. But by means of whispers and gestures I convinced her to lie flat on the floor. The shots came from all sides, it was difficult to tell just from where. At a certain time my wife, as she later told me, was able clearly to distinguish spurts of fire from a gun: consequently, the shooting was being done right here in the room although we could not see anybody. My impression is that altogether some two hundred shots were fired, of which about one hundred fell right here, near us. Splinters of glass from windowpanes and chips from walls flew in all directions. A little later I felt that my right leg, had been slightly wounded in two places. (...).

My wife and I were convinced on the next day that the assailants had fired only through the windows and doors and that no one had entered our bedroom—however, an analysis of the trajectory of the bullets proves irrefutably that eight shots which struck the wall at the head of the two beds and which left holes in four places in both mattresses, as well as traces in the floor underneath the beds could have been fired only inside the bedroom itself. Empty cartridges found on the floor, and the lining of a blanket singed in two places testify to the same thing.

When did the terrorist enter our bedroom? Was it during the first part of their operation before we had yet awakened? Or was it, on the contrary, during the last moments when we were lying on the floor? I incline toward the latter supposition. Having fired through the doors and windows several scores of bullets aimed at the beds and not hearing any outcries or groans, the assailants had every reason to conclude that they had accomplished their work successfully. One of them might have at the last moment entered the room for a final check. Possibly the bed clothes and pillows still retained the form of human bodies. At four o'clock in the morning the room was in darkness My wife and I remained motionless and silent on the floor. Before leaving our bedroom the terrorist who came in for verification deeming that the task had been already accomplished might have fired a few shots into our beds "to clear his conscience."

(Stalin Seeks My Death, Leon Trotsky, Written: 24 May, 1940, First Published: The Fourth International, Vol. 2 No. 7, August 1941, pp. 201-207, Translated: By The Fourth International, Marxists Internet Archive) (IMG)

Two hundred shots at the place in which Trotsky was supposedly sleeping, and Trotsky did not die!

As mentioned in C5S1, NKVD chief Yagoda – the ally of Bukharin, hence covertly of Trotsky – plotted, in collaboration with the White Guard agents of the Gestapo and MI6, a fake assassination attempt against Trotsky so to discredit the Soviet state while making a martyr out of Trotsky. The provocative terror plot failed, as Stalin leaked the White Guard plan to the press, Trotsky's admissions revealed. Years later, in Mexico, Trotsky was busily involved in another fake 'assassination' plot 'against' himself. Trotsky's dirty hands in this self-assault is confirmed by the intelligence service and media of the Mexican government headed by Cardenas.

Natalia Sedova Trotsky, the wife of Leon Trotsky, remarked that Lazaro Cardenas was an honest man who sought to protect Leon Trotsky, who sought to find out the truth, and who sought to help Trotsky after the terror attack launched on him. In a letter to Cardenas, Natalia Trotsky wrote:

Permit me to offer to your wife and yourself my most profound appreciation for your visit, for your sincere sentiments, for your unalterable conviction in the honor of Leon Trotsky and for the contempt manifested by you toward calumny and lie. (...). You prolonged the life of Leon Trotsky for 43 months. I carry in my heart my gratitude for those 43 months. Not only I, but hundreds of thousands of incorruptible fighters, who struggle for the emancipation of humanity.

Your tender attention sustained us in the sorrowful moments of the loss of our son in February, 1938. And again you came to help us after the perfidious attack of our enemies against our house on May 24. Saturday (August 24) once more you proved your activity in

favor of him who had from you the possibility of living on Mexican soil. Permit me, Mr. President, to repeat here the expression of my deepest gratitude to the people of Mexico, to its government and to you particularly.

(Natalia's Letter to Cardenas, from: Natalia Sedova Trotsky, to: Lazaro Cardenas, Written: 13 September 1940, Source: Socialist Appeal, Vol. 4 No. 38, 21 September 1940, p. 1. Online Version: Natalia Sedova Internet Archive, August 2020. Marxists Internet Archive) (IMG)

As can be seen, Natalia Sedova Trotsky stated that the government of Mexico showed honesty, and regarded Cardenas as an honest man. Remarkably, the Mexican government's counter-intelligence and media noted that Trotsky had engineered a terror attack against himself in May 24. Leon Trotsky admitted:

the representatives of the investigation ... take a serious attitude toward the absurd idea of self-assault. (Stalin Seeks My Death, Leon Trotsky, Written: 24 May, 1940, First Published: The Fourth International, Vol. 2 No. 7, August 1941, pp. 201-207, Translated: By The Fourth International, Marxists Internet Archive) (IMG)

Trotsky further wrote:

Why were these two members of the guard arrested and not the others? Because Otto and Charles served as liaison agents with the authorities and with our few friends in the city. Preparing the blow against me, the investigating magistrates decided first of all to isolate our house completely. On the same day a Mexican, S., and a Czech, B., our young friends who had visited us to express their sympathy, were placed under arrest. The aim of the arrests was obviously the same: to cut off our connections with the outside world. The arrested members of the guard were confronted with a demand that they confess in "a quarter of an hour" that it was I who had ordered them to carry out the "self-assault." I am not at all inclined to exaggerate the importance of these episodes or to invest them with a tragic meaning. They interest me solely from the standpoint of the possibility of exposing those behind-the-scenes forces that were able in the course of 24 hours to bring about an almost magical turn in the direction of the investigation. These forces continue even today to exert an influence on the course of the investigation.

On Thursday May 30 when B. was questioned in Via Madera, all the police agents proceeded from the theory of self-assault....

(Stalin Seeks My Death, Leon Trotsky, Written: 24 May, 1940, First Published: The Fourth International, Vol. 2 No. 7, August 1941, pp. 201-207, Translated: By The Fourth International, Marxists Internet Archive) (IMG)

Mexico's ruling party newspaper El Nacional also agreed that the attempt on Trotsky's life was theatrical:

In contradistinction to all other newspapers of the capital, El Nacional did not even mention the attempt in the first section of its issue for May 25. In the second section it carried a dispatch under the heading "Trotsky Subjected to a Theatrical (!) Attempt in His Home." On what basis the paper reached its appraisal remained unknown. I am, unfortunately, compelled to assert that in several prior instances the paper attempted to ascribe to me reprehensible actions without a shadow of justification.

It is worthy of the most diligent attention that on the same day on which El Nacional called the attempt "theatrical," El Popular wrote, "The attempt against Trotsky is an attempt against Mexico." At first sight it might appear as if El Nacional displayed a much more hostile attitude toward the victim of the assault than did El Popular. As a matter of fact that is not the case. By its conduct El Nacional merely revealed that it is much further removed than El Popular from the sources of Stalinism, and consequently the source of the assault. El Nacional has editors who strive to do all they can to please the Stalinists. They know that the simplest way is to utter some sort of suspicion towards me. When the editors received news of the assault against my home, one of the editors placed in circulation the first ironical formula that came into his head. This very fact shows that the editors of El Nacional, in contrast to the editors of El Popular, know not of what they write.

In the following days there is to be observed, however, a drawing together of the lines of these two publications. El Nacional, gathering from the conduct of El Popular that it blurted out very incautiously its hypothesis of a "theatrical" attempt, beat a hasty retreat and assumed a more guarded position. For its part, El Popular, becoming convinced that none of the participants of the attempt had been arrested, began to pass over to the position of a "theatrical" attempt. The story of May 27 "Mr. Trotsky Contradicts Himself" was also carried by El Nacional. On the basis of an analysis of the articles in El Popular and a comparison between them and the articles in El Nacional it is thus possible to state with certainty that Toledano knew in advance of the preparations for the attempt, even if in the most general way. The GPU simultaneously prepared-along different channels-the conspiratorial plot, the political defense and the disinformation of the investigation. During the critical days El Popular received instructions, undoubtedly, from Toledano himself. It is quite probable that none other than he is the author of the article of May 25. In other words, Lombardo Toledano took moral part in the preparation of the attempt and in covering up its traces.

(Stalin Seeks My Death, Leon Trotsky, Written: 24 May, 1940, First Published: The Fourth International, Vol. 2 No. 7, August 1941, pp. 201-207, Translated: By The Fourth International, Marxists Internet Archive) (IMG)

Trotsky's fake 'assassination' plot against himself was being further exposed, thereby allowing elements in Mexican intelligence to encircle Trotsky.

As Trotsky himself admitted, he had lost connections to the 'outside world', meaning that it was not possible for him to move out of Mexico so easily. In this situation, there was an increased risk of Trotsky himself being interrogated by Mexicans, thusly exposing the farcical nature of the terror plot, and the imperialist-fascist hands in the Trotskyite plots. Trotsky's self-hitting plot was backfiring. Therefore, another assassination plot was engineered against Trotsky.

Shortly prior to his death Trotsky also confessed that his son and many others of his family members were assassinated by the Gestapo. In an article that Trotsky wrote shortly prior to his death, Trotsky admitted:

In the last few years, the Gestapo in the U.S.S.R has killed hundreds of my friends, including members of my family. In Spain, the Gestapo killed my ex-secretary, Ervin Wolff, and many members of my party; in Paris they killed my son, Lew Sedow.... ('The Gestapo, Organizer of the Assault', Leon Trotsky, 1940, p. 2) (IMG)

A look at Trotsky's writings on intelligence matters will demonstrate to the reader that Trotsky frequently accused the Stalin faction of the Soviet secret service of "supporting" the White Guards and the Gestapo. This provides context to Trotsky's attempt to link the Gestapo's assassination plots to Stalin. Trotsky's confession that the Gestapo was responsible for the murder of Leon Sedov (Lew Sedow) was part of his more general project at 'proving' the alleged parallels and alleged operational relationship between the Soviets and the Nazis. One of his articles is titled "The Inseparable Connection between the Komintern and the Gestapo," as an FBI document showed. Trotsky's revelation against the Nazi German secret service

would have surely been damaging to the Gestapo. Such a revelation would have undermined the MI6 as well. At the time, the British Empire still regarded the Nazi Reich favorably as a bulwark against Soviet power. Trotsky did not get the chance to live long enough to publish such an article. Indeed, just before he could publish his article exposing the Gestapo role, he was assassinated by the MI6. There is an FBI document that sheds light on this matter. An FBI document referred to an:

informant [who] was interviewed by Special Agent E. F. McNAMARA of this office. (Subject: 'BOMBING OF BRITISH PAVILION, NEW YORK WORLD'S FAIR, July 4, 1940. EXPLOSIVES.', To: Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington, D. C. Written by: B. E. SACKETT (Special Agent in Charge), New York, September 16, 1940, p. 3) (IMG)

The FBI informant referred to by the document:

stated at this time that he was assured from a confidential source that the agents of the British Intelligence Service had been responsible for the death of the late LEON TROTSKY.... (Subject: 'BOMBING OF BRITISH PAVILION, NEW YORK WORLD'S FAIR, July 4, 1940. EXPLOSIVES.', To: Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington, D. C. Written by: B. E. SACKETT (Special Agent in Charge), New York, September 16, 1940, p. 2) (IMG)

The FBI document detailing the report of the FBI informant continued:

the British Intelligence Service were ... eliminating a dangerous rival [of Stalin] in the person the late LEON TROTSKY. (Subject: 'BOMBING OF BRITISH PAVILION, NEW YORK WORLD'S FAIR, July 4, 1940. EXPLOSIVES.', To: Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington, D. C. Written by: B. E. SACKETT (Special Agent in Charge), New York, September 16, 1940, p. 3) (IMG)

Trotsky's confession against German intelligence bosses was not the sole reason why his death was useful to the imperialist-fascist secret services. The arrest of Trotsky by the Cardenas Administration could lead to the extradition of Trotsky to the USSR and the exposing of the dirty hands of the Trotskyite spies of the Anglo-American-German secret services in the USSR and Latin America. **Having arrested Trotsky's henchmen, and having prevented Trotsky's contacts with the rest of the world, the Mexican counter-intelligence was on the verge of arresting, and interrogating, Trotsky himself. Before such an arrest and potential extradition to the USSR, before the dirty hands of Anglo-American-German intelligence services could be exposed, Trotsky was eliminated so that the secrets he kept would go with him down to the grave.**

The public trials against Trotskyite conspirators in the USSR and the Mexican government's investigation against Trotsky's self-assault were further and further challenging Trotsky and Trotskyism. At a time when Trotskyism was decaying and being further and further exposed, only the 'martyrdom' of Trotsky and his family members could bolster Trotskyism, while ensuring that the secrets known by Trotsky would be buried with him. Through spilling the blood of Trotsky and his family members, the imperialist-fascist secret services saved Trotskyism. At the same time, the assassination of Trotsky was useful in associating the Comintern and the Soviets with global terrorist networks, a network that was in reality sponsored by the Anglo-Americans and the Axis, not the Soviets. Trotsky himself admitted that the PCM was not responsible at least for the first terror attack:

In its official declarations the Communist Party reiterates that individual terror does not enter into its system of actions, etc. No one supposes that the assault was organized by the Communist Party. The GPU makes use of the Communist Party but is not at all merged with the Communist Party. (Stalin Seeks My Death, Leon Trotsky, Written: 24 May, 1940, First Published: The Fourth International, Vol. 2 No. 7, August 1941, pp. 201-207, Translated: By The Fourth International, Marxists Internet Archive) (IMG)

However, the second terror attack, which did murder Trotsky inevitably caused the PCM to be regarded as terrorist-linked. Through the assassination, the MI6 embarrassed the PCM, the pillar of the progressive elements in the Mexican government. Cardenas himself was ousted three months after Trotsky's death. A Soviet-friendly (even if not necessarily PCM-dominated or socialist) government to the south of the United States would have helped the USSR to blackmail American imperialists into contributing more to the oncoming Great Patriotic War against the Axis forces in Europe. Later on, during the Cold War, it could have helped undermine US interests in Latin America and undermine the US regime from the south. American imperialists certainly did not like being blackmailed into fighting Nazism.

To annihilate the cadres of a hostile organization at once, either through a direct military conflict or through a shadow war, is to produce a quantitative leap that yields a qualitative change in the character of the targeted organization and renders the targeted organization incapable of a powerful response. Typically, to assassinate only one enemy leader is to make a martyr out of that hostile leader, to raise the vigilance of his followers, and to thereby provoke a mighty backlash in his/her favour. Such is why the assassination of Leon Trotsky was itself a Trotskyite adventure, and little surprise lies in the fact that the terror operation was committed by one of the MI6 agent Trotsky's own henchmen, Ramon Mercader, at the behest of the MI6.

Pavel Sudoplatov reportedly 'admitted' in his memoirs that Trotsky was assassinated by Soviet intelligence. Sudoplatov was a Beria agent, who in turn was an MI6 agent. Amy Knight, a scholar from the CIA's Wilson Center, admitted:

While the Fourth Administration consisted mainly of Beria loyalists such as Sudoplatov, NKVD officials in the republican and regional partisan groups often came from the border guards, which had a history of friction with the political police. (Beria: Stalin's First Lieutenant, Amy Knight, p. 122) (IMG)

Among the Beria supporters who remained in leading MGB posts throughout this period were ... Pavel Sudoplatov.... (Beria: Stalin's First Lieutenant, Amy Knight, p. 167) (IMG)

C9S5. Soviet Response to Nazi Invasion of Poland *** IMG-All-{Poland – 1939}

By 1939, the British were becoming increasingly wary of the expansion of Nazi Germany's finance capital, and began to slowly set up the infrastructure for altering their strategic alignment, hence to eventually realign with the USSR. The British were preparing for an anti-Axis alliance with the USSR, but were not yet going to join the USSR. This was clearly demonstrated in the fact that even as late 1940, the British were militarily sponsoring Finland after having provoked that country into a war with the USSR. The British and the Nazis both militarily sponsored Finland as will be shown in C9S6. Many other plots were being hatched by Britain against Soviet power as late as 1940. Hence, even by mid-1940, the British were not opposed to the Nazis. Until 1940, the British needed the Nazi Germans to continue to expand.

This meant that Poland was to join the Nazi project for a German-dominated Pan-Europe. The MI6-backed ruling junta in Poland held a line favorable to the Nazi Germans and had militarily allied with them in the war on Czechoslovakia, as mentioned in C8S3. Since the British needed the Nazis to expand further and take over Poland so that it can fight the Soviets more, Poland's ruling clique, being loyal agents of British intelligence interests, decided to practically hand Poland over to Nazi Germany and refused Soviet aid against the Nazis. Recall that the MI6 station in Poland had admitted:

Nor do the Poles feel the same horror of Nazism as is felt in democratic countries. No doubt there is such a feeling among socialists and peasants, but this does not extend to the ruling classes; and even among the peasants there is a dislike of Jews which counterbalances the disgust with which other countries regard the manifestations of German anti-Semitism. (Sir H. Kennard (Warsaw) to Viscount Halifax, September 10, 1938; Received: September 13, 1938, No. 73 Saving: Telegraphic [C9648/5302/18], in: Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, Series 3, Vol. II, The Internet Archives, p. 287) (IMG)

The 'democratic countries' to which the above intelligence report referred undoubtedly also included the British imperialist bourgeois-democracy, which did officially criticize the Nazis, but also, as mentioned previously, supported the Nazi military expansion. Hence, the British 'support' for the Soviet offers of aid to Poland was a classic MI6 deception game.

Numerous intelligence documents corroborate that the USSR offered to help Poland against the oncoming and expected German assault, a few days prior to Hitler's invasion. Three of these British diplomatic/intelligence documents will be provided here. One stated:

We have done our best both with M. Beck and with General Staff to persuade Polish Government to agree to passage of Soviet troops but I am afraid, notwithstanding all the arguments we could adduce, political objections appear to be overwhelming.

2. For some time past opinion here has been evolving slowly in favour of accepting Russian assistance in material and even, conceivably, technical personnel in the event of war but a request for passage of Russian troops goes far beyond this. M. Beck does not exclude it absolutely if Poland has her back to the wall but I could not persuade him to contemplate making arrangements now.

It must be remembered that it is not twenty years since Russian armies were at the gates of Warsaw. Passage of Russian forces has been the rock on which every proposal for a collective alliance in Eastern Europe has since foundered. Moreover although Russia has for centuries been the national enemy it must be admitted that Polish Government are not solely guided by prejudice and have strong internal political reasons for their attitude. It is almost unthinkable that the present political structure of Eastern Galicia could survive the entry of Russian troops especially as Communism makes a certain appeal to young Ukrainians. In Vilna area large White Russian population is politically immature and is easily influenced by Soviet propaganda. Poles of all classes are obsessed with fear of Communism and it must be remembered that in Poland Communism is not simply an intellectual idiosyncrasy in easy but means refusal to resist a potential invasion.

4. No Pole would ever expect to recover any territory occupied by Soviet troops and pressure on Poland has not yet reached such a pitch that Polish Government can be induced to envisage these . . . 2 losses for any of the territory.

5. Only way I can see of advancing matters would be if a joint memorandum could be prepared by British and French General Staffs based on reports from Military Missions in Moscow and stating in full military and economic advantages involved including precise quantities of war material and any Soviet Government could make available.

(No. 279 Telegraphic [C 11585/3356/18], Sir H. Kennard (Warsaw) to Viscount Halifax, Warsaw, August 20, 1939, 2.10 AM, received August 20, 1939, 9.30 AM. In: "Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939", Series 3, Vol. II, The Internet Archives, p. 87) (IMG)

Another document stated:

Military Attache accompanied by Musse saw Polish Chief of Staff this morning and conveyed to him strategic consideration affecting the question of Soviet collaboration in time of war as set out in his despatch No. 63 of today, copies of which were sent to the War Office by air.

2. General Stachiewicz underlined vital nature of principles involved [in] passage of Soviet troops across Polish territory and his strong suspicion of the bona fides of the Soviet Government. He said in no case could admission of Soviet troops into Poland be agreed to and that the mind of the Polish Government was made up.

The Military Attache stressed the advantages to be gained by Soviet collaboration and the great danger of a rupture in the negotiations. He proposed as Polish General Staff were unable to give their tacit consent in principle even to purely staff discussions of military aspects of passage of Soviet troops across Polish frontier, discussions which incidentally would in no way involve prior consent of Polish Government to any final concrete proposals tli.it might be made, it might be better for a definite Polish answer to be deferred until Polish General Staff had been able to give fuller con- sideration to strategic factors involved. Military Attache suggested in this connexion that the best solution might be for a joint memorandum to be prepared by British and French General Staffs based on discussions in Moscow setting out fully the military aspects of Soviet collaboration.

3. General Stachiewicz adhered to his opinion that no useful purpose could be served by discussing the passage of Soviet troops across Polish territory but he promised to refer to Marshal Smigly-Rydz question of postponing a final decision and further consideration of military factors involved.

4. General Stachiewicz [is] conveying views of the Marshal to Military Attache tomorrow morning.
Repeated to Moscow and Paris.

(No. 276 Telegraphic [C 11583/3356/18], Sir H. Kennard (Warsaw) to Viscount Halifax, Warsaw, August 20, 1939, 2.9 AM, received: August 20, 1939, 9.30 AM. In: "Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939", Series 3, Vol. II, The Internet Archives, pp. 84-85) (IMG)

Still, another British intelligence document is as follows:

M. Beck gave me this evening considered reply of the Polish Government which was, as I feared, negative.

2. The French Ambassador and I had previously agreed that should the reply be negative we should suggest to M. Beck that under the circumstances it would be preferable that while M. Beck should inform us of the views of his Government we should not treat his reply as an official one and that in the hope of easing the situation at Moscow it should be agreed that the request had not been put or answered officially, but that had such a reply been insisted upon it would have been in the negative.

3. M. Beck said that he had consulted the Marshal and that the views of the military authorities generally were the same as those he had already expressed. It had always been a fixed principle of Poland's policy that the passage of no foreign troops should be permitted on Polish soil and the Polish Government object to the passage of Russian troops across Polish territory just as much as that of German troops. He felt that Marshal Voroshilov was attempting today to reach in a peaceful manner what he had attempted to obtain by force of arms in 1920.

4. He had now heard from Moscow that when recently Marshal Voroshilov had made request for the passage across Polish territory of Russian troops, the Allied delegation had replied that Poland was a sovereign country and that it was for her to express her attitude. He

was grateful for this reply and wished to do anything he could to facilitate the task of the Allied delegation which he realized was a difficult one. He suggested that the greatest secrecy should be preserved as to the demarche which the French Ambassador and I had made, and agreed that it should be treated as a purely unofficial exchange of views.

Repeated to Paris and Moscow.

(No. 277 Telegraphic [C 11584/3356/18], Sir H. Kennard (Warsaw) to Viscount Halifax, Warsaw, August 20, 1939, 2.9 AM, received: August 20, 1939, 9.30 AM. In: "Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939", Series 3, Vol. II, The Internet Archives, pp. 85-86) (IMG)

The Polish government did not allow the Soviets to enter Poland in order to deter the Nazi German invasion, because a Nazi German presence in Poland was more beneficial to them than a Soviet presence.

The apologists for the Polish regime would argue that the Soviet military presence in Poland would have given the Soviets the leverage to overthrow of the Polish regime allowing the Soviets to "oppress" Poland. The argument does not bear weight. Firstly, the Soviets were not oppressors. Secondly, the Polish regime was reactionary and pro-Nazi, and thus its overthrow would have been progressive. Thirdly, even if one is to assume the Polish bourgeois-nationalist narrative that the Polish regime was a victim rather than a victimizer, and that this victim Polish regime was caught between two allegedly "equally evil" "totalitarian imperialist" powers, the USSR, AND Nazi Germany, the intervention of the Red Army troops into Poland was still necessary to "defend Poland" against Nazi Germany and against the allegedly "evil" USSR. Assuming that such an entirely baseless Polish bourgeois-nationalist pro-Nazi anti-Soviet narrative is correct, one thing that Poland's regime could do against both of these "equally evil" "totalitarian powers" was to invite the Red Army troops into Poland, and at the same time, to secretly sign a deal with Nazi Germany so that Nazi Germany invades Poland just when the Red Army troops arrive, thus to yield a balance of power between these two allegedly "equally evil" "totalitarian powers." Poland would have been immensely damaged as a result of becoming such a battlefield but it sure could retain its alleged "freedom" against the "equally evil" "totalitarian powers." Even that scenario would have required Soviet Red Army intervention. But, no, the Polish junta was hostile to the USSR and allied to Nazi Germany, and thus had every reason to prevent a Red Army intervention while allowing for a Nazi conquest of Poland. Anyways, on September 1st, 1939, Poland was invaded by the Nazi Germans. The Anglo-French who had officially formed a defensive pact with Poland, declared war on the Nazi Reich, but Britain did not help Poland. The 'war' between Germany and Britain was a 'phony war', as the historians have correctly remarked. By mid-September, the Polish government was nearing collapse.

Almost two days prior to the Soviet intervention, Laurence Adolph Steinhardt – then US ambassador to the USSR and infamous for his vehement anti-communism – admitted in his intelligence report to the US State Department that the USSR would not risk a war with the Anglo-French, who had a defensive pact with Poland, through an invasion of Poland, and that the USSR would instead wait for the Polish government to collapse and then to deploy its troops. Steinhardt wrote:

546. My 536, September 13, 11 a. Although, in so far as I can ascertain no additional reservists are being called up, Soviet military preparations are continuing and anti-aircraft batteries have been mounted in and around Moscow. While I am more than ever convinced that it is the intention of the Soviet Government to aid and abet a speedy termination of the Polish-German conflict in the hope of a withdrawal of the main body of German troops to the western front, it is not yet certain what measures the Soviet would be prepared to take in the furtherance of that aim. It may be assumed from the violent and hostile tone against Poland in the Pravda editorial yesterday that the Soviet authorities are endeavoring, possibly through agents, to foment discontent and disorder among the Ukrainian and White Russian minorities in the rear of the Polish armies. It is even rumored, although I have been unable to obtain any confirmation thereof, that the German Government is pressing the Soviet Government for direct Soviet intervention in Poland, presumably in the hope of embroiling the Soviet Union in war with England and France. **I am inclined to regard this rumor with reserve, since according to previous information received from German sources the German Government would prefer a benevolently neutral Russia** which might prove a source of economic assistance to Germany. Nor is there any reason to believe that the Soviet Government has any desire or intention of becoming involved in a war with England and France at the present time. For this reason, it is probable that any Soviet action, even that outlined in the last paragraph of my telegram under reference, **will await the collapse of the smaller Polish Government and the obvious disintegration of the Polish State.** (861.20/488 : Telegram, The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, September 15, 1939. In: "Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers: The Soviet Union, 1933-1939", US State Department, 1952, p. 781. Bold added) (IMG)

On September 16, 1939, a Polish bourgeois-nationalist newspaper named Dziennik Krakowski admitted that the Polish government had ceased to exist:

September 16, 1939 (no. 248):

"The Polish government no longer exists. President Moscicki also in Czerniowcz. We have been abandoned and forsaken."

"It may be easy for such people to pack up their pearls and gems to go live carefree and prosperous in another country... . This behavior is worthy of people whose fatherland is always where they can best do business and where we goyim can most easily be cheated. These gentlemen in caftans have fled en masse—and if the German occupation has any advantage for Poland, perhaps it is that, at least for a while, it has put a stop to this plague and perhaps may even—for now we don't yet dare hope — free us from it completely." ("Flight or Starvation")

(‘Reptile Journalism: The Official Polish-language Press Under the Nazis, 1939-1945’, Yale University Press, Lucjan Dobroszycki, 1994, p. 39. The Yeshiva University’s Fund for east European Jewry Research provided funds for Dobroszycki’s research.) (IMG)

The USSR deployed its troops on September 17, shortly after the Polish government had collapsed. This meant that according to international law, the Soviets did not invade Poland, since international law requires the existence of an aggressed state for there to be an invasion. This is also why, as predicted by the American ambassador to the USSR, the Anglo-French – who had a defensive treaty with Poland – declared war on the aggressor Nazi Germany but did not declare war on the non-aggressor Soviet Union.

Though potentially acknowledging that the USSR did not invade Poland, the critics may argue that the intervention was nonetheless unjustified because after all Polish territory was being taken and the Polish people were being ruled by a foreign country. This argument is flawed because firstly, one must recall that it was Poland that had invaded these Soviet territories in 1920 (see C3S3). Secondly, the majority of the population living in so-called ‘Eastern Poland’ (western USSR) were actually from ethnicities of the Soviet Republics. Thirdly, the Polish regime was pursuing an oppressive and brutal policy of settler-colonialism against the indigenous populations of ‘Eastern Poland’, whereas the Soviets were regarded as liberators by the local population of ‘Eastern Poland’. There is ample evidence testifying to these facts.

An excerpt of a lecture by the official biographer of Churchill states:

The Nazi-Soviet partition of Poland distressed Churchill enormously. But he knew that the line of the partition gave Russia those areas which, in 1920, Britain had also wanted to give Russia – where Poles were in a minority. (“The Origins of the ‘Iron Curtain’ Speech”, a lecture by: Martin Gillbert (the Official Biographer of Sir Winston Churchill), delivered at: The Winston Churchill Memorial, Westminster College, Fulton, Missouri, April 26, 1981, p. 12) (IMG)

The Polish regime, upon conquering the western USSR (or ‘Eastern Poland’) in the 1920s, began a policy of settler-colonialism against the populations it conquered, a process referred to as ‘Polonization’ (rhyming with ‘colonization’). Information provided by an American intelligence agent were recorded in a US intelligence document, an excerpt of which is as follows:

Under Poland, Ukrainian nationalism seems particularly strong primarily because the Poles treated the Ukrainians as an inferior race; the Poles brutally denied them cultural autonomy; their chances for professional advantages were severely curtailed, particularly in the Polish army and civil service; all manner of Ukrainians were arrested and beaten for opposing in any way the complete Polonisation of this ethnically Ukrainian territory. The Poles erroneously believed that the Galician Ukrainians represented a disloyal Soviet fifth column in their midst. (“Subject: Stephen BANDERA and the ZChouN (Foreign Section of the Organisation of the Ukrainian eNationalists).”, From: “SR/W2”, To: “SR/WC/[]. SR/DC/[], EE/SSS/[]”, January 13, 1952, p. 4. In: “QRPLUMB VOL. 1_0011.pdf”, CIA) (IMG)

The US intelligence document added that the Poles regarded the Ukrainians as the ‘fifth column’ of the Soviets:

The Poles ... believed that the Galician Ukrainians represented a disloyal Soviet fifth column in their midst. (“Subject: Stephen BANDERA and the ZChouN (Foreign Section of the Organisation of the Ukrainian Nationalists).”, From: “SR/W2”, To: “SR/WC/[]. SR/DC/[], EE/SSS/[]”, January 13, 1952, p. 4. In: “QRPLUMB VOL. 1_0011.pdf”, CIA) (IMG)

The MI6 station in Poland reported that young Ukrainians found communism appealing:

It is almost unthinkable that the present political structure of Eastern Galicia could survive the entry of Russian troops especially as Communism makes a certain appeal to young Ukrainians. (No. 279 Telegraphic [C 11585/3356/18], Sir H. Kennard (Warsaw) to Viscount Halifax, Warsaw, August 20, 1939, 2.10 AM, received August 20, 1939, 9.30 AM. In: “Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939”, Series 3, Vol. II, The Internet Archives, p. 87) (IMG)

Another intelligence document from the CIA archives was regarded as well-corroborated and reliable on all the statements it made except necessarily the ones regarding the Ukrainian fascist organization ZPUHVR. Wherein the intelligence document did not mention the ZPUHVR, the document too confirmed that the Polish regime until 1939 oppressed the Ukrainians in Poland. The document stated:

Vasyl MUDRY ... negotiated with the Polish government, concerning its decision (BECK's declaration at Geneva) that minority problems will not be submitted to the League of Nations but will be taken up directly with the minority, an agreement (normalization) that greatly extended the rights of the Ukrainian minority in the midst of the Polish State. Upon acceptance of the agreement (which was concluded through the intercession of LEVITSKY) Vasyl MUDRY was elected Vice Marshal of the Polish Parliament. The mode of existence between the Ukrainian minority and Polish majority was often disturbed by the Government in Warsaw, and this provoked the violent and brilliant intervention of V. MUDRY within the Parliament. Because of his attitude, he became the chief of the opposition in the Polish parliament. He was greatly respected by the democratic western world, and represented the Ukrainians at all the International Unions and Congresses. (‘Wasyl (Vasyl) MUDRY’. In: ‘QRPLUMB VOL. 1_0015’, CIA, p. 50) (IMG)

The document stated that Mudry was:

In conflict with the Polish Government from 1933 to 1939 because of the refusal of the Poles to consider a statute granting autonomy to Galicia within the framework of the Polish State (which was provided for in the "Normalization" agreement), because of the persecution of the Orthodox and Greek Catholic Churches and because of the hostile attitude of the Poles toward the existence of the Carpatho-Ukrainian State (formed Mar. 15, 1939) which Ukrainian public opinion favored.... (‘Wasyl (Vasyl) MUDRY’. In: ‘QRPLUMB VOL. 1_0015’, CIA, p. 50) (IMG)

The CIA established a special study of the different regions of the Eastern Bloc, called ‘Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas’. The document series, which drew on numerous intelligence documents which the CIA regarded as highly reliable, is therefore of special value. The document on Ukraine admitted that until World War II:

During World War I the region provided the largest Ukrainian military units and was the last stronghold of those favoring Ukrainian independence. After the war it became a part of Poland and continued to grow as a center of Ukrainian nationalism. The Polish government, despite its assurances that the rights of Ukrainians would be protected, attempted to repress Ukrainian institutions and to colonize Polish settlers in the region. (RESISTANCE FACTORS AND SPECIAL FORCES AREAS UKRAINE, CIA, August 1957, p. 108) (IMG)

As can be seen, the Polish regime pursued a policy of settler-colonial occupation against the Ukrainians, who lived in Western USSR (or ‘Eastern Poland’).

This fact is reflected in the relative popularity of Soviet power among the Ukrainians in Polish-occupied western USSR. Thus, referring to the Ukrainians of ‘Eastern Poland’, another American intelligence document added:

Union with the Soviet Ukraine would seem to be a more natural association for them than a return to Polish rule, which has a long record of bitterness and failure. (POLISH-SOVIET FRONTIER: ALTERNATIVE BOUNDARIES, US Intelligence (in CIA archives), March 26, 1943, p. 10) (IMG)

Similarly, the Byelorussians (White Russians) were supporters of communism and Soviet power, and were willing to join the USSR:

The White Russian-speaking of the northern provinces ... had both national and social grievances against the pre-1939 Polish regime; there was some sympathy with the Soviet Union and with Communism. Generally speaking the White Russians seem to have welcomed the Soviet occupation in 1939, for it meant liberation from their Polish landlords and the redistribution of land to the peasantry. Under Polish rule their living standards were so low that there could hardly be any strong objection, on economic grounds, to incorporation in the Soviet Union, despite the adjustments involved in the process of “Sovietization”. In the cultural sphere there White Russians of former Poland would probably have greater opportunities for development in association with Soviet White Russia than as citizens of a reconstituted Poland. (POLISH-SOVIET FRONTIER: ALTERNATIVE BOUNDARIES, US Intelligence, March 26, 1943, p. 9) (IMG)

The US intelligence document further added:

The year and a half of Soviet occupation of Eastern Poland was not a happy experience for many of the former leading elements among the Ukrainian and White Russian population. The nationalist political parties were liquidated. The intelligentsia and “kulak” elements, and even some Communists, were persecuted. The collectivization of agriculture, gradually introduced in 1940 and 1941.... Generally speaking, however, the elimination of the Polish ruling class and the fact that a distribution of land to the peasants preceded collectivization (which could then be introduced slowly and without the use of force), compensated for the “invasion” of Communist Party men and G.P.U. agents, ... and the campaign against religion. (POLISH-SOVIET FRONTIER: ALTERNATIVE BOUNDARIES, US Intelligence, March 26, 1943, p. 10) (IMG)

Vast numbers of Poles living in the so-called ‘Eastern Poland’ were sent to the camps inside the USSR, since again, these were not just ordinary Poles but rather were settler-colonial Poles, kind of like the Israeli settlers in the West Bank. Later on, under the terms of the temporary alliance between the Polish government-in-exile and the USSR during the Great Patriotic War, these settler-colonial Poles kept in the USSR were released. The Soviets allowed them to move to Iran; they then moved out of Iran. Under British direction, these settler-colonial Poles – who were majority non-Jewish – ended up temporarily residing in British-occupied Israel-Palestine.

C9S6. The Winter War *** IMG-All-{Baltic-Finland}

Patrick Salmon, the official historian of the British Foreign Office, confirmed that the military staff of Estonia and Finland held close ties to the German armed forces and that they posed a danger to the USSR:

In August 1939 the American military attache in Riga wrote that these fortifications would be ‘a serious menace to the operations of the Soviet vessels’. In the light of the close contacts of the general staff of both countries with the German armed forces, there were therefore concrete grounds for Soviet anxiety. ‘Great Britain, the Soviet Union and Finland at the Beginning of the Second World War’, Patrick Salmon. In: ‘The Baltic and the Outbreak of the Second World War’, Cambridge University Press, editors: John Hiden and Thomas Lane, 1992, p. 101) (IMG)

The Finnish islands could serve the Nazi German naval blockade of the Soviet Union:

In 1935 German naval exercises revealed the strategic importance of Estonian and Finnish islands for a possible German naval blockade of the Red Navy's access to the Baltic Sea. (Nazi German Policy Towards the Baltic States on the Eve of the Second World War, Rolf Ahman. In: ‘The Baltic and the Outbreak of the Second World War’, Cambridge University Press, editors: John Hiden and Thomas Lane, 1992, p. 52) (IMG)

As for Finland, the Soviet Union had a series of requests and offers to Finland before the Winter War broke out:

In the negotiations with Finland, the Soviet Union is mainly concerned with the settlement of two questions:

- a) Securing the safety of Leningrad,
- b) Becoming satisfied that Finland will maintain firm, friendly relations with the Soviet Union.

Both points are essential for the purpose of preserving against external hostile aggression the integrity of the Soviet Union coast of the Gulf of Finland and also of the coast of Estonia whose independence the Soviet Union has undertaken to defend.

In order to fulfill this duty, it is necessary:

- 1) To make it possible to block the opening of the Gulf of Finland by means of artillery fire from both coasts of the Gulf of Finland in order to prevent warships and transport ships of the enemy from penetrating to the waters of the Gulf of Finland;
- 2) To make it possible to prevent the access of the enemy to those islands in the Gulf of Finland which are situated west and north-west of the entrance to Leningrad;
- 3) To have the Finnish frontier on the Carelian Isthmus which is now at a distance of 32 km from Leningrad, i.e. within the range of long-distance artillery, moved somewhat farther northwards and north-westwards.

A separate question arises with regard to the Kalastajasaarento in Petsamo, where the frontier is unskillfully and artificially drawn and has to be adjusted in accordance with the annexed map.

With the preceding as a basis it is necessary to settle the following questions by having in view a mutual arrangement and common interests:—

- 1) Leasing to the Soviet Union for a period of 30 years the port of Hanko and a territory adjoining thereto, situated within a radius of 5-6 nautical miles southwards and eastwards and within a radius of 3 nautical miles westwards and northwards, for the purpose of creating a naval base with coastal artillery capable of blocking by artillery fire together with the naval base Paldiski on the southern coast of the Gulf of Finland, the access to the Gulf of Finland. For the protection of the naval base the Finnish Government should permit the Government of the Soviet Union to keep in the port of Hanko the following garrison:

- 1 Infantry regiment,
- 2 Anti-aircraft battery groups,
- 2 Air-force regiments,

1 Battalion of armoured cars, altogether not more than 5000 men.

- 2) Granting to the naval forces of the Soviet Union the right of using the bay of Lappohja as an anchorage.

- 3) Ceding to the Soviet Union, in exchange for other territories, the following territories:

The islands Suursaari, Seiskari, Lavansaari, Tytärsaari and Koivisto, part of the Carelian Isthmus from the village of Lipola to the southern border of the town of Koivisto, and the western parts of the Kalastajasaarento, in all 2,761 km² in accordance with the annexed map.

- 4) In exchange for the territories mentioned in paragraph 3, the Soviet Union cedes to the Republic of Finland Soviet Union territory in the districts of Repola and Porajarvi to the extent of 5,529 km² in accordance with the annexed map.

5) Strengthening the Treaty of Non-Aggression between the Soviet Union and Finland by including therein a paragraph according to which the Contracting Parties undertake not to join any groups or alliances directly or indirectly hostile to either of the Contracting Parties.

- 6) Suppression of the fortified zones situated on both sides of the frontier between Finland and the Soviet Union and leaving Frontier Guard troops only at the frontier.

7) The Soviet Union does not object to the fortifying of the Aaland Islands by Finland's own work provided that no foreign Power, Sweden included, has anything to do with the question of fortifying the Aaland Islands.

(‘Memorandum of the Government of the USSR, Handed in Moscow on October 14th, 1939, by MM. Stalin and Molotov to M. Paasikivi’.

In: ‘The development of Finnish-Soviet relations during the autumn 1939 in the light of official documents’. Publication of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland. Doc. nr. 13. Suomen Kirja, Helsinki 1940., as cited in: histdoc.net) (IMG)

Finland rejected the Soviet demands. This was not out of consideration of the interests of the Finnish people but out of love for Nazi Germany and the British intelligence service.

Finland had been a country that hosted MI6 and Nazi German intelligence bases, and harbored the Ukrainian fascist gangsters of Bandera. As with most Nazi German intelligence agents during the 1930s, Bandera was first and foremost an MI6 agent and was secondarily a Nazi German agent. One of the bases of operations against the USSR conducted by Bandera’s group was located in Finland. Stephen Dorril, the famous scholar on MI6, remarked:

From the mid-thirties, MI6, under its chief, Admiral Sir Hugh 'Quex' Sinclair – previously head of Naval Intelligence in the 'Intervention' years against the Bolsheviks – patronised Bandera's extremist faction, which had been condemned by the League of Nations as a 'terrorist syndicate'. Open to a variety of offers, Bandera's followers were recruited by the MI6 head of station in Finland, Harry Carr, and used as a network of informants inside the Soviet Union (since Bandera was in prison it is unlikely that Carr actually met the OUN leader as some accounts suggest). Carr, who was attracted to Bandera's brand of anti-communism, soon began to deliver funding and support for operations to infiltrate agents across the Finnish-Soviet border.... (MI6: Inside the Covert World of Her Majesty’s Secret Intelligence Service, Stephen Dorril, p. 224) (IMG)

Hence, Bandera’s gang represented one of the circles connecting the MI6, the Nazi German intelligence, and the Finnish regime. (There is evidence that Bandera seriously turned against the Nazis for the brief period 1941-1942 when the MI6 and their agent Wilhelm Canaris really did turn against the Nazis, but that matter is beyond the scope of this work.)

It must also be noted that the Nazi Reich and the Finnish regime were unofficially allies against the USSR since long before the end of the Winter War. Nazi Germany had provided extensive military support to Finland. Furthermore, the Finnish regime’s commanders were pro-German. According to a British intelligence document:

many Finnish officers, both senior and junior, are great admirers of the German military system. (Wing Commander Johnson to Mr. K. T. Gurney. No. A.A.28. Secret. Inclosure in: N 948/31/63, Mr. Snow to Viscount Halifax, No. 30 Confidential. Helsingfors, February 10, 1939. Received: February 22, 1939. In: Foreign Office (1939), p. 46) (IMG)

The intelligence document, which was written in February 10, 1939 added that in the event of war between the USSR and Nazi Germany, Finland will side with the Reich:

That Finland will never defend her neutrality in a war between Russia and Germany, that she will support the latter, and that Finnish guns will not be directed against a German after all the services rendered to Finland by Germany in past difficulties. (Wing Commander Johnson to Mr. Snow. No. A.A.6. Confidential. Inclosure in: N 948/31/63, Mr. Snow to Viscount Halifax, No. 30 Confidential. Helsingfors, February 10, 1939. Received: February 22, 1939. In: Foreign Office (1939), p. 47) (IMG)

The following excerpts of a conversation between the British commander Johnson and Colonel Kempff, the Swedish military attache in Helsinki, show the depth of the influence of Nazi Germany over Finland’s military and the pervasive powers of such pro-Nazi commanders:

I then asked the colonel if he felt that there might be some portion of truth in [his] statement ... [on] the pro-German sympathies of certain senior Finnish generals, coupled with a suggestion I had heard that in any crisis the army and the Schutz Corps generals would probably form a military dictatorship and take over from the Government.

Colonel Kempff said that such a situation was likely....

I suggested that the Schutz Corps system gives the generals such a control over the country districts that they could probably establish their position fairly easily by a sudden *coup d’Etat*.

Colonel Kempff agreed that this was quite likely, and then went on to tell me confidentially that whenever he had discussed this matter with these generals after a good dinner and they had talked freely what was in their hearts, they all said: “We will never, under any circumstances, fight against Germany,” and they also said that in the event of a great war involving Germany and Russia they would take over from the Government at once.

The colonel then told me that nearly all the generals who were originally Jaegers felt like that. He mentioned Generals Osterman, Oesch, Grandell and Malmberg particularly, and said that they many old friends of their own ages who now held important posts in the German army. he also explained that if Finland was threatened by Russia, the Finnish army only possessed enough war material and ammunition to fight for one month and would therefore need help.

I said that, as these names included the Commander-in-chief and the Chief of Staff of the Finnish army and the Commander of the Schutz Corps, it appeared that the “Jaeger” generals could easily organise a pro-German military dictatorship. I also mentioned that if they were to call in the Germans to fight for them against Russia, it might mean involving Finland in the war on the opposite side to England, if the conflict was a general one.

The colonel agreed that in such circumstances that would be the case....

(Wing Commander Johnson to Mr. Snow. No. A.A.6. Confidential. Inclosure in: N 948/31/63, Mr. Snow to Viscount Halifax, No. 30 Confidential. Helsingfors, February 10, 1939. Received: February 22, 1939. In: Foreign Office (1939), p. 47) (IMG)

Furthermore,:

Towards the end of June the German Army chief of staff, General Halder, visited Estonia and Finland. Halder was accompanied by the head of the military operational planning department, Major Krebs, and his visit had been prepared by the German military attache in Helsinki, Colonel Rossing. Although he was apparently not allowed to see the Estonian defence preparations in this Narva region on the Estonian-Soviet border, Halder talked to the Estonian commander, Laidoner, and President Pats, and assured the Estonians that the German Navy would come to their aid in the event of a Soviet attack. Halder afterwards went to Finland to inspect Vyborg, Perkejarwi, and other strategically important Finnish defences. Shortly before Halder's visit, the head of German military intelligence, Admiral Canaris, had gone to Estonia. (Nazi German Policy Towards the Baltic States on the Eve of the Second World War, Rolf Ahman. In:

'The Baltic and the Outbreak of the Second World War', Cambridge University Press, editors: John Hiden and Thomas Lane, 1992, pp. 69-70) (IMG)

It is not entirely clear if Halder himself was anti-Soviet or not, as Halder had some Strasserite connections. Nonetheless, as an official inside the Nazi German regime, he inevitably had to be accountable to his anti-Soviet bosses even if he himself was not necessarily anti-Soviet. Therefore, the visit of Halder to Estonia and Finland did indeed signify the ties of Finland and Estonia towards Nazi Germany.

Prior to the outbreak of the Winter War, the Nazi Reich sent arms to Finland:

Germany had before the commencement of hostilities last summer contracted with Finland for the supply of certain anti-aircraft guns in exchange for nickel shipments from Finland. After the hostilities began, further shipments ceased. (F19/041-043, Memorandum by the Foreign Minister, Berlin, December 11, 1939, RAM No. 60. In: "Documents on German foreign policy 1918-1945", series D, Vol. 8: "THE WAR YEARS: September 4, 1939 – March 18, 1940", Washington, US Department of State, publication 5436, 1954, p. 512) (IMG)

According to a December 11th Nazi German intelligence memorandum by General Weizsacker, the Nazi Reich had sent weapons to Finland:

In a memorandum of Dec. 11. Weizsacker noted that on the previous day Kapitän zur See Burkner of OKW, after consulting Generals Thomas and Jeschonek, told him the following: "In the past four weeks, i.e., prior to the outbreak of the Russo-Finnish hostilities, only two shipments, each consisting of twenty to thirty 20 mm. anti-aircraft guns, had gone to Finland from Germany. There had been no further shipment of war material to Finland from Germany during that period. (...)" ("Documents on German foreign policy 1918-1945", series D, Vol. 8: "THE WAR YEARS: September 4, 1939 – March 18, 1940", Washington, US Department of State, publication 5436, 1954, p. 512) (IMG)

Galeazzo Ciano, the Italian Fascist foreign minister, admitted in his diaries that Nazi Germany had been providing arms to the Finnish regime for years:

November 28, 1939

The Duce completely approves of the speech which, unless something new comes up, will be delivered on the sixteenth of December. He speaks to me about the new President of the Chamber. He had already chosen de Francisci. I dissuade him. It does not seem to me right that my father's place should be filled by a mediocre individual who has been rescued by Fascism. I talk in favor of the appointment of Grandi, and the Duce decides it this way.

In the international field, nothing new except the increasing tension between Russia and Finland, which forecasts a coming attack. What is the attitude of the Germans? One thing is sure, and that is that for many years Germany has been supplying arms to the Finns. I did not neglect to find ways of informing the Russians of this.

('The Ciano Diaries: 1939-1943: The Complete, Unabridged Diaries of Count Galeazzo Ciano, Italian Minister Of Foreign Affairs'. Galeazzo Ciano, p. 172) (IMG)

The US intelligence at the time agreed that the Soviet Union would not invade Poland. Just three days prior to the onset of the conflict, the US ambassador to Moscow – who at the time was Laurence A. Steinhardt, who had replaced ambassador Davies – confirmed this fact. Lieutenant-Colonel Jouni Keravuori – a Finnish-American commander of the US Army who stated that he had several "personal interviews with Finnish officers who commanded platoons, companies, and battalions prior to and during the Winter War" and for whom many of these Finnish generals "provided personal papers" – wrote the following in his research paper:

17. Throughout November, matters were relatively calm in spite of a steady stream of abuse against Finland in the Soviet press.... However, an optimism prevailed in the Finnish government that a bad phase had passed and affairs with Russia would improve. This feeling was strengthened by a report on the 23rd that the American Ambassador to Moscow did not believe the USSR would attack Finland.

18. In a note on 26 November, the Finnish army was accused of an artillery attack at the village of Mainila.

('The Russo-Finnish War, 1939-1940: A Study in Leadership, Training, and Esprit-de-corps', US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Lieutenant-Colonel Jouni Keravuori, May 15, 1985, p. I-11) (IMG)

In spite of the fact that the USSR had no aggressive intent on Finland, the Finnish regime was encouraged by the British – the allies of Nazi Germany – to pursue a war against the USSR. Finland's own ally Nazi Germany admitted in an intelligence memorandum, that the British Empire, by encouraging Finland to reject Soviet proposals, brought about the conflict:

Only a few weeks ago Finland was about to come to an understanding with Russia, which might have been achieved by a prudent Finnish policy. An appeal to the League of Nations by the Finnish Government is the least suitable way of solving the crisis.

There is no doubt that British influence on the Finnish Government – partly operating through Scandinavian capitals – induced the Finnish Government to reject Russian proposals and thereby brought on the conflict. England's guilt in the Russo-Finnish conflict should be especially emphasized.

(Frames 111836-111837, serial 108, The State Secretary in the German Foreign Office (Weizsäcker) to the German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg), Telegram, No. 1008, Berlin, December 6, 1939. In: "Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941: Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Office as Released by the Department of State", edited by: Raymond James Sontag & James Stuart Beddie, p. 129) (IMG)

There was the famous artillery attack on Mainila, which Western media alleges was a false flag attack launched by the USSR against itself so to 'justify' its 'aggression' against Finland. In light of the absence of the USSR's aggressive intent towards Finland, in light of the British encouragement of Finnish aggression against the USSR, and in light of the absence of evidence that this was a false flag attack, it is reasonable to say that the attack on Mainila was likely not a false flag attack, thereby implying Finnish aggression. The war began.

Nazi Germany continued to provide arms to Finland in this midst, albeit via clandestine channels. Note that this was during the Nazi-Soviet Pacts era (1939-1941), when Nazi Germany and the USSR were wrongly alleged to be 'allies'. The MI6-backed Fascist Italy also provided arms. All of these are admitted by Galeazzo Ciano, the Italian Fascist foreign minister, who wrote in his diaries:

December 8, 1939

The Duce was quite satisfied with my report. On the other hand, he was furious at Balbo, who continues to carry on a press campaign in the Corriere Padano [a Ferrara daily], which is so openly anti-Communist that it implies an indirect crack at Germany. "He thinks," said

the Duce in my presence and in the presence of Pavolini, "that he can fish in troubled waters at home but he should remember that I am in a position to put everyone, without exception, to the wall."

I receive the Minister of Finland, who thanks me for the moral assistance given to his country, and who asks for arms and possibly specialists. No objection on our part to the sending of arms; some planes have already been sent. This, however, is possible only so long as Germany will permit the traffic. But how much longer will Germany consent? The Minister replies that that side of the question is settled, and confides to me that Germany herself has supplied arms to Finland, turning over to her certain stocks especially from the Polish war booty.

This proves that the German-Bolshevist understanding is not so complete as they would have us believe in Berlin and in Moscow. In reality, distrust, contempt, and hatred dominate.

(‘The Ciano Diaries: 1939 1943: The Complete, Unabridged Diaries of Count Galeazzo Ciano, Italian Minister Of Foreign Affairs’. Galeazzo Ciano, pp. 176-177) (IMG)

As a side note, it is worth mentioning that – so much for the alleged Nazi-Soviet ‘alliance’ – the Soviet war against the Finnish aggressors surely undermined Finnish exports to Nazi Germany:

All indications are that if Russia will not confine its demands to islands in the Gulf of Finland, Finland will offer armed resistance. The consequences for our war would be grave. Not only food and timber export' but also indispensable copper and molybdenum exports from Finland to Germany would cease. For this reason I you intercede with Russian Government in the sense that it should not go beyond a demand for the islands. (‘The German Minister in Finland (Blucher) to the German Foreign Office’, Frame 214964, serial 407, Telegram, Very Urgent, Wipert von Blucher, Helsinki, October 10, 1939, 9:30 p.m. Received: October 10, 1939, 12 midnight. No. 287 of October 10. In: “Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941: Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Office as Released by the Department of State”, edited by: Raymond James Sontag & James Stuart Beddie, p. 123) (IMG)

The war on Finland was a part of the Cold War of the USSR against Nazi Germany during the era of its superficially ‘friendly’ relations with that regime. At the time, the British Empire was an ‘enemy’ of Nazi Germany in words but not in deeds. The interests of British finance capital dictated that until some time between late 1940 and mid-1941, the British should assist the expansion of Nazi German influence throughout Europe so to undermine Soviet power. Hence, the British too supplied arms to Nazi Germany’s ally, Finland.

Some of the details of the British military funds sent to Finland are provided in the excerpts of a British War Cabinet document:

Major Magill had informed him that there were 3 Blenheim bombers in action with the Finns and 5 in the workshops, 2 having been lost in action. The remainder were apparently still on their way. He had brought back with him a complete statement of the ground facilities which the Finns possessed for the operation of additional aircraft.

THE MINISTER FOR CO-ORDINATION OF DEFENCE said that he had not any very up-to-date information of what aircraft had actually arrived in Finland, but the position so far as he knew it was as follows:-

Gladiators.

30 promised. All had arrived in Finland.

Gauntlets.

28 promised. 8 already shipped; none yet arrived in Finland. Manufacturers were supplying 2 a day to the packers.

Blenheims.

12 long-nosed and 12 short-nosed promised. 1 long-nosed Blenheim had been lost in transit and 1 delayed, for some unknown reason, in Sweden; 10 had arrived in Finland. 12 short-nosed Blenheims had reached Finland on the 27th February.

Lysanders.

17 promised. 9 already shipped; 6 had left by air, of which 2 had crashed en route. 2 more were due to leave by air on the 9th March,

Hurricanes.

12 promised. 11 had reached Sweden, one having crashed en route.

Rocs.

33 promised. 5 would go every four days by air, starting about the 9th March. A considerable quantity of bombs, spare parts and ancillary equipment was being sent at the same time as the aircraft.

(WAR CABINET CONCLUSION: Minutes and papers: CAB/65/12/7. W.M.(40) 62nd CONCLUSIONS, MINUTE 7, Most Secret, Confidential Annex, March 7, 1940. In: British National Archives) (IMG)

The interests of French finance capital were antagonistic to the interests of German imperialism; had the French imperialists sent actual material aid in high quantity or quality, they would have benefited their own imperial rival. Hence, the French imperialists provided token and ineffective ‘aid’ to Finland in the form of 12 bombers that were of little use because they ‘could not fly direct from north Scotland’, hence forcing the British themselves to have to contribute to the war effort:

The French were also sending 12 bombers, but it was understood that these could not fly direct from north Scotland and they would have to be shipped. The only way to get immediate assistance to the Finns seemed to be to send our own first-line aircraft over by air. They would have to be flown by R.A.F. personnel, either officially or in the guise of "volunteers". It was true that if we sent these aircraft, and some ground staff to accompany them, the ground staff might be lost for a long time if the Finns collapsed, but the aircraft could presumably be flown back and the machines themselves put into reserve.

(WAR CABINET CONCLUSION: Minutes and papers: CAB/65/12/7. W.M.(40) 62nd CONCLUSIONS, MINUTE 7, Most Secret, Confidential Annex, March 7, 1940. In: British National Archives.) (IMG)

In other words, French imperialist ‘help’ to the Anglo-German ally Finland, created additional costs to the British – deliberately so, because the interests of French finance capital converged with those of the USSR. Since British finance capital was allied to German finance capital, British finance capital was also antagonistic to French finance capital. In fact, France and the USSR had established a military alliance. In fact, on May 2, 1935,:

Franco-Soviet mutual assistance pact was signed in Paris. It was based on articles 10, 15, and 16 of the Covenant. They involved the obligation of both parties to consult together in case of a danger of aggression or give each other mutual assistance in case of unprovoked aggression. (A Chronology of Principal Events Relating to the USSR, Part I, CIA, p. 28) (IMG)

The rise of Nazi Germany's imperial power, and the rise of the fascist forces encircling France, all had contributed to bogging down the dominant faction of the French state and strengthening the fascist lobby in France. That is, the French imperialist allies of the USSR were weakened and the agents of Anglo-German finance capital had gained greater power by 1939, with the overthrow of the Spanish Republic and the overthrow of Czechoslovakia the previous year. These factors led to France to partially 'cooperate' with the British; thanks to the influence of the French finance capital, however, France ensured that its 'aid' would be token aid.

At the risk of severely weakening their own defenses, the British leaders agreed to send 50 bombers to Finland:

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS said that he did not think we should do any good by continuing to manoeuvre for position with Sweden and Finland. According to Brigadier Ling, Field Marshal Mannerheim felt that he had already made his appeal, though it was for bombers that he had asked as being his most urgent need. He thought that the right course was, therefore, to send some bombers immediately, and to waste no more time haggling with Sweden. (...).

THE PRIME MINISTER ... himself was in favour of taking considerable risks and sending a substantial number of bombers, provided always, of course, that the Finns were not intending to give way to the Russians. (...).

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he would not have acceded to any request for the despatch of further fighters, since this would have meant a direct weakening of our own defences. Our bomber force on the other hand was only a deterrent to attack on this country. He therefore suggested that we might offer 50 bombers to the Finns.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AIR pointed out that to weaken our bomber force in this country might invite attack on us by the Germans. He would like to have an opportunity of consulting his technical advisers before coming to a final decision. Suppose that we sent these aircraft, and then after all the Finns collapsed a short time afterwards, we should have incurred grave risk to no purpose. He doubted whether, if the Finns managed to last out till April, they would then be able to hold on until July, during the period of the thaw. His own opinion was that the despatch of these aircraft would do nothing more than postpone the inevitable for about three weeks.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR said that Major Magill's report tended to confirm this view.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER pointed out that the offer of 50 bombers would make a very big difference in the presentation of our case to the world. The Swedes would no doubt try to make out that we were only serving our own selfish interests and had no real desire to assist the Finns at all. But if we now offered 50 bombers, which we could ill afford, after the Swedes had refused to allow us to send an expedition to help the Finns, it would be clear that we had done everything possible to aid Finland. This was an important political consideration, which must be balanced against the risk we were running in denuding our bomber force in this country.

THE MINISTER WITHOUT PORTFOLIO observed that if we sent bombers, we must expect further demands from the Finns for other material, such as artillery, which they would say was essential to enable them to continue the struggle.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR said that one of the main reasons why the Finns wanted aircraft was for counter-battery work. We had no artillery to spare which were suitable for this purpose.

THE PRIME MINISTER suggested that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the Secretary of State for Air and himself should draft a communication to the Finnish Government in the light of the discussion which had taken place.

The War Cabinet: -

i) Agreed that authority should be given for the despatch of up to 50 bomber aircraft to Finland, subject to further consultation as to the technical problems involved, the arrangements necessary in regard to personnel, the dates of despatch, etc.

(ii) Authorised the Prime Minister and the Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs and Air, in consultation, to draft a telegram for despatch to Helsinki on the lines indicated in discussion;

(a) Asking for a definite answer within a specified period as to whether the Finns intended to issue an appeal for Allied land forces.

(b) Conveying to the Finns the promise of further air assistance as at (i) above.

Richmond Terrace, S.W.1.

("ASSISTANCE TO FINLAND". (Previous Reference: W.M.(40)61st Conclusions, Minute 5.), W.M.(40) 62nd CONCLUSIONS, Minute 7, Confidential Annex, Secret, March 7, 1940. From: "British National Archives". WAR CABINET CONCLUSION: Minutes and papers: CAB/65/12/7) (IMG)

The success of the Finnish forces during the Winter War is but an Anglo-Finnish myth. Both sides of the conflict, each in their own time, experienced successes and setbacks, no doubt. However, ultimately, by March 1940 – the end of the Winter War – the Finnish high command had come to terms with reality, concluding that overall, the Winter War was a defeat for Finland. The Mannerheim regime could not win the war or raise troop morale without a further Western military support – which was lacking. The following excerpts from a British War Cabinet meeting are very telling:

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR recounted a long talk which he had had on the previous day with Major Magill, who had returned by air from Finland on Monday, the 4th March.

Major Magill, who had many and close connections with the Swedes and Finns, had seen much of Field-Marshal Mannerheim, and reported that he had never seen him so depressed. Major Magill's assessment of the present situation had been as follows. The Finns, by character, had immense powers of endurance, but once they cracked they would break altogether. There were signs of physical failing, due to the tremendous strain to which the rank and file had been put, but the fighting troops would not be likely to give in unless the Finnish High Command began to weaken. The fear, therefore, was that the rot would set in at the top, particularly as the result of the constant defeatist pressure which Sweden never ceased to exert. Furthermore, the ability of the Russians to follow up their recent attacks had undoubtedly come as a catastrophic surprise to the Finnish High Command. There was still time to save the situation, but the remedy - and according to Major Magill, the only remedy in the opinion of the Finns - was the immediate despatch of bombing aircraft. The Finns had had to withdraw two Divisions to deal with the attacks which the Russians were launching across the ice, but these attacks could easily be countered by bombing the very vulnerable targets which were presented by the Russian columns advancing without cover across the open ice. More bombers were also required for attacking the Russian lines of communication in the Karelian Isthmus,

where very telling damage could be inflicted. Above all, these bombers were needed to put heart into the Finns, without which there was grave danger that they might make peace at any moment.

(WAR CABINET CONCLUSION: Minutes and papers: CAB/65/12/7. W.M.(40) 62nd CONCLUSIONS, MINUTE 7, Most Secret, Confidential Annex, March 7, 1940. In: "British National Archives".) (IMG)

Months prior, Mannerheim had expressed much confidence in defeating the Red Army; he believed that Finland would be able to hold out until May 1940, when in fact Finland 'resisted' the mighty USSR only until March. The following excerpt of a British War Cabinet document sheds light on this fact:

The Chief of the Imperial General Staff informed the War Cabinet that Brigadier Ling had returned the previous day from his visit to Finland, where he had seen Field-Marshal Mannerheim. Brigadier Ling reported that the Finnish morale was still high. (...). Field-Marshal Mannerheim was of the opinion that the Finns would be attacked by the Russians in force in February or March, but that they would be able to hold out until May, when the snows would melt. They would then lose the advantage which they at present enjoyed through the possession of skiing troops. Even so, the Finns were confident that they could stop any Russian advance across the Karelian Isthmus. Further north, however, they were likely to be overwhelmed by superior numbers unless they obtained reinforcements of trained volunteers. The figure of 30,000 had been mentioned. It would be necessary that volunteers should not come as units of the British Army, since this would inevitably provoke the Germans to occupy Finland and Sweden. They would have to arrive in small bodies, made up ostensibly of private individuals, though Field-Marshal Mannerheim's idea was that they would, in fact, be trained members of our armed forces. (WAR CABINET 11 (40), CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street, S.W. 1, on Saturday, January 13, 1940, at 11 a.m. From: British National Archives. Catalogue Reference: CAB/65/5/11. Printed for the War Cabinet. January 1940. Transcript provided in: histdoc.net) (IMG)

C9S7. The Quasi-Mythical 'Operation PIKE' *** IMG-All-{Operation PIKE}

The Soviet advances against the Finnish regime undermined the confidence of the Mannerheim gang. Mannerheim expressed to the British his desire for the Soviet oil industry in the Caucasus to be undermined. According to a document from the British War Cabinet:

The Chief of the Imperial General Staff informed the War Cabinet that Brigadier Ling had returned the previous day from his visit to Finland, where he had seen Field-Marshal Mannerheim. Field-Marshal Mannerheim's ... observation had been that, if we could stop the supplies of oil from Baku reaching Russia, this would end the war against Finland.

(CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street, S.W. 1, on Saturday, January 13, 1940, at 11 A.M. Present: Admiral of the Fleet the Right Hon. LORD CHATFIELD, Minister for Co-ordination of Defence (in the Chair). The Right Hon. Sir KINGSLEY WOOD, M.P., Secretary of State for Air. The Right Hon. LORD HANKEY, Minister without Portfolio. The Right Hon. LORD HANKEY, Minister without Portfolio. General Sir W. EDMUND IRONSIDE, Chief of the Imperial General Staff. Air Marshal R. E. C. PIERSE, Deputy Chief of the Air Staff. Rear-Admiral T. S. V. PHILLIPS, Deputy Chief of Naval Staff. *Secretariat*. Sir EDWARD BRIDGES. Mr. W. D. WILKINSON. Wing Commander W. ELLIOT. Lieutenant-Colonel E.I.C. JACOB, R.E. In: British National Archives. Catalogue Reference: CAB/65/5/11. Printed for the War Cabinet. January 1940.) (IMG{Baltic-Finland})

In this midst, the MI6 invented the quasi-mythical ('quasi' as in 'almost') contingency plan codenamed 'Operation PIKE'. Strategically ludicrous, the joke 'Operation PIKE' involved Anglo-French warplanes flying over Pahlavi Iran and the Turkish Republic so to bomb the Caucasus oil fields. The bombing of the Soviets would have also been 'justified' by the myth of the Nazi-Soviet 'alliance' since the French and the British would have bombed Germany's supposed 'ally' and 'top' supplier of oil, thereby allegedly harming Nazi German military production as well. Echoing such propaganda, the US Army's journal stated:

Then, during the winter of 1939-40, Stalin's army invaded Finland when demands for territorial concessions were not met. Concerned over the Soviet action, the British and French organized a plan to assist the embattled Finns. Before they could undertake any action, however, the Finns were defeated.

Increasingly fearful of German-Soviet cooperation, the British and French also devised a plan in March 1940 to bomb the Soviet oil-refining center at Baku in the Caucasus to deny oil to Germany. The attack was to be staged from Syria and Iraq during the latter part of June, but Germany overran France before the plan could be implemented.

("SOVIET MILITARY INTERVENTION IN IRAN, 1920-1946", Richard A. Stewart. In: "Parameters: Journal of the Army War College", Vol. 11, No. 4, December 1981, p. 26) (IMG)

Obviously, the truth was that an Anglo-French invasion of the USSR would have for long tilted the balance of power in favor of Nazi Germany, spelling the end of not just French imperialism but also British imperialism. The Anglo-French imperialists were considerate of this fact, which is why they did not carry out the PIKE plan. Such an analysis is shared by Patrick Osborn who is a British:

archivist for the National Archives and Records Administration. (About the Author, Operation Pike, Amazon)

Osborn is arguably the foremost anti-Soviet researcher on the issue of Operation PIKE. The anti-Soviet archivist concluded:

Someone would have had to have filled the power vacuum if Stalin's government collapsed; that in all likelihood would have been Hitler, who could have hardly passed a golden opportunity to seize the natural resources of the western USSR and the Caucasus if he had the chance. Then it would have been Hitler, not Stalin, who controlled the oil deposits of the Caucasus, which was hardly the result the Allies desired or expected to achieve by attacking the Soviet Union. In such a circumstance, the Allied blockade, the principal weapon against Nazi Germany, would have been an absurdity. ("Operation Pike: Britain Versus the Soviet Union, 1939-1941", Patrick R. Osborn, p. 249) (IMG)

While there is no doubt that the plan 'Operation PIKE' actually existed, it was a contingency plan that the British and the French knew they were not going to actually implement. Added to all of this was that even in the case of actual British implementation of such an operation, the French imperialists were only going to send token useless 'help' to the British in this campaign, since real help would have devastated the interests of French finance capital by undermining its ally, the USSR. What Operation PIKE did actually serve, however, was to help the British give promises to the Finns that more help was potentially going to come to Finland, through the bombing of the Soviet Caucasus. Giving promises of potential help is an old MI6 technique.

The PIKE Operation was shelved then, but the plan would be back on the table 6 years later, this time planned not as a contingency but as the main plan, with a more active German and American participation (see C17S3). It would be called Operation PINCHER.

C9S8. Nazi German invasion of France *** IMG-All-{Conquest of France}

Even when Nazi Germany invaded France, there is still plenty of evidence that the British Empire had not seriously turned against Nazi Germany. Nonetheless, the invasion against France was a step towards eventually upsetting the balance of power that the British sought to see in Europe. This led Britain to sharply reduce its anti-Soviet and pro-Nazi activity while stillly orienting towards anti-Sovietism and pro-Nazism. The sharp reduction in British anti-Soviet activity was manifest in the fact that in London,:

planning for Operation Pike [was] ... finally shelved when German forces invaded France and the Low Countries [Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxemburg] on May 10, 1940. (The Devils' Alliance: Hitler's Pact with Stalin, 1939-1941, Roger Moorhouse, 2014)

The British came ostensibly to the "assistance" of their French imperialist 'allies' by deploying their troops to Dunkirk for failed incursion. The Hitlerian army, lenient towards its covert ally Britain, ended up not taking out the British troops in Dunkirk. Hence the British Empire appeased Nazi Germany yet again and handed France over to fascist Axis, despite pretending otherwise.

The MI6 had a massive fifth column in France; the alliance that the MI6 had fostered with the Nazis years prior to the Nazi German invasion, had established the channel for the Nazi Germans to more freely sew their own intelligence networks and their own fifth column in France; hence, by the time the MI6 genuinely turned against the Nazi Germans, it was too late and the MI6 was not powerful enough to be able to help France much in the fight against the Nazi German intelligence network that the MI6 had previously helped in establishing.

At the time, France's Minister of National Defense was General Maxime Weygand. Weygand was loyal not so much to French finance capital but to reactionary class forces. When French imperial interests were antagonistic to the dictatorship of the proletariat, the USSR, Weygand was firmly loyal to France's government. When French imperial interests began to converge with the dictatorship of the proletariat, the USSR, Weygand reoriented his 'national loyalties' and made sure to cause as much mess in the French military as possible. Indeed, Weygand belonged to an international intelligence network of anti-Soviet generals. He had established such connections, as mentioned in C3S3, through his close collaboration with Petlura and Pilsudski and their respective armies of terror. The intelligence networks and armies of terror that Petlura and Pilsudski founded later overtly and covertly allied to the Nazis, and thus by extension, Weygand had covert ties to the Nazi Germans. Not surprisingly, during the Nazi German invasion of France, Weygand – as the chief of the French troops – decided to preoccupy himself not with the Nazi German invasion but with the 'threat' 'posed' by the communist-led anti-fascist popular front allies of France in the war against the Nazis. Thus, even:

when Hitler's troops had overrun most of the country, General Weygand was "impregnated with the fear of a Bolshevik revolution. 'If we do not make peace [with Nazi Germany] now, the soldiers will shoot their officers.'" (Operation Pike: Britain Versus the Soviet Union, 1939-1941. Patrick R. Osborn, p. 249) (IMG)

Not all wars are launched necessarily for the full annihilation of enemy troops. Military warfare, after all, is the continuation of the intelligence war by more physical means. The priority of the Nazi Germans in the war on France was more so to strike the French troops just enough so that their intelligence network at the high command of France can realign the French state into a direction favorable to the Nazi Germans. Hence, the Nazi Germans devastated the French military just enough to weaken the leverage of the enemies of the Nazi German regime in the French state apparatus, so that the Nazi German fifth column in France would have more room for getting French troops to surrender to the Third Reich. Weygand, who, as stated above, was trying to get France to make peace with Nazi Germany as much as possible and to reorient efforts towards fighting the Bolshevik 'threat', eventually succeeded. In the end:

[French] Prime Minister Paul Reynaud resigned because the majority of his Cabinet favoured asking Nazi Germany for armistice terms [as opposed to surrender]. (De Gaulle to Mitterrand: President Power in France, Martin Harrison, Jack Hayward, June 13, 1993, p. 12) (IMG)

As can be seen, France was betrayed by the Nazi German fifth column that existed in it, and the Nazi Germans quickly took that country over, despite the fact that the French had high quality military technology.

The new government of Marshal Petain had a number of collaborators. Weygand continued to serve in the Petain regime after the Nazi victory. One person who needs special mention in the case of collaboration was a Nazi German named Robert Schuman. Schuman was unique because his: primary language was French, but with the unique German accent of the Lorraine region. (Events that Formed the Modern World, Frank W. Thackeray, John E. Finding, p. 256)

That is because Schuman was from the Lorraine region, a territory disputed between Germany and France since at least the days of Bismarck. Prior to the First World War:

Schuman was educated at the University of Bonn, the University of Berlin, the University of Munich, and the University of Strasbourg, where he was awarded a doctorate in law. During World War I, he served in the German army but not on active duty. (Events that Formed the Modern World, Frank W. Thackeray, John E. Finding, p. 256)

By the end of the First World War, Germany was defeated, France emerged victorious, thereby regaining the territories of Alsace and Lorraine. Although Schuman was a German, once Alsace and Lorraine were given to France, Schumann 'became' a 'French' politician! Alan Paul Fimister studied:

both Modern History and Philosophy & Theology at the University of Oxford. In 1997 ... was elected Senior Scholar in Theology at Exeter College, Oxford. After studying Theology at the International Theological Institute in Austria ... completed his Ph.D. in the political Thomism of Robert Schuman at the University of Aberdeen in 2007. (About the Author, Amazon, Robert Schuman, Alan Fimister)

As a professor of modern history and theology, Fimister studied the Christian 'Democrat' politician Robert Schuman extensively. Fimister confirms that:

when President Lebrun asked the defeatist Marshal Petain to form a government on 16th June, Petain retained Schuman as Under-Secretary for Refugees; (Robert Schuman: Neo Scholastic Humanism and the Reunification of Europe, Alan Fimister, p. 161) (IMG)

Schuman continued to serve the Vichy State:

On 22nd June Petain signed the armistice and the government was moved to Vichy. Schuman followed [the government] with the archives of his department. (Robert Schuman: Neo Scholastic Humanism and the Reunification of Europe, Alan Fimister, p. 161) (IMG)

Almost two weeks later, Schuman made:

the faithful vote on 10th July 1940 investing Petain with full powers to reform the constitution of France, and in the interim, rule by decree. (Robert Schuman: Neo Scholastic Humanism and the Reunification of Europe, Alan Fimister, p. 161) (IMG)

In 1940, Schuman voted with the majority to confirm Marshal Philippe Petain as the leader of the Vichy government. [This] act ... was seen as a betrayal of democracy in France.... (Events that Formed the Modern World, Frank W. Thackeray, John E. Finding, p. 256)

Schuman later emerged as an even more powerful figure during the post-War years: the Nazi German Schuman became the Prime Minister and foreign minister of 'de-Nazified' France, and became known as the 'father' of Germany's European Union.

C9S9. The Baltics *** IMG-All-{Baltic-Finland}

As mentioned in C3S6, the peoples of Latvia and Lithuania were confirmed by the MI6 to be staunchly pro-Soviet, pro-Bolshevik, and pro-communist. Nonetheless, Early on in the years of the Civil War in the territories of the former Soviet Union, Imperial Germany had established puppet regimes in the Baltic countries, separating them from the USSR. In those years, the USSR nonetheless established peace treaties with those countries, parts of the terms of which were as follows:

Article 4.

The two Contracting Parties undertake:

(1) To ... forbid, within the limits of their respective territory the mobilisation and recruiting of any personnel intended for the armies of States, organisations, or groups, for purposes of armed conflict against the other Contracting Party. (...).

(2) Not to permit the formation or residence in their territory of organisations or groups of any kind claiming to represent the Government of all or part of the territory of the other Contracting Party ; or of representatives or officials of organisations or groups having as their object the overthrow of the Government of the other Contracting Party.

(Latvia and Soviet Government of Russia: Peace Treaty and Protocol, signed at Moscow, August 11, 1920. In: League of Nations – Treaty Series, No. 67, p. 215) (IMG)

Article 7. The two contracting Parties undertake: (...).

(4) (a) to refuse ... to organisations or groups whose object is armed warfare against either of the contracting Parties, the passage through their ports and their territory of anything which might be used in attacking the other contracting Party, and particularly of the armed forces attached to such States, organisations or groups, and of any objects and any war material of the artillery, commissariat, engineers, air force or other arm belonging to such military formations;

(4) (b) to forbid, except in cases provided for in international law, the launching and navigation in their territorial waters of any warships, gunboats, mine-layers, etc., belonging either to organisations or groups whose object is to make war upon the other contracting Party....;

(5) to forbid the ... the presence of representatives or officials of organisations or groups whose object is to overthrow the Government of the other Party to the Treaty.

(Estonia and Soviet Government of Russia: Peace Treaty and Protocol, signed at Moscow, August 11, 1920. In: League of Nations – Treaty Series, No. 289, pp. 57-59. Bold added.) (IMG)

Both contracting parties undertake:

(1) Not to permit on their territory the formation and sojourn of the Governments, organisations or groups, who have for their object armed warfare against the other contracting party. Similarly not to permit within their territories the recruiting and mobilisation of effectives for the armies of such Governments, organisations or groups, and the sojourn of their Governments and officials.

(2) To prohibit those countries who are de facto in a state of war with the other of the contracting parties, and also organisations or groups, who have as their object armed warfare against the other contracting party, the importation into their ports and the transport through their territories of all that may be made use of against the other contracting party, such as : armed forces, military equipment, technical war supplies and artillery, commissariat, engineering and flying materials,

(Lithuania and Soviet Government of Russia: Peace Treaty and Protocol, signed at Moscow, July 12, 1920. In: League of Nations – Treaty Series, No. 94, pp. 126-127) (IMG)

Any Baltic state alliance with an organization whose aim was armed conflict against Soviet power was forbidden by the terms of the treaty. Therefore, the peace treaties banned the formation of Baltic state anti-Soviet military alliances.

Fast forward to the mid-to-late-1930s. Supporting Nazi Germany's expansion as a means of brutally containing the influence of the USSR in Europe was part of Britain's agenda. In the case of the Baltics, this was clearly demonstrated in the fact that the British – under the guise of 'appeasement' – concluded a maritime treaty to de facto grant the Baltic Sea and the country of Estonia to Nazi Germany. In the words of a paper published by the US Naval Post-Graduate School,:

In 1935, Estonia's position in the international community was altered. That year, the British concluded a maritime treaty with Germany effectively granting the Baltic Sea into the German sphere of influence. This isolated Estonia geopolitically ... and they found themselves caught [by] a totalitarian Germany in the west.... ('ESTONIA - PROSPECTS FOR SURVIVAL IN THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY', Naval Post-Graduate School, Timothy J. Marshall, June 1997, p. 19) (IMG)

Since then, Estonia was further and further integrated into the German sphere of influence. One book that presents extensive information on the situation in the Baltics in those years is the 'The Baltic and the Outbreak of the Second World War' published by the Cambridge University Press, and edited by John Hiden, an advisor to the UK's Ministry of Defense with regards to the Baltic affairs. A chapter of the book was written by Rolf Ahman, a member of the NATO-collaborationist think tank, the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Ahman wrote:

It had emerged in contacts between the Estonian and Latvian military commands that ... the Estonian Army was concentrating on defending Estonia against an attack by the Soviet Union.... (Nazi German Policy Towards the Baltic States on the Eve of the Second World War, Rolf Ahman. In: 'The Baltic and the Outbreak of the Second World War', Cambridge University Press, editors: John Hiden and Thomas Lane, 1992, p. 67) (IMG)

So much for the pursuit of 'peace' by the German-backed regime in Estonia, Estonia was concentrating its military against the USSR. Since the mid-1930s, Nazi Germany expanded its influence in Estonia. The MI6 agent Wilhelm Canaris, who was also the head of Nazi Germany's intelligence service, established closer relations with the Estonian general staff:

Nazi Germany also seemed content that the Latvian Government did not implement its threat in 1935 to conclude an assistance treaty with the Soviet Union if Germany refused to participate in an Eastern security pact. Only Estonia, which had growing conflicts with the USSR but maintained good relations with Poland and Germany, received special German attention. (...). In the same year Germany concluded an agreement with Estonia which undertook to supply the German Navy with shale oil. In 1936, conversing with Akel, the Estonian minister in Germany and designated Foreign Minister of Estonia, Hitler called Estonia what he had previously called Poland: a 'glacis' of the European anti-bolshevist powers against the Soviet Union. At the same time the head of German military intelligence, Admiral Canaris, established closer relations with the Estonian general staff. (Nazi German Policy Towards the Baltic States on the Eve of the Second World War, Rolf Ahman. In: 'The Baltic and the Outbreak of the Second World War', Cambridge University Press, editors: John Hiden and Thomas Lane, 1992, p. 52) (IMG)

The year 1937 witnessed signs of increasing competition between the USSR and Germany for military influence in the Baltic region, with Nazi Germany concentrating on Estonia and the USSR on Latvia. The German Panzerkreuzer 'Leipzig' paid a visit to Tallinn and a Soviet Panzerkreuzer visited Riga. German officers observed Estonian military manoeuvres while Latvian officers were invited to the Red Army's manoeuvres. (Nazi German Policy Towards the Baltic States on the Eve of the Second World War, Rolf Ahman. In: 'The Baltic and the Outbreak of the Second World War', Cambridge University Press, editors: John Hiden and Thomas Lane, 1992, p. 52) (IMG)

In 1938, Estonia, which had the backing of Nazi Germany, had a number of border clashes with the USSR, in which the Soviet guards were murdered. In the words of an OSS document, on January 1938:

Estonia: Soviet guards killed on the border. (A Chronology of Principal Events Relating to the USSR, Part I, CIA, September 25, 1945, p. 87) (IMG)

And on February 1938:

Estonia: Second border clash with Soviet guards. (A Chronology of Principal Events Relating to the USSR, Part I, CIA, September 25, 1945, p. 89) (IMG)

Though it is difficult to prove that the Soviet guards were murdered by Estonia, there is no doubt that, already, the peace treaty between the USSR and Estonia had been betrayed. However, over time, more concrete evidence emerged of the aggressive anti-Soviet military intents of not only Estonia but also the other Baltic regimes, as well as the thorough betrayals and nullification of the peace treaties signed with the USSR.

During the late 1930s, the Nazi regime had its greedy eyes on Lithuania's strategic territory of Klaipeda. This fact has been documented in Ahman wrote:

At first the Nazi Government seemed to be satisfied with the isolation of Lithuania, which had territorial conflicts with Germany over the Klaipeda district and with Poland over the old Lithuanian capital, Vilnius. (Nazi German Policy Towards the Baltic States on the Eve of the Second World War, Rolf Ahman. In: 'The Baltic and the Outbreak of the Second World War', Cambridge University Press, editors: John Hiden and Thomas Lane, 1992, p. 52) (IMG)

Nazi Germany forcefully seized the strategic territory of Klaipeda from Lithuania, as means of undermining the anti-Nazi elements within the Lithuanian government and strengthening the leverage of pro-German elements such as the violently anti-Soviet Lithuanian commander in chief Rastikis.

Simultaneously, the Germans were seeking to establish agreements with Estonia and Latvia. The two Baltic states made their agreements with Nazi Germany conditional on Nazi German recognition of the Estonian-Latvian alliance:

The Baltic countries also lay on the line of Hitler's political offensive, which was confirmed by the way in which Klaipeda had been seized. It is worth noting that there were differences between the goals of German policy with respect to Scandinavia and the Baltic countries. If Hitler's policy toward the Scandinavian countries was mainly based on anti-British feeling (in the case of Finland also anti-Soviet feeling), then in the case of the Baltic countries it was pursued clearly in the context of German policy towards the USSR (...). Lithuania had signed such a treaty with Germany earlier, its contents being set out in Section 4 of the German-Lithuanian agreement of 22 March concerning Klaipeda. On 4 May Berlin presented Latvia and Estonia with a full text of the projected agreement. The Estonians and Latvians in their counterproposal made the realisation of the agreement conditional on the guarantee of the right of free trade and the recognition of an Estonian-Latvian military alliance. (Great Britain and the Baltic in the Last Months of Peace, March-August 1939. author: Mieczyslaw Nurek. In: 'The Baltic and the Outbreak of the Second World War', Cambridge University Press, editors: John Hiden and Thomas Lane, 1992, p. 37) (IMG)

The Latvian and Estonian regimes, who had established the recognition of the Estonian-Latvian alliance as a precondition for agreements with Nazi Germany, did establish their 'non-aggression' pacts with Nazi Germany, and the Nazis in turn promised aid to these regimes. More importantly however, the Latvian and Estonian militaries were oriented strictly towards combatting the USSR, with the backing of Nazi Germany. Indeed, from the archives of the Third Reich, the NATO-collaborationist think tank fellow Rolf Ahman presents the following quote:

In addition to the published non-aggression pacts Estonia and Latvia have agreed a secret clause with us. By the terms of this clause the two states are obliged to take all military security precautions against the Soviet Union in consultation with Germany and following advice from the German side. Both states recognize that the danger of attack exists for them only from the Soviet Union and that implementing their policy neutrality demands the concentration of all their defence forces against this danger. Insofar as they are not able to do this Germany will help them. (Nazi German Policy Towards the Baltic States on the Eve of the Second World War, Rolf Ahman. In: 'The Baltic and the Outbreak of the Second World War', Cambridge University Press, editors: John Hiden and Thomas Lane, 1992, p. 69. Citing: Informationsbericht no. 55, June 8, 1939. Informationsbericht no. 60, June 13, 1939. Both in BA Zsg. 101, 34.) (IMG)

Thus, the Nazi German, Latvian, and Estonian regimes had established an anti-Soviet military alliance thusly violating the principles of so-called 'neutrality' which they had agreed to, violating the terms of the peace treaty with the USSR, and most importantly, nullifying the peace agreements with the USSR.

Ahman further remarks:

The evidence presented here suggests that at least until the conclusion of the German-Latvian and the German-Estonian nonaggression pacts on 7 June, Nazi Germany operated with a special policy towards the Baltic states. Its short-term objectives were: to strengthen Estonia's and Latvia's neutrality in order to prevent them from becoming part of a Western-Soviet encirclement of Nazi Germany, and to secure and increase their food exports to Germany; and to use the Baltic region as a barrier against Soviet interference in the planned war with Poland by encouraging them to defend their neutrality against the USSR and to concentrate their forces in that direction. (Nazi German Policy Towards the Baltic States on the Eve of the Second World War, Rolf Ahman. In: 'The Baltic and the Outbreak of the Second World War', Cambridge University Press, editors: John Hiden and Thomas Lane, 1992, p. 73) (IMG)

In order to buy further leverage and to invest in Latvia's anti-Soviet military re-orientation, Nazi Germany began providing arms to Latvia well before the 'non-aggression' pact with that country was signed:

Before these pacts were signed Nazi Germany had already initiated negotiations with Latvia about the export of German military equipment there, valued at 15 million RM, which amounted to about half of the total German exports to Latvia in 1938. In his conversation with Munters on 7 June, Hitler stressed that Latvia would need weapons and praised the quality of German arms. (Nazi German Policy Towards the Baltic States on the Eve of the Second World War, Rolf Ahman. In: 'The Baltic and the Outbreak of the Second World War', Cambridge University Press, editors: John Hiden and Thomas Lane, 1992, p. 69) (IMG)

The Soviets were well aware of the German-Baltic plots hatched against them. Numerous documents prove this. For example:

According to Soviet documents, ... Estonia seems to have moved most of its army to the Soviet border, and to have received military equipment which was apparently transported by night trains to the new army concentrations. (Nazi German Policy Towards the Baltic States on the Eve of the Second World War, Rolf Ahman. In: 'The Baltic and the Outbreak of the Second World War', Cambridge University Press, editors: John Hiden and Thomas Lane, 1992, p. 69) (IMG)

Patrick Salmon, the official historian of the British Foreign Office, confirmed that the military staff of Estonia and Finland held close ties to the German armed forces and that they posed a danger to the USSR:

In August 1939 the American military attache in Riga wrote that these fortifications would be 'a serious menace to the operations of the Soviet vessels'. In the light of the close contacts of the general staff of both countries with the German armed forces, there were therefore concrete grounds for Soviet anxiety. 'Great Britain, the Soviet Union and Finland at the Beginning of the Second World War', Patrick Salmon. In: 'The Baltic and the Outbreak of the Second World War', Cambridge University Press, editors: John Hiden and Thomas Lane, 1992, p. 101) (IMG)

And in the case of Estonia too, the Estonian foreign minister had covertly called for an anti-Soviet alliance:

Other indications of what was coming were given by the German minister in Estonia, Frohwein, in conversation with the Estonian Deputy Foreign Minister, Oepik, on 24 April. Oepik had suggested 'a joint German-Estonian political campaign to counteract Soviet efforts to create a kind of protective domination over Estonia under the pretence of planned aggression against the Baltic States'. (Nazi German Policy Towards the Baltic States on the Eve of the Second World War, Rolf Ahman. In: 'The Baltic and the Outbreak of the Second World War', Cambridge University Press, editors: John Hiden and Thomas Lane, 1992, pp. 66-67) (IMG)

Also interesting is the use of the phrase 'under the pretence of planned aggression against the Baltic States'. That implies that the Estonians would pretend that the Soviets are aggressors, and thus the Baltic states would supposedly gain the 'right' to ally with Nazi Germany for an aggressive anti-Soviet effort.

Since the British had handed the Baltic Sea to the Nazi Germans so that the latter can confront Soviet power more, it was natural for Britain to be fine with the Estonian and Latvian regimes to conclude these pacts with these Nazis:

During the negotiations with Estonia and Latvia, Nazi Germany demanded an unrestricted neutrality obligation valid even in the event of German aggression against third states. Much to the annoyance of the Germans, Estonia and Latvia remained in contact with the British Government, but apparently concluded that Britain did not have severe objections to their signing non-aggression pacts with Nazi Germany. (Nazi German Policy Towards the Baltic States on the Eve of the Second World War, Rolf Ahman. In: 'The Baltic and the Outbreak of the Second World War', Cambridge University Press, editors: John Hiden and Thomas Lane, 1992, p. 63) (IMG)

Nazi Germany thus became the only guarantor of Latvian and Estonian 'independence', meaning that the colonization or satellitization of these countries by Nazi Germany was guaranteed for the while:

Internally it was noted on the German side that by signing these pacts, Estonia and Latvia would have to reject the idea of their independence being guaranteed by other states.... (Nazi German Policy Towards the Baltic States on the Eve of the Second World War, Rolf Ahman. In: 'The Baltic and the Outbreak of the Second World War', Cambridge University Press, editors: John Hiden and Thomas Lane, 1992, p. 63) (IMG)

The Latvian military was increasingly being dominated by pro-German elements. By the time Klaipeda was seized by the Germans, the Lithuanian military too, already headed by Rastikis, gained greater leverage. Rastikis, having vast support from the military which he headed and from the Germans, supported an anti-Soviet alliance with pro-German Baltic regimes Estonia and Latvia:

the supporters of an anti-Soviet alliance, General S. Rastikis and General J. Baliadis ... commanded the Lithuanian and Latvian Armies respectively and had enjoyed great prestige among the officers of the Baltic states.... (The meeting of the Lithuanian Cabinet, June 15, 1940. author: Alfonsas Eidintas. In: 'The Baltic and the Outbreak of the Second World War', Cambridge University Press, editors: John Hiden and Thomas Lane, 1992, p. 169) (IMG)

Rastikis too had been among those Lithuanian generals courted by the Nazis:

the Latvian generals had accepted the German invitation to take part in Hitler's birthday celebration in Berlin on 20 April. On that day Hitler impressed his guests with a huge military parade. Among the foreign generals watching the spectacle were the Estonian general Reek, the head of the Lithuanian Army, Rastikis, and the chief of the Latvian general staff, General Hartmanis.

Hitler paid considerable attention both to Rastikis and to Hartmanis, to whom he had apparently already indicated views on Nazi Germany's future relations with the Baltic states which were later incorporated in his speech on 28 April.

(Nazi German Policy Towards the Baltic States on the Eve of the Second World War, Rolf Ahman. In: 'The Baltic and the Outbreak of the Second World War', Cambridge University Press, editors: John Hiden and Thomas Lane, 1992, pp. 66-67) (IMG)

On its own, attending Hitler's birthday does not mean collaboration with the Nazi regime, but when the fact of Rastikis's anti-Soviet military efforts and aggressive violations of Lithuanian peace treaties with the USSR are taken into account, the courting of the Lithuanian commander in chief by Hitler becomes suspicious, no doubt, and becomes a provocative albeit symbolic gesture against Europe's freedom forces.

Since the Baltic regimes and the Germans had together formed an anti-Soviet military alliance, the Baltic 'peace treaties' signed with the USSR had become nullified albeit in a covert and secretive manner, as opposed to overtly/officially. It follows that in the absence of peace, when peace was broken by the Baltics, the USSR had the right to militarily engage against those Baltic regimes. However at the same time, since the peace had been broken in a covert and secretive manner, and since the treaties did not officially provide for war to be launched if the peace treaty had been nullified, the USSR needed a way to launch a military offensive against these states without causing war clashes and without launching a kind of offensive categorized as 'invasion' or 'aggression' by international law. A military offensive that did not constitute an aggression was the USSR's proportional, fair, and strategically necessary response to the covert betrayal of treaties by the Baltic states.

Just when the Nazi Germans were busy on the Western and Northern fronts and could not devote as much attention to the Baltics, the USSR swiftly used the opportunity to blackmail the German-backed pro-Nazi Baltic regimes - which had nullified their peace treaties with the USSR - into accepting treaties that helped the USSR to reorient Baltic foreign policy. No war broke out between the USSR and the Baltic states, but since the Baltics were not sufficiently supported by the Germans who were busy on other war fronts, the blackmail worked. The following are excerpts of the treaties signed with Estonia and Latvia:

Article II.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics undertakes to assist the Latvian army, on advantageous terms, with armaments and other war material.

Article III.

The Latvian Republic, with a view to ensuring the security Of the Union Of Soviet Socialist Republics and consolidating its own independence, grants to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics the right to have in the towns of Liepaja (Libau) and Ventspils (Windau) naval bases and a number of aerodromes for an air force, these to be leased at a reasonable rent. The exact sites of the bases and aerodromes shall be assigned and their boundaries determined by special agreement.

(Latvia and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics - Pact of Mutual Assistance. Signed at Moscow, October 5th, 1939. In: League of Nations – Treaty Series, No. 4656, p. 386) (IMG)

Article II.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics undertakes to assist the Estonian army on advantageous terms, with armaments or other war material.

Article III.

The Republic of Estonia grants the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics the right to have naval bases on the Estonian islands of Saaremaa and Hiiumaa and in the town of Paldiski, together with a number of aerodromes for air forces, on lease at reasonable rates. The exact sites of the bases and aerodromes in question shall be assigned, and the limits thereof defined, by common accord.

With a view to the defence of the naval bases and aerodromes in question, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall be entitled at its own expense to maintain strictly limited numbers of Soviet land and air armed forces, up to a maximum to be determined by special agreement, within the areas allotted for the said bases and aerodromes.

(Estonia and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics - Pact of Mutual Assistance. Signed at Moscow, September 28th, 1939. In: League of Nations – Treaty Series, No. 4643, p. 228) (IMG)

Soviet policy towards Lithuania was slightly different. Since Lithuania had been bullied by Germany into ceding strategic territory to the latter, the USSR decided to offer a part of the USSR's own territory to Lithuania. However, since the ceding of Lithuanian territory to Germany had materially weakened the anti-Nazi faction in Lithuania and strengthened the hand of the pro-German elements headed by General Rastikis, it was necessary to also station Soviet troops in Lithuania as counter-pressure against the pro-German lobby in Lithuania. A document by the Chancellery of the Seimas (Parliament) of the Republic of Lithuania stated:

On 10 October 1939, [the pro-German Rastikis-dominated regime of] Lithuania was forced into signing the mutual assistance treaty (the Treaty on the Transfer of Vilnius and Vilnius Region to the Republic of Lithuania and on Mutual Assistance between the Republic of Lithuania and the Soviet Union) and into allowing the alien army to enter its territory. The Treaty, however, provided for the guarantees of inviolability of the Lithuanian administrative framework and its economic and social systems. The goal of the Lithuanian authorities to preserve “the life of the nation and a shade of sovereignty” was achieved but short-lived. Under the mutual assistance treaty, Stalin transferred Vilnius to Lithuania and deployed Soviet army garrisons on the Lithuanian soil thus in advance securing himself a dominant position in further negotiations with Lithuania. The occupation of the Baltic States by the Red Army seemed the only real alternative to the mutual assistance treaty. Upon the conclusion of the mutual assistance treaties, the Soviet contingent in the Baltic States had already numbered as many as 66 946 men, 1 065 tanks, 1 630 cannons, and 526 aircraft. (LESSONS OF HISTORY: THE SILENT OCCUPATION OF 1940, Lietuvos Respublikos Seimo kanceliarija [Chancellery of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania], Arvydas Anusauskas, 2014, pp. 5-6) (IMG)

By April 1940 – that is, shortly before June 1940 – the critically important officials who had pushed for the (Nazi-inspired) anti-Soviet military alliance were compelled to resign, thanks to the pressure that the Red Army presence in these countries brought:

the supporters of an anti-Soviet alliance, General S. Rastikis and General J. Baliudis, who had formerly commanded the Lithuanian and Latvian Armies respectively and had enjoyed great prestige among the officers of the Baltic states, had been retired on the grounds of conflicts with their respective presidents. (The meeting of the Lithuanian Cabinet, June 15, 1940. author: Alfonsas Eidintas. In: ‘The Baltic and the Outbreak of the Second World War’, Cambridge University Press, editors: John Hiden and Thomas Lane, 1992, p. 169) (IMG)

This allowed the USSR to push through the ouster of these Baltic regimes. In mid-June of 1940, the USSR called for the resignation of the Lithuanian government and new elections were called. As such, on June 14, 1940:

Lithuania: Ultimatum presented to Lithuania expiring at 10 a.m. the next day, demanding resignation of the Government. It required Lithuania to form a new Government which would enjoy Moscow's confidence and to allow the passage of Soviet troops. (Chronology of Principal Events Relating to the USSR Part I, OSS, September 25, 1945, p. 137) (IMG)

On June 15, 1940:

Lithuania: Lithuania occupied by Soviet troops, although that country had agreed to Soviet demands. (Chronology of Principal Events Relating to the USSR Part I, OSS, September 25, 1945, p. 137) (IMG)

Similar was the case of Latvia and Estonia. On June 16, 1940:

Baltic countries: Latvia and Estonia received notes from Molotov, requiring an immediate change of government and free passage of troops to occupy important centers.

Both governments accepted the demands. (Chronology of Principal Events Relating to the USSR Part I, OSS, September 25, 1945, p. 137) (IMG)

Latvia and Lithuania, two nations predominantly made up of pro-Soviet and pro-communist peoples, had been held as captives at the hands of pro-German regimes. The pro-Soviet sympathies of these captive nations during the years of the Civil War has already been documented in C3S6. Furthermore, even as late as 1938, Eberhard von Schack – the German intelligence operative sent to Latvia under diplomatic cover – acknowledged the potential welcome from the Latvian population that a Soviet military intervention into Latvia could bring:

During the Sudeten crisis ... [t]he German minister in Latvia, Eberhard von Schack, even gained the impression that the Latvian Army command was 'Russophile' and that a Soviet military move into Latvia at that time might have been welcomed by the Latvian population. (Nazi German Policy Towards the Baltic States on the Eve of the Second World War, Rolf Ahman. In: 'The Baltic and the Outbreak of the Second World War', Cambridge University Press, editors: John Hiden and Thomas Lane, 1992, p. 54) (IMG)

The regimes of the Baltics were largely totalitarian and pro-German, and thus unlikely to have been popular among their populations. The overthrow of these regimes allowed for the people to vote for pro-Soviet and pro-communist parties. Thus, on July 13, 1940:

Latvia: General election resulted in over 90% voting for the new popular party. (Chronology of Principal Events Relating to the USSR Part I, OSS, September 25, 1945, p. 139) (IMG)

And on July 14, 1940:

Lithuania: General election was held; 90% of the electorate voted for the new popular party. (Chronology of Principal Events Relating to the USSR Part I, OSS, September 25, 1945, p. 140) (IMG)

The Germans who lived in the Baltics were repatriated to Germany. On January 10, 1941:

Germany: Three accords signed with the Soviet Union: Trade agreement extending for one year the agreement signed on 11 February 1940; an agreement on the settlement of mutual property claims concerning Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia and on the exchange of nationals; a Treaty on the Soviet-German frontier from the River Igorka to the Baltic Sea. (Chronology of Principal Events Relating to the USSR Part I, OSS, September 25, 1945, p. 152)

On January 14, 1941:

Germany: Estimated 57,000 people to be repatriated from the Baltic States under terms of the Soviet-German pact (cf. 10 January). (Chronology of Principal Events Relating to the USSR Part I, OSS, September 25, 1945, p. 152) (IMG)

While the USSR did not have any kind of vested economic self-interest in the Baltics, through this course of action in the Baltic zone, the USSR also undermined German finance capital, since these countries were de facto colonies of Nazi Germany, providing it goods for cheap:

Foreign Office Memorandum

The economic importance of the three Baltic States for our supply of food and of raw materials essential for war has become quite considerable as a result of the commercial treaties concluded with these three States during the last year. In the course of the last six months, we have furthermore concluded secret agreements with all three States whereby the entire export of these countries, except the part going to Russia and another small portion which to neutral countries, will be sent to Germany. That means for all three States about 70 percent of their total exports. German imports from the three Baltic States will in the current year amount to a total of approximately 200 million Reichsmarks – comprising grain, hogs, butter, eggs, flax, lumber, seeds, and in the case of Estonia, petroleum.

The consolidation of Russian influence in these areas will seriously endanger these necessary imports. For one thing, the Russians will do their utmost to keep the raw materials, and food, at home for their own use. On the other hand, if part continues to go to Germany, they will make quite different demands in regard to deliveries of German products from those made in the past by the Baltic States, so that in effect the previous exchange of goods will break down. We were able to make the deliveries desired by the Baltic States much more easily, and in many cases, under the stress of circumstances, we were able to put these States off till later.

In contrast, the economic interests of the Soviet Union in the three Baltic States are of minor importance. Soviet Union was able to secure only about 10 percent of the export trade of these countries for itself by means of the treaties it recently concluded.

(Foreign Office Memorandum, Schnurre, Berlin, June 17, 1940. In: "Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941: Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Office as Released by the Department of State", edited by: Raymond James Sontag & James Stuart Beddie, p. 153) (IMG)

C9S10. Romanian Petroleum Flow Disruption / Regaining Bessarabia and Bukovina *** IMG-All-{Nazi-Soviet Pact Era}

Shawn Keller, a US Airforce Major and scholar at the Air Command and Staff College Air University, reported in a military paper that the USSR's oil supply to Nazi Germany was not anywhere even close to that provided by the Romanian regime:

Once war began in 1939, German industrial production grew at an exponential rate as battlefronts expanded and attrition rates for aircraft, ships and vehicles mounted at a frenzied pace. The Luftwaffe, for example, took delivery of 8,300 aircraft in 1939 – a number that exploded to a peak production of 39,800 by 1944. With the disappearance of foreign imports from the west as a result of the Allied blockade, Germany took swift action to alleviate its desperate demand for oil. As the war escalated and fuel reserves began to tighten, production of domestic crude was stepped up dramatically, as was production of synthetic petroleum. Turning to their neighbors in the east, Germany pressed both Romania and the Soviet Union to significantly increase current oil exports. Romania was particularly critical to the Reich's oil stockpile program, producing 8 million barrels for German export in 1940 – a staggering increase of 4.7 million barrels in only two years. By comparison, Soviet Union exports to Germany only amounted to 4.5 million barrels – despite the fact that the USSR sat squarely on top of the world's largest oil reserves. By January 1941, six months before Hitler launched the Soviet invasion, Germany had managed to build petroleum reserves to an estimated 56 million barrels. (TURNING POINT: A HISTORY OF GERMAN

PETROLEUM IN WORLD WAR II AND ITS LESSONS FOR THE ROLE OF OIL IN MODERN AIR WARFARE, Air Command and Staff College Air University, Shawn P. Keller (Major, US Airforce), Independent Elective Advisor: Dr. Michael May, pp. 5-6 (IMG)

Roger Moorhouse – a prominent British historian, fellow at the British Royal Historical Society, and a regular contributor to the BBC History Magazine – wrote:

It is often lazily assumed, for instance, that supplies of Soviet fuel were paramount in German thinking. Certainly, the thirst for fuel shown by Hitler's war machine would ultimately prove its Achilles' heel, but one should be wary of projecting such problems back to the opening phase of the conflict. Germany went to war in September 1939 with over 2 million tons of oil stocks, and by the start of the campaign against the Soviet Union, in June 1941, that figure had dropped by only about a quarter. Total oil supplies from the Soviet Union, meanwhile, amounted to less than 1 million tons – that is, less than the monthly German reserve stock and barely 3 percent of the USSR's total annual production – over that same period. (The Devils' Alliance: Hitler's Pact with Stalin, 1939-1941, Roger Moorhouse, 2014)

More significantly, perhaps, the Soviet Union was not Germany's only source of oil; Hitler's troops confiscated around 1 million tons of French oil stocks following the fall of France in 1940. Romania, too, put its oil wells at Hitler's disposal, and with greater generosity than Stalin did, quickly emerging in 1940 as Germany's most important supplier of crude oil. In the same period that the USSR supplied barely 1 million tons of oil to Germany, Romania supplied over four times that amount. Every drop would ultimately be crucial, of course, but the idea that Hitler was dependent on Soviet oil between 1939 and 1941 simply does not withstand scrutiny. (The Devils' Alliance: Hitler's Pact with Stalin, 1939-1941, Roger Moorhouse, 2014) (IMG)

A more practical concern was that raised in January 1940 by cabinet member Lord Hankey, who pointed out that the wider objective of hamstringing Germany by hitting the Soviet oil industry was unrealistic. "only a trickle" of Soviet oil was reaching Germany, he said, adding – quite correctly – that Romania was "by far the largest source of oil" for German industry. Though his figures were revised by a subsequent report to cabinet, the gist of his argument was not. In March, Secretary for Mines Geoffrey Lloyd told the cabinet that petroleum exports from the USSR and occupied eastern Europe into Germany to that point accounted for only 3 percent of Germany's fuel stocks. Hitler's dependence on Soviet fuel, it seems, had been vastly exaggerated. (The Devils' Alliance: Hitler's Pact with Stalin, 1939-1941, Roger Moorhouse, 2014) (IMG)

An article published by the US Naval War College Review, the journal of top-ranking US naval warfare university, stated:

Romania, ... became Germany's most important source of oil after 1939 and later joined the Axis.... ("THE NAVY'S SUCCESS SPEAKS FOR ITSELF"?: The German Navy's Independent Energy Security Strategy, 1932-1940', Anand Toprani. In: Naval War College Review, Vol. 68, No. 3, Naval War College, 2015, p. 94) (IMG)

Gregory Liedtke, a military historian and doctoral graduate of the War Studies Program at the Royal Military College of Canada, wrote:

Romanian oil deliveries to Germany amounted to 1,556,000 tons in 1939 and 1,304,800 tons in 1940. Of equal importance, during 1940 Romania food exports to Germany amounted to 979,866 tons. (Enduring the Whirlwind: The German Army and the Russo-German War 1941-1943. Helion and Company, Gregory Liedtke, 2016, p. 88. Citing: Mark Anthony, *Third Axis – Fourth Ally: Romanian Armed Forces in the European War, 1941-1944*. (London: 1995), pp. 18-21 & 30.) (IMG)

By:

the summer of 1940 ... a succession of events [only] led to increased tensions and a steady deterioration of Russo-German relations. (Enduring the Whirlwind: The German Army and the Russo-German War 1941-1943. Helion and Company, Gregory Liedtke, 2016, pp. 88-89) (IMG)

On June 26:

Soviet Foreign Minister and People's Commissar Vyacheslav Molotov presented the Romanian ambassador with an ultimatum demanding the immediate surrender of the provinces of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. On 23 May 1940, German intelligence agencies noted increased Soviet troop movements ... towards the Romanian border. (Enduring the Whirlwind: The German Army and the Russo-German War 1941-1943. Helion and Company, Gregory Liedtke, 2016, p. 88) (IMG)

By mobilizing the Red Army close to the Romanian border, the USSR sought to drive up the Romanian oil prices, destabilize the Reich's petroleum markets in Romania, and disrupt the flow of cheap Romanian petroleum to the Reich. This fact horrified the Reich leaders, as:

Hostilities would threaten Romania's oil production, upon which Germany was utterly dependent, as this was its primary source of crude oil. Moreover, conflict in Romania could potentially spread throughout the Balkans, which Germany was anxious to avoid given the key role the region played in sustaining its wartime economy. (Enduring the Whirlwind: The German Army and the Russo-German War 1941-1943. Helion and Company, Gregory Liedtke, 2016, pp. 88-89) (IMG)

The Red Army threats against the Romanian regime occurred when:

Militarily, Germany was in no position to intervene as the preponderance of its ground forces were still stationed in Western Europe, while only a handful of low-grade formations guarded Poland. In contrast, between September 1939 and December 1940, the size of the Red Army deployed in the western districts of the Soviet Union had expanded from two to four million men. (Enduring the Whirlwind: The German Army and the Russo-German War 1941-1943. Helion and Company, Gregory Liedtke, 2016, p. 89) (IMG)

The Axis forces were in a very weak position. Therefore:

Without German assistance, Romania was forced to accept the Soviet demands and on 28 June the Red Army occupied the two provinces. (Enduring the Whirlwind: The German Army and the Russo-German War 1941-1943. Helion and Company, Gregory Liedtke, 2016, p. 89) (IMG)

Although the Romanians were inclined to fight, German diplomats pressured them to accede to Russian demands. (Enduring the Whirlwind: The German Army and the Russo-German War 1941-1943. Helion and Company, Gregory Liedtke, 2016, p. 88) (IMG)

The USSR finally regained the territory that had, almost decades earlier (C4S2), been forcefully stolen from the USSR and annexed by the Romanian regime. Jonathan Wilkenfeld – the Principal Investigator in the 'Interstate Behavior Analysis Project' sponsored by the Defense Advanced Research

Projects Agency (DARPA) during the years 1974-1977, the Principal Investigator in the 'Cross-National Crisis Analysis Project' sponsored by DARPA for the period 1977-1978, and the Program Consultant for the Pennsylvania Governor's School for International Studies in the early 1990s – confirmed that Bessarabia was taken over from the Soviet Union by the Romanian military in 1918:

Bessarabia had a long history of foreign occupation, from the time the Bulgars, a Turkic people, settled there in 679 A.D.: the Mongols (1241); Lithuania (1396); Russia (1812); Turkey (1856); and Russia once more (1878).

The breakdown of law and order at the time of the Bolshevik Revolution led the provincial government in Bessarabia in late December 1917 to request both the Romanian government and the Russian army's GHQ to dispatch troops to the area. Romania did so; and its forces occupied Kishinev, capital of Bessarabia, on 13 January 1918. Bessarabia proclaimed its independence on 24 January, but it was not recognized by the powers.

Russia responded to Romania's military intervention by severing diplomatic relations with Bucharest on 13 January and insisting that Romanian troops be withdrawn from Bessarabia. Romania refused; and its military presence was backed by a Note in early February from the senior representatives of France, Greece, Italy, the U.K., and the U.S. to the Rumtcerod, or governing body in Odessa, as a measure designed to restore order; the question of sovereignty over Bessarabia was left open. Tension rose on 27 March and again on 9 April 1918, when the legislatures of Romania and Bessarabia passed an act of union. Chicherin, the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, protested to Bucharest on 27 March. (The events from 13 January to 27 March 1918 constitute a separate

(A Study of Crisis, University of Michigan Press, Michael Brecher, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, 1997, p. 576) (IMG)

The population of Romanian-occupied Bessarabia and Bukovina, which had long been oppressed by the Romanian regime, gleefully accepted joining the USSR. Referring to the transfer of those territories to the USSR, the British Embassy in Bucharest, Romania, said:

one might have expected the populations to be appalled at the forthcoming change. (N 6751/9/37, Sir R. Hoare to Viscount Halifax, Bucharest, July 2, 1940. Received: August 8, 1940. In: Foreign Office (January to December 1940), p. 251. In: Foreign Office (January 1940 – December 1941), p. 275) (IMG)

Thus, the British diplomat Reginald Hoare in Bucharest may have initially expected mass resentment by the people of Bessarabia and Bukovina towards the USSR. However, increased intelligence reports for the British Embassy proved just the contrary. Indeed, the people of Bessarabia and Bukovina enthusiastically welcomed the Soviet Union. Based on the intelligence 'reports which are reaching me', Hoare noted, 'I am convinced that':

Roumanian rule has been corrupt and unpopular, and the province has been more neglected by the Administration than almost any other [province]. The Russian and Ukrainian element have long wanted "our people" to come and take them over. The Jews, who form a large percentage of the total population of 2 million in the territories transferred, are hated by and hate the Roumanians, and have pronounced tendency to communism. Roumanian officials admit that a good many villages hunt out the red flag and ... according to official communiques, many thousands of people have tried to go back to Bessarabia since it was occupied [by the Red Army]. (N 6751/9/37, Sir R. Hoare to Viscount Halifax, Bucharest, July 2, 1940. Received: August 8, 1940. In: Foreign Office (January to December 1940), p. 251. In: Foreign Office (January 1940 – December 1941), p. 275) (IMG)

C9S11. Volume of Soviet-Nazi Trade 1939-1941 *** IMG-All-{Nazi-Soviet Pact Era}

According to Roger Moorhouse of the BBC and British Royal Historical Society,:

relationship [between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union] was barely reaching parity with the volumes of trade that had gone before. (The Devils' Alliance: Hitler's Pact with Stalin, 1939-1941, Roger Moorhouse, 2014) (IMG)

In fact,:

The volume of Soviet imports from Germany in 1940, for example, was quantitatively less than the annual totals from the decade between 1924 and 1933, while Soviet exports in the other direction fell short of the peak of the 1926-1930 period. (The Devils' Alliance: Hitler's Pact with Stalin, 1939-1941, Roger Moorhouse, 2014) (IMG)

Hence, the Soviet-German trade was:

hardly matching the volumes of German-Soviet trade that had already existed a decade earlier. (The Devils' Alliance: Hitler's Pact with Stalin, 1939-1941, Roger Moorhouse, 2014) (IMG)

Thus,:

as in the German case, the paucity of Soviet trade in the immediately preceding years means that such apparently impressive increases can be deceptive. (The Devils' Alliance: Hitler's Pact with Stalin, 1939-1941, Roger Moorhouse, 2014) (IMG)

An examination of the details of the Soviet-German trade makes it clear that for the Reich,:

the economic advantages brought by the connection with the Soviet Union are [even] more difficult to discern. (The Devils' Alliance: Hitler's Pact with Stalin, 1939-1941, Roger Moorhouse, 2014) (IMG)

C9S12. Development of the Soviet Military *** IMG-All-{Nazi-Soviet Pact Era}

The commercial relations between the Third Reich and the USSR earned relatively little for the former, but plenty for the latter. The Red Army's fight against the Reich-aligned regimes – the Baltics, Romania, and Finland – put the Third Reich at a disadvantage, as it threatened to disrupt the flow of cheap commodities to the German Empire. By contrast, the USSR's vast reserves of those commodities badly needed for the Third Reich's war machine gave Moscow the upper hand in its commercial negotiations with Nazi Germany. As Liedtke explained:

When combined, Soviet actions against Finland, Romania, and the Baltic States during the summer of 1940 appeared to represent a coherent effort to make Germany even more dependent upon Soviet exports through the control of vital resource areas. This economic dependence, and its potential to serve as means of exerting political pressure (which some German diplomats had already taken to calling 'Soviet blackmail') was highlighted in early August when the Soviet Union briefly suspended exports because of the dispute regarding the Balkans and by Germany's failure to pay for more than half of the materials it had thus far received. (Enduring the Whirlwind: The German Army and the Russo-German War 1941-1943. Helion and Company, Gregory Liedtke, 2016, p. 89) (IMG)

The Naval War College Review, the media of the US military's Naval War College, provided more details:

Estonian oil shale was attractive in spite of its uncompetitive price since Estonia (an independent republic until 1940) could be a reliable source of supply even in wartime, because Germany thought it likely that it would still control access through the Baltic even during a conflict against Britain or the Soviet Union. Exports of petroleum extracted from shale to Germany began in 1937 and reached 110,000 tons in 1939. But oil shale yielded only trivial amounts of naval fuel – the navy's prewar contracts guaranteed deliveries of only three thousand tons of fuel oil a month (at well above the world market price) against a total consumption of 44,300 tons. In any case, deliveries ended in 1940 after the Soviet Union annexed Estonia; (“THE NAVY’S SUCCESS SPEAKS FOR ITSELF”?: The German Navy’s Independent Energy Security Strategy, 1932-1940”, Anand Toprani. In: ‘Naval War College Review’, Vol. 68, No. 3, Naval War College, 2015, p. 97.) (IMG)

The above quote falsely (see C9S9) claims that ‘the Soviet Union annexed Estonia’. Regardless, as the above quote implies, the Soviet overthrow of the Estonian regime cut off the supply of oil to Nazi Germany, thus causing damage to the economy of the Third Reich, and giving the USSR a virtual monopoly over the oil supply to Nazi Germany. This in turn provided the USSR significant political leverage during its negotiations for the Soviet import of German arms.

Moscow’s upper hand in the trade negotiations helped it secure its defenses in the coming imperialist assault by the Axis troops; the USSR was able to obtain military technology from the Germans. Ultimately, the losers in these Nazi-Soviet trade deals were the Germans. While the Soviets provided raw materials to Nazi Germany, in relatively little amounts, they gained military-industrial equipment and technology at a relatively large scale, much to the disadvantage of the Germans. Commenting on the matter, the British Embassy in Moscow reported:

There seems little doubt the Trade Agreement has been a serious disappointment to the Germans. (N 2253/360/38, Mr. Le Rougetel to Viscount Halifax, Moscow, February 22, 1940. In: Foreign Office (January to December 1940), p. 122. In: Foreign Office (January 1940 – December 1941), p. 146) (IMG)

The Nazi-Soviet trade pacts, far from being uneasy compromises or necessary evils, were in fact a forward step in favor of the Soviet Union and democracy against the interests of Nazi Germany. Through these deals, the USSR imported technology and machinery so to boost its industrial production of tanks and army equipment. An intelligence agent of the British Embassy in Moscow told the Embassy that:

the German’s main requirement here is gold, of which Russia has undertaken to release a certain quantity in return for technical assistance in speeding up munition production, and possibly even export of arms from Germany. (N 2264/360/38, Mr. Le Rougetel to Viscount Halifax, No. 86, Moscow, February 22, 1940. In: Foreign Office (January to December 1940), p. 122. In: Foreign Office (January 1940 – December 1941), p. 146) (IMG)

Moorhouse provided some details as follows:

A clear – indeed a vital – benefit is perceptible in the area of military production. The Soviet tank industry is a salient example. Soviet tank production was in flux in 1940, with the obsolete T-26 and BT series tanks being phased out and production switching to the more modern T-34 and KV models. In addition, a simultaneous expansion of the sector entailed the building of new plants and the retooling of existing plants to produce the new models. A natural partner in these processes was German heavy industry, which could provide both the hardware and the know-how to assist, and the Soviets were not shy in exploiting this resource.

Starting in the summer of 1940, Soviet foreign trade commissar Anastas Mikoyan began submitting sizeable orders to German firms – such as Reinecker, which had been Europe's largest machine tool manufacturer in 1939 – for sundry heavy engineering items, including mills, forges, presses, and cranes. The KV factory at Chelyabinsk alone took over four hundred German machining tools, while an order from mid-July 1940 contained a request – worth 11.5 million rubles – for the import from Germany of 117 metal-processing tools, twenty-two presses, forges, and a complete bearing assembly plant. The collaboration was not confined to the tank industry. When Factory 292 was set up at Saratov in 1941 for the production of the mainstay Yakovlev Yak-I fighter, it was established with 40 percent of its machine tools coming from Germany. And when factories were retooled at Kirov and Kharkov in 1940 for the production of the M-30 and M-40 aircraft engines, nearly 20 million rubles were spent on machinery from German suppliers. Total figures and volumes of such orders will probably never be known....

(The Devils’ Alliance: Hitler’s Pact with Stalin, 1939-1941, Roger Moorhouse, 2014) (IMG)

In other areas, such as precision machine tools, the benefit is much easier to divine. Soviet industry was endeavoring to close the gap with its rival economies via the third Five Year Plan from 1938 onwards, and the German connection can only have helped in that respect, despite the exports of raw materials that it demanded. Indeed, after plateauing through 1939, Soviet industrial production very clearly rose again in 1940, with a couple of sectors – such as high-grade steel – showing particularly impressive increases. Moreover, such advances appear to have saved the Five Year Plan, which, despite a poor start, was well on the way to being fulfilled and even overfulfilled by the middle of 1941. Although economic historians of the period rarely mention the German connection, it seems plausible to attribute these increases, at least in part, to the influence of the commercial agreements. (The Devils’ Alliance: Hitler’s Pact with Stalin, 1939-1941, Roger Moorhouse, 2014) (IMG)

Extensive information has been provided on the Soviet imports of military equipment and technology from Nazi Germany by Gerhard Weinberg. Having served in the US Army during the years 1946-1947, Weinberg was responsible for training the American military’s GI units on history and government. From 1951 to 1954, the German-American scholar worked as a Research Analyst in the War Documentation Project, a project initiated by the US Air Force in a contract with Columbia University, for research in the captured German World War II documents. Subsequently Weinberg taught at the US Air Force Academy and has frequently lectured for the Extension Program of the Naval War College as well as at the Marine Corps University and West Point. In 1956-57 he established a program to microfilm the German documents. As confirmed by Weinberg, already:

on November 1, 1939 there was agreement that the uncompleted German cruiser “Luetzow” would be placed at the disposal of the Russians. (Germany and the Soviet Union, Gerhard Weinberg, 1954, pp. 75-76) (IMG)

As time went by, the Soviets expanded their demands and compelled the Third Reich to provide more military technology to the USSR:

As the negotiations in Moscow continued, larger Russian demands were presented. These included the cruiser "Prinz Eugen" as well as the two previously named, and big naval turrets, naval blue-prints, and naval equipment. Many of these demands were met... (Germany and the Soviet Union, Gerhard Weinberg, 1954, p. 76) (IMG)

The main demand which was not met was the Prinz Eugen. Indeed:

"Prinz Eugen" was ... withheld. (Germany and the Soviet Union, Gerhard Weinberg, 1954, p. 76) (IMG)

Nonetheless:

The navy declared itself ready, ... to provide the Russians with the plans for the battleship "Bismarck" and with plans for destroyers and submarines. Hitler wanted this matter examined further before making a decision. In a conference between Raeder and Ritter, the Admiral declared his willingness to sell the blue-prints of the battleship "Bismarck" provided the price were high enough. He was willing to take the chance of having them fall into the hands of the English and was prepared to let out the fact that the ship when planned was designed in a manner violative of Germany's treaty obligations. (Germany and the Soviet Union, Gerhard Weinberg, 1954, p. 76) (IMG) Included in the extensive lists of German delivery obligations were the cruiser "Luetzow", the plans for the "Bismarck", plans for a large destroyer, a long schedule of ship-building materials, various kinds of naval guns and gun equipment, hydrographic equipment, several small ships, naval turrets of the heaviest caliber, and other categories of material for the Soviet Navy. (Germany and the Soviet Union, Gerhard Weinberg, 1954, pp. 76-77) (IMG)

The Soviets also:

continued to ask for heavy caliber naval turrets and other important items of naval equipment. These demands were, to a considerable extent, agreed to by the Germans. It is clear from the various lists of planned German deliveries attached to the Soviet-German economic treaty of February 11, 1940, that naval equipment was to constitute a very large part of the German repayment for Soviet raw materials. (Germany and the Soviet Union, Gerhard Weinberg, 1954, p. 76) (IMG)

A 1940 report by the British Embassy in Moscow, citing a British intelligence source, stated:

Germany is stated by the same source to have delivered three or four merchant vessels to this country. (N 1979/360/38, Mr. Le Rougetel to Viscount Halifax, No. 76, Telegram No. 75, Moscow, Sent and Received: February 16, 1940. In: Foreign Office (January to December 1940), p. 122 In: Foreign Office (January 1940 – December 1941), p. 146) (IMG)

Alongside naval technology, advancements were made for the USSR in the field of aerial warfare. The Third Reich was compelled to deliver large amounts of military material to the USSR both for the navy and the air combat:

After discussion it seems that Germany has **reluctantly** agreed to deliver large quantities of material (including heavy armoured-plate) for naval construction and armoured plating for aircraft. These deliveries are said to meet 80 per cent of Russia's demands, and, in the view of my information, represent a significant concession [by Germany]. (N 1979/360/38, Mr. Le Rougetel to Viscount Halifax, No. 76, Telegram No. 75, Moscow, Sent and Received: February 16, 1940. In: Foreign Office (January to December 1940), p. 122 In: Foreign Office (January 1940 – December 1941), p. 146) (IMG)

Germany, in 1940, also provided nine aircrafts of the most advanced design. A report by the British Embassy in Moscow stated:

THE German Ambassador recently informed a neutral Minister that Germany had supplied the U.S.S.R. with nine aircraft of the very latest type. (N 5430/360/38, Mr. Le Rougetel to Viscount Halifax, May 3, 1940. Received: May 4, 1940. In: Foreign Office (January to December 1940), p. 125. In: Foreign Office (January 1940 – December 1941), p. 149) (IMG)

It is clear that the overwhelming majority of the Soviet objectives were achieved, with the disadvantaged Germans having to duly comply. Soviet imports of weapons from Nazi Germany, while obviously assisting the expansion of the Soviet military capabilities, also weakened the capability and slowed down the development of the Nazi German military expansion. Evidence presented by the United States Office of Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality demonstrated:

As previously reported in 1939, according to the German-Russo treaty of August 19, 1939, the German deliveries on credit were to attain in the next two years the sum of 200 millions RM [Reich Marks], 120 millions RM, thereof during the first year. It was indicated that German deliveries of material to the value of 500 millions RM were desired during the first year alone. As such quantities of machines, vehicles, apparatus, etc., could not be obtained from the production point of view in such a short time, and as the Russians had also included war material in their request, the preponderant desire, from the beginning, at the Foreign office and the Reich-ministry of economy was, to put at the disposal of the Russians as much finished war material as possible.

(...). As the Russians delivered [raw materials] quickly and well, it was imperative to accelerate German deliveries. Consequently the German High Command decided to offer the Russians even more war material, that was already manufactured or under construction, and whose monetary value was great. The great cruiser Luetzow especially came into this category, other ordnance installations for ships, patterns for heavy artillery and tanks and important patents [lizenzen] for war material. As these contracts for this material did not satisfy the Russian requests, the Fuehrer ordered, on March 30, that – as far as necessary – the delivery of war material to the Russians should have priority over the delivery to the German Armed Forces.

This order put some of the Army departments in a difficult position, as the High command also wanted production for the German requirements stepped up and demanded punctual delivery.

(BASIC FACTS FOR A HISTORY OF GERMAN WAR AND ARMAMENTS ECONOMY. In: 'Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume 4', International Tribunals, Nuremburg, United States Office of Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality, pp. 1081-1082) (IMG)

In fact:

during a conference with Reichmarshal Goering, ... the Fuehrer desired punctual delivery to the Russians only till spring 1941. Later on we would have no further interest in completely satisfying the Russian demands. (BASIC FACTS FOR A HISTORY OF GERMAN WAR AND ARMAMENTS ECONOMY. In: 'Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume 4', International Tribunals, Nuremburg, United States Office of Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality, p. 1082) (IMG)

'This allusion', the document concluded, 'moved' the German war economy

to give priority to matters concerning Russian War Economy. (BASIC FACTS FOR A HISTORY OF GERMAN WAR AND ARMAMENTS ECONOMY. In: 'Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume 4', International Tribunals, Nuremburg, United States Office of Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality, p. 1082) (IMG)

As can be seen, the Soviet exports of raw materials to Nazi Germany amounted to relatively little, whereas the imports of military-industrial technology and technical instruments amounted to relatively much. The Nazis were frustrated, as the Soviets could use geo-economic pressures such as the threats on Romania, as political blackmail so to force the Germans to hand over the military equipment. These commercial relations, the German military supplies to the Soviet Union, dramatically boosted the Soviet military capability. As Weinberg put it,:

In these ways the Germans were to contribute to the building up of the Russian navy. (Germany and the Soviet Union, Gerhard Weinberg, 1954, p. 77) (IMG)

The Nazi-Soviet commercial relations, therefore, constituted neither 'Soviet economic aid to fascism', nor a 'necessary evil', but served rather as a tilt of power-balance against fascism. To quote the British Embassy again, the deals were a 'serious disappointment to the Germans'. The deals were not a 'necessary evil' but were rather a necessary good. The deals were not made as much for the USSR to 'buy time' but to rather sabotage the Nazis' military-industrial backbone.

The Soviets also provided a port for German ships in Murmansk. However, contrary to the Western media's propaganda, the port did not serve the Germans as a military or naval base, but was rather virtually exclusively utilized for merchant ships. Jurgen Rohwer – the renowned anti-Soviet German naval scholar, former servant in the German Navy during World War II, President of the International Intelligence History Association, Chairman of the German Committee for the History for the Second World War, Vice-President of the International Commission for Military History, and Managing Director of the Working Group for Military Research in Frankfurt – wrote:

The Soviets allowed the Germans to use a bight in the area of Murmansk as Basis Nord, first to give the German merchant ships returning from overseas after breaking the British blockade, such as the big passenger liner Bremen and many others, a secure refuge. While this was working well up to the early spring of 1940, the use of the Basis Nord for military and naval operations did not bear fruit. Only the whale factory ship Jan Wellem, loaded with fuel for the destroyers was sent from there to Narvik before the German attack against Norway started. But with Norway conquered in early June 1940 the Germans did not use the base anymore. (Stalin's Ocean-Going Fleet, Jurgen Rohwer, Mikhail Monakov, July 5, 2017) (IMG)

The Soviets provided the bight in 1939 and the Germans did not use it beyond June 1940.

C9S13. Disrupting the Finnish Nickel Flow to the Reich *** IMG-All-{Nazi-Soviet Pact Era}

Germany had a large share of Finland's nickel resources. In a message to the German Embassy in the USSR, Clodius, the Deputy Director of the Economy Policy Department of the Third Reich, noted:

besides the private agreements between I.G. Farben Industrie and the Petsamo Nickel Company, there exists the agreement of July 24, 1940, ... between the German and Finnish Governments, which constitutes the basis of the German claims to delivery of 60 percent of the nickel output of Petsamo. (171/135041-45, The Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department to the Embassy in the Soviet Union, No. 477 of March 8, Berlin, March 9, 1941. 'Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945', Series D (1937-1945), Vol. 12, 'The War Years, February 1 – June 22, 1941, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, p. 248) (IMG)

Hence, the USSR during this period worked to disrupt the flow of nickel to the German economy. Indeed, the Soviet actions against the fascist regime of Romania were:

followed on 23 June [1940] by new Soviet demands upon Finland for territorial concessions in the vital nickel producing region of Petsamo, from which Germany obtained 60 percent of its nickel. (Enduring the Whirlwind: The German Army and the Russo-German War 1941-1943. Helion and Company, Gregory Liedtke, 2016, p. 88) (IMG)

A declassified German Foreign Ministry document confirmed that the Soviet calls for a concession from the Finnish regime posed a serious threat not only to Germany's economy, but also its military and geostrategic interests:

In the matter of the granting of the Petsamo nickel concession the Finnish Government finds itself exposed to daily increasing pressure from the Soviet Government. The Finns are afraid that bad intentions lie concealed behind Molotov's persistence. If the Finnish Government yields to Russian pressure and by national emergency legislation cancels the present Canadian nickel concession and gives it to the Soviet Government, an unpleasant and unfavorable situation would arise for us: Our own nickel interests, which had been established in the negotiations with the Finnish Government, would be completely wiped out, as Russia will not respect the German-Finnish agreements. With the transfer of the nickel concession Soviet Russia will acquire exclusive territorial influence in this area as well and thereby border directly on the area of Kirkenes, which is protected by our troops. The military, and the Reichsmarschall in particular, have voiced the hope that we shall not lose Petsamo. The Deputy of the Reichsmarschall, Lt. Col. Veltjens, has, among other things, obtained an option for the nickel concession, as compensation for the German supplies of arms. (104/112565-66, The Foreign Ministry to the Foreign Minister's Secretariat at Fuschl, No. 34, October 8, 1940, W 4646 g. In: 'Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945', Series D (1937-1945), Vol. 11, The War Years, September 1, 1940 – January 31, 1941, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, p. 270) (IMG)

Another version of the same kind of message, a longer one, is as follows:

To the Office of the Reich Foreign Minister.

Please send the following by teletype to Fuschl:

In the matter of the granting of the Petsamo nickel concession the Finnish Government finds itself exposed to daily increasing pressure from the Soviet Government. The Finns are afraid that bad intentions lie concealed behind Molotov's persistence. If the Finnish Government yields to Russian pressure and by national emergency legislation cancels the present Canadian nickel concession and gives it to the Soviet Government, an unpleasant and unfavorable situation would arise for us: Our own nickel interests, which had been established in the negotiations with the Finnish Government, would be completely wiped out, as Russia will not respect the German-Finnish agreements. With the transfer of the nickel concession Soviet Russia will acquire exclusive territorial influence in this area as well and thereby border directly on the area of Kirkenes, which is protected by our troops. The military, and the Reich Marshal in

particular, have voiced the hope that we shall not lose Petsamo. The deputy of the Reich Marshal, Lt. Col. Veltjens, has, among other things, obtained an option for the nickel concession, as compensation for the German supplies of arms.

Up to now the Foreign Office has been telling the Finns that Germany will confine herself to carrying out the German-Finnish nickel contracts and will not on her own initiative take up the question of the concession with the Russians. It will now be necessary to go beyond that and to strengthen the Finnish will to resist. They should be told we were in favor of their holding the question of the concession in abeyance and not definitely concluding the matter by the transfer to Russia. It is not necessary to comply with the wish of the Finns that we support their attitude in Moscow.

(W 4646/40g, Frames 112565-112566, serial 104, Foreign Office Memorandum, October 8, 1940. In: "Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941: Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Office as Released by the Department of State", edited by: Raymond James Sontag & James Stuart Beddie, p. 205) (IMG)

Another strategic material necessary for the German war effort was rubber, which was for the most part produced domestically. Unlike the British Empire which was Nazi Germany's main source of rubber, the USSR exported little rubber to the Third Reich:

Rubber is another area of Soviet supply that appears to have fallen short of expectations. The importance of rubber to the modern military should not be underestimated, and Germany's prewar supply came largely from British-controlled sources in Southeast Asia. Once war broke out in 1939 and those sources dried up, Germany hoped to source its rubber via the USSR, with the latter serving as a proxy buyer and transporting the goods to Germany.

In the event, Soviet-sourced rubber would be symptomatic of the wider shortcomings of Germany's economic relationship with the USSR. Already at the outbreak of war, Germany was a world leader in the production of synthetic rubber, known by the trade name Buna and being produced in three plants. Heightened wartime demand, however, projected at around 9,000 tons per month, required alternative resources, mainly from the USSR. Yet Soviet-sourced rubber could not make up the shortfall. Soviet deliveries, totaling only 18,000 tons – less than Germany's annual production of synthetic rubber – would barely ease the shortage.

(‘The Devils’ Alliance: Hitler’s Pact with Stalin, 1939-1941’, Roger Moorhouse, 2014) (IMG)

C9S14. Soviet Policy on Xinjiang *** IMG-All-{USSR, China, Mongolia – 1930s}

A 1943 US intelligence document noted:

In Chinese territory special interest attaches to the strategically located province of Sinkiang (Chinese Turkestan) with its overwhelming Muslim population, chiefly of Turkic stock. Japanese officers are stationed there on one pretext or another, as early as 1919. (JAPANESE INFILTRATION AMONG THE MUSLIMS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD, Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Research and Analysis Branch, May 15, 1943, p. 11) (IMG)

By the early 1930s, the main ‘Muslim’ representative of the Japanese in Xinjiang/Sinkiang was, “Ma Chung-Ying,” who in the words of the anti-Soviet American Colonel Jesse Wang, was:

a Chinese Muslim warlord with Japanese advisors and support from local Muslim rebels. (THE MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SINO-SOVIET BORDER IN CENTRAL ASIA, Army War College Carlisle Barracks, Colonel Jesse Wang (Signal Corps), 19 March 1971, pp. 41-42) (IMG)

Hence:

In due time the country is thrown into political turmoil culminating, by 1931, in an open Muslim revolt against the central government. (JAPANESE INFILTRATION AMONG THE MUSLIMS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD, Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Research and Analysis Branch, May 15, 1943, p. 11) (IMG)

“Apparently in anticipation of an eventual Muslim victory,” the US intelligence document continued,:

Japan gets hold of a young and naïve Turkish prince, by the name of Abdul Kerim, and grooms him for the titular rule over a greater Turco-Tatar empire. The prospective subjects could not fail to be swayed by the prince’s antecedents; for it was his grandfather, the not-to-be-forgotten Abdul Hamid II, who had revived the Ottoman Caliphate and launched pan-Islam on its fateful course. (JAPANESE INFILTRATION AMONG THE MUSLIMS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD, Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Research and Analysis Branch, May 15, 1943, p. 11) (IMG)

As the head of the Xinjiang/Sinkiang central government:

Chin was threatened in 1931, shortly after the Japanese aggression in Manchuria, by Ma Chung-Ying.... To obtain Soviet arms and increase Soviet trade with Sinkiang, Chin signed an agreement with the Soviet Union. This agreement was signed without authorization from the National Government in Nanking, and without its being reported to that government. The agreement reduced customs duties on Soviet goods and authorized the opening of eight Soviet trade agencies at Khotan, Yarkand, Kucha, Aksu, Kashgar, Kuldja, Chuguchak (Tarbagaytay or T'a-ch'eng) and Urumchi. (THE MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SINO-SOVIET BORDER IN CENTRAL ASIA, Army War College Carlisle Barracks, Colonel Jesse Wang (Signal Corps), 19 March 1971, pp. 41-42) (IMG)

In Xinjiang/Sinkiang, the exiled anti-Soviet White Guards were allied to the Japanese-backed pseudo-Muslim terrorist forces of Ma Chung-Ying. The Soviet intelligence rushed to assist General Chin:

It was learned by the White Russian troops, during the siege of Urumchi, the capital, that Governor Chin was planning to have them annihilated and replaced by Soviet troops which were standing by at Changki. These Soviet troops consisted of two regiments of one thousand men each, who wore Chinese uniforms and who claimed to be White Russian volunteers from the Tarbagatai and Altai Regions. (The Russian Population of Sinkiang, CIA, January 22, 1953, p. 3) (IMG)

However:

The White Russians refused to be disarmed and to march out of the city as ordered by Governor Chin. Instead, they joined forces with the Manchu troops of General Sheng, defeated the Chinese forces of Governor Chin and proclaimed General Sheng as the new Governor of Sinkiang. (The Russian Population of Sinkiang, CIA, January 22, 1953, p. 3) (IMG)

Thus:

In April 1933, Chin fled to the Soviet Union after his White Russian mercenaries mutinied and joined local Muslim rebels in an attack on the provincial headquarters. He later returned to China where he was tried and imprisoned for the unauthorized and unreported

agreement he had made with the Soviet Union. The overthrow of Chin led to the accession of power of Sheng Shih-ts'ai, a recently assigned military officer of the National Government. (THE MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SINO-SOVIET BORDER IN CENTRAL ASIA, Army War College Carlisle Barracks, Colonel Jesse Wang (Signal Corps), 19 March 1971, p. 42) (IMG)

General Sheng, an enemy of the Soviet-backed Chin team, was an agent of reaction and had risen to power with the support of the Japanese-backed 'Muslim' terrorists. Having gained the assistance of his White Russian allies in overthrowing his Soviet-friendly opponent, he felt compelled, for the sake of his political survival, to accept Soviet influence in the territory which he ruled, even though covertly he continued to operate as a White Guard agent and an enemy of the Soviet Union. The might of the USSR, the pressure which he faced from the Red Army, compelled him into being coopted by the Soviets. Hence, overtly, he began a pro-Soviet course:

In the autumn of that year it became evident to the White Russian leaders in Sinkiang that Governor Sheng, as Governor Chin, also had strong pro-Soviet leanings. (The Russian Population of Sinkiang, CIA, January 22, 1953, p. 3) (IMG)

Observing the cooptation of General Sheng, the Japanese fascists and their henchmen among the 'Islamic' terrorists plotted yet another attempt for overthrowing the Soviet-backed forces in Sinkiang. Hence came again the Soviet military and intelligence service assistance to the government of Sinkiang against the Japan-backed pseudo-Muslim terrorists. Although the USSR never 'invaded' Sinkiang, the military intervention has been falsely labeled in the Anglo-American media as the 'Soviet invasion of Sinkiang'. Soviet military intervention in Sinkiang was in agreement with the government there. In the words of US military Colonel Jesse Wang:

By agreement with Sheng, two brigades of Soviet G.P.U. troops with air support were sent into Sinkiang in January 1934 to clear the roads, lift the siege of Urumchi by Ma's forces, and end the rebellion. The Soviet troops were later withdrawn. (THE MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SINO-SOVIET BORDER IN CENTRAL ASIA, Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Colonel Jesse Wang (Signal Corps), 19 March 1971, p. 43) (IMG)

Again, Sheng was never truly pro-Soviet but the geographic proximity of Sinkiang to USSR and the distance that Sinkiang had with a Chinese 'central' government that was already at war, all made imperialist-fascist influence in Sinkiang costly whereas the Soviets found it much easier to put political pressure on the renegade Sheng to compel him to accept Soviet intelligence influence there. This is why Sheng, ever the opportunist, adopted pro-Soviet colorations and overtly invited Soviet military intervention. Basically, the Sheng gang was coopted by the Soviets. One could correctly argue that Sheng, a reactionary who had risen to power with the assistance of fascist Japan, would have been unwilling to invite the Soviets, but that does not change the fact that the government which Sheng led was generally pro-Soviet in strategic orientation, and that the Soviets were legally invited to intervene; the Soviets were no 'invaders'.

Fitzroy McLean, the prominent MI6 official and operative from whose memoirs the character of James Bond was inspired, remarked:

The Tungans or Chinese Mohammedans revolted against the Provincial Government. The Provincial Government appealed for help, not to the Chinese Central Government, who in any case had their hands full elsewhere, but to Moscow. (Eastern Approaches, Fitzroy McLean, 1949, p. 123) (IMG)

By international law, military intervention upon the consent of the sovereign government is not an 'invasion'. Thanks to Soviet intervention, Anglo-Japanese plots in Xinjiang were indeed foiled:

Moscow intervened rapidly and effectively and Soviet troops and aircraft soon accounted for the Tungans. When the Russians returned home, they left behind them considerable numbers of technical and other advisers, who continued to help the Provincial Government. (Eastern Approaches, Fitzroy McLean, 1949, p. 123) (IMG)

Referring to the dreams of Abdul Kerim and his pseudo-Muslim and Japanese backers:

Soviet Russia upset all these dreams by contributing materially to the downfall of the insurgents. (JAPANESE INFILTRATION AMONG THE MUSLIMS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD, Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Research and Analysis Branch, May 15, 1943, p. 11) (IMG)

Subsequently:

Discarded and disillusioned, Abdul Kerim leaves Japan in 1934 for the United States, where he is found a year later in the room of a New York hotel, dead by his own hand, with a nearly empty and strictly contra-Islamic bottle of gin at his side. Tokyo, however, is in a position to produce, if need be, another Muslim prince of imperial blood. The man now in tow is His Highness P'u-kuang, a younger cousin of the "Emperor" of Manchukuo, who in 1935 had providentially embraced the faith of Islam. (JAPANESE INFILTRATION AMONG THE MUSLIMS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD, Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Research and Analysis Branch, May 15, 1943, p. 11) (IMG)

The Japanese fascists, keen to buy up support from among the Muslims of Asia, invested greatly in presenting themselves, the Shinto Pagans, as Islamic or Islamic-leaning. Anyways, the USSR flooded Sinkiang with extensive economic and military assistance to be paid back in kind. As the US Colonel Jesse Wang remarked:

Significant as the military aid and the Soviet troops were to Sheng, it was in the economic area that Soviet influence and exploitation seemed most obvious. On 16 May 1935, Sheng signed a loan for five million gold rubles. The loan was to be paid off over a five-year period with products of Sinkiang. (THE MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SINO-SOVIET BORDER IN CENTRAL ASIA, Army War College Carlisle Barracks, Colonel Jesse Wang (Signal Corps), 19 March 1971, p. 44) (IMG)

A paper by the US government's National Resources Planning Board stated:

Between 1938 and 1941, the Soviet Union advanced four loans to China amounting to 300 million U.S. dollars, which were based on barter agreements, that is, they were to be repaid by the shipment of agricultural products, chiefly tea and wood. (Technical Papers, Issues 6-8, United States National Resources Planning Board, July 1942, p. 54) (IMG)

A prominent China scholar and explorer listed some of the mineral wealth that Sinkiang provided to the USSR in exchange for military assistance:

In exchange for military aid, Stalin secured access to valuable minerals such as gold, tungsten, tin, uranium and manganese as well as petroleum near Wusu, north of the Tian Shan mountain.... (History of Central Asia: The Age of Decline and Revival, Vol. 4, Christoph Baumer, p. 210) (IMG)

As a coopted ally of the USSR, Sheng felt compelled to 'colour' himself towards Soviet-friendly and progressive bourgeois-democratic positions. The influence of the USSR over the Sinkiang was the influence of the dictatorship of the proletariat on that area; the influence of the dictatorship of

the proletariat in that progressive bourgeois state yielded a progressive bourgeois-democratic state. These included reforms for the democratization of the province and the end of the racial apartheid that existed in China. When the Nazi invasion of the USSR happened in 1941, when the costs inflicted upon the USSR resulted in the Soviet intelligence to temporarily lose the ability to coopt Sheng, the latter, whose interests were correlated with those of the fascists, saw the time as opportune and aggressively turned away from the USSR. He also reinstated racial apartheid and anti-democratic policies. US Colonel Wang wrote:

After taking over the government in 1933, Sheng announced his "Eight Points for Sinkiang" which were: equality among races or nationalities, religious freedom, immediate rural relief, financial reform, administrative reform, extension of education, encouragement of self-government, and judicial reforms. In 1934, he promulgated his "Six Great Policies" with which to implement the "Eight Points." The six policies were anti-imperialism (Japanese and British), friendship with the Soviet Union, racial or national equality, clean government, peace, and reconstruction. In August 1938, Sheng visited the Kremlin for conferences with Stalin and was admitted into the All-Union Communist Party. In 1938 he received a number of Chinese Communist advisors, including Mao Tse-Min, the brother of Mao Tse-Tung. During this period (1933-1940), Sheng ran the province smoothly, generally adhering to his announced policies.

In 1941 and 1942, Sheng changed from the pro-Soviet stance ... to one leaning on the [KMT-led] National Government of China. This change may have been impelled by Soviet difficulties in the war with Germany and the termination of Soviet aid to Sinkiang. At the same time, Sheng changed from a policy of relative racial tolerance to authoritarian repression of non-Chinese national groups and arrested liberal Chinese as well as Communists such as Mao Tse-Min.

(THE MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SINO-SOVIET BORDER IN CENTRAL ASIA, Army War College Carlisle Barracks, Colonel Jesse Wang (Signal Corps), 19 March 1971, pp. 46-47) (IMG)

The proletariat is the main force that imposes democracy. The alliance of the British with the USSR in the beginning of the Great Patriotic War was an alliance of British finance capital with the dictatorship of the proletariat and thus with the proletariat itself. This resulted in British finance capital, up to then an enemy of democracy, to become a pro-democracy force in the beginning of the War. As mentioned in C10S8, the British had opposed Egypt's democratic, popular, and anti-colonial prime minister Nahas. And yet, during the Great Patriotic War, they installed him as head of the government in Egypt. Wherever there is more influence of the proletariat, there is greater proletarianization. The case of Sheng is an excellent demonstration of the historical materialist fact that an alliance with the dictatorship of the proletariat increases the influence of the proletariat, and thus leads to even tyrannical-minded rulers such as Sheng to feel compelled to establish democratic rule.

C9S15. Class Struggles in and Soviet Economic Aid to Mongolia *** IMG-All-{Mongolia}

A document by the Federal Research Division of the US Library of Congress and sponsored by the US Department of the Army stated that with the collectivization drive of the 1930s in Mongolia, there came efforts to promote the voluntary formation of cooperatives:

Mongolian agriculture developed slowly. An abortive attempt to collectivize all arads occurred in the early 1930s; efforts to encourage voluntary cooperatives and arad producers' associations followed. In the 1930s, the government also began developing state farms, and by 1940 there were ten state farms and ninety-one agricultural cooperatives. In 1937 the Soviet Union provided ten hay-making machine stations to prepare fodder for livestock. In 1940 agriculture represented 61 percent of national income, and it employed approximately 90 percent of the labor force. (Country Study: Mongolia, Federal Research Division of the US Library of Congress, sponsored by the US Department of the Army, edited by: Robert L. Worden & and Andrea Matles Savada, June 1989) (IMG)

The USSR also began a decades-long provision of aid to Mongolia in the industrial sector:

In 1924 Mongolian industry was limited to the Nalayh coal mine, an electric power plant in Ulaanbaatar, and various handicrafts. Gross industrial output (measured in constant 1967 prices), was 300,000 tugriks. (...). With Soviet advice, however, Mongolia adopted an industrial strategy that was based on the exploitation of natural resources and agriculture and it has followed this strategy since. The first steps to develop industry began in the 1930s. In 1933 the Union of Artisans was organized. In 1934 the Choybalsan industrial combine, the flagship of Mongolian industry, began operating in Ulaanbaatar. The combine, a joint Mongolian-Soviet company transferred to Mongolian control in 1935, had its own power plant, cloth factories, tanneries, and wool-scouring mill that produced blankets, felt, footwear, leather coats, and soap. Coal production at Nalayh rose in the 1930s, and in 1938 the narrow-gauge railroad connecting the mine with the capital's power-generating station was completed. In 1940 industry accounted for 8.5 percent, and construction for 0.8 percent, of national income. Gross industrial output rose to 124.7 million tugriks.

Industry began to develop substantially after World War II, when Soviet aid increased and Soviet-style central planning was introduced.... Most industrialization occurred in Ulaanbaatar; smaller food combines and livestock-product processing plants were scattered throughout the country. In the 1950s, major projects completed with Soviet assistance included the modernization of the Choybalsan industrial combine; the expansion of production at the Nalayh coal mine;

(Country Study: Mongolia, Federal Research Division of the US Library of Congress, sponsored by the US Department of the Army, edited by: Robert L. Worden & and Andrea Matles Savada, June 1989) (IMG)

Theory on Mongolia's slow development: {A large part of Mongolia was suitable for agriculture but much of Mongolia was a desert. In the desert part of Mongolia, just like in the central zone of Saudi Arabia, there could not be a high level of development of the productive forces, and the low development of the productive forces meant a very slow development of the progressive class forces relying upon the rise of the productive forces. Hence, just like in the central zone of Saudi Arabia, extremely backwards class forces predominated in its desert region of Mongolia, thereby yielding extremely reactionary tendencies – i.e. the Mongol barbarians in the pre-modern times; and the Tsarist White Guards, anti-Soviet Trotskyites, and Japanese fascist agents during the Soviet era. The predominance of the desert in Mongolia and the consequent strengthening of the reactionary class forces slowed down the pace of socialist transformation and the development of the productive forces there. Socialism was popular there; however, consciousness – e.g. the people's general opinion of an idea – does not determine the course of class struggles as much as the more material factors such as geography and the level of the development of the productive forces would. Therefore, Mongolia was not as ready as other regions to become an SSR and thereby remained a separate country.

A significant amount of information has been provided by Colonel Trevor Nevitt Dupuy. Having served in the US Department of Defense's Operations Division during the late 1940s, Dupuy went on to serve in the Supreme Headquarters of Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE) under

Eisenhower during the 1950s. As confirmed by Dupuy, the USSR provided generous aid to the Mongolian people against the menace posed by those reactionary forces that sought to take away Mongolia's independence. With the assistance of the Soviet intelligence, a great purge began against the Japanese fascist fifth column in the Mongolian Party and state apparatuses, while the Red Army assisted the Mongolian People's Army (MPA) in defeating the Japanese-backed rebels:

Growing Japanese imperialism on the Asian mainland stimulated the idea of revolt (undoubtedly with Japanese encouragement). With elements of the Mongolian army as well as many Party and Revsomol members in revolt, and with Japanese troops provoking border incidents, the Red Army entered the MPR in force to aid the loyal portion of the MPA in putting down the rebellion. By the mid-1930's the Communist regime had suppressed the insurgency. It now decided that a more reliable army was necessary both for internal security and as a forward screen for the deployment of Soviet troops in the event of Japanese aggression. (Area Handbook for Mongolia, Vol. 550, Issue 76, Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Washington, D.C., Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Trevor Nevitt Dupuy, p. 424) (IMG)

Dupuy also stated:

With the growing threats of Germany in the west and Japan to the east, as well as internal pressures, in the mid-1930's Stalin undertook a widespread purge of presumed unreliable elements in the Red Army, including Marshal Tukhachevski and many other high-ranking military officers. With Japanese pressure also on the MPR and Japanese agents attempting to subvert Mongolians, it was perhaps inevitable that the Soviet purge should spill over into Mongolia in 1937. Demid, then Minister of War, had conferred with Tukhachevski on defense matters not long before the Marshal's trial and execution. Thus Demid was immediately suspect. He was called to Moscow in 1936 for interrogation, but died mysteriously of poison while on the Trans-Siberian express. (Area Handbook for Mongolia, Vol. 550, Issue 76, Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Washington, D.C., Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Trevor Nevitt Dupuy, p. 426) (IMG)

Widespread rebellions by the Buddhist monks and the aristocracy occurred in Mongolia:

Outside Mongolia and the Soviet Union, little is known of the revolts of the early 1930's except that they were led by former nobles and monks and were apparently widespread. (Area Handbook for Mongolia, Vol. 550, Issue 76, Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Washington, D.C., Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Trevor Nevitt Dupuy, p. 423) (IMG)

The counter-revolutionary infiltrators in the MPA also assisted the rebels:

at least one officer of the MPA general staff, Samba, in 1932 joined the rebels in western Mongolia, and some conscripts and isolated detachments under local influence revolted.... (Area Handbook for Mongolia, Vol. 550, Issue 76, Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Washington, D.C., Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Trevor Nevitt Dupuy, p. 423) (IMG)

The Red Army support for Mongolia of course came since the days of the Mongolian revolution and continued well during the 1920s and beyond:

White Russian army remnants remained in remote parts of Mongolia as brigands, while Chinese bandits and detachments of warlord armies constantly encroached upon the borders. Thus one of the first orders of business for the new government was the establishment of an adequately strong and politically reliable army. To help suppress White Russian remnants and Chinese bandits, and to back up the Comintern's political fiat, significant detachments of the Red Army remained in Mongolia at least until 1925. Thereafter, until the revolts of the early 1930's and the Japanese border probing beginning in the mid-1930's, Red Army troops in Mongolia amounted to little more than instructors and guards for diplomatic and trading installations.

Eventually the MPA would have to assume these duties....

(Area Handbook for Mongolia, Vol. 550, Issue 76, Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Washington, D.C., Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Trevor Nevitt Dupuy, p. 420) (IMG)

Not surprisingly, the Japanese Empire continued its efforts to gain control over Mongolia in the mid-1930s:

Following serious clashes with the Japanese along the eastern MPR border in early 1935, a conference of MPR and Japanese representatives was held in June at the border town of Manchouli to settle border demarcation and other matters at issue. After 6 months of wrangling without any agreement, the effort was abandoned. (Area Handbook for Mongolia, Vol. 550, Issue 76, Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Washington, D.C., Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Trevor Nevitt Dupuy, pp. 425-426) (IMG)

Hence the USSR further strengthened its military ties to Mongolia. Indeed:

On March 1, 1936, Stalin unequivocally and publically stated that, "If Japan should venture to attack the Mongolian People's Republic and encroach upon its independence, we will have to help the MPR ... just as we helped in 1921... ." This was followed 2 weeks later by a formal Protocol of Friendship and Mutual Assistance which reiterated the main provisions of the 1934 agreement. (Apparently the Russians were now less concerned about Chinese sensibilities.) The protocol was to run for 10 years.... (Area Handbook for Mongolia, Vol. 550, Issue 76, Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Washington, D.C., Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Trevor Nevitt Dupuy, pp. 425-426) (IMG)

As such, and as confirmed by a US military document:

In an effort to stem Japan's Mongolian aspirations, the Soviets concluded a mutual defense pact with Mongolia in March 1936. The real import of the agreement was to give Japan warning of the presence of Soviet troops in Mongolia and the far-reaching consequences of any attack upon that satellite. The purpose of the pact was fulfilled in that the Japanese did not invade Outer Mongolia and the number of border incidents diminished. (SOVIET POWER AND POLICY: 1917-1939, United States Army Lieutenant Colonel William W. Tombaugh, In: Military Review, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Vol. 48, p. 70) (IMG)

During the late 1930s, there were two major wars that occurred between the USSR and the aggressor Japan. Remarkably though, the American bourgeois media has made it look 'unclear' as to who was the aggressor, and thus have refused to condemn the Japanese for aggression. This is in spite of the fact that American officials have confirmed Japan as the aggressor. In 1946, already at the outset of the Cold War, a trial was held against the fascist leaders of the Empire of Japan. The trial was held by the following states and their corresponding judges:

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA,

CANADA, THE REPUBLIC OF FRANCE, THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS, NEW ZEALAND, INDIA, AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE PHILIPPINES. (TRIAL OF JAPANESE WAR CRIMINALS, United States Department of State, Washington, 1946, p. 45) (IMG)

As can be seen, among the judges, the USSR was the only country that did not belong to the Western bloc. The Anglo-Americans, their colonies and proxy states – including the KMT-led Republic of China – as well as the French held the upper hand. Not surprisingly, the case's Chief of Counsel belonged to the American government. The case was led by:

JOSEPH B. KEENAN

Chief of Counsel, acting on behalf of the United States of America.

(TRIAL OF JAPANESE WAR CRIMINALS, United States Department of State, Washington, 1946, p. 62) (IMG)

The 1946 US-led trial, published by the United States Department of State, corroborates that the Japanese were the aggressors against the USSR in both the battles of Lake Khasan and Khalkhin-Gol. A part of the document is as follows:

Count 25

The accused ARAKI, DOHIHARA, HATA, HIRANUMA, HIROTA, HOSHINO, ITAGAKI, KIDO, MATSUOKA, MATSUI, SHIGEMITSU, SUZUKI and TOGO, during July and August 1938, initiated a war of aggression and a war in violation of international law, treaties, agreements and assurances, by attacking the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the area of Lake Khasan. The same Particulars, Treaty Articles and Assurances as in Count 17, relate to this Count.

(TRIAL OF JAPANESE WAR CRIMINALS, United States Department of State, Washington, 1946, p. 53) (IMG)

The fact of Japan being the aggressor is also corroborated by the American Colonel Trevor Nevitt Dupuy. Having served in the US Department of Defense's Operations Division during the late 1940s, Dupuy went on to serve in the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) under Eisenhower during the 1950s. An anti-Soviet author, he nonetheless admitted as late as 1970, the following:

In 1937, the Japanese invaded North China, which enabled Japanese forces to occupy the Inner Mongolian provinces of Chahar and Suiyan along the MPR southern border. This widened the zone of contact between MPR and Japanese forces and increased Mongolian security problems. Border incidents continued along the MPR borders with Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. In July 1938, the Japanese Kwantung Army mounted a major attack against Soviet positions in an ambiguously demarcated area along the Manchurian-Siberian border near Vladivostok, and were repulsed. Frustrated along the Siberian border, Japan turned the following year to the more vulnerable MPR border where it felt that subversion against the Mongolians would pave the way. (Area Handbook for Mongolia, Vol. 550, Issue 76, Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Washington, D.C., Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Trevor Nevitt Dupuy, pp. 424-425) (IMG)

On the other hand, the US-led trial in 1946, also stated:

Count 51

The accused ARAKI, DOHIHARA, HATA, HIRANUMA, ITAGAKI, KIDO, KOISO, MATSUI, MATSUOKA, MUTO, SUZUKI, TOGO, TOJO and UMEZU, by ordering, causing, and permitting the armed forces of Japan to attack the territories of Mongolia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, with which nations Japan was then at peace, in the region of the Khalkhin-Gol River in the summer of 1939, unlawfully killed and murdered certain members of the armed forces of Mongolia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, whose names and number are at present unknown.

Count 52

The accused ARAKI, DOHIHARA, HATA, HIRANUMA, HIROTA, HOSHINO, ITAGAKI, KIDO, MATSUOKA, MATSUI, SHIGEMITSU, SUZUKI and TOJO by ordering, causing and permitting the armed forces of Japan to attack the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, with which nation Japan was then at peace, (in the region of Lake Khasan in the months of July and August 1938) unlawfully killed and murdered certain members Of the armed forces Of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, whose name and number are at present unknown.

(TRIAL OF JAPANESE WAR CRIMINALS, United States Department of State, Washington, 1946, p. 60) (IMG)

That the Japanese were aggressors in the battle of Khalkhin-Gol is also corroborated by the American Colonel Trevor Nevitt Dupuy:

On 11 May 1939, the Japanese Kwantung Army occupied portions of the MPR between the border and the Khalkhin Gol. A combined MPA-Red Army force quickly moved against the invaders. By the end of May, a joint Soviet-Mongolian force had seized a bridgehead on the Khalkhin Gol's east bank. To counter this move, the Japanese by early July concentrated a corps of some 38,000 men and attacked the northern flank of the Soviet-Mongolian bridgehead. They drove the allies back across the Khalkhin Gol, crossed it themselves, and established their own bridgehead on the western bank. On July 5 Soviet armor counterattacked and eliminated the Japanese bridgehead. Both sides began a major force build-up. (Area Handbook for Mongolia, Vol. 550, Issue 76, Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Washington, D.C., Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Trevor Nevitt Dupuy, p. 427) (IMG)

The Japanese suffered crushing defeats in both of the wars they began:

Japanese military forces were decisively defeated in the major battles of Changkufeng and Khalkhin-Gol. (Military Review, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Vol. 48, p. 71) (IMG)

Colonel Dupuy too said:

The Japanese defended tenaciously, but by 23 August the Soviet encirclement of their forces along the Khalkhin Gol was complete. For 5 days the Soviet-Mongolian forces beat off fanatical attacks by relieving Japanese forces and attempts by the surrounded units to break out. The Japanese relief attempts slackened and the pockets of resistance were mopped up. On the 31st, the Soviet-Mongolian forces closed to the frontier. A cease-fire was negotiated on 15 September, as the Japanese grudgingly conceded defeat.

Soviet casualties came to nearly 10,000 and the Mongolians lost 1131. The Japanese losses were far greater, with over 18,000 killed and 25,000 wounded (some estimates were as high as 80,000 total), as well as over 170 guns and 200 aircraft lost. The magnitude of these losses, together with the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact signed 23 August, led Japan to turn her imperialistic thrust southward. On 9 June 1940, an agreement fixing the Manchukuo-MPR border was signed in Moscow. This was followed on 13 April 1941 by the Soviet-Japanese Non-Aggression Pact....

C9S16. Deportations of Koreans *** IMG-All-{Deportation of Koreans}

Although the people of Japanese-occupied Korea were savagely oppressed by the Japanese fascist masters, there was widespread Japanese fascist influence among the Koreans of the USSR, nonetheless. The Koreans in the USSR had family bonds with the Koreans in Japanese-occupied Korea. The Japanese fascists could use such family bonds for cross-border intelligence penetration by mainland-Korean nationals who had been recruited as agents of fascist Japan. Their tribal ties and their geographic proximity to the Japanese-occupied mainland Korea was unfortunately being far too pervasively exploited for Japanese fascist intelligence penetration. To cut such a link, the USSR saw it best to reduce the geographic proximity of these Koreans from fascist Japan.

As confirmed by Japanese intelligence, the Soviet state's deportation of the Koreans was aimed at securing the USSR from the conspiracies of the Japanese fascist espionage centers. American-Japanese intelligence document series in the Cold War years completely confirm this reality.

In its hostile anti-Soviet Cold War efforts, US military intelligence utilized the vast knowledge and experience of prominent Japanese military intelligence figures. One such prominent Japanese military and intelligence figure provided much assistance to the US military and intelligence in an:

original study ... prepared in 1953 under the supervision of the Historical Records Division of the [US military's] First Demobilization Bureau.... (STUDY OF STRATEGICAL AND TACTICAL PECULIARITIES OF FAR EASTERN RUSSIA AND SOVIET FAR EAST FORCES, Japanese Special Studies on Manchuria, Vol. 13, Prepared by Military History Section, Headquarters of the US Army Forces of Far East, Distributed by Office of the Chief of Military History in the US Department of Army, Lieutenant Hayashi, p. 1) (IMG)

The mentioned Japanese commander was Lieutenant Hayashi whose description is as follows:

Lieutenant Hayashi was graduated from Japan's military academy in 1925. After about six years of duty with troops, he attended the three-year course at Japan's equivalent of the U.S. Command and General Staff College. Following graduation from this school, he was given a series of assignments that kept him in close contact with Soviet matters throughout the rest of his career: from December 1935 until April 1938, Captain Hayashi was with the Russian (Fifth) Section of the Intelligence (Second) Bureau of the [Japanese] Army General Staff; the following year Major Hayashi was sent to the USSR and Poland as a language officer; in March 1939 he became Assistant Military Attache at the Japanese Embassy in Moscow. Upon returning to Japan in October 1940 he was again assigned to the Fifth Section and was promoted lieutenant colonel early the following year. He became chief of that section in October 1943, and after promotion to colonel in March 1944 continued in that post until June 1933. His next assignment was as chief of the Third Section of the Operations Bureau of the Army General Staff. Upon completing this assignment in April 1945, Colonel Hayashi became Military Secretary to the War Minister, a post he held at the end of the War. (STUDY OF STRATEGICAL AND TACTICAL PECULIARITIES OF FAR EASTERN RUSSIA AND SOVIET FAR EAST FORCES, Japanese Special Studies on Manchuria, Vol. 13, Prepared by Military History Section, Headquarters of the US Army Forces of Far East, Distributed by Office of the Chief of Military History in the US Department of Army, Lieutenant Hayashi, p. 3) (IMG)

Based:

mainly on Colonel Hayashi's notes and recollections.... (STUDY OF STRATEGICAL AND TACTICAL PECULIARITIES OF FAR EASTERN RUSSIA AND SOVIET FAR EAST FORCES, Japanese Special Studies on Manchuria, Vol. 13, Prepared by Military History Section, Headquarters of the US Army Forces of Far East, Distributed by Office of the Chief of Military History in the US Department of Army, Lieutenant Hayashi, p. 1) (IMG)

the US intelligence produced several volumes of studies documenting Japanese intelligence in East Asia. "In developing FER [i.e. Far Eastern Russia] during this period," volume 13 of the document series stated,:

the USSR also took counter-espionage measures against Japan, a few of which are worth mentioning. Soviet authorities for some time had regarded the Japanese Manchurian consulates in Soviet territory as centers of espionage activity. After the conclusion of the Anti-Comintern Pact in 1936, they initiated reductions in the number of their consulates in Japan and Manchuria, and at the same time made a strong request that Japan make a corresponding reduction in the number of Japanese consulates at Blagoveshchensk, Khabarovsk, Aleksandrovsk, Novosibirsk, and other cities. Thereafter, the USSR took even more thorough counter-intelligence measures.

Immediately after the Changkufeng Incident in 1938, the USSR forcibly and abruptly moved about 200,000 Koreans engaged in rice farming in the Ussuri area to the Kazakh SSR. The object of this mass movement was to eliminate all Korean hamlets, which then were being used by Japanese espionage agents as centers of activity.

(STUDY OF STRATEGICAL AND TACTICAL PECULIARITIES OF FAR EASTERN RUSSIA AND SOVIET FAR EAST FORCES, Japanese Special Studies on Manchuria, Vol. 13, Prepared by Military History Section, Headquarters of the US Army Forces of Far East, Distributed by Office of the Chief of Military History in the US Department of Army, Lieutenant Hayashi, p. 79) (IMG)

Hence, as confirmed by Japanese intelligence, the Soviet state's deportation of the Koreans was aimed at securing the USSR from the conspiracies of the Japanese fascist espionage centers.

C9S17. Soviet Aid to China 1939-1941 *** IMG-All-{USSR, China, Mongolia – 1930s}

A diplomatic factor in the strengthening of Soviet power in the Far East was indeed the 1939 Nazi-Soviet pacts, rendering the Japanese unable to wage war on the USSR:

The conclusion of the Berlin-Moscow agreement in 1939 must be credited with increasing the military prestige of the Soviets in the Far East in that it compelled a reversal of former Japanese policy.

The virtual isolation of Japan as a result of the pact and its heavy commitments in China rendered the pursuit of an aggressive anti-Soviet policy impractical. With its western borders temporarily secure, the Soviets could leisurely continue to supply the united Chinese front with military aid and gradually weaken Japan to the point of ineffectiveness.

(SOVIET POWER AND POLICY: 1917-1939, United States Army Lieutenant Colonel William W. Tombaugh. In: Military Review, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Vol. 48, p. 71) (IMG)

The diplomatic factor became more than just words and became action because back in the Nazi-Soviet Pact period, the Nazis were bogged down in Europe's wars, thus affording the Soviets the opportunity to undermine Japanese fascism in East Asia. Soviet military assistance to China inflicted heavy damage on the Japanese imperial forces:

By 1940, in China's war with Japan, thanks to active Soviet military support of Chiang, Soviet pilots destroyed 986 Japanese planes. (The CIA and Double Demonology: Calling the Sino-Soviet Split, CIA, Harold P. Ford, p. 63) (IMG)

C9S18. The Ustase Regime *** IMG-All-{Ustase}

The Ustase is a case in point for proving the fact that fascism is not a real ideology but is rather only the open terrorist dictatorship of the most reactionary and most chauvinistic elements of finance capital. Fascism manifests itself in all kinds of different ideological and religious covers as means of pursuing its ultimate agenda: terror and crimes for the purpose of service to finance capital. The Ustase promoted Catholicism, Paganism, Islamism. The Ustase was a colorful multi-ethnic and multi-religious fascist organization.

For years, the most reactionary powers of Europe, the Axis had sponsored the Ustase led by Ante Pavelic. In the words of the MI6 operative Richard West:

Pavelic and his Ustasha were both helped - and used - by the Italian Fascists and German Nazis.... (Tito: And the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, p. 79) (IMG)

To the Western liberals, the ideology of the Ustase gang would surely appear strange. On the one hand, they are most famous for being an extremist Croatian Catholic religio-nationalist organization. It is a well-known fact that Pavelic and his Ustase viciously pursued the genocide against the Serbs:

In dealing with his Axis allies, Pavelic was respectful and eager to please, provided they let him exterminate the Serbs. (Tito: And the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, p. 79) (IMG)

In early April of 1941, the Axis forces violated Yugoslav sovereignty and initiated a large-scale bombardment of that country. In approximately two weeks, the Axis powers took full control over Yugoslavia, and on April 10, 1941, the 'Independent State of Croatia' (NDH) was proclaimed by the Ustase, ruled by the Croatian Fuhrer Pavelic. Upon founding the NDH, Pavelic immediately formed his cabinet:

Among Pavelic's colleagues, the most important were Slavko Kvaternik, the head of the armed forces; Andrija Artukovic (also known as 'the Yugoslav Himmler'), the Minister of the Interior; and Mile Budak, the Doglavnik (Deputy Leader) and Minister of Religion and Education. (Tito: And the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, p. 79) (IMG)

The NDH included not just the predominantly Catholic Croatia, but also the predominantly Muslim Bosnia. Because it self-described as a theocratic Catholic regime, the NDH famously enjoyed the blessing of the local Catholic Church of Croatia led by Archbishop Stepinac:

In a circular letter to his priests on 28 April 1941, [Archbishop] Stepinac expressed his joy at the new regime introduced by Adolf Hitler and Ante Pavelic:

Our people has come face to face with its age-old and ardently desired dream. The times are such that it is no longer the tongue which speaks but the blood with its mysterious links with the country, in which we have seen the light of God, and with its people from whom we spring. Do we need to say that the blood flows more quickly in our veins, that the hearts in our breasts beat faster?... It is easy to see God's hand at work here.

(Tito: And the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, p. 84) (IMG) (IMG)

Throughout the War, the NDH also enjoyed the support of the fascist Pope and his gang in the Vatican:

Stepinac's apologists find it hard to explain why he justified the Ustasha regime to its most influential supporter, Pope Pius XII. (Tito: And the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, p. 133) (IMG)

the cardinals and the Pope himself preferred to listen to lies or cover-ups about the Ustasha regime from its main apologist, Archbishop Stepinac.... (Tito: And the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, p. 134) (IMG)

the Holy See in Rome supported the NDH government.... (Tito: And the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, p. 134) (IMG)

Again, the NDH also encompassed the predominantly Muslim Bosnia. Thus, although self-described as 'Catholic Crusaders', the Ustase also openly declared the establishment of an 'Islamic State' in Bosnia. Mile Budak, the Deputy leader of Croatia, publicly declared:

The NDH is an Islamic state wherever our people belong to the Islamic faith. I emphasise this because it is necessary to know that we are a state of two creeds, Catholic and Muslim. (Tito: And the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, p. 81) (IMG)

At the same time:

Pavelic's wife was Jewish. (Tito: And the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, p. 78) (IMG)

This was in spite of the numerous:

Jews and Serbs he murdered. (Tito: And the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, p. 78) (IMG)

The fact is that Pavelic was not particularly fanatical in favour of any of the Abrahamic religions. Although officially self-described as 'Catholic', there is no concrete evidence that Pavelic was a Christian. He was rather interested in 'proving' that the Croatian (including the Bosnian) 'race' was distinct from Slavs and that it was rather Eastern Germanic (Gothic):

We know that Pavelic went to Mass each day in his private chapel but not if he had any strong Christian devotion. His only recorded interests outside politics were philology and philately. He had taken from Ante Starcevic the absurd idea that the Croats were really Goths who had fallen by accident into speaking a Slav-sounding language.... (Tito: And the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, p. 78) (IMG)

As a matter of fact, Pavelic disbelieved in all of the Abrahamic religions. He instead leaned towards Paganism, even though that too was a mere cover by which to pursue his reactionary fascist agenda. According to the Croatian history scholar Ivo Goldstein, Slavko Kvaternik, the head of the NDH armed forces, maintained that Pavelic:

was a true oriental Pagan. ('Ante Pavelic, Charisma and National Mission in Wartime Croatia', Ivo Goldstein. In: Charisma and Fascism, edited by Antonio Costa Pinto, Roger Eatwell, Stein Ugelvik Larsen)

Above all, fascists have no religion, nor an ideology. Their own 'ideology' is to commit crimes for finance capital.

The plans of the Vatican-backed 'Islamic State' and Crusaders led by the Pagan Pavelic were indeed approved of by another Pagan lord, namely:

Hitler, who in June 1941 advised [Pavelic] that if he wanted a truly lasting NDH he must pursue 'a fifty-year-long policy of intolerance'. (Tito: And the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, p. 79) (IMG)

Pavelic agreed with Hitler, and thus set about to slay every Serb, wherever he could find them. The Ustase began the implementation of a policy of extermination. According to the MI6 operative Richard West:

The reports of the SS ... described ... how the Ustasha had made Serb peasants lie on their faces in church, then speared them with pikes. (...). The German Plenipotentiary General to the NDH, the historian Glaise von Horstenau, wrote in June that 'according to reliable reports from countless German military and civilian observers during the last few weeks, in country and town, the Ustasha have gone raging mad'. Early in July von Horstenau reported that the Croats had expelled all Serbian intellectuals from Zagreb. When he went to complain Pavelic promised to give them better treatment; but he did not do so, for on 10 July von Horstenau described the 'utterly inhuman treatment of the Serbs living in Croatia', and the embarrassment of the Germans who, 'with six battalions of foot-soldiers', could do nothing but stand by and watch the 'blind bloody fury of the Ustasha'. (Tito: And the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West) (IMG)

The Ustase carried out its mass-murders using both advanced technology and 'amateurish' tools like knives. They were like a mix of ISIS and the Nazis.

Unlike the Nazis whose methods of extermination were scientific and based on high-quality technology, the Ustase was relatively primitive and backwards in its extermination practices:

Although the Ustasha tried out poison gas as a way of killing the Jews on special trains, they scorned modern technology at Jasenovac and the other camps. They normally killed with knives, axes and clubs, or by hanging, burning in furnaces or burying alive. One group of Ustasha posed for their photograph as they sawed off the head of a young Serb. (Tito: and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, p. 129)

The Ustase were therefore similar to the 'Islamic State of Iraq and Syria' (ISIS) and Al-Qa'ida. Under the Ustase regime, an 'Islamic State' officially headed by a gang of 'Catholic Crusaders' took shape in the Balkans. As a matter of fact, an entire SS division, almost exclusively made up of Bosnian Muslims loyal to both Hitler and Pavelic was formed. **It was called the Handzar SS Division** (Handzar was a Bosnian knife or scimitar). According to a scholar from the US Naval Postgraduate School:

In April 1943 the Bosnian Muslims also formed the SS Handzar Division.... (The War in Bosnia, 1992-1995: Analyzing Military Asymmetries and Failures, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, Thesis Advisor: David Yost Co-Advisor: Donald Abenheim, Thesis Author: Gheorghe Anghel, June 2000, p. 18) (IMG{Gestapo Agent Tito})

Chapter 10

C10S1. The Communist-Led French Resistance *** IMG-All-{French Resistance}

A paper sponsored by the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) and the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base (AFB) documented the case of the resistance activities of the PCF. The document shows that the PCF initiated the Front National (FN), which was a popular communist-led resistance movement responsible for combatting the German occupation and the Vichy regime. Although the US military official supported many slanderous remarks against the PCF, he nevertheless admitted, in between the lines, the important role of the PCF-led popular front, including its covert activities, in the resistance against the fascist occupation:

when Germany invaded France before it invaded the Soviet Union, ... Maurice Thorez, the head of the PCF went into exile in the Soviet Union for the duration of the war, while a new communist organization formed, taking the name the Front National (FN). While the communists directed the FN, it sought to maintain a non-political image and sought to fight German occupation and the Vichy collaborationist policies. Therefore, they dropped the international aspect of communist ideology from its cause, while it held firmly onto the central tenet of communist ideology calling for armed action to force the revolutionary change. Its desire to fight attracted many adherents, whether they were communist or not into its armed Resistance organization, the Franc-Tireurs et Partisans Francais (FTPF or often simply the FTP). For the Front National, and later the PCF, Resistance meant violence, not simply printing underground newspapers or spiriting downed Allied airmen back into Allied hands. They wanted to kill Germans and Vichy officials despite the very real threat of reprisals. Action was more important and worth the price.

Their assassination of various German officers or Vichy officials played into the occupation authority's propaganda. The Germans and Vichy could then claim that the Resistance was a fringe movement of communists and Jews in an excuse to arrest any they found and label its efforts as a part of the global communist/Jewish movement the Nazi's had portrayed as a great threat. When the Germans enacted counter-terrorist policies in Paris focusing on communists and Jews, it ironically furthered the Front National's and later the PCF's own propaganda attempting to convince the French people of their status as the leading way to resist occupation and collaboration.

('Freeing France: The Allies, the Resistance, and the JEDBURGHs', sponsored by: Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) and the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base (AFB), Benjamin F. Jones, July 21, 2008, pp. 88-89. Citing: Sweets, The Politics of Resistance in France, 1940-1944: A History of the Mouvements Unis De La Resistance, pp. 116-121. The FN's FTP should not be confused with the Resistance movement Franc-Tireurs, largely affiliated with a centrist ideology. B. F. Jones also cited: Jackson, France: The Dark Years, 1940-1944. P. 423 - 425.) (IMG)

The above fact also debunks the commonly promoted myth that the French communists refused to engage in a struggle against the Nazi Germans when the latter invaded France and that the PCF only began resistance against the Axis after the 1941 invasion against USSR. On the contrary, as stated above, 'when Germany invaded France before it invaded the Soviet Union', the PCF formed a popular front organization called Front National (FN) in order to both combat the Nazi Germans. The change of name was also useful for the Soviets as it kept the façade of their 'friendship' with Nazi Germany while covertly undermining the Nazis.

As time went by the communist-led French Resistance only became more powerful. By 1943, the PCF's:

FTP units, mostly in southern France, proved to be a popular alternative when Vichy persisted in making one very particular policy that directly affected men in their 20s and 30s.

In February of 1943, Laval and the German labor minister agreed to institute a labor draft to man factories in Germany. Numbers of people involved in the Resistance increased as a result. Popular reaction to the Service du Travail Obligatoire (STO) was the single greatest cause for young men to join the Resistance. The German Labor Minister, Fritz Sauckel came to be known at the time the "recruiter par excellence, for the army of the Marquis."

(‘Freeing France: The Allies, the Resistance, and the JEDBURGHs’, sponsored by: Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) and the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base (AFB), Benjamin F. Jones, July 21, 2008, p. 90. Citing: Henry Rousso, *The Vichy Syndrome: History and Memory in France since 1944* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991). pp. 4 - 26. Philippe Buton, *Les Lendemain Qui Dechantent: Le Parti Communiste Frangais A La Liberation* ([Paris, France]: Presses de la Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 1993)., pp. 15 - 17. Kedward, *In Search of the Maquis: Rural Resistance in Southern France, 1942-1944*. p. 40.) (IMG)

Note that the ‘Maquis’ was an alternative term for the communist-led anti-fascist resistance forces. Referring to the Nazi occupation period, the CIA confirmed that in France:

the left ... had stood squarely against fascism and the occupation. It formed the backbone and largest block of fighters in the Resistance, [and] among these the Communists played a commanding ... role. (France: Defection of the Leftist Intellectuals, Research Paper, Directorate of Intelligence, CIA, November 15, 1985, p. 2) (IMG)

C10S2. Danish and Swedish Communist-led anti-Nazi Resistance *** IMG-All-{Scandinavian Resistance}

In Western Europe too, the anti-fascist resistance movement was led by the popular communist parties. The case of France has already been previously studied in C10S1. However, there were many other cases. For example, in both Nazi-occupied Norway and Denmark, the communist parties won popular strength given that, in the CIA’s words, they ‘spearheaded’ the anti-fascist resistance movement:

During World War II, however, DKP strength was materially increased. By spearheading the Danish resistance movement the Communists won popular admiration. The DKP also profited from widespread public disillusionment with the conventional political parties whose policy of passivity during the occupation caused large segments of their membership to desert to the illegal resistance organizations. (Communism in Scandinavia, ORE 77-49, CIA, December 14, 1949, p. 3) (IMG)

World War II materially augmented the strength of the NKP. After the German attack on the USSR in June 1941 the Norwegian Communists became violently anti-Nazi and carried on active and effective underground resistance. The undoubted courage of many of them aroused popular admiration, and the military achievements of the Red Army further increased NKP prestige. Many Norwegians, having been sincerely convinced that the Communists had become democratic and patriotic, were not averse to joining or supporting the party. Others, though skeptical, were willing to give the Communists an opportunity to demonstrate that their wartime patriotism would continue. Clothed thus with a semblance of respectability, the party gained new support, and in the first post-liberation election in October 1945 received 176,535 votes (11.9 percent), and obtained eleven representatives in the *Storting*. By mid-1946 party membership, which before the war had been insignificant, reached its peak of 30 to 40,000. (Communism in Scandinavia, ORE 77-49, CIA, December 14, 1949, p. 5) (IMG)

Even in Sweden, which technically was not occupied by the Axis, the communists gained a high popularity during the War:

During the latter years of the war, both its membership and popular vote increased greatly. While popular admiration of the USSR's fight against Nazi Germany contributed to its rise, more cogent reasons were dissatisfaction, chiefly economic, with the wartime coalition government from which only the Communists were excluded, and with the conservatism of the Social Democratic hierarchy which dominates organized labor. In both the 1944 national election and the 1946 municipal elections, the SKP consequently received over 10 percent of the total popular vote (see Appendix B). At the end of the war the party had a membership of approximately 50,000. (Communism in Scandinavia, ORE 77-49, CIA, December 14, 1949, p. 8) (IMG)

C10S3. MI6 Encourages Operation Barbarossa *** IMG-All-{Canaris}

British Conservative Party politician, electoral candidate, and intelligence studies scholar Rupert Allason (known more commonly as 'Nigel West') noted that Canaris provided top secret intelligence to the MI6. The UPI reported:

Most of Canaris' information was political, but [Nigel] West said that in the autumn of 1940 he disclosed Hitler's intentions to invade Russia the following year, the famed Barbarossa plan. (Hitler's spymaster leaked secrets to Britain, UPI, October 16, 1983)

A major British intelligence officer and historian at the University of Oxford recalled:

Late in 1942 my office had come to certain conclusions - which time proved to be correct - about the struggle between the Nazi Party and the German General Staff, as it was being fought out in the field of secret intelligence. The German Secret Service (the Abwehr) and its leader, Admiral Canaris, were suspected by the Party not only of inefficiency but of disloyalty, and attempts were being made by Himmler to oust the Admiral and to take over his whole organization. Admiral Canaris himself, at that time, was making repeated journeys to Spain and had indicated a willingness to treat with us. (The Secret World: Behind the Curtain of British Intelligence in World War II and the Cold War, Hugh Trevor-Roper, edited by: Edward Harrison, 2014, p. 106)

Canaris's activities are also corroborated by Ian Colvin's book which received the praise of the CIA. The CIA described Ian Colvin's:

MASTER SPY: The Incredible Story of Admiral Wilhelm Canaris.

(New York: McGraw-Hill. 1951. Ppk 286. cited in: PUBLIC TEXTS IN INTELLIGENCE, CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM, APPROVED FOR RELEASE, CIA, September 22, 1993)

as one of:

the most broadly informative books on intelligence available in English. (PUBLIC TEXTS IN INTELLIGENCE, CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM, APPROVED FOR RELEASE, CIA, September 22, 1993)

In that book, the CIA notes, Colvin described the:

Ambivalent attitude and pro-Allied activities of the head of the German Abwehr, based on published documents and interviews with many of his former associates. (PUBLIC TEXTS IN INTELLIGENCE, CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM, APPROVED FOR RELEASE, CIA, September 22, 1993)

The British required the Nazi Reich to reduce its fight against the British Empire and instead focus on the USSR. As such, the MI6, through its agent Wilhelm Canaris, who was the head of the Abwehr, actively encouraged Hitler's gang to expedite the invasion of the USSR by depicting Soviet defenses as much weaker than they actually were.

The memoirs of Nazi Germany's intelligence chief Walter Schellenberg shed light on:

Canaris's inclination to underestimate Russia's technical strength.... (Hitler's Secret Service, Original title: The Labyrinth, Walther Schellenberg, Introduction by Alan Bullock, Translation by Louis Hagen, first published: 1956, p. 196) (IMG)

Schellenberg further stated:

During the rides that Admiral Canaris and I used to have early in the morning we usually discussed the information that was coming in to our respective organizations, between which there was unfortunately a great deal of wasteful overlapping. Various differences existed between us about Russia, and we argued over these for many months. First, there was the question of production figures of Russian heavy industry. I rated their tank production much higher than Canaris did, and was convinced that they had new models in production that were better than ours, but this Canaris refused to believe. I had come to this conclusion as the result of a peculiar order that Hitler, wishing to impress the Russians, had given in March 1941; we were to show the Soviet Military Mission our most advanced tank factories and tank corps training schools, and all secrecy measures as far as they were concerned were to be dropped. (Nevertheless, we did not obey the Fuehrer's orders and hid our newest models.) It was the attitude of the Russians on this occasion, and the questions they asked, that led me to conclude that they possessed better models than anything we had. The appearance in large masses of T-34 tanks on the Russian front in the summer of 1941 proved that my assumption had been correct. Another point of disagreement arose because Canaris claimed he had documentary proof that the industrial centers round Moscow, and in the northeast, the south, and near the Urals, as well as their chief centers of raw materials, were linked only by single-track railways. My department had received different information. However, Canaris claimed that his had been verified, while we possessed no means of checking the accuracy of ours. (Hitler's Secret Service, Original title: The Labyrinth, Walther Schellenberg, Introduction by Alan Bullock, Translation by Louis Hagen, first published: 1956, pp. 195-196) (IMG)

It is questionable if Hitler really was deceived by the MI6 into a war, because Canaris was known for his MI6 connections and Hitler was smart enough to know that the British were trying to lure him into a quicker invasion. Nonetheless, what this does show is that the MI6 really did try to get Hitler group to invade the USSR so that one the one hand, the USSR would get damaged and on the other hand, the British Empire would have contribute less in order to undermine its imperial rival, Nazi Germany.

C10S4. USSR and Nazi Germany were not Allies / Stalin Did Expect War / USSR was Ready for War *** IMG-All-{Nazi-Soviet Pact Era}{Soviets Expect Nazi Invasion}

As has been abundantly evidenced previously, the USSR and Nazi Germany, in spite of their superficial appearance of 'friendship', were actually engaged in a Cold War throughout Europe, 'even' in the case of Poland. Yet, imperialist-fascist secret services continue to trumpet of the Nazi-Soviet alliance for the period 1939-1941. In fact, the Nazi Germans and the Soviets were engaged in a Cold War throughout Europe. This fact was summarized in the following Memorandum of Conversation between the Nazi German and Japanese foreign ministers:

Confidentially, he (the Reich Foreign Minister) could inform Matsuoka that present relations with Russia were correct, to be sure, but not very friendly. After Molotov's visit, during which accession to the Three Power Pact was offered, Russia had made conditions that were unacceptable. They involved. the sacrifice of German interests in Finland, the granting of bases on the Dardanelles and a strong influence on conditions in the Balkans, particularly in Bulgaria. The Führer had not concurred because he had been of the opinion that Germany could not permanently subscribe to such a Russian policy. Germany needed the Balkan Peninsula above all for her own and had not been inclined to let it come under Russian domination. For this reason she had given Rumania a guarantee. It was this latter action, particularly, that the Russians had taken amiss. Germany had further been obliged to enter into a closer relationship with Bulgaria in order to obtain a vantage point from which to expel the British from Greece. Germany had had to decide on this course because this campaign would otherwise not have been possible. This, too, the Russians had not liked at all.

Under these circumstances, relations with Russia were externally normal and correct. The Russians, however, had for some time demonstrated their unfriendliness to Germany wherever they could. The declaration made to Turkey within the last few days was an example of this. Germany felt plainly that since Sir Stafford Cripps became Ambassador to Moscow (he had recently met Eden at Ankara) ties between Russia and England were being cultivated in secret and, at times, even relatively openly. Germany was watching these proceedings carefully. He (the Reich Foreign Minister), who knew Stalin personally, did not assume that the latter was inclined toward adventure, but it was impossible to be sure.

('Memorandum of the Conversation Between the Reich Foreign Minister and Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka in the Presence of Ambassadors Ott and Oshima at Berlin on March 27, 1941', State Secret, Aufz. RAM 14/41. In: W 4646/40g, Frames 112565-112566, serial 104, Foreign Office Memorandum, October 8, 1940. In: "Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941: Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Office as Released by the Department of State", edited by: Raymond James Sontag & James Stuart Beddie, pp. 284-285) (IMG)

The Nazis in fact tried in vain to enter the USSR into an alliance:

The initial bellicose response to Soviet moves towards Finland and the Balkans was then followed by an attempt to resolve Russo-German disagreements and bring the Soviet Union into a larger anti-British alliance, or continental bloc. Following a Soviet request for discussions to reconcile Russo-German differences and clarify respective areas of influence, Molotov travelled to Berlin where he met with Hitler and the German Foreign Minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop. During the course of 12-13 November, Hitler and Ribbentrop endeavoured to convince Molotov of the opportunities, such as expansion into south-central Asia, which awaited the Soviet Union should it join the Tripartite Pact or if it at least increased its cooperation with Germany. Unimpressed with the vagueness of the German proposal, Molotov pressed for German recognition of Soviet interests in Finland and the Balkans, including the likely annexation of Finland and

the establishment of Soviet air and naval bases in Bulgaria and Turkey. Hitler concluded the meeting by responding that, for economic reasons, Germany viewed the occupation of these regions, at least for the duration of the war with Great Britain, to be against its interests. On 25 November the Soviet Union formally replied to the German proposals, again reiterating that German recognition of its interests in Finland and the Balkans a vital precondition for signing the Tripartite Pact. For Hitler this was unacceptable since a Soviet occupation of these areas would only increase Germany's dependence, and arguably marks the point at which he firmly resolved to invade the Soviet Union. (Enduring the Whirlwind: The German Army and the Russo-German War 1941-1943. Helion and Company, Gregory Liedtke, 2016, p. 90) (IMG)

The fact that the Trotskyite 4th International, a front for the intelligence service of Nazi Germany, was slandering the USSR by stating that the Soviets were 'allied' to the Nazis, and the fact that the Soviets resisted such slanders by the Nazi German-backed 4th International, is itself an excellent evidence that the USSR and the Nazis were not allies. For by using the Trotskyite media to slander the USSR as being allied to 'us Nazis', the Nazis were undermining the Soviet state, and were creating splits in the pro-Soviet parties, the communist parties; and by resisting the Trotskyite media slanders, the Soviets were resisting the individuals whom they correctly identified as serving the Nazi German intelligence.

The MI6 station in Moscow too agreed that rumours of a Soviet-German military alliance were unlikely to be true:

Various [false] reports are also current regarding imminence of a German-Soviet Military Alliance. (...). In the absence of concrete evidence I am therefore inclined for the present, to treat such reports with great reserve. (N 2094/233/38, Mr. Le Rougetel to Viscount Halifax, No. 81, Moscow, February 18, 1940. In: Foreign Office (January to December 1940), p. 122. In: Foreign Office (January 1940 – December 1941), p. 146) (IMG)

Nor did the Soviets have any delusion as to approximately when the war with Nazi Germany will begin. According to an American intelligence document written in June 1940, the Finnish Prime Minister Risto Ryti told US diplomat Schoenfeld that top-ranking military leaders in the USSR predicted war with Nazi Germany to occur within one year (i.e. on June 1941). An excerpt of the document is as follows:

The Prime Minister told me this afternoon that notwithstanding Molotov's emphatic statement to him of intention of Soviet Union to keep out of the present war, important military leaders in Russia have lately expressed the conviction that the Soviet Union will be at war with Germany within a year. (740.0011 European War 1939/3761: Telegram, The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State, Helsinki, June 13, 1940. In: "Foreign relations of the United States" (FRUS), Diplomatic papers, 1940, Vol. 1, General, (ACTIVITIES OF THE SOVIET UNION IN EASTERN EUROPE, AND SOVIET RELATIONS WITH THE BELLIGERENT POWERS), Department of State, Historical Division, Bureau of Public Affairs, 1959) (IMG)

It was 1941, and the Soviets, expecting an imperialist assault on their territory, retained vigilance. Indeed, in a timeline produced by the US intelligence in 1945, it was noted that on the very first day of the year 1941:

Stalin's New Year message stated that the USSR was prepared for every eventuality, and was in a state of total mobilization. (Chronology of Principal Events Relating to the USSR Part I, OSS, September 25, 1945, p. 151) (IMG)

The term 'total mobilization' of course refers to the mobilization of the entire armed forces for the war conditions. In the 'Military Intelligence' magazine published by the United States Army Intelligence Center and School, anti-Soviet American Captain Rober Kells Jr. admitted:

In terms of Soviet military doctrine. Stalin's actions prior to June 22, 1941, seemed perfectly reasonable. Stalin had come to the conclusion, probably early in 1941, that war with Germany was inevitable. ('Intelligence, Doctrine and Decision Making: Josef Stalin and June 22, 1941', Captain Robert E. Kells Jr. In: Military Intelligence: From the Home of Intelligence, Vol. 11, No. 1, United States Army Intelligence Center and School, January-March 1985, p. 17) (IMG)

On January 4, 1941, only three days after Stalin's New Year message:

Timoshenko, Defense Commissar, ordered strict economy in use of gasoline and oil by the Red Army in order to build up reserves. (Chronology of Principal Events Relating to the USSR Part I, OSS, September 25, 1945, p. 151) (IMG)

On January 30, 1941:

Pravda announced that due to organization changes, Red Army training and activity reached maximum approximation to real conditions of warfare. (Chronology of Principal Events Relating to the USSR Part I, OSS, September 25, 1945, p. 153) (IMG)

Around this time, the Americans too received intelligence from Erwin Respondek, a high-level official of Nazi Germany and American spy, regarding the coming Operation Barbarossa. According to Stephen Kotkin of the neo-conservative Hoover Institute:

The Americans, too, had learned the world's most important secret. A high German economic official from Weimar days, Erwin Respondek, who had been tasked with preparing the Currency for the occupied Soviet Union, arranged meetings with the U.S. commercial attaché in a darkened cinema and passed him word of the invasion planning. In early 1941, Respondek had prepared the first of several detailed memoranda for the United States outlining the steps being taken for the destruction of the Soviet Union and "a rigorous liquidation of Bolshevism, all its political and other institutions, and, in particular, the 'extermination' of its leaders by the SS." Respondek, whose key contact was General Halder, had proved a reliable source till now.... ('Stalin: Waiting for Hitler, 1929-1941', Stephen Kotkin, p. 854) (IMG)

The Americans passed on this intelligence, of which the Soviets were already well aware:

After internal debate, Roosevelt had undersecretary of state Sumner Welles tell Konstantin Umansky, the Soviet envoy in Washington, that the United States "has come into possession of information which it regards as authentic, clearly indicating that it is the intention of Germany to attack the Soviet Union." ('Stalin: Waiting for Hitler, 1929-1941', Stephen Kotkin, p. 854) (IMG)

Actually, the coming war was well-expected by the Soviets including Stalin himself, since the mid-1930s. The Nazi-Soviet pacts (1939-1941) did not delude the Soviets on the imminence of the much-expected war. A CIA document, referring to the period between 1939 and 1940, admitted:

The likelihood of war with Germany however was recognized in the USSR, and possibly a food-stockpiling program was instituted. (The Ethyl Alcohol Industry in the USSR, CIA, February 27, 1953. p. 4) (IMG)

In mid-1940, the British diplomatic intelligence, citing the British Prime Minister, noted the Soviet Government was apprehensive of German war plans against the USSR:

PRIME Minister stated this morning that ... the Soviet Government were becoming rather apprehensive of German continental hegemony and of an attack on Russia. It was for this reason that the Soviet Government were taking all those "precautions" in Lithuania and other Baltic States, which were solely designed to strengthen the position of the Soviet defenses in the event of German aggression. The Prime Minister also quoted General Vassilievski, who is acting as a liaison officer here and was one of negotiators of the peace treaty, as having stated repeatedly that there would be war between Germany and Russia before the end of the present conflict. (N 5827/283/38, Mr. Vereker to Viscount Halifax, No. 429, June 15, 1940. In: Foreign Office (January to December 1940), p. 126. In: Foreign Office (January 1940 – December 1941), p. 150) (IMG)

A 1998 US military document cited Matvei Zakharov – Soviet Marshal, Chief of General Staff, and Deputy Defense Minister – stating that the Soviet defense ministry in the late 1930s modified the Third Five Year Plan, in order to prepare for the war against the Nazis:

By the mid-1930s Soviet military forecasters were agreed that Nazi Germany and imperial Japan had become the chief threats to the USSR. According to M. V. Zakharov, Marshal B. M. Shaposhnikov, who served as Chief of the Soviet General Staff during the late 1930s, revised the threat estimate for the Third Five Year Plan to address this issue. (The Methodology of Foresight and Forecasting in Soviet Military Affairs, Soviet Army Studies Office, Jacob Kipp, May 31, 1998, p. 14) (IMG)

Thus, on May 1, 1941:

Defense Commissar Timoshenko stated in his May Day proclamation the readiness of Red Army to rebuff any encroachment on Soviet territory; declared that the country was "in a capitalist encirclement." (Chronology of Principal Events Relating to the USSR Part I, OSS, September 25, 1945, p. 162) (IMG)

On June 6th, 1941:

Stalin signed decrees "on measures for industry's preparedness to switch to the mobilization plan for [producing] ammunition" and for possible wartime mobilization of all industry from July 1. ('Stalin: Waiting for Hitler, 1929-1941', Stephen Kotkin, p. 877) (IMG)

As the economy was preparing for a total war, so was the Soviet stay-behind guerrilla training. Partisan warfare training was being actively organized by the CPSU and the NKVD weeks prior to the War. Based on the:

information gradually assembled by the Germans, it appears certain that partisan warfare was planned even before the beginning of hostilities, not by the military, but by the Communist Party and the NKVD. This is substantiated in a report, by the Chief of German Army Military Police of December 31st, 1941. (Soviet Partisan Warfare Since 1941, CIA, March 1, 1949, p. 6) (IMG)

The German military intelligence:

report noted the following statement of a twenty-five-year old Soviet partisan: "I know that, two to three weeks before the outbreak of war, Vassili Kossolapov, a member of the Bolshevik Central Committee (the highest Party group), who was in Kholm during meetings and discussions of the Party, repeatedly urged the organization of partisan groups. (Soviet Partisan Warfare Since 1941, CIA, March 1, 1949, p. 6) (IMG)

If Stalin was the dictator of the USSR not expecting war with Nazi Germany, and if the high-ranking commander in the Soviet Union did not dare to challenge him on the question of preparations for war against Nazi Germany, then the following which Roger Moorhouse of the BBC and Royal Historical Society describes, would not have happened. In, 1941:

defensive preparations continued. By the mid-summer of 1941, around 2,000 strongpoints had been completed along the Molotov Line, of which around half were armed and equipped. In addition, all of the "fortified areas" were ordered brought up to combat strength as soon as possible. In mid-May Zhukov succeeded in securing a "partial mobilization," with reservists being called up and over 50,000 troops from the Caucasus and other interior districts of the Soviet Union being relocated to the western frontier areas. (The Devils' Alliance: Hitler's Pact with Stalin, 1939-1941, Roger Moorhouse, 2014) (IMG)

It is often said that the Soviets ignored the warnings of their spy Richard Sorge concerning a fascist Japanese invasion of the Soviet Union. Such claims are baseless. Richard Sorge, a Schleicherite agent who had infiltrated Nazi Germany's intelligence, had the support of Eugen Ott and Hans Zehrer, both agents of Kurt von Schleicher. Sorge was informed by the Japanese progressive Ozaki and Sorge informed the Soviets that the Japanese fascists were planning to invade southwards. Stalin, upon receiving such military intelligence, decided to send the bulk of the Siberian troops to Moscow. Nazi Germany's extraterritorial special operations chief Otto Skorzeny wrote in his memoirs:

It was due to the indiscretions of Eugen Ott that Ramsey [i.e. Richard Sorge's codename] was able to inform his 4th Office on March 5, 1941 that the German attack on the USSR would take place "mainly in the direction of Moscow" and in mid-June. In another signal deciphered by the Japanese, on May 15 Sorge gave the date of the attack as June 20, 1941. Immediately after the sitting of the Imperial Council on July 2, 1941 Ozaki informed Sorge that the Japanese government had decided to attack the USA. On August 14 Ozaki brought Sorge the important information that all Japanese war plans against the USSR had practically been abandoned. and Sorge also learned the significant points from the meeting of the Japanese high command held on August 20 or 23, 1941. Ozaki was also informed about the entire military transport on the Manchurian railroads. On September 27 he was able to assure Sorge that "Japan was preparing a great offensive in the south." aimed at Singapore, Hong Kong and the Philippine Islands: it would take place at the end of November or early December 1941. Any danger of a war against the USSR had eliminated.

Only now, after receiving this intelligence, could Stalin send the bulk of the Siberian troops to Moscow. It was more than half a million men. Thus was Moscow saved.

(My Commando Operations, Otto Skorzeny, 1975, p. 119) (IMG)

In mid-June, the Soviet media initiated a wave of psychological warfare against the imperialist adversaries. To neutralize British provocations and to entice the Germans away from an invasion, the Soviet press:

tried to seize the initiative, composing a TASS bulletin, read out over Moscow radio at 6:00 p.m. on June 13 and published in Soviet newspapers the next morning. (...). "Germany is also, just as consistently as the USSR, observing the terms of the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact," it stated. "In view of this, according to Soviet circles, rumors of Germany's intent to break the Pact and to attack the USSR are utterly groundless." ('Stalin: Waiting for Hitler, 1929-1941', Stephen Kotkin, p. 880) (IMG)

In doing so, the Soviet media:

aimed not only to refute the rumors of war, again blaming them on British provocations to cause that very war, but also to elicit a German denial of any intentions to attack.... ('Stalin: Waiting for Hitler, 1929-1941', Stephen Kotkin, p. 880) (IMG)

This propaganda and psychological warfare operation was not an indication of the Soviet ignorance of German war plans, but rather the contrary – it was evidence of the USSR's attempt to delay its much-expected war. While the Soviet media engaged in the psychological warfare, the USSR was still rigorously preparing for combat:

The Germans knew, of course, that the Soviets had been calling up reserves, moving forces to the frontier, furiously building border defenses, and stepping up patriotic propaganda. ('Stalin: Waiting for Hitler, 1929-1941', Stephen Kotkin, p. 881) (IMG)

Red Army troops concentrated on the eastern border in a manner to stall the expected German advance, without provoking or handing the Germans an excuse for war:

Such immense Soviet troop concentrations testify to ... Stalin's understanding that Germany represented a monumental danger.... But only one of the two vast armies on the frontier had occupied its firing positions. Stalin had allowed covert strategic redeployments westward and lately had finally yielded to Timoshenko and Zhukov's insistence that the Red Army commence camouflaging of aerodromes, tank parks, warehouses, and military installations (which in many cases would require repainting). But he would not permit assumption of combat positions, which he feared would only play into the hands of German militarist-adventurers, who craved war and schemed to force Hitler's hand, the way they had pushed the Wehrmacht beyond the agreed-upon German-Soviet line in Poland in 1939. Soviet planes were forbidden from flying within six miles of the border. Timoshenko and Zhukov, ... made sure that frontline commanders did not cause or yield to "provocation." ('Stalin: Waiting for Hitler, 1929-1941', Stephen Kotkin, p. 894) (IMG)

Stalin certainly was not a naïve man, and he could not have helped being aware of the massive German troop buildup on the borders of the Soviet Union because his intelligence services were doing an admirable job collecting information. ('Intelligence, Doctrine and Decision Making: Josef Stalin and June 22, 1941', Captain Robert E. Kells Jr. In: Military Intelligence: From the Home of Intelligence, Vol. 11, No. 1, United States Army Intelligence Center and School, January-March 1985, p. 16) (IMG)

Stalin already knew of the Nazi plans almost a day prior to the Nazi aggression. However, to prevent the enemy from gaining an excuse for war, and to delay the war for as long as possible, he issued the alert three hours prior to the attack. In the magazine published by the United States Army Intelligence Center and School, Kells remarked:

Stalin finally became convinced that an attack against his country was in the offing on the afternoon of June 21, yet he waited until three hours before the attack to issue an alert. This refusal to act any earlier underscores Stalin's desire to delay the war until 1942. ('Intelligence, Doctrine and Decision Making: Josef Stalin and June 22, 1941', Captain Robert E. Kells Jr. In: Military Intelligence: From the Home of Intelligence, Vol. 11, No. 1, United States Army Intelligence Center and School, January-March 1985, p. 16) (IMG)

Finally:

Around midnight, Mikhail Kirponos, commander of the Kiev military district, called the defense commissariat on the high-frequency phone from his field HQ at Ternopol to report that another German had forded a river and crossed the border near Sokal (Ukraine) and said that Wehrmacht soldiers had taken up their firing positions, with tanks at their start lines. Zhukov called the Near Dacha to inform Stalin. A little after midnight, a train carrying Soviet oil, manganese, and grain crossed the frontier into Greater Germany, its passage observed by waiting German divisions. At around 1:00 a.m., Timoshenko called Pavlov on the high-frequency phone, evidently with word of Directive No. 1 to assume full combat readiness, and a caution not to succumb to provocation. ('Stalin: Waiting for Hitler, 1929-1941', Stephen Kotkin, p. 900) (IMG)

The Red Army was awaiting the Hitler gang.

In 1190, the King Barbarossa reached the River Saleph, located to the south of modern-day Turkey. However, while crossing the river on June 10, he fell off his horse and drowned. Subsequently, a plague struck the German Crusader army, leading to its disintegration. Prior to reaching the sacred soil of the Shaam, the German troops suffered a humiliating defeat. 751 years and 12 days after the drowning of King Barbarossa during the Third Crusade, 'Operation BARBAROSSA', the Pan-European Crusade led by Nazi Germany against Soviet power, was officially launched on June 22, 1941. The Nazi invasion of the USSR's industrial and proletarianized cities, such as Stalingrad, was met with the active and strong resistance of the people of those cities, as the proletariat tend towards a determined resistance against fascism. The hybrid nature of Soviet warfare, the Partisan guerrilla resistance on the one hand and the conventional Red Army resistance on the other, would successfully break the Hitlerite war machine.

The Soviet military strategy both during and after the Great Patriotic War, accounting for the historical materialist fact that the strength of the rear – the industrial backbone and the support units - is fundamentally vital to the strength of the frontline troops, extensively utilized guerilla warfare both in the Nazi-occupied Soviet territory and in the rest of Europe, so to cause disruptions in fascist troop formations. Such a strategy helped undermine the Axis troops' material rear, thus forcibly deforming the neatly organized fascist armies. The deformation of such frontlines created enough holes and gaps in the shape of the fascist army formations so to render them vulnerable to conventional assaults from the regular Soviet frontline troops. When the enemy is flawless, force it to have flaws. When facing a well-organized and self-consolidated enemy, send a bug-like entity to its rear so that the 'wiz-wiz' of the 'bug' and the damages that this small but dangerously mobile entity causes will force the enemy to look back, to almost-vainly attempt to eliminate this small but annoying and mobile entity, and to thus to sacrifice its neat and tidy formation. Upon the deformation of the enemy, by the time the weaknesses in enemy lines have been created, assault with utmost mass against the weak points created by the deformation, and mightily strike and strike those weak points enough so that no longer will the foe have the energy to uphold its strong points. This scientific Soviet military strategy, which persisted well into the 1980s and was renamed the 'Operational Maneuver Group (OMG)', was also applied by the Russian Army in the 2022 Ukraine War.

C10S5. The Soviet Intervention into Iran 1941 *** IMG-All-{Iran}

Pahlavi Iran was to join the Nazi invaders. A CIA document noted that under the 'commercial' agreements between Iran and Germany, German 'technicians' (read: spies) were to go near the Soviet-Iranian border, and that the Nazi German intelligence service had two intelligence bases, one

located in Tehran and the other in Tabriz. The top priority of the Nazi German intelligence bases was to gather intelligence on the oil-rich region of the Soviet Caucasus. The CIA document stated:

1. Before the German invasion of Russia in June 1941 and the Allied occupation of Iran in August 1941, Germany not only maintained active commercial exchanges with Iran, but was also engaged in industrial construction work, some of which involved the transit of goods through Soviet Russia and brought German technicians close to the Soviet-Iranian border. The Soviets tried to hinder German-Iranian trade and to slow down the shipment of Iranian exports to Germany, presumably because they suspected that these activities provided cover for the GIS [German intelligence service]. During this pre-occupation period the following German intelligence operatives were using commercial cover in Iran:

fnu [First Name Unknown] ALLARDT
Dr. fnu TISMER
fnu WOEHLER
fnu KUNDERT
Dr. Paul LEVERKUEHN

2. **There were two German intelligence bases in Iran.** In November 1940 Lt. Erwin Otto FINK undercover as German Commercial Attache, became chief of the base in Tehran, and in April 1941 R. KULLENKAMPF and Lt. (fnu) KORRER joined him as assistants. Captain Bruno SCHULZE-HOLTHUS (post-war author of Daybreak in Iran) [published 1954] was chief of the base in Tabriz. The targets of the bases were Iran, Iraq, Northern India, and the Caucasus. Priority was given to operations to target and obtain data on the Soviet Black and Caspian Sea areas, to establish contact with the border tribes in northern India; and to prepare for sabotage of the oil installations in southern Iran.

(‘STUDY OF GERMAN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN THE NEAR EAST AND RELATED AREAS PRIOR TO AND DURING WORLD WAR II’, CIA, p. 97. Bold added) (IMG)

In this situation, the USSR had every legal right to intervene into Iran, and to overthrow the pro-Nazi elements of the regime there – and that meant the overthrow of Iran’s regime in general, because Iran’s regime was pro-Nazi. The Article 5 of the 1921 Soviet-Iranian Friendship Treaty states:

The two High Contracting Parties undertake:

- (1) To prohibit the formation or presence within their respective territories, of any organisations or groups of persons, irrespective of the name by which they are known, whose Object is to engage in acts of hostility against Persia or Russia, or against the Allies of Russia. They will likewise prohibit the formation of troops or armies within their respective territories with the afore-mentioned object.
- (2) Not to allow a third Party or any organisation, whatever it be called, which is hostile to the other Contracting Party, to import or to convey in transit across their countries material which can be used against the other Party.
- (3) To prevent by all means in their power the presence within their territories or within the territories of their Allies of all armies or forces of a third Party in cases in which the presence of such forces would be regarded as a menace to the frontiers, interests or safety of the other Contracting Party.

(Persia and the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic - Treaty of Friendship, signed at Moscow, February 26, 1921 [1922] LNTSer 69; 9 LNTS 383, p. 3) (IMG)

The US intelligence too stated:

With the advent of Riza Khan as army chief of staff in 1931, strong efforts to re-establish Iran’s authority over the area were encouraged by the favorable terms of the 1921 Soviet-Iranian Treaty of Friendship. Under the terms of this agreement the young Bolshevik Government renounced extraterritorial rights and all concessions and holdings gained in Iran during the Czarist regime (including the Julfa-Tabriz Railway) with the exception of Soviet interests in the Caspian Sea fisheries. The USSR did, however, reserve “the right to advance her troops into (Iran) for the purpose of carrying out military operations necessary for its defense” should a third party threaten the frontiers of Russia through this area and should Iran be unable to meet such a threat after having been once called upon to do so by Russia. (DEVELOPMENTS IN THE AZERBAIJAN SITUATION, US intelligence, Central Intelligence Group, ORE, June 4, 1947, p. 3) (IMG)

The USSR warned Iran that this course of action – the hosting of hostile anti-Soviet units in Iran – was a violation of the 1921 treaty which stated that Iran was prohibited from harbouring anti-Soviet units in its territory, and that should Iran violate this clause, the USSR has a right to deploy troops to overthrow the hostile anti-Soviet units. The Soviets again and again warned Iran against the impending German plans to stage a coup and force Iran to the Axis camp. The Soviet calls would fall to deaf ears. Iran’s treasonous pro-Nazi Shah would accept none of it. On June 26, 1941:

Iran [was] notified by USSR that German agents were preparing for revolt to put Iran on the side of the Axis. (Chronology of Principal Events Relating to the USSR Part II, OSS, September 25, 1945, p. 2) (IMG)

On July 19, 1941:

USSR made representations to the Iranian government demanding suppression of German agents. (Chronology of Principal Events Relating to the USSR Part II, OSS, September 25, 1945, p. 7) (IMG)

On August 11, 1941:

Ankara reported Stalin’s warning to Iran to expel German agents. (Chronology of Principal Events Relating to the USSR Part II, OSS, September 25, 1945, p. 12) (IMG)

August 16, 1941:

On August 16, 1941, there was a:

Joint British-Russian warning to Iran to oust Germans. (Chronology of Principal Events Relating to the USSR Part II, OSS, September 25, 1945, p. 13) (IMG)

Finally, on August 25, 1941, the:

USSR [made a] note to the Iranian government on securing the Soviet rights under the Soviet Iranian treaty of 1921. (Chronology of Principal Events Relating to the USSR Part II, OSS, September 25, 1945, p. 15) (IMG)

And thus, the USSR deployed its troops to Iran to overthrow the German Nazis and their collaborators.

In order to help the Soviets and at the same time expand their imperial presence at the expense of their German imperial rivals, the British intervened in Iran as well. The British intervention was legal, as it was invited by the Soviets. According to the 1921 Soviet-Iranian treaty, the USSR had the right to militarily occupy Iran until six months after the defeat of the hostile power hosted by Iran.

C10S6. Soviet Germans oppose Nazism *** IMG-All-{Factional Conflict & Great Purge}

Among the Soviet successes in exposing Nazism, it is noteworthy that as late as July 1937, the overwhelming majority of the USSR's German citizens were hostile to Nazism. Referring to the German population and the German embassy, the British Embassy in Moscow reported:

in private, the [German] Embassy makes no secret of the fact that most of [the Soviet Germans] are more or less ill-disposed towards the National Socialist regime, and have long ceased to have any contact with the German consulates. (N 3648/250/38, No. 319, Viscount Chilston to Mr. Eden, Moscow, July 3, 1937; Received July 16, 1937, Foreign Office (1937-1938), pp. 144-145) (IMG)

C10S7. The Strasserite and Schleicherite agents and the Soviet Intelligence Service *** IMG-All-{Soviet Intelligence in Nazi Germany}

Fascism arises out of the coalition of the parasitic classes led by imperialist finance capital. Wheresoever exists finance capital, therein is generated a fascist tendency. Yet, not in every country dominated by the financial-bourgeois ruling class is the state a fascist regime. The question of whether an imperialist state emerges as a fascist state or as a bourgeois-democracy of the imperialist type is heavily reliant upon the level of the development of the progressive classes in the country.

Unlike the anti-colonial national bourgeoisie, who can utilize their big businesses as cushions against risk and as a powerful material base for confrontation with finance capital, the petit-bourgeoisie have small business interests to lose upon fierce confrontation vis-à-vis finance capital. The proletariat, by contrast, have no business interests to lose. Owing to their characteristic of 'having nothing to lose but their chains', the proletariat have interests unavoidably antagonistic finance capital. As such, the stronger the proletariat, the more vigorously would fascist finance capital be rolled back and the more the financial-bourgeois ruling class would have to accept the influence of the proletariat over their anti-proletarian state. In such a situation, the class character of the state would continue to be the dictatorship of the fascist financial bourgeoisie, but of a kind forced to accept elements of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The consequence of such an imperialist-fascist state capitulation to elements of the dictatorship of the proletariat is the establishment of a bourgeois-democracy of the imperialist type, of the kind seen in America and Britain, wherein the fascist agents of finance capital rule but so within the context of a bourgeois-democracy and forcibly accountable to the proletarian electorate. In Germany, the proletariat was smaller than in America and Britain, for it was concentrated in the industrialized 'North', whereas the agrarian petit-bourgeoisie covered most of the rest of Germany. Where the petit-bourgeoisie predominated, resistance against finance capital was much lower, and hence the material strength of German finance capital was far higher. The material strength translated to cultural dominance. The propaganda of German finance capital, manifested in the form of Hitlerian propaganda, was far more decisively dominant in the agrarian petit-bourgeois zones. Not surprisingly, the Hitler faction of the Nazi Party drew electoral support, and recruited, from these agrarian and petit-bourgeois zones which formed most of Germany. In the industrial parts of Germany, the KPD was very strong, but still no match for the Nazis who had most of Germany on their side.

A minority of German proletarians were attracted to the "National-Socialist German Workers' Party." They adopted some Nazi ideas. However, as the Nazi agenda was that of German finance capital, and since fascist finance capital and the proletariat unavoidably have antagonistic interests, the German proletariat as a class could not possibly be a force for the Nazi Party and the Nazi regime. How then are we to resolve the superficial contradiction between the attraction of some German blue-collar workers to the Nazi movement and the inherent opposition of the German proletariat to the agents of German finance capital? One must distinguish between the workers as an aggregate of individual consciousnesses vs. the workers as a class. The workers as an aggregate of individual consciousnesses may well adopt many aspects of the fascist 'consciousness' – the fascist ideology, the embrace of terror, and the ethno-racial hatred – but the workers as a class cannot but be a material force that rolls back the influence of fascism.

If members of the proletarian class harbor fascist ideas, such fascistic-minded proletarians would generate a proletarian internationalist and anti-fascist tendency disguised as anti-proletarian and pro-fascist. When proletarians constitute a significant percentage of the membership and ranks of a fascist organization, such membership of the proletarians would catapult upwards the anti-fascist intelligence agents into the high ranks of the fascist regime and organization. A powerful anti-fascist intelligence network and anti-fascist lobby inside the fascist organization would arise. Under the disposal of such an intelligence network would not necessarily be enough material factors to overthrow the fascists and to decisively decimate the fascists, but there will be enough lobbying power and leverage to slow down the pace of the pursuit of the fascist agenda, to engage in anti-fascist espionage and sabotage inside of the fascist movement and to, with partial success, reduce the severity of the pain inflicted upon the popular masses by the fascists. The fascists who dominate their movement would be aware of the betrayal of the anti-fascist agents who dominate important positions in the fascist movement but would not be able to totally decimate these known traitors to fascism, for these traitors to fascism are a lobby with a significant level of material power and a significant class base inside the fascist military and intelligence bodies.

Such a historical materialist analysis is not merely some load of theorizing but rests upon actual empirical evidence.

For a while, the interests of German finance capital dictated that for German finance capital to stand up against Germany's Anglo-French imperial rivals, German finance capital shall strengthen the German military alliance with the USSR. For the same reason, the USSR opposed any attempt at fomenting Trotskyite instability in Germany for Germany was the bulwark against Anglo-French imperialism:

The Russians even opposed any attempt at a Communist revolution in Germany, since such a disturbance might weaken that country's ability to resist France. The Comintern therefore decided that Germany's struggle against France was that of an "enslaved country" defending herself against "Western imperialism," and deserved the wholehearted support of the revolutionary international proletariat. "Our sympathy," said Litvinov on January 27, "is with Germany, as it is with any oppressed nation." (NATIONAL BOLSHEVISM IN WEIMAR GERMANY: Alliance of Political Extremes Against Democracy, John Hopkins University, Social Research, Vol. 23, No. 4, Abraham Ascher, Gunter Lewy, Winter 1956, p. 458)

The Soviets supported a communist revolutionary transformation of Germany, but opposed a counter-productive and left-sectarian 'communist' uprising against a German military which the USSR was keen on strengthening. The KPD proletariat were to increase their influence in the German state apparatus through cooperation with the dominant, pro-Soviet tendency in the German government, rather than conflict with it. Thus, at the time, with German finance capital's alliance with the proletariat against Anglo-French finance capital, the progressive forces had a greater leverage in Germany whereas the reactionary class forces were weaker. This led to the upwards catapulting of the progressive infiltrators in the right-wing pro-

fascist circles at the high ranks of the German armed forces. The foremost among these was Kurt von Schleicher, who was a communist sympathizer at the high ranks of the anti-communist pro-Freikorps command of the German military. His sympathies with the communists were independent of German finance capital's support for an alliance with the USSR, for he assisted communist efforts even during pre-Rapallo and post-Rapallo periods when the German finance capital was anti-Soviet. Rather, it was simply the case that the Rapallo-era efforts of German finance capital towards an alliance with the USSR catapulted him upwards in the hierarchy of control over Germany's means of violence, the armed forces.

Schleicher was appointed to be in charge of the German imperialist military's program of supporting the Nazi terror gangs aimed at undermining the communist presence in Germany during the period between the First World War and the Rapallo alliance. It was a program betrayed by its appointed supervisor. Indeed, while being in charge of the German imperial program of supporting the Nazi terror against the communists, Schleicher tried to sabotage such a plan as much as he could. The very point of the Kapp-Lüttwitz putsch was to destroy the German communists and the proletarian revolutionaries – and Schleicher, sympathetic towards the cause of the Soviet Union, refused to obey orders. The pro-Nazi official historian of the British Foreign Office and MI6 operative, John Wheeler-Bennet, wrote:

Von Schleicher's politico-military career ... was never to be far from the vital centre of events. With Gröner he was present at the momentous interview with Hindenburg on November 10, 1918, when the Marshal was persuaded to accept and support the existing Government in Berlin simply because it was a government; and he became the trusted envoy between the High Command at Cassel and the Reichskanzlei during the dark and perilous winter which followed the military collapse. He played an important part in the organization and equipping of the Free Corps, but, along with von Hammerstein, he refused to accept the orders of von Lüttwitz at the time of the Kapp Putsch. ('The Nemesis of Power: The Germany Army in Politics, 1918-1945', John Wheeler-Bennett, 1954, pp. 183-184)

Nonetheless, through being in charge of the program of sponsoring the Nazis against the communists, Schleicher got to know the factional disputes in the Nazi terror network quite well. This would have a significant historic impact on the Nazi cause. Schleicher was also one of the key architects of German-Soviet Rapallo strategic cooperation against the Anglo-American and French imperialists. Indeed,:

It had been in [Schleicher's] flat that the first tentative and secret negotiations took place in September 1921 for the building up of the Soviet arms industry for the greater benefit of the German Army.... ('The Nemesis of Power: The Germany Army in Politics, 1918-1945', John Wheeler-Bennett, 1954, pp. 183-184)

von Schleicher ... had played an important part ... in the formulation of the Russian connection.... ('The Nemesis of Power: The Germany Army in Politics, 1918-1945', John Wheeler-Bennett, 1954, p. 152)

Owen Matthews, the anti-Soviet slanderer and journalist, wrote a book about the Soviet intelligence service's presence in Nazi Germany, a book that was top-rated by the imperialist media. In it, Matthews too confirmed the alliance of Schleicher with the Soviets:

Schleicher was forming a secret group within the army, Sondergruppe R (for 'Russland'), which was devoted to rebuilding covertly the German Army in defiance of the Treaty of Versailles. This secret rearmament meant dealing with Bolshevik Russia, under a confidential deal negotiated between Schleicher and Soviet Central Committee member Leonid Krasin in 1921. The funds for Germany's covert military build-up were supplied by a network of dummy corporations created by Schleicher — notably the GEFU, or Company for the Promotion of Industrial Enterprise, that funnelled 75 million Reichsmarks into the Soviet arms industry. Between 1921 and 1933, when the deal was terminated by a Soviet leadership nervous of the rise of Hitler, these clandestine arms contracts provided the USSR with much-needed foreign currency and ensured that Germany did not fall behind in military technology in the 1920s, despite being officially disarmed by the victorious Allies. ('An Impeccable Spy: Richard Sorge, Stalin's Master Agent', Owen Matthews, 2019)

Again, the alliance of Schleicher with the Soviets was not limited to the Rapallo era. Not only had he refused to implement the anti-communist coup plots prior to the Rapallo era, Schleicher continued to be a champion of the Rapallo cooperation with the USSR against the Nazis and the British. The Hitler faction sought an alliance with Britain – and hence also with the Pilsudski regime in Poland – against the USSR and against a French imperialism which by the mid-1930s had emerged as a Soviet ally. Schleicher, on the other hand, sought to force Germany closer to the USSR in a manner that would strengthen Soviet influence in German, rather than Nazi German influence in the USSR:

[On] May 22, 1935 ... Hitler told M. Joseph Lipski, the Polish Ambassador in Berlin, that von Schleicher 'was rightfully murdered, if only because he had sought to maintain the Rapallo Treaty'. Göring, during his visit to Warsaw in January 1935, had already informed Count Szembek that when von Schleicher had handed over the seals of office to Hitler in January 1933 he had urged upon the Führer the desirability of reaching an understanding with France and Russia, and with the assistance of the latter, of eliminating [the MI6 puppet regime in] Poland, but that Hitler had recoiled in horror from such a proposal. ('The Nemesis of Power: The Germany Army in Politics, 1918-1945', John Wheeler-Bennett, 1954, p. 327. Citing: Polish White Book, Official Documents concerning Polish-German and Polish-Soviet Relations, 1933—1939 (London, 1939), pp. 25, 29 and 216)

Schleicher back then advocated an alliance with France, for France was on the side of the USSR against Nazi German imperialism. By then, since French imperialism had turned towards the Soviet Union, Schleicher advocated cooperation with France as well, even though that same Schleicher had supported cooperation with the USSR against the Anglo-French imperialist camp during the Rapallo years.

Class conflicts render inevitable the process by which two prominent politicians, representing two antagonistic classes, become 'co-workers' hostile to each other but having to 'cooperate' with each other. In the case of Weimar Germany, this 'duo' was Schleicher and Seeckt. Superficially, they were on the 'same' side, while in reality, they were bitter opponents. The differences between Schleicher and Seeckt were fundamental. Seeckt, who would later serve in Hitler's staff as well, sought to promote relations with the Soviets as a channel for fomenting fascist subversion against the Soviet state, whereas Schleicher aimed to promote relations with the Soviets as a means of increasing Soviet influence in Germany. Nonetheless, despite being enemies, they did superficially appear to be on the 'same' side because they both wanted more relations with the Soviets. At the time, Seeckt as such was partially coopted as a yes-man for Schleicher's team:

The insatiable intriguing ambition of Kurt von Schleicher now caused him to murmur against his chief. He and von Seeckt had never been on intimate terms, they were too different in character for that; von Seeckt a far-seeing planner and von Schleicher a political opportunist. Yet von Schleicher had been closely associated with his chief in that little group of trusted confidants in the Bendlerstrasse and had played an important part in the 'Black Reichswehr' affair, in the formulation of the Russian connection, and in the organization of 'military government' within the Reich during the Year of Testing. In all these episodes von Seeckt had recognized and appreciated the executive ability of his subordinate, whom he had latterly made the head of the Ministeramt, the political bureau of the 'non-political'

Reichstvehr Ministry. But von Schleicher could never dominate von Seeckt as he could Gröner. ('The Nemesis of Power: The Germany Army in Politics, 1918-1945', John Wheeler-Bennett, 1954, p. 152. Bold added.)

It was von Schleicher who, with von Bock, supervised the activities of the 'Black Reichswehr', and it was von Schleicher who had been largely responsible for the success of the Reichswehr's experiment in 'military government' from September 1923 to February 1924. It had been in his flat that the first tentative and secret negotiations took place in September 1921 for the building up of the Soviet arms industry for the greater benefit of the German Army, and later he was one of those officers sent by von Seeckt to Moscow for confidential talks with the Red General Staff; later still, von Seeckt, who had never liked von Schleicher personally, displayed appreciation of his political ability, by entrusting to him the delicate duties of maintaining the political contacts of the Ministry of Defence. ('The Nemesis of Power: The Germany Army in Politics, 1918-1945', John Wheeler-Bennett, 1954, pp. 183-184)

During the Rapallo era, the reactionary class forces were strong enough to cause a mess but not strong enough to take over the whole stage. The reactionary class forces, of whom the pro-MI6 Hitler was a major representative, supported a German alliance with the British Empire against the USSR. Hitler, who supposedly sought to build a strong Germany and to supposedly root out corruption, was advocating an alliance with the very same British finance capital which was economically terrorizing the German people using the debt and reparations and supporting corrupt politicians. While the Soviets were assisting Germany in military-industrial recovery and hence the restoration of German dignity against Versailles oppression, Hitler and his gang were busy opposing the socialist state that was strengthening the German military and boosting German national independence. What I dislike about the historiography regarding Hitler is that he is portrayed as a 'principled' man; he had evil ideals but was 'truly' and fanatically 'committed' to these ideals however evil they were, the mainstream media narrates. Incorrect. Actually, Hitler only became loyal to the national expansion of Germany when German finance capital turned against the USSR. Prior to then, he was standing against the government that expanded Germany's military-industrial might and was supporting British economic terror against the German people. These facts about Hitler's stances are well-known and well-documented in Hitler's 'Secret Book'. In that book, he argued that British colonial interests shall not be undermined but rather a German-dominated British-friendly anti-Soviet pan-Europe shall be established. Years later, during the Great Patriotic War, as the Anglo-American imperialists were carpet-bombing German cities and raping German women, the Hitler faction superficially condemned the Anglo-American imperialist aggression but secretly established an alliance with them against the USSR.

Even when Anglo-American finance capital was economically terrorizing the German people, using all kinds of debt traps, Hitler was a supporter of an alliance with the Anglo-American imperialists against the USSR. The Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the US intelligence service, reported:

(10) Between 1919 and 1933 three trends were operating in German foreign policy: **the Western orientation** (General Max Hoffmann, **Hitler, Rosenberg**), the Eastern orientation (General Von Seeckt, V. Brockdorff-Rantzau, V. Maltzahn), and the bridge theory (Stresemann, the Social Democrats). The victory of the bridge theory was short-lived and bound up with a more or less stable political and social system. High officers and many of the conservatives favored, and may still favor, Eastern orientation. (THE FREE GERMANY MANIFESTO AND THE GERMAN PEOPLE, Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Branch of Research and Analysis (R&A#1033), Europe-Africa Division, Psychological Warfare Subdivision, Central European Section, August 6, 1943, p. 2. Bold added.) At the end of the World War 1914-1918 three foreign political trends became apparent in Germany, the Eastern orientation, the Western orientation and the so-called Bridge theory. For the easterners, friendly relations with Russia were to enable Germany to get rid of the Versailles Treaty and to establish herself as a great power. To the westerners, the entrance of Germany in the concert of Western Powers was to provide the same result [of getting rid of a Versailles Treaty which the Anglo-Americans themselves had promoted]. The adherents of the third theory conceived Germany as a bridge between eastern and western Europe and hoped by careful juggling between the East and the West, by playing off Russia against France and England to achieve concession after concession. (THE FREE GERMANY MANIFESTO AND THE GERMAN PEOPLE, Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Branch of Research and Analysis (R&A#1033), Europe-Africa Division, Psychological Warfare Subdivision, Central European Section, August 6, 1943, p. 14)

The western orientation stems from Frederich List. It found its most powerful expression in the writings of General Hoffmann. According to Hoffmann, the basic fact which the great powers in the world have to face is the crisis of industrialism intensified by Russia's elimination from the world economy and Bolshevism's fight against the fundamental interests of capitalistic society. The solution therefore is the destruction of Bolshevism and the re-integration of Russia into a world economy based on world economic collaboration and **political integration of Germany, Great Britain, and France. Hoffmann desired to this end, the financial and economic cooperation of the United States. It is this thesis which went into Hitler's "Mein Kampf" and into Alfred Rosenberg's mythology. It amounted to the suggestion of establishing a huge world trust directed against Soviet Russia.** (THE FREE GERMANY MANIFESTO AND THE GERMAN PEOPLE, Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Branch of Research and Analysis (R&A#1033), Europe-Africa Division, Psychological Warfare Subdivision, Central European Section, August 6, 1943, p. 15. Bold added)

The ... history of National Socialism has amply demonstrated [Hitler's] conviction that he can retain power only by letting the ruling groups share in the spoils of peaceful and warlike exploitation of the German masses as well as those of occupied Europe. This insight led Hitler to a ruthless war against those who advocated some kind of a National Bolshevik program. (THE FREE GERMANY MANIFESTO AND THE GERMAN PEOPLE, Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Branch of Research and Analysis (R&A#1033), Europe-Africa Division, Psychological Warfare Subdivision, Central European Section, August 6, 1943, p. 11)

As Ernst Thalmann correctly pointed out, the Hitler gang emerged as major allies of the anti-German chauvinist terror junta of the MI6 agent Pilsudski:

In February 1932 at the meeting of the Central Committee Thaelmann reiterated the position of the Communist Party in the following manner: "We the sole party in Germany which really and with the greatest determination fights against the policy of fulfillment. National liberation cannot be divorced from the social liberation of the tolling people, that is from the overthrow of capitalism.... One cannot fight against the Versailles, system if one engages in violent baiting of the only government in the world which did not sign the shameful Versailles Treaty.... The Hitler party will become the direct ally of Pilsudski's Poland which with her policy of the Polish Corridor and in Upper Silesia where she enslaves and tortures German workers and peasants.... One cannot fight against the Versailles Treaty and the Young slavery without unfurling the banner of proletariat internationalism." (THE FREE GERMANY MANIFESTO AND THE GERMAN PEOPLE, Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Branch of Research and Analysis (R&A#1033), Europe-Africa Division, Psychological Warfare Subdivision, Central European Section, August 6, 1943, p. 10)

Hitler did notoriously become openly an ally of the anti-German chauvinist dictator of Poland, Pilsudski.

Furthermore, Hitler turned genuinely against the Anglo-American imperialists only when the latter bloc, feeling threatened by the rise of a German Empire that could compete against the interests of Anglo-American finance capital, allied with the Soviet Union. For their alliance with the Soviets, the Anglo-Americans were to be punished for the while, Hitler believed.

The SPD Kautskyites and the Liberals shared the Hitler faction's attitude in support of an alliance with the Anglo-American imperialists against the USSR, and the alliance with finance capital and the reactionary class forces against the German proletariat. However, whereas the Hitler faction was to draw votes from the agrarian zones of Germany, the focus of the Kautskyite agents of reaction was to mislead the workers and draw votes from these misled workers. Nonetheless, precisely because of the concentration of their electoral base into the proletarianized areas, the Kautskyite allies of the Anglo-American imperialists against the USSR were compelled to partially distance themselves from the Anglo-American imperialists in favor of the USSR. The immersion of the Kautskyite agents of fascism among the proletariat meant fascist infiltration among the proletarians but also meant the proletarian encirclement, and thus cooptation, of these fascist agents of finance capital. Coopted by the proletarians, these Kautskyite agents of Anglo-American imperialism also pursued a pro-Soviet orientation. The result of such a policy line was the Kautskyite thesis that Germany should be a 'bridge', a midpoint, between the USSR and the Anglo-Americans:

It was the Social Democrats and the Liberals who sought to incorporate Germany into the concert of the Western Powers without alienating Soviet Russia. It is characteristic, however, that this policy could be carried out only during the time when the Weimar Republic appeared to be stabilized. (THE FREE GERMANY MANIFESTO AND THE GERMAN PEOPLE, Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Branch of Research and Analysis (R&A#1033), Europe-Africa Division, Psychological Warfare Subdivision, Central European Section, August 6, 1943, p. 16)

Insofar as they publicly argued for an eastwards shift in German policy, the Kautskyites were publicly arguing for a progressive policy line and therefore could be cooperated with against the more blatantly anti-Soviet trends, but behind the scenes, at the most fundamental level, the Kautskyites continued to be the vicious enemies of the USSR and the allies of Anglo-American finance capital, just like the Hitler faction. The Kautskyites and the Hitler faction were the agents of the same reactionary class forces but adopted differing colorations and differing official stances because they had to respond to differing electoral bases, one the northern proletarian electoral base and the other the Bavarian agrarian petit-bourgeois electoral base.

The reactionary class forces were strong 'thanks' to the leverage provided to them by Anglo-American finance capital and French imperialist revanchist aggression, but German finance capital, which dominated the German state, was at the time on the proletariat's side. Hence, the reactionary class forces (e.g. the feudal generals) could not so quickly take over. Such was the reason for the defeat of the Hitler gang in their Beer Hall Putsch and the confinement of Hitler. The Hitler gang's Beer Hall Putsch attempt failed and the Hitler faction was rolled back thanks to the crackdown. The crackdown on the Hitlerian agents of the reactionary class forces naturally came with the increase in the strength of the faction that, covertly and in a manner disguised as 'loyal' to fascism, was pursuing a fundamentally anti-fascist crypto-progressive and crypto-proletarian agenda. This was the Strasser faction, which compositionally proletarianized much of the membership of the Nazi Party, and whose agents engaged in cooperation with the Schleicher faction, slowed down the pace of the project for the Nazification of Germany, engaged in espionage for the USSR, and fomented military coups against the Hitler faction. They did all of this while wearing shirts that were brown. They did all of these while condemning the communists and 'the Jews'.

With the defeat of Hitler and the increase in the powers of the Strasser faction in the Nazi Party, there came changes within the ranks of those German military units tasked with supporting the Nazi Party which had not yet risen to power. Seeckt, a supporter of Hitler, was ousted:

It was, therefore, with relief that von Schleicher welcomed von Seeckt's fall in October 1926. If he had no hand in bringing it about – a matter which is still open to debate – he certainly did nothing to prevent it, and he was at pains to see that the successor was a man more susceptible to his persuasion. The successor chosen was Colonel-General Wilhelm Heye, whose melancholy duty it had been to inform first Wilhelm II and then General von Liittwitz that they no longer enjoyed the confidence of the German Army. A good Staff officer and well grounded in the fundamental principles of his predecessor, Heye continued to pursue the von Seeckt policy in a modified form ; modified, that is to say, by the advice of von Schleicher and von Hammerstein, who now became the controlling influences in the Bendlerstrasse. ('The Nemesis of Power: The Germany Army in Politics, 1918-1945', John Wheeler-Bennett, 1954, p. 185)

As a result of the Beer Hall coup, Hitler was imprisoned. This gave the Strasser faction of the Nazi Party greater operational freedom, and resulted in the strengthening of the proletariat's Strasserite pseudo-Nazi agents in the Nazi Party:

Hitler was immediately confronted in 1925 by the problem of restoring some semblance of order among his followers and of constructing the basis of an organisational and administrative structure that would allow him to assert his authority as Führer. It was a formidable undertaking in view of the deep schisms which had been opened up in the broad National Socialist-völkisch movement during his imprisonment. The situation was further complicated by the need for Hitler to give his party a lead in ideological and propaganda matters now that it was developing a quasi-legalistic parliamentary road to power. Hitler had to take account of the fact that Weimar politics by the mid-1920s had settled into a pattern in which socio-economic status and confessional inclination largely dictated electoral preferences. ('Gregor Strasser and the Rise of Nazism', Routledge, Peter D. Stachura, 2015, p. 40) (IMG)

Germany's north was industrialized and proletarianized part of Germany. The proletarians of the north were antagonistic to the Hitler mafia. Hitler's lieutenant, Hermann Rauschning, recalled:

Hitler's nature was incomprehensible to the North German. (Hitler Speaks, Hermann Rauschning, 1939, p. 165) (IMG)

Strasser's social base was the blue-collar industrial working class voters in Germany's north. He spent plenty of time recruiting the proletarians in the north as a membership base that would support the Strasser faction against the Hitler faction which had its membership base among the Bavarian petit-bourgeoisie:

Every party involved in the democratic process had, therefore, to decide to which particular groups of society it should project its appeal. The NSDAP's dilemma in this respect was intensified at the outset because of a certain dichotomy in its own ranks: the conflict implicit in the emergence of a northern section of the party committed, however vaguely, to a form of 'socialism' and to attracting blue-collar industrial workers, alongside the southern end of the party, based in Munich [in Bavaria], which pursued an essentially national-racist anti-semitic and anti-Marxist course. Hitler's problem in 1925-6 was to reach an accommodation between these two viewpoints, but this necessitated, of course, facing up to his northern supporters, whose leading spokesman was Strasser.

Although appointed leader of NSDAP Kreisverband Lower Bavaria in March 1925, and shortly thereafter Gauleiter of Lower Bavaria, Strasser delegated most of the everyday running of the Gau to his deputy, Himmler, and tended to restrict his appearances there to district

meetings and the occasional public speech. His Reichstag duties took up some of his attention in Berlin, but it was his interest and enthusiasm for the work of disseminating National Socialism in northern Germany which demanded most of his time. Indeed, he was reprimanded and fined RM800 in the summer of 1925 by the Reich President's office for being absent for too long a period from parliament and for holding public meetings during that time. The year 1925 saw Strasser fully complete his transformation into a politician of the NSDAP, and simultaneously it witnessed a flowering of his organisational talent and ideological outlook.

(‘Gregor Strasser and the Rise of Nazism’, Routledge, Peter D. Stachura, 2015, pp. 40-41) (IMG)

Strasser travelled extensively throughout the north helping to establish local branches, appointing or confirming leaders, and making speeches. Of the ninety-one public speaking engagements he held that year, the overwhelming majority took place in industrial parts of north-central Germany. Through this intense activity Strasser consolidated his earlier good impression among northern National Socialists, and despite his Bavarian Catholic background he very quickly became finely attuned to the interests, attitudes and sensibilities of his associates. (‘Gregor Strasser and the Rise of Nazism’, Routledge, Peter D. Stachura, 2015, p. 41) (IMG)

Hitler, confirmed the US intelligence, was with the ‘Bavarian faction’ – the agrarian petit-bourgeois part of Germany. The US intelligence reported: In fact, as the breach between Hitler and Strasser widened, and as Hitler and his Bavarian faction asserted dictatorial control over the Party, it can be said that the Party came to consist more and more not only of failures, but of the most depraved elements of the old murderers' army.... Roehm himself having returned to the fold in 1927. (THE CAREER OF HEINRICH HIMMLER, US intelligence, p. 8)

During the 1920s when they had a greater level of operational freedom inside the Nazi Party, the Strasserites quite openly advocated an alliance with the USSR. However, upon the return of the Hitler gang from jail, trouble for the Strasserites began again:

As Mr. Laqueur reminds us, on his return from Landsberg fortress in 1925 Hitler had to fight a strong “National Bolshevik” faction in his own party, which saw the cooperation between the German and Russian armies as reflecting a natural kinship between the Prussian and Russian forms of “national socialism.” (Richard Lowenthal’s Review of “Russia and Germany: A Century of Conflict” written by Walter Laqueur. In: US Congressional Record – Senate, August 22, 1966, p. 20187) (IMG)

At that point, publicly, Gregor Strasser began to denounce the Soviet Union:

Although at pains to emphasise that for 'we National Socialists the struggle against Marxism in its every form is a sacred task' and that there had to be no suspicion that 'we sympathise with the Marxist Soviet Republic and its Jewish leadership', Strasser believed at this time that Russia and Germany, as oppressed nations, had broadly similar interests. The road to friendship and alliance with Russia, he insisted, had to be kept open despite the ideological cleavage. His notion of a 'Bund der unterdrückten Völker' (League of Oppressed Nations) was a rather fanciful extension of his anti-colonial and pro-Eastern outlook, but Hitler's strongly anti-Bolshevik and anti-Russian animus and, above all, the concept of eastward expansion (Lebensraum), which was clearly expressed in Mein Kampf, put a decided dampener on this particular aspect of Strasser's ideology. (‘Gregor Strasser and the Rise of Nazism’, Routledge, Peter D. Stachura, 2015, p. 42) (IMG)

Indeed, behind the scenes, Gregor Strasser continued to oppose the militant anti-Sovietism of the Nazis. In the 1932 confidential letter to Hitler, Gregor Strasser condemned Hitler’s focus on the violent confrontation with communism and instead promoted his vision for ‘a great broad front of constructive people’:

The brutal confrontation with Marxism cannot and may not - left to individuals - stand at the centre of the internal political task; rather, I see the great problem of this age as the creation of a great broad front of constructive people and their integration into the new-styled state. The single-minded hope that chaos will produce the party’s hour of destiny is, I believe, erroneous, dangerous, and not in the interests of Germany as a whole. In all of these matters your fundamental view is different from mine, and hence my political task as a member of parliament and party spokesman is rendered untenable, and I am drawing the necessary conclusions from this. (From: Gregor Strasser, To: Adolf Hitler, December 8, 1932. In: ‘Gregor Strasser and the Rise of Nazism’, Routledge, Peter D. Stachura, 2015, p. 113)

The above quote from Strasser is interesting on a number of levels, not only where it denounced the violent confrontation with communism but also in its call for a 'broad front' of 'constructive' people governing German society. As the OSS correctly reported, the Strasser wing of the Nazi Party opposed the virulent anti-Sovietism and anti-Semitism of the Hitler faction:

The Strasser-Goebbels group attacked Rosenberg's anti-Russian and anti-Semitic conceptions. It demanded eastern orientation of the Nazi Party, opposition to American and English imperialism and assistance to Russia’s fight against this imperialism. Germany's place was on the side of Russia, Turkey, China, India, in short on the side of all those people which are hostile to Versailles. Russia therefore is the natural ally of Germany and it is nobody's concern how Russia is internally governed.

These views were supported by Gregor Strasser’s brother, Otto Strasser, and by Count Reventlow, who belonged to the Deutsch Voelkische Freiheitspartei which had formed an alliance with the Nazi Party in March 1923.

c) The occasion for dealing the first blow to the National Bolshevik trend within the party was the Communist sponsored referendum for the expropriation of the princely houses. On February 14, 1925, Hitler called a meeting of the party leaders to Bamberg. The northern Graue were represented only by Gregor Strasser and Goebbels. Hitler succeeded, in spite of Strasser's opposition to commit the party to wholesale opposition to the Communist initiative by depicting it as Jewish engineered. Goebbels used this occasion to desert Strasser and to swing over entirely to Hitler's side. From that day on Goebbels as well as Ley have consistently followed Hitler's directives and that day created the deadly enmity between Goebbels and the Strasser brothers which led ultimately to Gregor Strasser's assassination on June 30, 1934. The Arbeitsgemeinschaft of the northern Graue was dissolved.

(THE FREE GERMANY MANIFESTO AND THE GERMAN PEOPLE, Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Branch of Research and Analysis (R&A#1033), Europe-Africa Division, Psychological Warfare Subdivision, Central European Section, August 6, 1943, p. 12)

It is worth noting that Goebbels was a spy for the Hitler faction inside of the Strasser wing of the Nazi Party. Otto Strasser condemned Goebbels as a traitor to the Strasser grouping, a traitor who served the Hitler group:

Goebbels didn't hesitate - he betrayed [the Strasserites] without a thought. (Flight from Terror, Otto Strasser, 1943, p. 111)

The Strasserites themselves were already betraying the Nazi Party, but Goebbels betrayed the traitors to the Nazi Party. This had a context. Goebbels was based in the proletarianized north of Germany unlike Hitler and Himmler who were based in the petit-bourgeois Bavaria. Due to his location in the north, he was surrounded by a much stronger proletarian tendency than the Hitlerian forces in the agrarian south of Germany. As a result, much

like the Kautskyite social-fascists, Goebbels felt compelled by the proletarian tide to adopt a less uncivilized appearance to himself in order to survive in such a proletarian environment. As the above OSS document stated, 'The Strasser-Goebbels group attacked Rosenberg's anti-Russian and anti-Semitic conceptions.' Strasser was serious in attacking these Hitlerian conceptions; for a while, Goebbels pretended to oppose these Hitlerian conceptions and began to praise the USSR and, as implied by the above OSS document, to make himself appear less of an anti-Semite than Hitler. Of course, in reality, Goebbels was vehemently anti-Soviet and anti-Semitic, and operated as a Hitlerian spy among the Strasserite conspirators who were aiming to hijack the Nazi Party.

Otto Strasser decided to take some of the resources of the Nazi Party with him in order to damage the Nazi Party, and to utilize the resources for the establishment of a 'Black Front' for shadow war against the Hitler faction. Gregor Strasser, Otto's brother, played the 'stay-behind' role and remained in the Nazi Party in order to be able to foment subversion against the Hitler faction from within the Party while the Black Front was fomenting the subversion from 'without' the Nazi Party:

The fight between the two wings, especially between the Strasser group and the Hitler majority, is well known. While Gregor Strasser finally accepted the leadership of Hitler, his brother Otto Strasser did not. He founded the "Fighting Community of Revolutionary National Socialists," later called Black Front, and submitted to the German public "Fourteen Theses of the German Revolution. These theses, though outwardly socialistic, do not contain any foreign political program except the demand for the unification of all Germans and the destruction of the Versailles Treaty. Otto Strasser has, however, exposed his foreign political views in his book "Structure of German Socialism!" to which his famous discussion with Hitler is appended. (THE FREE GERMANY MANIFESTO AND THE GERMAN PEOPLE, Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Branch of Research and Analysis (R&A#1033), Europe-Africa Division, Psychological Warfare Subdivision, Central European Section, August 6, 1943, p. 13)

The Black Front and the SS engaged in armed conflicts against each other:

In such circumstances, the blind obedience of the SS and its dissociation from the doctrinal differences within the Party were priceless qualities. When Otto Strasser and his socialistic faction, first within the Party and later outside it under the name of the "Black Front," had to be hounded out of the Party and the country, the SS, together with elements of the SA, was called in to do the job. On 2 July 1930 SS Guards did Goebbels' will in barring Otto Strasser from a conference of Berlin Party officials, after the final interview in which Strasser had broken with Hitler. SS and SA district leaders threatened any [one] who dared to cling to Strasser with expulsion from the Party, and SA men took part in a physical attack on Strasser himself. The SS, together with the SA, fought Strasser's secessionist "Black Front" during the next few years, in bloody fights throughout the country. Finally, after the Reichstag fire, the SS set out deliberately to wipe out Strasser and his movement, and its agents hounded him out of Germany to Austria, and later Czechoslovakia, whence he escaped in turn to Switzerland, France, and finally to Canada. (THE CAREER OF HEINRICH HIMMLER, US intelligence, p. 15)

By 1941, Heydrich, the top Nazi German intelligence and military official, had mentioned that Otto Strasser's 'Black Front' agents in Germany were closely working with the emigres harbored by the USSR, and suspected that Otto Strasser himself was an intelligence agent of the Soviet Union:

ONE DAY in April 1941, Himmler telephoned me. His tone was curt, he sounded displeased – always a bad sign – as he ordered me to be ready to report to Hitler in the afternoon. I was not to bring any documents with me. I sat there wondering gloomily what was coming. As a precaution I called Heydrich and told him of the conversation. He knew about it already. "I know what it's about," he said, "but I don't want to discuss it over the phone. We'll just have to see what happens."

At three o'clock I had a call from Heydrich. "Get ready, we're leaving in ten minutes," he announced. "But come to my office first."

When I entered he was sitting at his desk, bent over some documents. He closed his brief case, which was unusual for him; it was his custom to continue to read while he issued orders. His face was very serious as he explained the situation to me. "For several weeks we have been informed through a very reliable source that Otto Strasser is in Portugal. Hitler hates Otto just as much as he hated his brother Gregor. He considers them both not only betrayers of our cause, but traitors to him personally. He's convinced that Otto is trying to bring about his assassination and that he's working toward it with the British and American Secret Services. There are still some 'Black Front' characters here in Germany, too, working pretty closely with émigré circles from Moscow, but they take the 'National Bolshevism' line. Personally, I'm not quite sure whether Otto isn't really a 'double agent' – whether he isn't actually working under Stalin's orders. (...)" (Hitler's Secret Service, Original title: The Labyrinth, Walther Schellenberg, Introduction by Alan Bullock, Translation by Louis Hagen, first published: 1956, p. 173)

When Hitler was in jail and the Strasser faction had gained operational freedom within the Nazi Party, it was not just the ordinary membership of the Nazi Party that was being compositionally proletarianized but also the very armed forces and intelligence apparatus of the Nazi Party was affected by the process. The Sturmabteilung (SA) was the fascist terrorist paramilitary and intelligence service of the Nazi Party at the time. Yet, it ended up being infiltrated at its high ranks by the Strasserite spies and agents of the KPD and the USSR.

The power base of the crypto-progressive and crypto-communist forces that had risen to the high ranks of the SA lied in the compositional proletarianization of a significantly high percentage of the staff of the SA. Published by the Cambridge University Press, a book extensively researching this matter stated:

Further evidence on this question was advanced in 1987 by Muhlberger, which involved SA members recruited in Munich before the November Putsch of 1923, along with an analysis of 1,539 members of the SA resident in numerous small towns and villages scattered throughout Bavaria in early April 1932 [101: 115–22]. The latter data demonstrated a consistent pattern of a high working-class presence within the ranks of the SA in all regions of Bavaria, ranging from 49.2 per cent in the Palatinate to 66.6 per cent in Upper Bavaria, averaging out at 61.1 per cent for Bavaria as a whole [101: 119–20]. The structure of the SA in predominantly small-town, rural areas of Bavaria in the spring of 1932 was in marked contrast to that of the SA in rural East Prussia in 1931 as summarised in the police records which Bessel had discovered. Additional material published by Muhlberger in the early 1990s gave further strong support to Fischer's argument that the SA was predominantly working class in terms of its rank-and-file membership. In data relating to SA units recruited in the states of Bavaria and Württemberg, and in the Prussian provinces of Hesse-Nassau, Hanover and Westphalia, agricultural workers, unskilled, semi-skilled and skilled workers, as well as craftsmen, dominated the social make-up of units of 'ordinary' SA, of SA-Motor and SA-Rider corps, as well as of SA probationers and SA reservists, and confirmed Fischer's contention that the SA's rank-

and-file was predominantly lower class [102: 168–71]. ('The Social Bases of Nazism, 1919-1933', Cambridge University Press, Detlef Muhlberger, 2003, p. 61)

The compositional proletarianization of the Nazi Party's military and intelligence staff entrenched the crypto-progressive/pro-communist Strasserite tendency in the Nazi Party, so much so that later on, when the Hitler gang took over and banned the KPD, the KPD operatives easily infiltrated the SA and fomented anti-Nazi subversion from there.

As early as the 1920s, the KPD had had two parallel apparatuses, the legal and the 'illegal'. The 'illegal' part of the KPD was the secretive body that constituted the KPD's intelligence service and covert agency, and was affiliated directly with the Comintern intelligence service. The 'legal' part of the KPD was the regular section of the Party, which engaged in agitation and education, functioned according to the principles of democratic centralism, and did pretty much anything we know the regular part of the communist party to engage in. The KPD intelligence service was an intelligence network and did not have the structure of the KPD's regular section. Furthermore, in order to on the one hand save the members of the regular/'legal' section of the KPD from the accusation of espionage and on the other hand, because the members of the regular section were often known members or more easily identifiable members of the KPD, it did not make sense for the KPD intelligence agents to contact the known members pervasively for that would have led to KPD intelligence agents to get caught and for regular KPD members to be accused of espionage. As a result, the KPD intelligence, or the 'Illegal Apparat' maintained minimal contacts with the KPD's regular/'legal' Party section and limited such contacts to the high-ranking Party members responsible for intelligence matters. As the CIA put it,:

This study is based principally on captured Gestapo records, and on the interrogations of surviving Gestapo and Illegal Apparat personnel, supplemented by the published accounts of individual Communist defectors. These records, for the most part second hand, cannot of course be considered conclusive, but they do permit what is probably a fairly accurate construction of the German Illegal Apparat. (THE ILLEGAL APPARAT OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF GERMANY, S-Memorandum #16, CIA, October 20, 1947, p. 1)

Both the *Conditions for Admission* to the Communist International (1920) and the *Comintern Statutes* (1920) called for the establishment of secret or "illegal" organizations by each of the national sections in order both to guarantee their continued existence when and if they were forced to go underground and to carry on such pre-revolutionary activities as could not safely be performed by the Legal Party (parallel apparat). The Illegal Apparat of the German Communist Party described in the following pages falls into this latter class; it worked "parallel" to the legal Party up to 1933 and to the underground Party after it had been outlawed by the Nazis. Set up almost as early as the legal Party itself, the illegal apparat with few exceptions functioned quite separately from it at all echelons. Some "illegal" personnel occupied legal Party positions for cover, but the great majority of functionaries and routine workers dissociated themselves completely from public Party membership and activity. (THE ILLEGAL APPARAT OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF GERMANY, S-Memorandum #16, CIA, October 20, 1947, p. 1)

The KPD intelligence service established an 'NSDAP Section' responsible for KPD intelligence penetration into the Nazi Party, sabotage, and the sowing of dissension within that Party. On the KPD intelligence service, the CIA stated:

NSDAP or Nazi Section. The primary activity of the Apparat was naturally directed against the National Socialists.... The Nazi Section had the primary task of reporting in detail on activities within the Nazi party and its associated organizations. It was further responsible for spreading false rumors in the Party, stirring up dissatisfaction, spreading false stories about Party leaders – in short, sabotaging the Nazi movement in every possible faction. Its program naturally involved the planting of agents inside the Nazi ranks. (THE ILLEGAL APPARAT OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF GERMANY, S-Memorandum #16, CIA, October 20, 1947, p. 8)

It is not clear if the 'rumours' and 'stories' spread by the KPD were actually false, or were false only in the perspective of the Gestapo upon which the above CIA report was based. Regardless, the point is that the KPD was busy infiltrating and fomenting subversion within the Nazi Party. The compositional proletarianization of the SA led the KPD to focus much of its efforts to recruiting intelligence agents from the SA:

The primacy of emotive concepts in the ideological makeup of the SA did not stop the Communist Party from trying to shape and direct the radicalism of the storm troopers along the lines predicted by Marxist theory; on the contrary, work within and around the SA became a centerpiece of Communist subversive efforts in the final Weimar years. Communist attempts to infiltrate the radical right organizations — primarily the Stahlhelm veterans' organization — dated from the early 1920s. These efforts reached a new pitch beginning in 1930, focusing now on the rapidly growing Nazis. **Appeals to working-class Nazis to abandon their leadership**—a version of the "united front from below" strategy used against the SPD from the end of the 1920s — were a staple of the Communist press from 1930 on, as were reports of Zersetzung ("disintegration") in Nazi ranks. ('The SA in the Radical Imagination of the Long Weimar Republic', Cambridge University Press, Vol. 46, Issue 2, Timothy Scott Brown, August 14, 2013. Bold added)

Thanks to such a pervasive KPD intelligence infiltration, reports kept flowing from SA high ranks to the KPD regarding internal events in the SA:

Reports from Communist operatives appeared in "NSDAP Weekly Reports" published by the KPD for internal use. The reports were aimed at assessing the effects of Communist propaganda and determining prospects for future work. Detailed inside information appeared in sections titled "From within the SA" and "Signs of Disintegration." Using these reports, Communist propagandists could learn, for example, that in summer 1932, storm troopers of Sturms 44 and 45 in Berlin were openly talking among themselves of going over to the KPD: "the least we could do," one storm trooper is quoted as saying to his comrades, "would be if we threw in our lot with the KPD and first cleaned house in Germany and solved the economic question—the rest can be discussed once everyone has work and bread again. Only the revolutionary KPD can help us in this." ('The SA in the Radical Imagination of the Long Weimar Republic', Cambridge University Press, Vol. 46, Issue 2, Timothy Scott Brown, August 14, 2013)

Zersetzungschriften such as *Der Freiheitskämpfer* (Frankfurt) and *Die Sturmflagge* (Hamburg) were produced with the help of SA junior officers using positions of authority to carry out Communist agitation. *Der Freiheitskämpfer* was distributed in an SA barracks in Düsseldorf by a uniformed Sturmführer who, after being expelled from the SA, became a star performer at Communist meetings organized to win over Nazi militants to communism. A concerned Nazi official reported that the Sturmführer in question had later been seen in the company of another SA man entering a Communist printing house. *Die Sturmflagge* was produced at the initiative of the treasurer of a Hamburg SA formation who was active, simultaneously, in a fake opposition group working at the behest of the Communist M-Apparat (the so-called Sturmflagge group) and a genuine Nazi opposition group that called itself the "League of National Socialist Front Soldiers" [!]. The latter group, made up of former and active-duty SA and SS men, included supporters of both Walter Stennes and General Ludendorff, as well as a spy who reported to the NSDAP on the group's meetings. The spy was well aware of the presence

of the operative from the Sturmflamme group, whom he reported as possessing "the most intimate connections to the KPD." ('The SA in the Radical Imagination of the Long Weimar Republic', Cambridge University Press, Vol. 46, Issue 2, Timothy Scott Brown, August 14, 2013)

A famous case of KPD infiltration into the high ranks of the Nazi Party was the case of Richard Scheringer. A CIA document and a paper published by the Cambridge University Press stated:

Richard Scheringer [was] an army officer and supporter of Adolf Hitler who became famous during the early 1930s for his high-profile conversion to communism. ('Richard Scheringer, the KPD and the Politics of Class and Nation in Germany, 1922-1965', Cambridge University Press, Contemporary European History, August 2005, Vol. 14, No. 3, Timothy S. Brown, August 2005, p. 317-318)

During his subsequent imprisonment in Koslin Fortress, Scheringer fell under the influence of a fellow prisoner, the KPD leader Torgler, and was converted to Communism. After his release from prison, Scheringer became an outstanding orator for the KPD. (SUBJECT: SKORZENY's Neo-Nazi Apparat in West Germany, CIA, p. 4. In: 'SKORZENY, OTTO VOL. 2_0057', CIA.)

By recruiting Scheringer, the KPD succeeded in establishing a powerful network of crypto-communist intelligence agents at the high ranks of the Nazi Storm-Troopers:

The KPD's agitation succeeded in converting a number of National Bolshevik officers and intellectuals, such as Captain Beppo Römer, the head of the Freikorps Bund Oberland, which had a long record of collaboration with the Communists. Junkers like Ludwig Renn (pseudonym for Arnold Vieth von Gollsenau) and Count Alexander Stenbock-Fermor also joined the Communists. One of the converts, the writer Bodo Uhse, had run the gamut in his membership, from the Freikorps, the NSDAP, the Strasser circle, to the KPD. The party's attempts to induce nationalists to join its ranks is known as the "Scheringer Course," so called because of the widely publicized case of Lieutenant Scheringer. Early in 1931, while serving a prison sentence for carrying on Nazi propaganda in the Reichswehr, Scheringer had yielded to the enticements of the Communists, accepting their assertion that they represented the only true nationalist force. He became a Communist organizer, and claimed to have succeeded in "producing a healthy nucleus for Communism" among the rank-and-file and the leadership of the Nazi Storm Troops. There is some evidence to indicate that one of the aims of Hitler's blood purge of June 30, 1934, was to eliminate National Bolshevism within the Nazi party. (NATIONAL BOLSHEVISM IN WEIMAR GERMANY: Alliance of Political Extremes Against Democracy, John Hopkins University, Social Research, Vol. 23, No. 4, Abraham Ascher, Gunter Lewy, Winter 1956, p. 478)

By 1932, a third of the ranks of the Berlin wing of the SA, for instance, was made up of KPD agents:

Albert Grzesinski, head of the Berlin police force in 1930-32, said that thirty percent of the Berlin SA was made up of Communists by 1932; (Faschistische Kampfbünde, Reichardt, p. 524. Cited in: 'The SA in the Radical Imagination of the Long Weimar Republic', Cambridge University Press, Vol. 46, Issue 2, Timothy Scott Brown, August 14, 2013)

When the Hitler faction rose to power, Scheringer the communist agent was thrown into jail. Thanks to the lobbying of SA General Ludin, Scheringer was released from jail and was able to be installed as a commander of Nazi Germany's army. He was a general of the Nazi German army in the war against France and in Operation BARBAROSSA against the USSR:

When Hitler came to power, Scheringer was sent to a concentration camp, but was released not long after through the efforts of his former colleague Ludin, who had remained [ostensibly] loyal to the Nazis, and had become an SA leader. During the next few years, Scheringer, ostensibly at least, dropped his Communist affiliations and in 1939 secured a commission as a captain in the Wehrmacht. Later he led a battalion on the Russian front. At the war's end, he was an American prisoner for three weeks. (SUBJECT: SKORZENY's Neo-Nazi Apparat in West Germany, CIA, p. 4. In: 'SKORZENY, OTTO VOL. 2_0057', CIA.)

In reality, Scheringer continued to be a KPD intelligence agent, aiming to sabotage the Nazi German army. During this time,:

The illegal AM-Apparat remained active in Bavaria after the [Nazi] seizure of power, as did surviving portions of the Aufbruch Arbeitskreise, but Scheringer appears to have had no contact with them. ('Richard Scheringer, the KPD and the Politics of Class and Nation in Germany, 1922-1965', Cambridge University Press, Contemporary European History, August 2005, Vol. 14, No. 3, Timothy S. Brown, August 2005, pp. 335-336)

The agrarian petit-bourgeois Bavaria was a Nazi German intelligence stronghold. The progressive forces in Bavaria would have inevitably faced immense pressure from the Nazis and the progressive organizations there would have been much more easily infiltrated by the Nazis. Hence the Bavaria branch of the KPD's AM-Apparat would not have necessarily been so worth Scheringer's trust.

After the liberation of Germany, Scheringer rejoined with the KPD 'family' to which he had always belonged and became a prominent KPD leader:

Scheringer hailed the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact of 23 August 1939 and enlisted with the Wehrmacht promptly with the outbreak of war a week later. He served in the artillery under Ludin's command in the French campaign of 1940 and commanded his own battery in the invasion of the Soviet Union in the summer of 1941. After an extended period of home leave to tend the harvest, he returned voluntarily to the front in late 1944. Scheringer would later cast his military service in the Third Reich in terms of 'resistance', explaining his initial enthusiasm as a hope that war would 'set things rolling' against the Nazis. His voluntary return to the front in 1944 was, he said, done in the hope of agitating among his fellow officers. ('Richard Scheringer, the KPD and the Politics of Class and Nation in Germany, 1922-1965', Cambridge University Press, Contemporary European History, August 2005, Vol. 14, No. 3, Timothy S. Brown, August 2005, pp. 335-336)

He nevertheless became involved with local underground KPD circles in Ingolstadt, holding meetings in his home and, in at least one instance, arranging the escape abroad of an opponent of the Nazis. Scheringer's continued low level activity for the KPD escaped the notice of the authorities, but despite the protection of his friend Ludin, which lasted throughout the war, Scheringer's Weimar-era reputation and his reserved attitude toward the Hitler regime got him into some potentially serious scrapes with the law. ('Richard Scheringer, the KPD and the Politics of Class and Nation in Germany, 1922-1965', Cambridge University Press, Contemporary European History, August 2005, Vol. 14, No. 3, Timothy S. Brown, August 2005, pp. 335-336)

Known in the closing years of the Weimar Republic as a point-man for Communist efforts to win support from the radical right, Scheringer survived the Third Reich to become a leading figure in the postwar Communist Party. ('Richard Scheringer, the KPD and the Politics of Class and Nation in Germany, 1922-1965', Cambridge University Press, Contemporary European History, August 2005, Vol. 14, No. 3, Timothy S. Brown, August 2005, p. 317-318)

The CIA documents reveal that after the Great Patriotic War, Otto Skorzeny's group tried to infiltrate the Scheringer-led intelligence network but failed in this endeavour.

The Scheringer case is demonstrative of the depth of the Soviet-KPD infiltration into the Nazi regime. The Strasserite SA lobby allowed him out of Hitler's jail and onto the position of a military general in the Third Reich. While being a military official of the regime, he was covertly operating as an agent of the KPD underground, and by the time of the collapse of the regime, he came out as the KPD leader he really was.

Back in the 1920s, the leader of the SA was confirmed by the US intelligence to be a fake Nazi and the SA staff were regarded as unreliable in Hitler's eyes. Indeed, this was the reason that Hitler promoted the rise of the SS to be eventually led by Himmler against the SA. The US intelligence reported:

However, with the revival of the SA in 1926, under the leadership of Pfeffer von Salomon, an untrustworthy adventurer who was not even a National Socialist at heart, and was not amenable to Hitler's discipline, Hitler conceived the SS more narrowly as his own inner guard, the instrument of his own dictatorship over the Party, which was now threatened not only by the semi-independent course of the SA but also by the Strasser 'and other factions within the Party. Thus the SS, to enhance its prestige, was entrusted in 1926 with custody of the sacred Blutfahne, which all the banners of the Party had to "touch" in a ceremony of ordination. Also, the SS members were distinguished by the new black Fascist uniform, distinguishing' them from the far larger membership of the brown-shirted SA. (THE CAREER OF HEINRICH HIMMLER, US intelligence, p. 12)

Upon becoming the SA chief, Pfeffer von Salomon strategically deployed his old comrade-in-arms and agent Walther Stennes as the deputy of the SA. Otto Strasser recalled:

WALTHER STENNES was a small, elegant man about thirty-five years old - a blond with blue eyes, who was never seen out of his SA uniform. He was a typical son of a Junker family, rich in the tradition of that military caste, and during the war had earned many citations for valor, especially at Cambrai, where the English first threw tanks into the struggle. After the war he joined the Frei Korps Pfeffer, a Baltic unit, in which he was second in command to von Pfeffer. Consequently, when Pfeffer later became head of the SA, he appointed Stennes a commander in that organization. Amazingly, Stennes was allowed to accept that post without being required to join the Nazi Party. Later he became leader of the North German SA. (Flight from Terror, Otto Strasser, 1943, p. 11)

Infiltrated by the KPD and the Black Front operatives at its high ranks, a large segment of the SA went ahead and launched a military coup against the Hitler faction of the Nazi Party before the Nazi Party's rise to the leadership of the German state. It was the time of Stennes Rebellion.

In the year 1930, Stennes launched an armed rebellion of the SA aimed at overthrowing the Hitlerian leadership of the Nazi Party. Shortly prior to the Stennes revolt, fliers had been spreading in the Nazi SA, which bore a crypto-communist pseudo-Nazi character, leading the Nazi counter-intelligence service to arrive at the conclusion that the KPD was behind the spread of such leaflets:

A profusion of flyers and local newspapers attempted to exploit Nazi discontent in the wake of the Stennes revolt and to capitalize on the example of Richard Scheringer. ('The SA in the Radical Imagination of the Long Weimar Republic', Cambridge University Press, Vol. 46, Issue 2, Timothy Scott Brown, August 14, 2013)

The liberal Frankfurter Zeitung observed, not without sarcasm, that although "the matter has a distinctly Communist flavor, the directness of the language and the undisguised hate that rings out of every line speaks for its authenticity." Others were not so sure. Police authorities in Pomerania, where the flyers were also in circulation, attributed them to the rebel group around Walter Stennes and Otto Strasser. The Nazi Party, in contrast, charged the flyers to the account of the KPD. A memorandum from the party in Berlin reproduced parts of the flyer to illustrate what it called "typical phrases" used by Communist propagandists, such as "the only thing that will help now is ruthless openness," "is there a point to fighting the Marxist and bourgeois parties when in our own party," and so on. ('The SA in the Radical Imagination of the Long Weimar Republic', Cambridge University Press, Vol. 46, Issue 2, Timothy Scott Brown, August 14, 2013)

In corroboration with the CIA report about the KPD dissension-sowing activities, there was the fact that the KPD played a role in increasing tensions that 'appear' to have led to the Stennes revolt. In the footnote section, the study published by the Cambridge University Press stated:

The KPD appears, in fact, to have played a role in fomenting the tensions that led up to the [Stennes] revolt. See Schuster, Kurt G. P., *Der Rote Frontkämpferbund 1924–1929. Beiträge zur Geschichte und Organisationsstruktur eines politischen Kampfbundes* (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1975). ('The SA in the Radical Imagination of the Long Weimar Republic', Cambridge University Press, Vol. 46, Issue 2, Timothy Scott Brown, August 14, 2013)

Furthermore,:

Stennes also appears to have had ties to the Soviet embassy in Berlin; see "Auszugsweiser Bericht in Sachen Stennes u. Genossen," June 6, 1933, Institut für Zeitgeschichte (hereafter IfZ) 1887/56. ('The SA in the Radical Imagination of the Long Weimar Republic', Cambridge University Press, Vol. 46, Issue 2, Timothy Scott Brown, August 14, 2013)

Later on, Stennes would emerge as a major Soviet spy.

The Hitler faction was going to suppress the Stennes rebellion. To sabotage the efforts to suppress the Stennes rebellion, Pfeffer decided to take leadership of such a suppression. Note that Stennes was an agent of Pfeffer and had been promoted by Pfeffer. Note further that as confirmed by the US intelligence, Pfeffer was never really loyal to Nazism. He had promoted Stennes to lead the Nazis without requiring Stennes to even become a Nazi Party member. In light of these facts, it is not surprising that Pfeffer decided to take on the role of a fake opposition to the Stennes rebellion, and in leading the efforts to suppress the rebellion, he devised a strategy of suppression that was meant to fail. Pfeffer scattered his troops throughout Berlin, thereby allowing Stennes to 'defeat in detail' the suppression forces:

von Pfeffer, who had once been Stennes' superior officer, found himself outguessed and outgeneraled from the very beginning. Initiative and surprise rested with Stennes, and he was able to maintain the advantage. Von Pfeffer had prepared to meet Stennes' attack by placing his forces in possession of the many beer-hall headquarters scattered throughout Berlin. But now, besieged by roving bands of the enemy who could strike and retreat quickly with no cost to themselves, he hastily ordered his own men into their trucks. (Flight from Terror, Otto Strasser, 1943, p. 115)

Further, von Pfeffer's strategy of scattering his forces in an attempt to meet Stennes at every point was a costly blunder, for in that way he could have absolute control of no one point. (Flight from Terror, Otto Strasser, 1943, p. 117)

Pfeffer intentionally did not put up a strong resistance against Stennes. Another layer of fake resistance to the Stennes rebellion was to come from Ernst Roehm, also a fake opponent of the Stennes rebellion. The Hitler faction had to rely on the Hitlerian loyalist Goering, Lieutenant Schulz, and the regular German police which was by then under the influence of the Britain-aligned German finance capital to quell the uprising:

While the facts at this point are obscure, it seems that Hitler did, not even trust Roehm to put down the revolt, and placed a Lt. Schulz under Goering's supervision to restore order in the SA of Eastern Germany. Within a few weeks Schulz, noted for his ruthlessness, had quelled the revolt with the help of the SS and, strangely enough, the forces of law and order, the regular police. (THE CAREER OF HEINRICH HIMMLER, US intelligence, p. 16)

Yet even the inner nucleus of the Party had disintegrated; [In the 1920s] many of Hitler's supporters had deserted him, Roehm among them. (THE CAREER OF HEINRICH HIMMLER, US intelligence, p. 8)

Even the very German police that assisted Hitler in the quelling of the Stennes rebellion was not really a monolith either and was headed by a pro-Stennes sympathizer:

The Chief of Police of Berlin favored Stennes, Goebbels having made a vicious and slanderous attack on him in a pamphlet entitled "The Isidore Book." (Flight from Terror, Otto Strasser, 1943, p. 112)

Note also that the Stennes rebellion occurred in the 'Eastern Germany' using the 'Northern Brown Army', the northern wing of the Storm-Troopers sponsored by German imperialists:

Stennes was one of those malcontents acutely dissatisfied with the present shape of things, and behind him he had his loyal Northern Brown Army, a splendidly equipped force upon whom the wealthy industrialists had showered money and favors to protect their own selfish interests. (Flight from Terror, Otto Strasser, 1943, p. 111)

That the Stennes rebellion was in the northeast of Germany and was concentrated in Berlin is significant because that was Prussia – a top industrialized, proletarianized zone of Germany. While the SA had been armed by the German bourgeoisie, it had recruited from among the proletariat and was entrenched in the proletarianized north of Germany. Note furthermore that Stennes was the head of the Berlin SA and that approximately a third of the Berlin SA, as previously documented, was made up of KPD operatives. A third of the Berlin SA plus a fifth of the Hitler youth joined Stennes in the revolt against the Hitler gang:

Some thirty percent of the Berlin SA and twenty percent of the Berlin Hitler Youth went over to Stennes immediately. (HA 56/1368, Landeskriminalpolizeiamt (IA) Berlin, May 1, 1931, 'Rechtsradikale Bewegung. N.S.D.A.P. 1.) Die Stennes-Revolt'. Cited in: 'The SA in the Radical Imagination of the Long Weimar Republic', Cambridge University Press, Vol. 46, Issue 2, Timothy Scott Brown, August 14, 2013)

The KPD itself explicitly supported Stennes's armed revolt against Hitler gang:

The KPD hailed the revolt as evidence that the long-predicted split in the Nazi movement was finally at hand. ('The SA in the Radical Imagination of the Long Weimar Republic', Cambridge University Press, Vol. 46, Issue 2, Timothy Scott Brown, August 14, 2013)

Outwardly, Walter Stennes's rhetoric was fundamentally a Strasserite/Naz-Bol rhetoric. The Stennes revolt, recalled a Strasserite infiltrator into Hitler's circle, was an outgrowth of the Strasser revolt:

The full consequences of the Strasser revolt possibly lie in the future. The Stennes revolt, in part an outgrowth of the other, entailed more serious immediate embarrassments. (I Knew Hitler: The Story of a Nazi Who Escaped the Blood Purge, Kurt G. W. Ludecke, 1938, p. 320)

By the time of his rebellion, Stennes had become an agent of the Black Front:

Once under way, however, Captain Stennes sent for me and I responded at once. He told me that he knew little or nothing about political matters and suggested that I function as his guide in the present emergency. I reminded him that I was already the leader of a full-fledged political group and that we would be glad to welcome him and his followers into our existing organization. (Flight from Terror, Otto Strasser, 1943, p. 112)

Milan Hauner – the former director of the CIA think tank East European Studies at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, and a scholar of the US Naval War College and the neoconservative Hoover Institute – confirmed that Stennes had been recruited by the Black Front intelligence network by the time of the end of the rebellion (if not prior):

In Berlin, the deputy SA leader, Walter Stennes, who commands the entire SA east of the River Elbe, defies Hitler.... With his men he stages a brief rebellion, which is quickly put down through Hitler's personal intervention in Berlin. Stennes is expelled from the SA and the NSDAP and joins the 'Black Front' under Otto Strasser, which is opposed to Hitler's NSDAP. (Hitler: A Chronology of his Life and Time, Milan Hauner, 2005, p. 72)

many elements of the SA [were] of doubtful allegiance to Hitler's leadership, as was shown by the Stennes revolt, which quickly followed. Captain Walter Stennes, OSAF-OST, that is, commander of the SA in Eastern Germany, was as such the second most important commander of the SA, second only to Roehm. The Stennes "conspiracy" was [officially stated to be] intended ... to drive Hitler back to the course of forcible revolution, which he had abandoned in favor of "legality"; it was also stimulated, according to Otto Strasser, by Black Front revelations of various Party intrigues. Whatever the precise motives, Hitler acted first, and deposed Stennes on 1 April 1931. A few weeks of action followed, in which Stennes captured the Berlin Party headquarters and press, issued an order deposing both Goebbels and Hitler, and led his -followers in the accompanying battles with loyal elements, which were directed valiantly by Goebbels via telephone from Munich. (THE CAREER OF HEINRICH HIMMLER, US intelligence, p. 16)

The Black Front had formed before the Stennes revolt, but Stennes was a major pillar of the emigres of the Black Front, nonetheless. John Wheeler-Bennett, the prominent anti-Soviet British historian and an MI6 official, wrote:

Walter Stennes continued his fight for the 'pure principles' of National Socialism outside the Party. With Otto Strasser and Buchrucker, the former leader of the 'Black Reichswehr', he formed the 'Black Front', which, with headquarters in Prague, became the spearhead of the 'Nazi émigré' activities against Hitler. Later he went to China, where he became commander of Chiang Kai-shek's bodyguard. ('The Nemesis of Power: The Germany Army in Politics, 1918-1945', John Wheeler-Bennett, 1954, p. 227)

Stennes, who emerged as a top Soviet intelligence agent, did pretend on the overt level to be a Naz-Bol against communism:

Stennes himself worried openly about the possibility of losing rank-and-file SA men to the KPD; a key item in the curriculum in the political training he instituted for his storm troopers was a section on the question "What distinguishes us from the KPD?" ('The SA in the Radical Imagination of the Long Weimar Republic', Cambridge University Press, Vol. 46, Issue 2, Timothy Scott Brown, August 14, 2013)

Rather, Stennes's rhetoric was very typical of the Naz-Bol rhetoric:

Yet socialism and soldierly virtue were, in the event, synonymous. A self-justificatory essay published by Stennes shortly after the revolt reprinted an open letter to Hitler from an “anonymous SA man”—probably Stennes himself—that sought to link the fight against the party with National Socialism's fight against bourgeois corruption (the use of the “anonymous SA man” simultaneously attempted to achieve “rank-and-file” credibility while calling up associations of “unknown soldierhood”). (‘The SA in the Radical Imagination of the Long Weimar Republic’, Cambridge University Press, Vol. 46, Issue 2, Timothy Scott Brown, August 14, 2013)

Stennes's supporters in the Pomeranian SA took up a similar theme, accusing the NSDAP of leaving “the revolutionary course of true National Socialism” and becoming a reactionary “coalition party.” In portraying the revolt as a struggle against “the system,” the rebellion transformed bureaucratizing tendencies in the NSDAP into a synonym for the system against which National Socialism struggled. (‘The SA in the Radical Imagination of the Long Weimar Republic’, Cambridge University Press, Vol. 46, Issue 2, Timothy Scott Brown, August 14, 2013)

If there was little in all this of the socialism that the KPD and Otto Strasser (or, for that matter, worried conservative commentators) saw in the revolt, socialism was nevertheless key; it simply held a meaning that rendered it impervious to meddling by outside, “unsoldierly” elements. Socialism in the language of the SA was both a radical egalitarianism and a revolutionary intransigence that rejected compromise with the system; it was a synonym for soldierhood and self-sacrifice, where socialism equaled “comradeship” – a connection straight out of the postwar radical right's fantasy of a “trench community” or “socialism of the trenches.” Bonzentum, which represented both a rejection of egalitarianism and a betrayal of the party into alliances with reactionaries, as well as the primacy of “civilian” over “military,” of “female comfort” over “manly struggle,” was the opposite of socialism. (‘The SA in the Radical Imagination of the Long Weimar Republic’, Cambridge University Press, Vol. 46, Issue 2, Timothy Scott Brown, August 14, 2013)

Walter Stennes may or may not have been a crypto-communist but the ideology he was officially promoting was smuggling communism into Nazism. It really was a ‘beefsteak’ ideology – red in the inside, brown in the outside. The Stennes Rebellion unfortunately but also unsurprisingly failed, for the proletariat were not a large enough force in the semi-industrial Germany and the weakness of the proletariat was naturally reflected in the Nazi Party's factional conflicts as well.

After the ascendancy of the Nazis to power, the KPD focused ever more on intelligence penetration into the Nazi movement. The Strasserite-dominated Storm Troopers was the primary channel of infiltration by the communist-led Red Front Fighting League (RFB), the military force of the KPD:

Some Communists, however, joined [and infiltrated] the Nazi movement, especially members of the RFB, the Red Front Fighting League, which was shot through with gangsters. On the other hand, the underground CP organization was the most active underground movement. (THE FREE GERMANY MANIFESTO AND THE GERMAN PEOPLE, Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Branch of Research and Analysis (R&A#1033), Europe-Africa Division, Psychological Warfare Subdivision, Central European Section, August 6, 1943, p. 19)

In cities where the KPD had been strong before January 1933, surviving Communist functionaries were able to rebuild some of the party organization and continue their activity under cover. To an even greater extent than before 1933, the KPD continued to focus on its strategy of infiltration. The size of the Communist presence in the SA, SS, Nationalsozialistische Betriebszellenorganisation (National Socialist Factory Cell Organization, NSBO), and other Nazi organizations has, for obvious reasons, been difficult to quantify. As far as the SA is concerned, a significant portion of new recruits was known to have previously belonged to the KPD. Rudolf Diels, the first head of the Gestapo, estimated that in Berlin, seventy percent of new SA recruits after January 30 were former Communists. In some cases, wrote Diels, entire units of the RFB went over to the SA en masse. Peter Longerich has questioned Diels's frequently cited seventy-percent figure as exaggerated, and although he must certainly be right that the figure is too high, he appears himself to have erred in the other direction. According to Diels's subordinate Gisevius, at least a third of the post-1933 SA was made up of former Communists for whom “the popular phrase . . . was ‘Beefsteak Nazis’—Brown on the outside, red inside.” A leading functionary in the KPD's Red Sport organization gave a figure of twenty percent. The SA itself gave a figure of fifty-five percent. (‘The SA in the Radical Imagination of the Long Weimar Republic’, Cambridge University Press, Vol. 46, Issue 2, Timothy Scott Brown, August 14, 2013, pp. 263-264)

From the Reichstag Fire, which was Hitler's version of a 9/11, came the ‘draconian’ ‘security’ measures by the Nazis through which they increased their strength and brought about a showdown not just against the KPD but also against some of the Strasserites. Hitler's German intelligence chief Walter Schellenberg recalled:

Roehm's activities in setting up a private militia may have constituted a threat to the state.... (Hitler's Secret Service, Original title: The Labyrinth, Walther Schellenberg, Introduction by Alan Bullock, Translation by Louis Hagen, first published: 1956, pp. 23-24)

Hence, the Hitlerian regime initiated the Night of the Long Knives:

Hitler's orders let loose among his own followers that night. The moving force behind the scenes was the General Staff of the Wehrmacht. They had maneuvered Goering into forcing a showdown. Their purpose was the elimination of the more unreliable elements among the Nazis, in particular the radical wing led by Gregor Strasser, who took the socialist aspect of National Socialism too seriously. General Schleicher, however, who had preceded Hitler as Chancellor, was . . . shot on the express orders of Hitler himself because he knew too much of the shady financial transactions by means of which Hitler came to power. (Hitler's Secret Service, Original title: The Labyrinth, Walther Schellenberg, Introduction by Alan Bullock, Translation by Louis Hagen, first published: 1956, pp. 23-24)

During the Night of the Long Knives, the Hitler faction eliminated Strasserite agent Ernst Rohm and brought about a decline of Storm-Troopers (SA) while elevating the position of the SS.:

The handing over of the trade unions to Ley's Labor Front instead of to the NSBO; the elimination of Roehm; the decline of the SA, – all these are steps in the eradication of the so-called “socialist”, that is National Bolshevik wing of the Nazi Party. (THE FREE GERMANY MANIFESTO AND THE GERMAN PEOPLE, Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Branch of Research and Analysis (R&A#1033), Europe-Africa Division, Psychological Warfare Subdivision, Central European Section, August 6, 1943, p. 13)

The fascist Storm-Troopers participated in Nazi terror activities, but precisely thanks to the pervasive KPD and Soviet intelligence infiltration in it, rogue and anti-Nazi wrecker behaviour was pervasive in it, hence the Hitler gang's drive to weaken it.

Meanwhile, Stennes went to China and emerged as a prominent intelligence agent of the USSR. The Soviet support for the struggles of the Sun Yat-Sen movement had allowed for the continued presence of Soviet intelligence elements in the KMT ever after the campaign of bloody anti-communist terror launched by the Chiang Kai-Shek/Jiang Jieshi gang. Thanks to the continued Soviet influence in the KMT, Stennes had the lobbying power to quickly become an ‘advisor’ to Jiang Jieshi on intelligence matters. Nigel West, a prominent author on intelligence studies and a lecturer at the US intelligence organization ‘Center for Counter-Intelligence’, wrote in his encyclopedia of intelligence concerning China:

STENNES, WALTER. Formerly a leading Nazi in Germany and the Berlin commandant of the Sturmabteilung (SA), Walter Stennes was appointed a liaison officer with the Kuomintang (KMT) in 1934 and became Chiang Kai-shek's principal intelligence adviser. Born in 1895, Stennes fell out with Adolf Hitler in 1931 and made two unsuccessful attempts to remove him from power, which resulted in his own lengthy exile in Shanghai. (Historical Dictionary of Chinese Intelligence, Nigel West, I. C. Smith, 2012, p. 251)

Actually, even long before his death, Stennes's ties to Soviet intelligence were already well-documented. Otto Skorzeny mentioned Stennes's intelligence ties to Richard Sorge. As is well-known, Sorge was a journalist and an ostensible ‘intelligence agent’ of the German Embassy in Tokyo, while really being a double agent who actually served the Soviet intelligence service rather than the German intelligence.

In his position in the KMT, Stennes continued his anti-Nazi subversion, even though the KMT was backed by the same Anglo-American intelligence service that supported the Nazi efforts. Nazi Germany's intelligence chief Walter Schellenberg and extraterritorial special operations chief Otto Skorzeny both confirmed that Sorge had established contacts with Gregor Strasser, Otto Strasser, and Walter Stennes:

In the years between 1923 and 1928 he had been in touch with German Nationalist and extreme Right Wing circles, and also with the National Socialists. Thus the picture presented by the files was somewhat complicated. I could not agree at once with von Ritgen. In spite of Sorge's wide knowledge of China and Japan, and in spite of his collaboration with Professor Haushofer, the geopolitician, and the excellent articles he had published about internal affairs in Japan—von Ritgen thought them the best things that had been written about the social tensions in that country—there were some very suspicious factors against the man. For instance, his relations with Stennes, a high SA leader who had fled from Germany in 1934, and who had been in close contact with Gregor and Otto Strasser and other factions in the Party who were now considered pro-Russian. (Hitler's Secret Service, Original title: The Labyrinth, Walther Schellenberg, Introduction by Alan Bullock, Translation by Louis Hagen, first published: 1956, p. 167)

In Office VI of the SD they knew that Sorge had a relationship with Stennes, one of the senior SA chiefs, in 1933. Stennes was very much orientated toward the left and a friend of Gregor and Otto Strasser and had fled to China. It is curious that no one mentioned the close relationships between the various people, like Schleicher, Ott and his wife, Stennes, Zeller (of whom Schellenberg said nothing) and Sorge, although these connections were naturally very important and revealing. (My Commando Operations, Otto Skorzeny, 1975, p. 120)

Nigel West further wrote:

[Stennes] remained in China until 1949 and then returned to Germany where he died in 1989, and after his death, it was alleged that, while working for the KMT, he had also acted as a source for the NKVD, codenamed DRUG (friend), until 1952. According to a report published in Trud in March 2000, Stennes had been in contact with Richard Sorge in Shanghai and had warned Josef Stalin that the Nazis would attack the Soviet Union in May or June 1941. The KGB's official history confirmed that in 1941 Vasili Zarubin had been sent to Shanghai to make contact with Stennes. (Historical Dictionary of Chinese Intelligence, Nigel West, I. C. Smith, 2012, p. 251)

Note further that when speaking of Stennes, we are not speaking of merely one man but also the team of Stennes which continued to operate in the SA. Stennes had already established an intelligence corps in Germany, loyal to the crypto-anti-fascist objectives of Stennes. Strasser recalled:

Stennes, of course, had an intelligence corps covering Munich, and this sudden military activity was instantly reported to him. (Flight from Terror, Otto Strasser, 1943, p. 112)

The roots of Sorge went back to the Schleicherite network in Germany, which was allied to the Strasserite network.

As confirmed by US intelligence, Hans Zehrer was a supporter of General Schleicher and the alliance with the Strasserites against the Hitler faction of the Nazi Party:

At this phase of the Weimar era, Wirsing followed Zehrer in supporting General SCHLEICHER in the hope that he might organize a “third front” against Hitler with the aid of the Gregor Strasser wing of the Nazis. Wirsing has described, in private, a meeting which he and Zehrer had with Schleicher at the end of January 1933, just a few days before the Nazi takeover. Their purpose was to persuade Schleicher to use his authority in the Reichswehr to kidnap Reich President HINDENBURG in order to keep him from becoming a tool of the Nazis. According to Wirsing's account, Schleicher listened to all this with ill-disguised contempt and practically booted the young upstarts (Zehrer was 30 at the time, Wirsing 25) out of his office.

Before the end of 1933, Zehrer (whose wife was Jewish) gave up the editorship of TAT and Wirsing succeeded him, but the periodical went down hill and never recovered its influence. It finally ceased publication in 1937. Meanwhile, Wirsing had joined the staff of the “Muenchener Neusten Nachrichten,” of which he became deputy editor-in-chief in 1936, and chief editor 1939-1942.

(Dr. Giselher WIRSING and Christ und Welt: A Profile, From: American Consulate in Stuttgart, author: Paul R. Sweet, To: US Department of State, CIA, November 23, 1965, p. 2)

An American Historical Review paper published by the Oxford University Press stated:

In 1932 the Tat opted for a coup d'état to clear the stage for the emergence of the new elite. The notion of a "revolution from above" [not to be confused with the notion of the revolution from above in the USSR] had become increasingly popular in Right-wing circles after the collapse of the Weimar coalition in 1930. Zehrer and his friends placed their hopes in General Kurt von Schleicher to lead a version of this "revolution." First as "chief" of the army and then as Reichswehr Minister in Franz von Papen's cabinet, Schleicher had become deeply involved in the political intrigues of the last years of the republic. (Hans Zehrer as a Neoconservative Elite Theorist, The American Historical Review, Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the American Historical Association, Walter Struve, July 1965, Vol. 70, No. 4 (July 1965), p. 1055)

Zehrer promoted an eclectic mix of conservatism, the Pareto-inspired sociological theory of ‘elitism’, and socialist concepts:

An important date for Wirsing was 1929 when Hans ZEHREER became editor of the political periodical, the TAT. (...). Zehrer transformed the TAT almost overnight from a sleepy publication with a small circulation into a very influential periodical appealing to young intellectuals. Despite his youth, Wirsing while continuing his work at the Institute [for Social Science] in Heidelberg became one of the main writers for TAT.

Because of their role in helping [to] create a climate of opinion congenial to some form of German authoritarianism, the very small group of talented writers who wrote much of what went into the TAT has already received a good deal of attention.... Kurt SONTEHIMER, now professor at the Free University in Berlin, has written the best account of the TAT circle, and even the American Historical Review has published a lengthy article on Zehrer. (...).

Zehrer was 30 years old when he became editor of the TAT. He evidently had a good deal of influence on Wirsing in this period. In any case, both of them had developed similar methods of sociological analysis, formed in an intellectual atmosphere in which such writers as SPENGLER, Karl MANNHEIM, PARETO, and Carl SCMITT set the tone. Zehrer's basic conception was of German capitalism in crisis, and, most particularly, of a middle class in crisis. Renewal must come through a new amalgam of socialism and nationalism in which a neoconservative elite would provide solutions to the dilemma of the middle class. In the years 1929-32, under Zehrer's editorship, the TAT, in the words of Professor Sontheimer, was "the most interesting, the most active, and the most influential periodical in the fight against Versailles and Weimar, and it was at the same time the organ which stood closest to the ideology of the National Socialist Movement."

Wirsing's specialty during his first years with TAT was East Central Europe, the area of medium-sized states from Finland to the Aegean. He used the term *Zwischeneuropa* to describe the area. His first book, "Zwischeneuropa und die deutsch Zukunft," published in 1932, elaborated the view that Germany must shape its future by a new integrated relationship with these states of *Zwischeneuropa*. It should bring into existence a new order in Central Europe, a federalistic, anti-capitalistic, socialistic order which would take fully into account the agrarian social and economic structure of the Eastern part of Central Europe.

(Dr. Giseler WIRSING and Christ und Welt: A Profile, From: American Consulate in Stuttgart, author: Paul R. Sweet, To: US Department of State, CIA, November 23, 1965, pp. 1-2)

Regarding the statement of Dr. Sontheimer on the Tat being "the most interesting .. periodical in the fight against Versailles and Weimar, and ... at the same time the organ which stood closest to the ideology of the National Socialist Movement," it is worth clarifying that Zehrer's ideas are regarded by the historiographical consensus as having stood outside of the ideological range of the Nazi Party. Zehrer was not a Strasserite and certainly not a Hitlerian either. His eclectic mixture of right-wing and socialist ideas, however, did give some room for the comparison of his views with 'National-Socialism'. The term 'neoconservative elite' was used in the above quote to describe Zehrer's vision; it should be clarified that the term 'neoconservative' in the context of Zehrer's politics has a radically different meaning than the term 'neoconservative' in the context of the politics of America's neocons. These two kinds of neoconservatisms are separate and were not historically connected to each other. In the context of Germany in the 1920s and the 1930s, the term 'neoconservative' referred to the pro-Soviet and pro-communist conservative tendency described.

Quite significantly, the Tat circle, which had the support of the Schleicher faction, established ties with the Strasserites, concurrent with Schleicher's establishment of such ties:

In August 1932, **with some financial support from Reichswehr funds made available by Schleicher, the Tat circle expanded its journalistic activities by taking over the Tagliche Rundschau.** This small Berlin daily newspaper had been a voice of the German Nationalist Federation of Commercial Employees and the Christlich-sozialer Volksdienst, an organization founded in 1929 in part by dissidents from the German Nationalist party. (See Neumann, *Die deutschen Parteien*, 70-72.) Under Zehrer's editorship the Tagliche Rundschau assumed temporary importance as a semi-official interpreter of Schleicher's intentions. (For this phase of the Tat circle's activities, see Sontheimer, "Der Tat-Kreis," 248-51.) (Hans Zehrer as a Neoconservative Elite Theorist, *The American Historical Review*, Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the American Historical Association, Walter Struve, July 1965, Vol. 70, No. 4 (July 1965), p. 1056. Bold added.)

Intermittently, he drafted plans for a "third front" between the parties of the Left and those of the Right. Despite the vagueness of many of these plans, the Tat circle established ties with several prospective candidates for membership in it. Especially through Eschmann, the circle had since its inception been linked to the German Freischar, one of the youth groups most severely torn between political activism and withdrawal. By the middle of 1932 loose ties had also been established with some **Reichswehr circles, Otto Strasser's "Black Front," Gregor Strasser's "left wing" of the Nazi party,** the German Nationalist Federation of Commercial Employees (*Deutschnationaler Handlungsgehilfenverband*), and several less prominent organizations. (Hans Zehrer as a Neoconservative Elite Theorist, *The American Historical Review*, Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the American Historical Association, Walter Struve, July 1965, Vol. 70, No. 4 (July 1965), p. 1055. Bold added)

The paper further stated:

Early in 1932 the Tat established a close liaison with the general. Throughout the next year Zehrer pleaded with increasing fervor for the destruction of the republic by a coalition led by a "neutral" Chancellor with the support of the President, the army, and the ministerial bureaucracy. The hour of the intelligentsia would then have arrived. The "real revolution" would depend upon it. During the last hectic months of the republic there were some signs that Schleicher might be willing and able to piece together a 'third front.' The prospect of a split in the Nazi party heartened Zehrer. He hoped to obtain middle- and lower-class support from Gregor Strasser's wing of the party and from the major trade-unions. The Tat circle aided Schleicher's attempts to obtain a mass basis. His negotiations met with some success. Then both Strasser and the head of the Free Trade Unions failed to deliver the support that had been anticipated from them. The political leaders of the Social Democrats blocked the projected entente with the Free Trade Unions, and on December 8 Strasser resigned from his offices in the Nazi party without summoning his followers to join him. Although in the mean. time Schleicher had become Chancellor, the vision of a "third front" became a mirage. The Nazis survived the brief Schleicher cabinet with their party intact, and Hitler became Chancellor. (Hans Zehrer as a Neoconservative Elite Theorist, *The American Historical Review*, Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the American Historical Association, Walter Struve, July 1965, Vol. 70, No. 4 (July 1965), p. 1056)

To summarize, the ideology of Hans Zehrer was a mix of the right-wing elitist conservative ideas with doses of socialism and progressive ideas. Eclectic ideologies very often serve as a fertile ground for intelligence penetration. The eclectic mix of socialism and right-wing ideas in Germany contributed to Soviet intelligence efforts to establish cover in Nazi Germany. It assisted communist infiltration into the Nazi regime. It was Tagliche Rundschau editor Zehrer who linked Richard Sorge with Schleicher's group and Ott in particular. William Deakin, the high-ranking MI6 official who very extensively studied the case of Richard Sorge, wrote:

In June 1934, Schleicher was shot during the Rohm purges, as an act of personal revenge by the Nazi leadership. His protégé, Ott, had been posted in the previous year away from the perilous climate of the new German régime, and was sent as a military observer to Japan.

He was stationed in Nagoya, as special liaison officer with the 3rd 'Artillery Regiment. In May 1934, when Sorge met Ozaki at Nara, Ott was military attaché, having been appointed to this post in February, though still remaining at Nagoya. It will be recalled that in Berlin Dr. Zeller, of the Tagliche Rundschau, had given Sorge a letter of introduction to Ott. This letter, as we have noted in a previous chapter, described Sorge as 'completely trustworthy, both politically and personally'.

(The Case of Richard Sorge, William Deakin, Richard Storry, 1966, p. 138)

The Tagliche Rundschau had no such a person named 'Zeller' as editor-in-chief in the early 1930s. The name 'Zehrer' was misread as 'Zeller'. It is worth reminding that because the Japanese language does not really have the 'L' sound, the 'R' sound is used instead of the 'L' sound. For this reason, many of the authors who studied the Japanese documents on Sorge's case misread 'Zehrer', which sounded like 'Ze-re', as 'Zeller', which also sounded like 'Ze-re' in Japanese. Further describing the case of Richard Sorge, Otto Skorzeny wrote in his memoirs:

Sorge volunteered for service in the German Army in 1914 and was twice wounded. He completed his studies in political science at the University of Hamburg in 1920. By 1922 he had already become a specialist in agitation propaganda with the German Communist Party. Two years later he went to Moscow. Sorge attended courses at specialist schools until 1927. The Comintern agent became a specialist in the Red Army's 4th Office (intelligence). In 1929 he found him back in Germany. There is little doubt that he met the future wife of Eugen Ott, later an envoy of the Third Reich, in Munich at this time. She was then married to an architect and was said to hold radical leftist views. General Willoughby wrote: "Many assume that she was a member of the German Communist Party (KPD)."

Sorge was sent to Shanghai in 1930. Three years later he was recalled to Moscow by the 4th Office, which gave him his most important assignment, in Tokyo. Oddly enough Sorge first spent two months in Germany, where Hitler was now Reich Chancellor. He had to create another good cover. A Soviet female spy, Agnes Smedley, a correspondent with the Frankfurter Zeitung, recommended him to the newspaper, which sent him to Tokyo as a correspondent. But Sorge needed a contact with Oberstleutnant Eugen Ott, who had come to Tokyo as a military observer in 1942. But who was to give Sorge the introduction?: Dr. Zeller, editor of the Taglichen Rundschau. Zeller had such progressive views that his paper was banned at the end of 1933. He introduced Sorge to his friend Ott as "completely trustworthy, personally as well as politically."

This should make the historians suspicious, for we know that Oberstleutnant Ott had previously belonged to the staff of General von Schleicher. Following the failure of the political-military alliance with the extreme left planned by Chancellor von Schleicher at the end of 1933, Ott was sent to safety in Tokyo. I don't believe that it was chance that Sorge was recommended to Ott by Zeller as "completely trustworthy." It has been claimed that Sorge made his entire career as a secret agent as the result of a sentimental relationship with Frau Ott. (...). It was however Eugen Ott, quickly promoted to Oberst and named First Military Attache and later, in April 1936, German ambassador in Tokyo, who assisted Sorge during his entire career and thus eased his work as a spy.

(My Commando Operations, Otto Skorzeny, 1975, pp. 117-118)

Note that since the early 1930s, Eugen Ott had been a key agent linking Schleicher to the Strasser-Frick team against the Hitler-Goebbels-Goering gang:

At this conference, attended by the Big Five leaders, Goering, Goebbels, Strasser, Frick and Hitler, on December 1, there was considerable disagreement. Strasser, supported by Frick, urged at least Nazi toleration of a Schleicher government, though he himself preferred joining it. Goering and Goebbels argued strenuously against such a course and Hitler sided with them. Next day Hitler advised a certain Major Ott, whom Schleicher had sent to him, to counsel the General not to take the chancellorship, but it was too late. (Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany, William L. Shirer, 1960, p. 173)

It was obvious that Ott had knowingly assisted Sorge in these espionage operations although Ott later pretended to have been duped:

Eugen Ott in Tokyo, covered up or overlooked the spying activities and the treason of their subordinates (Dr. Sorge).

Oberst Ott had belonged to the staff of General von Schleicher, who was Reich Chancellor from December 2, 1932 to January 29, 1933. Schleicher, who had tried to talk the left wing of the national-socialist party (Strasser) into a joint move against Hitler with the communist labor unions in order to break up the party, was murdered on June 30, 1934 in the course of the countermeasures. It was also Schleicher who sent Ott to Tokyo as a "military observer" in 1933. He was named attache and later general and ambassador. His behavior in Japan concerning Dr. Sorge is inexplicable.

(My Commando Operations, Otto Skorzeny, 1975, p. 93)

Providing details of some of the intelligence activities of Sorge and the Schleicherite agent Eugen Ott, Skorzeny wrote:

Ramsey [i.e. Sorge's alleged codename] was not only accepted as a member of the Tokyo branch of the National-Socialist Party (October 1, 1934), but in 1939 the envoy officially made him his press chief. In autumn 1934 Sorge accompanied Ott on a trip through Manchuria. In 1936, with Sorge not yet an official member of the embassy staff, he encoded certain telegrams signed by Ott and addressed to Berlin! When he had to travel to Hong Kong to deliver microfilm to his Soviet agent leader, the new ambassador, the now General Ott, entrusted him with the secret diplomatic mail in which Ramsey was able to smuggle through all his documents intended for the 4th Office.

In 1938 the embassy entrusted him with the files on an important Soviet defector, General Lyushkov. At the time of the Tukhachevsky clearing operation Lyushkov passed important data on the Soviet military organization in Siberia and the Ukraine to the Japanese along with secret codes, the names of Stalin's main military foes in Siberia and so on. The Japanese informed Ott and Canaris at once sent Oberst Greiling to Tokyo to summarize Lyushkov's information in a memorandum. Sorge learned of this and informed Moscow of the most important details.

After Sorge's arrest on October 18, 1941, Ambassador Ott sent reports to Berlin in which he at first portrayed Ramsey as the innocent victim of the Japanese secret service and declared that Sorge had played only a subordinate role in the embassy. No one can seriously believe that Ott did not know who Sorge really was, but no one expressed this fact, which however did not escape the Japanese, clearly and acted accordingly.

Sorge was of course careful not to expose Ott, who was not replaced as ambassador in Tokyo, by Dr Heinrich Stahmer, until November 1943. Ott and his wife did not return to Germany, instead they went to Peking where they waited for the end of the war.

From April 1939 until October 14, 1941 Sorge's radio operator, Max Clausen, sent 65,421 words to the 4th Office via secret transmitter. Sorge also had at his disposal special couriers for his microfilm, and at the end his net had also established contact with the Russian embassy in Tokyo.

(My Commando Operations, Otto Skorzeny, 1975, pp. 118-119)

Contrary to the widespread allegations that the Soviets had allowed the Japanese to freely kill Sorge, the evidence shows – as confirmed by the new Nazi German ambassador to Tokyo, Stahmer – that the Soviets at least tried to, if not succeeded in, negotiating the exchange of Sorge with the Japanese fascist agents hunted down by the Soviets:

That Ozaki is dead is a fact. There is some doubt about Sorge, however. His arrest, his sentencing and especially his execution were aggravating moments for the Japanese in their negotiations with the Soviets. (...). In a report to Ribbentrop, the new German envoy Stahmer claimed that Sorge had been exchanged for a group of Japanese agents of the Kouan-Tong [i.e. Kwantung] Army then being held by the Russians. According to Hans Meissner (*The Man with Three Faces*, 1957), the exchange had taken place on Portuguese soil in Macao, to where Sorge had been taken by the Japanese General Doihara. (My Commando Operations, Otto Skorzeny, 1975, p. 121) During the intricate Japanese-Soviet negotiations to maintain Soviet neutrality in the Pacific War, which coincided in time with the detention of Sorge and his associates, it is probable that at some stage the Japanese prepared the exchange of Sorge for agents of the Kwantung Army caught in Siberia. The existence of such a move has been seriously hinted at on several occasions, particularly in German Embassy circles in Tokyo and even by Ambassador Stahmer himself [who replaced Ambassador Otto]. (...). Several Europeans later claimed that they saw Sorge alive in this Portuguese colony [Macao] at the time [in 1944-1945]. (The Case of Richard Sorge, William Deakin, Richard Storry, 1966, p. 330)

Back to Germany in the early 1930s.

The pro-Soviet ‘right-wingers’ Schleicher, Gregor Strasser and Roehm, in cooperation with the French imperialist intelligence service, which was by then allied to the Soviet Union, aimed to overthrow the Hitler faction which dominated the German government. At the behest of Hitler, they were all eliminated during the Night of the Long Knives.

In this midst, Otto Strasser was able to escape Germany and go to the French-influenced Czechoslovakia, which was also increasingly pro-Soviet. Once again, the role of the Strasserite agent Wilhelm Frick came into play. Frick, the Minister of Interior of the Hitlerian regime, was a spy for Otto Strasser as well and thus a traitor to the Hitler faction’s agenda. It was he who informed Gregor Strasser of the Hitlerian plot to assassinate the Strasser brothers, and thus saved Otto Strasser’s life so that the latter could go on to foment anti-Nazi subversion from abroad. Otto Strasser in his memoirs recalled:

She pulled a letter from the pocket of her apron and I immediately recognized Gregor's script. Tearing it open quickly, I read a warning from Gregor to flee for my life. He had just met Minister Frick, he said, who told him that Goering was sending out two death squads to murder me, and that the Gestapo had somehow found out just where I was in Chiem-see. The waiting chasseur, he added, could be completely trusted; I was to use the car in making my escape, without wasting a moment. (Flight from Terror, Otto Strasser, 1943, p. 159)

The existence of class struggles in Germany as a country was reflected in the existence of class struggles in the German state. The Nazi German state was not a monolith and was infiltrated at its high ranks. Thanks to the significant pressure of the German proletariat in Germany’s industrial north, Wilhelm Frick, the Black Front spy, managed to continue to foment anti-Hitlerian subversion even when it was known by the Nazis that he was an anti-Hitlerian subversive.

As is known, the ‘Enabling Act’ was the official term for what one would refer to as the ‘Hitler Shall be Dictator’ Act. Resultant from the Hitler gang’s false flag terror operation in the Reichstag Fire, it enabled Hitler to rule without accountability to the laws of the state and turn Germany into its ‘state of emergency’ in order to ‘restore’ ‘order’ ‘against’ terrorism. It was the major step that legalized the Nazi dictatorship. Wilhelm Frick, on the other hand, was actively working to undo the Enabling Act, and the high-ranking members of the Hitler faction were aware of this.

The balance of power in the class warfare was manifested in the configuration of power positions. The fascist faction strongly dominated the German regime apparatus, and thus was entrenched in the armed forces. The fact that Wilhelm Frick, the top oppositionist in the Nazi regime, held the leadership of the Ministry of Interior, a comparably weaker intelligence service, and did not lead the German military, evidently demonstrates the relative weakness of the hold of the Strasserite agents of the proletariat in the Nazi regime. Furthermore, the fact that primarily the SS and secondarily the Wehrmacht held higher statuses than the SA further shows that the proletariat did not have as strong an influence in the Nazi regime’s armed forces, as fascist finance capital and its allied parasitic classes did. Thirdly, whereas the Ministry of Interior and the SA were hubs for communist agents and Strasserite dissidents, the Abwehr and the German Foreign Office were major hubs for the MI6 agents. The MI6 and the Soviets both had some influence in the Wehrmacht too, though the fascists retained dominance over the Wehrmacht throughout. For a long time, since the MI6 supported the Hitler faction, the latter exercised high influence in his regime. However, by 1941, when the MI6 strongholds Abwehr and German Foreign Office began to support the pro-Soviet elements, there came a sharp cut in the Hitlerian faction’s level of control over the Nazi regime though the Hitler faction still retained an overall strong dominance over the German regime apparatus.

With his tenure as a senior fellow at the Centre for Advanced Holocaust Studies in the prestigious United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM), Peter Longerich, the prominent Holocaust scholar, wrote a major book on Heinrich Himmler and his power struggles. In it, he described the conflict between the Hitler-Himmler faction with the Frick faction in the Interior Ministry over the question of ‘Enabling’ the dictatorial rule of the Hitler clique. In the early 1930s, when the elimination of Schleicher and Ernst Rohm along with the decline of the communist-infiltrated Strasserite ‘Storm-Troopers’ (SA) occurred, the Hitler faction saw an increase in its leverage and lobbying power. However, it was still challenged by the Strasserite spy Wilhelm Frick:

Himmler’s position was still not unchallenged, however. Frick continued to hold the view that the new instruments of repression, which the so-called Third Reich had created and transferred to Himmler—the autonomous Gestapo, the concentration camps that had been subordinated to it immediately after 30 June [1934], as well as the practice of protective custody – were merely temporary phenomena which, after a general normalization of the situation had occurred, should once again be strictly subordinated to the state administration. Coming immediately after the emasculation of the SA, however, the timing for a move against this emerging concentration of power in Himmler’s hands was exceptionally unfavourable, and Goring soon put an end to it. When Frick instructed the state governments no longer to cooperate with ‘unofficial persons’, that is to say, the SD, Goring immediately and brusquely rejected this as far as the sphere of the Gestapo was concerned, in other words for Prussia, and in doing so referred explicitly to the events of 30 June. Himmler responded more cautiously and cooperatively. He issued an order restricting the cooperation of the SD with the Gestapo to the passing on of information. Moreover, the SD was forbidden to perform executive functions.

(Heinrich Himmler: A Life, Peter Longerich, 2007)

Frick was aiming to prevent the expanded influence of the Hitler faction over the security and intelligence apparatus. Again, owing to the historical-material situation in Germany and the dramatic outnumbering of the proletariat by the imperialist-minded petit-bourgeoisie and the dramatic overpowering of the proletariat by German finance capital, British finance capital, the feudal lords and the bureaucrats, the Frick faction did not succeed in rolling back the Hitler faction, but did succeed in slowing it down. In order to strengthen the power of the corrupt bureaucrats, the class enemies of the proletariat and the allies of British and German finance capital, Hitler's henchman Goring made a move against the Frick faction. Goring promoted the decentralization of the police, because decentralization and 'autonomy' would render difficult the surveillance over the many smaller local bureaus and would reduce coordination between the local bureaus, thus creating an environment that allows the corrupt bureaucrats to thrive (for more information, see C1S6). As finance capital is allied to such a parasitic class as the corrupt bureaucratic class, the Hitler faction aimed to entrench them so to entrench finance capital's ally at the expense of the influence of the bureaucrats' class foes, the proletariat. The increased influence of the corrupt bureaucrats could reduce the influence of the proletariat over the police, and hence reduce the influence of the Strasserite infiltrators' class base. Longerich wrote:

Goring, for his part, began a move against Frick. In a message to the heads of the Stapo offices, the provincial governors, and district governors of 6 July 1934 he emphasized that the Gestapo was to remain 'an autonomous part of the internal administration' that he considered 'of great importance for the stability of the new state'. The heads of the Gestapo offices should operate closely with the district governors, but obey their directives only if there were no instructions to the contrary from the Gestapo or from him. Frick, acting in his capacity as Reich Interior Minister, then responded by ordering that all state governments, as well as all provincial governors and district governors in Prussia, should send in monthly reports on the political situation, since the creation of a 'special political police' had by no means absolved them of their political responsibilities. Goring conceded the point, and a few days later Frick too backed-pedalled. He agreed to Goring's regulation of 6 July, since the latter had explained to him that it was a temporary measure. (Heinrich Himmler: A Life, Peter Longerich, 2007)

In this decentralization and increased power for the bureaucrats, Goring was backed by Hitler:

Following massive protests by the Reich Governors about their right of appeal to the Führer, Frick had to be content with a gloss by Hitler which in practice completely undermined Frick's authority. It was now stated that, although generally subordinated to Frick, 'an exception must be made for those cases which are concerned with questions of special political importance. In the view of the Reich Chancellor, such a regulation is consistent with his position of leadership'. Frick's patiently devised schemes for Reich reform, aimed at introducing a centralized and rational system of authority, based on a Reich Constitution instead of the Enabling Act, went much the same way and were finally abandoned in the middle of the war, as were plans to introduce a senate to assist the Führer and to elect his successor. (The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation, Ian Kershaw, 1985)

The Frick faction tried to prevent protective custody. In the context of Nazi Germany, 'protective custody' was basically the legalistic term for arbitrary detention of individuals, in this case by Himmler and the SS. For example, for the year 1935, Longerich described the situation as follows:

Even after Himmler's takeover of the Gestapo, Frick continued to try to restrict the arbitrary handling of protective custody. In a letter to the Bavarian state government of 30 January 1935 the Reich Interior Minister complained about the large number of prisoners in protective custody in Bavaria, and emphasized the responsibility of the Bavarian Interior Minister, Adolf Wagner, for these events. Frick demanded that Wagner should continually scrutinize these cases of protective custody, as was the case in Prussia. On 20 February Himmler, who was brought in by Wagner, then secured a decision by the Führer which he minuted in the margin of Frick's letter of complaint: 'The prisoners are to remain in custody.'

From the beginning of 1935 onwards, however, there was an increasing number of civil actions and investigations concerning cases of mistreatment in concentration camps. According to Hans Gisevius, who at the time was a member of the police department in the Reich Interior Ministry, in the spring of 1935 Frick selected one of the most striking cases, namely, of a Nazi functionary who had been arrested for criticizing the conditions in the Papenburg concentration camp. According to Gisevius, Frick demanded that Himmler should order the immediate release of this man, and said that if the same thing happened again he would begin an action against Himmler for wrongful detention. But his threat proved completely ineffective

(Heinrich Himmler: A Life, Peter Longerich, 2007, p. 191)

Against the will of Hitler, Frick tried to expand his faction's influence over the Nazi German security but was pushed back by the Hitler faction which promoted Hitler's henchman Himmler:

Only a few days later, on 21 October 1935, Hitler rejected Frick's proposal to take over the Reich Security Service, in other words, the small special unit responsible for the personal protection of the dictator and senior politicians of the regime. Hitler informed Frick that Himmler was formally responsible for the Reich Security Service; but in fact Hitler was himself in command, and in particular retained for himself the selection of its personnel. Frick's move could thus be interpreted as an attempt to restrict the dictator's room for manoeuvre in a sensitive area, an exceptionally clumsy one, given his ambitions vis-à-vis the police. (Heinrich Himmler: A Life, Peter Longerich, 2007)

In all regimes, even in tyrannies, whoso owns a higher share of the means of violence has more voting rights in the decision-making, much like in a private corporation. In the year 1935, with the expanded backing of the British intelligence service, and the expansion of Nazi Germany's military capabilities, the Hitler faction saw a greater leverage thanks to its expanded military. The Hitlerite armed forces composed a much larger percentage of the means of violence in Germany than did the Storm-Troopers and Frick agents in the regime intelligence. The greater military strength of the Hitlerites laid more weight behind their will, just as how buying greater shares of a corporation makes one's vote count more. It allowed Hitler and his henchmen to reduce the influence of the Strasserite faction. By 1936, the influence of Frick, who was the Interior Minister and was in charge of the police, reduced. By contrast, the influence of Himmler and the SS over the police dramatically expanded:

On 17 June 1936 Hitler finally appointed Himmler 'Reichsführer-SS and Chief of the German Police within the Reich Ministry of the Interior'. The formula 'within the Reich Ministry of the Interior' proved in practice to be just as meaningless as the statement in the same law that Himmler was 'personally and directly' subordinate to the Reich Interior Minister. What was decisive was the fact that Frick had proved unable to integrate Himmler effectively into his ministry. In fact the opposite occurred; Himmler removed the police from the internal administration and took over the responsibility for it himself. What proved decisive was the linking together of the police and the SS. As Reichsführer-SS, Himmler was already directly subordinate to Hitler and, therefore, could always receive his

orders directly from his 'Führer'. As Chief of the German Police, Himmler carefully evaded the Reich Interior Ministry by immediately creating two new Main Departments: the Security Police, comprising the Gestapo and the Criminal Police (Kripo) under Heydrich, and the Order Police under Daluge. These were hybrid organizations that anticipated the intended amalgamation of SS and police. (Heinrich Himmler: A Life, Peter Longrich, 2007)

The Hitler-Himmler group took further action to reduce the influence of Wilhelm Frick faction in the German police and the Interior Ministry by striving to render the police further into a militaristic force, especially of the terrorist type:

Himmler recommended the model of a soldierly civil service for the whole of the German police force. It would be 'given more and more training—and that will be the work of generations—and one day will share the spirit of the SS, an uncivil service-like and unsoldierly organization, that has been created in the spirit of an order based on blood and promoting family inheritance and which must develop over centuries, even millennia'.

In March 1937 Himmler once more expressed his views about the tasks of the police in public. The occasion was a publication to mark the sixtieth birthday of Interior Minister Frick, Himmler's main opponent in his takeover of the police. Himmler used his article to stress once more, contrary to the views of Frick, who was rightly called by his biographer the 'legalist of the unjust state', that as a matter of principle the activities of the police could not be described or restricted by law.

(Heinrich Himmler: A Life, Peter Longrich, 2007, p. 206)

Note that the further 'militarization' of the police into a terror force came along with the decentralization of the police. There was no contradiction in this move. Decentralization means bureaucratization, and the rise of the parasitic class in an institution. The bureaucrats aimed to militarize the police into a terror force. Hence, there was no dialectical contradiction in the decentralization and militarization of the police. Democratization and economic centralization are always correlated. The parallels to this are numerous. In the CPSU, one of Trotsky's membership bases was among the careerist Party members and corrupt bureaucrats. Trotsky advocated the decentralization of the Party and an end to democratic centralism so to strengthen the bureaucrats. That same Trotsky supported authoritarian behaviour and terrorism. By no means the sole historical example, the Pinochet Junta was the nonetheless the most infamous and one of the most extreme cases of anti-democratic de-centralism.

The compositional proletarianization of a significant part of the Nazi Party would have inevitably generated in that organization an anti-chauvinist and proletarian internationalist tendency disguised as anti-proletarian and German chauvinist. This was for the most part manifested in the Strasserite rhetoric. As the US intelligence reported, the Nazi Party's Gregor Strasser wing, into which Goebbels had infiltrated,:

attacked Rosenberg's anti-Russian and anti-Semitic conceptions. (...) These views were supported by Gregor Strasser's brother, Otto Strasser, and by Count Reventlow, who belonged to the Deutsch Voelkische Freiheitspartei which had formed an alliance with the Nazi Party in March 1923.

(THE FREE GERMANY MANIFESTO AND THE GERMAN PEOPLE, Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Branch of Research and Analysis (R&A#1033), Europe-Africa Division, Psychological Warfare Subdivision, Central European Section, August 6, 1943, p. 12)

The Strasserites had an overtly anti-Semitic rhetoric, but there is evidence that their anti-Semitism did not bear as much of a material reality as that of the Hitlerites. Never mind that Otto Strasser was accused of being a 'Jew' by Hitler:

'An intellectual white Jew, totally incapable of organization, a Marxist of the purest ilk', was [Hitler's] withering assessment of Otto Strasser. (Hitler 1989-1936: Hubris, Ian Kershaw, p. III)

Moreover, the Black Front led by Otto Strasser, with which Gregor Strasser had a covert alliance, openly had Yiddish members in it. The Strasserite 'Black Front' accepted Yiddish individual, even 'elite' Yiddish individuals like doctors, as members:

Franzensbad was a favorite spot for our meetings, not only because of its convenience of access, but because a Black Frontier there, a Jewish doctor, had thrown open his sanitarium to us. I might add that Franzensbad was famous for its fertility baths, a fact that made it a women's resort with a constantly changing patronage, which added to our security from detection. (Flight from Terror, Otto Strasser, 1943, p. 202)

The 'Survey' Magazine, which was funded by the CIA's Congress for Cultural Freedom and was led by the Zionist activist Walter Laqueur, described a case of a Schleicherite pro-communist German conservative named Otto Hoetzsch, and his Strasserite assistant Klaus Mehnert, whose Society (as in: club) had Yiddish members. With the ascendancy of the Nazis to power, the Schleicherites pro-Soviet conservatives, in order to stay in the academia, had little choice other than to appear to 'blend' with the Nazi regime, and so the Yiddish members of the society ceased to be members. Nonetheless, confirmed Walter Laqueur, the Society continued to retain its Schleicherite progressive conservative character and was thus purged by the Nazi regime:

In Germany, Professor Otto Hoetzsch and East European studies were more or less synonymous in the public mind, for the editor of Osteuropa — the journal of the German Society for the study of Eastern Europe — was by far the most active and influential of German expats on the USSR. Unlike most professors, he combined academic teaching with a political career, journalism, and much public speaking. As a pro-Russian conservative he had little sympathy for Hitler's movement and none at all for the anti-Russian ideology of the Nazis. Klaus Mehnert, his assistant, who had made a name for himself with a well-received book on the younger generation in Russia was at that time a sympathiser of Otto Strasser's Black Front. Members the Society, and contributors to its journal, included Jews, and what the Nazis loosely called liberals. Yet Professor Hoetzsch, like most German intellectuals, found in 1933 that there was no point in actively resisting the national revival as he called it in one of his writings. The Jewish and liberal collaborators were gradually dropped, but otherwise the character of the Society and the journal changed little after January 1933. Hoetzsch and his colleagues made ritual obeisance to the new regime, observing that in the new Reich German Eastern policy would of even greater importance than before. But they were not to escape so lightly. Their activities had long been an irritant to the Nazis in charge of anti-bolshevik propaganda, who felt that the time was now ripe for getting rid of these 'crypto-communists' permanently. The attack was on various levels. A junior employee of the Anti-Komintern denounced the Society to the Gestapo as a hotbed of pro-bolshevik activity.' (SURVEY: A Journal of Soviet and East European Studies, No. 46, Walter Laqueur, January 1963, p. 148)

According to US intelligence, Mehnert, the Strasserite Black Front journalist, had traveled to Moscow in 1934 as a correspondent, but got into trouble with the Gestapo because of his Strasserite-Soviet connections and thus had to move to the United States:

Wirsing's acquaintance with him goes back to the early 1930's. At the time Mehnert was editor of the magazine "Osteuropa." Wirsing say she was responsible for sending Mehnert to Moscow in 1934 as a correspondent. Mehnert then, according to Wirsing, fell into difficulties with the Gestapo, as a result of which he decided to go to the United States. he lived in the United States and in Hawaii from

1936 to 19941. In this period he remained in touch with Wirsing. (Dr. Giselher WIRSING and Christ und Welt: A Profile, From: American Consulate in Stuttgart, author: Paul R. Sweet, To: US Department of State, CIA, November 23, 1965, p. 4)

Mehnert falling into trouble with the Gestapo may be explained, perhaps, by this remark made by Heydrich to Schellenberg:

There are still some 'Black Front' characters here in Germany, too, working pretty closely with émigré circles from Moscow, but they take the 'National Bolshevism' line. (Hitler's Secret Service, Original title: The Labyrinth, Walther Schellenberg, Introduction by Alan Bullock, Translation by Louis Hagen, first published: 1956, p. 173)

Against the Nazi tide, the KPD adopted the concept of the "People's Revolution" in order to have the KPD proletarians to take leadership of the petit-bourgeoisie. The KPD was not to render its membership composition into that of a predominantly petit-bourgeoisie party, but it sure was to increase efforts to have the KPD proletariat take leadership of and appeal more to the petit-bourgeoisie who supported the Hitler group:

the growing electoral success of the NSDAP from the end of the 1920s, and the national visibility achieved by the Nazis through the campaign against the Young Plan in 1929, forced the KPD to begin taking the Nazi threat more seriously. Aware of the NSDAP's success in mobilising cross-class support by exploiting opposition to the Treaty of Versailles, the KPD tried to stake out nationalist territory for itself, a manoeuvre it had attempted once before with the 'Schlageter line' of the early 1920s. The centerpiece of this 'second wave' of KPD nationalism was the 'Programme for the National and Social Liberation of the German People', unveiled during the campaign for the Reichstag elections of September 1930. Promising to 'tear up' the Treaty of Versailles and to destroy all other obstacles to Germany's national self-determination, the programme forcefully argued that the KPD, not the NSDAP, was the true representative of Germany's national interests. This strategic amendment to the idea of proletarian internationalism - representing nothing less than the adoption of all the main demands of the radical right by the KPD - was followed by the policy of 'Volksrevolution' ('People's Revolution'), a line for which Ernst Thälmann successfully argued at the eleventh plenum of the EKKI in Moscow in March 1931. The concept of 'Volksrevolution' was an attempt to extend Communist influence to those groups with which the Nazis were enjoying the greatest electoral success and the Communists the least: rural voters, white-collar employees and civil servants. It had the two-fold aim of winning the middle class for communism while preventing further Nazi inroads into the working class, a KPD concern from the early 1920s. ('Richard Scheringer, the KPD and the Politics of Class and Nation in Germany, 1922-1965', Cambridge University Press, Contemporary European History, August 2005, Vol. 14, No. 3, Timothy S. Brown, August 2005, pp. 326-327)

It has at times been incorrectly stated that the concept of the People's Revolution was opposed by Ernst Thälmann. Not true. In a speech to the Central Committee of the KPD, Thälmann said:

The people's revolution as the main strategic slogan thus means not only a popular formulation for the concept of socialist proletarian revolution, but at the same time also a greater involvement of the broad middle [strata] in the present situation in the revolutionary class front. The obligation arises for us to tackle this involvement of the toiling people with determined initiative. This applies to the small and medium-sized farmers, to the urban middle class and last but not least to the work among the civil servants and employees. (The People's Revolution in Germany: Speech by Comrade Ernst Thälmann at the plenum of the Central Committee of the KPD, January 15-17, 1931. In: 'Ernst Thälmann Speeches and Essays on the History of the German Labor Movement: Vol. 3: Selection from the years September 1930 to February 1932', Based on the volume 1 edition published by Rote Fahne, 1975)

What Ernst Thälmann opposed, and rightly so, was the smuggling of 'National-Bolshevik' ideas into the communist party, for the smuggling of eclectic ideas into the communist movement damages it.

Many seem to fundamentally misunderstand the nature of eclectic tendencies that mix reactionary and progressive ideas. Such eclecticism is like a bomb. The question is not so much whether the very existence of bombs is reactionary or progressive; rather the real question is against whom the bomb shall be launched and against whom the bomb shall not be. The question is not so much whether such eclecticism should exist at all, but rather against which tendencies such eclectic ideas shall be used. An eclectic ideology that mixes a progressive idea with a reactionary idea would be progressive when launched against a reactionary movement, and would be reactionary when launched against a progressive movement. Promoting 'National Bolshevik' ('Naz-Bol') and 'Strasserite' ideas among communists leads to the corrupting of the communist movement and the deviation of the communists to the right; promoting 'National Bolshevik' and 'Strasserite' ideas among the Nazis leads to the deviation of the Nazis away from Nazism and in favor of covert intelligence cooperation with the communist and progressive forces against Nazism and fascism in general. Of course, that is not to imply that a particular 'National Bolshevik' or 'Strasserite' who is genuinely anti-Nazi, would suddenly become an anti-communist when surrounded by communist friends; nor is that to imply that a 'National Bolshevik' or 'Strasserite' who is genuinely anti-communist, would become an anti-Nazi when surrounded by his/her Nazi friends. Rather, it is to point out that the idea of Strasserism/National-Bolshevism would cause right-deviations among communists if promoted and agitated among communists and would produce a favorable outcome when promoted and agitated among the Nazis. The right-opportunist agents of fascism seek to corrupt the communist movement by promoting Naz-Bol ideas among the communists, whereas the left-opportunist agents of fascism denounce as 'Nazi-collaborationist' the promotion of the 'National Bolshevik' and 'Strasserite' tendency among the Nazis. Beware of both the left-opportunist and right-opportunist trends which together constitute a fascist pincer assault against the freedom forces.

The origin of this eclecticism is rooted in the mix of the class composition. The Nazi Party was a terrorist organization supported electorally and membership-wise by the fascism-beguiled petit-bourgeoisie. The penetration of a proletarian tendency inside such a movement of fascism-beguiled petit-bourgeois foot-soldiers could not possibly be in the form of communism but rather in the form of the mix of communist and fascist ideas. The Strasser brothers themselves were Bavarians who had spent significant parts of their political 'careers' in the predominantly proletarian parts of Germany.

The Naz-Bol trend in the KPD, represented by Heinz Neumann and Ruth Fischer, was a kind of a Naz-Bol trend unlike that of Strasser and Stennes. This Neumannite Naz-Bol trend represented the infiltration of the Nazi tendency into the communist movement rather than the infiltration of communist ideological tendency. The Neumannites advocated treasonous collaboration with the Nazi Party and lobbied the KPD, against the will of the Thälmann faction, into assisting the Nazi Party on:

the Referendum in the summer of 1931 for the dissolution of the Prussian Diet with the aim of overthrowing the social democratic government of Braun and Severing. Though the Communist Party originally opposed the initiative sponsored by Nazis, Nationalists,

and the Steel Helmet, Heinz Neumann succeeded in bringing the Communist Party behind the National opposition. Remmele, his second in command, supported Neumann. Thaelmann against his better insight was compelled to defend the Inglorious Referendum.

Only in October 1932 did the Thaelmann group begin to attack the [Neumannite] National Bolshevist line....

(THE FREE GERMANY MANIFESTO AND THE GERMAN PEOPLE, Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Branch of Research and Analysis (R&A#1033), Europe-Africa Division, Psychological Warfare Subdivision, Central European Section, August 6, 1943, p. 10)

Years later, during the Great Purge, the Neumannites were duly annihilated:

The Russians have killed almost all the advocates of this National Bolshevist line – Heinz Neumann, Remynele, Max Hoelz – and have thus shown, from 1933 to 1941, to have definitely rejected the National Bolshevist theory. (THE FREE GERMANY MANIFESTO AND THE GERMAN PEOPLE, Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Branch of Research and Analysis (R&A#1033), Europe-Africa Division, Psychological Warfare Subdivision, Central European Section, August 6, 1943, p. 11)

The differing approaches of the Soviets towards the Strasserites vs. the Neumannites is rooted directly in the issue of National-Bolshevism as communist infiltration into Nazism vs. National-Bolshevism as Nazi infiltration into communism.

Even if the crypto-progressive ideas of the Strasserite agents of the Soviet-KPD intelligence services were to be promoted inside the KPD, that would have had a very toxic influence over the communist movement no matter how positive the intention of these Strasserite agents of the KPD and Soviet intelligence were, for the increase in the influence of 'Nazism + Communism' in the communist movement inevitably pulls the communist movement towards Nazi deviations. And in spite of the fact that Neumann and his gang were agents of the Nazis, the propagation of their ideas within the Nazi Party would have had the positive effect of undermining the Nazi movement no matter how pro-Nazi the intentions of the Neumann gang indeed were. It follows that Naz-Bol ideas should not be promoted among communist or socialistic circles but should be promoted in fascist networks as a Trojan Horse for socialist anti-fascist subversion and for hijacking of fascist terror organizations.

Owing to the petit-bourgeois composition of some of such fascist movements, there may exist vacillations in favour of fascism by some of those 'fascism + communism' eclectics who sincerely believe in those socialist concepts. Some of them might be sincere eclectics who really do swing, in the style of the petit-bourgeoisie, to both communist anti-fascist and fascist anti-communist sides in different settings, instead of consistently fitting into either of the categories of (1) crypto-fascist pseudo-communists, or (2) crypto-communist pseudo-fascists. And these petit-bourgeois vacillators can sting. They can build trust because they would be sincere and vigorous in promoting some progressive stances against reaction, but at some point they will hit the progressive forces in the back also vigorously, for they genuinely would believe in their reactionary doctrines along with their progressive views. They could genuinely believe that they are advancing the good of humanity, while still stabbing the freedom forces in the back. Like some religious people, they could appear sane and mentally 'normal' while still being anti-logically invalid or philosophically self-contradictory. And many petit-bourgeois agents are religiously fanatical anyways, defying the basics of logic and reason while still somehow managing to be broadly 'sane'.

The influence of eclectic currents and their role in intelligence penetration can as well be observed in the case of Japan. In Japan, Richard Sorge gained influence over a circle of progressive pseudo-fascist Japanese politicians centered around Prime Minister Konoye:

[Sorge] employed at least 30 Japanese. His most important agent was Ozaki Hozumi, advisor and close friend of Prince Konoje, minister president in the years 1937-1939 and 1940-1941. (My Commando Operations, Otto Skorzeny, 1975, p. 119)

Describing the personality of Konoye, the prominent MI6 official William Deakin wrote:

Konoye had declined to be Premier after the February Mutiny. This increased, if anything, the popular desire that he should take office. He was a general favourite, for several reasons. The army hoped to use him as a respected figurehead.... Liberals thought he would be some kind of bulwark against fascism. The general public thought of him, since he belonged to the most exalted branch of the ancient Fujiwara house, as disinterested [in personal power], free from ambition and therefore a refreshing contrast to the generals, admirals, party politicians and bureaucrats who had held Premiership over the previous ten years. Moreover he was still relatively young. He was forty-six in 1937. His friends and admirers included people of nearly every shade of opinion – from conservatives ... to socialist intellectuals. (The Case of Richard Sorge, William Deakin, Richard Storry, 1966, p. 191)

Konoye was affiliated with the Showa Research Society, a think tank that was under the influence of the communists and fought for the democratization of Japan. Of course, it could not be so explicitly pro-democracy and pro-communist; it therefore presented itself as a supporter of the Empire of Japan, the Japanese monarchy, and the Japanese fascist army and navy, so to infiltrate the Japanese fascist apparatus, stab the Japanese fascists in the back, and eventually transition Japan towards a progressive democracy:

But of more importance, at this period, was Ozaki's association with the Chief Secretary to the Konoye Cabinet, Kazami Akira. Ozaki had come to know Kazami through an organization known as Showa Research Society (Showa Kenkyukai), which was substantially endowed and had its own premises and administrative staff. It was founded in November 1936, by friends and admirers of Prince Konoye. Their general purpose was to study, and recommend action on, problems of Japan's domestic and foreign policy, so that Konoye would have a body of unofficial but instructed opinion to consult when the time came – as his friends believed was inevitable – for him to accept the office of Prime Minister. (...). The majority of the members of the Showa Research Society, which included some of the best minds in Japan, could be described as having a broadly liberal outlook. (...). As patriotic Japanese they esteemed the monarchy and had an instinctive regard for the army and navy. They had developed a certain contempt for many, if not most, of the party politicians. But they feared and resented the overbearing pressures exercised by the two services [i.e. navy and army], especially the army. They were in fact frightened men. It was now both futile and unsafe to overtly oppose the army and its demands. Prudence seemed to dictate a feigned compliance with the drift towards totalitarianism at home and military aggression abroad. Only by this means could the leaders of the Japanese Army be guided back – somehow, some time – to the path of moderation and common sense. This was an illusion cherished, notably, by Konoye himself. (The Case of Richard Sorge, William Deakin, Richard Storry, 1966, pp. 191-192)

Other members of the Showa Research Society were communistic:

Some members of the Showa Research Society were nationalists; others were socialists, non-Marxist and Marxist. (The Case of Richard Sorge, William Deakin, Richard Storry, 1966, p. 192)

It was of course impossible for these communists to be openly such, because the regime banned communism. This means that the Showa Research Society operated similar to a communist-influenced anti-fascist popular front infiltrating a fascist regime. Precisely thanks to its eclectic character – on the one hand ostensibly 'supportive' of Japanese fascism and on other hand smuggling undercover pro-democracy policies – the communist-influenced Showa Research Society became a pool of espionage for the communist tendency.

The Konoye faction derived its lobbying power from the proletariat and it was Japan's industrial proletariat that catapulted a dissident like him into the high ranks of the regime. Konoye, the Prime Minister of the Empire of Japan, opposed the fascist Tojo faction and opposed the Japanese monarchy. He aimed to strip the Imperial Family from their political powers, and to try the war criminal members of the royal family. He aimed to crackdown on the bureaucrats standing in the way of democratic reform. Behind the scenes, he tried to render the Japanese foreign policy more dovish towards the USSR and its allies, although outwardly he paid lip service to regime rhetoric.

The decline of the Sorge network occurred as a result of the temporary tactical decline of the Soviet Union as a result of Operation BARBAROSSA. The Nazi German invasion tactically decimated the Soviet Union, and bogged down its resources onto protecting itself against the invasion. The reallocation of resources onto further strengthening its defenses against the Nazi invasion reduced its funds for protecting the Soviet-backed elements in Nazi Germany and fascist Japan. At the same time, the weakening of the USSR for that time period also increased the relative amount of resources possessed by Japan vis-à-vis the Soviets, a fact which increased Japanese imperial leverage power and lobbying power against the Soviet-backed faction. The result was the hunt-down of Sorge's network, the elimination of Ozaki, and the jeopardizing of Japanese Prime Minister Konoye's career for that time period:

Sorge transmitted several more radio messages, the last after a conversation with Clausen and Ozaki on October 4, 1941. After eight years of extremely successful activity as a spy in Tokyo he considered his mission ended and feared being discovered. On October 13 Miyagi, a member of his group, failed to appear at the agreed-upon meeting place: he had been arrested. Sorge had to become more cautious. On October 15 radio operator Clausen came to see him; Ramsey then dispatched a radio message to Moscow suggesting they dissolve the net. Too late. Sorge was arrested at his home on the morning of October 18 and was taken to Sugamo prison still in his pajamas and slippers. On his desk the Japanese police officials found a draft of the radio message which Clausen was to send to Director on the evening of October 15. Clausen was found in possession of the same half-encoded signal. That was the end. (My Commando Operations, Otto Skorzeny, 1975, p. 119)

Prime Minister Konoye was the pro-Soviet pseudo-fascist infiltrator who had risen to power thanks to the support of the Japanese proletariat and thanks to the blows inflicted by the Red Army, Soviet-backed forces, and the dissident Japanese army officers. With the temporary decline of the Soviets, the Konoye faction too went on the decline. When the Sorge ring in Japan was arrested along with a number of Japanese officials from the Konoye faction, numerous Japanese officials also believed that Konoye was detained as well:

[Many Japanese] were astounded to read that not only foreigners – that caused no particular surprise – but also Japanese in high official circles had been arrested as secret agents of the Comintern. (...) But a Commander of the Imperial Japanese Navy (retd.) voiced what thousands believed, when he declared: 'I take it for granted that Konoye has been put in custody, and that the announcement is being withheld in view of its international repercussions.' (...) When it became public knowledge, in 1942, that, apart from Ozaki, two leading figures in the charmed circle around Konoye ... had been arrested, Konoye's enemies rejoiced and his admirers quailed. Senator McCarthy himself could not have improved upon the more extreme views of Konoye's opponents. On this interpretation, Konoye and his friends were all traitors, corrupted by liberalism if not actually in the pay of foreign agents. (The Case of Richard Sorge, William Deakin, Richard Storry, 1966, pp. 290-294)

Traitors to Japanese fascism they were. It is not clear if Konoye himself was a Soviet intelligence agent per se, but surely the movement that he elevated did create the fertile ground for socialist intelligence penetration. The Konoye faction advocated that Japan does not wage a military struggle against the Soviet Union and focuses instead on combatting the Anglo-American imperialists; however, as soon as the time had come for Japan to go to war against the Anglo-American imperialists, the Konoye faction pushed for as dovish a line towards the Anglo-American imperialists as possible, since by harming Anglo-American imperialism at the time, fascist Japan would have undermined the allies of the Soviet Union.

In 1945 in Japan, the American occupation forces, by then in favour of supporting the Japanese fascists in the struggle against Soviet power, accused Konoye of being a war criminal and demoted him. Since Konoye had been officially a high-ranking member of the fascist regime, the Americans had an easy time claiming that he was loyal to the fascist regime. Konoye died shortly thereafter in December 1945. Since Konoye was Japanese, the American propagandists had an easy time asserting that Konoye committed 'suicide'.

A similar thing was done by the Anglo-Americans concerning the Nazis. The Anglo-American imperialists who dominated the Nuremberg Trials sentenced Martin Bormann to death, and 'executed' him, but actually secretly saved him and helped him escape to Latin America. The Anglo-American imperialists saved and promoted hundreds of thousands of Nazis, Japanese fascists, Ustase terrorists, Italian Fascists, etc. In many cases, in justifying their support for these fascists, Anglo-American imperialists made up fake stories of how so many of these Nazis were 'critical' of Hitler, how these Nazis had 'opposed' the Hitler regime all along and were only 'forced' to commit those crimes because they were ordered to do so, how these Nazis supposedly 'saved' the Yiddish people, etc. Those same Anglo-American imperialists made sure that Wilhelm Frick – the one official in the high ranks of the Nazi German state who actually opposed the Hitler regime (of course in a covert rather than blatant manner) – would get executed during the Nuremberg Trials, on the 'basis' that he was a high-ranking official in the Nazi German state. This was monstrous hypocrisy from the same Anglo-American imperialists who installed Nazi Germany's intelligence chief Reinhard Gehlen as the West German intelligence chief and the Nazi Party member Georg Kiesinger as West German Chancellor. For the Anglo-American imperialists, it was necessary that Frick would get killed because he was a spy for the Strasserite Black Front, which in turn had intelligence ties to the KPD and the Soviets. The Anglo-American imperialists were taking Hitler's and Himmler's revenge on the Strasserite stab in the back of Nazism.

The influence of the proletariat over the fascist movement can be observed as well in Fascist Italy. In a speech to the Comintern, Clara Zetkin correctly pointed out that the recruitment of the proletarians by the Italian Fascists had in part backfired in the form of class warfare within the Fascist movement:

Of particular importance is the awakening of sections of the proletariat that were intoxicated and poisoned by fascism. Meanwhile, fascism is incapable of defending the workers' interests against the bourgeoisie, and incapable of keeping the promises that it made, particularly to the fascist trade unions. The greater its victories, the more incapable it is of posing as the proletariat's protector. Fascism cannot even force the employers to hold to fascist promises about the advantages of common organizations. Wherever only a few workers are organized in the fascist trade unions, it may be possible for a capitalist to pay better wages to these few. But wherever the masses are herded into the fascist organizations, the employers do not take into consideration the "fascist brothers," because it would cost too much – and where moneybags and profits are concerned, capitalist gentlemen do not display kindness.

The awakening of the proletarians has been speeded up in particular by the large number of workers thrown into the street with no sustenance, not only in private concerns but also in public enterprises. Soon after the fascist coup, 17,000 railway workers were laid off.

Further layoffs followed and more are definitely in store. The governmental army workshops were closed, leaving 24,000 workers with no income and delivered over to unrestricted exploitation in the private workshops.

A fervent rebellion against fascist economic policies is emerging precisely among the workers organized by the fascists themselves. In Turin, Naples, Trieste, Venice, and a large number of other cities it was the fascist trade unions that took the lead without exception in joining with workers of other parties and organizations – including the Communist and syndicalist workers – in a massive public rally against the layoffs and workshop closures. Several hundred war invalids who had been dismissed from the army workshops traveled from Naples to Rome in order to protest the injustice they had suffered. They hoped Mussolini himself would grant them justice and protection, and instead, as reward for their faith, they were arrested the moment they got off the trains. The dockworkers of Monfalcone and Trieste, the workers of many localities and industries – all of them members of fascist organizations – have moved into action. In some places factory occupations have once again come about, carried out in fact by workers in fascist unions, with sympathetic toleration or support by the squadrons.

(The Struggle Against Fascism: Report to the Third Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International (ECCI), Clara Zetkin, June 20, 1923. Reprinted from: 'Mike Taber and John Riddell, eds., Fighting Fascism: How to Struggle and How to Win (Haymarket Books, 2017)', MIA)

Hence in Italy too, although the membership of the proletarian elements in the Fascist movement could help the Mussolini gang in mobilizing a larger section of the population towards the fascist agenda, the presence of the proletarian elements in the Fascist movement also constituted the infiltration of the proletarian tendency, the anti-fascist subversion tendency, into the fascist forces.

The core lessons to learn from the case of the Soviet/KPD intelligence penetration into the Nazi movement are the following four points:

(1) If naïve proletarians join a fascist movement, the fascist movement can mobilize those proletarians towards an anti-proletarian agenda, such as by deceiving the workers to send their sons to battle for fascism. Therefore, the phenomenon of proletarians joining-to-serve a fascist movement would be a reactionary event. However, although typically reactionary, the joining of proletarians to a fascist movement can also create an anti-fascist proletarian fifth column within the fascist movement, as a social base that catapults the crypto-anti-fascist intelligence agents of the proletariat, thus undermining fascism. Fascism itself arises out of finance capital first and foremost, but also relies heavily on the bureaucrats, the intelligentsia, the kulaks, the feudal landlords, the mercantile bourgeoisie, and the slave-owners as the class allies of fascism. Among the ordinary masses, fascism relies primarily on the lumpen-proletarians, the unemployed individuals who are so immiserated that they end up resorting to banditry, and the beguiled petit-bourgeoisie, the class that fails to resist finance capital both materially and ideologically. The existence of a proletarian contingent in the membership or rank-and-file of a fascist movement that has mobilized the fascism-beguiled petit-bourgeoisie will result in the rise of an anti-fascist proletarian current that adopts the veneer and symbolism of the ideologies promoted by finance capital and its fascism-beguiled petit-bourgeois pawns.

(2) A fascist regime relies on the petit-bourgeoisie as its pawns, but the mere existence of a proletariat inside the fascist-ruled country inevitably catapults upwards the crypto-anti-fascist agents of the proletariat into the high ranks of the fascist regime apparatus, and allows the crypto-anti-fascist agents to have a network of resistance against the regime, all so even if the fascist movement itself has not been composed of proletarians in its membership.

(3) Imperialist bourgeois-democracy of the kind seen in Britain and USA arises when, unlike in Germany, the vast majority of the population is proletarian and hence capable of imposing on finance capital, the establishment of a bourgeois-democratic order rather than a fascist disorder; otherwise, in the absence of a powerful proletariat or of a class ally of the proletariat, finance capital everywhere in the imperial bourgeois-democracies – in Britain, in USA, in France, etc. – would have imposed fascist tyranny. The Strasserite spy, Interior Minister Wilhelm Frick, resisted the Enabling Act and the transition of Germany deeper into totalitarianism, and the mere fact that Himmler was not able to ever oust Frick, a leader of the crypto-pro-democracy forces against totalitarianism, shows the lobbying power of the Strasserites whose power derived from the German proletariat. Fascism can expand its dominance through the boosting of its industry. Fascism cannot conquer without industry. And yet, industry is what expands the proletariat, thereby weakening fascism at home; such is why fascism is doomed to be overtaken by the Strasserite crypto-anti-fascist crypto-democratic forces and eventually to be overthrown by the blatantly and openly pro-democracy forces.

(4) For understanding the best avenues of intelligence penetration into a fascist regime, look for those regime officials who are politically based in the proletarian or cooperativist neighbourhoods and those are the officials that are either crypto-anti-fascist or are so surrounded by the agents of the proletariat that they can serve as potential yes-men or yes-women coopted by the anti-fascist agents in the struggle against fascism.

C10S8. The Anglo-American Finance Capital allies with the Proletariat and Anti-Colonial National Bourgeoisie even in its own Colonies *** IMG-All-{British pro-democracy}

By late 1940, the Nazi Germans had already expanded their imperial reach to France, thus having under their control vast amounts of geographic factors – in this case natural resources – as well as too strong a productive capacity for the British to be able to tolerate. With the natural resources as well as the high level of industrial capacity combined, the Nazi German empire began to pose a greater threat to British imperial interests than the USSR, in late 1940. As such, the British began to form an alliance with the Soviets in late 1940 or early 1941. Following the British were the American imperialists who also allied with the USSR at the same time as the British. With or without Roosevelt as President of the United States, American imperialism would have pursued a hostile anti-Soviet line until early 1941 or late 1940, and would have pursued an alliance with the USSR from 1941. However, the fact that a Soviet-friendly individual as Roosevelt (see C11S4) was the President of the United States certainly did smoothen the path for American alliance with the USSR.

In this situation, therefore, the Anglo-American imperialists objectively did form an alliance with the USSR. That however, should not be mistaken as to mean that the Anglo-American imperialists provided tremendous amounts of aid to the USSR; they allowed the USSR to lift most of the weight of the war, and contributed relatively little to the war effort. However, it would still be contrary to historical materialist science to state that the Anglo-Americans were not allied to the USSR in the first year and a half of the war, because advancing such a remark would require one to ignore the threat that the productive forces of Nazi Germany posed to Anglo-American imperialist interests.

Here it is necessary for me to mention another thing about the laws of historical materialism, since debates around this matter surfaced during the Varga debate.

The strategic realignment of the Anglo-American imperialists with the USSR during the first year and a half of the Great Patriotic War meant that those countries would form an alliance with the USSR - and they did. The alliance in turn opened a channel for increased Anglo-American intelligence

influence in the camp of the USSR and People's Democratic forces, but it also opened a channel for increased Soviet intelligence influence in the Anglo-American camp, including in the colonies of the Anglo-American imperialists. Increased Soviet influence - which was approved of by the Anglo-Americans since they needed the USSR in the fight against the Axis intelligence in Anglo-American colonies - meant increased proletarian class force influence in those colonies. The increased proletarian class force influence in these colonies meant in turn increased progressive bourgeois-democratic class force influence in the colonies, since the proletarian class forces were inevitably allied to progressive bourgeois-democratic class forces. From here, it follows that with the approval of Anglo-American colonial and neo-colonial administrations, there was established a tendency for progressive bourgeois democratic development and with it, the tendency for the colonial and neo-colonial administrations to approve of the development of the productive forces in the colonies. It follows that by the laws of historical materialism, yes, Anglo-American imperialists played an objectively progressive role in their colonies in the first two years of the Great Patriotic War, and favored progressive bourgeois-democratic development and the development of the productive forces in the nations they had conquered. None of that is to say that the colonies became developing progressive bourgeois democracies - rather it is to say that the tendency for becoming such was created during the brief period 1941-1942, thanks to increased proletarian class force influence. In Egypt in 1942 for instance, the British began to promote the pro-Soviet Wafd forces that later during the Cold War led the struggle for democratic reform against King Farouk, against the British, and for an alliance with the USSR. As was mentioned in C4S7, the Soviets had established an alliance with Egypt's Wafd, the progressive national-bourgeois pro-democracy party that struggled against British colonialism. The struggle of the Wafd Party continued well after the 1920s. Yet, by 1942, the very same British who had waged a struggle against the Wafd, suddenly decided to support the pro-democracy Wafd against King Farouk. Anwar Sadat wrote in his memoirs:

In el-Nahas and the Wafd Party I saw a symbol of the struggle of the entire Egyptian people against the British. (In Search of An Identity:

An Autobiography, Anwar Sadat, p. 12) (IMG)

The British in fact launched a military coup against the tyrannical regime of King Farouk, the regime that the British had installed, in order to force the king to accept the democratic rule of the Wafd party, the pre-democracy party with a history of anti-MI6 and Soviet-friendly struggles. Sadat then wrote:

Rommel had arrived in Libya with the German Panzer divisions. The general feeling in Egypt was against the British and, naturally, in favor of their enemies. The British knew this. In February 1942 they asked King Farouk to request el-Nahas, as leader of the parliamentary majority, to form a new government in the hope of winning over the Egyptian public opinion. When the king said no, Lord Killearn, the British ambassador, ordered British tanks to besiege the Royal Palace in Abidin. On February 4 an ultimatum was issued to the king, either to accept the British demand or to abdicate. Under that threat, the king summoned el-Nahas and asked him to form a new government. (In Search of An Identity: An Autobiography, Anwar Sadat, p. 31) (IMG)

Naturally, Anwar Sadat, who was a Gestapo agent during World War II, started denouncing Mustafa el-Nahas for this:

February 4, 1942, is a date our generation cannot forget. It was on that day that Mustafa el-Nahas Pasha lost [my] respect. How could he agreed to be imposed upon his people, literally at gunpoint, by the colonizing power? (In Search of An Identity: An Autobiography, Anwar Sadat, p. 32) (IMG)

By the end of the Great Patriotic War, Mustafa el-Nahas began waging a struggle against the British. During his leadership in the 1950s, Egypt became closer the USSR, as documented in C16S5 (although Nahas himself is not mentioned there). On the other hand, during that same time period, King Farouk again realigned with the British. By 1951, the Gestapo agent Anwar Sadat, who had denounced Mustafa el-Nahas for being a supposed agent of British colonialism, decided to also become a British spy infiltrating Abdel-Nasser's Free Officer network so to spy on the latter. The case of Egypt is only one case among the many other cases in which British finance capital - because of its strategic realignment with the Soviet dictatorship of the proletariat - strategically realigned with the proletariat in general, and since the proletariat were the pro-democracy class, the British aligned with those elements of the national-bourgeoisie that closely allied to the proletariat - in the case of Egypt, this was represented by the Wafd. On the other hand, the agents of the reactionary class forces, Anwar Sadat and King Farouk, were against the British back when the British were allied to the proletariat and democracy, and became British spies when Britain allied yet again with the Axis.

The laws of historical materialism are inescapable. The tendency for democratic development becomes inevitable as soon as a power aligns with the freedom forces, with the proletariat, and with a political force serving and controlled by the proletariat, such as socialist Soviet power.

The facts about the British Empire's temporarily progressive role in its colonies during the time in which it was on the correct side of history is also worthy of note for those post-modernist foes and fake friends of Karl Marx; these left-opportunists and post-modernists who deliberately misquoted Marx and slandered him as 'colonial-minded' because of his argument that for a very particular time period, British colonialism in India shifted from being a force hindering the development of the productive forces to a force promoting the development of the productive forces in India.

The democratic imperial powers Britain and USA both had supported the Axis, and only turned against the Axis when the Axis imperial power began to contradict and compete against the Anglo-American imperialists. However, questions arise concerning the reasons behind the bundling of the alliances. What guarantee was there that the democratic imperial powers would bundle together against the fascist imperial powers? What factor guaranteed that one democratic imperial power would not bundle with the Axis fascists, and that another fascist modern imperial power would not bundle with the democratic powers? What historical factor prevented the bundle of alliance from being, for example, Nazi Germany, democratic USA, and fascist Japan in one camp vs. democratic Britain, democratic France, and fascist Italy in another camp?

Japan, Germany and Italy allied with each other because in all of them, the economy was semi-industrial, which created a powerful finance capital that could mobilize the petit-bourgeoisie of the non-industrial zones in order to suppress the proletariat. The strength of the anti-proletarian forces in these countries led to their alliance, against Britain, France, and America. The three latter powers had more proletariat in them and thus the finance capital in those powers was more contained by the proletariat than in Germany, Italy, and Japan. The higher number and hence the higher strength of the proletariat led to the United States, Britain and France to ally with the USSR against the Nazis. The more fundamental reason for the Anglo-American-French alliance against the Axis imperial powers was merely the imperial competition, but the reason for the bundling together of the democratic imperial powers vs. the bundling together of the fascist imperial powers was precisely owing to the fact that the proletariat were more numerous and stronger in the democratic imperial powers. As the proletariat of different countries are allies regardless of geographic or ethnic boundaries, the strength of the proletariat in these democratic powers aligned such imperial powers into the same proletarian camp against the fascist imperial powers which faced less of a proletariat 'problem'. This same factor, the strength of the proletariat in the democratic imperialist countries, also contributed to the democratic imperial powers eventually allying with the USSR instead of an implausible hypothetical scenario in which fascist anti-proletarian imperial powers would ally with the proletarian USSR against the democratic imperial powers which were back then pro-proletarian.

The proletariat, even in countries in which the proletariat are under the heavy propaganda bombardment of the imperialists, inevitably and at times even class-‘unconsciously’ generate a tendency towards proletarian internationalism, which is what leads to the democratic imperial powers to bundle with each other and to ally with the Soviet proletarian state.

C10S9. The Anti-Fascists from Among the German Soldiers

Although most German soldiers fought willingly for the fascist Reich, there still was percentage of German units who, much against their will to combat the Third Reich, were forced to fight for it. The Soviet government took this reality into account and aimed to re-educate and allow these imprisoned German military units to participate in the struggle for toppling the Nazi regime. To give an example, a former German prisoner of war (POW) described to the CIA his experience in POW camps. He first testified to the CIA against the myth of Soviet ‘brutality’:

At Marshansk, treatment of the prisoners was generally fair and we were able to walk around inside the camp after returning from working parties. (...). The treatment of the prisoners inside the camp was not particularly brutal.... (‘POW CAMPS: GENERAL CONDITIONS / SECURITY MEASURES/ TREATMENT OF PRISONERS / POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION / INTERROGATION / MEDICAL TREATMENT / WORK ASSIGNMENTS’, CIA, January 12, 1954, p. 5) (IMG{Gulag})

He then described the process of political indoctrination in his camp:

There was a steady program of political indoctrination at Marshansk.... Every night a Soviet political officer who spoke German came to our barracks and talked for about two hours about Stalin, Marx, and Lenin. It was a strange performance in that the barracks was dark and this man talked while we slept. ((‘POW CAMPS: GENERAL CONDITIONS / SECURITY MEASURES/ TREATMENT OF PRISONERS / POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION / INTERROGATION / MEDICAL TREATMENT / WORK ASSIGNMENTS’, CIA, January 12, 1954, p. 5) (IMG{Gulag}))

The ideological program was an attempt

to indoctrinate them [i.e. the prisoners of war] with Communist ideology.... (Attitude of Former Prisoners of War of the Soviet/Prison Camp Conditions, CIA, March 1953, p.1) (IMG{GDR})

Interestingly, the ideological indoctrination course was called ‘ANTIFA’:

The Soviets had a communist indoctrination class which was known as ANTIFA and anyone who volunteered could attend the course. (Attitude of Former Prisoners of War of the Soviet/Prison Camp Conditions, CIA, March 1953, p.1) (IMG{GDR})

The Soviet ANTIFA is not to be confused with the anarchistic left-deviationist ‘Antifa Network’ that currently operates in modern-day Western societies. The Soviet ANTIFA was an organized ideological training program aimed at turning German soldiers away from the Hitlerian ideology and inspiring them to invest their energy for anti-fascist struggles.

There was limited success in this anti-fascist ideological re-education program, owing to the popularity of Hitler among German soldiers, the overwhelming majority of whom came from petit-bourgeois, rather than proletarian, backgrounds. Nevertheless, there existed a percentage of German soldiers who were participating in the Nazi crimes unwillingly. For example., in a sample camp,:

Of the nine hundred prisoners only 30 attended the ANTIFA course. (Attitude of Former Prisoners of War of the Soviet/Prison Camp Conditions, CIA, March 1953, p.1) (IMG{GDR})

The Soviets succeeded in ideologically rehabilitating these soldiers. As the CIA suggests:

a small fraction of one per cent of former prisoners of war of the Soviets were actually influenced by the Soviet [anti-fascist] propaganda and indoctrination. (Attitude of Former Prisoners of War of the Soviet/Prison Camp Conditions, CIA, March 1953, p.1) (IMG{GDR})

In 1943, the Soviet Union helped German anti-fascists to join the communist-led ‘National Committee for a Free Germany’ (NKFD). Among the members of the NKFD were former German soldiers fighting for the Nazi Regime against the Soviet Union. American military and intelligence sources reported:

Following the German Army’s surrender at Stalingrad in January 1943, high-ranking German prisoners of war and communist exiles had formed the Moscow-based National Committee for a Free Germany. Its primary goal was to foment anti-Nazi resistance and become the nucleus of a post-war German government. (The OSS and the London “Free Germans”, CIA Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 46, No. 1, Johnathan S. Gould) (IMG{GDR})

Through their stay in the Soviet Union during the war were they able to achieve legitimacy as they aided the Soviet Union against the Wehrmacht during the war through the framework of the National Committee for a Free Germany and the Association of German Officers located in Moscow. Their primary role consisted of translating propaganda for the purpose of converting Wehrmacht POWs in the Soviet Union that provided leverage for the USSR and legitimacy for the German communists in Stalin’s eyes. (THE INNER COLD WAR: STATE PARTY CONTROL AND EAST GERMAN SOCIETY, Naval Postgraduate School, written by: Nicholas A. Willet, Thesis Co-Advisors: Donald Abenheim and Carolyn Halladay, June 2014, p. 20) (IMG{GDR})

The National Committee for a Free Germany was formed in July 1943 from German emigres and prisoners of war held in the Soviet Union. This group published a manifesto which called on the German people to overthrow Hitler, establish a non-Nazi government, stop the war, and relinquish all occupied territories. Membership in the committee was open to all; however, the Soviets encouraged higher ranking officers to join to legitimize the movement. The High Command and Hitler naturally condemned the members as traitors. Reaction of junior military personnel seems to have been mixed.... (THE UNKNOWN GENERALS – GERMAN CORPS COMMANDERS IN WOILD WAR II, United States Military Academy (1974), Major French L. MacLean, June 3, 1988, p. 92) (IMG{GDR})

The NKFD – not to be confused with the NKVD – was composed of high-ranking German military figures and many of their subordinates. Robert Naughton, a military scholar from the US Naval War College, wrote:

The senior officers became members of such pro-Soviet groups as the NKFD (National Komite Fries Deutschland) and other anti-Fascism organizations. Other PWs perceived membership in these groups to be a *fait accompli* if the generals belonged to them. Therefore, there was no organized resistance to such activities, and other acts of cooperation with the Soviets followed. (Motivational Factors of American Prisoners of War Held by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Naval War College, College of Naval Command and Staff, Robert Joseph Naughton, pp. 63-64) (IMG{GDR})

C10S10. Soviet Red Army 'Rape' of Germany? *** IMG-All-{Rape during War?}

Regarding the orders of the Soviet command on the issue of rape, it is important to introduce Joachim Hoffmann, who as:

a professional researcher since 1960 in the West German Military History Research Office.... (Review of: DIE GESCHICHTE DER WLASSOW-ARMEE written by Joachim Hoffmann, Published in: Slavic Studies, Vol. 46, Issue 2, summer of 1987, p. 310) (IMG)

was viciously hostile to the Soviet Union and the Red Army. Yet, even he could not hide the fact that the Soviet command gave orders to the Red Army, prohibiting rape, theft, and plundering in Germany:

Many prisoners of war informed the Germans that they had received knowledge of the new rules of conduct in February 1945. For example, Major of the Guards of the Superintendent Service Kostikov of the 277th Guards Infantry Regiment of the 91st Guards Infantry Division (39th Army, 3rd White Russian Front), on 17 February 1945, reported that "strict orders have been issued that the German civilian population is to be left alone, nothing is to be stolen, and German women are not to be molested." 7 According to the testimony of one Red Army soldier, Shevchuk, the "shooting of civilians and German prisoners of war," which had been customary in the Red Army until that time, was now "strictly prohibited" in the 44th Motorized Infantry Brigade as of 6-7 February 1945. Similar, quite comparable, prohibitions were also issued with regards to other units.9 When Soviet soldiers wantonly set fire to the city of Gleiwitz, the burning of localities was "strictly forbidden" in that section of the front as well.10 The commander of the 1042nd Infantry Regiment of the 295th Infantry Division, Lieutenant Colonel Chaiko, informed his units that violations of the existing prohibition against plundering would be "severely punished." Generally, the Soviet command authorities were not stingy about threats of punishment; the military tribunals appear to have intervened occasionally. ('Stalin's War of Extermination, 1941-1945: Planning, Realization, and Documentation', Joachim Hoffmann, 2001, pp. 310-311. Citing Nazi German archival materials: 'Tovarisci bojcy, serzanty i oficyery!', February 17, 1945; BA-MA, RH 2/2685, March 17, 1945, BA-MA, RH 2/2684, February 2, 1945; BA-MA, RH 2/2688, folder 74, 25.2. folder 5, March 1, 1945.) (IMG)

A US intelligence report confirmed that prior to June 9, 1945,:

Marshal Zhukov ... had established a strict regime for the Soviet zone of occupation and had forbidden the Red Army to fraternize with the people. (Chronology of Principal Events Relating to the USSR Part II, OSS, September 25, 1945, p. 313) (IMG)

For those not familiar with the term 'fraternize', the Merriam Webster dictionary defines it as:

to associate on close terms with members of a hostile group especially when contrary to military orders' (Merriam-Webster).

Significant social association with the civilians in territories 'occupied' by the Red Army was forbidden.

A British military intelligence report written by Frank Roberts, the anti-Soviet advisor to Churchill and the British minister to the Soviet Union, confirmed that while the Red Army men did commit many crimes during the Great Patriotic War, the Red Army commanders "did more to check" (i.e. prevent) such excesses, and "they appear[ed]" to have had "some success":

Ever since Soviet troops entered foreign countries and more particularly since fighting ceased and they became occupation forces, the Red army seems, however, somewhat out of hand. Red Army men abroad began to loot and rape and to commit acts of indiscipline not previously observed, and even Red army commanders seem to have been ready to connive at many of the excesses committed, particularly in the early stages. Later on, when they did more to check them, they appear on the whole to have met with some success. But reports reaching this embassy and the tone of the Soviet press suggest that the behaviour and discipline of Soviet troops abroad still leave much to be desired, though in some places they are said to be a good deal worse than in others. (N 14634/558/38, Mr. Roberts to Mr. Bevin, Moscow, No. 767. Confidential, author: Frank Kenyon Roberts, October 19, 1945. Received: October 27, 1945. In: British Foreign Office (1945), p. 327) (IMG)

Somewhat relatedly,:

A general order issued in December 1941 revealed that the supreme command ... prohibited the killing of prisoners by combat troops. (Russian Methods of Interrogating Captured Personnel World War II, CIA, the Office of the Chief of the Military History, US Department of the Army, Kermit Stewart (Major, Infantry, US Army), Orland Ward (Major General, USA Chief), September 1951, p. 161) (IMG{Katyn})

It is also worth examining US intelligence reports that came after 7-8 years after the overthrow of the Third Reich. 'In order to improve discipline', one CIA document stated, the Soviet command:

issued orders ... prohibiting Soviet military personnel from doing the following:

- a. Drinking alcoholic beverages (beer, wine, vodka)
- b. Fraternizing with Germans, visiting German movies, cafes, bars, and homes
- c. Riding in the same trains with Germans or using German trolleys

the [soldiers] greatly resented these restrictions; however, they could do nothing about them.

(Soviet Army Morale, CIA, May 21, 1953, p. 2) (IMG)

According to the CIA, already 7 years after the overthrow of the Third Reich, some 15% of the Soviet Armed Forces in both Germany and the Soviet Union spent time in jail on charges of sexual assault. In East Germany, the percentage of Soviet troops jailed for rape was even disproportionately higher. The CIA document reported:

At least 10-15% of the Soviet Armed Forces ... in Germany and in the [Soviet] Union are in prison. This estimate is based on experience with the KONTRAZVEDKA. In Germany the percentage of sentences [against Soviet Armed Forces] is even higher than in the U.S.S.R. (...). Every day a special railway truck leaves the main transit camp full of soldiers under sentence, who are usually sent under escort of special troops, in one of the Russia-bound transit trains.

The main offences are drunkenness, contact with German women, assaults on women, breaches of theft etc.

(Political Attitude of Soviet Troops in Germany, CIA, December 2, 1953, p. 5) (IMG)

The crack-down on rape continued well after 1945. 'Every year' the CIA noted, there were cases of rape, as well as the attempts of the Soviet army commanders to prevent it and punish those responsible:

Officers therefore drink illogically and heavily, look for German women, whom they often assault, and many of them ultimately get bored to death, tired of constant supervision and restrictions, and commit suicide. The usual seasons for officers' suicide attempts are the May and November festivities. Every year the same story repeats itself. The Army Commanders organise conferences for senior

officers, order special precautions, patrols and checks, mobilise the political personnel instructing them to increase “vigilance”: and the results are exactly the same as they were in previous years. In 24 Air Army alone during the three days of the 1952 November festivities, eight officers, all of them young men, committed suicide. In November 1951 one young officer shot dead three of his fellow officers and committed suicide. It was “an officers’ bottle party”. There were also cases when officers, caught by the patrols with German women, fought desperately and used their firearms. In November 1951 a young officer caught by the patrol and apparently afraid of the consequences, killed the German woman and committed suicide before the men of the patrol had time to disarm him. (...). In spring 1952 an Artillery Captain raped a 13 year-old German girl and was sentenced to eighteen years’ imprisonment. In early July, 1953 two captains from units of 37 Air Technical Division gave a lift to two German women. They attempted to rape them in the truck but the women resisted fiercely. The officers shot both women dead and left the bodies on the road. They were sentenced to eight years in corrective labour camps. (Political Attitude of Soviet Troops in Germany, CIA, December 2, 1953, p. 6) (IMG)

Chapter 11

C11S1. Submerging Below the River Saleph?: The Nazis Establish an Underground State *** IMG-All-{Nazi Underground}

The tactical and strategic victories of the Soviet Red Army in the Battle of Stalingrad in late December 1942 turned the tide. Thus shifted the balance of power in favour of the Soviets against the Nazi regime.

With the death of Operation BARBAROSSA in late December of 1942, the Nazi Germans had already begun plans for another Crusade against the Soviet Union, a Third World War. Curt Riess, an American intelligence officer who researched extensively on such Nazi plans, wrote in a May 1944 book:

In a way this is one and the same thing, since the ultimate goal of the Nazis who continue after the defeat will be another war. World War III is by no means a product of the overheated imagination of diehards among the Nazis. Even the most realistic among the German generals have begun to think and talk seriously about it. General Otto von Stuelpnagel has already prepared a memorandum on the next war which the Algerian weekly Combat (November 28, 1943) printed. (The Nazis Go Underground, Curt Riess, May 1, 1944, p. VIII) (IMG)

The Nazi Reich even set the ground for the German army to go underground. This was revealed by the very German commander responsible for rendering the Reich army underground. Indeed:

it has been established that it was Field Marshal von Kluge himself who arranged for this intelligence to leak out. (The Nazis Go Underground, Curt Riess, May 1, 1944, p. 58) (IMG)

The German:

generals desired ... to work out their long-range plan of an army underground which was to start many years after the armistice. Field Marshals von Kluge and von Mannstein put their foot down in no uncertain way. (The Nazis Go Underground, Curt Riess, May 1, 1944, p. 57) (IMG)

One of the key architects of this Underground Fourth Reich was Reinhard Gehlen:

the former chief of the German Army’s intelligence branch dealing with the Eastern Front and Soviet forces.... (CIA AND NAZI WAR CRIM. AND COL. CHAP. 1-10, DRAFT WORKING PAPER_0010, Chapter 9: America’s Seeing-Eye Dog on a Long Leash, CIA, p. 2) (IMG)

The British intelligence officer Hugh Trevor-Roper noted that the head of German intelligence service:

[Walter] Schellenberg has told us how, in these darkening days [of the Third Reich], a certain Major-General Gehlen, who had long been busy studying the Polish underground movement, drew up a careful plan for German resistance on similar lines; (The Last Days of Hitler: The Classic Account of Hitler’s Fall from Power, 7th Edition, Hugh Trevor Roper) (IMG)

Major-General Gehlen, the top architect and planner of the establishment of such a Nazi Underground, would later become the leader of the Anglo-American-backed Nazi shadow war against the USSR and the Peoples’ Democracies. Gehlen knew that the Anglo-Americans wanted to ally with the Nazi Underground:

Like most Germans, Gehlen preferred surrender to the Western Allies as opposed to an uncertain fate at Russian hands. (...). Gehlen believed that the Western Allies and the Soviet Union, while wartime allies, would soon become peacetime rivals. With his knowledge about the Russians, combined with the FHO’s collective resources, Gehlen felt he could influence relations between East and West and Germany’s role in postwar Europe. (CIA AND NAZI WAR CRIM. AND COL. CHAP. 1-10, DRAFT WORKING PAPER_0010, Chapter 9: America’s Seeing-Eye Dog on a Long Leash, CIA, pp. 2-3) (IMG)

Germany, Gehlen believed, could count on Anglo-American assistance. The Nazis expected that the Anglo-American-installed regime in Germany would provide pensions for the Reich commanders. These pensions in turn would serve as funds for the underground Reich army:

This again presents a parallel with 1918. After the last war the German Republic decided to pay pensions to all imperial officials and the officers of the army and the navy. In the minds of German Socialists and Democrats the officers had done their duty; they could not be blamed for the war, and that was that. It never occurred to them that they were thus feeding their worst enemies.

If Germany does not go Communist, there is an overwhelming likelihood that this time pensions will again be paid. Indeed, the Nazis are counting on it. It is undoubtedly because of these pensions that the officer corps of the German Army and the Navy have become so unbelievably large. There are today about 700 admirals in Germany, almost twice as many as there are in the United States Navy, although the German fleet hardly exists any longer. The amusing and revealing feature about this situation is that, while the German fleet has steadily grown smaller and smaller, the number of admirals has just as steadily grown larger and larger. As for the army, it may have between 4,000 and 5,000 marshals and generals. Including colonels, there will be about 20,000 commissioned German officers who will get pensions large enough for them to live on. With their incomes assured, the recipients will be able to devote their time and

energies to something else. And to what better activity could they devote their time and energy, so they must think, than to make Germany once more a strong and feared nation? That is what the Nazis count on. It is why the Nazis have promoted these officers – so that they can live without worrying about their daily bread and butter. The Nazi underground will take full advantage of them.

(The Nazis Go Underground, Curt Riess, May 1, 1944, p. 177) (IMG)

The information leaked by Marshal von Kluge:

appeared in Czechoslovakian underground newspapers and in Swiss periodicals. They even found their way via Stockholm papers to the London dailies. These reports said that Heinrich Himmler “had been instructed to establish cadres immediately for the underground cells of an illegal Nazi party to exist fully ramified and equipped. . . .” It was also said that “plans had been completed for violence and terror . . . to start as soon as the war was over.” In particular it was rumored that “two to three secret divisions of SS men had been established and were being trained in guerrilla tactics. . . . Factories, power plants, waterworks would be destroyed . . . communications would be smashed, food depots be blown up.” Other accounts spoke of “secret radio stations, a clandestine press, and secret arsenals of arms and ammunitions. New Free Corps were quoted with names such as “Goetz von Berlichingen” and “Georg von Frundsberg.” (The Nazis Go Underground, Curt Riess, May 1, 1944, pp. 57-58) (IMG)

‘Toward the end of October 1943, for instance,’ added the US intelligence officer,:

the Swedish daily, Nydag, reported that a vast organization all over Germany was preparing to go underground when Germany is defeated; that the “General Staff” of this “illegal Nazi party” had been established in Munich; that secret radio stations, a clandestine press, and secret arsenals of arms, ammunition, explosives, and sabotage material were being prepared; that wholesale sabotage was to start in Germany in case of . . . defeat; that SS men were being selected and trained as guerrillas. (The Nazis Go Underground, Curt Riess, May 1, 1944, p. VII) (IMG)

The US intelligence officer even predicted:

The Nazi guerrillas and partisans who hold out in Germany until the zero hour will have a great nuisance value. (. . .). And also certain organizations of the early twenties which featured political assassinations may spring up again in order to prevent . . . Germans . . . from betraying the guerrillas. (The Nazis Go Underground, Curt Riess, May 1, 1944, p. 176) (IMG)

Terror operations by the stay-behind Nazi underground were to soon haunt not just Germany, but the whole of Europe. The beginning of the end for the Third Reich had come – and the Nazis knew it. That did not mean, however, that the Reich leaders would accept defeat. No, the ‘National-Socialist’ dream shall and will prevail, the Nazis argued. Himmler said:

It is possible that Germany will be defeated on the military front. It is even possible that she may have to capitulate. But never must the National Socialist German Workers’ party capitulate. That is what we have to work for from now on. (The Nazis Go Underground, Curt Riess, May 1, 1944, p. 4) (IMG)

Thus, the German Reich began preparing to go underground, in some cases, literally, beneath the surface of the Earth. ‘[T]here had been’, said Curt Riess:

many weeks of preliminary and preparatory work – work done mainly inside the so-called Gestapo building in the Prinz Albrechtstrasse, Berlin, where Himmler had his headquarters on the second floor. But on May 16 the real work began. On that day those who were in charge of it moved to a spacious house, almost a little chateau, at II Koenigsallee in Berlin Grunewald. The whole estate, which had once belonged to a Jewish banker and had been taken over by the Nazis before the outbreak of the war, comprised more than a square mile. The rebuilt house contained large rooms on the first floor and a number of small offices on the second floor. The left wing of the main building was occupied by General Werner Heissmeyer of the SS and his staff, the right wing by General Fritz Kaltenbrunner of the SS. In the large, well-kept garden that surrounded the house some of the old trees had been cut off to make room for small office bungalows. The archives were stored in a bombproof cellar.

I quote from a report: “It was the Intelligence Department of the Gestapo which moved to II Koenigsallee on May 15 and 16. From May 16 on the Intelligence Department of the Gestapo was split into two parts. About half of the officials went on as usual in the Prinz Albrechtstrasse. The rest worked in Koenigsallee under Heissmeyer and Kaltenbrunner.”

(The Nazis Go Underground, Curt Riess, May 1, 1944, p. 1) (IMG)

Thus, for the first time in their history as a state:

THE NAZIS went underground on May 16, 1943. (The Nazis Go Underground, Curt Riess, May 1, 1944, p. 1) (IMG)

Notice that the date was in the first half of 1943, which shows that the preparations for going underground must have been in early 1943. This shows that the Nazi decision originated from the December 1942 defeat of the Nazis in the Battle of Stalingrad. The rendering of the Nazi state apparatus into an underground was also important concerning the Anglo-American alliance with the Nazis, for this underground constituted the roots of the Gehlen Organization, HIAG, Schnez Truppe, and other Nazi military and intelligence networks backed by the CIA and MI6 in the years to come.

In another case, there was an underground Nazi city built. According to Gregory Pallucci, a specialist cited in a documentary by the British Channel 4, the Monte Soratte bunker:

was a city, an underground city. (Exploring the Haunting ‘Underground City’ Built by Nazis, Treasure Hunters, Channel 4 Documentary, November 1, 2018) (IMG)

Calling the massive bunker ‘a city’ was by no means an exaggeration. The Channel 4 documentary stated that in this underground Nazi city: there was once a fully operational cinema, a bakery, a beer hall. (Exploring the Haunting ‘Underground City’ Built by Nazis, Treasure Hunters, Channel 4 Documentary, November 1, 2018) (IMG)

Of course, only a portion – and not the whole – of the Reich went underground on that important date. However, more was soon to come.

C11S2. Anglo-American Imperialists form an Alliance with Nazi Germany *** IMG-All-{Nazi Underground}

Between 1941 and 1943, Germany had a higher amount of power, a higher amount of productive forces, under its disposal, a factor which led Anglo-American imperialists to regard Germany as a threat against which to stand with the Soviet Union. From late December of 1942 and early January of 1943, when Soviet power was overwhelming the Nazi Germans, the Soviet Red Army was paving the way for a mighty bloc of socialist states with plenty of productive forces under their control, capable of fighting against the Anglo-American imperialists. Expecting this, the Anglo-American imperialists assessed that this potential socialist bloc would have high amounts of productive forces, hence a high amount of power, thus being a greater threat than the Nazi German Empire. As such, the Anglo-American imperialists decided to ally with the Nazi Germans against the Soviets.

Undoubtedly, the Reich leaders themselves were enthusiastic about an alliance with the Anglo-American imperialists against the Soviet Union. For one, Hitler's Chief of Staff, Heinz Guderian:

had a conversation with RIBBENTROPPE in which he pointed out that a two-front war was too much to cope with, and asked him to make peace either in the WEST or in the EAST. (Observations on Armored Tactics, OSS, May 25, 1945. in: Miscellaneous 1945 Seventh Army reports on Germany, CIA, September 22, 1950, p. 7) (IMG)

Eichmann recalled in his memoirs:

for almost to the end Himmler was optimistic about making separate peace terms. "We'll get a better treaty than the ones at Hubertusburg," he said to me, slapping his thighs. We'll lose a few feathers, but it will be a better one." It was then mid-April 1945. (MEMOIRS PART I, Adolf Otto Eichmann, November 1, 1960, PART II, pp. 14-15. Recorded by: CIA) (IMG{Israel})

The Moshe Dayan henchman Shlomo Aronson wrote of:

the very connection thereby created between Himmler and the West ... for his genuine political purpose, separate peace, ... mainly due to the German defeat at Stalingrad, as argued by several parties involved such as Pomeranz in his postwar memoir and by some scholars ex post facto. ('Hitler, the Allies, and the Jews', Shlomo Aronson, 2004, pp. 172-173) (IMG{Israel})

Indeed, the Anglo-American agents and mercenaries throughout the world began to fight against the Red Army starting from early 1943, and the Nazi German negotiations with the Anglo-American imperialists, as shown in C16S1, were instructed by Hitler himself to start on December 1942. Therefore, the dating of the turn-about of the Anglo-American stance on the Nazi-Soviet War shows that it was directly correlated with the Soviet victories on the Stalingrad front. All the other Anglo-American-Axis negotiations that came about after the Battle of Stalingrad were mere continuations, extensions, and expansions of the series of negotiations that began on December 1942.

The MI6-backed fascist 'resistance' sleeper cells in Soviet Central Asia were reactivated to fight against the Red Army, to bog down the Soviets in Central Asia as a means of aiding the Nazi Germans. In this regard, the CIA referred to a report by the military intelligence of the Third Reich. According to the CIA:

There exists a long report by the (German) Chief of Security Police and Secret Service on the resistance movements in the USSR in 1943 and 1944. (...). In general, the report noted a considerable increase of opposition in the Soviet interior since the beginning of 1942. (Soviet Defections to the Germans in World War II, CIA, November 19, 1952, p. 30) (IMG{The Georgia Purge})

The German intelligence report cited in the CIA document specified that Britain was utilizing Afghanistan as a base for active sponsorship of anti-Soviet bands in Central Asia:

In Turkmenistan ... where the [anti-Soviet] resistance movement was strongest, there was a strong nationalistic movement, - which ... the report attributed to British support from Afghanistan. (Soviet Defections to the Germans in World War II, CIA, November 19, 1952, p. 31) (IMG{The Georgia Purge})

During the 1930s, Britain was keen on containing Soviet Central Asia through the occupation of Afghanistan, fascist subversion in Xinjiang, Central Asian Trotskyite-separatist infiltration in the Party, and the sponsorship of reactionary bandits in Turkmenistan. However, once Germany began outrivalling the British, Britain was compelled into a two-year alliance with the Soviet Union against the Third Reich. Between 1941 and late 1942, Britain ceased its support for separatism in Central Asia, as a partitioned USSR would have only helped Britain's imperial rival, the Third Reich. However, with the death of Operation Barbarossa in late 1942, Britain fully returned to its policy of supporting and siding with the Axis.

A CIA paper stated that the Nazi agenda was to compel:

the Americans and the British [to] join forces with the Germans to fight the Soviets. (The Conclusion Must Be Left to History, CIA, p. 3. Chapter 1 for: CIA and the Nazi War Criminals) (IMG)

The American spymaster Allen Dulles was enthusiastic towards an alliance with Nazi Germany. Allen Dulles, the high-ranking American spymaster was also a lawyer representing the interests of American finance capital in Fascist Italy. This has been confirmed by Kerstin von Lingen, a historian for the Stuttgart Attorney General in preliminary proceedings on Nazi war crimes in Italy and a Fellow at the Royal Historical Society and the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. Kerstin von Lingen wrote:

In northern Italy and in Switzerland, American companies had financial stakes in firms and banks, so it is no surprise that there was an economic interest in protecting these resources by reaching a surrender settlement quickly. As a lawyer, Allen Dulles represented clients from U.S. high finance in northern Italy. Should Italy fall, he considered it a top priority for economic reasons to protect Trieste and Austria from a Russian invasion. This economic motivation was strengthened ideologically by a strong anti-communist current found particularly among the East Coast upper classes, and the two Dulles brothers had certainly never made any secret about their lifelong aversion to communism.' (Allen Dulles, the OSS, and Nazi War Criminals: The Dynamics of Selective Persecution, Cambridge University Press, Kerstin von Lingen, 2013, p. 254) (IMG)

Documenting the history of the American intelligence collaboration with the SS, the CIA reported:

By late 1944, various SS officials in Italy and in Germany decided to contact the Allies. (The Conclusion Must Be Left to History, CIA, p. 4. Chapter 1 for: CIA and the Nazi War Criminals) (IMG)

When the Americans came to the aid of the Axis forces, the fascist armies began to rebrand themselves with 'democratic' coloration, 'democratic'-sounding names, 'democratic' slogans, etc. in order to provide the excuse for US intelligence support. In 1943, Mussolini established his 'Italian Social Republic' with the 'National Republican Army', thus returning to some of the Kautskyite San-Sepolcrist rhetoric that he used to promote during the post-WWI period when communist ideas were popular amongst the Italian proletarians. The San-Sepolcro program was a program that gave 'democratic' and 'socialist' slogans to Italian Fascism in the 1910s, so that MI6 agent Mussolini could demagogically nullify worker discontent. Via intermediaries, the Dulles network and the SS engaged in negotiations behind the back of the Roosevelt faction and of the Soviets:

In December 1944, Dulles's agent, Gero von Schulze Gaevernitz, told Dulles that Alexander von Neurath, the German consul in Lugano, was in close contact with senior German military and SS officers searching for an American contact to discuss surrender terms. Dulles was forced to reject this feeler because President Roosevelt ... had expressed concern about the reaction of the Soviet allies to any negotiations by the Western Allies with the Germans. (The Conclusion Must Be Left to History, CIA, p. 3. Chapter 1 for: CIA and the Nazi War Criminals) (IMG)

In spite of the US President's efforts to prevent any such negotiations with Nazi Germany:

Over the next several months [after December 1944], Dulles continued to receive feelers in Switzerland from senior SS officers, including such notable Nazis as Heinrich Himmler, Ernst Kaltenbrunner, and Walter Schellenberg. (The Conclusion Must Be Left to History, CIA, p. 3. Chapter 1 for: CIA and the Nazi War Criminals) (IMG)

Thus:

By mid-February 1945, SS-Obergruppenfuhrer Karl Wolff, the commander of all SS troops in Italy, told Walther Rauff, a subordinate SS officer, that he wanted to establish contact with the Allies in neutral Switzerland. Rauff mentioned this to another SS officer, Guido Zimmer, who suggested Baron Luigi Parilli as an intermediary.

Parilli, the prewar European representative of a prominent American company, was closely tied to Zimmer and may have been one of his agents. The Italian claimed that Zimmer's love for Italy and his concern that the Germans would unleash a "scorched earth" policy motivated both men to seek the Allies. Through Professor Max Husmann, a Swiss schoolmaster, Parilli received a visa to visit Switzerland and present the German proposal to Maj. Max Waibel, a Swiss intelligence officer and a contact of Allen Dulles, the OSS station chief in Bern. This led to the first meeting between Gero von Gaevernitz and Parilli in Lucerne and the beginning of Operation SUNRISE.

(The Conclusion Must Be Left to History, CIA, p. 4. Chapter 1 for: CIA and the Nazi War Criminals) (IMG)

Hitler is documented to have given the order for selling the wealthy among the Ashkenazi captives in exchange for the Anglo-American provisions of arms to Nazi Germany since December 1942. In addition, Hitler hinted at the process of negotiations with the United States for a general alliance. On February 24, 1945, Hitler gave his last speech to the Nazi Party members in the Reich Chancellery. Mainstream newspapers presented incorrect information about the nature of Hitler's speech. According to US intelligence:

No authentic reports of this session [were] published in the Press or announced over the Radio [at the time]. Reports which [were] released did not contain the true facts [about the speech]. (Hitler's Last Session in the Reich Chancellery, in: Seventh Army Interrogation Center. Ref No SAIC/18, US Army. May 24, 1945. p. 1. Cited in: Miscellaneous 1945 Seventh Army reports on Germany, CIA, September 22, 1950) (IMG)

The following is the authentic information about Hitler's speech, based on declassified US intelligence files. Having:

stated that the Russian onslaught was of paramount concern to the people.... (Hitler's Last Session in the Reich Chancellery, in Seventh Army Interrogation Center. Ref No SAIC/18, US Army. CIA, May 24, 1945. p. 2. Cited in: Miscellaneous 1945 Seventh Army reports on Germany, CIA, September 22, 1950) (IMG)

Hitler:

predicted that, if Germany held firm during the crisis, a day would come when serious conflicts would arise between Russia and the US. (Hitler's Last Session in the Reich Chancellery, in Seventh Army Interrogation Center. Ref No SAIC/18, US Army. May 24, 1945. p. 2. Cited in: Miscellaneous 1945 Seventh Army reports on Germany, CIA, September 22, 1950) (IMG)

The Nazis concentrated their military power on fighting their formidable foes in the East rather than their secret Allies in the West. In his final speech to the Reich Chancellery on February, Hitler had also explained that:

A large-scale counter-attack [against the Red Army] was planned.... (Hitler's Last Session in the Reich Chancellery, in Seventh Army Interrogation Center. Ref No SAIC/18, US Army. May 24, 1945. p. 1) (IMG)

so:

that the [Red Army] attack could be stopped. (Hitler's Last Session in the Reich Chancellery, in Seventh Army Interrogation Center. Ref No SAIC/18, US Army. May 24, 1945. p. 1) (IMG)

Hitler further explained

i) Germany must remain on the defensive in the WEST. (...).

ii) In the EAST a powerful [anti-Soviet] counter-offensive would be prepared.

(Hitler's Last Session in the Reich Chancellery, Seventh Army Interrogation Center, Ref No SAIC/18, US Army. May 24, 1945. p. 2) (IMG)

Clearly, the Nazis had biased their units towards fighting on the Eastern Front as opposed to the Western Front. This was obviously because a covert alliance between the Anglo-Americans and the Third Reich had taken shape. Both the Anglo-Americans and the Third Reich wanted the Axis forces to surrender Northern Italy, so that the Axis forces could be deployed to the Eastern Front. 'The military advantages', von Lingen wrote:

derive from the relief provided to the Allied forces by the early surrender. The peaceful cessation of hostilities in Italy meant that two Allied armies could be redeployed to southern Germany. In this way, the surrender of the southern front affected troop strength and combat capacity within Germany as a whole because it enabled the Western Allies to make further territorial gains in the heart of Germany before the Soviet Union could expand its advance into the country. Therefore, from a military standpoint, territorial gains over the Red Army and its allies were the immediate benefit of the surrender in northern Italy.

The surrender was also crucial to the political reorientation of Europe. As the Red Army advanced across Eastern Europe, liberating countries from German occupation, it planted communist governments (such as in Poland) or concluded partial surrenders, thereby determining the postwar order and prompting the Western Allies to make the containment of the Soviet sphere of influence their highest priority as long as the military possibility to do so existed. A race ensued between the Anglo-American Allies and the Soviet troops to reach certain points in central Europe that were attributed strategic importance both militarily and politically. Northern Italy held such a key position.

(Allen Dulles, the OSS, and Nazi War Criminals: The Dynamics of Selective Persecution, Cambridge University Press, Kerstin von Lingen, 2013, p. 255) (IMG)

In the end, Northern Italy was surrendered to the Anglo-Americans, the Soviets were betrayed, and German troops moved eastward. As von Lingen confirmed, these:

negotiations between the U.S. intelligence service and the SS general violated existing Allied agreements.... ('Allen Dulles, the OSS, and Nazi War Criminals: The Dynamics of Selective Persecution', Cambridge University Press, Kerstin von Lingen, 2013, p. 6) (IMG)

Meanwhile, Gehlen hid his files in Bavaria, the agrarian petit-bourgeois territory in which Nazism was most entrenched, and eventually surrendered to the Americans:

As the Soviets drew closer to Berlin, Gehlen dispersed his staff and transferred the FHO's intelligence files from the capital to secret locations in Bavaria. There, Gehlen and his handpicked officers waited to surrender to American forces. (CIA AND NAZI WAR CRIM. AND COL. CHAP. 1-10, DRAFT WORKING PAPER 0010, Chapter 9: America's Seeing-Eye Dog on a Long Leash, CIA, p. 2) (IMG)

The British Prime Minister and the staff of the British military were devising contingency plans for a war against the USSR in alliance with the forces of the Third Reich. The British could not afford to launch a war against the USSR, but they nonetheless did need to contingency-plan for such an 'unthinkable' scenario. 'Operation UNTHINKABLE' the plan was called. Churchill's intentions were clarified to Truman, the newly-installed pro-Nazi American President, on May 12, 1945, just three days after the official 'surrender' of the Third Reich. 'I am profoundly concerned about the European situation' said Churchill in a Telegram to Truman, adding:

what is to happen about Russia? I have always worked for friendship with Russia but, like you, I feel deep anxiety because of their ... overwhelming influence in the Balkans excepting Greece, ... and above all their power to maintain very large Armies in the field for a long time. (Telegram from Prime Minister Winston Churchill to US President Truman, May 12th 1945, National Archives of the United Kingdom, Winston Churchill) (IMG)

'What will be the position in a year or two', Churchill added:

when the British and American Armies have melted and the French has not yet been formed on any major scale, when we may have a handful of divisions mostly French, and when Russia may choose to keep two or three hundred on active service? (Telegram from Prime Minister Winston Churchill to US President Truman, May 12th 1945, National Archives of the United Kingdom, Winston Churchill) (IMG)

Nevertheless, in late April when the Red Army was increasingly closer to the heart of Berlin, the British staff under Churchill were busy devising contingent plans for wars of elimination against the USSR which could:

only be achieved as a result of:

(a) The occupation of such areas of metropolitan Russia that the war making capacity of the country would be reduced to a point at which further resistance became impossible.

(b) Such a decisive defeat of the Russian forces in the field as to render it impossible for the U.S.S.R. to continue the war.

(Operation UNTHINKABLE, Final Report by the Joint Planning Staff, May 22, 1945, p. 1. in: National Archives of the United Kingdom) (IMG)

This was:

Apart from the chances of revolution in the U.S.S.R. and the political collapse of the present regime.... (Operation UNTHINKABLE, Final Report by the Joint Planning Staff, May 22, 1945, p. 2. in: National Archives of the United Kingdom) (IMG)

The British war Planning Staff assumed the:

full assistance from the Polish armed force [i.e. the Nazi-collaborationist Home Army] and ...of German [Nazi] manpower.... (Operation UNTHINKABLE, Final Report by the Joint Planning Staff, May 22, 1945, p. 1. in: National Archives of the United Kingdom) (IMG)

as well as the:

readiness of German industrial capacity. (Operation UNTHINKABLE, Final Report by the Joint Planning Staff, May 22, 1945, p. 1. in: National Archives of the United Kingdom) (IMG)

The Nazi military, party, and government – which by then had gone underground – were to engage in the conflict in support of the British forces. On the one hand, the British would use them for a frontal assault against the Soviets; on the other hand, the Nazi Underground, the Fourth Reich would utilize British aid to strengthen itself. This scenario had been predicted a year earlier by the US intelligence officer Curt Riess:

But it is not the [Nazi] guerrillas or their aides who will make up the dangerous part of the Nazi underground. It is, rather, those who will not make trouble openly; those who will seem to co-operate with the AMG [Allied Military Government in Occupied Territories]; those who, in order to demonstrate their good will, may quite conceivably ... become stool pigeons for the AMG....

This peaceful Nazi underground will have various ways and means of establishing an aura of confidence.

(The Nazis Go Underground, Curt Riess, May 1, 1944, p. 176) (IMG)

Riess did not specify which countries among the 'Allied' he was speaking of – the British, the Americans, or the Soviets. However, history proved that it was the Americans and even more so the British with whom the Nazis would collaborate. According to von Lingen – historian for the Stuttgart Attorney General in preliminary proceedings on Nazi war crimes in Italy and a Fellow at the Royal Historical Society and the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum – the German archives show that under Operation Unthinkable, the German troops were to remain armed 'in the interests of the West':

Still, the Soviet Union posed a considerable threat to the Western Allies in the spring of 1945. Therefore, contingency plans involving the support of German military units were drawn up and circulated at Allied headquarters under the codename Operation Unthinkable. (...). In a speech he gave on November 23, 1954, the aging Churchill himself had casually mentioned such plans from 1945 and thereby sparked one final major debate in British parliament and in the daily newspapers on his change of policy toward the end of the war. Although the possibility of a last-minute betrayal of the alliance had long been discussed in research, it had been considered merely a hypothesis and was always repudiated by other participants. With the help of German sources, it can now be shown that Operation Unthinkable was not merely a war game of the British military but of the vanquished German commanders to possibly keep their troops armed to continue the fight for Trieste, this time in the interest of the West. ('Allen Dulles, the OSS, and Nazi War Criminals: The Dynamics of Selective Persecution', Cambridge University Press, Kerstin von Lingen, 2013, pp. 255-256) (IMG)

Churchill himself, von Lingen noted, had admitted this in a 1954 speech:

In a 1954 speech, Churchill unleashed the last major controversy of his political career in parliament and in the daily newspapers when he acknowledged in passing that the idea to rely on the support of German troops to achieve local war aims against the Soviet Union had been considered at the time and circulated under the codename of Operation Unthinkable. The possibility of such a last-minute treasonous breach of the alliance fueled by East-West antagonism had been discussed in research but considered hypothetical. When the Cabinet files from the final days of the war were released as a routine measure in 1998 by the National Archive (PRO) in London, public

debate was again rekindled. With the help of German sources, it is now possible to confirm that Operation Unthinkable was not just a British military war-game scenario, but that the defeated German commanders had indeed kept their troops under arms with the expressed permission of the Western Allies.

Certain individual decision makers thus garnered sufficient leeway to undermine high-level political agreements by bringing about the critically important separate peace in northern Italy in exchange for the protection of alleged war criminals, as is evident in the case of Wolff. It must have been clear to the negotiators that any deal with the Germans went against the Casablanca agreements on the unconditional surrender of the German Reich. Hence, secrecy was the highest priority.

(Allen Dulles, the OSS, and Nazi War Criminals: The Dynamics of Selective Persecution, Cambridge University Press, Kerstin von Lingen, 2013, p. 6) (IMG)

In the 1954 speech, Churchill openly confessed:

Even before the war had ended and while the Germans were surrendering by hundreds of thousands, and our streets were crowded with cheering people, I telegraphed to Lord Montgomery directing him to be careful in collecting the German arms, to stack them so that they could easily be issued again to the German soldiers whom we should have to work with if the Soviet advance continued. (The Unity of the free Nations, Winston Churchill, November 23, 1954. In: Speeches of Winston Churchill, London 1974, Vol. 8, Robert James. Cited in: Allen Dulles, the OSS, and Nazi War Criminals: The Dynamics of Selective Persecution, Cambridge University Press, Kerstin von Lingen, 2013, p. 6) (IMG)

In 1945, just as the Anglo-American forces and the Red Army were marching towards Germany's heartland, Himmler ordered Eichmann's gang not to shoot at the Anglo-Americans:

In the middle of our move an orderly arrived from Kaltenbrunner with a directive from Reichsführer Himmler ordering us not to shoot at Americans or Englishmen. I countersigned it and ... I conveyed this order to the men. (MEMOIRS PART I, Adolf Otto Eichmann, November 1, 1960, PART II, pp. 24-25. Recorded by: CIA) (IMG{Israel})

Meanwhile, the Nazi Underground, which Reinhard Gehlen had established (see C11S1), was of special value for the Anglo-American imperialists. As such, the American intelligence service assisted the Gehlen group in entrenching the already-existing Nazi German intelligence network. This was regarded in foreign media as the 'reconstituting' and the 'reviving' of the Nazi German intelligence network that, in the first place, never 'died' for it to revive. In Bavaria, the agrarian petit-bourgeois zone in which the Nazis were so well-entrenched socially, the new capital of the Nazi German intelligence was established – particularly in the city of Pullach. From that time onwards, CIA documents frequently referred to Pullach, not to Bonn, as the capital of the Nazi German intelligence network. After his phony 'suicide' and fake 'death' in 1945, Hitler may well have escaped to Pullach, Bavaria.

The official declaration of the establishment of the 'Gehlen Organization' was in June 1946. According to Gehlen's own conservative estimates, 28% of the Gehlen Organization's members had a history of membership in the Nazi Party. Some time in the early 1950s:

Gehlen had told Critchfield (who served as the CIA's contact with the Germans and as chief of CIA's base at Pullach from 1948 through 1956) that 28 percent of his officers had been Nazi Party members. (CIA AND NAZI WAR CRIM. AND COL. CHAP. 1-10, DRAFT WORKING PAPER_0010, Chapter 9: America's Seeing-Eye Dog on a Long Leash, CIA, p. 36) (IMG)

Such estimates do not mention the Nazi Germans existing outside of the Nazi Party, nor does it speak of the many Slovak, Italian, etc. fascists that were not 'Nazis'. Nazi Germany's intelligence service ran the deep state of the West German government. West Germany contained much of the agrarian zones of Germany whereas East Germany contained the industrial zones. Hence, West Germany had a smaller proletariat. It was therefore harder for West Germany to transition to democracy, and easier for the Nazis to run that country. A failing democracy was established in West Germany, a terror state that banned the communist party but at the same time had some façade of democratic governance.

The entire regime apparatus of the Third Reich, the German army had gone underground. The state went underground but that does not mean the West German government was no longer ruling Germany; rather, in this context, it means that the West German government would serve as a mere façade of this 'underground' state. It means that the Nazi institutions had a powerful lobby which allowed them to control the West German state. No, the underground Nazi state cannot be regarded as a state separate from the West German state. Under the auspices of the Christian Democrats and the Kautskyites, the underground Nazi army began to resurface. Known as the Schnez Truppe, it:

was an organization of former German professional soldiers who were ... doing staff work now on how former professional soldiers could aid in the [supposed] defense of the Fatherland.... (Report on 16 October 1952 Meeting with KIBITZ-15 and his Reaction to BDJ"FLAP," CIA, October 28, 1952, p. 3) (IMG)

KIBITZ-15 was the code for Nazi German official Walter Kopp (IMG).

The leaders of Schnez Truppe were:

former Lt. Col. Albert Paul Schnez of Stuttgart-Gaisburg [after whom the group was obviously named], Ferher Strasse 12, manager or frontman; former General of Infantry Rudolf von Buenau of Stuttgart, Gaensheide Strasse 62, responsible head of organization. (Report on 16 October 1952 Meeting with KIBITZ-15 and his Reaction to BDJ"FLAP," CIA, October 28, 1952, p. 3) (IMG)

The Schnez Army had:

plans drawn up for the organization now of former soldiers into dormant groups or military formations. In time of hostilities, ... these soldiers would join Allied forces for the defense of the Fatherland. (Report on 16 October 1952 Meeting with KIBITZ-15 and his Reaction to BDJ"FLAP," CIA, October 28, 1952, p. 3) (IMG)

Agilolf Kesselring – a Lieutenant Colonel of the Federal Republic of Germany's military, and one of the foremost scholars on the history of the Schnez Truppe – noted that in the event of war, the Schnez Truppe would comprise a:

military force of about 40,000 men in their war.... (The Gehlen Organization and the Re-Formation of the Military in the Federal Republic, Agilolf Kesselring, 2017, p. 255) (IMG)

The following was the plan of the Schnez Army as outlined in the declassified CIA file:

- 1) The first will be the defense of the land East of the Donau and then withdrawal over the Donau. All former soldiers living East of the Donau would form groups now; activate in time of invasion and join the Allies in defense of that area and withdraw with them over
- 2) The second line of defense, a line running approximately north and south through Stuttgart. Same action as above, to;
- 3) The third line of defense, the Rhine, with same action by groups as above. Then in the worst military situation;

4) The withdrawal of Allied troops, the Selbsthilfe organized German groups included, down the Rhine valley into Spain. (Report on 16 October 1952 Meeting with KIBITZ-15 and his Reaction to BDJ"FLAP," CIA, October 28, 1952, pp. 3-4) (IMG)

The plan also calls for the evacuation (upon hostilities) of 100-200 former German officers who would be given the task of: a) organizing combat-qualified German males from the streams of refugee into military units to soldier with Allied forces; and, b) other logistical responsibilities in regard to the organization of such divisions. (Report on 16 October 1952 Meeting with KIBITZ-15 and his Reaction to BDJ"FLAP," CIA, October 28, 1952, p. 4) (IMG)

As mentioned in the US intelligence document, the Schnez Truppe would fight alongside the Anglo-American allies against the Soviet and Popular-Democratic forces.

The 'Gehlen Organization' (codenamed ZIPPER) (IMG) maintained close friendly ties with the head of the Schnez Truppe:

Schnez has evidently maintained contact ... with ZIPPER. (Report on 16 October 1952 Meeting with KIBITZ-15 and his Reaction to BDJ"FLAP," CIA, October 28, 1952, p. 4) (IMG)

In fact, according to Der Spiegel which examined the declassified German intelligence documents, the Gehlen Organization provided intelligence for the Schnez Army and vice versa:

Gehlen and Schnez also reached an agreement to share intelligence derived from spying efforts. Schnez boasted of having a "particularly well-organized" intelligence apparatus. (Nazi Veterans Created Illegal Army, Spiegel Online, Klaus Wiegrefe, May 15, 2014) (IMG)

Furthermore, Schnez successfully persuaded the Gehlen Organization to provide the former's army with financial support:

These contacts were made with the idea of having ZIPPER sponsor the [Schnez Army's] plan ... for providing the Western military forces with four German divisions four weeks after the outbreak of hostilities. (Report on 16 October 1952 Meeting with KIBITZ-15 and his Reaction to BDJ"FLAP," CIA, October 28, 1952, p. 4) (IMG)

In the original approach to ZIPPER [Gehlen Organization], the [Schnez Army] and [its leader] Schnez evidently sold ZIPPER with the idea for ZIPPER [desired] to furnish about 9,000 DM a month for the maintenance of a small Selbsthilfe planning staff. (Report on 16 October 1952 Meeting with KIBITZ-15 and his Reaction to BDJ"FLAP," CIA, October 28, 1952, p. 4) (IMG)

Selbsthilfe was a subgroup within the Schnez Army. The subgroup's:

full title is "Soldatenselbsthilfe in Sueddeutschland". It is also known as the South Wurttemberg Officers Group. (Report on 16 October 1952 Meeting with KIBITZ-15 and his Reaction to BDJ"FLAP," CIA, October 28, 1952, p. 4) (IMG)

It was an officers' organization. As was mentioned previously in this section, the Nazi Underground was predicted by Curt Riess to be using 'pension' funds as a cover for financial assistance for up-keeping this Nazi Underground. The establishment of veterans' organizations created the cover of 'insurance' providing and 'pension' funds which were all really financial assistance.

Der Spiegel suggested that 'apparently', well until the 1950s, the networks of SS organizations retained influence on West German politics:

According to another BND document seen by SPIEGEL, a division head raised the question of whether it was possible for the organization to take an aggressive stance against Skorzeny. The Gehlen Organization man suggested consulting "the SS", adding, the SS "is a factor and we should sound out opinions in detail there before making a decision." Apparently networks of old and former Nazis still exercised considerable influence during the 1950s. (Nazi Veterans Created Illegal Army, Spiegel Online, Klaus Wiegrefe, May 15, 2014) (IMG)

There is no need for the word 'apparently'. As with the Nazi Schnez Army, the SS as an organization had gone underground; its networks remained almost intact; it also had a very strong influence in German politics through a powerful lobby and intelligence organization known as 'Hilfsgemeinschaft auf Gegenseitigkeit der Angehörigen der ehemaligen Waffen-SS' (HIAG).

The Schnez Truppe marked the resurfacing of the Nazi army, the Wehrmacht, which had gone underground during the Great Patriotic War. Other underground Nazi organizations resurfaced as well. The Waffen-SS, the Nazi German intelligence service (SD), and the Reich Main Security Office (RSHA), which together formed the bulk of the underground Nazi state and party apparatus, resurfaced in 1951 as the 'HIAG'. The HIAG was a powerful group with its own propaganda apparatus as well as its own intelligence service called the 'Kameradschafts-ND', with extensive influence in West Germany and probably much of Western Europe, and a membership size that by the 1970s reached 120,000. Two documents from the CIA shed light on this matter. Having referred to the unnamed chief of Kameradschafts-ND as 'SUBJ[ECT]' and 'Identity 2', the CIA - codenamed as BKTRUST - noted that the unnamed chief had been the founder of the HIAG's intelligence organization; once the West German authorities found out about the existence of this intelligence service, 'Identity 2' founded the Kameradschafts-ND serving as the unofficial intelligence service of the HIAG. The following are excerpts of the two CIA documents:

SUBJ STATED [that] HE [was an] EARLY MEMBER [of the] SS AND [a] PROTÉGÉ [of] HEIDRICH WHO ASSIGNED HIM TO RSHA WHERE [he] HELD [the] RANK STURMBANNFUEHRER (MAJOR) AT [the] END [of the] WAR. CA 48 SUBJ [was] INSTRUMENTAL IN ORGANIZING [the] HILFSGEMEINSCHAFT AUF GEGENSEITIGKEIT (HIAG) WHICH [is a] VETERANS ORGANIZATION OF FORMER SS MEMBERS WITH CURRENT MEMBERSHIP [of] 120,000. SUBJ CLAIMS HIS JOB IS CHIEF OF "KAMERADSCHAFTS-ND" WHICH INFORMAL INTEL SECTION OF HIAG. ('SYRUP, GUENTHER_0022', CIA, March 1972, p. 1)

SUBJ CLAIMS HIS ORGANIZATION HAS RELIABLE CONTACTS IN GERMAN INDUSTRY, BUNDESWEHR, BANKING, GRENZSCHULTZ, POLICE ALL OF WHOM SUPPLY HIAG WITH CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION ON REQUEST. ALSO CLAIMS ROMANIAN CONTACTS THROUGH FORMER IRON GUARD MEMBERS. TWO UNIDENTIFIED SOURCES EAST BERLIN, SOURCE IN CZECH ELBE RIVER SHIPPING COMPANY, SON-IN-LAW WHO IN SWISS MILITARY. ('SYRUP, GUENTHER_0022', CIA, MARCH 1972, P. 1) (IMG)

According to Identity 2, his father - a conservative - occupied the post of Minister of Labor in the pre-HITLER German cabinet, and was imprisoned for a while after the takeover by the Nazis. Identity 2, who describes himself as "a national and a Nazi for reasons of ideology", joined the Waffen-SS at an early age. After short tour of duty with the "Sicherheitspolizei" in Prussia, Identity 2 was transferred to the "Reichssicherheitshauptamt" (RSHA) in Berlin where he worked in the section "Economic Espionage", and where he became a protegee of HEIDRICH. During World War II, he saw action in the Balkans and in Soviet Union, his last rank being that of "Sturmbannfuhrer" (Major). A lawyer by profession, Identity 2 was no longer permitted to practice law ... in 1948, and retired to his family's farm near Hamburg. A fanatical anti-Communist, he became one of the first organizers of the HIAG (Hilfsgemeinschaft auf Gegenseitigkeit), the association of former Waffen-SS members with current strength of ca 120,000 which publishes a monthly magazine

called the "Freiwilliger" (The Volunteer). Identity 2 then proceeded to organize an intelligence branch of the HIAG – the "Sicherheits-Referat" – but resigned from HIAG when it became evident that the authorities were watching this organization closely, and built his own informal intelligence network, the so-called "Kameradschafts-ND". This network is former members of the Waffen-SS (HIAG), RSHA, and SD, and allegedly possesses contacts in all walks of life, including political parties, police, Bundeswehr, industry, trade organizations, etc. According to Identity 2, the goal of his network is to continue fighting against Communism and left-wing Socialism in the ERG by means of providing the opposition parties CDU/CSU) with precise individuals who cooperate with the East. Identity 2, who showed several of his reports to [prominent German commander] STRAUSS, BARZEL, and other outstanding members of the opposition, and the thank-you letters he has received in return, stated that he is willing to furnish BKTRUST with similar or better information. ('GEHRICH, INGE MARIE_0040', CIA, July 1971, pp. 2-3) (IMG)

The existence of HIAG and its powerful intelligence and propaganda services is a testament to the continued existence of the underground Nazi Reich, which was designed by Reinhard Gehlen during the Great Patriotic War (see C11S1). It is also a demonstration of the tremendous covert intelligence and overt propaganda influence of this Nazi underground as explained by US intelligence officer Curt Riess in 1944. And indeed, Riess correctly predicted back then:

The picture in Germany immediately after the war would be somewhat as follows: at the top a few "decent, neutral" statesmen who, at first sight, seem to have no connection with the Nazis. Behind and around them a great number of men who seem willing, even eager, to collaborate with the AMG and the occupying authorities in order to retain their positions. Behind them innumerable front organizations and Nazi cells biding their time, waiting, lying low. And finally, at least during the first period of occupation, the relatively small group or groups of those who wage active resistance, the guerrillas and partisans. (The Nazis Go Underground, Curt Riess, May 1, 1944, pp. 184-185) (IMG)

With Heusinger as a top-ranking official of the West German government, the Nazi underground was able to entrench its influence in the West German regime. Heusinger and Speidel both were closely tied to Schnez:

Until July 1951, more and more reports were received in Pullach about Schnez. It was thus well known to the godfather [Gehlen] that [Schnez] not only had Graser's support but, in addition to the trust of Speidel, obviously also enjoyed that of Adenauer's other adviser in matters of security - Lieutenant General Adolf Heusinger's staff member. (The Gehlen Organization and the Re-Formation of the Military in the Federal Republic, Agilolf Kesselring, 2017, p. 255) (IMG)

The next step was a European military integration, which Adenauer advocated:

Adenauer ... pushed for West Germany to integrate more deeply with the West and for the establishment of the Bundeswehr. (Nazi Veterans Created Illegal Army, Spiegel Online, Klaus Wiegrefe, May 15, 2014) (IMG)

The agents of American finance capital were concerned by the communist 'spectre' that would have swept Western Europe. In the words of the CIA and State Department advisor Melvyn Leffler, the Americans were concerned by the force of 'revolutionary upheaval':

In April, Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy visited Germany and Western Europe. When he returned, he talked to Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson and President Truman. "He gave me a powerful picture of the tough situation that exists in Germany," wrote Stimson, "—something that is worse than anything probably that ever happened in the world. I had anticipated the chaos, but the details of it were appalling." During the following weeks, Undersecretary of State Joseph Grew as well as Acheson, Assistant Secretary of State William Clayton, and Byrnes became alarmed by portentous signs of revolutionary upheaval. (Safeguarding Democratic Capitalism: US Foreign Policy and National Security, 1920-1950. Melvyn P. Leffler, 2017, p. 203. Citing: For Stimson's comment, see diary entry, April 19, 1945 Stimson Diaries. For McCloy's report to the president, see Memorandum, April 26, 1945, HST, PSF, box 178. For State Department apprehensions, see, for example, FRUS, Potsdam, Vol. 1, pp. 524-525, 623.) (IMG)

The Nazi Germans and the Anglo-American imperialists needed each other's assistance to suppress such 'revolutionary upheavals'.

It remains an irrefutable fact that the Axis and the Anglo-American imperialists held common interests against the USSR since 1943, or rather late December 1942, when the productive forces of the USSR made that country a greater rival to Anglo-American interests than the much-destroyed Nazi German productive forces. The dialectical laws of history dictated that since Anglo-American imperialists had common interests with the Nazi German imperialists by late 1942, they were inevitably going to establish bonds and contacts for a general and comprehensive alliance in all fields, in all directions, in all sectors, on every corner of planet Earth, beneath the ground and 'even' in the space race.

C11S3. A More Aggressive Approach by the United States

The Truman Administration expected that fulfilling America's promises to the USSR would result in what the CIA and State Department advisor Melvyn Leffler called 'revolutionary upheaval' in Western Europe:

On June 24, Truman wrote Churchill, "From all the reports that reach me, I believe that without immediate concentration on the production of German coal we will have turmoil and unrest in the very areas of Western Europe on which the whole stability of the continent depends." A few days later it was decided that the president would issue a directive to ensure the export of 25 million tons of coal from Germany by April 1946. This objective was to take priority over all other considerations except the health and safety of occupation troops and the redeployment of Allied forces to the Pacific. (Safeguarding Democratic Capitalism: US Foreign Policy and National Security, 1920-1950. Melvyn P. Leffler, 2017, p. 203. Citing: For Truman's letter to Churchill, see *ibid.*, p. 612. For the directive to Eisenhower, see *ibid.*, Vol. 2, pp. 1028-1030) (IMG)

The American imperialists' concern was that the communist-led 'revolutionary forces in Western Europe' would rise:

Apprehension that revolutionary forces in Western Europe might bring Soviet influence to the Atlantic and Mediterranean impelled American officials to repudiate the Yalta agreements on Germany. (Safeguarding Democratic Capitalism: US Foreign Policy and National Security, 1920-1950. Melvyn P. Leffler, 2017, p. 205) (IMG)

Such fears:

decisively shaped American attitudes at Potsdam and impelled American officials to distance themselves from the position taken by Roosevelt at Yalta. (Safeguarding Democratic Capitalism: US Foreign Policy and National Security, 1920-1950. Melvyn P. Leffler, 2017, p. 204) (IMG)

Thus:

In the months between Yalta and Potsdam, ... American priorities changed significantly. In February, Roosevelt still sought Soviet cooperation to guarantee Germany's defeat and to perpetuate the wartime coalition into the postwar era. By July, Truman sought to revive Germany's coal production as a means to resurrect Western Europe and to contain the forces of revolution, even if it meant jeopardizing Soviet-American relations. Between February and July, the war in Europe ended and American officials became fully aware of the prospects for chaos, famine, and upheaval. (Safeguarding Democratic Capitalism: US Foreign Policy and National Security, 1920-1950. Melvyn P. Leffler, 2017, p. 203) (IMG)

Without the Americans' will to resist, Stalin would have taken over Europe. He said that if Roosevelt had still been alive, we would have succeeded. America would ... not have moved against us. Stalin was convinced, moreover, that Roosevelt had been assassinated and he blamed my father for having nothing to tell him about that matter. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 113) (IMG)

To honour its covert alliance with Nazi Germany, the United States blatantly violated its own official international agreements with the USSR: Byrnes sidestepped proposals for four-power control of the Ruhr industries, rejected the \$20 billion reparation figure [promised by the United States], argued that the Soviets should take reparations from their own zone in Germany, and proposed a settlement that safeguarded the potential resources of the Ruhr, Saar, and Rhine for Western European recovery. Molotov and Vyshinsky went to see Joseph Davies, whom Truman had invited to Potsdam as one of his closest advisers, and expressed disbelief at the overt violation of the meaning and spirit of the Yalta compromises. Neither Davies nor Byrnes nor Clayton really disputed Soviet claims. From the perspective of the State Department, however, new circumstances dictated new priorities and a reinterpretation of Yalta. It was now evident that Germany could not pay \$20 billion without risking economic chaos and revolution throughout Western Europe and without imposing a permanent drain on American financial resources. Nor could the Soviets be allowed to use their claim for reparations as a means to gain leverage over economic developments in Germany's industrial heartland. So a new formula had to be devised that entitled the Kremlin to reparations primarily from their own zone in eastern Germany rather than "from the national wealth of Germany," as stipulated in the Yalta accord. Transfers from the western zones to the Soviet Union were made contingent on a number of variables that the Kremlin had little means of controlling. (Safeguarding Democratic Capitalism: US Foreign Policy and National Security, 1920-1950. Melvyn P. Leffler, 2017, p. 204. Citing: For developments at Potsdam regarding Germany, see FRUS, Potsdam, Vol. 1, pp. 440-443, 491-492, 520-523, 587-588, 596; *ibid.*, vol. 2, pp. 141-142, 183-184, 297-298, 428-431, 472-475, 481-483, 486-493, 512-522; diary entry, July 28, 1945, Davies Papers, box 19; Frederick J. Dobney, ed., *Selected Papers of Will Clayton* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971), pp. 136-139.) (IMG)

American imperialism was keen to promote West Germany, in turn dominated by the Nazi Underground, as the dominant economic power of Western Europe. To honour its alliance with the West Germans, the United States government continued to break the Yalta commitments. 'By the summer of 1946', the CIA and State Department consultant Melvyn Leffler noted,:

the United States had determined that the reconstruction needs of Germany and Western Europe meant that no reparations from current production could go to the Soviet Union. Since Potsdam did not explicitly mandate such transfers, State Department officials argued that the Kremlin was not entitled to them (even though they had been explicitly mentioned in the Yalta agreements). (Safeguarding Democratic Capitalism: US Foreign Policy and National Security, 1920-1950. Melvyn P. Leffler, 2017, p. 212) (IMG)

Hence, the American imperialists, wary of Roosevelt faction attempts to fund Soviet power against US imperialism, suspended the delivery of reparations to the USSR from West Germany:

in May 1946 ... General Lucius Clay formally and unilaterally suspended delivery of reparations from the American occupation zone in Germany. The Soviets protested but to no avail. Clay's action was in response to the failure of the four occupation powers to agree on the economic unification and administration of Germany, as provided for in the Potsdam agreement. Indeed, a few months after Clay's decision, Clifford and Elsey cited the Soviet Union's actions in Germany as one of the litany of items demonstrating Soviet perfidy and untrustworthiness. Yet Clay himself did not blame the Soviet Union for the impasse in Germany. Nor did his superiors in Washington. In June 1946, Secretary of War Patterson and Assistant Secretary Howard C. Petersen, the officials responsible for the implementation of occupation policy, wrote the president that however much the Soviets might benefit from economic unrest and chaos in the Western zones of Germany and in Western Europe, it was the French, not the Soviets, who were the source of the problem and who were most egregiously disregarding the Potsdam accords. (Safeguarding Democratic Capitalism: US Foreign Policy and National Security, 1920-1950. Melvyn P. Leffler, 2017, p. 212. Citing: For background on the suspension of reparations, see John Gimbel, *The Origins of the Marshall Plan* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1976), pp. 53-140; and John H. Backer, *Winds of History: The German Years of Lucius DuBignon Clay* (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1983), pp. 121-124. For the emphasis on France as the most flagrant violator of the Potsdam agreement, see Jean Edward Smith, ed., *The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay, Germany 1945-1949*, 2 vols. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974), Vol. 1, pp. 243-244; and Patterson to Truman, June 11, 1946, HSTP, PSF, box 157. Also see FRUS, 1946, vol. 2, pp. 486-488. Although the French had not been invited to Berlin and had not signed the Potsdam accords, American officials expected the French to comply with the terms of the agreements.) (IMG)

The United States violated the Potsdam Agreement with the USSR:

The "first charge" principle meant that reparations should not be paid until German exports were sufficient to finance German imports (thereby reducing U.S. occupation costs and abetting economic reconstruction in Western Europe). Yet the "first charge" principle was of little importance to the Kremlin, whose representatives continually insisted that the Western powers should comply with the reparations obligations spelled out at Yalta and Potsdam. Their argument was well founded because section 19 of the Potsdam agreement on economic principles explicitly exempted the transfer of equipment and products from the western zones to the Soviet Union from the application of the "first charge" principle. Notwithstanding the legitimacy of their position, Soviet leaders' contempt for the "first charge" principle and their tacit support of French opposition to the economic unification of Germany provoked Byrnes in mid-1946 to threaten a reconsideration of Poland's western border. Since the boundary had been the key Soviet achievement at Potsdam and the trade-off for Soviet acceptance of Byrnes's reparation formula, the American threat must have prompted Soviet officials to wonder who indeed was adhering to agreements. (Safeguarding Democratic Capitalism: US Foreign Policy and National Security, 1920-1950. Melvyn P. Leffler, 2017, p. 213) (IMG)

In response to repeated violations of the Potsdam Agreement, the Soviets launched the Berlin Blockade to cripple the Anglo-American imperialist presence in West Berlin and to pave the way for the liberation of West Berlin. In this operation, the USSR prevented the Americans from providing aid to West Berlin. One objective was to pressure the Americans onto the negotiations so to force them to commit to their agreements at Potsdam and Yalta, by providing the reparations from Ruhr. The CIA analyzed the events as such:

The blockade of Berlin is designed, in the first instance, to compel the Western Powers to reopen quadripartite negotiations with respect to Germany as a whole and to render them acquiescent to Soviet terms. At no more cost than the relaxation of this pressure for the time being and perhaps minor concessions on such matters as reparations, the USSR would hope to gain an effective voice in the control of Western Germany and especially of the Ruhr. By this means it could prevent the consolidation of a West German state aligned with the West and could gain an opportunity to bring about an eventual eastward orientation of Germany as a whole. The corresponding broader consequences would be to reduce the contribution of the Ruhr to the recovery of Western Europe, to gain a share in Ruhr production for the USSR and its satellites, and to prevent or retard the consolidation of a Western European community antagonistic toward the USSR. If the Western Powers refuse to negotiate, however, or to accept in negotiation the USSR's terms, the current blockade of Berlin will have so weakened the Western position there as to hasten the day when the USSR would expect it to become untenable. Denied quadripartite agreement on Germany as a whole, in all probability the USSR would intensify its presently coercive blockade into a decisive effort, by all means short of armed force, to compel the Western Powers to withdraw from Berlin, would establish there a "national" German government, and would employ every means of political warfare and subversion to prevent the consolidation of a West German state and to bring about an eventual unification of Germany by accession of the West to the Soviet-controlled East.

(Review of the World Situation, CIA 7-48, CIA July 14, 1948, p. 1) (IMG)

C11S4. The Roosevelt Faction *** IMG-All-{The Roosevelt Faction}

By 1944, Britain was no longer the greatest imperial power in the world. The United States was a rapidly emerging economic and military powerhouse, followed by the gradual decline of the British Empire. For Britain, fostering a strategic balance of power between the Third Reich and the Soviet Union required the MI6 to involve Washington in European affairs on London's side. Without America on its side, the British Empire would have surely been doomed. The American imperialists fully sided with the British imperialists on all fronts, every step of the way, for the class interests of American and British finance capital was virtually the same at the time. Much to the dismay of the British, however, the Roosevelt faction in the United States, the agents of the proletariat disguised as 'American imperialist' 'liberals', sympathized with the Soviet Union, and stood as an obstacle, not a friend, to the newly re-shaped Anglo-American-Axis bloc. Stephen Ambrose – the Ernest J. King Professor of Maritime History at the Naval War College – et al. noted:

Documents show that Roosevelt ... and his advisors believed that "Britain epitomized much of what was wrong with the world." Indeed, the White House argued that British colonial policies were chiefly responsible for the international rivalries that brought on both world wars. During the interwar period, the British had encouraged the outbreak of economic depression and war through a closed economic system conducive to commercial and political rivalries. The Roosevelt administration wanted to replace the British system of imperial preference with a Wilsonian program of world interdependence based on a liberal commercial network resting on the principle of reciprocity. In this manner, the President could satisfy Wilsonian idealists while realistically involving the United States in international affairs. The White House wanted to redesign the postwar global economy into one based on the end of colonialism and the institution of free trade that, the writer correctly argues, meant "equal commercial opportunity" and "the elimination of discriminatory trade practices." (War Comes Again: Comparative Vistas on the Civil War and World War II, Oxford University Press, Stephen Ambrose, Michael Adams, Ira Berlin, 1995, p. 192) (IMG)

Therefore, the Anglo-American imperialists hatched plots to install a new Administration in the United States, one friendly to Anglo-American and Nazi German imperialist interests.

Roosevelt himself as US President was sympathetic to the USSR and antipathic towards the British, but the agents that surrounded Roosevelt were all loyal to American imperialism and hence loyal to an alliance with British imperialism. The centuries-old British intelligence service was to lead the way in establishing US intelligence. The founder of the US central intelligence, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), was William Donovan. The most important figure who in the post-WWII years proposed the founding of the 'Central Intelligence Agency' – and he was one of the first to use that phrase before the phrase became the official name of the agency – was William Donovan. And William Donovan was more loyal to British intelligence than to American intelligence. He was an MI6 agent. That is confirmed by Auriol Weigold, who is the:

Professor at the School of Government and Politics, Faculty of Business, Government and Law at the University of Canberra. She has been a Fellow and Honorary Fellow at the Australian Prime Ministers Centre at Old Parliament House... (Auriol Weigold, Senior Visiting Fellows, Future Directions International) (IMG)

According to Weigold, throughout World War II,;

Donovan also had an MI-6 code number and was a member of Churchill's Special Operations Executive (SOE). ('Churchill, Roosevelt and India: Propaganda During World War II'. Auriol Weigold, p. 13) (IMG)

Hence the MI6 operative Donovan founded the US central intelligence, the OSS:

On his return from Europe in mid-1941, Donovan was appointed Coordinator of Information (COI), which later became the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), directed by Donovan from June 1942. ('Churchill, Roosevelt and India: Propaganda During World War II'. Auriol Weigold, p. 13) (IMG)

The OSS was of course the parent to the CIA. The founding of the OSS was with the partial instigation of the MI6:

Churchill's intelligence chief in the United States, William Stephenson, promoted the creation of the COI and OSS. ('Churchill, Roosevelt and India: Propaganda During World War II'. Auriol Weigold, p. 13) (IMG)

It is a well-known fact that Donovan founded the OSS after a meeting with Stephenson and the British monarchs in Britain. At the time, since Britain was lobbying for US involvement in Europe against the Axis, the MI6 agent Donovan was cautiously welcomed by US President Roosevelt, for Donovan could convince the Congress to sell arms to Britain.

In 1940, the MI6 expanded its intelligence ties with the FBI chief Hoover. In his book, Keith Jeffrey, whom the British intelligence service selected as its official historian, wrote that the MI6 spymaster William:

Stephenson visited [FBI head Edgar] Hoover on 16 April and (as the American record dryly put it) ‘discussed arrangements for cooperation between the British Service and the Federal Bureau of Investigation’. (MI6: The History of the Secret Intelligence Service 1909-1949, Keith Jeffery, p. 439) (IMG)

London reminded ... Stephenson ‘that any liaison resulting from this must be entirely unofficial’ (MI6: The History of the Secret Intelligence Service 1909-1949, Keith Jeffery, p. 439) (IMG)

General Edwin Watson, who was in charge of the White House approved of and tacitly supported the MI6’s relationship with the FBI:

Hoover took very good care to clear the arrangement with President Roosevelt’s secretary, General Edwin M. Watson, and ensure that [he] had no objection to the proposed relationship ... between the FBI and SIS. (MI6: The History of the Secret Intelligence Service 1909-1949, Keith Jeffery, p. 439) (IMG)

The strategic partnership of the American imperialists with the Nazi Germans was manifest in the struggles in the White House, the struggles for power and life. A hybrid coup d’etats against the pro-Soviet elements in the White House, centered around Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Harry Hopkins, and Henry Wallace took place. Stalin had correctly assessed that Roosevelt had been assassinated and that had Roosevelt been alive, the Soviet-backed communist-led popular fronts would have taken over continental Europe:

Without the Americans’ will to resist, Stalin would have taken over Europe. He said that if Roosevelt had still been alive, we would have succeeded. America would ... not have moved against us. Stalin was convinced, moreover, that Roosevelt had been assassinated and he blamed my father for having nothing to tell him about that matter. (‘Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin’s Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 113) (IMG)

The anti-Soviet MI6 operative Richard West wrote in his book:

President Roosevelt wanted to rid the world of empires, whether that of the British in India or of the French in Indo-China.... (Tito: and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, p. 177) (IMG)

By attempting to rid the world of empires, Roosevelt was obviously paving the way for the establishment of Popular-Democratic governance throughout the world. An examination of the conditions in the countries of Western Europe – from France to West Germany to Italy, from Sweden to Denmark – leaves no doubt that Western Europe, possibly minus Spain, would have been ruled by the Peoples’ Democracies had the Roosevelt faction in the United States not been decimated. The installation of Harry Truman undoubtedly prevented Roosevelt’s project to hand Europe and East Asia over to the Peoples’ Democracies:

In the months between Yalta and Potsdam, ... American priorities changed significantly. In February, Roosevelt still sought Soviet cooperation to guarantee Germany’s defeat and to perpetuate the wartime coalition into the postwar era. By July, Truman sought to revive Germany’s coal production as a means to resurrect Western Europe and to contain the forces of revolution, even if it meant jeopardizing Soviet-American relations. Between February and July, the war in Europe ended and American officials became fully aware of the prospects for chaos, famine, and upheaval. (Safeguarding Democratic Capitalism: US Foreign Policy and National Security, 1920-1950. Melvyn P. Leffler, 2017, p. 203) (IMG)

The USSR’s access to many of the industrial zones of Germany was facilitated by team Roosevelt’s stab in the back of the American imperialists. The Truman Administration, upon rising to prominence, attempted to undo as many of Roosevelt’s projects as possible, as a part of the Cold War against the USSR. Harry Hopkins, one of the closest comrades of Roosevelt, was yet another traitor to American imperialism. Harry Hopkins went to Moscow and reaffirmed to Stalin the fact of the hostility of the Truman group towards the USSR:

When Hopkins was sent to Moscow by Truman on 26 May 1945, he reported to Stalin that Roosevelt had been very disappointed by Stalin’s conduct during the last days of his life, and warned him that the change in American policy had already begun. Hopkins said that Truman, knowing that the Soviets had confidence in him, wanted to make use of him, and added that he refused to play that game and misinform Stalin.³⁴ Had he passed that message at his government’s request or had he done it unknown to them? I favour the second hypothesis. At this time the worsening of relations between the USSR and the Western Powers was still covered up. (‘Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin’s Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 114) (IMG)

By whatever means necessary, Washington’s pro-Axis elites aimed to oust Hopkins. Plots were hatched to prevent him from living longer. In fact, this was the stated aim of Admiral Ross McIntire, the White House’s chief physician:

“Our biggest job is to keep Harry [Hopkins] from ever feeling completely well,” said the White House physician, Admiral Ross T. McIntire. (Pearl Harbor: FDR Leads the Nation into War, Steven M. Gilon) (IMG)

Yet despite his illness, his zest for life endeared him to Roosevelt. The president’s physician, however, was less pleased [with Hopkins], once declaring, “Our biggest job is to keep Harry from ever feeling completely well. (...).” (The Internationalists: How a Radical Plan to Outlaw War Remade the World, Oona A. Hathway, Scott J. Shapiro, p. 190) (IMG)

The President’s physician, Admiral Ross T. McIntire once said: “Our biggest job is to keep Harry [Hopkins] from ever feeling completely well.(...)” (Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History, Robert Emmet Sherwood) (IMG)

Hopkins was already ill during the War. However, had adequate medical care been provided for him, he could, against the will of the pro-Axis elites, live longer. When McIntire, the physician of the White House, sided with the pro-Axis elites in America, there was little chance for Hopkins. Over time, the advisor’s health deteriorated until he became too weak to be involved in politics. In 1946, seven months after the Great Patriotic War, he died at the age of 55.

It is true that the American imperialists had turned in favour of the Nazis against the USSR by 1943; yet, so is it also true that the ostensible ‘alliance’ of the United States with the USSR provided Soviet spies in the United States the cover and the excuse they needed for assisting America’s ‘ally’ by providing it top secret military-nuclear intelligence materials. Indeed, that is how the Soviet spies in the Manhattan Project operated – they helped America’s ‘ally’ in the war against the Nazis by assisting the USSR’s nuclear program. In so doing, these Soviet spies obviously stabbed the American imperialists. These Soviet spies were protected by their superiors from the Roosevelt faction. The ouster of the Roosevelt faction paved the way for a purge of these pro-Soviet elements in the US nuclear program. Later on, when Kennedy rose to leadership of the White House, Kennedy restored many of these agents linked to the Soviet espionage network back to prominence. The Kennedy faction used its network to spy on Israel’s nuclear program and then provided the intelligence materials to the Nasserist Egyptians. The elimination of the Roosevelt faction back then undermined the Soviet intelligence influence in the US government.

Besides Hopkins, another close agent of Roosevelt was Henry A. Wallace, a pro-Soviet politician from the Democratic Party, attacked by Allen Dulles's intelligence network and backed by the Soviet intelligence network.

Throughout 1944, Dulles had worked tirelessly to get Washington on board for an alliance with the Third Reich. On behalf of Dulles, the pro-Nazi elements in Washington were working tirelessly to oust the Soviet-friendly officials, Wallace among them. A large contingent of the Democratic Party absolutely despised Roosevelt and Wallace. Henry A. Wallace was regarded by the reactionary Kautskyite 'Democrats' as too:

pro-Soviet.... (Oral History Interview with Edwin W. Pauley, Harry S. Truman Library and Museum, March 1, 1971) (IMG)

Pro-Soviet he was. The Democrats, in their drive to oust Wallace, were in conflict with President Roosevelt himself because:

Roosevelt continued to say publicly and privately that he admired Wallace and that he was the obvious vice-presidential candidate. (Vice Presidents: A Biographical Dictionary, Edward Purcell, p. 326) (IMG)

The voting Democrats supported Wallace, but the agents of finance capital in the Democratic Party, the foes of the Roosevelt faction as they were, organized a soft putsch to oust Wallace:

The Gallup Poll said 65 per cent of the voting Democrats wanted Wallace and that 2 per cent wanted Senator Truman.

But the party bosses could not boss Wallace. They made a coalition with the Roosevelt-haters and skillfully but cynically mowed down the unorganized Wallace forces.

(St. Petersburg Times, July 22, 1944) (IMG)

A key official leading the Democrats in the front against Wallace was Edwin Pauley, a prominent businessman in the petroleum sector who had financial ties to the Axis powers. Importantly, he was an intelligence agent for Allen Dulles in the Roosevelt Administration. Former high-level US government prosecutor and CIA agent John Joseph Loftus claimed:

One of Allen Dulles's secret spies inside the Democratic party later became George Bush's partner in the Mexican oil business. Edwin Pauley, a California oil man, was, like James Forrestal, one of Dulles's covert agents in the Roosevelt and Truman administrations. Like Forrestal, Pauley was a "big business" Democrat. The parallels didn't end there.

During Roosevelt's presidency, Pauley was a major Democrat fundraiser and held a series of top posts, including treasurer of the Democratic party's National Committee. He was also director of the Democratic convention in 1944 and had an unrivaled reputation as a man who could shake a great deal of money out of the oil companies, which were notoriously right-wing.... (...). The truth is that Pauley was committed to profit and, like the Dulles brothers, could not distinguish between his own interests and his public duties. During World War II he was in the perfect position to assist the Dulles clique in their Nazi oil deals.

(The Secret War Against Jews: How Western Espionage Betrayed the Jewish People, John Joseph Loftus, Mark Aarons) (IMG)

For replacing Wallace, Harry Truman was Dulles agent Pauley's choice. As early as June 24, 1941 – only two days after the Third Reich's invasion of the USSR – Truman had openly said:

If we see that Germany is winning we ought to help Russia and if Russia is winning we ought to help Germany and that way let them kill as many as possible. (The New York Times, June 24, 1941) (IMG)

By 1944, the USSR was winning, and so the US intelligence believed that Truman's philosophy would need to be implemented. Pauley launched a campaign to overthrow Wallace and install Truman in his place. In his own words:

I organized a campaign to prevent Henry Wallace from becoming the Vice President and used all the influence that I had in the Democratic Party to bring this about. This came about by my recruiting all of the Democratic friends of great influence that I had within the party and particularly those that had influence with President Roosevelt.... (Oral History Interview with Edwin W. Pauley, Harry S. Truman Library and Museum, March 1, 1971) (IMG)

Pauley was instrumental:

in getting [Truman] the delegate numbers to replace Henry Wallace as vice president in 1944.... (The Secret War Against Jews: How Western Espionage Betrayed the Jewish People, John Joseph Loftus, Mark Aarons) (IMG)

In collaboration with General Edwin M. Watson, Edwin Pauley launched a soft coup against Wallace:

A cabal consisting of party treasurer Edwin W. Pauley, party secretary George B. Allen, the president's appointments secretary Major General Edwin M. Watson, together with national chairman Robert E. Hannegan and preceding chairman and then Postmaster General Frank C. Walker, thereupon determined to destroy Wallace. General Watson kept Wallace admirers out of the president's office and brought in Wallace antagonists. Gradually, the group [pressured] the president ... to their point of view. (Vice Presidents: A Biographical Dictionary, Edward Purcell, p. 326) (IMG)

Wallace was ousted and Harry Truman was installed as the Vice President.

On April 12, 1945, Roosevelt died at the age of 63. Photos of him prior to his death indicate that he was becoming increasingly weaker as time went by. Undoubtedly, the US President was old by then – but not so old as to die naturally, unless due to a disease. The official line was that he died of cerebral hemorrhage. However, data to prove or reject this thesis on the circumstances of Roosevelt's death is highly insufficient. As mentioned previously, his medical file has not been disclosed to the public, to date. Furthermore, Roosevelt's body did not even undergo any autopsy:

It is unlikely we will ever know with absolute certainty what killed the thirty-second president of the United States. No autopsy was performed.... (FDR's Deadly Secret, Eric Fettmann, Steven Lomazow, p. 8) (IMG)

There was no autopsy, and the rumor circulated ... that he was assassinated by his own bodyguards. (Franklin Delano Roosevelt: Champion of Freedom, Conrad Black, p. 366) (IMG)

save for a few slips that turned up in 1957, the whereabouts of Roosevelt's medical file, maintained by Ross McIntire, has been unknown since his death. (FDR's Deadly Secret, Eric Fettmann, Steven Lomazow, p. 8) (IMG)

Again, McIntire was directly responsible for the lack of autopsy and most likely the sudden disappearance of the President's medical records as well.

In an article for The Boston Globe, Dr. Steinberg remarked:

Much of the continued speculation concerning Roosevelt's health can be blamed on the actions of McIntire, Roosevelt's physician. After Roosevelt's death, no autopsy was performed because, as McIntire would later write in his book, White House Physician, there was "no useful purpose to be served by it." Had one been performed, many of the persistent controversies would be moot. Soon after Roosevelt died, his medical records, which were kept in the safe at the National Naval Medical Center in Bethesda, disappeared. Only three individuals - one of them McIntire - had access to them. It is generally believed that McIntire removed and destroyed those records,

fueling the speculation there was a well-hidden secret about Roosevelt's health. (Dr. Lahey's dilemma; Why the founder of the Lahey Clinic chose to conceal his report on President Franklin D. Roosevelt's medical exam - and how it was finally revealed six decades later, *The Boston Globe*, Dr David Steinberg, May 29, 2011) (IMG)

Stalin agreed with the claim that Roosevelt was murdered. Sergo Beria, son of Lavrenti Beria, remarked:

Stalin was convinced, moreover, that Roosevelt had been assassinated and he blamed my father [who was an MI6 agent] for having nothing to tell him about that matter. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 113) (IMG)

If Roosevelt was murdered, McIntire was most likely involved in the assassination plot. And if so, certain questions would be raised: did McIntire act independently or did he belong to a terrorist bloc or intelligence service?

Stalin believed that the MI6 was responsible for the assassination. Elliott Roosevelt, son of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, recalled that in a 1946 interview with Stalin, the Soviet leader told him that the British government poisoned the US president:

In an article in *Parade* magazine, Elliott Roosevelt also said that Stalin told him in a post-war interview that he believed the president had been poisoned by members of the British prime minister's "gang." ('Stalin Admitted Knowledge Of English, Roosevelt's Son Says'. AP News, Rick Hampson, February 6, 1986) (IMG)

The Soviet leader's claims must be taken very seriously as he (1) had much to lose from the death of his friend and ally in Washington and (2) may have had access to high-level intelligence sources indicating that the MI6 was behind the murder. The MI6, after all, was in control of the OSS and Donovan probably had enough power centralized around himself to launch a coup against the US President. The MI6 was planning to further involve the United States in forging an alliance with the Anglo-Axis bloc. Doing so required the MI6 to oust Soviet-friendly elements in Washington, and to install a new cabinet more rigidly in line with US imperial regime objectives, hostile to Soviet power, and friendly to Nazism. It made sense for the MI6 to plan to eliminate Roosevelt, along with Wallace and Hopkins.

Pages 35 to 70 of the book 'A Conspiracy of Silence: The Health and Death of Franklin D. Roosevelt' (2007) by Dr. Harry S. Goldsmith provide a very extensive research on the suspicious circumstances of the death of Roosevelt. The book provides evidence that the death of Roosevelt was likely a case of medical sabotage by a band of American killer-doctors. My personal tentative impression, based on that book and research from other areas, has been that McIntire was responsible for the medical sabotage against Roosevelt, whereas Bruenn was probably not guilty. Note that it was McIntire who explicitly stated: 'Our biggest job is to keep Harry [Hopkins] from ever feeling completely well'.

In early March of 1944, Vice Admiral McIntire appointed Lieutenant Howard Bruenn as a cardiologist doctor for the President. The official website of the US Navy Bureau of Medicine and Surgery stated:

Early in March 1944, the president's primary physician Vice Adm. Ross McIntire recruited Lt. Cmdr. Howard Bruenn (1905-1995), a talented Navy cardiologist at Naval Hospital Bethesda, Maryland, to conduct a complete heart and lung examination on the president. (The President's Vital Signs: A Look Back at FDR's Heart Health, Navy Medicine Live: The Official Blog of the US Navy Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, André B. Sobocinski (Bureau of Medicine Historian)) (IMG)

One factor leading me towards tentatively believing that Bruenn may have been innocent in this affair is Bruenn's rivalry with McIntire. A long article by the US Navy, defending McIntire, nonetheless admitted that Bruenn had a negative impression of McIntire:

In his later years, Bruenn was frequently sought out to discuss his experiences treating President Roosevelt, including a detailed interview by Navy Medicine in 1990/75; To all Bruenn spoke with, he left a distinctly negative impression of his mentor, VADM McIntire. (NAVY MEDICINE, Vol. 99, No. 4, U.S. Navy, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, Steven Lomazow July-August 2008, p. 23) (IMG)

Bruenn apparently believed that McIntire did not provide the necessary medical care for Roosevelt.

Stalin believed that the British were responsible for aggressively promoting the American imperialist anti-Soviet tendency in the US government. The anti-Soviet forces in the United States inevitably held the upper hand in the US government, but the British undoubtedly contributed immensely to their promotion. The US ambassador to Moscow in 1946 recalled the following conversation with Stalin:

I then asked directly why the Generalissimo [Stalin] thought that any power or powers seemed a threat to the USSR. To this he replied: "Churchill - He tried to instigate war against Russia, and persuaded the US to join him in armed occupation of part of our territory in 1919, and lately he has been at it again."

"Russia," he said, "as the events of the past few years have proved, is not stupid, and we can recognize our friends from our potential enemies."

I replied that we ourselves must plead stupidity since it was impossible for us to imagine a threat to Russia, particularly in the direction of the Baku oil fields, or any serious attempt at aggression without the support of the United States, which would never be given to aggression.

I then asked him categorically if he really believed that the US and Great Britain were united in an alliance to thwart Russia. He replied that he did so believe.

(711.61/4-546: Telegram, top secret, priority, The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, April 5, 1946, 6 PM; Received 6:38 PM. In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1946, EASTERN EUROPE, THE SOVIET UNION, VOLUME VI, p. 735) (IMG)

If Britain was the perpetrator of the probable murder of Roosevelt, then there must have been a connection between British intelligence and McIntire. McIntire was a Vice Admiral of the US imperial Army, and thus an agent of American imperialism. Since American imperialism was allied to British imperialism, all American agents were inevitably serving British intelligence as well. However, of the existence of a more direct or special connection between McIntire and the MI6 or the latter's agent William Donovan, I am unaware. Nonetheless, what can be stated for certain is that there should be no surprise if Britain utilized a gang of killer-doctors for eliminating its obstacles in Washington. The use of killer-doctors for murdering prominent officials has been a classic tradition of the British intelligence service, along with any other imperialist-fascist secret service.

After having ousted Wallace, having seen the extremely suspicious death of Harry Hopkins, and having possibly murdered Roosevelt, the Allen Dulles network, through the Truman team, slowly began a purge of some of the Roosevelt faction Democrats.

The crypto-communist and pro-Soviet forces made yet another effort to resurge the Roosevelt faction back to dominance of the White House. There were two main choices. One was for the remnants of the Roosevelt faction to directly compete against Truman in the 1948 election. The other option was to support Truman in exchange for concessions on the part of Truman to the pro-Soviet Roosevelt-Wallace faction. The membership base and electoral base of the Democratic Party was the American working class, a factor that catapulted upwards the Roosevelt faction in the Democratic

Party. Truman, although a militantly anti-Soviet reactionary, was nonetheless under a greater pressure by the proletarian-backed Roosevelt faction than the Republican/GOP candidates were. Hence, Truman was partially coopted by the Roosevelt faction into pursuing a less anti-Soviet policy than the GOP candidates who were not so under proletarian pressure and not so coopted by the pro-Soviet progressives. Therefore, Truman was objectively preferred over the GOP candidates. In this midst, should the Roosevelt faction have turned against Truman during the 1948 election, even at the risk of a split amongst the Democrats, a split to be exploited by the more anti-proletarian and anti-Soviet GOP? Back then, the American public opinion was in the favour of the Democratic Party and a Democratic politician was going to win anyways. Therefore, the remnants of the Roosevelt faction decided to compete against Truman during the election, correctly calculating that they would not lose to the more anti-Soviet GOP candidate. Henry A. Wallace formed the Progressive Party and ran against Harry Truman.

Wallace was backed by the Communist Party of USA (CPUSA). Wallace was also backed by the Soviet intelligence network in the Zionist movement. Moshe Sneh – the former Haganah commander, the leader of the Soviet spy front party Mapam, and a Soviet spy himself – went to the United States to back Wallace in the Presidential elections via a ‘progressive Zionist’ group:

I saw Sneh at his request. He is one of the leaders of the United Mapam Workers' Party, having previously been in command of the Hagana. In conversation Sneh told me that he was leaving in a few days' time for the US as his party's delegate in order to establish closer relations with a certain progressive Zionist group in the US. This group has recently been linked to Wallace's Party and supports his candidacy in the presidential elections. Sneh's task is to organize propaganda in the US, aiming to make the group work more actively in support of Wallace. Sneh, being a foreigner, cannot speak publicly for Wallace, but he will support him through the Zionist group. He thinks he will stay in the US until the presidential elections and may stop off in Paris on his way back. (DIARY: AVP RF. F.089, OP.1, P.1. D3, LL.5-6, Secret, Meeting: P.I. Ershov – M. Sneh, Tel Aviv, October 9, 1948. In: “Documents on Israeli-Soviet Relations, 1941-1953, Parts 1-2”, Israeli Foreign Ministry, Russian Foreign Ministry, Israel State Archives, Russian Federal Archives, p. 379) (IMG{Israel})

The ‘Progressive Zionist’ organization to which Sneh was referring was likely the organization ‘Progressive Zionist League’ (PZL), which had roots in the Hashomer Hatzair. The PZL had a major role in the establishment of ‘Americans for Progressive Israel’ (API) and ‘Partners for Progressive Israel’ (PPI). The PZL supported Wallace in the 1948 elections:

Organizationally, Partners for Progressive Israel has roots in the Hashomer Hatzair youth movement, founded in 1913 in Galicia, Austria-Hungary. In 1947, a number of adult former members of Hashomer Hatzair felt the need to maintain social and political cohesion even if not making Aliyah (moving to Israel); many were involved in the Progressive Party campaign of Henry Wallace. They created an organization called the Progressive Zionist League (PZL). (PPI'S ROOTS AND HISTORY, Partners for Progressive Israel, Arieh Lebowitz & Ralph Seliger) (IMG{Israel})

C11S5. Soviet Campaign against American Imperialist Hawks *** IMG-All-{Cultural Cold War}

The Soviet program was to promote the ‘peace’ campaign in order to prevent the remilitarization of Germany, to prevent the strengthening of the Nazis and NATO. The Soviets also aimed to strengthen the pro-Soviet dovish capitulationist tendency in the United States, the tendency that had the support of the American proletariat and was concentrated in strength in the Democratic Party, so that the USSR would develop its military against a weak level of resistance from the American imperialists. The dovish tendency, which had the backing of the American proletarians, was undoubtedly going to render the US imperialist military much weaker.

Meanwhile, inspired by the Soviet Union:

A world-wide collection of signatures “for peace” was directed against the “remilitarization of Germany” and against the “aggressive” Atlantic Pact. (The Soviet Bloc (Survey 1950 and 1951), CIA, p. 1) (IMG)

And:

A series of Soviet-sponsored cultural conferences beginning in September 1948 called for world peace and denounced the policies of the Truman administration. (‘Origins of the Congress for Cultural Freedom, 1949-50’, CIA, Michael Warner, p. 90) (IMG)

Referring to the West during the 1940s and early 1950s, the CIA pointed to:

Communism’s appeal to artists and intellectuals.... (‘Origins of the Congress for Cultural Freedom, 1949-50’, CIA, Michael Warner, p. 89) (IMG)

It was not just the intellectuals; the anti-imperialist movement in the United States, said Raymond Murphy of the US State Department’s Office of European Affairs, ‘actually embrace[d] far more than intellectuals’, with a larger population of Americans supporting the communist aims of ‘pacifism’ and ‘isolationism’:

Now the theme is that the United States and the Western democracies are the war-mongers and Fascists and the Kremlin and its stooges the peace-loving democracies. And there is a better than even chance that by constant repetition the Commies can persuade innocents to follow this line. Perhaps not immediately but in the course of the next few years because there is a tremendous residue of pacifism [sic], isolationism and big business [sic] to be exploited. For example, a recession in the United States might cause people to lose interest in bolstering Europe I think you will agree that this phony peace movement actually embraces far more than intellectuals and that ... [we] should emphasize also that the threat to world peace comes from the Kremlin and its allies. (‘Origins of the Congress for Cultural Freedom, 1949-50’, CIA, Michael Warner, p. 91. Square brackets original.) (IMG)

In his 1952 book, Stalin explained the character of the communist-inspired peace offensive against the imperialists, a move which in spite of not directly struggling for socialist revolution, would have had tremendous benefits for the proletariat. Stalin wrote:

The object of the present-day peace movement is to rouse the masses of the people to fight for the preservation of peace and for the prevention of another world war. Consequently, the aim of this movement is not to overthrow capitalism and establish socialism - it confines itself to the democratic aim of preserving peace. In this respect, the present-day peace movement differs from the movement of the time of the First World War for the conversion of the imperialist war into civil war, since the latter movement went farther and pursued socialist aims.

It is possible that in a definite conjuncture of circumstances the fight for peace will develop here or there into a fight for socialism. But then it will no longer be the present-day peace movement; it will be a movement for the overthrow of capitalism.

What is most likely is that the present-day peace movement, as a movement for the preservation of peace, will, if it succeeds, result in preventing a particular war, in its temporary postponement, in the temporary preservation of a particular peace, in the resignation of a

bellicose government and its supersession by another that is prepared temporarily to keep the peace. That, of course, will be good. Even very good. But, all the same, it will not be enough to eliminate the inevitability of wars between capitalist countries generally. It will not be enough, because, for all the successes of the peace movement, imperialism will remain, continue in force - and, consequently, the inevitability of wars will also continue in force.

To eliminate the inevitability of war, it is necessary to abolish imperialism.

(The Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR, Marxists Internet Archive, Joseph Stalin, 1952, Chapter 6).

In mid-1949, the intellectuals and artists gathered in New York to condemn US imperialism and support the Soviet Union:

In March 1949, New York's Waldorf-Astoria Hotel played host to one of the strangest gatherings in American history. Less than four years after Allied troops had liberated Hitler's concentration camps, 800 prominent literary and artistic figures congregated in the Waldorf to call for peace at any price with Stalin.... Americans, including Lillian Heliman, Aaron Copland, Arthur Miller, and a young Norman Mailer, joined with European and Soviet delegates to repudiate US warmongering. Russian composer Dmitri Shostakovich told the delegates that a small clique of hatemongers was preparing a global conflagration; he urged progressive artists to struggle against the new Fascists who were seeking world domination. American panelists echoed the Russian composer's fear of a new conflict. Playwright Clifford Odets denounced the enemies of Man and claimed the United States had been agitated into a state of holy terror by fraudulent reports of Soviet aggression; composer Copland declared the present policies of the American Government will lead inevitably into a third world war. ('Origins of the Congress for Cultural Freedom, 1949-50', CIA, Michael Warner, p. 90) (IMG)

Of 'the conference's sponsors,' the New York Magazine reported, were:

Albert Einstein and Eleanor Roosevelt. (New York Magazine, December 30, 1974 - January 6, 1975, p. 36) (IMG)

With some of the most prominent Americans on the side of the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies, the imperialist camp led by the United States was struck a blow:

The Waldorf conference another step in the Communist Information Bureau's (Cominform) campaign to shape Western opinion. ('Origins of the Congress for Cultural Freedom, 1949-50', CIA, Michael Warner, p. 90) (IMG)

Regarding the efforts to nullify the effects of the Waldorf Conference, Ruth Fischer, the CIA's German Trotskyist-Titoist spy and a notorious anti-Semite, said to a US intelligence friend of hers:

I think we talked about this plan already during my last stay in Paris, but I have now a much more concrete approach to it. I mean, of course, the idea of organizing a big Anti-Waldorf-Astoria Congress in Berlin itself. It should be a gathering of all ex-Communists, plus a good representative group of anti-Stalinist American, English, and European intellectuals, declaring its sympathy for Tito and Yugoslavia and the silent opposition in Russia and the satellite states, and giving the Politburo hell right at the gate of their own hell. All my friends agree that it would be of enormous effect and radiate to Moscow, if properly organized. It would create great possibilities for better co-ordination afterwards and would also lift the spirits of Berlin anti-Stalinists, which are somewhat fallen at present. ('Origins of the Congress for Cultural Freedom, 1949-50', CIA, Michael Warner, p. 92) (IMG)

C11S6. Francoist Spain *** IMG-All-{The Roosevelt Faction}

The last major openly fascist regime in Europe was that of Franco. On July 19, 1945, Stalin, Truman, and Churchill had their Third Sitting in the Potsdam Conference.

In the end:

the United States president, Harry S. Truman, and the British prime minister, Winston Churchill, successfully resisted Stalin's proposals at the Potsdam Conference in July 1945 for Allied intervention against Franco.... (Foreign Policy Under Franco, Federal Research Division, US Library of Congress, in: Eric Solsten and Sandra W. Meditz, editors. *Spain: A Country Study*. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1988, p. 51) (IMG)

In the end, according to the Federal Research Division of the US Library of Congress,:

The United States government took steps to normalize its political and economic relations with Spain in the years 1948-50. In September 1950, President Truman signed a bill that appropriated US\$62.5 million for aid to Spain. In the same year, the United States supported a UN resolution lifting the boycott on Franco's regime and resumed full diplomatic relations with Spain in 1951. As Spain became an increasingly important link in the overall defense system of the United States against the Soviet Union, the period of isolation came to an end. (Foreign Policy Under Franco, Federal Research Division, US Library of Congress, in: Eric Solsten and Sandra W. Meditz, editors. *Spain: A Country Study*. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1988, pp. 51-52) (IMG)

C11S7. Fascist Italy

A similar process occurred in Italy by the way. Mussolini resigned, but the Italian Fascists remained in power. A Fascist Italy devoid of Mussolini allied with the Anglo-American imperialists. A democracy with large waves terrorist bombings was the new 'democratic' Italy. US intelligence officer Curt Riess recalled:

In vain did six anti-Fascist parties, liberals as well as Socialists and Communists, demand that the King abdicate. It did not matter that Badoglio and his men had no intention of abandoning the Fascist spirit after they had, in name only, dropped Fascism. Lord Rennell of Rodd, the head of the Allied control machinery, a prominent financier and former friend of Schacht and of Pirelli and other Fascist industrialists, did everything he could to see to it that the regime was kept in power.

Anti-Fascists who had formed armed units to combat Fascism were forced by Badoglio to wear the King's insignia. In disgust they tore off their uniforms and went home. Workers in north Italy who had organized numerous uprisings and who had taken to guerrilla fighting decided that it was no use. Prominent liberals in Bari were arrested because they demanded the abdication of the King. Mass meetings in the University of Naples which were called for the same purpose were dissolved. Liberal papers were suppressed. Count Sforza received a severe warning for holding a meeting for which he had neglected to obtain a permit.

In short, we did everything possible to keep in power those who had fought us. Count Sforza said about the generals who did the dirty work there? "They despise the Allies in their hearts, but probably will be given congressional medals." The knowledge of what was

going on in Italy must have pleased the leaders of the Nazi underground enormously. Here was the perfect setup in which to plant their men.

They planted them. Perhaps they did not need to plant any around the King or Badoglio because there were enough Fascists or former Fascists close to them to assure any degree of collaboration with the Nazi underground in the years to come. Theoretically, that idea contradicted the original Nazi plan of not working in close contact with known Fascists.

(The Nazis Go Underground, Curt Riess, May 1, 1944, p. 65) (IMG{Nazi Underground})

C11S8. The Cold War in Music *** IMG-All-{Cultural Cold War}

In West Germany, the United States was working actively to resurface the Nazi underground under the guise of democratizing Germany. Goebbels's ideas regarding 'modernist' music was to be re-implemented on a wide scale. 'Modernist music' is ironically termed such, for the allegation of it being 'music' was dubious right from the start, and, far from being a modernizing cultural force, promoted backwards-ness. So-called 'modernist music' was particularly toxic due to its extremely irrational, ugly, and insane nature. The 'modernist' trend utilizes music in order to destroy music, and to corrupt the cultures of Europe. American propaganda, however, depicted 'modernist' music as emancipatory, anti-fascist, and pro-democratic given the 'modernist' music's 'revolt' against the 'tyrannical' 'totalitarian' rationality seen in non-'modernist' music. Suddenly, the fascists of yesterday were portrayed as the new 'anti-fascists'. Washington's cultural warfare against the kind of music that makes sense was a part of its general drive to yield masses of 'rootless cosmopolitans', brainwashed 'globalist' liberals passively absorbing imperialist propaganda. The Nazis supported rootless cosmopolitan mentality as means of pacifying the occupied peoples into accepting the New Order for a New Europe, the project for a Nazi European Union (see C8S2). In its alliance with the Nazi underground, the United States continued the fascist project to foster the rootless cosmopolitan mindset.

It would be an exaggeration to say that, merely because Western Europe was America's 'front yard', America totally succeeded in turning Europeans into rootless cosmopolitans. The existence of class forces antagonistic to American imperialist interests prevented such a process. In Western Europe, French finance capital was a class force that stood in the way of US finance capital, and thus sought to sabotage the rootless cosmopolitan campaign. This is of course in addition to the Western European proletarian class forces that stood in the way of the US plots. The USSR and the Peoples' Democracies used their instruments of influence to sabotage US plans. As such, the project for turning people into fully brainwashed liberals devoid of culture saw only mixed results. True, American propaganda bombardment of the masses was intense. However, the class forces that stood in the way of American finance capital designs were not weak either, and thus the rootless cosmopolitan campaign was not as successful. The masses of Europe did not lose their cultures, certainly not to the extent that the Americans would have desired.

The fin de siecle and rootless cosmopolitan tendencies fostered by the CIA and MI6 did however succeed in getting the intelligentsia of Western Europe fully on the side of the US and the so-called 'globalists'; but that is not surprising since the liberal intelligentsia were – long before the CIA was established – a stratum made up mostly of liberals or fin de siecle degenerates from feudal or bourgeois classes anyways. Never true friends, they presented themselves as 'allies' to the USSR against the Nazis, but in practice sided with fascist reaction against Soviet power. The CIA's Congress for Cultural Freedom programs only succeeded in expediting the inevitable.

In 1946, a major musical organization was founded in the US-occupied German city of Darmstadt. The name of the organization was:

Kranichsteiner Ferienkurse für Neue Musik (later renamed Internationale Ferienkurse für Neue Musik, hereafter IFNM or Ferienkurse). ('New Music, New Allies, American Experimental Music in West Germany from the Zero Hour to Reunification', University of California Press, Amy C. Beal, pp. 37-38) (IMG)

The IFNM, also known as the Darmstadt School, was widely acknowledged as:

quintessentially modernist.... (Darmstadt as Other: British and American Responses to Musical Modernism, Cambridge University Press, Bjorn Heile, p. 161) (IMG)

This 'modernist' musical organization had been founded with the active support – in the form of 'money, performance space, bedding and food' - of the US military administration in Germany, represented by the Office of Military Government, US (OMGUS):

The *Ferienkurse* had been founded in 1946 with support from the Allied military government, with aims that mirror those of political alliances such as the Council of Europe, launched soon after – namely, re-establishment of inter-government relations and the tempering of destructive nationalist forces after six years of war. In Germany, Darmstadt reopened cultural borders closed to the outside world after 1933 by National Socialist censorship of the arts. Quite self-consciously and publicly, the aim was to help a younger generation of artists catch up after a period devoid of contact with musical developments outside Germany. US funding of the early *Ferienkurse*, as a 1947 State Department publication put it, sought to "overcome the spiritual isolation imposed by National Socialism." (British Musical Modernism: The Manchester Group and their Contemporaries, Cambridge University Press, Philip Rupprecht, p. 69) (IMG)

Early IFNM programs were stamped with OMGUS publishing licenses, and Ferienkurse participants had to receive a clearance issued by the Music and Theater Branch. Music Officers stationed nearby, like Everett Helm in Wiesbaden, quickly came into the orbit of contemporary music activities in Darmstadt. Requests by Steinecke and others to the Military Government for money, performance space, bedding, and food were frequent, and frequently granted." A piano that had been confiscated from the Nazis by the Allies during the war was supposedly donated in 1946 by American soldiers, who transported the Steinway grand to Jagdschloss Kranichstein – the location of the first three Ferienkurse – on the back of a military jeep. ('New Music, New Allies, American Experimental Music in West Germany from the Zero Hour to Reunification', University of California Press, Amy C. Beal, p. 38) (IMG)

Indeed, the US-sponsored IFNM was very famous for being a hub for 'modernist' music as early as 1946.

The Soviets were well aware of the imperialist-fascist assault on the culture of European Enlightenment and the Renaissance, which the Soviet socialist realists had championed. In the USSR, the terms 'modernist' and 'formalist' music were utilized interchangeably to describe the same insane chaotic 'music'. In a 1946 speech to the Soviet intellectuals, Stalin condemned formalist/modernist music and declared:

music can also fight.

In 1944 I had the opportunity to read instructions written by an officer of British intelligence, with the title: "*How to use formalist music for corrupting the enemy army.*"

While talking about the future development of Soviet art, literature and music, it must be taken into consideration that it is developing in a condition of unprecedented secret war, a war that has been unleashed upon us and our art, literature and music by the world's imperialist circles. The job of our own foreign agents in our country is to penetrate Soviet organizations dealing with culture, to capture

the editorships of major newspapers and journals, to influence decisively the repertoire of theatres and movies and in the publication stop or hamper by any means possible the publication of revolutionary works that awaken patriotism and lead the Soviet people towards creating communism. They support and publish works where some failures of socialist ideals and communism are preached. (...). Their aim is to support and propagate the capitalist method of capitalist production and the bourgeois life style.

At the same time these agents are asked to popularize in art and literature the feelings of pessimism, decadence and demoralization.

(Stalin on Art and Culture, Revolutionary Democracy, retrieved from: North Star Compass) (IMG)

During the 1930s, the Nazi agent Tukhachevsky had actively promoted the expressionist-formalist-'modernist' music of Shostakovich, so to corrupt and sabotage Soviet music. Shostakovich's formalist 'music' was to music what sodomy is to sex. The 'music' was condemned in Pravda as 'Chaos, not Music'. The CIA picked up on the Nazi agent's project and sponsored such fascist reactionary 'music'. The agency responsible for sponsoring the formalist music was the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), an office shared as a sub-department of the CIA and the US State Department and responsible for the many extra-territorial power projections and special operations that later became the CIA's tasks. The OPC in turn pursued such a CIA music project via the infamous 'Congress for Cultural Freedom'. The first conference of the Congress for Cultural Freedom officially took place in Berlin on June 1950, with the CIA's OPC sponsoring the event in collaboration with the US State Department, and prominent philosophers such as Bertrand Russell, John Dewey (Trotsky's lawyer), and Karl Jaspers officially heading it:

The congress in Berlin rolled ahead that spring gathering sponsors and patrons. World-renowned philosophers John Dewey, Bertrand Russell, Benedetto Croce, Karl Jaspers, and Jacques Maritain agreed to lend gravitas to the event as its honorary chairmen. OPC bought tickets for the American delegation, using [several intermediary organizations] as its travel agents. Hook and another NYU philosophy professor named James Burnham took charge of the details for the American delegation. The Department of State proved an enthusiastic partner in the enterprise, arranging travel, expenses, and publicity for the delegates. (...). The Congress for Cultural Freedom convened in Berlin's Titania Palace on 26 June 1950. American delegates Hook, James Burnham, James T. Farrell, playwright Tennessee Williams, historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., actor Robert Montgomery, and chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission David Lilienthal had been greeted on their arrival the previous day with the news that troops of North Korea had launched a massive invasion of the South. This pointed reminder of the vulnerability of Berlin itself heightened the sense of apprehension in the hail. The Congress's opening caught and reflected this mood. Lord Mayor Reuter asked the almost 200 delegates and the 4,000 other attendees to stand for a moment of silence in memory of those who had died fighting for freedom or who still languished in concentration camps. ('Origins of the Congress for Cultural Freedom, 1949-50', CIA, Michael Warner, p. 94. Square brackets original.) (IMG)

Washington's leaders found the Congress for Cultural Freedom very useful for combatting the USSR, the Peoples' Democracies, and communism:

Indeed, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs Jesse MacKnight was so impressed with the American delegation that he urged CIA to sponsor the congress on a continuing basis even before the conclave in Berlin had taken place. ('Origins of the Congress for Cultural Freedom, 1949-50', CIA, Michael Warner, p. 94) (IMG)

And the CIA did continue to sponsor the Congress for Cultural Freedom throughout the Cold War:

The Congress for Cultural Freedom despite the embarrassing exposure of its CIA sponsorship in 1967 ... ultimately helped to negate Communism's appeal to artists undermining at the same time the Communist pose of moral superiority. ('Origins of the Congress for Cultural Freedom, 1949-50', CIA, Michael Warner, p. 89) (IMG)

From then on, the:

CIA sponsorship of the Congress has long been publicly known.... ('Origins of the Congress for Cultural Freedom, 1949-50', CIA, Michael Warner, p. 89) (IMG)

The Congress for Cultural Freedom:

helped to solidify CIA's ... [global] strategy of promoting the non-Communist left – the strategy that would soon become the theoretical foundation of the Agency's political operations against Communism over the next two decades. ('Origins of the Congress for Cultural Freedom, 1949-50', CIA, Michael Warner, p. 89) (IMG)

America's cultural offensive in support of formalist/'modernist' arts and the rootless cosmopolitan mentality of course accompanied the attempt to revive Hitler's New Order for a New Europe. Rootless cosmopolitanism served as propaganda for a Pan-European economic, military, and political integration. The mentality for a European citizen accepting CIA efforts to revive the New Order for a New Europe was the mentality of a brainwashed liberal devoid of national-cultural roots. As was mentioned, the CIA promoted the corrupt reactionary 'music' of Shostakovich in order to undermine Soviet music. A book published by the Cambridge University Press stated that between 1950 and 1952,:

The Congress [for Cultural Freedom] extracted a good deal of propaganda value out of featuring works by composers who were thought to have laboured under Soviet censure. These included two by Serge Prokofiev (*The Prodigal Son and Scythian Suite*) and Dmitri Shostakovich's *Lady Macbeth of the Mtsensk District*, the orchestral score of which was performed as a concert suite.... Soviet sensibilities were no doubt further affronted by these works being performed by the orchestra of the West Berlin Radio in the American Sector (RIAS). The difficulties experienced by Shostakovich in the wake of *Lady Macbeth* were highlighted in an article by Nabokov published in the special issue of *Preuves* [which was the magazine for the Congress for Cultural Freedom] given over to L'Oeuvre du XXe siecle. (Music and Ideology in Cold War Europe, Cambridge University Press, Mark Carroll, p. 21. Citing: This is Our Culture, Counterpoint, Nicolas Nabokov, May 1952, p. 15. 'Elegie funebre sur quatre notes', *Preuves*, Nicolas Nabokov, May 1952, p. 15) (IMG)

The United States also backed formalism (or 'modernism') in art and literature. Dr. Duncan White, the Harvard University's Assistant Director of Studies in History and Literature, wrote:


late modernism's insistence on the aesthetic autonomy was the fundamental reason for it being deployed as a weapon in the cultural Cold War. 'Modernist' art and literature ... became a powerful symbol of the freedom of expression of the West. (Nabokov and His Books: Between Late Modernism and the Literary Marketplace, Duncan White, p. 39) (IMG)

Jan Goldman – professor of intelligence and security studies at The Citadel, the Military College of South Carolina, as well as an experience employee of US intelligence – wrote:

The Congress for Cultural Freedom, officially known as Operation CONGRESS, also gave the CIA the ideal front for promoting its covert interest in Abstract Expressionism. The Congress for Cultural Freedom would be the official sponsor of touring exhibitions. Its magazines would provide useful platforms for critics favorable to the new American painting style, and no one – the artists included – would be any the wiser.

The Congress for Cultural Freedom put together several exhibitions of Abstract Expressionism during the 1950s. One of the most significant exhibitions, The New American Painting, visited every big European city in 1958-1959. Other influential shows included Modern Art in the United States (1955) and Masterpieces of the Twentieth Century (1952).

Because Abstract Expressionism was expensive to move around and exhibit, millionaires and museums were called into play. Preeminent among these was Nelson Rockefeller, whose mother had cofounded the Museum of Modern Art in New York. As president of what he called "Mummy's museum," Rockefeller was one of the biggest backers of Abstract Expressionism (which he called "free enterprise painting"). His museum was contracted to the Congress for Cultural Freedom to organize and curate most of its important art shows.



An example of expressionism in the field of paintings. Jackson Pollock, the 'artist' who painted the above was sponsored by the CIA. Pollock, No. 1A, 1948.

(‘CONGRESS, Operation (1950-1979)’, Jan Goldman. In: ‘The Central Intelligence Agency: An Encyclopedia of Covert Ops, Intelligence Gathering, and Spies’, Jan Goldman, p. 82) (IMG)

It is however important to not exaggerate the level of the success of this cultural program of the imperialist-fascist secret services. While expressionist/formalist music did emerge popular among the decadent intelligentsia around the world, it never succeeded in becoming widespread among the general populace anywhere; the average person simply would be and indeed was unwilling to listen to such nonsensical junk. Hence, this program did not succeed beyond just some decadent circles of intellectuals. The kinds of CIA music programs that did succeed however are the musical works that were rational but had unethical content, such as highly corrupt ideas and feelings promoted in many kinds of rap music.

The Soviets resisted. American efforts to promote formalist/'modernist' music and hence rootless cosmopolitanism began to fail in the USSR:

The change in Composers' Union leadership was reaffirmed and solidified at the First All-USSR Congress of Soviet Composers, and the attacks on the so-called "formalists," particularly Shostakovich, intensified.... (‘Creative Union: The Professional Organization of Soviet Composers, 1939-1953’, Cornell University Press, Kiril Tomoff, p. 123) (IMG)

A paper by the Cornell University Press stated that in the Soviet Union, in 1948:

On the morning of 25 April, representatives from each delegation gathered to discuss candidates for the newly organized governing board and auditing committee of the Composers' Union. The meeting was conducted by a few party members who led the delegations. They drew up a large list of candidates, and the assembled representatives objected to only four suggestions: the composers Ivan Dzerzhinskii, Anatolii Novikov, and Karl Rautio and the musicologist Tamara Livanova. Livanova was removed from the list because she concentrated on the prerevolutionary greats and not Soviet music. Novikov was replaced by another song composer, Boris Mokrousov, after allegations of unethical behavior sullied Novikov's candidacy. Despite significant support for another representative from the Karelo-Finnish Republic (Ruvim Pergament), Rautio remained on the list, as did Dzerzhinskii, without explanation.

In the final session of the congress, this list was presented to the assembled delegates, who sought to add Shostakovich, Khachaturian, Kabalevskii, Gol'denveizer, the stricken Novikov, and the unsuccessful Pergament. In the stormy discussion that followed, Shostakovich's candidacy was particularly vigorously championed by those in the room who "were satisfied" with his self-critical presentations in earlier days. Finally, a military band composer took the floor to ask how it would look "to the people" if, after all the discussion of the resolution, they reelected a "formalist composer." The question was called, Shostakovich was defeated, and Kabalevskii and Khachaturian withdrew their names.

When the secret voting finally took place, Shostakovich still garnered thirteen write-in votes, and Pergament, who also failed to make the list, gathered forty-four. The absent Miaskovskii got six write-in votes, and Kabalevskii and Khachaturian each received two. Though these tallies pale in comparison to the 333 votes needed to be elected to the new governing board, they indicate that a significant group continued stubbornly to protest long after the whispers died down and the writing was on the wall.

(‘Creative Union: The Professional Organization of Soviet Composers, 1939-1953’, Cornell University Press, Kiril Tomoff, p. 149) (IMG)

The Marshall Plan was part of the American drive to revive the New Order for a New Europe. The New Order called for the integration of the European states into one Union led by Germany against the USSR. In its alliance with the Nazi underground, the United States utilized the Marshall Plan in part to unite Europe. An Intelligence Memorandum by the CIA's Office of Current Intelligence (OCI) confirmed:

American interest in Western European integration is based largely on a desire to see the area strengthened against Soviet aggression. Starting in 1948 with the Marshall Plan, in the economic field, and the Brussels Pact, in the military, a number of organizations furthering integration have been established or projected.... (The Progress Toward Western European Integration, Intelligence Memorandum, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), CIA, April 2, 1953, p. 1) (IMG)

The Marshall Plan was against the Soviet Union. The US offered the Marshall Plan to the USSR as well, so long as the USSR gave the 'necessary' concessions, such as military 'transparency'. It was clear enough that the imperialist power that formed an alliance with Nazi Germany offered the 'aid' not for the reconstruction of its top enemy USSR, but to obtain a channel for sending its front companies and spies under the cover of 'technicians' to carry out espionage and sabotage, in a manner disguised as 'rebuilding' the Soviet Union. Naturally, Beria, Malenkov, and Mikoyan supported American designs. Led by MI6 agent Beria, Titoists in the Soviet Union argued in support of the Marshall Plan. Among them,:

Mikoyan ... viewed the Marshall Plan proposals favorably.... (The Balance of Power August 1948 to October 1950, HR70-14, CIA, August 5, 1953, p. 7) (IMG)

Another person supporting the Marshall Plan was Voznesensky – the head of the Gosplan or the State Central Planning Commission – who was a major ally of Beria:

My father never saw Voznesensky as a rival; on the contrary, they were always allies. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 215) (IMG{Titoist Coup})

As the head of the Soviet State Central Planning Commission, Nikolai Voznesensky:

shared my father's views on the economy.... ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 186) (IMG)

and:

disagreed with Stalin's opinions on some of the economic and political problems of the Soviet Government. (Background on The Execution of Abakumov and the Leningrad Case of 1949, CIA, January 14, 1955, p. 3)

Thus, in addition to Mikoyan, three other individuals Malenkov, Beria, and Voznesensky supported the receipt of Marshall Plan 'aid' as well: Voznesensky and my father, for example, and those who administered German reparations [i.e. Malenkov], favoured acceptance of American aid and [encouraged] the peoples' democracies to do the same. Like my father, they thought that we should have been able to manoeuvre and were not at all in favour of a categorical refusal. (...). Some of our leading personnel even thought that we might allow the Americans in to supervise certain sectors. I remember that the Minister of Transport, Kovalev, and his deputy Beshchev, argued in that sense. The Americans were offering special equipment which enabled railways to be built more quickly. (...). The leaders of agriculture were also attracted by the American offers, especially of fertiliser factories and technologies to improve yields. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 205) (IMG)

However,:

Stalin stated that it had become evident, upon receipt of information from Paris, that the purpose of the Marshall Plan was to aid the formation of a Western bloc and to isolate the Soviet Union. (The Balance of Power August 1948 to October 1950, HR70-14, CIA, August 5, 1953, p. 7, underline original) (IMG)

The constant flow of intelligence materials confirming Washington's plans to use the Marshall Plan against the Soviet Union built a strong case against the Marshall Plan and gave sufficient leverage to the communists to compel the Beria-Malenkov faction of the Politburo to stop their campaign for the Marshall Plan and to join the communists in voting against it. A senior fellow of the CIA front think tank Council on Foreign Relations wrote:

On the night of June 29 [1947], a brown-jacketed Feldjäger special messenger raced through the streets of Moscow. Arriving at the Kremlin gates, he handed the guard an envelope marked "Very Urgent." A few minutes later, Stalin, sitting in his dimly lit office, opened it and removed the intelligence report, growing increasingly "indignant" as he read. He quickly wrote out text, and directed his secretary, Alexander Poskrebyshev, to call Politburo members and request their approval. Once the last "yes" vote was secured in the early hours of June 30, Poskrebyshev told Vyshinsky to encipher the cable and send it to Paris.

The message directed Molotov to obstruct Marshall's plan from being implemented....

(The Marshall Plan: Dawn of the Cold War, Benn Steil, 2018, pp. 127-128) (IMG)

Via the Cominform, Andrei Zhdanov promoted the communist efforts at sabotaging the Marshall Plan in Western Europe. Zhdanov:

believed that it was possible to make striking advances internationally through foreign Communist Parties, particularly in France and Italy. Specifically, he is said to have been responsible for organization of the Cominform in September 1947, a foreign policy move which at the minimum was intended to sabotage the Marshall Plan but which was also intended to launch French and Italian Parties into revolutionary action to seize power. (The Zhdanov-Malenkov Relationship, CIA, July 29, 1953, p. 2) (IMG{Greece})

In his speech to the Cominform, Zhdanov declared:

One of the directions of the ideological "campaign" that accompanies the plans to enslave Europe is the attack on the principle of national sovereignty, calling for the abandonment of the sovereign rights of peoples and imposing the ideas of a "world government" to them. The meaning of this campaign is to embellish the rampant expansion of American imperialism, unceremoniously violating the sovereign rights of peoples, to expose the United States as a champion of universal laws, and to present those who resist American penetration as outdated "selfish" nationalism. Accepted by bourgeois intellectuals from among dreamers and pacifists, the idea of a "world government" is used not only as a means of pressure for the ideological disarmament of peoples who defend their independence from the attacks of American imperialism, but also as a slogan specifically opposed to the Soviet Union, which consistently defends the principle of real equality and fencing of the sovereign rights of all peoples, large and small. Under current conditions, the imperialist countries, like the United States, Britain and the countries close to them, become dangerous enemies of national independence and self-determination of peoples, and the Soviet Union and the countries of new democracy are a reliable pillar in the defense of equality and national self-determination of peoples. (The Zhdanov Report to the Cominform, September 22, 1947, p. 10. retrieved from: Centre Virtuel de la Connaissance sur l'Europe (CVCE)) (IMG)

The USSR unleashed a massive media campaign against the Marshall Plan, pan-Europeanism, and rootless cosmopolitanism. An article from the Soviet media stated:

American ideologists use every possible way to propagate the idea cosmopolitanism, the theory of the 'united' peoples of Europe under the aegis of the United States of America. They are trying to weaken the West European intelligentsia morally. American reactionaries spare no expense to introduce the ideas of cosmopolitanism into the consciousness of the intellectuals of Western Europe. In every possible way the reactionaries are enrolling spokesmen for their ideas. They bribe and buy renegades who sell themselves openly and cynically to their bosses across the Atlantic. They employ wavering intellectuals who, by their petty-bourgeois social nature, are unstable. They deafen people with their propaganda, press their ideology on artists who only yesterday were progressive, but who, not being sufficiently consistent, do not understand that if you offer a reactionary one finger you lose your hand. (...). What does cosmopolitanism mean in our days? Yesterday this reactionary cosmopolitan idea of a world state meant the Hitlerite 'new order in Europe', trampling on the national sovereignty and independence of the European peoples. Today it is one of imperialism's disguises in its struggle for world mastery. ('Kosmopolity iz literaturnogo Gollivuda' [Cosmopolitanism of the Literary Hollywood], R. Miller-Budnitskaya, *Novy mir*, 1948, No. 6, pp. 282-284, p. 293. Document 65 in: *The Soviet Government and the Jews 1948-1967*, Benjamin Pinkus, 1987. pp. 182-183) (IMG)

The intelligentsia of Western Europe were going to side with the CIA eventually no matter what. Since the intelligentsia come from feudal or bourgeois family backgrounds, the bulk of them side with reaction. The intelligentsia were going to condemn the USSR at some point. It was only a matter of time and smoothness in transition. The creation of the Congress for Cultural Freedom and the spread of rootless cosmopolitanism and counter-revolutionary ideas by the CIA were merely a means of more smoothly and quickly 'transitioning' the intelligentsia towards condemning the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies and towards siding with the pan-European entity. Rootless cosmopolitanism was a part of the CIA agenda for bring about Germany-led 'pan-Europeanism'. The Maoists and other 'culture warriors' and so-called 'cultural revolutionaries' are continuing the path of the CIA in spreading rootless cosmopolitanism.

C11S10.1. The Strategic Importance of France *** IMG-All-{France Post-War}

Should France have been conquered by the French proletariat, it was likely that all of continental Europe would be swept with proletarian revolutions, along with anti-imperialist revolutions in the Maghreb (Northwest Africa) and other areas ostensibly colonized by France. The CIA reported:

France is of greater strategic importance than any other continental European country except the USSR. It is important because of its geographic location, its military potential, its cultural and intellectual leadership of Western Europe, its key position in the European Economic Recovery Program, and its control of French North Africa and other outlying areas which, in the hands of a hostile power, would provide bases for military action against the US.

Access to France's airfields, Atlantic, Mediterranean, and Channel ports, and transportation net are essential to the successful prosecution of a war in Western Europe. Their control by a power hostile to the US would provide that power with bases for mounting amphibious attacks against the US or US-held bases in the Atlantic, would permit naval and aircraft to operate against US shipping in the Atlantic and Mediterranean, and would make US counteraction extremely difficult. The cost in manpower and matériel of forcing such a hostile power out of France was demonstrated in World War II.

(...). An unfriendly government in France would, at the outset of war at least, control French North Africa with obvious implications for US security (see ORE 63: *The Current Situation in French North Africa*). Other French possessions of varying degrees of importance to US security are located in other parts of Africa, the West Indies, the Far East, and the Indian Ocean. The most vital of these could be neutralized or occupied rapidly by the US but would, if controlled even temporarily by any enemy, cause diversion of force and effort. (ORE 64 – *The Current Situation in France*, CIA, December 31, 1947, p. 1) (IMG)

C11S10.2. Communist influence in France since 'de-Nazification' *** IMG-All-{France Post-War}

The proletarians of the 'West' in general were strongly sympathetic to the USSR. Michael Smith – the militant anti-Stalinist member of the British Army's Intelligence Corps and a prominent defense correspondent for the British mainstream media – confirmed that as late as March 1946:

As a result of the propaganda of the war years, 'Uncle Joe' Stalin was still regarded with affection in the West. ('New Cloak, Old Dagger', Michael Smith, 1996, p. 113) (IMG {Hungary})

In Britain, for example, the sympathies went back to the 1930s, in fact. Roger Moorhouse of the BBC and British Royal Historical Society wrote:

It remains an open question how the prospect of blatant aggression against the Soviet Union might have been received by the wider British public, which persistently viewed the USSR in general and Stalin in particular much more positively than did the political and military elite. In the summer of 1939, for instance, shortly before the outbreak of the war, a questionnaire circulated by Mass Observation – an official network established to keep the government informed of public opinion – asked contributors to rank the world leaders for whom they had the greatest respect and the nations that they would "prefer the British nation to collaborate with and associate with." The results would have surprised many among the ruling class, with the Soviet Union ranking fourth among the nation's potential allies, close behind France and above Poland; Stalin even ranked second as a "respected" leader, behind President Roosevelt. (*The Devils' Alliance: Hitler's Pact with Stalin, 1939-1941*, Roger Moorhouse, 2014) (IMG)

However, nowhere were pro-Soviet sympathies more strongly manifest than in France. In fact, a 1948 CIA report stated::

According to the Turkish diplomats in France, the internal situation in France in case of war between the Western Powers and the Soviet Union will be very dangerous because of the "great Russophile current" prevailing among the French people. ('Turkish Embassy in Athens Reports on Markos, Repatriation, Diplomats in Rumania and Aid to Guerrillas', CIA, November 2, 1948, p. 1) (IMG)

Well until the 1950s, the overwhelming majority of the Parisians were staunchly sympathetic to the USSR. One CIA document confirmed that in this time period:

Parisians who cared about world affairs were often Stalinists; novelist Arthur Koestler quipped that from Paris the French Communist Party could take over all of France with a single phone call. ('Origins of the Congress for Cultural Freedom, 1949-50', CIA, Michael Warner, p. 92) (IMG)

At the time, the French Communist Party (PCF) had an overwhelming representation in the French parliament:

The French Communist Party has the largest representation in the National Assembly — roughly 27%, exclusive of the minor parties which follow the Communist line. (ORE 64 – The Current Situation in France, CIA, December 31, 1947, p. 3) (IMG)

Over the years, the PCF had gained a strong influence over the French government. In a conversation with Thorez, Stalin remarked:

This is why the Party must have allies, even if they are weak at first. If the leader of the Socialist Party says in his report that the Socialist Party is for unity with the Communist Party, then one must answer him: 'Please do it!' One must attract other political groups into the bloc created. One must have allies in the trade unions, one must create something like a bloc. (...). Com. Stalin explains that ... it seems to him that the Communists have not yet understood that the situation in France has changed. The Communists are acting brashly and are continuing to follow the former line at a time when the situation has changed. They would like to send all the Socialist scoundrels to hell at a time when one must try to create a bloc and find allies among the Socialists. The Communists are trying to retain the militia. This will not happen. There is a government that is recognized by Great Britain, the Soviet Union, the United States and other powers, but the Communists continue to act by inertia. Meanwhile, the situation is new, different, it provides an opportunity for de Gaulle. The situation has changed and it is necessary to make a turn. The Communist Party is not strong enough to hit the government on its head. It must accumulate forces and search for allies. It must take measures so that, in the case of an offensive of reaction, the Communists can have a solid defence and can say that reaction is attacking not only the Communists but the people. If the situation changes for the better, then the forces united around the Party will be useful for the offensive. (Notes of a Talk of Com. J.V. Stalin with the General Secretary of the C.C. of the French Communist Party Com. Thorez, November 19, 1944. In: Revolutionary Democracy, George Gruenthal) (IMG)

The Trotskyites and Maoists like to denounce the French Communist Party (PCF) for its participation in coalition governments in imperialist France. This criticism of the PCF is a sneaky way to promote reactionary left-deviationist views under the guise of 'anti-revisionism'. True, participation in bourgeois parliaments and imperialist governments for the purpose of collaborating with imperialist reaction is a betrayal of the proletariat. However, and by contrast, participation in the imperialist state apparatus for the purpose of infiltration and planting of communists at the top ranks of the imperialist state as a means of sabotaging imperialist designs and stabbing the imperialist troops from the back and from the top is a correct strategy. And subsequently, when the right time comes, the communist party members at the top ranks of the imperialist or reactionary state can destabilize the bourgeois state apparatus, disarm the anti-worker troops and thus, in coordination with the rest of the party, pave the way for a bloodless violent proletarian revolution. This kind of a model is applicable not just to imperialist states but also pro-imperialist states. The communist revolution in Czechoslovakia occurred precisely through such a process. A comparable though not the same model was applied in People's Democratic Poland and Romania. The model implemented in Czechoslovakia was that adopted by the French Communists and was referred to by some as the 'Thorez Road'. This strategy is not collaboration with the enemy but is rather infiltration into the imperialist state apparatus. Those who criticize the 'Thorez road' or the 'Czechoslovak model' do so either out of naivete or out of an intense desire to sabotage the plans to infiltrate the imperialist state apparatus. Indeed this latter category, in which one will predominantly find the Trotskyite fascist agents and the Maoist reactionaries, has shown burning passion for yielding the global victory of the imperialist-fascist secret services. They oppose infiltration-disguised-as-'participation' into imperialist and comprador states not because they oppose collaboration with imperialists but precisely because they themselves are the collaborators with imperialism, just like Mao and Trotsky. The PCF infiltration into the French government, which was disguised as 'participation', was a natural product of the Soviet recommendation to the PCF that the latter forms a popular front alliance with communist-friendly elements in the Kautskyite 'Socialist' Party in France.

The PCF therefore embarked upon a path of recruiting French military generals and planting its agents in the positions of the French state. It did however face a number of major problems. At the time, France was ruled by:

The Schuman Cabinet, a centrist coalition government.... (ORE 64 – The Current Situation in France, CIA, December 31, 1947, p. 2) (IMG)

As mentioned in C9S8, Robert Schumann was an ethnic German who fought for the German Imperial Army during World War I, but who lived in France after WWI. A staunch German bourgeois-nationalist and a minister of the government prior to and during the Nazi invasion, he had unapologetically voted for the establishment of a Vichy Regime during WWII, and even served in the Petain government for a while. After the Great Patriotic War, this German fascist became the ruler of France 'thanks' to Anglo-American backing. The fact that a German fascist was the ruler of 'de-Nazified' France goes on to show the depth of Anglo-American imperialist and West German influence over the French state during those years. French finance capital did seek to ally with the USSR against the Anglo-American and West German rivals, but French finance capital after the Great Patriotic War was rather weak. It hardly had an army; its army was created by the Anglo-Americans, and the Anglo-Americans preferred West German finance capital over French finance capital. Added to this was the military occupation of France by the Anglo-American armies, and the fact that many Anglo-American spies have historically defected from anti-imperialist countries and have landed in France in particular. These defectors, by living in France, continue to serve as Anglo-American intelligence services' unofficial occupation troops. The gang of the German fascist Robert Schumann pursued the suppression of the French imperialist tendency in the French government and promoted a comprador alliance with the Anglo-Americans against the USSR. However, pro-Soviet sympathies were common amongst the French proletarians and amongst a minority of French intellectuals.

When the moment was ripe, the French Communist Party (PCF) launched:

a wave of strikes that seriously threatened the nation's economy.... (ORE 64 – The Current Situation in France, CIA, December 31, 1947, p. 2) (IMG)

A US intelligence document reported, with regards to the PCF-led waves of strikes:

the impetus for this was attributed to Zhdanov. (The Zhdanov-Malenkov Relationship, CIA, July 29, 1953, p. 2) (IMG{Greece})

Andrei Zhdanov did encourage militant action by the PCF via the Cominform, although obviously the PCF had the social base and the great capabilities for launching this series of strikes, without Soviet instigation. Finally, according to the CIA,:

The French Communist Party undertook ... action in November of 1947 and, until broken by the French army, almost succeeded in paralyzing the government and the economy. (The Zhdanov-Malenkov Relationship, CIA, July 29, 1953, p. 2) (IMG{Greece})

The Schuman faction suppressed the proletarian uprisings. However, a few months later:

The 48-hour "warning strike" by French coal miners is the first in a series which the Communists hope will prepare the ground for an all-out attempt to wreck French economy during April or May, or before the European recovery program becomes effective. As a result of lessons learned during the unsuccessful strikes of November 1947, the Communists will employ disguised tactics, including scattered

“non-political” strikes, and exploitation of existing local grievances. (BOOK IV – WEEKLY SUMMARY COMPLETE – 9 JAN 1948 (#80) THRU 14 MAY 1948 (#98), CIA, p. IV. p. 131 of the PDF) (IMG)

Inspired by the French:

The Italian [Communist] Party undertook similar action, but with much less success. (The Zhdanov-Malenkov Relationship, CIA, July 29, 1953, p. 2) (IMG{Greece})

Historically, in Italy, the communist movement somewhat consistently succeeded only half-way. This is rooted in the large population of both proletarians and the petit-bourgeoisie in Italy, the former being a major anti-fascist resistance force and the latter being submissive tacit enablers of fascism. Again:

the impetus for this was attributed to Zhdanov. (The Zhdanov-Malenkov Relationship, CIA, July 29, 1953, p. 2) (IMG{Greece})

The French and Italian communists were provided with priority armaments to form sleeper cells for an eventual armed uprising against the pro-fascist anti-Soviet factions in the French and Italian governments. The arms were provided by People’s Democratic Czechoslovakia. A CIA document confirmed with reference to Czechoslovak socialist arms:

European Parties which need arms much more urgently, namely Italy, France and Spain to a lesser extent, are being supplied with arms and ammunition via contraband shipments. (Shipments of Czechoslovakian Arms to Latin American Communist Parties, CIA, March 31, 1950, p. 1) (IMG)

This was in line with Stalin’s recommendation to Thorez that the French communists hide their arms rather than disarm:

Com. Stalin asks whether the resistance organizations have any armed forces.

Com. Thorez answers that there are armed detachments of the patriotic militia, which were the main forces of the resistance during the occupation of France. Presently these militia detachments retain their arms.

Com. Stalin says that one must take account of the fact that presently in France there is a government recognized by the allied powers. Under these conditions it is difficult for the Communists to have parallel armed forces, since there is a regular army. It can be asked of the Communists for what purpose they need parallel armed detachments. As long as there was no provisional government, as long as there was no rear area under its command, then the existence of these detachments had a definite sense. For what purpose do these detachments exist now when there is a government with its own army? Such could be the arguments of the enemies of the Communists. These arguments could convince the average French person. That is why the position of the Communist Party of retaining its own armed forces appears weak and will be weak. It is difficult to defend this position. This is why it is necessary to transform these armed detachments into another organization, into a political organization, but the arms should be hidden (‘a oruzhiye nuzhno spryatat’).

(Notes of a Talk of Com. J.V. Stalin with the General Secretary of the C.C. of the French Communist Party Com. Thorez, November 19, 1944. In: Revolutionary Democracy, George Gruenthal) (IMG)

C11S10.3. French Imperialism, the Ally of the Socialist Forces / The Subjugation of France by the West German Imperialists *** IMG-All-{France Post-War}

It is necessary to have some discussion of the following quote from Stalin’s ‘The Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR’ (1952). Stalin stated that in the Atlantic bloc, the emergence of the US as the dominant power would eventually – turn America’s own imperial allies against the United States:

Some comrades hold that, owing to the development of new international conditions since the Second World War, wars between capitalist countries have ceased to be inevitable. They consider that the contradictions between the socialist camp and the capitalist camp are more acute than the contradictions among the capitalist countries; that the U.S.A. has brought the other capitalist countries sufficiently under its sway to be able to prevent them going to war among themselves and weakening one another; that the fore-most capitalist minds have been sufficiently taught by the two world wars and the severe damage they caused to the whole capitalist world not to venture to involve the capitalist countries in war with one another again - and that, because of all this, wars between capitalist countries are no longer inevitable.

These comrades are mistaken. They see the outward phenomena that come and go on the surface, but they do not see those profound forces which, although they are so far operating imperceptibly, will nevertheless determine the course of developments.

Outwardly, everything would seem to be "going well": the U.S.A. has put Western Europe, Japan and other capitalist countries on rations; Germany (Western), Britain, France, Italy and Japan have fallen into the clutches of the U.S.A. and are meekly obeying its commands. But it would be mistaken to think that things can continue to "go well" for "all eternity," that these countries will tolerate the domination and oppression of the United States endlessly, that they will not endeavour to tear loose from American bondage and take the path of independent development.

(The Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR, Marxists Internet Archive, Joseph Stalin, 1952, Chapter 6)

Many have misinterpreted the above remarks by Stalin as meaning that the imperialist camp was in the condition of a secret civil war, that the imperialist powers’ alliance with one another was fake, and that the USSR was advancing freely forward in deepening the wedge between all these imperialist powers. This misinterpretation of Stalin’s quote is of course profoundly left-deviationist, not to mention foolish. Stalin, by making the above remark, was basically stating that any alliance between imperialist powers against the USSR was going to be temporary. After all, imagine if the US would be almost taking over the entire world; would the German, Japanese, British, etc. imperialists all stand by and watch as the US takes over the entire planet, leaving nothing for the German, Japanese, British imperialists? Of course not. The imperialist allies of the United States would have had to, for the sake of remaining as imperial powers, to eventually stand up against the United States. Their alliance with the US was and to this day remains temporary: an alliance against the USSR and Co. back then, and now against modern Russia and Co. Since the USSR was strong and bore a high level of development of the productive forces, the US – the imperialist power with the highest level of productive forces power – turned against it. In this Cold War against the USSR, the US had West Germany and Britain as its top imperialist allies in the Atlantic. Despite the outwardly pretensions of ‘differences’ (such as on Israel-Palestine; see C16S3), the imperial interests of Britain, the United States, and Germany strongly converged with one another and they were covertly allied with each other in all directions in all parts of the world.

The US, in order to contain the USSR, supported the expansion and restoration of the German empire not only in the form of reviving the Nazi networks but also in rendering France a satellite of West Germany as well. France was militarily occupied by the US troops, the CIA controlled

French intelligence, and French leaders – such as the Nazi German Robert Schuman – were sellouts to the CIA and to the West Germans. As such, the US was able to use France as a satellite so to force the French imperialists into accepting West Germany as the senior partner. France did not become a colony of Anglo-Americans and Germans because those countries' finance capital was not able to fully dominate France and so France remained its own imperialist power; however, France's politics was so heavily infiltrated and under the lobbying pressure of those imperialist powers that France became a satellite of the Anglo-American and German imperialists.

As early as 1942, the German intelligence chief Walter Schellenberg had set up plans for a Franco-German economic union, of course with Germany dominating France:

I am thinking of a solution which aims at the economic integration of German and French interests. France's own political physiognomy must be restored, but inevitably Germany and France will be drawn together, and France, with her colonial possessions, will bring Germany tremendous advantages. Therefore, one must not limit one's actions by doctrinaire preconceptions or political resentment. (Hitler's Secret Service, Original title: The Labyrinth, Walther Schellenberg, Introduction by Alan Bullock, Translation by Louis Hagen, first published: 1956, p. 309) (IMG)

This was already the case with the Nazi German occupation of France. Since the Anglo-Americans entered France in order to save the Nazi Germans, the Anglo-Americans saw it fit to keep the situation that way and to have France continue to operate as a satellite. For this purpose, the Anglo-Americans could count on Robert Schuman. The reader may recall that Robert Schuman was a German who had fought for Germany during World War I against France, and who, after the Nazi German invasion, supported the establishment of the Vichy regime. After the Great Patriotic War, 'thanks' to Anglo-American backing, the Nazi German Robert Schuman became the French Prime Minister and the French foreign minister.

In addition, the Americans had officially occupied France militarily until the late 1960s and forced France to contribute to NATO. As such, there was a massive American military pressure on French finance capital, coercing French imperialists to cooperate – against their will – with their American imperialist rivals. In this situation, Paris became an epicenter of those aiming to render France subjugated by West German imperialism. The Nazi German agent Robert Schuman, who was not even a French national but managed to be the leader of post-war France, declared that France and Germany should cooperate in the 'development' (colonization) of French-controlled West Africa:

With increased resources Europe will be able to pursue the achievement of one of its essential tasks, namely, the development of the African continent. In this way, there will be realised simply and speedily that fusion of interest which is indispensable to the establishment of a common economic system; it may be the leaven from which may grow a wider and deeper community between countries long opposed to one another by sanguinary divisions.

By pooling basic production and by instituting a new High Authority, whose decisions will bind France, Germany and other member countries, this proposal will lead to the realization of the first concrete foundation of a European federation indispensable to the preservation of peace.

To promote the realization of the objectives defined, the French Government is ready to open negotiations on the following bases.

The task with which this common High Authority will be charged will be that of securing in the shortest possible time the modernization of production and the improvement of its quality; the supply of coal and steel on identical terms to the French and German markets, as well as to the markets of other member countries; the development in common of exports to other countries; the equalization and improvement of the living conditions of workers in these industries.

(The Schuman Declaration – 9 May 1950. In: europa.eu) (IMG)

In other words, France was unofficially handing over its own colonies in West Africa to the West Germans. In case there is any doubt as to whether or not this remark in the Schuman Declaration was for having France and its colonies be dominated by the Germans, take note of the following quotes. As confirmed by prominent US State Department official on African affairs, Vernon McKay, Schuman sought to give French colonies in West Africa as a 'dowry to Europe':

Monnet evidently shared the motivation of those who desired to help France first, Europe second, and Africa last. It was he who reportedly coined the myopic phrase that France could bring Africa as a "dowry to Europe," which Foreign Minister Robert Schuman used in announcing his plan for a European Coal and Steel Community. (Africa in World Politics, Vernon McKay, 1963, pp. 138-139) (IMG)

And of course, Germany was to dominate the pan-Europe, as had been the case during the Great Patriotic War and before then. This was a part of the general conspiracy for rootless cosmopolitanism, for reviving the Hitlerian 'New Order' for a 'New Europe'. Furthermore, as confirmed by a top 'French' economic planner who helped establish the European Union, the purpose of the clause about Africa in the Schuman declaration was for 'seducing the Germans':

This closed, I admit that I have made some changes to the text of the [Schuman] Declaration. It seems that it has counted seventeen successive versions. The changes were minor after the writing I had helped to finalize. It was René Mayer who had added Africa, thinking of seducing the Germans, and the Quai d'Orsay which introduced the mention of the obligations imposed on Germany, as long as they remained. (Penser pour L'Action: Un Fondateur de L'Europe, Pierre Uri, 1991, p. 80) (IMG)

Clearly, the purpose of the French leaders was to have France hand over its colonies to West Germany as a means of strengthening West German-dominated pan-Europe against the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies. Jean Monnet, who was very well-known as a CIA agent, was joyfully enthusiastic about handing French colonies to American finance capital America, as well as to some extent the Anglo-German finance capital:

In these early postwar years, another person interested in the idea of Eurafrica was Volney Hurd, Chief of the Paris News Bureau of the Christian Science Monitor. Hurd has related how he approached Jean Monnet, then in charge of French economic planning, to discuss the idea. They considered the possibility of an African development corporation in which Europe would hold the ownership through bonds and half-interest in the stock, while the United States would be given the other half of the stock in return for Marshall Plan aid and any other sums invested in Africa. With Monnet's encouragement, Hurd put this suggestion into the form of a report which he sent to European foreign ministers and to Marshal Jan Christian Smuts in South Africa. According to Hurd, he received personal replies from many foreign ministers, including Bevin in England and Count Carlo Sforza in Italy, as well as from Marshal Smuts. They all approved the idea in principle but most of them indicated that the Marshall Plan was about all they could handle at the moment. Smuts "sent a particularly warm letter, saying the idea paralleled much of his own thinking and sincerely hoping it would come about. He questioned whether the minds of Europe were advanced enough in their thinking at the moment, however, and so it would probably have to be left to the future."

Soon afterward, following a Marshall Plan meeting, Hurd again met Monnet, who told him: "A wonderful idea, Mr. Hurd! But my French colleagues are finding it difficult to think even about uniting Europe, let alone thinking about Africa! But what a shame, for it is still a very great idea – and I'm terribly sorry!" Hurd does not mention, however, a basic weakness in Monnet's concept of Eurafrika. Monnet evidently shared the motivation of those who desired to help France first, Europe second, and Africa last. It was he who reportedly coined the myopic phrase that France could bring Africa as a "dowry to Europe," which Foreign Minister Robert Schuman used in announcing his plan for a European Coal and Steel Community. It is also said that while Monnet was enthusiastic about Eurafrika ideas in the abstract, he failed to give the necessary support to specific economic cooperation projects advocated by certain other French officials.

(Africa in World Politics, Vernon McKay, 1963, pp. 138-139) (IMG)

The quote 'A wonderful idea, Mr. Hurd! But my French colleagues are finding it difficult to think even about uniting Europe, let alone thinking about Africa!' belonged to the immediate post-war years. The 'French colleagues' were indeed very opposed to German imperialist dominance over France. Whereas in Britain, there was a great sentiment (as opposed to strong action) against German rearmament, the French pursued their opposition to West German rearmament eagerly, doing everything to this end:

There is a strong sentiment in Great Britain and France against German rearmament, and the French in particular are eager to do everything possible to relieve international [anti-Soviet] tension. (Repercussions in West Germany Resulting from Communist 'Unity' Offers, Intelligence Memorandum, CIA No. 49380, Dissemination Authorized, Officer of Current Intelligence, CIA, Assistant Director, October 5, 1951, p. 3) (IMG)

All imperialist powers, be they French, Britain, Germany, Japan, etc. were going to revolt against American imperialism at some point even if they would not have succeeded. At the time, France, which was being dominated by a West Germany backed by the Anglo-Americans, was at the forefront of the imperialist revolt against American imperialism. To this end, France needed – not out of some kind of moral or ideological necessity, but out of material benefits and French finance capital profits – to strategically align with the freedom forces of the world, the camp of the USSR, the Peoples' Democracies, and other anti-imperialist countries. Where the French military engaged in wars against these freedom forces, it did so not on behalf of French finance capital, for French finance capital had nothing to gain from such confrontation against the freedom forces, but it did so rather on behalf of American finance capital. Much as how 'Vichy French' colonialism was German colonialism rather than French colonialism, the colonialism of 'France' after 1945 and before the rise of the Gaullists in the 1960s, was Anglo-American colonialism rather than French colonialism.

During the Cold War, French imperialism therefore had a natural tendency to ally with the USSR, the Peoples' Democracies, and other anti-imperialist countries. The anti-imperialist countries in turn regarded French imperialism as a tool with which to sow division in the Atlantic alliance and to hamper Anglo-American and German efforts. The Anglo-American-German alliance in turn played its own intelligence game: Anglo-American-German imperialists pursued their agenda by disguising themselves as 'French imperialists'. Hence, the CIA-MI6-BND alliance utilized its vast network of agents dominating French intelligence for the purpose of infiltrating the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies. French companies like 'Total' are actually spy fronts for the CIA. American agents disguise themselves in Arab countries by utilizing their French politicians, agents of the CIA, as their cover. What if the anti-imperialist states' counter-intelligence services publicly announce the uncovering of the subversive and espionage activities of these French agencies and institutions? The CIA-MI6-BND needed not to worry because it would be French imperialism that would be blamed, not the West Germans and the Anglo-Americans. This in turn would assist CIA-MI6-BND agents in the anti-imperialist countries to increase pressure and to lobby for further widening the wedge between anti-imperialist states and French imperialism, thus rendering the anti-imperialist secret service use of French imperialism more covert and hence costlier. Often times, CIA-MI6 spies who defected from anti-imperialist countries to the North Atlantic zone settled in France so that French imperialism – the rival of Anglo-American and West German imperialists – would be blamed instead of CIA, MI6, BND, etc. being blamed. Defectors have at times overtly settled in America, Britain, West Germany, Yugoslavia, or Israel, but nowhere nearly as much as in France.

By fighting in Vietnam, the French troops were ostensibly protecting 'French' colonies when in fact they were protecting American imperialism, because after all, French imperialism's interests converged with those of the Vietnamese freedom-fighters despite appearances to the contrary; the US troops were in Vietnam to monitor the French troops so that they do not deviate from the pro-US line, and then to help the French troops in fighting not for French imperialism but for American imperialism. The French military, the military of the US satellite France, fought against Egypt in 1956 and against Algerian revolutionaries as a means of protecting Anglo-American imperialist interests in the Arab world. Yet, if one pays closer attention to the activities of the French imperialists, one will see that even in the case of the colonial war against the Algerians, French imperialism actually was very helpful for the decolonization of Algeria. Charles de Gaulle's group, who represented French imperialism, began negotiations with the FLN in the early 1960s to bring the independence of Algeria, and for this reason, Charles de Gaulle and his team faced a CIA military coup in 1961. The coup was plot was by pro-American military generals in the French Army, who opposed de Gaulle's and his team's plans to decolonize Algeria. French finance capital would have benefited from a stronger FLN, because the FLN was targeting more so the pro-American elements in the French military, hence undermining the American imperialist rivals of French imperialism. Since the Nazi German occupation of France, onwards, the 'French' colonial occupation of Algeria was 'French' in the appearance only; the faces were French, the names were French, the flag was French, but the finance capital was not French. The French imperialists morally supported the UAR and imposed sanctions on Israel during the 1967 War. The French imperialists also supplied arms to Libya in the 1970s. One of Hafez Al-Assad's objectives in the 1990s was to promote the French presence in the Middle East, and France sold arms to Syria for quite some time. France promoted the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya on the international scene, and, under the cover of supporting the anti-Qadhafist rebels in Libya, supported the Qadhafi agents in the Libyan fascist rebel opposition. There have been times in which German imperial revival was beneficial to anti-imperialist camp interests such as in the 1920s when the USSR and Weimar Germany engaged in economic and military cooperation against the Anglo-French alliance. After the rise to power of the Nazis and them becoming the top threat to the USSR and anti-imperialist forces, French imperialism once again became a progressive force in its contradiction with the German imperialists. And while in the Cold War and beyond, French imperialism played and plays a progressive role, none of this is to imply that French imperialism is somehow inherently more 'humane', 'good', etc., nor is to imply that French imperialism would be compatible with anti-imperialist interests in the longer-run. In the longer-term too, French imperialism, just like any finance capital, is an enemy of the proletariat and all the freedom forces. In his famous 'Letter to American Workers', Lenin wrote:

When in February 1918 the German imperialist vultures hurled their forces against unarmed, demobilised Russia, who had relied on the international solidarity of the proletariat before the world revolution had fully matured, I did not hesitate for a moment to enter into an "agreement" with the French monarchists. Captain Sadoul, a French army officer who, in words, sympathised with the Bolsheviks, but

was in deeds a loyal and faithful servant of French imperialism, brought the French officer de Lubersac to see me. "I am a monarchist. My only aim is to secure the defeat of Germany," de Lubersac declared to me. "That goes without saying (cela va sans dire)," I replied. But this did not in the least prevent me from entering into an "agreement" with de Lubersac concerning certain services that French army officers, experts in explosives, were ready to render us by blowing up railway lines in order to hinder the German invasion. This is an example of an "agreement" of which every class-conscious worker will approve, an agreement in the interests of socialism. The French monarchist and I shook hands, although we knew that each of us would willingly hang his "partner". But for a time our interests coincided. Against the advancing rapacious Germans, we, in the interests of the Russian and the world socialist revolution, utilised the equally rapacious counter-interests of other imperialists. In this way we served the interests of the working class of Russia and of other countries, we strengthened the proletariat and weakened the bourgeoisie of the whole world, we resorted to the methods, most legitimate and essential in every war, of manoeuvre, stratagem, retreat, in anticipation of the moment when the rapidly maturing proletarian revolution in a number of advanced countries completely matured. (Letter to American Workers, Lenin, August 20, 1918)

Note that Lenin made the above remark regarding a Germany that had not even been taken over by the Nazis. Even for fighting a non-fascist Germany, Lenin allied with the French monarchists to combat the German imperialists, even though he regarded the French finance capital as an eventual enemy of the USSR as well. In the period of the Cold War, the strategic situation was not so incomparable to that of 1918, because at the time, a revanchist West German imperialism, backed by the Anglo-Americans and covertly headed by the Nazi state apparatus, posed a greater menace to the freedom forces than the French imperialists. And a revival of French imperial power would have undermined West German imperialism, and hence Anglo-American imperialism. The problem though was that at the time imperialist France was too war-torn and too much of a satellite of the Anglo-Americans and West Germans to be able to stand up against them and openly ally with the freedom forces. It is interesting how Stalin once implied that the de Gaulle faction did not necessarily wish to take action against the PCF but was definitely going to do so anyways at the instigation of the Anglo-Americans. In a conversation with Maurice Thorez, Stalin said:

Com. Stalin says that the Communists should keep in mind the fact that de Gaulle will take measures against the Communists, even if he does not want to do so himself, he will be incited by the English and the Americans, who want to create a reactionary government in France, as everywhere else that this might be possible. (Notes of a Talk of Com. J.V. Stalin with the General Secretary of the C.C. of the French Communist Party Com. Thorez, November 19, 1944. In: Revolutionary Democracy, George Gruenthal) (IMG)

Sergo Beria recalled:

it was Soviet policy to push to the forefront the Gaullists, who might facilitate infiltration of Communists into positions of authority. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 101) (IMG)

Although Stalin initially was unsure as to whether the Anglo-Americans preferred French imperialism or German imperialism, the Soviets eventually sided with the French imperialists. Recall that as previously shown, the French imperialists and the Soviets ended up on the same side in their struggle against the expansion of West Germany's military-industrial complex:

The "first charge" principle meant that reparations should not be paid until German exports were sufficient to finance German imports (thereby reducing U.S. occupation costs and abetting economic reconstruction in Western Europe). Yet the "first charge" principle was of little importance to the Kremlin, whose representatives continually insisted that the Western powers should comply with the reparations obligations spelled out at Yalta and Potsdam. Their argument was well founded because section 19 of the Potsdam agreement on economic principles explicitly exempted the transfer of equipment and products from the western zones to the Soviet Union from the application of the "first charge" principle. Notwithstanding the legitimacy of their position, Soviet leaders' contempt for the "first charge" principle and their tacit support of French opposition to the economic unification of Germany provoked Byrnes in mid-1946 to threaten a reconsideration of Poland's western border. (Safeguarding Democratic Capitalism: US Foreign Policy and National Security, 1920-1950. Melvyn P. Leffler, 2017, p. 213) (IMG)

Of course, in this midst, Lenin, who advocated the alliance with French imperialism against German imperialism, would be privately denounced as a 'revisionist' and a 'right-opportunist' by the Maoists.

C11S11. USA for a New Order in a New Europe *** IMG-All-{Pan-Europe – Cold War}

As was explained in C8S2, the idea of a German-dominated Pan-European 'federation' had been pursued by Nazi German officials Hitler, Himmler, Schellenberg, Goebbels, and Funk. The Hitler faction referred to the project as the 'New Order' for a 'New Europe'. Geostrategically, the idea made sense from a Nazi perspective – Germany would dominate and 'unite' Europe onto a struggle against Soviet power. When the American imperialists joined Germany's side of the Great Patriotic War, they began to pursue the same idea of a German-dominated Pan-European integration. 'I am coming to believe' wrote US President Eisenhower on June 11, 1951 in his memoirs,:

that Europe's security problem is never going to be solved satisfactorily until there exists a United States of Europe, to include all countries now in NATO: West Germany and (I think) Sweden, Spain, Yugoslavia, with Greece definitely in if Yugoslavia is (if necessary, the United Kingdom could be omitted). (The Eisenhower Diaries, Dwight Eisenhower, Edited by: Robert Ferrel, 1981, p. 194) (IMG)

Note that Yugoslavia, led by the CIA's fascist agent Tito (see C12S1, C12S2, and C12S3), was included in the list of countries which Eisenhower envisioned in 1951 to be a part of the anti-Soviet European Union. Beria, a Titoist agent of the MI6, shared the pan-European and pan-Balkan ideas. West Germany was to take over East Germany, and through the mechanism of a Pan-Europe, to conquer most of Eastern Europe after Yugoslavia had devoured the Peoples' Democracies. Then, through such a German-dominated Pan-Europe, Eurasia would be more easily contained. This is why:

My father wanted an economic union of the Balkan countries, led by Yugoslavia, which would later join up with a unified Germany and a free Austria. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, pp. 209-210) (IMG)

The pan-European entity was the next stage of Tito's project for a fascist settler-colonial entity in the Balkan zone. Such an idea of a 'Balkan Federation' that would then become a part of a 'federation' led by a 'unified Germany' was almost identical to the views of Himmler and Schellenberg. Midway through Operation BARBAROSSA, the German intelligence chief Walter Schellenberg pondered of ways to establish a Pan-European alliance that would encompass Eastern Europe in order to maintain the German Empire. Referring to this 'New Europe' in late 1942, Schellenberg said to Himmler:

"(...). Czechia and Slovakia will each be governed by their autonomous governments, but economically integrated with the Reich. I believe this ought to apply also to all southeastern Europe, including Croatia, Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, and Rumania."

At first Himmler did not agree, but after a discussion he admitted these areas could hardly be integrated into the framework of a new Europe in any other way.

(Hitler's Secret Service, Original title: The Labyrinth, Walther Schellenberg, Introduction by Alan Bullock, Translation by Louis Hagen, first published: 1956, p. 310) (IMG)

Schellenberg's and Himmler's vision of a federation of Europe led by Germany would come true more than seven decades later when the European Union that Hitler and he envisioned expanded its reach to the Balkans. Yet, it was the vision of Lavrenti Beria and Dwight Eisenhower as well. The idea was quite unpopular in Europe. In spite of the mass opposition to a Pan-European alliance, Washington continued to pursue Hitler's New Order for a New Europe. The refusal of many Western Europeans towards American imperialist subjugation of their populations, along with the refusal of antagonizing the USSR all:

limited progress toward integration along these [Pan-Europeanist] lines.... (The Progress Toward Western European Integration, Intelligence Memorandum, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), CIA, April 2, 1953, p. 3) (IMG)

The CIA further reported:

Longstanding mutual distrusts, reluctance to give up sovereign powers or make other national sacrifices, and fear of antagonizing the Soviet Union have all been powerful deterrents. (The Progress Toward Western European Integration, Intelligence Memorandum, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), CIA, April 2, 1953, p. 1) (IMG)

Quite simply, in Europe, there were two currents – the current for pan-European integration, which adopted the same ideological justification, and the current against pan-European integration. The latter current, which was backed by the USSR and did not get defeated until the 1991 collapse of Eurasia, incarnated in different ideological appearances nation by nation. Each European nation's anti-pan-Europeanist movement justified its opposition differently than the anti-pan-Europeanist movement in the other European nations. That is why 'different' arguments were made specific to each European nation against such a pan-European integration:

Great Britain contends that its Commonwealth and Atlantic ties preclude joining any European federation; the Scandinavian countries do not like the absence of Britain, and Sweden additionally refuses to compromise its alliance-free foreign policy; Switzerland maintains its traditional neutrality; the Spanish and Portuguese governments distrust European integration, and the former is politically unpalatable to most other European countries (The Progress Toward Western European Integration, Intelligence Memorandum, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), CIA, April 2, 1953, p. 1) (IMG)

In reality, despite the differences in their methods of justification, all the forces against pan-European integration fed from the same center – the communist faction in the territory of the former Soviet Union. That is why, although the establishment of the European Union was meant for containing the Soviet Union, not until the 1991 collapse did the European Union come to be established. The CIA reaffirmed with dismay:

little active interest has developed among the populations concerned and there are no indications of effective European union being accomplished soon. (The Progress Toward Western European Integration, Intelligence Memorandum, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), CIA, April 2, 1953, p. 3) (IMG)

In March 1948, a military alliance pact was signed:

Earlier, the Brussels Pact, signed by Britain, France, and the Benelux countries in March 1948, had established a military alliance known as Western Union, which helped pave the way for the North Atlantic Treaty of April 1949. (The Progress Toward Western European Integration, Intelligence Memorandum, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), CIA, April 2, 1953, p. 4) (IMG)

Then, on April 1948, the OEEC was founded:

The program for European economic cooperation was intended initially to help overcome the dislocations caused by the war, then to make Europe more self-supporting, and later, also to provide a solid economic base for rearmament. The first major step was the formation, in April 1948, of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), which embraces all the Western European countries except Spain. Besides helping to allocate American aid under the Marshall Plan and establishing the European Payments Union, the OEEC has tried to strengthen the area's economy by such other measures as the elimination of import quotas, reduction of tariffs, and increases in investments. It has also served, in some ways, as a first step toward a loose confederation of the whole of Western Europe. (The Progress Toward Western European Integration, Intelligence Memorandum, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), CIA, April 2, 1953, p. 3) (IMG)

Although later in 1948, Robert Schuman officially became the French foreign minister, that German fascist leader of France nevertheless maintained the power and influence that he had as Prime Minister of France a while earlier. In May 1950, Schuman continued the Hitlerian project, the New Order for a New Europe. Known as the 'Schuman Declaration' it paved the way for the European Union to resurface:

The Schuman Declaration was presented by French foreign minister Robert Schuman on 9 May 1950. It proposed the creation of a European Coal and Steel Community, whose members would pool coal and steel production.

The ECSC (founding members: France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg) was the first of a series of supranational European institutions that would ultimately become today's "European Union".

(The Schuman Declaration – 9 May 1950, europa.eu) (IMG)

As the Schuman Plan was being implemented, the Pleven Plan, the project for the Pan-European military integration of Western Europe towards the establishment of a single 'European Army', was simultaneously pursued:

In the summer of 1950, Jean Monnet, General Commissioner of the French National Planning Board ... sought to organise European defence on a supranational basis comparable to that laid down in the Schuman proposal. At the same time, the USA asked their allies to plan for the rearmament of West Germany. But Monnet was also trying to ensure that Germany, aware that its role was becoming increasingly indispensable, did not lose sight of the plan for a coal and steel pool or harden its position in negotiations on this matter. He put his proposal to René Pleven, French Premier and former Defence Minister, who in turn submitted it to the Council of Ministers before putting it to the French National Assembly on 24 October 1950.

Keen that the establishment of a German army should be undertaken within the confines of a European structure, the French Premier, René Pleven, put forward to his European partners a plan proposing the constitution of a European army of 100 000 men. The Pleven Plan was to combine battalions from various European countries, including Germany. The European army, though run by a European Minister for Defence and endowed with a common budget, would be placed under the supreme command of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).

Negotiations began on 15 February 1951. With American support, the members of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) signed the Treaty establishing the European Defence Community (EDC) on 27 May 1952 in Paris. It differed from the initial French plan in several respects. The planned European army would consist of 40 national divisions of 13 000 soldiers wearing a common uniform, much more than originally proposed by France. The Treaty also provided for the creation of a Commissariat of nine members, having less extensive powers than those of the High Authority of the ECSC, a Council of Ministers, and an EDC Assembly with the task of drafting a plan for a European political authority. As those in federalist circles had wished, Article 38 of the Treaty provided for the development of a plan for a federal structure to oversee and democratically control the planned European army. The EDC Treaty, signed for a period of 50 years, could not, however, come into force until it had been ratified by the parliaments of all the signatory states.

(The plan for an EDC – The organization of post-war defence in Europe (1948-1954), cvce.eu) (IMG)

The Pleven Plan ... proposed an integrated European army under a supranational authority similar to that proposed in the Schuman Plan. The treaty, as it emerged from the protracted negotiations which began in February 1951, would set up for 50 years a Defense Community with common institutions, an integrated army with a common uniform, and a common budget. The basic unit consists of 15,000 men of a single nationality – a figure more than twice as large as that originally proposed by the French but finally accepted by them as small enough to prevent re-creation of a German general staff. A mutual assistance agreement with NATO is provided for, and Britain has extended its Brussels Pact guarantees to include West Germany, which is to remain subject to certain indirect restrictions on its armament production and total military contribution.

A “Commissariat,” ... [as a supranational] High Authority answerable to an Assembly and Council of Ministers, is to head the proposed community and handle relations with other international organizations.

(The Progress Toward Western European Integration, Intelligence Memorandum, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), CIA, April 2, 1953, p. 5) (IMG)

The United States planned more and more steps towards a Pan-European integration. However, these plans progressed far too slowly:

Obstacles to a united Europe are, however, still very serious, as is illustrated by the current difficulties in obtaining ratification of the European Defense Community treaty. (The Progress Toward Western European Integration, Intelligence Memorandum, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), CIA, April 2, 1953, p. 1) (IMG)

The CIA predicted:

The West, in 1952, will continue its efforts toward a unified Europe and toward strengthening the defense potential, thereby provoking the East into employing all tricks of diplomacy and cold-war in order to doom these efforts to failure. According to all available evidence, it is doubtful whether the Soviet Union will be prepared, as early as 1952, to look upon the growing military defense of the West and West Germany's participation in the European Army as a *casus belli*. (The Soviet Bloc (Survey 1950 and 1951), CIA, p. 4) (IMG)

C11S12. German Proletarian Resistance against Pan-Europeanism and for German Reunion / The Soviet-SED Peace Offensive *** IMG-All-Communist-led Resistance in West Germany}

The Anglo-American plan for integrating their occupied zones of Germany into a US-led Atlantic alliance and to arm West Germany made the division of Germany inevitable. And in fact, this was precisely what the leaders of the Nazi Underground, described by US intelligence officer Curt Riess in 1944, wanted. ‘Undoubtedly’, remarked Riess, much of the Nazi underground:

will even support separatist movements or Allied plans to create such movements. Nothing would be more favorable for a Nazi underground than a split-up of the unified German administration into many state administrations. In the first place, such a solution would create fierce resentment among the Germans – and it is on this resentment that the Nazi underground must live and grow for years to come. But even more important than the resentment such a change would arouse is the fact that while it will be difficult for the Allies to survey and control a central administration of Germany, it would be next to impossible for them to watch a number of administrations. They would supply the Nazis with literally thousands of chances to place their people in unobtrusive key positions. (The Nazis Go Underground, Curt Riess, May 1, 1944, p. 176) (IMG{Nazi Underground})

The Anglo-Americans could not afford to split the Western zone of Germany while the Eastern zone was going to be unified. This was to be ruled out. However, the split of Germany into the two zones did assist Nazi propaganda. As a matter of fact, as early as 1945, the leadership of the Nazi underground had articulated this in their instructions. Titled ‘Secret German Underground Instructions’, it declared:

‘They [i.e. Anglo-American] consciously set about breaking Germany into small bits, but by this very action they force it to reunite and become great. It is a stunning blow for Germany, but the national idea is not extinguished. The disaster welds the true German national community together.’ (‘Secret German Underground Instructions’. Cited in: German Underground Movement, CIA, Hilary Pawel Januszewski's letter, September 3, 1945, p. 2) (IMG{Nazi Underground})

The Anglo-Americans did however ‘split’ the Western zone of Germany in the economic sense – namely that they established a decentralized economy that benefited the bureaucrats and thus promoted the interests of the Nazi intelligence network.

The Soviets launched a campaign against the program of the Anglo-American imperialists and the Nazi Germans for the partition of Germany into two countries, the rearmament of West Germany, and the closer alignment of West Germany with the US-led camp. A 1951 CIA document stated:

as the result of consistent propaganda, the Soviets have succeeded in creating a sympathetic reaction, among large circles of West Germans, to the thesis that there are only two alternatives for Germany, namely rearmament and the subsequent threat of a civil war, or reunification. (The Soviet Bloc (Survey 1950 and 1951), CIA, p. 3) (IMG{Israel})

Indeed, largely for this reason:

West German opinion is by no means strongly in favor of rearmament or closer relations with the West.... (Repercussions in West Germany Resulting from Communist ‘Unity’ Offers, Intelligence Memorandum, CIA No. 49380, Dissemination Authorized, Officer of Current Intelligence, CIA, Assistant Director, October 5, 1951, p. 3) (IMG)

It was not just the West German Nazis that smuggled their agents for agitating colour revolutions against the Soviets. The Soviets and the SED smuggled communist agents across the border for agitating communist uprisings against the West German Nazis. The German communists led several strikes in West Germany. In late April of 1948, the CIA pointed:

to Communist-inspired strikes and demonstrations in Berlin and the penetration of Soviet-controlled labor unions in that city.... (BOOK IV – WEEKLY SUMMARY COMPLETE – 9 JAN 1948 (#80) THRU 14 MAY 1948 (#98), CIA, p. II. p. 54 of the PDF) (IMG)

Another report shortly after stated:

Communist-inspired wildcat strikes in Essen, Hamburg and Frankfurt may occur during the next few months and will probably follow the general pattern of the successful wildcat test strike of dock workers in Hamburg last January. The Central Committee of the Communist Socialist Unity Party in Berlin is reported to have organized strike committees in these German cities and to have sent leaders to organize and control strikes in the areas. The local Communist headquarters in each city has been instructed to show sympathy for strikers but not to participate openly in strike action. Discontent and idleness among workers in Essen and Hamburg made those cities especially vulnerable to this type of penetration. Frankfurt, as the seat of the Bizonal Economic Council, also makes an excellent target for such Communist activity. (BOOK IV – WEEKLY SUMMARY COMPLETE – 9 JAN 1948 (#80) THRU 14 MAY 1948 (#98), CIA, p. III. p. 39 of the PDF) (IMG)

The German proletarian strikes did take place. Anti-government protests of the German proletariat swept West Germany. In mid-May 1948, the CIA reported:

German food strikes, labor demonstrations, and general unrest may be expected to continue in the US-UK Zones until the food situation and general economic conditions have improved substantially. The present wave of strikes may be regarded, in large part, as spontaneous protests resulting from: (1) the unsatisfactory food situation; (2) the slowness of economic recovery; (3) the preferential treatment of workers in favored industries; and (4) dissatisfaction with the [low level of] efficiency of the German local administrations. Meanwhile union members still at work have been instructed by trade union officials to slow down production until ration demands are met. (BOOK IV – WEEKLY SUMMARY COMPLETE – 9 JAN 1948 (#80) THRU 14 MAY 1948 (#98), CIA, pp. II-III. pp. 4-5 of the PDF) (IMG)

West German proletarian public opinion forced Konrad Adenauer to demand sovereignty for Germany:

Negotiations between the Occupation Powers on the one hand and the Federal Republic on the other with regard both to the replacement of the Occupation Statute and a German contribution to Western European defense are currently at a critical stage. The West German Chancellor is reported to be bitterly disappointed at the failure of the Washington Conference to accord the Federal Republic full sovereignty, and there is a strong feeling in Germany, whipped up by political factions hostile to the Chancellor and the veterans groups, to resist Allied offers until all German terms are met.

There are indications that the Chancellor, aware of these pressures has increased his demands in the last few days lest his control of the situation be weakened by appearing too subservient to Allied wishes.

(Repercussions in West Germany Resulting from Communist 'Unity' Offers, Intelligence Memorandum, CIA No. 49380, Dissemination Authorized, Officer of Current Intelligence, CIA, Assistant Director, October 5, 1951, p. 2) (IMG)

Against Anglo-American plans, the East German communist-led 'Socialist Unity Party' (SED) called once again for the reunification of Germany:

The projected rearming of Germany was countered by the East with the demand for a reunified Germany. This demand, as expressed in Grotewohl's letter of 30 November 1950, has been given unremitting propaganda support. The East German regime tried to create the impression that it was seriously concerned with reunifying Germany on a democratic basis. It maintained that the arming of West Germany would make reunification impossible and that it contained the threat of a fratricidal war. (The Soviet Bloc (Survey 1950 and 1951), CIA, p. 1) (IMG)

In support of the SED and the West European people's hostility to the rearmament of West Germany, the USSR intensified its campaign for German unity:

The USSR cognizant of the present crisis in the relationship between the Allies and the Germans, has timed the ... Germany "unity" campaign to produce a maximum influence on those forces in West Germany opposed to the Chancellor's proposals. (Repercussions in West Germany Resulting from Communist 'Unity' Offers, Intelligence Memorandum, CIA No. 49380, Dissemination Authorized, Officer of Current Intelligence, CIA, Assistant Director, October 5, 1951, p. 2) (IMG)

There were two series of unity campaigns that the USSR launched:

In the first of these notes, the Kremlin called for a peace treaty with a united, neutralized, and rearmed Germany. In the second note, the Kremlin asked for immediate four-power discussion of the terms upon which all-German elections should take place. (The Soviet Notes on German Unity as a Possible Indication of a More "Conciliatory" Soviet Policy, Office of National Estimates, CIA, April 17, 1952, p. 1) (IMG)

The [Soviet] proposal is cleverly baited to carry the maximum appeal to those West Germans – a considerable number – who are still undecided between the merits of integration with the West and another try at German unification. A united Germany is promised its own national land, sea and air forces as well as "democratic rights" and membership in the United Nations but not in NATO. No restrictions of any kind are to be placed upon the development of the German economy, and Germany will even be allowed to manufacture some war materials for its own armed forces. Most important perhaps is the offer to let the united Germans participate in writing their own peace treaty. (The Soviet Proposal for a German Peace Treaty, Intelligence Memorandum, Office of Current Intelligence, CIA, March 17, 1952, p. 2) (IMG)

In a conversation with the East German SED leader, Stalin made it clear that he had no delusions that the Anglo-Americans will consistently reject the proposals for a German reunification campaign. Rather, the purpose of the diplomatic offensive for the reunification of Germany into a democratic and 'neutral' Germany was to expose the hostility of the Anglo-Americans to the German nation and the friendship of the USSR to the German nation:

Comrade Stalin says that in their last conversation W. Pieck raised the issue of the prospects for German development in connection with the Soviet proposals on peace treaty and the policy of the Americans and the British in Germany. Comrade Stalin believes that regardless of what proposals we make on the German issue, the Western powers will not agree with them, and will not leave West Germany anyway. To think that we would be able to achieve a compromise or that the Americans would accept the draft of peace treaty would be a mistake. The Americans need an army in West Germany, so that they would be able to have all of Europe in their hands. They are saying that they keep the army there against us. In reality however, the mission of their army there is to control Europe. The Americans will pull West Germany into the Atlantic pact. They will create West German troops. Adenauer is in the Americans' pocket. All the former fascists and generals are there as well. In reality, an independent state is being created in Germany. And you too need to organize an independent state. The demarcation line between East and West Germany should be considered a border--and not just any border, but a dangerous one. We need to strengthen the defense of this border. The Germans will guard the first line of defense, and we

will put Russian troops on the second line. Agents of Western countries are moving around the German Democratic Republic all too freely. They can decide to use some extreme measures and kill you or Comrade [Vasilii] Chuikov. This has to be taken into account. Therefore, we need strong border defenses. (...). Comrade Grotewohl says that they completely agree with Comrade Stalin's opinion in his evaluation of the situation in West Germany, and the policy of the United States. He, Grotewohl, would like to ask whether Comrade Stalin believes that at the present time we should introduce changes in our arguments to the official position of the GDR government on the issue of revival of German unity. Comrade Stalin answers negatively. You should continue propaganda of German unity in the future. It has a great importance for the education of the people in Western Germany. Now it is a weapon in your hands and you should always hold it in your hands. We should also continue to make proposals regarding German unity in order to expose the Americans. ('Conversation between Joseph V. Stalin and SED leadership', Wilson Center, April 07, 1952, pp. 2-9. Conversation between Joseph V. Stalin and SED leadership, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Library of Congress, Dmitri Volkogonov Collection; according to Mikhail Narinsky, April 07, 1952. A copy can be found in Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiisskoi Federatsii, Moscow (AP RF), fond (f.) 45, opis' (op.) 1, delo (d.) 303, list (l.) 179.) (IMG{GDR})

As a result of communist efforts, Washington's:

Attempts to unite western Europe have not progressed beyond the experimental stage. Partial economic integration, such as the Schuman Plan (coal and steel), and the achievements in connection with setting up a European Army, with a view to bringing about a political merger as well, have developed very slowly. Thus far it has been impossible either to eliminate the political differences (formation of political bodies for the control of the Army of Europe) or to create a substantial financial basis for unification. (The Soviet Bloc (Survey 1950 and 1951), CIA, p. 3) (IMG{Israel})

Led by Kurt Schumacher, West Germany's Social-Democrats (SPD) joined the Nazis, the Anglo-Americans, and the Schuman gang in opposing the communist plans for a united sovereign Germany. A 1952 CIA document confirmed:

Schumacher is hostile to Communist schemes for a united Germany.... (Repercussions in West Germany Resulting from Communist 'Unity' Offers, Intelligence Memorandum, CIA No. 49380, Dissemination Authorized, Officer of Current Intelligence, CIA, Assistant Director, October 5, 1951, p. 3) (IMG)

Hence:

the SPD ... has unfortunately let itself be dragged into a deadly hostility to the Communists and the Soviet Union, and will have to pay a high price for this unreasonable attitude. (SED and East German Communist Views on Unification, CIA, November 12, 1952, p. 2) (IMG{GDR})

Chapter 12

C12S1. Tito's Gang, Agents of the Nazis *** IMG-All-{Gestapo agent Tito}

In Yugoslavia, a small level of capitalist development of the productive forces had occurred but the bulk of Yugoslavia throughout the entire 20th century was agrarian. The population of Yugoslavia was therefore primarily petit-bourgeoisie and since the petit-bourgeoisie are unwilling to risk losing their businesses in the fight against finance capital – unlike the proletarians who have nothing to lose in the fight against finance capital, and unlike the national bourgeoisie who can afford to take the risk of standing up against finance capital – the areas in which the petit-bourgeoisie live are materially dominated by fascist finance capital. Historically, this took the form of dominance by the Tsarist ultra-reactionaries, then the Nazis and the Ustase, then Trotskyism and Titoism, and then direct NATO rule. All of these reactionary forces were closely correlated with one another. The story of Tito's gang is the story of the Trotskyite agents of Nazism, Ustase, and Italian Fascism, a Trotskyite gang that would then begin its alliance with the CIA and MI6, all in the struggle against the proletariat and the anti-colonial national bourgeoisie.

Pay very careful attention to the following excerpts from a 1950 article in the Soviet press:

The Tito fascist clique is an abominable product of the darkest forces of international reaction. The imperialists rightly regard Tito as Hitler's successor. It is no accident that when the fascists captured power in Germany the Tito-Rankovic clique was in the service of the Hitlerite Gestapo which later turned over the Yugoslav traitors to the secret services of other imperialist powers.

Irrefutable facts revealed at the trials of Koche Dzodze [i.e. Koci Xoxe], Laszlo Rajk, and Traicho Kostov showed that while thousands of Yugoslav patriots were brutally put to death in the torture chambers of the Gestapo, the ringleaders of the Titoite gang, including Rankovic, were at liberty because they were already at the time agents of the imperialist secret services. This is also confirmed by other voluminous data.

(...). While serving Gestapo, Tito clique betrayed many Communists and patriots. Thus Vukmanovic (Tempo) betrayed the Communist Party and Young Communist League organization in Sarajevo in 1941. Hundreds of young patriots were then cast into prison and concentration camps, many of them were killed. In the same year Tito's colleague Velebit denounced members of the Central Committee of the Croatian Communist party who met at his villa.

Thus the Belgrade hirelings of imperialist reaction, even before coming to power, destroyed by various means the finest sons of the Yugoslav people.

Seeking to behead the Communist and labor movement in the country, the Titoites have pursued a policy of the mass annihilation of the finest proletarian forces. Thousands of Yugoslav patriots have fallen victim to treacherous directives and orders. The treachery of Tito, Rankovic and Djilas in valley of the Pivo, Tire, and Suteski [Sutjeska] rivers alone in March 1943, claimed the lives of thousands of patriots.

(Tito-Rankovic Clique Has Established Fascist Regime in Yugoslavia, A. Kalinin, April 14, 1950. In: Information Bulletin, Soviet Union. Posol'stvo (U.S.), p. 221) (IMG{Titoist Yugoslavia})

The above is an article published by the USSR Information Bulletin, which was a media outlet of the Soviet foreign ministry.

A 1952 Soviet book titled ‘The Secret Weapon of the Doomed’ was written by the Soviet intelligence scholar Vladislav Minayev and was widely published and supported by the Soviet press throughout 1952 and 1953. The Komsomolskaya Pravda, the CIA noted, emphatically recommended to the young Soviet communists in the Komsomol on the need:

to read all available literature dealing with foreign intelligence and espionage so that [they] may learn to “recognize the enemy and his subversive methods.” Highly recommended in this connection is a recently-published book by V. Minayev, “The Secret Weapon of the Doomed” (Taynoye Oruzhie Obrechenntkh), referred to later in this report, which “exposes” American hostile activities against the USSR in the past several decades. “It is necessary to read it. It is absolutely essential for each one of us to do so!” (Indications of Psychological Vulnerabilities, CIA, March 16, 1953, p. 5)

In this book, which had a circulation of 50,000 copies, Minayev noted:

These trials completely ripped off the mask from Tito and finally exposed the fascist Gestapo gang headed by him.... (The Secret Weapon of the Doomed, Vladislav Minayev. From: aliba.ru) (IMG)

On January 30, 1953, the Soviet press published an article, condemning Tito as a ‘Gestapo agent’:

American imperialism bought the Gestapo agent Tito and his clique for a low price.

(‘Spies, Saboteurs, Embezzlers and Swindlers’, L. Smirnov, Material for Talks: Untiringly Raise the Political Vigilance of Soviet People. January 1953, Published in: Soviet History, Seventeen Moments in Soviet History: An Online Archive of Primary Sources, Original Source: Bloknot agitatora, No. 3, 30 January 1953, pp. 10-22.) (IMG)

That Tito’s clique were a gang of fascists was also officially stated as the position of the communist parties of the Cominform, including the CPSU. The Cominform resolution started with the following:

The Information Bureau, consisting of representatives of the Communist Party of Bulgaria, Rumanian Workers’ Party, Working People’s Party of Hungary, United Workers’ Party of Poland, Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), Communist Party of France, and the Czechoslovak and Italian Communist Parties, having considered the question: “The Yugoslav Communist Party in the power of murders and spies”, unanimously reached the following conclusions.... (COMMUNIST PARTY OF YUGOSLAVIA IN THE POWER OF MURDERERS & SPIES, Cominform, 1949, p. 1. Retrieved from: Revolutionary Democracy.) (IMG)

One of the main themes explicitly emphasized in the Cominform resolution was:

the fascist terror of the Tito gangs.... (COMMUNIST PARTY OF YUGOSLAVIA IN THE POWER OF MURDERERS & SPIES, Cominform, 1949, p. 3. Retrieved from: Revolutionary Democracy.) (IMG)

In this section are presented a series of documents providing incontrovertible evidence of the correctness of the claims made by the Soviet and Popular-Democratic state press. First, the suspicious case of Mustafa Golubic’s death will be briefly examined; then, the course of the Trotskyite policy lines adopted by Tito’s gang harming the Yugoslav People’s Liberation War will be examined; and lastly, the extensive collaboration and full-scale alliance of Tito’s group with the Nazi Germans will be documented.

In a long and well-sourced report to the US Congress, Joseph Martin – the official leader of the Republicans in the US Congress and thus the House Minority Leader – said:

when Hitler attacked Russia, Tito was killing Serbs – our allies – not Nazis. Tito was the best friend Hitler had. (Joseph Martin’s Report, May 24, 1945. Congressional Record: Proceedings and Debates of the 79th Congress, First Session, Volume 91, Part 4, May 7 1945 to June 1945. p. 4993. Bold added) (IMG)

The GOP/Republicans was more anti-Soviet and pro-Titoist than the ‘Democratic Party’ back then. Thus, as confirmed by the GOP’s leader in the Congress, **Tito was ally of the Nazis in Yugoslavia as early as 1941**, ‘when Hitler attacked’ the Soviet Union.

Before delving further into the case of Tito’s intelligence connections to the Gestapo, however, it is worth examining the case of Mustafa Golubic, which should raise suspicion. One of the most important figures in the fight against the Nazi occupation in Yugoslavia was a man named Mustafa Golubic. Golubic was a very good friend of the Soviet leaders and had personally met several times with Joseph Stalin. Borivoj Neskovic, a Yugoslav intelligence Major who worked under Tito and Rankovic in the post-war years, recalled:

At the end of 1932, when they met on the street, Mustafa summoned [Rocko] Colakovic, who at the time lived in Moscow as an emigrant and stayed at the Lux Hotel, which was reserved for foreigners and executives, to come to Red Square in the evening. Once they were in, Mustafa and Colakovic headed to ... the room of Stalin’s wife, Aliluyeva, for a cup of tea, where an elected society of Soviet executives and their families met at that time. Near the end of this tea, Stalin entered the Aliluyeva’s room as well, and after greeting with the attendees, he approached Mustafa, who presented him with Ročko. After a brief conversation, in which Stalin was interested in ‘Yugoslav’ matters and the situation in the YCP, they greeted each other and parted. Comrade Rocko also told me that this was the first



Soviet media associating Yugoslavia’s fascist butcher-in-chef Tito with the Swastika or Hakenkreuz and the Dollar

and only time that he had met with Stalin, unlike Mustafa, which sufficiently shows the level of reputation that Mustafa enjoyed with Soviet leaders. ('Mustafa Golubic', Belgrade, Borivoj Neskovic, 1985, p. 18) (IMG)

Moscow had been fully aware of the Trotskyite deviations of Tito's gang. The roots of the rift between Tito's clique and the USSR can be traced to as early as mid-1930s. Tito, back then codenamed as 'Walter', had engaged in suspicious romantic relationships:

Ivan Srebrnjak (Antonov), an agent of the Soviet military intelligence, ... called the attention of the IKKI to the romance Walter had in Moscow with a certain Elsa, a member of the German Communist Party, who was suspected of working for the Gestapo. He also affirmed that the young woman who brought party correspondence from Yugoslavia to Paris and back (obviously Herta Haas) was also a Gestapo spy. For all these reasons, Srebrnjak felt that Walter needed to explain himself, underscoring his resemblance to Gorkic and inviting the IKKI to disband the CPY. (Tito and His Comrades, Joze Pirjevec, 2015, p. 38) (IMG)

This was why as early as 1939, Stalin and cadres of the Soviet intelligence had asked Mustafa Golubic to travel to Yugoslavia, as means of targeting the Trotskyite group of Tito which held the dominant position in the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party. A communist loyalist and an agent of the Soviet intelligence, Mustafa Golubic had traveled to Yugoslavia in 1939 in order to purge Tito's ring of Trotskyite saboteurs dominating the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party. In his memoirs, Milovan Djilas admits that he and Rankovic, the two main members of Tito's inner circle, maintained strict surveillance over Golubic with the goal of eventually assassinating him. Djilas and Rankovic encouraged their friend Cile Kovacevic to maintain contact with Golubic, as means of maintaining surveillance over Golubic. Djilas wrote:

We didn't even maintain contact with the Soviet Intelligence agent who had come to Belgrade long before the diplomatic staff – in fact, some time in 1939. He was hostile to our Central Committee and said that it was composed of Trotskyites. The Regional Committee, particularly Rankovic, kept an eye on him.... (...).

Cile Kovacevic maintained contact with him by doing him various favors, which we encouraged [so that Kovacevic could spy on him]. Moreover, we were prepared to kill him if he indeed proved to be a Trotskyite. So we followed him carefully, and took photographs of him. Rankovic showed them to Tito, who recognized the man.... He was in Yugoslavia on a "special assignment,"....

The man's name was Mustafa Golubic. He ... after the [First World] war, joined the Communist movement, and soon became an agent of the Soviet Secret Police. Among us Communists there were many tales about his great exploits in distant lands. Exactly how high he was in the Soviet hierarchy of the Soviet secret service, I don't know. But judging by Tito's reaction, he must have been fairly important. (Memoir of a Revolutionary, Milovan Djilas, 1973, pp. 375-376) (IMG)

In highly suspicious circumstances, Golubic was captured by the Germans once they invaded, hence preventing the Soviet intelligence investigation into Tito's case. Referring to Golubic, Djilas concluded:

shortly after the occupation, the Germans took him away. (Memoir of a Revolutionary, Milovan Djilas, 1973, p. 376) (IMG)

Former UDB Colonel Zivorad Silija (UDB was Yugoslav intelligence during Tito's era) pointed out that there is 'some basis' for believing that 'Mustafa Golubic was arrested on the report of someone from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia':

According to an unverified version, Mustafa Golubic was arrested on the report of someone from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, in order to protect Tito, because Mustafa Golubic came to Belgrade to liquidate him and appoint Draza Mihailovic as the leader of the movement.

This assumption has some basis on which it could be correct. Namely, Tito was not to Stalin's taste. Tito wanted an independent Party, and Tito's action at the beginning of the Second World War to free the CPY from Moscow's subsidies provoked resentment from Stalin, of course expressed through the KI [Comintern].

Even the very beginning of the uprising, the formation of the First Proletarian Brigade was against the will of Stalin, although its founding was on the very birthday of Big Brother, Stalin!

('Dossier: Use and Abuse' [Dosije: Upotreba i Zlopotreba], Zivorad Mihajlovic-Silja, 1989, p. 84) (IMG)

By the time of the Nazis' official withdrawal from Yugoslavia, however, the files of Mustafa Golubic were no longer available, so that the conspiracy could be covered up:

when Mustafa Golubic's file was found, someone picked up all the documents that would reveal how Mustafa Golubic was caught, what charged him and who was his informant. ('Dossier: Use and Abuse' [Dosije: Upotreba i Zlopotreba], Zivorad Mihajlovic-Silja, 1989, p. 84) (IMG)

Tito's group, as confirmed by the leader of the GOP in the US Congress, was allied to the Nazis as early as 1941. It follows that the surveillance over, and assassination plot against, Golubic by Tito's group was surveillance and assassination plots by the allies of the Nazis. As allies of Nazi Germany as early as 1941, Tito and his group inevitably had on their hands the blood of Golubic, even if they were not the ones to directly inform the Gestapo about Golubic's positions and activities. Their desire of eventually murdering him was fulfilled by the Tito group's allies, the Nazis.

By the time of the Axis invasion of Yugoslavia, the time was ripe for the Yugoslav Communist Party to plan a popular resistance cause against the Axis occupation. However, Tito and his Trotskyite-fascist clique, positioned at the helm of the Yugoslav Communist Party, had ulterior motives. The gang of Tito was planning the implementation of the Permanent Revolution thesis of Trotsky, leaping from slavery under fascism straight to Trotskyite 'socialism'. This would involve 'skipping' the bourgeois-democratic phase of development, and the refusal to engage in popular fronts of communists and progressive bourgeois-democrats against fascism. This viewpoint of Tito was likely influenced by his studies of the situation in China. Klaus Schmider – a scholar with extensive access to the German archives, and a senior lecturer at Britain's Royal Military Academy Sandhurst – wrote:

The example of China, where a Communist party succeeded in initiating a revolution without an upstream "bourgeois" or "democratic" revolution, seemed to point the way to a possible "shortcut." That Tito attentively studied the book of the American journalist Edgar Snow during the month of May, by which the events in China became known only to a larger public in the west, is in this respect certainly a not insignificant indication. (PARTISANENKRIEG IN JUGOSLAWIEN 1941-1944, Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn GmbH, Klaus Schmider, p. 54. Edgar Snow's book, as referred to by Schmider, was 'The Red Storm over China' (1938).) (IMG)

The material conditions in China were significantly different than those of Yugoslavia, however. Although Yugoslavia was not yet a developed capitalist-imperialist state, it nevertheless had a considerable capitalist class – unlike in China which had a very insignificant bourgeois class.

Therefore, in China, the progressive democratic revolution could take place through the proletariat's recruitment of the peasantry as lower rank soldiers, as well as the proletariat's alliance with the very insignificant national-bourgeois class. By contrast, in Yugoslavia, the progressive anti-fascist revolution necessitated an alliance between the proletariat and the anti-fascist national-bourgeoisie. Tito would ignore these profound differences between China and Yugoslavia, and would therefore seek to implement a leap from slavery under fascism to a Trotskyite 'strand' of 'socialism'.

While the forces of the fascist occupation were stationed in Yugoslavia, Tito's anti-fascist activity was quite delayed. The anti-Soviet MI6 operative Richard West confirmed:

Tito remained in Zagreb until early in May 1941 but did not try to mount a resistance to the Ustasha regime. (Tito: and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, p. 103) (IMG)

Rather than fight the Nazis, Tito's gang collaborated with the Nazi occupation forces against the anti-fascist resistance movement. In a long and well-sourced report to the US Congress, Joseph Martin – the official leader of the Republicans in the US Congress and thus the House Minority Leader – said:

when Hitler attacked Russia, Tito was killing Serbs – our allies – not Nazis. **Tito was the best friend Hitler had.** (Joseph Martin's Report, May 24, 1945. Congressional Record: Proceedings and Debates of the 79th Congress, First Session, Volume 91, Part 4, May 7 1945 to June 1945. p. 4993. Bold added) (IMG)

Franjo Tujman would later become the fascist head of 'independent' Croatia in the 1990s, leading the separatist efforts against Yugoslavia. As confirmed by the Oxford University Press's 'Oxford Reference', Franjo Tujman indeed was a:

solider in the army of the Fascist Independent State of Croatia in 1941. (Overview: Franjo Tujman (1922-1999), Oxford Reference) (IMG)

However, later in the War, Tujman:

joined Tito's partisans army.... (Overview: Franjo Tujman (1922-1999), Oxford Reference) (IMG)

And:

Tujman ... ended the war as a major and also as political commissar in the 32nd Division. Later he went to the Yugoslav High Military Academy. (Tito: And the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, p. 300) (IMG)

During 1941, there was extensive collaboration between the Trotskyite clique in the Croatian Communist Party's top leadership and the Ustase. Citing Italian intelligence archives, Smilja Avramov – the well-known pro-Milosevic politician, legal and history scholar with a background in the study of the Italian archives – noted:

there were direct links and cooperation between the Croatian communist Partisans and the Ustasas, even in the course of the war. These liaisons were reported to the High Command of the Italian troops on November 28, 1941, with the note that contacts between the Croatian communist top leadership and Ustasas were maintained through the area between Sinj and Knin. (Genocide in Yugoslavia, Smilja Avramov, p. 232. Citing: AUSSME, Rac. 5, Telescrivente 28/11/1941, Superescrito a Comando Supremo.) (IMG)

Avramov does not name a specific individual in the Croatian Communist Party. However, until early 1942, the head of the Party in Croatia was Vladimir Popovic, who shortly after:

the invasion of Yugoslavia by the German army in World War II, ... became a leader of the Partisan forces in Croatia. ('Vladimir Popovic Is Dead at 58; Yugoslavia's Envoy to 3 Powers', New York Times, April 3, 1972) (IMG)

And Vladimir Popovic was a:

Close Associate of Tito.... ('Vladimir Popovic Is Dead at 58; Yugoslavia's Envoy to 3 Powers', New York Times, April 3, 1972) (IMG)

Noteworthy is that Andrija Hebrang, the Yugoslav communist leader of the Communist Party of Croatia, did not become the Secretary until late 1942 when Soviet victories in the Battle of Stalingrad destabilized the Nazi Empire. Ivo Goldstein, a historian and Croatia's ambassador to France and UNESCO during 2012, confirmed:

After 1942 Andrija Hebrang was secretary of the central committee of the Communist Party of Croatia, and thus the most influential person in the Croatian Partisan movement. (Croatia: A History, McGill-Queen's Press, Ivo Goldstein, p. 150) (IMG)

Therefore, most likely, a member of Tito's gang was responsible for such covert contacts with the Ustase during 1941.

While such collaboration between the fascist fifth column of the Croatian Communist Party was occurring, Tito himself and the supreme staff of the Yugoslav partisan movement were busy conquering the Serbian-populated towns and implementing their Trotskyite policies there. The Uzice 'Soviet' Republic became the two-months-old capital of Tito's gang:

It was in Uzice, a town of some 12,000 inhabitants, that Tito proclaimed a symbolic 'Red Republic' boasting its own hotel, bank, factories, newspaper and prison. All the future leaders of Yugoslavia held their positions in embryo, with Tito as President, Rankovic in charge of the secret police, Kardelj dealing with policy, and Djilas producing the newspaper *Borba*.

Tito worked and slept in the bank, whose coffers provided the Partisan treasury. On top of the bank building Tito erected a Partisan star, which glowed red at night and attracted German bombers. Factories turned out rifles, ammunition, matches, and uniforms, in which Tito took a particular interest. He had a Soviet pilot's cap made for himself; this kind of cap, a *pilotka*, was later renamed the *Titovka* and became a standard issue to Yugoslav troops. While every other Partisan had a red star of cloth in his cap, Tito wore an enamel Soviet star with a hammer and sickle.

(Tito: and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, p. 113) (IMG)

Like Khrushchev and other Trotskyite enemies of Stalin, Tito tried to flatter the Soviet commander-in-chief, establishing the 'Proletarian Brigade' during the latter's birthday:

On Stalin's birthday, 21 December 1941, Tito established the 'Proletarian Brigades' which, as Djilas remarked, 'were proletarian not in a literal but in an ideological sense'. Although these brigades later included genuine proletarians such as miners, shipyard workers and almost the whole of Split's 'Hajduk' football team, most of the troops were Party activists from the urban middle class. The Marxist

sound of the 'Proletarian Brigades' was to be a disadvantage ... in the National Liberation Movement. (Tito: and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, p. 116) (IMG)

However, Yugoslavia did not need such 'socialist' slogans, phrase-mongering, and symbolism. Yugoslavia did not need a 'socialist' revolution at the time; what the Axis-occupied country needed more than ever was a progressive bourgeois-democratic revolution, much the better if communist-led, against the Axis occupation. The establishment of a 'free' 'Red Republic' with 'socialist' slogans and symbolism were measures hostile to the force of communism, the proletariat, and democracy, for such measures were Trotskyite left-sectarian. The communist line under the condition of fascist occupation was to downplay communist symbols and slogans and to emphasize the national-liberationist character of the struggle. Tito's gang disagreed with such anti-fascist policy promoted by the Comintern.

Nor did Stalin ever need or desire the creation of a cult around him; he was opposed to such left-opportunist attempts by his fake 'friends' to etherealize him. In C5S8, it was mentioned that Stalin was opposed to the cult of personality fostered around him. While Tito's gang was implementing Trotskyite policies in Serbia, Stalin – without directly naming Tito's gang – condemned such left-opportunist attempts at imposing a 'Soviet' 'regime' on 'the Slavonic or other enslaved nations of Europe':

We have not, and cannot have, any such war aims at that of imposing our will and our regime upon the Slavonic or other enslaved nations of Europe, who are expecting our help. Our aim is to help these nations in the struggle for liberation they are waging against Hitler's tyranny and then to leave it to them quite freely to arrange their lives on their lands as they think fit. There must be no interference whatever in the internal affairs of other nations! ('Speech on the Twenty-Fourth Anniversary of the October Revolution, to the Moscow Soviet and Representatives of Moscow party and Public Organizations', Joseph Stalin, November 6, 1941. Cited in: A Documentary History of Communism and the World: From Revolution to Collapse, 3rd Edition, University Press of New England, Robert V. Daniels, pp. 88-89. Cited in: The Cold War: Interpreting Conflict through Primary Documents [2 volumes], edited by Priscilla Roberts, p. 105) (IMG)

Stalin's opposition to Tito's Trotskyite measures is confirmed by Franklin Lindsay, an OSS operative who landed in Yugoslavia to support Tito and later emerged as the head of the American Military Mission to Tito's group. He later served as a founding official of the CIA, with a focus on widening the gap between Tito regime and the USSR. In his memoirs, Lindsay wrote:

The Comintern instructions, significantly, also directed the Yugoslav party to "take into consideration that at this stage your task is the liberation from Fascist oppression and not Socialist revolution" In March 1942 the Comintern repeated their guidance in a further message to Tito:

Study of all information you send gives the impression that the adherents of Great Britain and the Yugoslav Government have some [justification] in suspecting the Partisan movement of acquiring a Communist character, and aiming at the Sovietization of Yugoslavia. Why, for example, did you need to form a special Proletarian Brigade? We earnestly request you to give serious thought to your tactics in general and to your actions, and to make sure that you on your side have really done all you can to achieve a united national front.

The Comintern also advised Tito to play down the conflict with the Chetniks: "It is not opportune to emphasize that the struggle is mainly against the Chetniks. World opinion must first and foremost be mobilized against the invaders; mentioning or unmasking the Chetniks is secondary." In spite of Moscow's directives, Tito continued to concentrate on the defeat of the Chetniks and to prepare the ground» step by step, for the creation of a postwar Communist government.

Throughout the war Moscow continued to advise Tito to avoid anything that smacked of a provisional government, to play down the role of the party, to emphasize the role of the National Liberation Front, and to emphasize that the Front had representatives of all parties and groups resisting the German occupation. Yet Tito ignored Stalin's advice. Instead he created a provisional government in liberated territory in 1943.... Stalin was furious when he learned of the former;

(Beacons in the Night: With the OSS and Tito's Partisans in Yugoslavia, Franklin Lindsay, p. 334) (IMG)

Djilas too, in his memoirs, corroborated the suspicion of the Soviets that Tito's group were essentially Trotskyites:

Though in May 1942 we scoffed at Mihailovic's claim that the Yugoslav Communists were Trotskyites because they didn't listen to Moscow, the suspicion was born in us that not only was this diabolical brew concocted by the British Secret Service, but that Moscow knew of it and chose to ignore it. All this was in time relegated to oblivion, only to be resurrected when Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union parted ways, and particularly when they crossed each other. (Wartime, Milovan Djilas, 1977, p. 144) (IMG)

It is no wonder then that Stalin for long refused to enthusiastically endorse the Trotskyite regime of Tito's clique – the very regime that sought to flatter him by founding its 'Proletarian Brigades' on his birthday – and instead supported the Chetniks led by Dragoslav 'Draza' Mihailovic:

Stalin and Churchill supported Draza Mihailovic because he was popular with the Serbs and therefore the man most dangerous to the Germans. They thought that the Partisans, with their Communist slogans and red star camps, were alienating the Serbs and therefore splitting the opposition to Germany. And at that time Stalin and Churchill were right. (Tito: And the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, p. 116) (IMG)

Tito and his group should have supported the common-sense line of Stalin by allying with the bourgeois forces against the fascist invaders. However, far from agreeing with the Soviet leader whom they had flattered to heavens, Tito's gang obstructed all attempts for an alliance with the Soviet-backed Chetniks. A US intelligence document – undated but from the looks of it, most likely written between late June 1950 and early March 1953 – confirmed that Tito was responsible for the failure to reconcile the two forces against the Axis invaders:

All attempts on the part of the allies to reconcile the two armed factions of resistance [i.e. Chetniks and Partisans] so that they may cooperate with one another as was the case in other occupied countries, failed as a result of the obstructions of Tito ... who on top of it shamelessly threw the blame for these very facts on Mihailovic. (Economic Situation in FNR Yugoslavia, CIA, p. 5) (IMG)

Richard West also confirmed:

Tito ... wanted to conquer the Chetniks more than he wanted to drive the foreigners out of the country. (Tito: and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, p. 143) (IMG)

By warring against the Soviet-backed Chetnik forces, Tito's gang was fighting the Nazis' proxy war against the USSR. All of this was a part of Tito's general activity on behalf of his Nazi German spymasters. Again, recall that in a long and well-sourced report to the US Congress, Joseph Martin – the official leader of the Republicans in the US Congress and thus the House Minority Leader – had said:

when Hitler attacked Russia, Tito was killing Serbs – our allies – not Nazis. Tito was the best friend Hitler had. (Joseph Martin's Report, May 24, 1945. Congressional Record: Proceedings and Debates of the 79th Congress, First Session, Volume 91, Part 4, May 7 1945 to June 1945. p. 4993. Bold added) (IMG)

The Trotskyite measures of Tito's gang in the Uzice Republic were all done in the names of 'socialism' and 'communism'. Through their left-reactionary policies, the Trotskyites successfully tarnished the reputation of communism among the inhabitants of Uzice. The situation in Montenegro, if not worse, was no better. There, a popular anti-fascist uprising had taken place; but the Axis occupation forces were able to successfully crush the uprising. However, as time went by, the Trotskyite-led YCP partisans were able to take over some of the Axis-occupied territories, and thereby implemented Trotskyite policies in those Montenegrin territories. Elizabeth Roberts – member of the Australian Diplomatic Service serving in Paris and researcher in the House of Commons for the Liberal Party spokesman on Foreign Affairs – wrote:

as the Partisans began to retake some of the terrain lost after the crushing of the uprising, their return was accompanied by a spate of executions of their fellow Montenegrins. Many of those executed were denounced as spies or collaborators but others were in reality simply prominent citizens judged to be 'class enemies', a category that included former members of parliament, judges and larger landowners. Caught between the Partisans' excesses and fear of Italian reprisals, many villagers turned instead to the nationalist bands as offering some degree of protection. So counterproductive was this upsurge of extremism that the Communists themselves later denounced it as an example of 'left deviation', a fundamental error for which Djilas was blamed. But it was in his absence from Montenegro, from November till the following March, that some of the worst atrocities were perpetrated including the macabre events that took place outside Kolasin over Orthodox Christmas of 1941-2. Here fanatical young Partisans carried out a particularly gruesome series of executions of prominent townspeople in a field where the bodies were then dumped together with that of a tortured dog at a site they dubbed the 'Graveyard'. (Realm of the Black Mountain: A History of Montenegro, Cornell University Press, Elizabeth Roberts, p. 361) (IMG)

The Trotskyite leader responsible for implementing such extreme-left measures in Montenegro was Milovan Djilas:

Djilas ... was by his own admission involved in the executions of some civilians and prisoners. His account of the period, Wartime, published in the United States and Britain in 1977 at a time when publication was impossible in Yugoslavia, is a work that must stand as one of the great memoirs of warfare of modern history. In it Djilas admits to ordering or acquiescing in both the burning of villages and the execution individuals who were in no way collaborators but were deemed by virtue of their occupation or social position to be 'reactionaries' and class enemies.... (Realm of the Black Mountain: A History of Montenegro, Cornell University Press, Elizabeth Roberts, pp. 361-362) (IMG)

More details will be provided later, concerning Djilas's confessions on the burning of villages.

In his memoirs, Djilas recalls:

It became increasingly clear to me that our imprudent, hasty executions, along with hunger and war weariness, were helping to strengthen the Chetniks. Even more horrible and inconceivable was the killing of kinsmen and hurling of their bodies into ravines – less for convenience than to avoid the funeral processions and the inconsolable and fearless mourners. In Hercegovina it was still more horrible and ugly: Communist sons confirmed their devotion by killing their own fathers, and there was dancing and singing around the bodies. How many were executed in Montenegro and Sandzak at that time? I don't know, but several hundred doesn't seem exaggerated. All too lightly the Communists destroyed the inherited, primeval customs – as if they had new and immutable ones to replace them with. By retrieving the bodies from the ravines and giving them solemn burial, the Chetniks made impressive gains, while pinning on the Communists the horrible nickname of "pitmen." (Wartime, Milovan Djilas, 1977, p. 149) (IMG)

In a research book published by the Cornell University Press, Ivo Banac, a prominent Croatian-American historian at Yale University, described the events as follows:

The burning of "enemy" villages and the confiscation of "enemy" property were commonplace during the Left Errors. Partisan units were given quotas of "fifth columnists" to be shot. Perhaps as many as 500 were executed in Hercegovina alone. (...). Plans were laid for the building of soviets and kolkhozes. Churches were desecrated and such anti-Western jingles as "Partisans, prepare your machine guns to greet the king and Englishmen" were quite popular. In addition to the Partisan slogan, "Death to fascism – liberty to the people," a new slogan was gaining currency: "The Red Army is with us – victory is ours." Idleness in the villages was treated as military desertion, and peasants were fined or sentenced to forced labor if their houses were untidy or if they were infested by lice. (With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism, Cornell University Press, Ivo Banac, 1988, p. 82) (IMG)

Moshe Pijade, said the MI6 operative Richard West, even went on to create his own pseudo-'sovkhoz':

In their isolation and hopelessness, some of the Partisans in Montenegro seem to have taken refuge in fantasy. The avant garde Mosa Pijade, or 'Uncle Janko', started a sovkhoz, or Soviet state farm, on Mount Durmitor, stocked with animals stolen from Chetnik peasants. (Tito: and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, pp. 119-120) (IMG)

This is confirmed based on Djilas's memoirs. Djilas wrote:

Alongside the heroic and tragic undertakings, there were also the grotesque and the preposterous. Pijade concocted the idea of establishing on Mount Durmitor animal farms that would be modeled on the sovkhozes or Soviet state farms described by our Soviet-trained "Muscovites," and stocked with cattle seized from Chetnik peasants. With his lively imagination, Pijade threw himself into a detailed inventory and disposition of sheep, cows, bulls, sheds, pens, shepherds, milkmaids, herders, monthly and yearly yields of wool, milk, and meat. There was a fair supply of those animals – some twelve thousand sheep alone, with hopes for their increase along with improvement in planning and organization. For a beginning Pijade engaged Mitra, happy that he would at last have an intelligent and resourceful helper who, on top of everything, could take shorthand. True, neither of them knew much about farm animals. Mitra was

from a small town where the well-to-do kept animals, so she might conceivably have known how many teats a cow had, but in the case of Mosa Pijade even this was unlikely. However, that seemed unimportant for the job at hand. Who can expect herders to manage farms? Mosa and Mitra zealously organized shepherd brigades, administrators, and inspectors. Provision was also made, to be sure, for competition between camps. Mosa established strict economy and discipline, yet the animals kept disappearing, and the yields fell short. Mitra made fun of the whole venture with a merriment no more restrained than her diligence and devotion to the job. Even so, this project might have survived until the end of the war, had not the Chetniks and Italians swept down upon us, and the Partisan units and the peasants appropriated the animals. Overnight, everything disappeared except Mosa's and Mitra's saddlebags crammed with regulations, inventories, decrees, and orders. (Wartime, Milovan Djilas, 1977, p. 175) (IMG)

Moshe Pijade, a sworn Nazi-collaborationist traitor to the Yiddish people and one of the closest henchmen of the Gestapo agent Tito, put to torch the entire village of Zabljak

The Chetniks had broken through in considerable force. We had only two small battalions left with which to confront them. But we did secure the withdrawal of our wounded, around six hundred of them. That evening the clouds grew red over Durmitor's peaks, as Pijade and Pekic set Zabljak on fire to keep it from serving as a Chetnik stronghold. (Wartime, Milovan Djilas, 1977, p. 177) (IMG)

Djilas comments:

the Chetniks were also a guerrilla army, so for them every village could be a stronghold. On the other hand, it was justified not to accept the Chetnik takeover of a town which had been ours for so long and with such devotion. Though there were regrets over the burning of Zabljak, there was no criticism. (Wartime, Milovan Djilas, 1977, p. 177) (IMG)

Again and again, entire villages were burnt down by the Trotskyite gang of Tito:

On their way to Bihac in the mainly Muslim north-west of Bosnia, the partisans put to the torch the Chetnik villages in the plain of Grahovo, and almost burnt to the ground the birthplace of Gavrilo Princip, the Sarajevo assassin of 1914. (Tito: and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, p. 124) (IMG)

Such Trotskyite policy lines were:

completely out of tune with the Soviet position.... (With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism, Cornell University Press, Ivo Banac, 1988, p. 82) (IMG)

Note that the interests of Tito's group were inversely correlated with the interests of the Yugoslav communist movement. The weaker the Yugoslav Communist Party, the more the casualties inflicted upon the Yugoslav communists and patriots, the stronger became the hand of Tito's clique. As such, the Trotskyite left-opportunism of Tito's group:

weakened the base of the Politburo's control to the point of virtual collapse. Terrorized peasants who were anything but kulaks or collaborators swelled the Chetnik ranks in Montenegro and eastern Hercegovina. (With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism, Cornell University Press, Ivo Banac, 1988, p. 82) (IMG)

Indeed:

Partisan excesses were ... why the winter of 1941 saw ordinary villagers deserting the Partisans and turning for support to local nationalists. (Realm of the Black Mountain: A History of Montenegro, Cornell University Press, Elizabeth Roberts, p. 363) (IMG)

Precisely as the Gestapo agent Tito's gang of Trotskyite wreckers intended, communism grew unpopular amongst the masses of the Yugoslav people. By the end of 1941, the Trotskyite regime became very unstable; it was unpopular internally, while susceptible to swift German assaults externally. The Gestapo wreckers leading the Party ensured that as much casualties would be inflicted on the lower echelons of the Yugoslav Communist Party which were indeed predominantly made up of Soviet-friendly, non-Trotskyite communists. The German military itself would directly do the job for Tito's gang. On November 25, 1941, the German 342nd Infantry Division (ID) launched their operation against the Uzice Republic:

The 342nd ID was still in use in the Valjevo area until 23rd November, repeating the "cleansing" of the surrounding area twice earlier during the previous month. From there, on 25 November, they pushed south to the capital of the partisans. The 113th ID started out from its Jagodina-Krusevac landing area, where it had arrived in full on the 24th of November, heading west the following day. Flanking were also four battalions of the occupying divisions and - as far as in the West, a novelty associations of the Serbian gendarmerie in use. According to German estimates, these forces faced about 10,000 partisans in the Cacak / Uzice area. (PARTISANENKRIEG IN JUGOSLAWIEN 1941-1944, Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn GmbH, Klaus Schmider, p. 78. Citing: 'Ebd., S. 73-78 u. BA/MA, RW 40/14 10-Tage-Meldung der 342. ID an den Bev. Kdr. Gen. (10.12.1941).') (IMG)

Of course, it would have been strategically unsound for the Nazis to kill their own agents at the helm of the Yugoslav Communist Party during the fighting. And indeed, the Nazis, when given the chance to shoot the Gestapo agent Tito and his gang, refused to fire at their own agents:

Although the enclosure was again not complete enough to allow a complete annihilation of the enemy, Tito and his supreme staff managed to escape only by German leadership mistakes in the Boehme entry. Thus, the partisan leadership had ... to flee head over heels south towards the Italian-occupied Sandzak. In doing so, they benefited from the fact that such an escape route had either been overlooked or rejected as unlikely in the German Einsatz Order. Even more serious, however, was that the 342nd Infantry Division's peaks on pursuit of the Sandzak border, at the express command of the divisional commander, halted the persecution. (PARTISANENKRIEG IN JUGOSLAWIEN 1941-1944, Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn GmbH, Klaus Schmider, p. 78. Citing: Wartime, Milovan Djilas, pp. 103-115. BA/MA, RH 26-342/16 Einsatzbefehl zum Unternehmen Uzice (18.11.1941)) (IMG)

December 1: A comparison of German and Yugoslav battle reports shows that at this time the group led by Tito and the Supreme Staff was only a few minutes ahead of their German pursuers, and, with a push of the 342nd ID into the Italian occupation zone, would have been with high probability killed in battle or captured. (PARTISANENKRIEG IN JUGOSLAWIEN 1941-1944, Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn GmbH, Klaus Schmider, p. 80. Citing: Wartime, Milovan Djilas, pp. 109-113. BA/MA, RW 40/14 342. ID/Ia 10-Tage-Meldung vom 30.11. bis 10.12.41 (10.12.1941)) (IMG)

Again, the interests of the 'Yugoslav Communist Party' were inversely correlated with the interests of Tito's terrorist organization which led the YCP. The Third Reich did not inflict any harm upon its spy ring in the Party leadership, but vigorously moved to exterminate thousands of lower-ranking YCP members, capturing thousands of rifles as spoils of war:

Nevertheless, the extent of the seized prey and especially the numerical relationship between it and the number of fatalities was a sure indication that the insurgency movement had been dealt a blow this time: 2,000 killed, 2,723 captured rifles. (PARTISANENKRIEG IN JUGOSLAWIEN 1941-1944, Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn GmbH, Klaus Schmider, p. 80. Citing his sources, Schmider says: 'In a first report of December 5, the spoils are numbered 18 MG and 1,537 rifles; see. BA/MA, RH 20-12/121 Der Bev. Kdr. General an den Wehrmachtbefehlshaber Südost (5.12.1941). The 10-day announcement of the 342nd ID on 10 December speaks of 28 MG and 2,723 rifles; see. RW 40/14.') (IMG)

With minimal casualties on the German side, the Third Reich triumphantly destroyed the lower-ranking members of the Yugoslav Party, while allowing the Trotskyite fascist agents on the upper echelons of the Party to escape. A remarkably similar incident would occur a few months later, this time as a result of direct collusion between Tito and the Italian Fascist command.

On Tito's behalf, Milutinovic and Djilas, two 'former' Trotskyite associates of the notorious terrorist Petko Miletic, had been slaughtering the Slavs of Montenegro in the name of 'socialism'. After his escape from Uzice, the Gestapo agent Tito called on Ivan Milutinovic to divert more Yugoslav revolutionary fighters into fighting the heavily fortified Italian Fascist positions in Pljevlja:

In early December the Partisans' prestige had been deeply damaged by a failed attack on the Italian garrison at Pljevlja which left them with over 300 dead and two to three times that number wounded. Milutinovic believed that in order to send the Montenegrin Partisans into Serbia in compliance with Tito's orders he had first to drive the Italian forces out of Pljevlja, a key point in their battle to control the Sandzak. As he was to discover, his plan to reduce the garrison and capture the town was over-ambitious. Pljevlja was heavily fortified and defended by the highly capable Alpine Pusteria Division. Tito, who had been initially consulted by Milutinovic, had already expressed grave doubts over the viability of the plan... Hoping for both glory and booty, Milutinovic went ahead with catastrophic consequences. Although some Partisan units fought bravely, others had melted away even before battle was engaged, thereby providing the nationalists with a demonstration of Partisan military ineptitude, if not actual cowardice, which they were quick to exploit.

(Realm of the Black Mountain: A History of Montenegro, Cornell University Press, Elizabeth Roberts, p. 363) (IMG)

A look at the map of the Yugoslav war renders it clear that conquering Pljevlja was not strategically necessary for the survival of Tito and his staff who were migrating from Uzice. A much more powerful imperialist occupation force can be vanquished not by striking it where it is strongest, but by attacking it wheresoever it is weakest. To win, persistently attack the enemy from where it is weakest so that via that avenue, the enemy would be deprived of the resources with which it could even upkeep its strength. By contrast, to sabotage a military force, have that military force keep on attacking where the enemy is the strongest. The Gestapo agent Tito and the notorious Trotskyite Milutinovic knowingly sabotaged the military operations against the Nazis. They struck the enemy force wherever it was strongest. Naturally were yielded heavy casualties – approximately one thousand Yugoslav communists and progressives, the sons and daughters of Yugoslavia who laid their lives for freedom only to be stabbed in the back by the Trotskyite-Nazi wreckers leading them. This entire battle launched by Tito and Milutinovic was nothing short of military sabotage.

As always, Tito refused to accept blame for the catastrophic defeat he caused. He highly doubted that the YCP would triumph over the Nazis in that battle – and that was the point. The point was that the YCP would not triumph, which was the YCP leadership, Tito's gang, did nothing to stop Milutinovic and his group from launching the doomed-to-fail military operation. Under great pressure, to deflect criticism away from himself, Tito was forced to rightly blame Milutinovic, but did not take any responsibility himself. In the post-war years, when the Yugoslav communist freedom-fighter and patriot Arso Jovanovic proved to be too anti-Trotskyite for Tito to tolerate, after the Tito group assassinated Jovanovic while he was on his escape route to the camp of the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies, Tito decided to blame him for the Pljevlja battle as well:

On hearing the news Tito blamed both Arso Jovanovic, the commander, and Milutinovic for the defeat, although it was not until Arso Jovanovic broke with Tito over the split with Stalin in 1948 that his role in the debacle at Pljevlja resurfaced to set the seal on his disgrace. (Realm of the Black Mountain: A History of Montenegro, Elizabeth Roberts, p. 363) (IMG)

Afterwards, the YCP (abbreviated in Yugoslavia as KPJ) was attacked by Chetniks, who were aiming for self-defense against Titoist betrayals: Buoyed by the self-inflicted propaganda defeat of the KPJ, the Chetniks and the occupiers inflicted several military defeats on the Partisans in the spring of 1942. (With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism, Cornell University Press, Ivo Banac, 1988, p. 82) (IMG)



Red represents the YCP partisans. Photoshopped screenshot from a video. Video source: (Yugoslav Partisans during World War II, YouTube, Balkan History May 27, 2017)

As confirmed by Djilas, the Trotskyite policies of Tito's gang in Montenegro were precisely the key set of factors leading to the rise of the Chetnik movement in Montenegro:

And though I didn't have sufficient maturity to express it, I sensed that the Chetniks also profited from the Communists' excessive stress on Montenegrin, as distinct from Serbian, nationality. I thought then, and I believe to this day, that this explains in part why the Chetniks gained their most vital and broadest support from the Vasojevici, a region and clan which from ancient times has looked to Serbia for leadership. Serbianism was the most vociferous and emphatic sentiment of the Montenegrin Chetniks – all the more so in that the Montenegrins are, despite provincial and historical differences, quintessential Serbs, and Montenegro the cradle of Serbian myths and of aspirations for the unification of Serbs. (Wartime, Milovan Djilas, 1977, p. 149) (IMG)

The Trotskyite group of Tito had overwhelmingly lost support among the Montenegrins. Thus, a while after Djilas's return from Montenegro, the Gestapo agent Tito, the systematic exterminator of the Montenegrin people, ordered Djilas to go back and restore 'order' by doing 'whatever was necessary, including the burning of whole villages':

Ostrog monastery on 8 and 9 February 1942 failed in its attempt to harness popular support by setting up a National Liberation Council intended to lay the foundations for a future Government of Montenegro. Meanwhile increasing hunger among the population was encouraging yet more defections among the Partisans' peasant supporters.... So concerned was Tito at the prospect of losing Montenegro that in March 1942 he ordered Djilas to return to Montenegro to replace the now out of favour Milutinovic. Not only was Montenegro a traditional bastion of Communist support, but its loss would rule out the prospect of the Partisans in Serbia receiving help by sea, as well as forfeiting large tracts of country best suited to guerrilla warfare. Tito therefore authorized Djilas to do whatever was necessary, including the burning of whole villages to discourage their inhabitants from going over to the Chetniks. (Realm of the Black Mountain: A History of Montenegro, Cornell University Press, Elizabeth Roberts, p. 366) (IMG)

Djilas in his memoirs wrote:

The danger loomed of losing Montenegro, our most important base, and of its final separation from Serbia. An analysis was made of the situation and, naturally, of "errors." All along we were troubled by the peasants' excuse that they were going over to the Chetniks for fear of having their houses burned down and other reprisals. This issue came up at the meeting with Tito, and the following argument developed: If the peasants realize that if they go over to the invader we will also burn their houses, they will change their minds. This argument seemed logical to me, too, though I did not support it resolutely. Finally Tito made up his mind, though hesitantly: "Well, all right, we can burn a house or a village here and there." Later Tito issued orders to that effect – orders that were fairly bold, by virtue of being explicit. (Wartime, Milovan Djilas, 1977, p. 146) (IMG)

The prominent American anti-Soviet diplomatic official Walter Roberts wrote that the Trotskyite gang of the Gestapo agent Tito:

On February 8 ... even proclaimed such territory of Montenegro as they held to be an integral part of the USSR. ('Tito, Mihailović, and the Allies, 1941-1945', Walter R. Roberts, p. 55) (IMG)

Although Stalin had emphatically condemned any attempts to impose the Soviet system on the Slavic countries, this did not stop the Yugoslav Trotskyites leading the YCP to call on Montenegro to be annexed by the USSR. The Titoists were effectively supporting the Nazi and Trotskyite propaganda depictions of the USSR as a 'chauvinist' 'aggressive' expansionist power.

By March of 1942, Tito's Trotskyite group had overwhelmingly sabotaged the image of the Yugoslav Communist Party. As such, Tito's group was pressured by public opinion to officially denounce its own Trotskyite policies:

The Politburo then repudiated the Left Errors, "ignoring the fact that the [wrong line] in fact was formulated by the KPJ CC." The principal exponents of the Left Errors (Milovan Djilas and Ivan Milutinović in Montenegro and Boris Kidrič in Slovenia) were not punished, but some local leaders were (Miro Popara and Petar Drapöin in Hercegovina and several members of the party leadership in Montenegro). (With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism, Cornell University Press, Ivo Banac, 1988, pp. 82-83) (IMG)

In practice, however, the Trotskyite policies did not stop. As Elizabeth Roberts pointed out:

The killings ... did not stop, and nor did burning of villages and settlements. (Realm of the Black Mountain: A History of Montenegro, Cornell University Press, Elizabeth Roberts, p. 366) (IMG)

Nor did the left-sectarian phrase-mongering of Tito's group stop:

in rejecting the excesses of the Left Errors, the KPJ leadership did not reject the leftist goals of class revolution and Communist control; (With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism, Cornell University Press, Ivo Banac, 1988, p. 83) (IMG)

In early April of 1942 for instance:

thirty members of the Karadzici clan were deemed guilty of conspiracy and executed in Savnik. Many of them, as Djilas himself observes, were condemned solely on the basis of clan affiliation, although the Partisans themselves would have argued that while such a penalty was extreme, it was a reaction to the clan's known nationalistic and anti-Communist fanaticism. (Realm of the Black Mountain: A History of Montenegro, Cornell University Press, Elizabeth Roberts, p. 366) (IMG)

Boio Ljumovic, a YCP official who harbored a line to the right of the left-deviationists, would have served to reduce the leftist deviations of Tito's gang. Thus, as the saboteur-in-chief Tito removed Ljumovic from his positions in Montenegro, thereupon tilting the balance further in the favour of the Trotskyite exterminators of the Montenegrin nation:

Curiously, Boio Ljumovic, political secretary of the KPJ regional committee for Montenegro and a future Cominformist, whom Djilas considered an opportunist and a rightist, was also removed from the Montenegrin party leadership, at least for the time being. (With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism, Cornell University Press, Ivo Banac, 1988, p. 83) (IMG)

By the middle of 1942, the communist faction in the Yugoslav Communist Party had been seriously weakened, as patriotic men and women of the Party had collapsed in the battlefield in the thousands. Other patriots were demoted. The Trotskyite-fascist wing of the Party, therefore, gained the upper hand in some regions. This allowed Tito's group to further pursue its Nazi agenda and to plant fascist agents in strategic command positions.

Having been interned in France after the collapse of the Spanish Republic, Ivan Gosnjak was 'freed' as a result of the establishment of the Vichy Regime and therefore was allowed to travel to Germany and be employed by Hitler's regime. In 1942, the Nazi employee Ivan Gosnjak went on to join Tito's gang:

After the defeat of the republican forces in Spain, Gosnjak was detained in France in February 1939. Only after the capitulation of France in 1940 did Gosnjak succeed in escaping from the camp, going in 1941 to Germany as a worker. (IVAN GOSNJAK – TITO'S GENERAL – DIES, RFE-RL, Research, RAD BR/36, Slobodan Stankovic, February 12, 1980, pp. 1-2) (IMG)

This employee for the Nazis was:

one of Tito's closest comrades.... (IVAN GOSNJAK – TITO'S GENERAL – DIES, RFE-RL, Research, RAD BR/36, Slobodan Stankovic, February 12, 1980, pp. 1-2) (IMG)

Then in July of 1942, he travelled to Yugoslavia to join the band of the Gestapo agent Tito:

In Germany he used a fake passport, and in July 1942 ... returned to his native Croatia and immediately joined Tito's partisan units. (IVAN GOSNJAK – TITO'S GENERAL – DIES, RFE-RL, Research, RAD BR/36, Slobodan Stankovic, February 12, 1980, p. 2) (IMG)

Nazi Germany, which strictly obstructed attempts to join resistance movements, somehow managed to 'miss' the fact that one of its 'employees', freed from prison 'thanks' to the Nazi German invasion and occupation of France, was able to join Germany's secret ally, Tito. Ivan Gosnjak joined Tito and was promoted to the rank of the commander of the partisan forces in Croatia:

Gosnjak returned to Yugoslavia (via Germany) and immediately joined Tito's partisan units. (IVAN GOSNJAK – TITO'S GENERAL – DIES, RFE-RL, Research, RAD BR/36, Slobodan Stankovic, February 12, 1980, p. 1) (IMG)

Gosnjak's return to Yugoslavia approximately coincided with the strategic alliances of the Party's Trotskyite leadership with the Ustase, which occurred a month prior. By late April of 1942, General Francetic – the Ustase commissioner for Bosnia and Herzegovina, the head of the Black Legion, and a likely successor to Ante Pavelic – had made alliances with the 1st and 2nd 'Proletarian Brigades':

Politically, the Trio's greatest surprise [move] had undoubtedly been the success of the Francetic group and its temporary alliance with the 1st and 2nd Proletarian Brigades. (PARTISANENKRIEG IN JUGOSLAWIEN 1941-1944, Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn GmbH, Klaus Schmider, p. 132. Citing: BA/MA, RL 21/218 10-Tage-Meldung des Kdr. Generals, 21. (30.4.1942).) (IMG)

During April and May 1942, the Ustase regime made pacts with the Italian Fascist occupation forces regarding the situation in Yugoslavia. These pacts nominally targeted both the Chetniks and Tito's units. In practice, they rarely struck Tito's units:

Beginning with the first talks which the Croatian civilian commissary Vjekoslav Vrancic led in March in the Italian occupation zone, these negotiations resulted in two standstill agreements, of which the first (27 April), concerned the West Bosnian, and the second (28 May) concerned the majority of the East Bosnian Cetniks. In practice, these agreements resulted in the establishment of more or less well-defined protection zones for the Bosnian Serb population; Parts of the agreements, which also provided for joint action against the partisans, were only occasionally put into practice. (PARTISANENKRIEG IN JUGOSLAWIEN 1941-1944, Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn GmbH, Klaus Schmider, p. 133. Citing: 'The Cetniks: War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945', Stanford University Press, Jozo Tomasevich, 1975, pp. 226-231. The Chetnik Movement and the Yugoslav resistance, Matteo J. Milazzo, 1975, pp. 78-81) (IMG)

The Italian General Roatta assured the German command that he would cooperate in the fight against the partisans:

Interestingly, however, [German General Walter] Kuntze had already reconciled himself with the idea of continuing the operations even before the release of Rogatica. Roatta's assurance of 21 April seems to have played a decisive role here, and the command of the troops deployed would definitely remain in German hands even after the demarcation line had been crossed. Unlike his subordinate Bader, Kuntze was able to gain something from the idea of commanding Italian troops south of the demarcation line. Not least of all, he promised himself the chance of being able to persuade the Italians within their own sphere of influence "to engage in more active warfare." In any case, there was cause for hope that the cooperation agreed upon in Abbazia might yet lead to a presentable result. (PARTISANENKRIEG IN JUGOSLAWIEN 1941-1944, Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn GmbH, Klaus Schmider, p. 128) (IMG)

Therefore, on:

May 2, an armed force of one German and three Italian divisions could be targeted against an area roughly bordered by the Sarajevo-Gorazde-Foca-Kalinovik line. While the 718th ID [i.e. Infantry Division] had to advance from the northeast, the 1st Italian Mountain Division "Taurinense" from northwestern Germany, which meanwhile had arrived in Sarajevo, and the 22nd ID "Cacciatori delle Alpi", deployed in Nevesinje in Herzegovina, came from the south. Towards the east, the securing of the Drina section between Gorazde and Foca had been entrusted to the 5th Mountain Division "Pusteria". That, unlike the attack on Rogatica, the "Bader Task Force" finally arrived on the eve of the pincer operation against the capital of the partisan movement. (PARTISANENKRIEG IN JUGOSLAWIEN 1941-1944, Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn GmbH, Klaus Schmider, p. 129. Citing: BA/MA, RW 40/26 Kampfgruppe General Bader, Befehl zur Bildung der Einschließungsfront (30.4.1942).) (IMG)

'However, the company "Trio II" ... was not even a day old', said Schmider, 'when':

Contrary to the assurance given by Roatta Bader on April 21, Colonel-General Ugo Cavallero decreed on May 3 that the three Italian divisions should withdraw from the combat group and the Italian VI responsible for this area. Army Corps (General Renzo Dalmazzo) are to be subordinated. It was only thanks to the protest of Rintelens that at least the "Pusteria", which at no time belonged to the VI. AK, under Bader's command remained.

The further course of the operation, despite all efforts to the contrary, showed striking parallels to the previous operation against Rogatica. On the one hand, because again no major enemy forces were put to the fight, on the other hand, because due to the delayed opening up of the "Cacciatori" once again no timely south barrier could be established. It was also this gap that made it possible for Tito and his staff to detach themselves via Zabljak to Pluzine in the Herzegovinian-Montenegrin border region.

(PARTISANENKRIEG IN JUGOSLAWIEN 1941-1944, Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn GmbH, Klaus Schmider, p. 129. Citing: KTB OKW, II. 1, S. 334 (Eintrag vom 3.5.1942); BA/MA, RH 20-12/145, Der Deutsche General beim Hauptquartier der italienischen

Wehrmacht an den Wehrmachtbefehlshaber Südost (3.5.1942). BA/MA, RW 40/26 Abschlußbericht »Unternehmen Foca« (20.5.1942.) (IMG)

Luciano Viazzi, a head of Italy's 'Historical Society for the Study of the Second World War', argued that: the "Cacciatori" Division approaching from the south only by the order issued on 15.5. [i.e. June 15th] prevented the setting of the "trio" operation. This laid the way [for escape] for Tito and his staff. ('L'inutile vittoria: La tragica esperienza delle truppe italiane in Montenegro', Giacomo Scotti, Luciano Viazzi, Milan, 1989, p. 331. Cited in: PARTISANENKRIEG IN JUGOSLAWIEN 1941-1944, Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn GmbH, Klaus Schmider, p. 129) (IMG)

In other words, the Italian forces allowed Tito and his supreme staff to escape the battlefield. Indeed, Dedijer and Djilas: agree that the group around Tito during the retreat from Foca at not time was in immediate danger of being cut off.... (PARTISANENKRIEG IN JUGOSLAWIEN 1941-1944, Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn GmbH, Klaus Schmider, p. 129. Citing: Wartime, Milovan Djilas, pp. 173-175. War Diaries, Vladimir Dedijer, pp. 156-175 (entries from 9.5.-20.5.1942).) (IMG)

The British intelligence agent Richard West wrote:

the Italian soldiers were loath to get involved in fighting the Partisans, and in July 1942 they began to withdraw from the NDH to their territory on the coast. (Tito: and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, p. 136) (IMG)

Schmider adds:

The temporary evacuation of Konjic by the Italian garrison on the route of the "long march" at least suggests this conclusion; (PARTISANENKRIEG IN JUGOSLAWIEN 1941-1944, Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn GmbH, Klaus Schmider, p. 190. Citing: BA / MA, RH 26-118 / 28 Annex 7 to 718. ID, Ia, No. 2554/42 go.) (IMG)

Thus:

the Italians started to leave places like Bihac, Drvar, Kalinovica, Karlovac and Petrova Gor.... (Tito: and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, p. 136) (IMG)

Elsewhere Richard West writes:

Although the Partisans captured and briefly held small highland towns such as Uzice, Foca, Bihac and later Drvar and Jaice, they seldom descended into the cities or the rich lowland plains which held most of the country's wealth and population. Until the end of 1942, their presence did not much bother the Axis occupation force. When the Italians moved into the NDH in the summer and autumn of 1941, this was not to suppress the Partisans.... (Tito: and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, p. 126) (IMG)

A German intelligence officer named Wilhelm Hottl reported in his memoirs that a courier of Tito:

had traveled the road between Tito and Roatta several times. (Use for the Rich: In the Foreign Secret Service of the Third Reich, Koblenz, Wilhelm Höttl, 1997, p. 223. Cited in: PARTISANENKRIEG IN JUGOSLAWIEN 1941-1944, Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn GmbH, Klaus Schmider, p. 190) (IMG)

The Nazi officials themselves stated that the Italian Fascist commander Roatta and Tito had colluded. Indeed, there were remarks:

by some German authorities in 1942, that the "long march" was even based on a collusion between Roatta and Tito.... (PARTISANENKRIEG IN JUGOSLAWIEN 1941-1944, Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn GmbH, Klaus Schmider, p. 190) (IMG)

For the second and third times in a row, the Trotskyite agents of the Gestapo were able to escape the battlefield, as their subordinates, Yugoslav patriots, were being martyred by the Axis assassins. One may allow the Tito apologists to argue, for as much as they desire, that divine providence was at work, but for the non-superstitious, it is clear that the Nazi Germans and Fascist Italians, not the heavens, were on Tito's side. As documented previously, the Nazi German authorities, entirely correctly, remarked that the 'long march', Tito's escape from the hands of the Nazis, was a case of collusion between the Italian Fascists and Tito.

Having annihilated more and more of the communist and progressive children of Yugoslavia rivalling Tito's group, the latter gained even further leverage. A leap from quantity to quality, the annihilation of many Yugoslav communists and progressives, allowed Tito's clique to consolidate its influence on more sections of the Party. More than ever before, the hold of fascist faction over that Party was growing. In this midst, Tito's group confidently went ahead and treated the Nazi German military and intelligence officials loyally and royally, expressing to them a desire for consolidating the strategic partnership between Tito's group and the Nazis. In 'a comprehensive report compiled for Heinrich Himmler', said Schmider, the 'German police attaché in Zagreb' stated the following in September 21, 1942:

"The loyal treatment in the headquarters even went so far that the Germans were invited for lunch on Sunday. The table was laid white and it was served like a first class hotel. The food order was accordingly. Noteworthy are political statements by the Partisan Commander-in-Chief Tito. On the occasion of a conversation with a German, he expressed the view that, in spite of the present terrible bloodbath on the eastern front, it was necessary to bring about an understanding between Germany and Russia. Otherwise there would be the danger that England and America would eventually emerge victorious again, and the victory of these regimes would mean the downfall and subjugation of the working peoples." (PARTISANENKRIEG IN JUGOSLAWIEN 1941-1944, Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn GmbH, Klaus Schmider, p. 159. Citing: PA/AA, Inland II g 99, 1956 Der Polizeiattache in Zagreb an den Reichsführer SS (21.9.1942).) (IMG)

Another report shortly after by the German police attaché made the same remarks

In another report, written three days later, ... the [German] police attaché once again referred to the negotiating readiness of the partisans.... (PARTISANENKRIEG IN JUGOSLAWIEN 1941-1944, Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn GmbH, Klaus Schmider, p. 159. Citing: PA/AA, Inland II g 99, 1956 Der Polizeiattache in Zagreb an den Reichsführer SS (24.9.1942).) (IMG)

In October 1942, the Nazi high command reported that Tito was willing to serve as an economic 'partner' of the Third Reich:

Thus, above all, the question of the undisturbed exploitation of the resources of the country by the occupying power, which had already been discussed three months earlier, seems to have been the subject of extensive discussions. On October 30, the commander-in-chief of the Commanding General noted the following impressions: "Tito believes that economic cooperation between the partisans as equal partners with Germany, even in the Yugoslav area, is quite possible." (PARTISANENKRIEG IN JUGOSLAWIEN 1941-1944, Verlag

E.S. Mittler & Sohn GmbH, Klaus Schmider, p. 171. Citing: 'BA/MA, RH 26-114/14 Die kommunistische Aufstandsbewegung im Raum des ehemaligen Jugoslawien (30.10.1942)'.) (IMG)

It was for this reason that:

In November 1942, the Partisans were not even a serious threat to the Ustasha government of the Independent State of Croatia. (Tito: and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, p. 127) (IMG)

By late 1942, a strategic alliance had indeed been consolidated between the Ustase and certain elements of the partisan movement, involving joint plunder raids:

Thus, the 718th ID and the IC Department [note: IC refers to Abwehr, the German intelligence service] of the Commanding General reported in late October 1942 that in the area of Rogatica, the Ustasha and Partisans a deliberate alliance was formed, which among other things also served to carry out joint plunder raids. The fact that a few weeks later (beginning of December 1942) an attempt to contact the partisan leadership in Bihac by a senior Ustasha leader was taken very seriously by the latter can be seen from the fact that a member of the Politburo (Milovan Djilas) was sent out as negotiator; the establishment of a connection failed only at the outbreak of hostilities that forced Djilas and his companion Velebit to turn back. (PARTISANENKRIEG IN JUGOSLAWIEN 1941-1944, Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn GmbH, Klaus Schmider, p. 400. Citing: BA/MA, RH 26-118/12 KTB-Eintrag vom 20.10.1942; RH 26-118/41 718.ID. Ic-Lagebericht für die Zeit vom 17.10.- 26.10.1942 (26.10.1942); RH 26-114/13 Kdr. Gen. u. Bfhl. in Serbien, IcLagebericht für die Zeit vom 19.10.-29.10.1942 (29.10.1942). Survey of Dr. Vladimir Velebit in Zagreb (9. u. 10.5.1998).) (IMG)

Nor did the Axis occupation forces attempt to combat Tito's army. Referring to the presence of Tito's group in some Yugoslav cities, the MI6 operative Richard West wrote:

Until the end of 1942, their [i.e. Titoist-led Partisans'] presence did not much bother the Axis occupation force. When the Italians moved into the NDH in the summer and autumn of 1941, this was not to suppress the Partisans....

The Germans also intervened to restrain and sometimes to hang the Ustasha in Slavonia and the Srem, but did not ... take the Partisans seriously. Hitler's vital interests in the former Yugoslavia were first to protect the railway line down the Sava and Morava valleys, and secondly to ensure the supply of strategic ores such as copper and chrome from the mines, which were mostly in Bosnia. Since the Partisans wanted to win power in Yugoslavia rather than damage the Axis war effort, they seldom threatened either of these two German interests.

(Tito: and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, p. 127) (IMG)

In late January 1943, Tito was maintaining secret talks with the heads of the Ustase. This fact is backed up by the Italian intelligence archives cited by Avramov:

Josip Broz himself, according to these [Italian intelligence] sources, maintained communications with certain members of Pavelic's cabinet. At a time when the Italian command from Sibenik informed the superiors about the meeting between Broz and Ustasa minister Rustinovic in 1943, the latter had already ceased to be the Independent State of Croatia's permanent emissary to the Holy See, but he continued to carry out various assignments in his old role. In this connection, a whole series of new questions arises, which call for comprehensive study: Was Josip Broz playing a double role? (Genocide in Yugoslavia, Smilja Avramov, p. 232. Citing: AVII – ANJ, Contatti tra il Ministro croato Rustinov e il Tito, K. 58, Reg. No. 34/9-1) (IMG)

He sure was, as confirmed also by the German side. Regarding January 1943:

the visit of a three-headed Ustasha delegation in Livno is confirmed by the testimony of a German eyewitness. (PARTISANENKRIEG IN JUGOSLAWIEN 1941-1944, Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn GmbH, Klaus Schmider, p. 400) (IMG)

'The German Reich citizen Franz Leinschütz', said Schmider referring to the eyewitness, 'gave the following statement on the record':

When I was in Livno last week, I saw an Ustasha officer in uniform, but without weapons. The partisans told me there were two more here. All three, according to the partisans, had come to Livno for negotiations. (PARTISANENKRIEG IN JUGOSLAWIEN 1941-1944, Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn GmbH, Klaus Schmider, p. 400. Citing: BA/MA, RH 26-118/42 718. ID Abt. Ic, Vernehmung (25.1.1943).) (IMG)

Although pro-Soviet communists still formed a majority in the YCP, the slaughtering of thousands of Yugoslav communists and progressives had weakened the communist faction enough to render the YCP into a force susceptible to a full-on alliance with the Nazis. Via several intermediaries, only some of which were the Nazi German officials with whom Tito's group spoke, the Berlin leadership was receiving signals to that effect. Note that Tito had told the Nazis that "it was necessary to bring about an understanding between Germany and Russia. Otherwise there would be the danger that England and America would eventually emerge victorious again, and the victory of these regimes would mean the downfall and subjugation of the working peoples." The communications with the Pavelic regime in Croatia were almost certainly along such lines as well. Tito's group was thus indicating to the Nazis that the time was ripe for elevating the relations between the YCP and the Axis to a new level, to render the YCP, a Party by then decisively dominated by the fascist agents, into a force no longer to be decimated by the Nazis but to be embraced as an ally in the war against the Soviets.

On March 4, 1943, the partisans, which by then had too low a potential for a serious combat against the Nazis, surprisingly achieved an ostensible 'victory' over the Germans:

It was around nine o'clock when we reached the plateau at Gornji Vakuf, amid campfires and the roar of artillery. We walked among the soldiers, who were eating their supper around the fires. They recognized us and saluted with an easygoing seriousness. The commanders were stiffer, and terse and direct in their reports. The immediate surroundings of the battle area were as I had imagined them from novels and pictures. The battle had already been won, in the sense that the Germans had been pinned down, thus ensuring the wounded a successful retreat. (Wartime, Milovan Djilas, 1977, p. 225-226) (IMG)

The YCP 'victory' over the Nazis on March 1943 was highly suspicious. The behaviour of Tito's group after this tactical 'victory' made it appear all the more so as a case of collusion. It would start with 'prisoner exchanges' as the mask for something far worse:

Some dozen Germans were captured in the Gornji Vakuf battles, among them a high-ranking officer by the name of Stoecker, a short man of dignified bearing. The idea came up in a conversation involving Velebit, Rankovic, Tito, and myself that a letter be sent to the Germans through the captured Major Stoecker, offering the captured Germans in exchange for our arrested comrades, especially since the Germans had agreed to such an arrangement in 1942. It was Tito who developed the idea – or rather, immediately sought ways of putting it into effect. He brought together the Central Committee members – Rankovic, Pijade, and me – in his water mill by the Rama River, and suggested that we send a letter to the Germans through Major Stoecker proposing, in addition to an exchange of prisoners, that the wounded and prisoners be treated according to international conventions, and demanding specifically that the Germans recognize us as a "belligerent force." We had been briefed before in detail on the issues of the "belligerent force" by Vlatko Velebit, who was a good lawyer. The covering letter bore the seal of the Supreme Staff, but Terzic's signature, not Tito's. However, it was clear to the Germans that the offer had been made with the knowledge and approval of the supreme command: they knew that our movement was centralized. Our assumption was that the Germans would not easily agree to our proposal, and we phrased the proposal in a way that left room for negotiation. (Wartime, Milovan Djilas, 1977, p. 229) (IMG)

A Nazi German Major named Stoecker had easily been captured by Tito's group – or much more likely, as the behaviour of Tito's group afterwards indicated, the Nazi German Major was an undercover German negotiator dispatched by the Nazis to communicate with Tito's group regarding the details of a YCP-Nazi alliance, all under the guise of a 'prisoner' 'captured' by the Partisans during a highly unlikely tactical 'victory'. As mentioned by Djilas in the above excerpt, Major Stoecker was freed, permitted to leave the Partisan camp, and to go to the German-occupied camp and let the authorities in the latter know that the YCP leadership had been 'centralized' under Tito's authoritarian rule and that the Germans should start treating the YCP in a much more favourable manner, as a 'belligerent force' respected in accordance to the Hague Convention. Tito's gang sent a message to the Germans, and the latter responded positively:

we received an answer from the Germans within two or three days: the message that we could immediately send our negotiators was signed by an officer and sealed with an eagle. On the day the German reply came – March 9, 1943 – another meeting was held, attended only by Tito, Rankovic, and myself, to appoint a delegation and work out tactics to deal with a hypothetical German offer. (Wartime, Milovan Djilas, 1977, p. 230) (IMG)

The goal of these talks between the Germans and the partisans was not at all a prisoner exchange but rather the establishment of an alliance of a Titoist-dictated YCP and the Axis. Tito decided to entrench his own alliance with the Nazis by reducing the conflict between the Partisan troops and the army of the Third Reich:

It was now in the first days of March, in a mill-house over the River Rama, that Tito conceived the most daring and controversial stratagem of his long career. **He decided to make a truce, even an alliance with the Germans.**

In the battle at Gornji Vakuf during the first days of March, the Partisans captured a number of Germans including one Major Stoecker. Remembering how the previous year they had used the German civilian Hans Ott to effect the release of some of their prisoner, Rankovic, Djilas and other suggested to Tito that they might reopen talks. On the face of it, this was simple offer to hand over some of the Germans, including Stoecker, in return for some of the Communists now in the gaols of the NDH, including Tito's common-law wife Herta Hass, by whom he had had a child shortly before the Axis invasion. The Partisans also wished to be recognized as a belligerent force to ensure the proper treatment of casualties and prisoners.

In fact, Tito wanted very much more than this. His most pressing need was to break through the Chetnik forces now blocking his way across the River Neretva and then to press on through eastern Bosnia-Herzegovina to the comparative safety of Montenegro and Sandjak. His long-term need was come to an understanding with the Germans by which, in return for ceasing attacks on their forces and lines of communications, the Partisans would be given *carte blanche* to destroy the Chetniks in eastern Yugoslavia. Tito was also willing to talk with the Germans on joint military action against the expected British landing.

Tito authorised Major Stoecker to send a letter through the lines suggesting talks about the exchange of prisoners. A reply came two days later giving the time and place for receiving a Partisan mission.

(Tito: and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, pp. 148-149. Bold added.) (IMG)

The 'arrest' of Herta Haas (or Hass) by the Nazis was also extremely suspicious and seems to have born the same character as the 'arrest' of Stoecker by Tito's group. Recall that:

Ivan Srebrnjak (Antonov), an agent of the Soviet military intelligence, ... called the attention of the IKKI to the romance Walter had in Moscow with a certain Elsa, a member of the German Communist Party, who was suspected of working for the Gestapo. He also affirmed that the young woman who brought party correspondence from Yugoslavia to Paris and back (obviously Herta Haas) was also a Gestapo spy. For all these reasons, Srebrnjak felt that Walter needed to explain himself, underscoring his resemblance to Gorkic and inviting the IKKI to disband the CPY. (Tito and His Comrades, Joze Pirjevec, 2015, p. 38) (IMG)

In essence, Tito's plan was to 'give' to the Germans regions such as Serbia, Montenegro, and parts of Kosovo. These were strategic zones which the Germans surely could utilize as a launching pad for counter-offensives against the Red Army. Many parts of these territories were already under German control. However, Tito's gang would 'give' these territories by, at least for the while, not fighting for them. In 'exchange', the Gestapo agent Tito and his clique would divert the Yugoslav patriots to fight to death against Chetnik Yugoslavs in the less strategic Sandzak region. Both by giving such territories to the Nazis and by fighting the Chetniks, Tito's group was serving the Nazi agenda while getting nothing favourable to the anti-fascist forces in return.

By 1943, the MI6 had shifted its alliance network onto partnership with the Nazis again. Naturally, this resulted in a strategic partnership between the MI6-backed contingent in the Chetnik movement and the Nazis. The Chetniks thus became a generally Axis-collaborationist force. Nonetheless, Soviet support for the Chetniks had allowed Moscow to strengthen the hand of the progressive forces in the Chetnik movement. Therefore, not everyone from among the Chetniks was reactionary or Axis-collaborationist. After all, such was why, based on Djilas's personal experience during the March dealings,:

The German officers spoke with contempt of the Chetniks.... (Wartime, Milovan Djilas, 1977, p. 235) (IMG)

Even if the Chetniks were so pervasively Nazi-collaborationist as to deserve a full-scale war, the strategy pursued by Tito's terror bands was reactionary and favourable to fascism. The Comintern emphasized that the communist parties must invite such MI6-backed right-wing fake 'anti-fascist' movements to cooperate against the Nazis. The objective was that (1) if they, the fake 'anti-fascist' non-communist organizations, do accept cooperation, the communists gain a channel to surveil them and ensure that these right-wing parties really do fight against the Nazis, and (2) if they refuse to cooperate with the communists against the fascist occupiers, they only expose themselves, and (3) if they betray their deal of cooperation with the communists, the communists can then use the surveillance capacity which they gained through a cooperation agreement to expose the fascist-collaborationism of the MI6-backed right-wing movements. In this setting, Tito's continuation of the years-long policy of waging war against the Chetniks instead of the Nazis would have seriously harmed the anti-fascist movement. Furthermore, 'giving' the Nazis the more strategic parts of Yugoslavia was a grand betrayal.

Forming a military alliance with the Nazis against the Soviet-backed progressive elements amongst the Chetniks constitutes not only a proxy war for Nazism against Soviet socialism but also assistance to the Nazis in retaining and expanding their physical presence in Yugoslavia. Assisting the Nazis in retaining and expanding the number of their military and intelligence bases in Yugoslavia in turn constitutes a form of espionage for the Nazis. Undoubtedly, the phrase "Nazi spies" is a generous description of Tito and his terror band.

These facts set the context for the following remarks by Djilas in his memoirs:

The tactics to be followed in the negotiations could only be formulated generally, especially since Tito did not get into hypothetical situations and strategies. The Germans were not to know that our chief objective was to penetrate into Serbia, or that we intended to occupy northern Montenegro, Sandzak, and parts of Kosovo and southern Serbia. We were aware of German sensitivity with regard to Serbia as a central Balkan region with a strongly anti-German population and a sense of national identity. But we had to offer them something convincing: Sandzak was the most expendable, being our poorest and most backward territory, while the Chetniks were an enemy of ours of whom the Germans were also apprehensive – though they had not fought against one another in some time, but on the contrary were collaborating, as on the Neretva. In short, we were to name Sandzak as the future Partisan territory, and the Chetniks as our main enemy. (...). There was not a word about the cessation of fighting between the Germans and ourselves, but this too was understood. (Wartime, Milovan Djilas, 1977, p. 231) (IMG)

Djilas, while admitting many facts, was also distorting the picture in the above excerpt. Indeed, contrary to Djilas's remark in the memoirs, in their written agreement with the Nazis, the Titoist Yugoslav delegation promised to not fight against them and to instead concentrate on the Chetniks as their main foes. Below is the full transcript of the deal, translated from German:

Gornji Vakuf, March 11, 1943.

Written submission of proposals by the delegation of the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia, authorized by the high command of this army, on the basis of the letter from Major Barth dated March 10, 1943.


1) On January 2nd, Mr. Leinschutz was probed to Mostar to end the question of prisoner-of-war exchanges that had been already raised in earlier talks with members of the German Wehrmacht. He had to return by February 1, 1943 but has not yet reported. We believe that prisoner exchanges should finish sooner. The following can be considered for exchange:

- a. The ethnic German prisoners from Jajce and the crew of the Croatian plane, which was replaced by Mr. Leinschutz.
- b. Major Strecker, for whom we request Prof. Ivan Marinkovic from Karlovac in exchange. He himself is in the police prison in Zagreb.
- c. 25 captured German soldiers who were caught in the fighting at Sitnica.
- d. Around 100 officers, under-officers [German: Unteroffizier; Abbreviated: Uffz.] and officials of the Croatian Wehrmacht and the Croatian State.
- e. 15 Italian officers.
- f. About 500 Italian soldiers and under-officers.

2) We believe that the command of the German Armed Forces vis-à-vis the Yugoslav PLA in this respect gives full guarantee from this side that the rules are strictly observed.

3) The command the Yugoslav PLA is of the opinion:

- a. That in the given situation, there is no reason that the German Wehrmacht's warfare against the Yugoslav PLA is in the interests of either side. However, it would be of mutual interest if the delicacy were discontinued. In connection with



A photo of the secret deal between Tito and his gang with the Nazi Germans in March 1943

this, the German command and this delegation had to put forward their proposals about a possible zone and the directions of the economic or other interests.

b. The Yugoslav PLA considers the Chetniks as its main foe.

4) Throughout the duration of the sub-accumulations after all these functions, we put an end to the acts of war by the German troops and the troops of the Yugoslav PLA before.

5) This delegation is authorized to conclude preliminary negotiations, while a possible, final agreement had to be confirmed by our high command. This delegation has hastily stressed that this delegation was to be closed by the higher command posts and asked the German command to approve authorized negotiators.

(Gornji Vakuf, March 11, 1943)

Koca Popovic, Vladimir Velebit, and Milovan Djilas were the three representatives from the YCP side in these March 1943 negotiations. However, only Popovic revealed his real name during the negotiations:

Tito regarded the matter as so delicate and important that he proposed that I be appointed to the delegation as a member of the Politburo. No one raised any objection, and I did not demur. I knew enough German to follow a conversation and get along somehow or other. After all, we didn't intend to discuss Goethe and Kant. Tito also felt that a senior commander should go; Koca Popovic was designated; he knew German fairly well. Vlatko Velebit's participation in the delegation was taken for granted; he had shown adroitness in handling the exchange with the Germans in Livno, and he knew German so well – he had studied it in Vienna – that the Germans thought he was Viennese. (Wartime, Milovan Djilas, 1977, p. 230) (IMG)

We had agreed that only Koca Popovic would give his real name: because he had introduced himself as the commander of the First Division, it made no sense to conceal it, and the Germans probably knew of him through prisoners. Velebit changed his surname to Petrovic, for fear of reprisals against his family, while I assumed a common name – one borne by a Montenegrin hero of long ago: Markovic. I was too prominent a figure to reveal myself, and too tempting a prisoner for the Gestapo in case the Germans reneged on their bargain. Later, when Velebit and I went to Zagreb to negotiate, I permitted Velebit to give his real name and to visit his family.

The Germans in Gornji Vakuf took photographs of us by surprise, but I covered my face. (Wartime, Milovan Djilas, 1977, p. 234) (IMG)

In all likelihood, the reason why the Djilas group refused to disclose their names was to maintain secrecy from potential Soviet spies in the Nazi Wehrmacht. After all, the Nazis were well aware of Djilas's identity:

the German officers in Gornji Vakuf were not deceived by our secrecy. When I told them that I was the quartermaster of a division, the coarse major remarked with irony, "This one is their commissar!" On the morning of March 14 both officers wished Koca a happy birthday with cordially ironic expressions. Koca wasn't at all taken aback; he thanked them and added, "That was easy enough for you to find out: the Belgrade police have had a file on me for a long time." (Wartime, Milovan Djilas, 1977, p. 235) (IMG)

'A few days later', said Walter Roberts, 'on March 17, the German Minister in Zagreb, Kasche, sent a telegram to Berlin in which, clearly referring to the German-Partisan talks,' he noted the possibility:

that Tito and supporters will cease to fight against Germany, Italy and Croatia and retire to the Sandzak in order to settle matters with Mihailovic's Cetniks. ('Tito, Mihailović, and the Allies, 1941-1945', Walter R. Roberts, p. 109) (IMG)

Kasche added:

Under circumstances possibility exists that Tito will demonstratively turn his back on Moscow.... The wishes of the Partisans are: Fight against the Chetniks in the Sandžak, thereafter return to their villages and pacification in Croatian and Serbian areas; return of camp-followers to their villages after they are disarmed; no executions of leading Partisans on our part... It is my opinion that this possibility should be pursued since secession from the enemy of this fighting force highly regarded in world opinion would be very important. In fact, the Tito Partisans are, in their masses, not Communists.... I refer to previous written reports and also to my conversation with State Secretary von Weizsacker. Request instructions. In talks with Casertano [Italian Minister in Zagreb] and Lorković [Croatian Foreign Minister] I found that the above development would be treated positively. ('Tito, Mihailović, and the Allies, 1941-1945', Walter R. Roberts, p. 109) (IMG)

Indeed, Tito had already turned his back on Moscow since long ago. The Nazi agent was never a friend of the USSR in the first place; nor were such deals with the Nazis particularly new for him, considering his history of collaboration with the Third Reich as their agent. In fact, Gestapo agents Tito and Djilas were very confident about the need for backstabbing the USSR:

Neither I nor the other Central Committee members [who were aware of these deals] had any pangs of conscience that by negotiating with the Germans we might have betrayed the Soviets, internationalism, or our ultimate aims. (Wartime, Milovan Djilas, 1977, p. 244) (IMG)

We were in agreement on the course of the negotiations, though Tito was the least skeptical of all. I raised the question, "What will the Russians say?"

Tito replied almost angrily – in anger at the Russians, not me – "Well, they also think first of their own people and their own army!" (...). I was very pleased with Tito's reaction: yes, it was clear to me that we were beginning to differ with the Soviets over a very sensitive question – the most sensitive of all – and one that was vital to us. Had someone asked me then if this divergence from the Soviets agreed with our ideology, I would have replied, "Well, our struggle is also a contribution to the Marxist-Leninist teaching." In other words, as long as life fits into the ideology – as long as the ideology makes possible a productive orientation – the ideology is alive.

(Wartime, Milovan Djilas, 1977, p. 231) (IMG)

Here too, the widening rift between Tito's fascist clique and Moscow can be observed. Stalin, as implicitly admitted by the prominent US military and intelligence official Franklin Lindsay, would have strongly disapproved of any such deals between Tito's gang and the Nazi Germans. Referring to the matter, Lindsay wrote:

had [Stalin] known of the latter [i.e. Titoist-Nazi deal] he would have considered it high treason. (Beacons in the Night: With the OSS and Tito's Partisans in Yugoslavia, Franklin Lindsay, p. 334) (IMG)

As Djilas himself pointed out:

The negotiations were held in great secrecy. There were no differences among the top leaders.... (Wartime, Milovan Djilas, 1977, p. 244) (IMG)

The Soviet leaders almost certainly had an idea as to the nature of the negotiations between Tito's terror gang and the Nazis, although they may not have necessarily known all the details. Note again that the Soviet intelligence service found Tito and his group highly suspicious since the 1930s, and, upon gaining the chance to hunt down Tito's girlfriend Elsa, had executed her during the Great Purge on the charge of espionage for the Gestapo. Moscow expressed its suspicion of the treasonous Titoite-Nazi collaboration by asking on March 9, two days prior to the signing of the deal, whether Tito's clique would betray 'enslaved Europe' by ceasing 'the struggle against the worst enemy of mankind':

Besides, Tito had already received Moscow's reply. At the same time as the letter to the Germans, a dispatch had been sent to Moscow which mentioned only an exchange of prisoners. But this time Moscow was quick and discerning, and we received an immediate and angry reply, true to style: Is it possible that you who were an example to all of enslaved Europe – you who have until now shown such heroism – will cease the struggle against the worst enemy of mankind and of your people? (Wartime, Milovan Djilas, 1977, p. 232) (IMG)

One needs not mention the fact that the phrase "you who were an example to all of enslaved Europe – you who have until now shown such heroism" in Moscow's statement to Tito's Gestapo gang was merely diplomatic rhetoric in which the Soviets themselves disbelieved. After all, the Soviets regarded Tito as a Nazi agent long before 1943.

Tito's gang also promised to the Germans that the partisans would combat the British if they land in Yugoslavia:

We didn't shrink from declarations that we would fight the British if they landed. (Wartime, Milovan Djilas, 1977, p. 243) (IMG)

Again, by 1943, with Soviet victory in the Battle of Stalingrad, the balance had tilted in the favour of the Soviets, and hence the MI6 policy of bleeding the Soviets and Nazis out implied that the MI6 would ally with the Nazis – and with Tito's gang. Therefore, Tito's gang would not hold on to that promise of striking the British imperial forces, nor would their German spymasters want them to act on their promise. Therefore, it was only a matter of time before the MI6 would begin supplying the Third Reich's agents – in the case of Yugoslavia, the Gestapo agent Tito's clique – with all kinds of assistance in order to prop up Tito's gang against the Soviets.

By the time Djilas returned to the partisan base later in March,:

I found Tito and the Supreme Staff in a village not far from Kalinovik. I made my report to Tito, but he didn't seem quite as interested as before: the Germans had, in fact, already called a halt to their drive, while our units had won a hard-fought victory over Pavle Djurisic's Chetniks, and were penetrating into Hercegovina toward Montenegro and Sandzak. (Wartime, Milovan Djilas, 1977, p. 244) (IMG)

For further negotiations:

Velebit and Djilas passed again through the German lines and were brought by a German military plane from Sarajevo to Zagreb on March 25, 1943. ('Tito, Mihailović, and the Allies, 1941-1945', Walter R. Roberts, p. 109) (IMG)

It should not come as a surprise that the Germans allowed their own agents, Velebit and Djilas who served their top agent Tito, to travel through German lines on German aircraft. Djilas returned to the partisan base but was greeted with the skepticism of the Hero of Yugoslavia and top Yugoslav communist freedom-fighter, General Sava Kovacevic, who warned Djilas and Tito against collaboration with the Nazi enemy:

Sava was sprawled out by a fire, eating supper. He said to me, ... suddenly, with a sly smile, he added, "Don't you go making peace between us and the Germans!"

I felt trapped and confused, nevertheless I was on the offensive: "Don't be a wise guy! Don't you have any confidence in the Central Committee? This is an exchange of prisoners. And to protect the wounded from being killed."

"I do trust them!" Sava said, "but the army has just barely gotten started against the Germans. They're our worst enemies."

(Wartime, Milovan Djilas, 1977, pp. 238-239) (IMG)

The Tito-Djilas faction had serious disputes with Sava Kovacevic. As the reader may recall, the Soviets believed that the casualties of the Battle of Sutjeska, in which General Kovacevic was murdered by the Nazis, was a case of tactical sabotage in favour of the Nazis by the command of the Yugoslav "Communist" Party. In any case, by allying with the Nazi Wehrmacht, Tito's gang inevitably contributed to the murder of their and the Wehrmacht's Yugoslav communist foe, Kovacevic.

Upon returning to Tito's position in the partisan base, Djilas was welcomed by the 'overjoyed' Tito who claimed that the Germans maintained the 'spirit of chivalry' given their well-treatment of Djilas:

Tito and the Supreme Staff were up there by a cliff, deep in the forest.

Tito was overjoyed to see me. (...).

"And how did the Germans treat you?" Tito inquired.

"Correctly, very correctly."

"Yes, it seems that the German army has kept something of the spirit of chivalry," Tito commented.

I told Tito and the others of my impressions and experiences, talking until the afternoon, when Tito had to go on to Glavatitevo and I had to return to Bijela, to await word from Velebit.

(Wartime, Milovan Djilas, 1977, p. 240) (IMG)

As mentioned previously, the deal with the Nazis was only nominally a prisoner exchange. In reality, it was not a prisoner exchange at all. Tito's gang unilaterally released Major Stoecker not in exchange for something from the Nazis but as a gesture of good will. The rest of the prisoners had already been allowed to escape. As Djilas put it in the following excerpt, 'there were no more' 'prisoners', and it was illogical to say that the Partisans could send those 'prisoners' back to the Nazis because those 'prisoners' were not really 'rounded up' at all in the first place. Djilas wrote:

Tito and the Supreme Staff were up there by a cliff, deep in the forest.

(...). I was convinced that the ... release of Major Stoecker and the other prisoners by us would be looked upon as a token of good will, so Tito approved this immediately. We sent Major Stoecker and my escort on their way to Konjic within the next twenty-four hours. As for the remaining dozen or so prisoners – there were no more – we couldn't send them yet because they weren't rounded up.

(Wartime, Milovan Djilas, 1977, p. 240) (IMG)

The fact that these ‘prisoners’ were not really rounded leaves no doubt that those Nazi German officials ‘captured’ during the Partisans’ implausible tactical ‘victory’ over the Nazis were not really captives at all. Rather, that Tito sent back Major Stoecker as an intermediary for alliance negotiations shows that these ‘captives’ were a delegation of negotiators and spies dispatched by the Nazi command to inquire about the conditions of the Yugoslav ‘Communist’ Party and to then be dispatched back by Tito’s group to inform the Nazi authorities of the susceptibility of the Titoist-dictated YCP for a strategic partnership with the Axis. The fake ‘exchange’ of fake ‘prisoners’ was purely a cover for intelligence contacts with the Nazis.

On March 31, Kasche confirmed to Ribbentrop that:

the reliability of Tito’s promises has been confirmed. (‘Tito, Mihailović, and the Allies, 1941-1945’, Walter R. Roberts, p. 110) (IMG)

Indeed, Tito had strictly ordered his troops not to fight the Germans, and, as with the past, was able to ‘escape’ through a deal with the Gestapo:

The Yugoslav archives show that Tito wrote to the commandant of the 6th Bosnian Brigade, telling him to continue attacking the Chetniks but to avoid fighting the Germans on the way to the Sandjak. Similar orders, written partly in Spanish were sent to the 1st Bosnian Corps and the 1st Proletarian Brigade. General Glaise von Horstenau personally made it possible for Velebit to deliver a letter from Tito to the Partisans in Slavonia. It seem that von Horstenau and local German intelligence officers favoured a deal with the partisans....

Meanwhile the 2nd Proletarian Division had scored a crushing victory over the Chetniks; and by early April the Partisans were standing upon the banks of the River Drina, preparing to cross to the Sandjak, Montenegro and, as they imagined, safety.

Tito’s escape across the River Neretva, once hailed as a triumph of tactical feint and daring, was really made possible by a deal with the Germans.

(Tito: and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, p. 152) (IMG)

Through such cowardly ‘escapes’, the Nazis were intentionally making a hero out of him. On November 17, 1943, Velebit proposed to the Nazis to recognize the partisan units of Yugoslavia as a legitimate and legal belligerent to be respected according to the Hague Convention:

The idea of this "equality" seems to have been so mature until the day of the prisoners’ exchange (17 November) that one of the partisan negotiators, Agramer's advocate Dr. Vladimir Velebit, took this opportunity to formally propose to the German side the recognition of the People's Liberation Army as a legal belligerent power and a mutual respect for the Hague Convention on Land Warfare. (PARTISANENKRIEG IN JUGOSLAWIEN 1941-1944, Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn GmbH, Klaus Schmider, p. 171. Citing: BA/MA, RH 26-114/14 Die kommunistische Aufstandsbewegung im Raum des ehemaligen Jugoslawien (30.10.1942). For Velebit interview, the author cites: Survey of Dr. Vladimir Velebit in Zagreb (9. u. 10.5.1998).) (IMG)

Usually, calling on the enemy forces to recognize one’s own forces as legitimate is a correct policy, given it serves as a propaganda victory against the enemy. However, I need not mention that in this case, and in light of the history of the espionage and sabotage by Tito’s gang on behalf of the Axis, this measure by Velebit can be seen as yet another instance of how Tito’s gang aimed to retain the favour of the fascist forces. During March 1943, Tito sent Velebit to Croatia to prevent the partisans from engaging in combat against the Nazi Germans. However, the Croatian Communist Party leadership suspected Velebit of being an undercover agent:

Tito immediately approved Velebit's return to Zagreb, and stopped the operations of the Slavonian Partisans, particularly on the Zagreb-Belgrade railroad. Velebit carried out this assignment, taking quite a bit of time. He also brought Herta back. He told me that he had trouble in Slavonia: the Partisans suspected him of being a provocateur, and the supreme command in Croatia had to intervene. (Wartime, Milovan Djilas, 1977, p. 244) (IMG)

Recall that the Soviets had accused Velebit of being a high-level Nazi spy. A Soviet Foreign Ministry had stated:

In [1941] Tito's colleague Velebit denounced members of the Central Committee of the Croatian Communist party who met at his villa. (Tito-Rankovic Clique Has Established Fascist Regime in Yugoslavia, A. Kalinin, April 14, 1950. In: Information Bulletin, Soviet Union. Posol'stvo (U.S.), p. 221) (IMG{Titoist Yugoslavia})

Indeed, in Croatia, Tito’s ‘home’, the conditions were rather different. There, by late 1942, with the defeats suffered by the Nazis in the Battle of Stalingrad, the real communist faction saw an elevation of its strength in correlation with the weakening of the Nazis and of the Nazis’ agents, the Trotskyites. The communists of the ‘Communist Party of Croatia’ (KPH) were led by Andrija Hebrang who strongly agreed with the USSR on the merits of popular frontism. During the anti-fascist war, the communists of Croatia downplayed communist rhetoric and symbolism and strongly rejected such Trotskyite notions as (1) ‘leaping’ from fascist slavery to socialism, (2) imposing the Trotskyite ‘socialist’ mode of production on the masses of the Yugoslav workers and peasants, (3) pursuing left-sectarian policies, such as denouncing anti-fascist progressive bourgeois-democratic parties and overemphasizing ‘socialist’ symbols such as red flags. The KPH mainstream assessed that the attempt by Tito’s Trotskyite-fascist gang to aggressively impose socialism on Yugoslavia would have only fed into the imperialist-fascist propaganda narratives that communists were dictatorial and that the USSR was an aggressive expansionist power:

“One has only to look at the ‘ultraleftist’ sectarian slogans on the walls of houses and on fences throughout the liberated territory, in the press, etc.,” said one of the KPH’s editorials, “to see how sectarianism – and phrasemongering, too, which is its complement – is blooming.” Many Communists not only allowed various “ignorant fanatics to fly only red flags and to show ‘leftist’ sectarian slogans, but did the same themselves, though our audience is the masses of the people and our rallies [must be] national-militant and antifascist in character.” Moreover, the ultra-left underestimated the firmness of the Soviet coalition with the Western Allies: “These comrades are falling for fascist slanders and carefully contrived fancies, which are designed to force a wedge between the Allies, weaken the coalition, and isolate the USSR, which would mean the weakening and isolation of the whole consistent antifascist movement throughout the world.”

The social policy of the KPH was as moderate as its overall Popular Front approach. The KPH repeatedly stressed that economic life on Partisan territory was being conducted “on the basis of private ownership, private initiative, and freedom of trade.” Croatian Partisans encouraged the free exchange of goods, except when shortages of such staple commodities as grain encouraged speculation and hindered military supply. Moreover, ZAVNOH and the Croatian headquarters staff declared in 1943 that the “national liberation movement is introducing no radical changes in regard to social life” and that it “recognizes the inviolability of private ownership as well as the broadest possibilities for the expression of initiative in industry and in other economic activities.”

(With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism, Ivo Banac, p. 87) (IMG)

Hebrang's call for a "true war against sectarianism" was meant to break the resistance of those KPH forces that were opposed to any appeal to the members of the Croat Peasant Party. He rightly suspected that such sectarian tendencies thrived in Dalmatia, where the influence of the KPJ Politburo was much stronger than in his Partisan "republic," the vast liberated territory "from the Kupa to the sea" – that is, in Baniia, Kordun, Lika, Gorski Kotar, and Hrvatsko Primorje. Hebrang claimed that "fear of cooperation with the Croat Peasant Party and its adherents (which is evident in some comrades) only reveals their own political weakness and insecurity." In short, his line was far closer to the coalitionist Soviet positions during the war than to the leftist stance of the KPJ. Small wonder that as early as November 1943 the KPH called for a "free, popular democratic, federative community in Yugoslavia and the Balkans." Small wonder, too, that Stalin and not Tito was cited as the only [ideological] authority in the main organ of the KPH until September 1943.... (With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism, Ivo Banac, pp. 88-89) (IMG)

'Hebrang himself', remarked Banac, 'tried to answer questions about the social order after the war in his rousing report to the Second Session of ZAVNOH October 14, 1943' as such:

The first problem is the question of land for the peasants, because the land must belong to those who cultivate it without respite or compensation. Workers, too, have their demands and their rights. They must be guaranteed better work conditions, a better livelihood, and greater influence in public life. The middle strata, those small people who were totally exploited and oppressed by capital, also have their demands, which we shall take into consideration so that they can live in a more human way. In short, the position of the working masses must be thoroughly improved.... The Democratic Republic of Yugoslavia will clip the wings of capital, which will be supervised and will serve its people. (With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism, Ivo Banac, pp. 87-88) (IMG)

Thanks to these policies, the communist-led anti-fascist partisan movement in Croatia, far from shrinking, dramatically grew:

By the summer of 1943 the Partisan movement in Croatia had scored some dramatic gains, in part because the KPH avoided many of the errors of Tito's supreme staff. The Croatian Partisans, well away from the Politburo's eye, followed their own dictates and imposed no rigid ideological restraints on the noncommunists in the movement. The organizational vehicle for their policy was the Zemaljsko antifašističko vijeće narodnog oslobođenja Hrvatske (ZAVNOH, Land Antifascist Council of People's Liberation of Croatia), Croatia's equivalent of AVNOJ – that is, the highest representative body in the land, intended to evolve into the Croatian parliament (Sabor). From the beginning the members of ZAVNOH were plainly identified as adherents of separate parties – the Croat Peasant Party, the Independent Democratic Party (the main Serb party in Croatia), KPH, various popular associations and trade unions – or as independents. Though the Communists stressed that their party was the "leading force in the national liberation struggle," the KPH increasingly used the language of Croat patriotism in its "mass line." The goal and the meaning of the Partisan struggle, according to the Hebrang nucleus of the KPH, was the resolution of the national question. "The struggle that the Croat people are today waging for their national liberation, though this struggle contains a series of new developments and changes, is nevertheless a natural, logical continuation and the highest expression of the centuries-old national Struggle – to determine their own fate freely in their own home." (With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism, Cornell University Press, Ivo Banac, 1988, pp. 84-85) (IMG)

The British Embassy in 1949 admitted:

On liberated territory Hebrang was most active in organising Z.A.V.N.O.H and promoting good relations and comradeship-in-arms between Serbs and Croats in Croatia and in bringing the Left wing of the Croat Peasant Party into the Partisan movement. He has also been frequent contributor to the Partisan press and secretary of the National Liberation Front for Croatia. Hebrang may perhaps be regarded as the most able and forceful Croat Partisan leader after Marshal Tito himself. (LEADING PERSONALITIES IN YUGOSLAVIA, R 8191/1012/92, No. 75, Sir C. Peake to Mr. Attlee, August 18, 1949; Received: , August 23, 1949, Foreign Office (Balkans, 1949) - Yugoslavia, p. 68. Foreign Office (Balkans, 1949) – Whole Book, p. 296) (IMG)

It is no wonder then, that:

By the summer of 1943 Hebrang's line was a source of much displeasure in the KPJ leadership. (With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism, Ivo Banac, p. 89) (IMG)

As Tito was continuing his consistent betrayal of the national liberation cause, the KPH, in agreement with the Soviets, continued to pursue its anti-fascist popular front strategy:

In his famous speech at the Third Session of ZAVNOH, at Topusko on May 8, 1944, Hebrang declared that the "national liberation movement has been and is leading the struggle not for communism but ... for common popular aims – for national liberation and democracy." The Topusko session also adopted a declaration that guaranteed to the peoples and citizens of Democratic Croatia the rights of ownership and property, of private initiative, of freedom of religion and conscience, and of speech, press, assembly, consultation, and association (the latter four within the framework of the Partisan movement for the duration of the war). Small wonder that Kardelj faulted the Slovene party leadership for publishing the "decisions of the Third Session of ZAVNOH, because we [the KPJ Politburo] do not agree with them in everything." (With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism, Ivo Banac, p. 88) (IMG)

The strong presence of the fascists in Yugoslavia gave Tito the leverage through which to oust Hebrang, the agent of the proletarians, and demote him. Thus, as the Croatian ambassador Ivo Goldstein put it:

Disputes between Hebrang and other Communist leaders became more frequent in 1944 (his opponents accused him of insufficient 'Yugoslavism'), and Tito decided to post him to Belgrade – where, however, he and Tito continued to have disagreements. (Croatia: A History, McGill-Queen's Press, Ivo Goldstein, p. 150) (IMG)

And from then on:

Vladimir Bakarić (1912-83) became the leading figure in Croatia [since 1944] and so remained till his death. (Croatia: A History, McGill-Queen's Press, Ivo Goldstein, p. 150) (IMG)

And of course, Bakarić was:

Tito's close associate.... (Croatia: A History, McGill-Queen's Press, Ivo Goldstein, p. 150) (IMG)

Hebrang would later pay dearly for daring to disagree with Tito.


While Tito was accusing Hebrang of not being loyal to Yugoslavia enough, he was hypocritically also committing more and more betrayals of the cause. In 1944, Tito held discussions with the infamous fascist Pope Pius XII:

on August 9, 1944, Josip Broz visited the Vatican in the strictest secrecy, as can be seen from the facsimile of the document presented here, and according to unofficial sources held talks with top officials and even with Pope Pius XII, which were never reported in Yugoslavia, either at the government level or in the party. (Genocide in Yugoslavia, Smilja Avramov, p. 233)

The following is the very brief report:

Following the news appeared in the press of a visit to Saint Peter of Yugoslav officials, I communicate that it has been confirmed in the Vatican that Marshal Tito along with his team of advisors has, naturally in cognito, visited ... St. Peter's Basilica. (Telegram N. 293/198, Visit to St. Peters of Marshall Tito Marshal, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 14, 1944)

It is not known exactly what the Gestapo agent Tito and the fascist Pope discussed. By the time Tito and the Pope met, Italy had already been taken over by the Anglo-Americans and the fascist Vatican had become a hub for Anglo-American intelligence services. The essence of Tito's conversation with the Pope must have boiled down to a discussion on how to ensure the victory of fascism during the post-war years, in an alliance with the Anglo-American intelligence services, the patrons of the Axis, against the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies.



Left Photo: (Telegram N. 293/198, Visit to St. Peters of Marshall Tito Marshal, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 14, 1944). Facsimile in: 'Genocide in Yugoslavia' by Smilja Avramov.)

Right Photo: Tito (right) meets Pope Pius (far left, sitting on a chair) on August 1944 – from the Italian Archives, uncovered by Smilja Avramov.

It is said that the Nazi German intelligence had not even known of such a Yugoslav leader with the name 'Tito'. That is a blatant lie. In fact, it is even well possible that the code name 'Tito' was given to Josip Broz by the Axis secret services. The name 'Josip Tito' is the Romanto-Yugoslav version of the name 'Josephus Titus'. The historical 'Josephus Titus' was a prominent Israelite general who was responsible for leading the war of liberation against Roman colonial conquerors of Eretz Yisrael – except that Josephus Titus was actually a traitor among the Israelites and turned out to be a saboteur and spy for the Roman colonizers. Josephus Titus provided the Roman colonizers with plenty of intelligence materials, allowing them to systematically decimate the Israelite war of national liberation. Considered by the Romans as the 'good' Israelite, he further assisted the Romans in creating a new branch of Judaism called "Christianity," which later grew on to become its own separate religion. Christianity was promoted by him and the Romans in order to (1) smuggle Roman colonial Paganism into Judaism, (2) to utilize the Pharisaic Jews' texts, the genocide-supporting Old Testament, to support Roman colonial terror against the Israelites, and (3) to utilize the 'pacifist' capitulationist junk of the New Testament so to render the Israelites into pacified, submissive cheek-turners. The story of Josephus Titus had many parallels with the story of Josip Tito. In their propaganda, the Nazi Germans defined the war against communism as a 'war against the Jews'. Tito was the commander of the Communist Party's war of liberation and hence, from the perspective of someone who believes in Nazi propaganda, the 'commander of the Jews' – yet, he was a traitor to the communists and hence, if one is to use Nazi propaganda rhetoric, a 'traitor to the Jews'. He promoted Trotskyite savagery as a fifth column of

the Nazis, just like how Josephus Titus promoted Pharisaic Judaism as a terrorist cultural idea that assisted the Romans in justifying terror activities against Israel. He promoted capitulation to international fascism just like how Christianity supported such pro-oppression capitulation. He smuggled fascist anti-communist ideas into the communist anti-fascist movement, just like Josephus Titus and his smuggling of anti-Israelite ideas into the culture of the Israelites. He was considered by the imperialists as the ‘good Communist’ just like the ‘good Jew’ Josephus Titus. Many Serbs rightly regard Tito as an agent of the Vatican, much as how Titus was an agent of Rome. By the way, the parallels go much beyond the time of the codenaming of ‘Tito’; Josephus Titus strongly supported the Roman war of terror against the Israelites, much as how Tito’s group later backed the Nazi Panzerwaffe and Horthyite troops that entered Hungary in 1956 (more on this in C20S13) and carried out numerous pogroms against the Yiddish proletarians there – the result of the Roman war was the dispersal of the Israelites, much as how the result of Tito’s Nazi covert war on Hungary’s Yiddish Israelite proletarians forced many of the latter to disperse and flee.

Whereas ‘Josip’ is a Yugoslav version of ‘Josephus’, the name ‘Tito’ is a Hispano-Italian version of the name ‘Titus’. The name ‘Tito’ could have arisen for Josip Broz during the time of the growth of his intelligence ties to the Italian Fascists. It is however speculated by some scholars that the name came from his activities during the Spanish Civil War. Josip Broz’s activities during the Civil War were suspicious. He was responsible for gathering the team of communists and progressives who would travel to Spain as volunteers. Onto a French ship the volunteers secretly got. Yet, information of the position of the ship and of the volunteers on board somehow ended up in the hands of an MI6-backed secret service in southeastern Europe and those volunteers were all hunted down by the police in just one move. Tito was suspected of having had a hand in this. As well, according to the prominent Slovenian pro-Titoist history scholar Jozef Pirjevec,:

In another letter, sent the following day [in May 1944], Foreign Office diplomat M. E. Rose mentioned to Elizabeth Barker, who was active in British wartime propaganda, that word of crimes committed by Tito during the Spanish Civil War were circulating in London in the spring of 1944. (Tito and His Comrades, Joze Pirjevec, 2015, p. 36) (IMG)

Tito and his friends had many contradicting narratives on the origins of the codename ‘Tito’ for Josip Broz. One narrative is that the phrase ‘Ti To’ means ‘You that’ in Serbian, which could be used as an indication that Tito was authoritarian and used to ordering people and assigning people different tasks (‘you do that; you do this’). Tito himself claimed that he adopted the name ‘Tito’, because, he claimed, it was common in the Kumrovec region. However, the ‘Sir Wilfred Grenfell College’ professor and scholar on Croatia, Tony Fabijancic, fact-checked Tito’s claim by studying the Church records of the Kumrovec zone and spoke to the people there, and found that the name was not common there at all, with no one there knowing any ‘Tito’ beside ‘Josip Broz’ (see his book ‘Croatia’, p. 62). Of course, I have no proof for my theory that the name ‘Tito’ was inspired by ‘Josephus Titus’ but unavoidable are the parallels in their stories and the similarities of their names.

The years 1943 and 1944 were crucial years for Tito’s foreign policy for the next 40 years. It was in this time period that the Nazi agent Tito would foster bonds with the Anglo-American intelligence services. As mentioned previously the gradual retreat of the Nazis since the battles of Stalingrad and Kursk had led the British into a covert full-scale alliance with the Third Reich against the Soviet Union. This Anglo-German alliance was also manifested in the MI6’s support for the Gestapo agent Tito and his fascist clique. Klugmann, the very MI6 operative who is officially said to have convinced Churchill of the need for assisting Tito’s gang instead of the Chetniks, said the following about the change in British policy:

At a certain time, and exactly how and when history still has to disclose, the British political and military leadership, on a very high and top-secret level, must have received information, some of which it may have had all along, that there were leading elements *inside the Partisan forces, inside the Yugoslav Communist Party*, spies and provocateurs, Gestapo elements, Trotskyites, who could be ‘trusted’ (from the point of view of British imperialism), and could be used to betray the Yugoslav people’s liberation movement *from inside*, and carry out an Anglo-American imperialist policy.

This was the basis of the change of British policy from Mihailović to Tito in the period of 1942-43. It was carried out with the maximum secrecy and with that great measure of cunning and deceit for which British imperialism, with its long and unrivalled experience of cunning and deceit, has become notorious throughout the world. (From Trotsky to Tito, James Klugmann, 1951, Chapter 2) (IMG)

The MI6 officer Klugmann, unlike the other MI6 agents cited elsewhere throughout this book, was either a communist or a communist-coopted agent. His comments, which may appear as ‘biased’ in favour of the USSR, are completely corroborated by staunchly anti-Soviet sources not coopted by the communists

The imperialists, an article in the Soviet press – particularly the USSR Information Bulletin, a media outlet of the Soviet foreign ministry – correctly assessed in 1950, correctly regarded Tito as Hitler’s successor and acting as a bulwark against the USSR and the Peoples’ Democracies:

The imperialists rightly regard Tito as Hitler’s successor. (Tito-Rankovic Clique Has Established Fascist Regime in Yugoslavia, A. Kalinin, April 14, 1950. In: Information Bulletin, Soviet Union. Posol’stvo (U.S.), p. 221) (IMG {Titoist Yugoslavia})

Precisely for this reason did the British military support Tito’s gang even though the latter viewed itself on the German side:

On 11 May the Yugoslav government in exile, probably under British coercion, instructed Mihailovic to make up his differences with the Partisans and to join the fight against the Germans.

Those Partisans who knew of the ‘March Consultations’ heard all this with private amusement. They still regarded themselves as on the side of the Germans against the British and the royalist exiles.

(Tito: and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, p. 153) (IMG)

And for this reason, the MI6 funded the Gestapo agent Tito even though the latter retained his connections to German intelligence:

During the summer of 1943, more British officers parachuted into the territory held by the Partisans, while the RAF started to drop supplies of clothing and food for the ragged and hungry guerrillas. Tito had not yet ... cut off his ties with German agents such as Hans Ott. Even in late November 1943, when Britain was pouring in arms and supplies to the Partisans, Tito’s transport department obtained a herd of horses from the Germans, in return for allowing shipments of chrome to enter the Reich. (Tito: and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, p. 163) (IMG)

Under the command of the blood-soaked Gestapo agent Tito, numerous Yugoslav communists and patriots had been killed at the frontlines of the anti-fascist war. It was necessary for Tito’s gang to increase the number of its troops, so to appear ‘popular’ and ‘powerful’, and to infiltrate thousands of Nazis to become members of the Yugoslav Communist Party or army, as means of rendering the fascists in the YCP into a powerful minority if

not a majority, helping to tilt the 'democratic' balance of power in the Party and army in favour of the Tito faction against the communists and democratic freedom-fighters. For the Nazi troops, in the face of the advancing Red Army troops, it was important that they join the Yugoslav Titoist army so to present themselves as 'anti-fascists' and save themselves from purges by the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies. This last point in turn would have given the British the excuse to covertly fund and arm the Nazis under the guise of 'anti-fascist' work. The combination of all of these factors was manifested in the fact that:

2,000 members of the SS Handzar division, joined the Partisans and formed Tito's "Sixteenth Muslim Brigade" in September 1943. (The War in Bosnia, 1992-1995: Analyzing Military Asymmetries and Failures, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, Thesis Advisor: David Yost Co-Advisor: Donald Abenheim, Thesis Author: Gheorghe Anghel, June 2000, pp. 18-19) (IMG)

The Tito group's permission to thousands of Handzar SS Nazi-Ustase operatives to infiltrate the YCP, hence to access internal YCP documents, constitutes a form of espionage for the Nazis.

In the Soviet Union, the MI6-backed Gestapo agent Tito had a network of supporters. The Titoist network in the USSR was led by the MI6 agent Lavrenti Beria:

My father also relied on the [fake 'anti-Nazi'] resistance fighters who had remained in their own countries [because the Nazis, having killed many of the actual anti-Nazi guerillas, had leniently allowed these fake 'anti-Nazi' 'resistance' fighters to stay in their own countries]. He thought that ... Hungarian Nagy, the Czech Slansky and the entire Yugoslav group of Tito, Djilas and Rankovic had endorsed his view.... (...). In Yugoslavia, my father's networks and those of the British had collaborated with Tito during the war. My father followed with attention the affairs of that country. One day, when the Yugoslav leader Kardelj complained to him about Tito's tyrannical character, he replied: 'Don't you think that we are all in the same boat?' He took care to add, however, that heads of state who mattered always had negative sides. Rankovic, the head of Yugoslav security, was more primitive than Kardelj, but Tito had total confidence in him, which was why he often acted as intermediary between Tito and my father. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, pp. 196-197) (IMG)

In contrast to the British, Roosevelt disagreed regarding Yugoslavia:

President Roosevelt wanted to rid the world of empires, whether that of the British in India or of the French in Indo-China, and this attitude may have coloured his outlook on Yugoslavia. (Tito: and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, p. 177) (IMG)

Indeed, the US President:

Roosevelt ... did not share Churchill's enthusiasm for Tito.... (Tito: and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, p. 177) (IMG)

Roosevelt was a true friend of Stalin. Nonetheless, not much could be done by the democratically elected President of the United States, for he did not have many agents in the US military and intelligence bodies, whereas American finance capital dominated such means of violence. Hence, the clear gaps between the US intelligence service and Roosevelt can be observed as early as 1943, when the OSS began funding and arming the YCP partisans – by then a mix of Soviet-friendly Yugoslav patriots, democrats, and communists on the one hand and the anti-Soviet Anglophilic Nazis, Ustase, and jihadists on the other. Fighting alongside all these different factions within the YCP forces were the OSS officers who even commanded 600 Yugoslav Partisan forces. Joseph F. Jakub, a prominent US intelligence and diplomatic official, said:

The performance of the OSS team supporting the Partisans from Italy between October and December 1943 was a testament to the American's ingenuity and energy in moving huge quantities of captured Italian materiel in combat conditions to Yugoslavia. Indeed, it was in the best 'can-do' traditions of Donovan's organization. When OSS dispatched Sterling Hayden in November to Bari, he quickly established a base on behalf of Allied Forces Headquarters at the Italian port of Monopoli, which lay some 30 miles to the south, which became the principal operating base when Bari was bombed by the Germans soon thereafter. With 400 Partisans, 14 schooners, and assorted other vessels, Hayden directed the resupply of the Partisan-held island of Vis, mostly using Italian arms prized away from the British Command. OSS Bari, meanwhile, delivered 6500 tons of uniforms, food, medicine, weapons, and ammunition to the Partisans via a motley assortment of some 60 seagoing vessels between 15 October and 31 December. The Americans provided 150 000 gallons of petrol to a British torpedo boat facility in the Dalmatian islands that had been established at OSS Bari's request to protect the supply fleet, and delivered large amounts of diesel Oil, kerosene, petrol, and lubricating oil to Tito's forces. In conjunction with SOE's Force 133, OSS organized, equipped, and transported to Dalmatia a 'brigade' of 2000 fighters who had been recruited from among Yugoslavs interned in Italy. OSS assigned an officer to manage the Partisan supply facility on Vis and organized a shipping line between Bari and the three major Sicilian ports 'to assist in transporting 7000 tons of captured enemy material to Bari for trans-shipment to Yugoslavia ... By the end of December 1943 four Partisan bases at Bari, Monopoli, Molfetta, and Manfredonia were in full operation under the command of OSS officers with a staff of some 600 Partisans. ('Spies and Saboteurs: Anglo-American Collaboration and Rivalry in Human Intelligence Collection and Special Operations, 1940-1945', Joseph F. Jakub III, p. 135) (IMG)

The OSS involvement marked the beginning of a decades-long relationship between Tito's fascist clique and the US intelligence. In the absence of an official 'Third Reich', it was inevitable that Tito would be recruited by the post-war era's most powerful fascism-friendly regime: the regime of the United States. The CIA was founded in 1947. However, by the late 1940s, Tito indeed consistently consulted the CIA. The prominent pro-Tito Yugoslav scholar and politician Joze Pirjevec said:

According to Dedijer, Tito himself frequently met CIA functionaries in Belgrade and together they planned common policy. This did not escape the attention of the Soviets. (Tito and His Comrades, Joze Pirjevec, 2015, p. 212) (IMG)

Note that Dedijer was the official biographer of Tito.

The above excerpt refers to the 'common policy' of Tito's gang and the CIA. Every policy of Tito's group was in common with that of the CIA fascists. Not wrongly did the Soviet press reports frequently emphasize that 'American imperialism bought the Gestapo agent Tito and his clique for a low price'. In fact, Tito's regime, arising from the comprador classes (kulaks, bureaucrats, comprador merchants, comprador bankers, etc.) allied to Anglo-American finance capital, was furnished with American imperialist financial and military supports of all kinds. Furthermore, as confirmed by the Cominform resolution of 1949,:

The Tito clique transformed Belgrade into an American center for espionage and anti-Communist propaganda. (Communist Party of Yugoslavia in the Power of Murderers and Spies, Cominform, November 1949. MIA. The same document can be found in the 'Revolutionary Democracy Organization of India' archives section) (IMG)

The remarks by the Cominform are well-documented as correct, and more and more evidence of the correctness of the remarks will be presented throughout this book. However, some of the evidence will be presented here as well. A top American intelligence operative who parachuted into Yugoslavia to help Tito said in his memoirs:

As the tempo of the Cold War increased in 1948, driven by the ruthless installation of full Communist governments in Eastern Europe, I was asked to join in the creation of a new postwar secret operations organization. Known first as OPC (Office of Policy Coordination – a deliberately bland name), it later became a part of CIA. Almost immediately we were directed to find ways to strengthen Yugoslav capabilities to remain independent of Moscow. (Beacons in the Night: With the OSS and Tito's Partisans in Yugoslavia, Franklin Lindsay, p. 336) (IMG)

By 1952, the prominent anti-Soviet US diplomatic official George Earle admitted that Tito was "our" (i.e. imperialist America's) "communist": Tito ... was, after all, nothing but a murderous Communist. He happens to be our murderous communist...; so we get along with him. ("The Katyn Forest Massacre: Hearings Before the Select Committee to Conduct and Investigation of the Facts, Evidence, and Circumstances of the Katyn Forest Massacre", 82nd Congress, Parts 5-7. 1952, p. 2208) (IMG)

The other Nazi agents who were the henchmen of Tito also participated in this relation with the CIA. The log of the director of the CIA is basically like the diaries or the daily memoirs of the high command of the Central Intelligence Agency. The CIA director's log for December 13, 1951 states: Chief, OS/Belgrade reports that Gen. Velebit has informed Ambassador Allen that all arrangements for liaison between CIA and the UDB in Belgrade will be complete within a week. The Yugoslav officer selected to conduct this liaison will be the direct representative of Interior Minister Rankovic but will sit in the Yugoslav Foreign Office for cover purposes and to avoid the precedent of allowing foreigners to go directly to the Interior Ministry. This procedure follows that proposed by CIA during the original conversations with Gen. Velebit. (DIRECTOR'S LOG, Top Secret, CIA, December 13, 1951, p. 208) (IMG)

The CIA cooperation with the UDB was since long before 1951. One of the intermediaries was the Joint Distribution Committee, the intelligence organization to which the Mossad was subordinated. However, according to the above quote, all arrangements for liaison between the 'former' Gestapo agent Velebit and Rankovic's fascist secret service and the CIA was to be fully completed within a week. Thus by late December 1951, the CIA's liaison with the UDB on all fronts was to be completed. Even before 1951, the UDB served the interests of the CIA, but 1951 smoothed such a relationship.

The cooperation between the Mossad and Tito's fascist secret service goes back at least to the mid-1940s. Aspects of this intelligence cooperation have been documented elsewhere in this book. However, to provide an introduction to this, here is some information. Uri Bialer, an official researcher for the Israeli Foreign Ministry, remarked:

Yugoslavia had always been the location of one of the most important Mossad centers in Eastern Europe. This situation was the result of the special relationship which the Yugoslavs had developed in the course of the Second World War and thereafter with representatives of the Yishuv who had operated in the framework of the British war effort. After the war, it seems to have been buttressed by ideological perceptions. As one of the Mossad emissaries in the Balkans phrased it: "The Yugoslavs saw in the [Mossad] an embodiment of the struggle against imperialism. The Yugoslavs ... as former partisans, ... felt an emotional affinity for the small nation struggling against an enemy that vastly outnumbered and overpowered it." (Between East and West: Israel's Foreign Policy Orientation 1948-1956, Cambridge University Press, Uri Bialer, 1990, p. 114) (IMG)

History would prove that Yugoslavia would continue to be the most important center of the Mossad activity in the bloc of the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies. The ties of Tito's group to the Israeli military goes back to World War II, when Tito's group established liaison with Dan Lanner, a traitor to the 'Palmach', the Hebrew socialist military force that was later unfortunately subordinated to the IDF. Prominent Mossad official Ehud Avriel wrote in his memoirs:

The third and most spectacular assault was on the main radar station on Mount Carmel. The commander of the 1st Battalion of the Palmach, then stationed in the vicinity of Haifa, had received instructions in the beginning of November to prepare for the eventuality of the 'related struggle'. His name was Dan Lanner, although once it had been Ernest Loehner, the son of the exclusive Vienna shopkeeper, Rudolf Loehner, who at the last moment and by pure chance had been plucked from the doomed at Cladovo to accompany a small, lucky group of youngsters to Palestine. Since then he had served as a parachutist-liaison officer in Tito's headquarters during the Yugoslav partisans' war of liberation, and from a Palmach commander he was to rise to the rank of general in Israel's army. The young man who only a few years earlier had been an 'illegal immigrant' himself was now commanding an operation to help secure the arrival of what was left of the victims of Nazi Europe. ('Open the Gates!: A Personal Story of "Illegal" Immigration to Israel', Ehud Avriel, 1975, p. 230) (IMG)

No doubt during the period 1941 to late 1942, an alliance with the Israelis against the Third Reich was necessary. In the early stages of World War II, Israel – as the settler-colony of American imperialism – had to contribute some of its resources to engage in an intelligence war with Nazi Germany. Involving the "Jewish Agency in Palestine" into fighting the Nazis would have certainly been progressive in the first stages of the Great Patriotic War, (1) because it contributed resources to fighting the Nazis, and (2) because for fighting the Nazis, it was forced to reallocate some of its resources away from slaughtering the Arabs and onto helping in the fight against the Nazis. Of course, the Jewish Agency in Palestine contributed so little to the fight against the Nazis, but insofar as it did, it did a correct thing, for it shifted resources away from murdering the Arabs and onto fighting the Nazis. From late 1942 onwards, the Israeli regime ('The Jewish Agency in Palestine') began to sponsor the Nazis as a bulwark against the Soviets, and so from then on, Israel played a reactionary role. Hence, the Mossad (Ha-Mossad Le-Aliyah Bet) began to support Tito's group after late 1942 – particularly in 1943:

Some 240 Palestinian Jews volunteered to parachute into the Balkans in 1943 and the British established training camps in Cairo and Haifa. The following year, 32 men and women were, in fact, dispatched in joint British-Allyah Bet missions into Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Italy, Slovakia, Austria, and Yugoslavia. (...). The most successful of the Palestinian agents, Yesheyahu Trachtenberg, better known as Shaike Dan, had a remarkable wartime and postwar intelligence career and is remembered as the savior of thousands of

Romanian Jews. ('CIA AND NAZI WAR CRIM. AND COL. CHAP. 11-21, DRAFT WORKING PAPER_0001', Chapter Eleven: American Intelligence and the Jewish Brichah, CIA Draft Working Paper, pp. 7-8) (IMG{Israel})

In the later phase of the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet Red Army arrived in Yugoslavia and, in collaboration with Yugoslav communists, liberated Belgrade. The arrival of the Soviet Red Army in Yugoslavia partially undermined the lobbying power of the Titoist faction in the YCP while catapulting upwards the communist agents there. As such, the Soviet presence and the Yugoslav communists yet again emerged as a force with which the Gestapo agent Tito had to reckon. Once again, Tito needed to cause a leap from quantity to quality, to inflict a quantitative change so to yield a qualitative change. The consolidation of power in the hands of Tito and his gang thus required the elimination of hundreds of thousands of communists and the planting of Titoist agents at the critical positions in the ranks of Yugoslav state apparatus.

Tito's gang on the other hand, sought to systematically exterminate numerous young Serbs so to deprive that nation of potential resistance to his fascist rule in the years to come, while also timing the massacre of the Serbs with the arrival of the Soviet Red Army so to render the arrival of the Soviets unpopular. Recall what the media of the Soviet foreign ministry had stated:

Thus the Belgrade hirelings of imperialist reaction, even before coming to power, destroyed by various means the finest sons of the Yugoslav people. (Tito-Rankovic Clique Has Established Fascist Regime in Yugoslavia, A. Kalinin, April 14, 1950. In: Information Bulletin, Soviet Union. Posol'stvo (U.S.), p. 221) (IMG{Titoist Yugoslavia})

Indeed, this clearly happened in the Srem front:

the majority of the Yugoslav people ... definitely will never forget that Tito mobilized thousands of youths, especially Serbs, immediately after the liberation of Belgrade, and sent them without training to be butchered in the front lines of the Srem front outside of Belgrade. In fact, the Serbs insist that Tito sent them purposely to be butchered as potential enemies of his regime. It is, indeed, difficult to conceive a vindictive Balkan, his hero-worshipping nature notwithstanding, looking upon his malefactor as a hero, particularly when this malefactor not only has done nothing to atone for his crimes, but even continued with his evil deeds. ('Political and Economic Conditions in Yugoslavia; Morale and Attitude of the People Toward Tito and the Present Regime', CIA February 20, 1952, p. 8) (IMG)

In an interview, respected Serbian historian Smilja Avramov stated:

His second order – and this was confirmed by many former elites and informers and members of intelligence services – the second order by Broz [Tito] was the liquidation of the 'Belgrade Carsija' [city center, i.e. elite]. (...). We know that in Belgrade a total of 3,000 people were killed without trial, simply killed on the spot, this was a tragedy. (Genocide in Yugoslavia, Dr. Smilja Avramov, 2/8) (IMG)

As a Nazi agent, Tito participated in Ustase's genocide against the Serbian nation.

C12S2. Yugoslavia, Anti-Soviet Quantitative Changes for pro-American Qualitative Changes *** IMG-All-{Titoist Yugoslavia}

As mentioned prior, the arrival of the Soviet Red Army in Yugoslavia reduced the lobbying power of the Titoist faction while catapulting upwards the communist agents in the YCP. As such, thanks to the Soviet presence, the Yugoslav communists yet again emerged as a force with which the Gestapo agent Tito had to reckon. Yet again, the campaign for the consolidation of power in the hands of the comprador classes represented by Tito's gang necessitated a leap from quantity to quality, the infliction of a quantitative change so to yield a qualitative change – i.e. the elimination of hundreds of thousands of communists and the planting of Titoist agents at the critical positions in the ranks of Yugoslav state apparatus. One leading Soviet-backed communist oppositionist in Tito's regime was Andrija Hebrang, Moscow's most favoured for leadership in Yugoslavia. According to the MI6 operative Richard West:

Hebrang relied on plant and economic expertise from the Soviet Union, and came to be seen as Moscow's man in the leadership. In 1945 he wrote a report for the Kremlin on differences in the Yugoslav Party. When he was dropped from the Politburo in April 1946, Hebrang looked to the Soviet Union for sympathy and support. (Tito: And the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, p. 221) (IMG)

By the year 1948, Tito's gang was ready to separate Yugoslavia from the camp of the socialist and progressive forces. This was not a very difficult thing for the Tito faction to do since Yugoslavia did not have as many proletarians, nor many kolkhoz peasants, hence keeping the pressure on Tito's gang low. At the same time, the regime that dominated Yugoslavia was made up mostly of Handzar SS units led by the band of Gestapo agents, Tito, Djilas, Velebit, etc. Years of savage terror against the population, and the Tito regime's praising of the USSR to the 'heavens', all served to link the name of the USSR in the minds of a significant minority of the Yugoslav public with the savagery of Tito's group. All of these, all such anti-communism which Tito's Trotskyite group was promoting, allowed for Tito's group to proceed ahead with moving Yugoslavia into the camp of Anglo-American imperialism. In "the first week of May," said a US National Intelligence Council document,:

Andrija Hebrang and Sreten Zujovic were arrested and expelled from their party and government positions. Both men were Central Committee Members. Hebrang was minister for light industries and had recently been head of the more important Planning Commission. Zujovic was minister of finance.... Both men were eventually accused publicly of opposing the regime's ambitious Five Year Plan – a plan the Soviets also thought was too ambitious – and of being pro-Cominform. (Appendix A: Surprised by Tito: Anatomy of an Intelligence Failure, US National Intelligence Council, August 2006, p. 57. In: 'Yugoslavia: From "national Communism" to National Collapse, US National Intelligence Council, p. 683) (IMG)

Undoubtedly, it was necessary to centralize the Yugoslav economy over time. However, the Yugoslav regime was making Trotskyite leaps, swiftly expanding state control and swiftly centralizing the economy. This Trotskyite haste was condemned by the Cominform:

Recently, even after the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) and fraternal parties had criticized the mistakes of the Yugoslav leaders, the latter tried to bring in a number of new leftist laws. They hastily decreed the nationalization of medium industry and trade, though the basis for this is completely unprepared. In view of such haste the new decision only hampers the supply of goods to the population. In a similar hurried manner they brought in a new grain tax for which the way is also not prepared and which can, therefore, only dislocate grain supplies to the urban population. Finally, only recently the Yugoslav leaders in loud declarations declared their love for, and devotion to, the Soviet Union, although it is known that in practice they are pursuing an unfriendly policy toward the Soviet Union. (Resolutions of the Communist Information Bureau Condemning Titoite Revisionism: Resolution of the Information Bureau Concerning the Situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, June 1948, MIA) (IMG)

Hebrang's views reflected the moderate views of the Cominform, which opposed the Trotskyite leap in the sphere of political economy:

Indeed Boris Kidric, the head of the Federal Planning Commission, indicted Hebrang and Djujovic, the previous economic bosses, for sabotaging and holding back the 'construction of socialism'. They were accused of attempting to check overambitious planning, and of insisting on the profitability of individual enterprises. The Second Plenum of the Central Committee in February 1949 prescribed 'greater boldness and a faster pace in setting up collective farms'. (...). The failure of [the phony] collective farms caused food shortages in towns. (Tito: and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, p. 238) (IMG)

Hebrang, as Richard West correctly stated, was a supporter of the USSR. This was also confirmed by the Cominform, which stated:

The Information Bureau regards as disgraceful such actions as the expulsion from the Party and the arrest of the Central Committee members, Comrades Djujovic and Hebrang because they dared to criticize the anti-Soviet attitude of the leaders of the Yugoslav Communist Party, and called for friendship between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. (Resolutions of the Communist Information Bureau Condemning Titoite Revisionism: Resolution of the Information Bureau Concerning the Situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, June 1948, MIA) (IMG)

The removal of Hebrang marked yet another step in the Titoist-fascist purges against Soviet-friendly elements. It was part of the anti-Soviet quantitative changes that were occurring in Yugoslavia, aimed at yielding a qualitative change in Yugoslavia's strategic orientation. The strategic orientation of states changes in the favour of the reactionary forces through the elimination of the progressive agents in the state and the elevation of reactionary agents as replacement. The elimination of Hebrang was that decisive step which allowed Tito's gang to reorient Yugoslavia strategically into the camp of American imperialism. As with almost every other issue, Tito did not consult the Central Committee on his decision to arrest Zujovic and Hebrang, even though both were prominent members of the Central Committee. As Djilas admitted:

The arrests of Sreten Zujovic and Andrija Hebrang were not discussed in the Central Committee either. Tito made that decision on his own. (Tito: the story from inside, Milovan Djilas, 1980, p. 83) (IMG)

Regarding the fact that Tito's gang kept the Yugoslav Communist Party in the dark, the Cominform stated:

Unable to face the criticism of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) and the Central Committees of the other fraternal Parties, the Yugoslav leaders took the path of outrightly deceiving their Party and people by concealing from the Yugoslav Communist Party the criticism of the Central Committee's incorrect policy and also by concealing from the Party and the people the real reasons for the brutal measures against Comrades Djujovic and Hebrang. (Resolutions of the Communist Information Bureau Condemning Titoite Revisionism: Resolution of the Information Bureau Concerning the Situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, June 1948, MIA) (IMG)

The fascist putsch against the communist elements in the Yugoslav Communist Party followed:

Expelling from the ranks of the Party those Communists loyal to proletarian internationalism, annihilating them, the Yugoslav fascists opened wide the doors of the Party to bourgeois and kulak elements. (Communist Party of Yugoslavia in the Power of Murderers and Spies, Cominform, November 1949. MIA. The same document can be found in the 'Revolutionary Democracy Organization of India' archives section) (IMG)

To be sure, the Yugoslav Communist Party already had numerous fascist agents of the reactionary classes dominating it, which was a key factor allowing Tito's gang to stay in power and to overthrow the communists in the first place. However, years of Red Army presence in Yugoslavia had given the communist faction in Yugoslavia some leverage, allowing it to plant communist agents in not insignificant positions in the Yugoslav regime. There still existed numerous communists who could have mounted resistance against Tito's fascist regime. In the June Resolution, it was also stated:

The Information Bureau considers that the bureaucratic regime created inside the Party by its leaders is disastrous for the life and development of the Yugoslav Communist Party. There is no inner Party democracy, no elections, and no criticism and self-criticism in the Party. Despite the unfounded assurances of Comrades Tito and Kardelj, the majority of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia is composed of co-opted, and not of elected members. The Communist Party is actually in a position of semi-legality. Party meetings are either not held at all, or meet in secret -- a fact which can only undermine the influence of the Party among the masses. This type of organization of the Yugoslav Communist Party cannot be described as anything but a sectarian-bureaucratic organization. It leads to the liquidation of the Party as an active, self-acting organism, it cultivates military methods of leadership in the Party similar to the methods advocated in his day by Trotsky. (Resolutions of the Communist Information Bureau Condemning Titoite Revisionism: Resolution of the Information Bureau Concerning the Situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, June 1948, MIA) (IMG)

The Party had been turned into a secretive conspirational network separate from the masses and devoid of democratic procedures. Even that Party, which had turned into a massive espionage hub, was not trusted by Tito, for sympathizers with the USSR existed in it, and the brief 1944-1948 period of Red Army presence had elevated the position of such communists. The fact that Tito made unilateral decisions without consultations with the Central Committee is further explained by Djilas who confirmed many of the statements of the Cominform in his memoirs,:

Tito skipped over the Central Committee and his closest long-time comrades. In the Central Committee ... perhaps he suspected a strong resistance (or hesitation) at the top. (...). By nature, Tito was not morbidly suspicious, but he was vigilant and cautious. (...). Perhaps Tito was led to make his sudden, solitary decision -- this seems to me the most persuasive explanation -- by reports about the rising tide of Stalinists in the Party committees and among the army officers. (...). I suppose it can be argued that it was an incomplete Central Committee. It was elected in 1940 at the Fifth Party Congress but its Plenum did not meet until March 1948, and then to answer the letter of Molotov and Stalin that criticized the Yugoslavs for deviation.

In the notes to his official *Collected Works*, Tito maintains that the Central Committee could not have met because of the circumstances of war. This is nonsense. The time was three years after the war! There had indeed been plenty of time for leisure and hunting. Couldn't the Central Committee have met during the war, just as the Partisan assembly know as AVNOJ had met? The truth is that the Central Committee met when Tito needed its legal support. He needed its support against Stalin and wanted a full forum. Prior to that, the Politburo had met irregularly, with coopted members.

(Tito: the story from inside, Milovan Djilas, 1980, pp. 82-83) (IMG)

The fact that 'Tito skipped over ... his closest long-time comrades', however, should not lead one to the delusion that Tito's decisions did not have the approval of Djilas, Rankovic, Kardelj, and other top-ranking members of Tito's clique. The belief in 'one-man totalitarian rule' is an inherently

idealist belief; the fascist dictator Tito did not rule without the support of the fascist clique behind him, and Tito's fascist clique in turn were agents of Anglo-American and German finance capital. Anyways, the plots for setting up concentration camps against the communists were enforced through the anti-democratic 'National Assembly':

The arrests were already under way when a hastily drawn up law regarding the camp was pushed through the National Assembly. The wording was clumsy and naive. But it was functional in the use of a term, "socially beneficial work"... Prison sentences meted out by the security forces usually amounted to two years, but the terms could be extended in the camp. (Tito: the story from inside, Milovan Djilas, 1980, p. 85) (IMG)

Meanwhile Hebrang was charged with all kinds of fascist slanders; denounced as an Ustase 'spy' allegedly 'collaborating' with the Nazis on the order of the Soviets, Hebrang was jailed. And rather than be tried, he was murdered in prison:

Hebrang was assassinated by the political police in a Belgrade prison. The incident was presented to the public at the time as a suicide.

Years later, at the end of the 1980s, the truth about Hebrang's politically inspired murder was revealed by historians and witnesses. (Europe from the Balkans to the Urals, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Center for Russian and Eastern European Studies, Oxford University Press, Reneo Lukic, Allen Lynch, p. 75) (IMG)

According to Ivo Banac, the date of his death was probably some time in 1949:

Hebrang was neither tried nor rehabilitated. He died in prison under highly ambiguous circumstances, probably in 1949. (With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism, Cornell University Press, Ivo Banac, 1988, pp. 121-122) (IMG)

By the time of the Cominform's expulsion of Tito's gang, Tito's gang within the Yugoslav Communist Party (YCP) was confronted with the majority opposition of the communist faction, whom Tito's group labelled as the 'Cominformists'. "Although the atmosphere was tense and poisoned by conspiratorial moods," Djilas remarked in his memoirs,:

we were continuously surprised to learn that this or that high official was wavering, that he was expressing support for the Cominform. Stalinists were soon discovered in every institution of national life. Slanderous and threatening pro-Soviet propaganda addled the brains of many. Suspicion wormed its way into the souls of all who felt responsible for the state and the Party.

At the onset of the troubles, Rankovic said with great distress: "The worst thing is that you don't know who your enemy is! Yesterday's friend becomes today's enemy – the enemy in one's own house!"

(Tito: the story from inside, Milovan Djilas, 1980, p. 82) (IMG)

Indeed:

It was common knowledge that there were federal ministers, deputies, members of the republican Central Committees, favorably disposed toward the Soviet Union and the Cominform. (Tito: the story from inside, Milovan Djilas, 1980, p. 82) (IMG)

Judging public opinion in Yugoslavia, a CIA report stated:

There are many people in Yugoslavia today who believe that a majority of the Yugoslav Communists, particularly the hard core, are Cominformists. ('Political and Economic Conditions in Yugoslavia; Morale and Attitude of the People Toward Tito and the Present Regime', CIA February 20, 1952, p. 1) (IMG)

The CIA itself agreed that the vast majority of Yugoslav communists opposed Tito's regime. Indeed, according to a US intelligence memorandum:

Tito, beside the implacable of hatred of the people, ... has against himself also the majority of the Yugoslav Communists. (Tito's True Face, Political Information (Analysis of Tito's Relationship with Stalin and the West, CIA, November 28, 1952, pp. 13-14) (IMG)

Furthermore:

Although the most outspoken and most militant Stalinists had been arrested, the Cominformists appeared to be multiplying. (Tito: the story from inside, Milovan Djilas, 1980, p. 83) (IMG)

Experienced communists in the YCP formed the bulk of the 'Cominformist' struggle in Yugoslavia. These old Bolsheviks suffered Tito's counter-revolutionary purges the most:

Party "veterans", those who joined the Party prior to 1937, are not trusted by the regime because some of them, while living in Russia, became friendly with the leading members of the CPSU. Others belonged to party factions which opposed Tito. (...). The major part of these "veterans" cannot adapt themselves to the new Party line, e.g., abandon orthodox communist doctrine. Consequently, there is a tendency in the regime to remove them from their posts in the FCY [Federation of Communists of Yugoslavia] and the state administration. (General Political Situation, CIA, July 20, 1954, p. 2) (IMG)

In the FCY and the state administration a great deal of attention is paid to the length of service of Party members. In general, the longer one has served in the Party the greater the privileges he is entitled to receive. However, most those who joined the Party prior to 1937 have disappeared, either through death or as victims of a Tito purge. (General Political Situation, CIA, July 20, 1954, p. 1) (IMG)



Andrija Hebrang (right) and his wife Olga Hebrang (left).

Source: 'Hebrang', a documentary that utilizes the Yugoslav archives to uncover the circumstances of the murder of Hebrang. Photo in: Interfilm.hr

The Cominformists were rather strong because of their deep ties to the working class, as well as their unmasking of the regime for its dictatorial behavior. As confirmed by the US intelligence:

The Cominformists do constitute an actual danger to the present regime because of their contact with the workers, their ability to mask their subversive activities from the UDB, and because of the inability of the present leadership of the Party to establish equal rights for all members of the Party, a situation which would be exploited by the Cominformists at the proper time. (General Political Situation, CIA, July 20, 1954, p. 15) (IMG)

The CIA document is a testament to the remarks of the USSR Information Bulletin, the media outlet of the Soviet foreign ministry, which noted that the Yugoslav working class was overwhelmingly on the side of the Cominform:

DAY by day the struggle of the working people in Yugoslavia against the fascist Tito regime is growing more intense. It is gaining a greater mass following, becoming better organized, and finding expression in new forms. All sections of the Yugoslav people, workers, peasants and intellectuals, youths and girls, men and women, are taking part in the heroic struggle. (The Yugoslav People's Struggle Against the Tito Clique, P. Zyablov, September 8, 1950. In: USSR Information Bulletin, Vol. 10, No. 17, p. 544) (IMG)

THE exposure of the Tito clique as a storm detachment of international imperialism has sharply changed the attitude of the Yugoslav people toward it. "Enemies of the Soviet Union and of the people's democracies are our enemies, too," say the peace-loving people of Yugoslavia, in whose name the fascist band of Belgrade rulers falsely claimed and still claims to be speaking. (Tito Clique Lacks Support of Yugoslav People, I. Livanov, August 11, 1950. In: USSR Information Bulletin, Vol. 10, No. 15, p. 480) (IMG)

The 1949 Cominform resolution too stated:

The fascist ideology, and fascist domestic policy, as well as the perfidious foreign policy of the Tito clique, completely subordinated to the foreign imperialist circles, have created a gulf between the espionage fascist Tito-Rankovic clique and the vital interests of the freedom-loving peoples of Yugoslavia.

Consequently, the anti-popular and treacherous activity of the Tito clique is encountering ever-growing resistance from those Communists who have remained loyal to Marxism-Leninism, and among the working class and working peasantry of Yugoslavia.

(Communist Party of Yugoslavia in the Power of Murderers and Spies, Cominform, November 1949. MIA. The same document can be found in the 'Revolutionary Democracy Organization of India' archives section) (IMG)

It was important that the communists would retain as much ground in the Yugoslav regime's means of violence, so that the way shall be paved for the overthrow of such a terror regime. Even among the members of the Yugoslav intelligence service (UDB), sympathies towards the Cominform were strong. In fact, some examples of serious dissent in the UDB are shown as follows by a 1949 CIA document:

In late May 1949, the entire District UDB of Gjurjevac escaped across the Drava River into Hungary.

In June 1949, almost all the principal officials of the Central UDB for Montenegro attempted to escape to Albania. Several were killed and a larger number captured. It is not known how many reached Albania.

Stanko Cenica-Opacic, Minister of Forest Industries for the Republic of Croatia, and Marko Bellinc, President of the United Syndicates for Croatia, are suspected by the UDB of being pro-Cominform. Informant is certain that they are Cominformists and that they will break with Tito at the first opportunity.

Nova Borba and For a Socialist Yugoslavia have been smuggled in bottles and flasks floated down the Danubes Tomis and Tisa Rivers. The containers have allegedly been picked up by Cominformists in Yugoslavia and the newspapers reproduced on illegal printing presses and distributed throughout the country.

(Reported UDB Defections and Cominform Activities in Yugoslavia, CIA, October 5, 1949, p. 1. Underline original) (IMG)

If possible, the 'Cominformist' UDB operatives should have stayed in the fascist UDB in order to foment subversion against the Titoist fascist regime from within, but some of the UDB officers were easy to hunt down by the Titoist fascist intelligence service. Hence, some of them needed to escape.

Tito's gang also faced the resistance of the Yugoslav People's Army. "If we take into consideration," Djilas remarked:

the fact that among army officers there was a substantial number of Cominformists, seven thousand, I believe, the possible danger to the system was not negligible. (Tito: the story from inside, Milovan Djilas, 1980, p. 87) (IMG)

Therefore:

We had been afraid of pro-Stalin disturbance; (Tito: the story from inside, Milovan Djilas, 1980, p. 80) (IMG)

In such circumstances, Djilas argued, Tito's group could not have:

shown tolerance ... allowed the legalization of opposition within the Party ... compromised its defense against the ... pressure of the Soviet Union and the Communist Parties within the Eastern European bloc – had the Party [leaders] allowed these, they might have led to the disintegration of the Party and to the ascendancy of pro-Soviet forces. It is the misfortune of dictatorial and particularly totalitarian powers that they cannot allow opposition without undermining their own survival. Besides, the pro-Soviet forces were more Stalinist than our own leadership. The ascent to power of those forces – and there could have been no doubt in anyone's mind about that – would have meant ... the removal of our present leadership and bloody purges within the Party.... (Tito: the story from inside, Milovan Djilas, 1980, pp. 84-85) (IMG)

Hence to prevent the fall of the fascist regime to the communist forces, it was vital for Tito's gang that anyone opposed would be exterminated, tortured, and/or brainwashed. In that famous 1949 resolution of the Cominform and its member parties, it was stated:

The Information Bureau, consisting of representatives of the Communist Party of Bulgaria, Rumanian Workers' Party, Working People's Party of Hungary, United Workers' Party of Poland, Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), Communist Party of France, and the Czechoslovak and Italian Communist Parties, having considered the question: "The Yugoslav Communist Party in the power of murderers and spies", unanimously reached the following conclusions: (...). Thousands of Yugoslav patriots, devoted to Communism, have been expelled from the Party and incarcerated in jails and concentration camps. Many have been tortured and killed in prison or, as was the case with the well-known Communist, Arso Jovanovic, were dastardly assassinated. (Communist Party of Yugoslavia in the Power of Murderers and Spies, Cominform, November 1949. MIA. The same document can be found in the 'Revolutionary Democracy Organization of India' archives section) (IMG)

As the Cominform resolution stated in the excerpt above, and as the publicly disclosed letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU confirmed, General Arso Jovanovic had been murdered trying to escape Tito's extermination campaign. Corroborating the remarks by the Cominform and the CC of the CPSU, the MI6 operative Richard West too admitted:

Arso Jovanovic and his friends had been shot attempting to escape in 1948. (Tito: and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, p. 272)

Jovanovic, as may be recalled, was an anti-fascist freedom-fighter from the Yugoslav People's Liberation War, upon whom Tito's gang had blamed the casualties in the war, even though those casualties were the result of the anti-communist military sabotage of Tito and Milutinovic. As the Cominform statement noted, Yugoslav communists and progressives were 'incarcerated in jails and concentration camps. Many have been tortured and killed in prison or ... were dastardly assassinated.' Miron Rezun – a former elite Canadian combatant and a hostile anti-Soviet international news correspondent with close ties to every major Western intelligence organization – remarked:

Despite his earlier assertion that the Yugoslav revolution was not devouring its children, Tito embarked on a most ruthless wholesale de-Stalinization of the ... cadres.... Mass conversions to Titoism were carried out from above, by ... administrative persuasion, intimidation, expulsions, purges, incarceration, concentration camps, and torture. (Europe and War in the Balkans, Miron Rezun, Chapter: The Legacy of Tito, p. 101) (IMG)

The CIA too stated:

The Yugoslav Government took strong measures against those who, after the break in 1948, still clung to a Moscow policy as the result of their political education. ('1. Yugoslav-Albanian Relations 2. Yugoslav Attitude vis-à-vis the Soviet Union 3. League of Albanian Refugees (Prizren Committee)', CIA, January 3, 1955, p. 2) (IMG)

And:

many people were put into newly created internment camps. ('1. Yugoslav-Albanian Relations 2. Yugoslav Attitude vis-à-vis the Soviet Union 3. League of Albanian Refugees (Prizren Committee)', CIA, January 3, 1955, p. 2) (IMG)

Essentially, Tito's fascist gang, already having concentrated a significant amount of power into their own hands on behalf of the comprador classes allied to finance capital, decided to, out in the open, launch a fascist coup to overthrow the last remnants of democracy in Yugoslavia. As the 1949 Cominform resolution put it:

Due to the counter-revolutionary policy of the Tito-Rankovic clique which usurped power in the Party and in the State, an anti-Communist police State -- fascist type regime -- has been installed in Yugoslavia. (Communist Party of Yugoslavia in the Power of Murderers and Spies, Cominform, November 1949. MIA. The same document can be found in the 'Revolutionary Democracy Organization of India' archives section) (IMG)

And:

The Yugoslav hirelings of imperialism, having seized leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, unloosed a campaign of terror against genuine Communists loyal to the principles of Marxism and Leninism and who fight for Yugoslavia's independence from the imperialists. (Communist Party of Yugoslavia in the Power of Murderers and Spies, Cominform, November 1949. MIA. The same document can be found in the 'Revolutionary Democracy Organization of India' archives section) (IMG)

As a first step, Tito's and Rankovic's:

purges, particularly in the UDB and the armed services, incapacitated the Cominformists from organizing. ('Political and Economic Conditions in Yugoslavia; Morale and Attitude of the People Toward Tito and the Present Regime', CIA February 20, 1952, p. 2) (IMG)

Again, due to the absence of a quantitatively large proletariat in Yugoslavia, and owing to the petit-bourgeois mode of the bulk of the population, resistance against the regime was low, leaving the communists and progressives low leverage in the factional conflict in the UDB, while allowing the Tito-Rankovic faction to reassert control over the UDB. The control of Rankovic's UDB already extended to the Party; that is, rather than the Party controlling the fascist secret service, the latter controlled the former. In his April 1948 polemical letter to the CPSU Central Committee, Tito wrote: the Organization Secretary in the CPY is also Minister of State Security.... ('Tito rejects the charges and defends his policies', April 13, 1948. In: 'Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, 1939-1973 : A Documentary Survey', Stephen Clissold, 1975, p. 179. Clissold, the book editor who collected the document series, was a British intelligence officer.) (IMG)

In other words, the head of the secret service was also a chief of the Party, thus giving Rankovic's secret service tremendous influence over the Party as well. However, with the victory of the Titoist fascist faction through the purge of much of the communist elements in the UDB, nothing stood in the way of Rankovic and Tito. Having thus annihilated the communists in the intelligence and security apparatus, the regime went on to hunt down the rest of the Yugoslav communists. The following is an example case in Slovenia:

Among the many Cominformists arrested in Slovenia during January were Vito Zupanc, a prominent party member and Bogumil Kristan, an old-guard Communist. The letter was honored by the State following his liberation in 1945 from a Nazi concentration camp.

Dr. Lemez (fnu) and Dusan Kermauer (or Kermaner), pre-war Communists and functionaries of the Communist Party of Slovenia, are Cominformists. To date they have not been arrested.

Plevlje in Montenegro is the site of a concentration camp for Cominformists. At the penitentiary of Pozarevac in Zebal, 120 government officials, charged with Cominformism, are kept in solitary confinement.

(Arrests of Cominformists Continue, CIA, March 2, 1949, p. 1. Note: FNU means First Name Unknown) (IMG)

During early February the UDB arrested at Pazin, Istria, Dusan Dimicic and Vlado (?) Stefanovic, who were former partisan officers, Political Commissars and prominent members of the Regional Committee of the Communist Party for Istria, on charges of Cominformism. At the same time Sestan (fnu), President of the Regional Committee, was appointed by UDB in Fiume. The arrests were preceded by a special session held in late January by the Regional Committee. (Arrests of Cominformists Continue, CIA, March 2, 1949, p. 1. Note: FNU means First Name Unknown) (IMG)

Upon their arrest in Slovenia, prisoners would undergo brutal torture in special chambers:

A building located in the Narodni Dom Arena garden, now serves as a UDB prison. Under the building the UDB constructed nine bunkers, six of which serve as cells for prisoners and three as torture chambers. The cells are for three persons each and are provided with beds made of cements. The torture chambers are one meter square and are equipped with hooks for tying people to be tortured. One

of the most common practices is to fill the bunker with ice or hot water into which the prisoners are placed for hours. ('UDB Installations and Personnel in Ljubljana, Slovenia', CIA, December 13, 1949, p. 1) (IMG)

Another case:

Approximately 700 Cominform sympathizers were arrested during the last few days in the coal regions of Trbovlje, Hrastnik, Zagorje, Kocevje and Jesenice.

An extensive anti-Tito net was rounded up in the Trbovlje area by the UDB. The net seemingly had regular communications with Yugoslav Cominformists in Prague and was supported by collaborators in Zone A of the Free Territory of Trieste. The ringleaders, among whom are prominent Tito officials (unidentified), will be brought to trial within the fortnight.

It is alleged that Minister Ivan Regent has been imprisoned on a charge among other things, of communicating with Riko Malalan, the top Yugoslav Cominformist in Opicina, Zone A of the Free Territory of Trieste.

(COMINFORMIST ACTIVITY WITHIN YUGOSLAVIA, CIA, February 10, 1949) (IMG)

Fascists of the previous regimes were employed by the Tito regime's espionage service to be used for torturing dissidents. An example is Nexhip Musa, who was:

the former body-guard of [Albanian Nazi] Xhafer Deva in Albania. ('DEVA, XHAFER', CIA, March 13, 1955, p. 13) (IMG)

He lived in:

the camp of JESENICE (Yugoslavia)... ('DEVA, XHAFER', CIA, March 13, 1955, p. 13) (IMG)

On behalf of the Yugoslav Regime, Musa worked as the:

commander of this camp and had formed his own team composed by former communist policemen of Albania... ('DEVA, XHAFER', CIA, p. 13) (IMG)

The defector Titoist policemen of Albania worked under the direction of Albanian Nazi Nexhip Musa. Under the local rule of Musa, they were: responsible for the death of an Albanian in the camp of JESENICE (Yugoslavia) called Sulejman BEGEJA, killed on the 4 July 1952, and many tortures against albanians, hungarians, rumanians, and bulgarians living in the camp. ('DEVA, XHAFER', CIA, March 13, 1955, p. 13) (IMG)

Nazi concentration camps were taken over by the UDB and were converted into Titoist-fascist concentration camps in which the emigres from the Peoples' Democracies were imprisoned, terrorized, enslaved, and shot:

The concentration camp at Zrenjanin was established during World War II by the Nazis and later taken over by the UDB. Its capacity is not known, although between February and November 1949, there were approximately 80 persons incarcerated there. At present the camp is used to hold refugees from Hungary and Rumania. The commandant of the camp is UDB Captain Joseph Tubic, who speaks Hungarian. (...). Outside these barracks are concrete bunkers, two and one-half meters deep and two and one-half meters long, inside which are wells in which prisoners sentenced to solitary confinement are kept in a crouching position. The entire camp is surrounded by a barbed wire fence and guarded by troops of the UDB. New arrivals are told by Tubic that the camp is the end of their journey; that anyone who breaks the rules will be shot. (...). Treatment of the prisoners is very harsh; the daily food ration consists of tea, 400 grams of bread, and thin soup. Neither fuel nor blankets are issued during the winter months. The most minor infractions of the camp rules are punished by ten days' confinements in the bunkers. There is considerable corruption among the UDB guards who, in exchange for personal possessions, will obtain some food, mostly vegetables, for the prisoners. (...). Artisans among the prisoners work at their trades in Zrenjanin and surrounding towns; the remainder are forced to work on nearby state collective farms, under the supervision of UDB sub-lieutenant Djuro Grabic. (...). At various times during 1949, but especially in March, April, and July, an unspecified number of prisoners was taken to the border and forced back into Hungary and Rumania. During December 1949 and January 1950, an unspecified number of prisoners was sent to Dobroveni in Macedonia, where they were forced to work on a project to widen the Cerna Reka River. ('THE CONCENTRATION CAMP NEAR ZRENJANIN, SERBIA', CIA, July 24, 1950, p. 1) (IMG)

Not all the 'refugees' to Yugoslavia were genuine refugees; some were in fact kidnapped on the border:

Often officials and workers of both sexes are kidnaped and brought into Yugoslavia where they are interrogated by the UDB and released at a later date with the excuse of mistaken identity. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 14-15. Underline added.) (IMG)

Thousands of Yugoslav communists and progressives underwent physical and psychological torture, of kinds found in the Axis slave camps. The gang of the 'former' Gestapo agent Tito employed Gestapo experts and Ustase fascists in suppressing communist or progressive bourgeois-democratic dissent:

The most traumatic effect of the crisis was the victimization of the imprisoned Communist opposition. (...). In the development of the system, Titoist security men were assisted by Gestapo experts still in Yugoslav captivity and by those collaborators of the Nazis and the Ustasha who were serving time for crimes committed in enemy concentration camps during the war. These were reinforced by some common criminals who were instructed to pose as "Cominformists" in order to create divisions among the inmates and to act as provocateurs. (Europe and War in the Balkans, Miron Rezun, Chapter: The Legacy of Tito, p. 101) (IMG)

The most infamous of all these torture camps was Goli Otok, also known as the Naked Island:

It was in the fall of 1948 that Tito made the decision to house the Cominformists at Goli Otok – without consulting the central Committee, [nor] the Politburo.... (Tito: the story from inside, Milovan Djilas, 1980, p. 81) (IMG)

Richard West, the MI6 operative who landed in Yugoslavia to assist Tito's group against the USSR, remarked:

Tito set up the Naked Island camp through Rankovic.... According to Djilas, Tito was more than once heard to explain in 1948: 'Off to jail with him! Off to the camp! What else can he expect if he works against his own Party?' (Tito: and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, p. 237) (IMG)

Richard West also noted that slavery was the mode of production in Goli Otok:

Tito ... sent thousands of Cominformists to slave in the camp on Goli Otok (Naked Island), opposite Senj in the north Adriatic. From autumn 1948 until well into the 1950s, about 12,000 men and some women as well were shipped to this inhospitable rock to quarry for marble. (Tito: and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, p. 237) (IMG)

US intelligence also confirmed that at Tito's:

bidding, and under the guidance of Party Secretary Aleksandar Rankovic and State Secretary for Internal Affairs Svetislav Stefanovic, local "Cominformists" were rounded up for imprisonment on Tito's Adriatic Devil's Island, Goli Otok: 4,000 in 1949, over 3,000 in 1950, 2,500 in 1951, and over 1,000 in 1952; in March 1956 after the first Soviet Yugoslav rapprochement, the National Assembly was told that 15,800 "Cominformists" had been prosecuted between 1948 and 1955. (YUGOSLAVIA: THE OUTWORN STRUCTURE, Reference Title: ESAU XLVII, Directorate of Intelligence, CIA, November 20, 1970, p. 3) (IMG)

Said to be the largest slave camp of Yugoslav communists, it was built by the slaves themselves:

Most [Cominformists] were sent to concentration camps on the Naked Island. (...). The worst Stalinist sinners were shipped off first, in great haste and without any technical and engineering preparations, to build the camps themselves and to welcome its steadily growing population. (Europe and War in the Balkans, Miron Rezun, Chapter: The Legacy of Tito, p. 101) (IMG)

In his memoirs, Milovan Djilas described in detail the Sadistic dungeon and slave camp of Goli Otok:

Evil and shame – evil beyond compare, unending shame – is what lay in store for the prisoners in the camp. Never mind the foul food, the mindless and exhausting labor in the quarry, the prisoners were subjected to torture, the cruelty of which was matched by its perversity. (...). On boarding the boat to Goli Otok, prisoners were shoved head first into its hold, and, on landing, they were herded through a double row of security guards, who punched and kicked them. This practice, which is referred to in Isakovic's novel as the "principle of the frightened rabbit," was frequently tested on the so-called incorrigibles. There were lynchings, too. Those who would not repent were subjected to humiliating abuse, which could only result from the dogmatic fury and the ingenuity of those who had reformed. Prisoners had their heads plunged into pails of human excrement. They were forced to wear placards that read "Traitor." They were required to confess publicly their nonpolitical sins. All of this was carefully planned. (Tito: the story from inside, Milovan Djilas, 1980, pp. 85-86) (IMG)

Rezun adds:

The camps were said to be reeducation centers, where self-punishment became the norm. (Europe and War in the Balkans, Miron Rezun, Chapter: The Legacy of Tito, p. 101) (IMG)

Goli Otok prisoners were forced to read imperialist publications against the USSR. A Western intelligence source confirmed:

The ideological reeducation of the Stalinists required that they read so-called imperialist publications denouncing the USSR and the Comintern. Some prisoners who resisted conversion were executed. (Europe and War in the Balkans, Miron Rezun, Chapter: The Legacy of Tito, p. 102) (IMG)

Describing the results of the fascist brainwashing process, Djilas recalled:

There would have been no camp at Goli Otok. Even if there had been a camp, if the will of the leader and the intractable secret police had not dominated the Party, the regime in that camp would not have been such a monstrous combination of two right-minded groups, the security officials and the reeducated. (Tito: the story from inside, Milovan Djilas, 1980, p. 89) (IMG)

Throughout Yugoslavia, in fact, the Tito regime was actively promoting an atmosphere of hatred towards the USSR:

The government has created a strong atmosphere of feeling against the Soviet Union. They even go back to the history of the war and say that the Soviet Union worked against the interests of Yugoslavia. ('1. Yugoslav-Albanian Relations 2. Yugoslav Attitude vis-à-vis the Soviet Union 3. League of Albanian Refugees (Prizren Committee)', CIA, January 3, 1955, p. 2) (IMG)

It is important to note, however, that the success of the Yugoslav regime in promoting anti-Soviet propaganda was limited, and the Stalin-era Soviet influence in Yugoslavia was increasing.

The Tito regime was inflicting immense levels of force upon the slaves so to brainwash and forcibly 'convert' them into 'believers' in the regime's propaganda narratives. To mildly escape the brutalities, they would have to spy on one another:

The camp was, in fact, a source of information for further arrests: to betray an ally still at large was the best way to demonstrate one's own rehabilitation and repentance. (Tito: the story from inside, Milovan Djilas, 1980, p. 87) (IMG)

The 'repentant' slaves would thereupon engage in slave 'self-management' in helping the UDB's torture of other prisoners:

Tito even, in his speeches, boasted that we were reeducating the prisoners. The secret police recruited teams from the ranks of the penitent and organized them into "self-managing units" – that is exactly what they were called. These units then took over the task of reeducation, through violence. (Tito: the story from inside, Milovan Djilas, 1980, p. 85) (IMG)

Djilas concluded:

The inmates were not provided with the protection of the law; nor were they allowed visits from their families. (...). Very few, if any, returned from Goli Otok unscathed. Not [as] much physically, perhaps, as psychologically and intellectually. Many were bitter, depressed, shattered.

(Tito: the story from inside, Milovan Djilas, 1980, p. 87) (IMG)

Richard West corroborated:

The camp was run on the principle of making the prisoners earn their release by breaking the will of those who had not yet made a confession and recantation. All new arrivals were made to run a gauntlet of beating, followed by constant physical and verbal abuse. The prisoners were not allowed visitors, and relatives were not even informed to the whereabouts of their loved ones; they were merely told that 'Daddy has gone away on a business trip'. All those released from Naked Island were sworn not to talk about it, under pain of returning there. Even after the end of Communism in Yugoslavia, veterans of Naked Island were loath to speak of their hellish experience. (Tito: and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, p. 237) (IMG)

The prominent Yugoslav regime official Dobrica Cosic, Djilas added, "had visited Goli Otok" and:

told me that the security service, the UDBA, had devised and applied corrective methods that were possibly the most diabolical in history. (Tito: the story from inside, Milovan Djilas, 1980, p. 86) (IMG)

The Yugoslav leaders were all well aware of the situation in Goli Otok. Indeed, as Djilas admitted,:

It is not as if no one in Belgrade knew what was going on at Goli Otok. (Tito: the story from inside, Milovan Djilas, 1980, p. 86) (IMG)

By his own confession, Djilas himself was involved in the torturous mass-brainwashing of the communist prisoners:

Although I was not involved directly in the organization and management of the camp, my ideological activity was not to be ignored. The sharpness and depth of my criticism of Stalin and the Soviet system contributed to the sufferings of the inmates. My positions were taken as official and prescribed. Those who were believed to harbor doubt were forced into self-criticism – in what ways, and with what results, one can only imagine. (Tito: the story from inside, Milovan Djilas, 1980, p. 87) (IMG)

Nor was Djilas much regretful of the bondage of the communist political prisoners:

In retrospect, and with all the self-criticism of which I am capable, I must admit that we could not have avoided a concentration camp for the Cominformists. (Tito: the story from inside, Milovan Djilas, 1980, p. 84) (IMG)

Hence both Djilas and Tito were involved in this historic crime:

Goli Otok ... is truly important in every respect. I cannot avoid it here, not only because of Tito's involvement, but also because of my own. ... (Tito: the story from inside, Milovan Djilas, 1980, p. 81) (IMG)

The tens of thousands victims of the Goli Otok torture camp were the communists, democrats, and dissidents. Djilas said:

Approximately fifteen thousand Party members and sympathizers passed through the camp. A substantial number served time simply because of having expressed pro-Soviet sentiments among friends. Some were entirely innocent. There were also quite a few activists who spread propaganda and tried to organize the overthrow of the regime. (Tito: the story from inside, Milovan Djilas, 1980, p. 87) (IMG)

One of the key "factors undermining the ... efforts at subversion," noted a CIA document, was:

the support given [to] his regime by U.S. and U.K. Governments since 1949.... (National Intelligence Survey 21; Yugoslavia; Government and Politics, 21/GS/GP, CIA, April 1973, p. 44) (IMG)

Of course, the Anglo-American imperialists regarded such anti-communist and anti-democratic brutality as understandable:

While at the United Nations I observed that the official West viewed the persecution of the Cominformists with understanding.... (Tito: the story from inside, Milovan Djilas, 1980, p. 88) (IMG)

Nonetheless, the outcry of progressive anti-fascists in Western societies could not be nipped in the bud. Thus, even in:

the West ... there were humanitarian protests as well. (Tito: the story from inside, Milovan Djilas, 1980, p. 88) (IMG)

Such international moral pressure:

urged [Yugoslav leaders] that some thought be given to dissolving the camp, that those who were guilty should be, instead, handed over to the courts. Kardelj was the first to oppose [these] recommendations. "We need the camp now desperately!" If I remember correctly, Rankovic remarked that it would not be so easy to settle accounts with the Cominformists through normal procedures. Tito was silent, reflective, then he dismissed [the] proposal, probably on the ground that it was premature. And so we reacted in the typical fashion of politicians who are above public control – in pursuit of political goals, arbitrarily and without overriding concern for human conditions, human suffering. (Tito: the story from inside, Milovan Djilas, 1980, p. 88) (IMG)

Regarding the casualty statistics of the communists in Yugoslavia under Tito's reign, pro-Cominform sources claim that:

between 1948 and 1952, Tito expelled from the party some 200,000 Communists of whom 30,000 were imprisoned with lengthy prison sentences and several thousand were killed. Among the imprisoned there were 5,000 officers cumulatively sentenced to more than 50,000 years imprisonment. The expellees represented 50% of the total strength of the CPY and 75% of the leading cadres. (The Conversion from Stalinism to 'Titoism': Its Impact on the Yugoslav Communist Militants, Sava D. Bosnitch, pp. 50-51)

Such pro-Cominform allegations against Tito's regime have in fact been acknowledged as correct by Rezun:

Between 1948 and 1952, Tito expelled almost 200,000 Communists, of whom 30,000 were imprisoned and several thousands killed. Those who were expelled represented 50 percent of the total strength of the CPY and 75% of the leading cadres. The Stalinists alleged that the true Marxist-Leninist CPY was liquidated. From its remnants, the so-called Communist League of Yugoslavia was formed. Its principal aim was to secure personal power for Tito and [his] clique by means of ruthless counterrevolutionary terror and suppression of all Yugoslav Communists with an internationalist outlook. (Europe and War in the Balkans, Miron Rezun, Chapter: The Legacy of Tito, p. 101) (IMG)

Again, Rezun's remarks are corroborated by the already-cited US intelligence memorandum which stated:

Tito, beside the implacable of hatred of the people, ... has against himself also the majority of the Yugoslav Communists. (Tito's True Face, Political Information (Analysis of Tito's Relationship with Stalin and the West, CIA, November 28, 1952, pp. 13-14) (IMG)

According to the CIA, the Yugoslav Regime stated that it arrested more than eight thousand 'Cominformists':

Minister of Interior Rankovic stated in June that since the Cominform break in 1948, 8,403 Cominformists had been arrested. (Daily Digest, CIA, October 10, 1951, p. 4) (IMG)

On the other hand, the CIA stated:

Rankovic ... rounded up the 15,000 "real" Cominformists.... (YUGOSLAVIA: THE OUTWORN STRUCTURE, Reference Title: ESAU XLVII, Directorate of Intelligence, CIA, November 20, 1970, p. 4) (IMG)

Tito seems to have exaggerated the number of the 'spy centers' of the Cominform countries:

Tito's figure of 98 spy centers in the Cominform countries represents a considerably larger number than previously estimated. (Daily Digest, CIA, October 10, 1951, p. 4) (IMG)

The exaggeration would have served his terrorist agenda.

As can be seen, Tito's gang formed a minority clique, criminally terrorizing the democratic majority in the YCP. The problem was that the structure of the YCP was not really so democratic, Tito's gang dominated the high command of the YCP. All of this in turn was due to the low number of proletarians in Yugoslavia and the high number of peasants there. This situation was vastly in contrast to what occurred in the CPSU, wherein – unlike in Yugoslavia – every phase of the purges involved the democratic majority of the Party conducting legal purges against the counter-revolutionary criminal minority.

What occurred in 1948-1949 was a hybrid coup, the combination of a soft coup and a hard coup. The Chancellor Hitler, through the Reichstag fire, launched a coup against the democratic forces in his state so to transition the state he led to a fascist dictatorship. In the same ways, Tito's gang

launched a coup against the communist forces in the state it led, annihilated numerous communists, established a brutal fascist military dictatorship, and set Yugoslavia firmly on the side of the Anglo-Americans for covert and shadow warfare against the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies.

C12S3. Setting Yugoslavia on the Path for War against the Peoples' Democracies / Slavery, not capitalism and not socialism, as the Main Mode of Production in Yugoslavia / Reign of Terror / Farcical Elections / Kulak-owned 'Collectivization' / Yugoslav Communist Resistance / Proletarian and Peasant Resistance *** IMG-All-{Titoist Yugoslavia}

The 1949 Cominform resolution stated:

The Belgrade clique of hired spies and murderers made a flagrant deal with imperialist reaction and entered its service, as the Budapest trial of Rajk-Brankov made perfectly clear.

This trial showed that the present Yugoslav rulers, having fled from the camp of democracy and socialism to the camp of capitalism and reaction, have become direct accomplices of the instigators of a new war, and, by their treacherous deeds, are ingratiating themselves with the imperialists and kow-towing to them.

(Communist Party of Yugoslavia in the Power of Murderers and Spies, Cominform, November 1949. MIA. The same document can be found in the 'Revolutionary Democracy Organization of India' archives section) (IMG)

Indeed, as the Cominform noted, the Yugoslav regime had aggressive intents and was an accomplice to the Anglo-American effort for war against the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies. Tito's gang literally enslaved large masses of Yugoslav people, forcing them to build infrastructure that would allow Yugoslavia to be a launching pad for an Anglo-Americans' invasion of the socialist and democratic camp. The British intelligence officer James Klugmann, himself having parachuted into Yugoslavia in order to aid Tito during World War II, wrote:

New roads are being built up and down the country with a specific military strategic purpose. It is one of the tragedies and ironies of history that the Belgrade – Zagreb highway, which began with the aid of the foreign Youth Brigades, has now been revealed as part of a general Western strategic plan to link Anglo-American military bases on the frontiers of the People's Democracies of Eastern Europe. It is now planned that this road should be so extended north and south as to link the Anglo-American base of Trieste through Zagreb, Belgrade and Skopje, to the Anglo-American base of Salonica in Northern Greece. The voluntary labour detachments, which had the willing support of youth and people in the emergency period immediately following Liberation, have been transformed into compulsory labour squads, and by such squads, unpaid and without proper equipment, this highway is now being completed. There are a whole series of airports situated along it. Several sectors of the road itself have been extended and surfaced with concrete for possible use as airstrips, and then camouflaged over with a thin layer of soil. It is remarkable that there is *already* rail contact between Trieste, Ljubljana, Zagreb and Belgrade, whilst a transverse east-west road linking the richer areas of Slavonia and Vojvodina with the barren coast of Dalmatia is desperately needed but not being constructed. New highways are being planned, however, linking Yugoslavia with neighbouring People's Democracies, highways demanded by Western strategy such as the Niš – Tsaribrod project leading up to the Bulgarian frontier. (From Trotsky to Tito, James Klugmann, 1951, Chapter 4) (IMG)

Critics may show skepticism to the remarks by James Klugmann as 'too biased', given that Klugmann wrote his book in support of the Cominform's line. The remarks by Klugmann, however, are backed by declassified reports from the US intelligence. A 'Geographic Intelligence Report' by the CIA's 'Office of Research and Reports' confirmed that the 'Brotherhood and Unity Highway' was aimed to link Italy, Greece, and Turkey, all of which were the allies of American imperialism, and that the Highway would be an 'asset' 'in time of war':

The international Balkan Highway was planned to link Italy, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey. In general the Yugoslav portion of this road, the Bratstvo i Jedinstvo Autoput (Brotherhood and Unity Highway), follows the Sava-Velika and Juzva Morava-Vardar route.... It is the most heavily financed road project in the country and is now about 55 percent complete. When completed the Brotherhood and Unity Highway will extend from the Italian border near Trieste to the Greek border at Gevgelija.... It will connect Ljubljana, Zagreb, Belgrade, and Skopje the capitals of the Republics of Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, and Macedonia, respectively, whose combined populations form 78 percent of the total for the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia. Militarily, the Brotherhood and Unity Highway would be ... an asset ... in time of war. Yugoslav forces could be moved quickly along the highway to roads leading to any part of the country. (The Roads of Yugoslavia, Geographic Intelligence Report, CIA/RR GR 60-3, Office of Research and Reports, CIA, December 1960, p. 3) (IMG)

An anonymous US intelligence agent cited by the CIA confirmed that for this project, the Yugoslav regime utilized forced labour, and that under the influence of what was believed to be Cominform 'propaganda', these slaves deserted their work. According to the CIA's rather "reliable informant" who was "an engineer of the Bor copper mines":

A great number of workers inducted for compulsory labor left their work and disappeared during the Fall of 1949. Most of these desertions occurred on the construction of the automobile highway from Zagreb to Belgrade and in mines.

The number of laborers who deserted the highway construction is estimated at 20,000. A managing official said that 21,800 new workers had to be employed to replace the deserters. The desertions are believed to be the result of Cominform propaganda.

(Mass Desertions of Workers in Yugoslavia, CIA, Date of Content: Early January 1950, Date Prepared: May 1, 1950, p. 1) (IMG)

These Anglo-American intelligence sources confirm the accusations made by the Soviet state media against Tito's fascist regime. A 1952 Soviet article stated that the construction of the Highway indeed involved workers taken as forced laborers:

Thousands of working people are compelled by force to work for the third consecutive year on building the Trieste-Zagreb-Belgrade-Skoplije strategic highway. (The Tito Clique Has Turned Yugoslavia Into a Military Camp, V. Nemchinov, June 9, 1952. USSR Information Bulletin, Vol. 10, No. 11, p. 352) (IMG)

However, another Soviet newspaper article confirmed:

Yugoslavia's working class decidedly refuses to put its head under the yoke to sweat out profits for foreign monopolies and riches for the Belgrade rulers. The Titoites' attempts to force the workers to accept conditions of slavery ... are meeting with constantly increasing resistance. (The Yugoslav People's Struggle Against the Tito Clique, P. Zyablov, September 8, 1950. In: USSR Information Bulletin, Vol. 10, No. 17, p. 544) (IMG)

In line with the information provided by the CIA, the Soviet press – particularly the USSR Information Bulletin, a media outlet of the Soviet foreign ministry – claimed that the Yugoslav workers were indeed influenced by Cominform slogans:

Rallying to the slogan: “Let’s Undermine the Economic Foundation of the Tito-Rankovic Fascist Regime,” the workers of Yugoslavia are everywhere cutting down the productivity of labor, thus disrupting the fulfillment of plans. Output at mills and factories is constantly dropping. (The Yugoslav People’s Struggle Against the Tito Clique, P. Zyablov, September 8, 1950. In: USSR Information Bulletin, Vol. 10, No. 17, p. 544) (IMG)

The Yugoslav regime press – cited by the CIA – admitted that numerous workers had deserted their mines:

Recruiting in 1948 was not very successful. Some labor recruiting administrations attracted new miners by promising higher pay than the law allows, or by misrepresenting conditions at the mine. Those workers soon left. Over 1,200 recruits left the Zenica mine last year, 200 left Breza, 150 left Kakanj, and an average of 50 a day left Trbovlje over a period of several days. The situation is similar at the Dobra Sreca, Bor, Trepca, and especially at the Senje mines. (‘Sociological – Labor Supply; food consumption; schooling’, Where Published: Yugoslavia, How Published: Daily newspapers, Language: Serbo-Croatian, Date of Information: 1949, Date Distributed: April 4, 1949, p. 1. Citing: MINE RECRUITING OFF IN 1948, Politika, No. 13154, February 7, 1949) (IMG)

The Highway was by no means the only project for which the Yugoslav regime enslaved ordinary Yugoslav citizens. The Albanians of Kosovo, as mentioned in C12S6, were, in accordance with the settler-colonial plans of the regime, forced to desert the places they inhabited in order to work as slaves in the construction of infrastructure for Yugoslavia’s war against the USSR and the Peoples’ Democracies. The Albanians of Kosovo were by no means the only ones enslaved. Every ordinary Yugoslav citizen lived under the menace of enslavement by the regime. This included Slovenia and Croatia, the ‘racially privileged’ provinces of fascist Yugoslavia:

On 25 July 1949, Zagreb security forces began a three day round-up of Yugoslav civilians for two months of forced duty in labor brigades. Forced recruitment apparently was necessary, because voluntary enlistments had fallen far short of current requirements.

On the first day of the round-up at all cafes and other public places within the city of Zagreb were canvassed and all of the city streets combed. On the second day similar establishments on the periphery of the city were canvassed. In all, some three thousand people were collected for the brigades. Of this number more than 1,500 were assembled on the first day.

The normal procedure of the round-up was as follows: Militia surrounded a cafe to prohibit anyone from leaving. and UDB (civilian) authorities entered the cafe and questioned every patron. Each was required to produce his documents. Those who could establish that they were employed in government offices and on critical industrial jobs were released. Others were ushered from the cafe into waiting trucks which transported them to the labor camp at Kraizerica, a suburb of Zagreb, directly across the Sava River. There they were billeted in barracks and put to work on a large farming project.

It is also reported that close to 3,000 persons were similarly recruited for labor brigades in Ljubljana towards the end of July 1949.

(Forced Labor Recruitment in Zagreb and Ljubljana, CIA, September 13, 1949, p. 1) (IMG)

In 1952, Tito stepped up his efforts to present himself as ‘pro-democracy’, so to give the United States the excuse to fund the Yugoslav regime. Even then, the working class was living under the condition of outright slavery:

In connection with the working class ... the laborers are deeply dissatisfied. They feel that, with the exception of much cheaper rents (in itself not an unalloyed blessing inasmuch as they have no choice concerning their place of abode nor of their dwelling partners) they are much worse off than under the former Yugoslav regime, although they must work harder because of the norm system. In addition to this, they are not free agents. (‘Political and Economic Conditions in Yugoslavia; Morale and Attitude of the People Toward Tito and the Present Regime’, CIA February 20, 1952, p. 9) (IMG)

Similar to the workers, the peasants too were enslaved by the Yugoslav regime to do so-called ‘voluntary’ labour:

the peasants ... are forced to perform “voluntary” labor; (‘Political and Economic Conditions in Yugoslavia; Morale and Attitude of the People Toward Tito and the Present Regime’, CIA February 20, 1952, p. 10) (IMG)

On the other hand, in this military dictatorship of the fascist type, in which Gestapo officers and Ustase commanders were the commanders of the Yugoslav regime’s army, the army officers were privileged and could reap the profits of the enslavement of the Yugoslav people:

Army officers constitute a favored class. (‘Political and Economic Conditions in Yugoslavia; Morale and Attitude of the People Toward Tito and the Present Regime’, CIA February 20, 1952, p. 9) (IMG)

In fact:

they [i.e. army officers] are still given preference in drawing their rations ahead of the rest of the population, an important advantage, considering the frequent shortage of rations. Complaints are frequent relative to the fact that, while other families are allowed only one cubic meter of wood for the entire winter, army officers are allowed one cubic meter a month, whether they need it or not, most of which they sell on the black market. Army officers, particularly those of higher ranks, receive cloth, house furnishings and a number of other commodities which, if they do not use, they sell on the black market. All of these things affect the morale and attitude of the Yugoslav people toward the regime. (‘Political and Economic Conditions in Yugoslavia; Morale and Attitude of the People Toward Tito and the Present Regime’, CIA February 20, 1952, p. 9) (IMG)

However, the Yugoslav people did not yield so much; they sabotaged the Yugoslav regime’s plans for an imperialist war against the USSR and the Peoples’ Democracies. The workers were largely aligned with the ‘Cominformists’. The proletarian resistance against the Titoist-fascist occupation forces of Yugoslavia took the form of industrial sabotage:

Yugoslavia’s economy is receding as a result of passive resistance on the part of workers and peasants. The coal output has decreased, [and] electrification projects have been halted.... (Military, Political and Economic Situation in Yugoslavia, CIA, June 20, 1951, p. 2) (IMG)

Yugoslavia's toilers are not confining themselves to resisting the coercion and arbitrary acts of the present rulers; they are doing everything in their power to disrupt the production and export of strategic raw and other materials wanted by the instigators of a new war. (...). More than half of the miners refuse to dig coal. (The Yugoslav People’s Struggle Against the Tito Clique, P. Zyablov, September 8, 1950. In: USSR Information Bulletin, Vol. 10, No. 17, p. 544) (IMG)

The Yugoslav regime pursued the classic strategy of launching a pincer assault on collectivization; on the one hand, they forced 'collectivization' on the peasants, and on the other hand, they put the kulaks in charge of the fake 'collectives'. On the one hand, they opposed any real collectivization that would have brought de-kulakization and on the other hand, they forced their phony 'collectivization' on the peasants. In the words of the Cominform:

The compulsory pseudo co-operatives in the country-side are in the hands of the kulaks and their agencies and represent an instrument for the exploitation of wide masses of working peasants. (Communist Party of Yugoslavia in the Power of Murderers and Spies, Cominform, November 1949. MIA. The same document can be found in the 'Revolutionary Democracy Organization of India' archives section) (IMG)

The CIA corroborates the claims of the Cominform by confirming that the so-called 'collectivized' peasants – and the collectivization in Yugoslavia was fake and Trotskyite unlike in the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies – were horrifically enslaved:

The situation of peasants who are members of collectives, on the other hand, is even worse, if anything. Exorbitant taxes and virtual confiscation of their produce and livestock (fruit and vegetables were placed on the free list in July) have reduced the independent peasant to a state of unprecedented misery, yet he still feels that he is his "own boss" and has self-respect, whereas the collectivized peasants have been virtually reduced to robots. Not only do they own nothing, but they have even lost their quality as men and women and have become merely "radne snage" (labor force). The situation is, in fact, most accurately reflected by the determination of those who are out of them to remain out. No promise can induce the independent farmers to join the collectives voluntarily. On the other hand, there is a spontaneous, strong movement on the part of the collectivized peasants, albeit unorganized, to break up the collectives. ('Political and Economic Conditions in Yugoslavia; Morale and Attitude of the People Toward Tito and the Present Regime', CIA February 20, 1952, p. 5) (IMG)

Indeed, the Yugoslav regime had pursued:

the forced collectivization, which the government launched in 1948-1949 in a misguided effort to disprove Moscow's charges that rural Yugoslavia was held in thrall by "kulaks." Since the rebels disseminated the most elementary propaganda ... the peasants took the message as a protest against collectivization. (With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism, Cornell University Press, Ivo Banac, 1988, p. 236) (IMG)

Those opposed to collectivization acted as its most extremist and terroristic pseudo-'advocates'. Kardelj was a case in point. Hence the regime pursued Trotskyite agricultural policies, terrorizing the Yugoslav peasantry:

Kardelj was opposed to collectivization, although he had delivered a report in favor of the collectives at the Central Committee Plenum in 1949. For many years there would have been no forced selling. Kidric, the chief economist, finally called forced selling a form of robbery. Yet that was not its most sinister aspect. I remember Kidric announcing at a Politburo meeting that sixty-five thousand freight cars of wheat had to be bought on a forced basis. While Rankovic was noting down the figure, he groaned: "Twelve thousand arrested!" These peasants were released after two or three months, but what an atmosphere those arrests and the accompanying brutality created! What despair and misery! (Tito: the story from inside, Milovan Djilas, 1980, pp. 89-90) (IMG)

The peasants':

feeling of bitterness against the Tito regime was not the expression of transient anger but was a genuine and deep-rooted feeling. The peasants complained bitterly about their lot, which they said was going from bad to worse, from year to year. The Yugoslav peasants looked miserable, and were as they described themselves "gol i bos" (naked and barefooted). An old Serb, lurching on black bread and green peppers, under a tree not far from Nis, after heaping abuse upon the regime (in which four or five other peasants present participated) for the multiform sufferings the regime has visited upon the peasants (which in his case reached the limit when "the government authorities took all my fat pigs and three lean ones"). ('Political and Economic Conditions in Yugoslavia; Morale and Attitude of the People Toward Tito and the Present Regime', CIA February 20, 1952, p. 3) (IMG)

Neither were the Titoites able to fulfill their plan for the export of food-stuffs. Despite the raging terror, the toiling peasantry stands shoulder to shoulder with the working class in opposing the Belgrade gang of traitors. Both autumn and spring plans were disrupted by the peasants, as a result of which more than 2,700,000 hectares of the 5,000,000 that were to be put under crops this year remained unsowed. (The Yugoslav People's Struggle Against the Tito Clique, P. Zyablov, September 8, 1950. In: USSR Information Bulletin, Vol. 10, No. 17, p. 544) (IMG)

The CIA emphasized:

The present regime has created a situation which affects every Yugoslav peasant deeply, spiritually as well as materially. It has brought a combination of privation and oppression which generates a feeling of hatred towards the regime that will be extremely difficult to eradicate, for it transcends nationalistic or patriotic pride. Any appeal to the Yugoslav population to rise in defense of such a regime would be an appeal to perpetuate its own slavery and misery. ('Political and Economic Conditions in Yugoslavia; Morale and Attitude of the People Toward Tito and the Present Regime', CIA February 20, 1952, p. 8) (IMG)

Numerous Yugoslavs who managed to escape to the Peoples' Democracies were able to describe the experience of the peasantry in Yugoslavia, and they wrote articles in many Cominform bloc journals about the crimes of Tito's regime against the peasantry.

The CIA, on the other hand, provided details about individual cases of peasants suffering under Tito regime yoke. Here is one case:

An old lady of seventy-five years of age told her most recent experiences with the [Titoist pseudo-]Communists. She said the "Communists" came to her and demanded 27,000 dinars in taxes. She protested that it was impossible for her to pay it. She had three pigs and they threatened to take them away from her. She went to every house in the village "except the Communist authorities", and tried to borrow money. She said everybody knew her to be an honest woman and she would have no trouble in raising the money if the people had it, but she was able to raise only 5,000 dinars. Frantically (sic), she sought the president of the village committee and pleaded with him for a delay "so that one of the pigs could have a litter", but her pigs were taken two days later by force when she was not at home and her daughter was too frightened to put up any resistance. ('Political and Economic Conditions in Yugoslavia; Morale and Attitude of the People Toward Tito and the Present Regime', CIA February 20, 1952, p. 4) (IMG)

As the case above shows, the Yugoslav regime terrorized the peasants through an extremely high level of taxation. There was another case:

About half-way from Nis to Belgrade, ... a young man ... was plowing a field and some farmers [were] working across the road. ('Political and Economic Conditions in Yugoslavia; Morale and Attitude of the People Toward Tito and the Present Regime', CIA February 20, 1952, p. 4) (IMG)

Describing the condition of the young peasant man and the barbaric dishonoring of his wife by the Tito regime, the US intelligence document continued:

the Yugoslav authorities went to his house and demanded 14 kilos of wool from his wife. Since he has only 15 sheep, his wife protested that if she delivered this wool, the family would have to go naked since at the prevailing prices (7,000 dinars for one meter of the cheapest sort of woolen cloth) it was impossible for them to buy even one meter of material. Thereupon, they tied her hands behind her back and took her to the village committee position. Several days later, at a village "conference", her son, a young man in his late twenties, ventured to say that his family could not deliver the wool, since they had nothing to wear and no money, and that a cheap shirt alone cost 2,600 dinars. He soon found out, the father said, that "things in this country had not changed, for he had to spend 20 days in jail, besides having to give up the wool". ('Political and Economic Conditions in Yugoslavia; Morale and Attitude of the People Toward Tito and the Present Regime', CIA February 20, 1952, p. 4) (IMG)

No, the situation in that country had not changed much; Titoist Yugoslavia was no less infernal than Ustase-occupied Yugoslavia. The document continued:

the previous week the Yugoslav authorities had called on his wife and demanded delivery of one and one-half kilograms of wool "for last year". She told them that she had no wool to give them, for the winter had been severe and they had no money to buy clothes and she had used the wool to knit a sweater. Whereupon, she was warned that unless the wool was delivered in 15 days, her husband would go to jail. They still had no wool, but they would have to find some. ('Political and Economic Conditions in Yugoslavia; Morale and Attitude of the People Toward Tito and the Present Regime', CIA February 20, 1952, p. 4) (IMG)

Or take the following example of Serbian peasants:

At Osiponica, just before entering Pozarevac, [there was] a group of peasants composed of an old man, a middle-aged man, two young men, three women and a baby, who were eating under the shade of a tree. The old man, a picturesque Serb ... went off into a vehement tirade against the regime, so intense and full of hatred, from deep down in his soul, that it fairly shook his frail body. ('Political and Economic Conditions in Yugoslavia; Morale and Attitude of the People Toward Tito and the Present Regime', CIA February 20, 1952, p. 7) (IMG)

The document continued:

not only had they not received any food of any kind, but ... the Yugoslav government took from the little that they raised. ('Political and Economic Conditions in Yugoslavia; Morale and Attitude of the People Toward Tito and the Present Regime', CIA February 20, 1952, p. 7) (IMG)

This old man was quite emotional, but so were practically all of the other persons ... even if they did not possess the dramatic talent of this old Serb. ('Political and Economic Conditions in Yugoslavia; Morale and Attitude of the People Toward Tito and the Present Regime', CIA February 20, 1952, p. 8) (IMG)

The situation of the Croatian peasants was not much better, if better at all. For example,:

in Lika, Croatia, a farmer complained that out of 900 kilograms of wheat the government had taken 400 kilograms (at the recently reduced quotas of collection). "Of the 500 kilograms left [to] me", he said, "I need 200 kilos for seed; then how long do you think the remaining 300 kilos would last [for] my family of eight persons? Not much more than a month." He said that government pressure was still great but that at a particular village in Bosnia the pressure was greater and so was the "otkup" (government collection quota). ('Political and Economic Conditions in Yugoslavia; Morale and Attitude of the People Toward Tito and the Present Regime', CIA February 20, 1952, pp. 4-5) (IMG)

Corroborating the Soviet media claims of Yugoslav peasants' resistance against the Tito regime's pseudo-collectivization enslavement projects, the CIA stated:

A considerable number of peasants in Serbia, and especially in Croatia, simply "abandoned everything" and left the collectives even before the three-year period had expired. In Macedonia, which is approximately 60 percent collectivized, the peasants were in a veritable state of ferment. ('Political and Economic Conditions in Yugoslavia; Morale and Attitude of the People Toward Tito and the Present Regime', CIA February 20, 1952, p. 5) (IMG)

So strong was peasant resistance, that the regime sent its fascist death squads to Novaci to terrorize the peasants, while the discontent was spreading to Macedonia as well:

200 militiamen had been dispatched from Bitolj to quell the "uprising" in a particularly brutal manner and that the leaders of the "uprising" had been sentenced to terms of eight to ten years' imprisonment. Strong and bitter peasant discontent against the collectives was not confined to the village of Novaci; from Bitolj to Kriva Palanka, peasant feeling ran high. Submittal of petitions to get out of the collectives appeared to be the order of the day in Macedonia. ('Political and Economic Conditions in Yugoslavia; Morale and Attitude of the People Toward Tito and the Present Regime', CIA February 20, 1952, p. 5) (IMG)

No real peasant rebellion in the form of an uprising took place, but peasant resistance in the covert form of under-fulfilling, under-performing, and sabotaging production, was widespread.

The situation in Yugoslavia resembled how, in the extreme heat of the summer, one would, for as brief a time as a second, wish it was an extremely cold winter, and in the extremely low temperature of the winter, one would for a second wish the old hot summer was near. The Nazis, just like their agent Tito, supported the Ustase, and the Ustase carried out a genocide against Serbs. Yet, the Tito regime's measures were so brutal that:

It is only when the situation is seen in this light that one can understand a Serb when he says: "I am really ashamed to admit it, but I would rather have the Nazis".... ('Political and Economic Conditions in Yugoslavia; Morale and Attitude of the People Toward Tito and the Present Regime', CIA February 20, 1952, p. 8) (IMG)

Similarly,:

There is no hesitation on the part of the Croat peasants as to whether they would prefer the old Yugoslavia to Tito. ('Political and Economic Conditions in Yugoslavia; Morale and Attitude of the People Toward Tito and the Present Regime', CIA February 20, 1952, p. 8) (IMG)

In fact, although:

they were not particularly keen on King Peter, they would prefer anyone to Tito. This way one Croat put it in referring to old Yugoslavia in comparison to the present regime: “those were golden times”. (‘Political and Economic Conditions in Yugoslavia; Morale and Attitude of the People Toward Tito and the Present Regime’, CIA February 20, 1952, p. 8) (IMG)

Similar to the poorer peasants whose little incomes were stolen by the regime, the income of the urban artisans and shopkeepers was also stolen through the mechanism of extremely high taxes which they could not pay:

One of the small classes in Yugoslavia who have no love for the Tito regime are the “private” artisans, such as shoemakers, tailors, shirt-makers, hairdressers, et cetera. The taxes levied upon them are so exorbitant that they can scarcely eke out an existence; still they refuse to become nationalized. (‘Political and Economic Conditions in Yugoslavia; Morale and Attitude of the People Toward Tito and the Present Regime’, CIA February 20, 1952, p. 10) (IMG)

Here is one individual case documented by the CIA:

the shoemaker ... began to recite the woes of all small shopowners like himself under “this inhuman regime which does not hesitate to drive people into starvation in order to free them into the cooperatives”. He said that he could not afford more than one helper, but the more helpers the greater the tax that had to be paid. As it is, he had been forced to sell one of his sewing machines during the previous year in order to pay his taxes, and this year, he expects to have to sell his radio. Nevertheless, he said that there were others who were even worse off than he was. He knew of one colleague who had only one sewing machine and no helper, and had a wife and four children to support. A few months before, he stated, “they descended upon him” for taxes and, as he could not possibly pay the taxes, they took away his machine, his one and only means of livelihood. “How was he going to support his family? They did not care. And now ... “would you blame him if he drew his gun (provided he had one) and shot them all dead?... But we will not join the cooperatives; we will not submit to daily indignities for a chunk of bread.” a hairdresser who had a prosperous business before the war, but now both he and his business were indescribably run down. This hairdresser’s mood was the same as that of the shoemaker. (‘Political and Economic Conditions in Yugoslavia; Morale and Attitude of the People Toward Tito and the Present Regime’, CIA February 20, 1952, p. 10) (IMG)

Many of these urban shopkeepers and artisans as well as some of the rural peasants remained partially petit-bourgeois, but also started to gain characteristics of state-owned semi-slaves, thus gaining a somewhat revolutionary potential.

Tito pretended to be ‘unaware’ of the crimes of the ‘local’ officials that he planted throughout Yugoslavia. In the self-criticism sessions, he criticized the system for leading to oligarchic millionaires rising in Yugoslavia, even though it was he who created those millionaire oligarchs through decentralization, and even though he continued to strengthen those millionaire oligarchs through even greater decentralization. Tito’s ‘criticism and self-criticism’ sessions superficially ‘denounced’ the brutalities of the intelligence officers, but it was the Gestapo agent Tito himself who had planted the Gestapo officers in charge of the intelligence bodies, knowingly sending thousands of ‘Cominformists’ to torture camps, knowingly enslaving countless individuals, knowingly collaborating with NATO for war plans against the USSR and the Peoples’ Democracies, personally being involved in assisting the efforts of the Mossad and enthusiastically endorsing it. Tito’s ‘criticisms and self-criticism’ sessions were festivals of monumental hypocrisy. The CIA reported:

In his speech at Knezica, Tito made reference to the much-advertized admission of Aleksandar Rankovic in his report to the fourth “plenum” of the many Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party, to the effect that many people had been unjustly prosecuted and jailed or given unjustified severe sentences. Then Tito added, “This demonstrates our tendency and progress toward democratization in our country.” Rankovic pointed out, indeed, the indignities perpetrated by the Security Police, according to the people; however, the latter maintain that, since none of those in jail were released, this affirmation on the part of Rankovic can hardly be said to point out any “tendency toward democratization”. As further proof that legislation passed by the [Titoist pseudo-]Communists or promises made by them are of no value, an individual in Belgrade showed ... a new form of summons, recently issued by the UDB “to fool the foreigners”. This summons provides for the name and address of the individual summoned, the reason for the summons (whether as a witness or as defendant), the nature of the charge or charges, and also provides a place for the signature of the chief of the UDB station concerned. Altogether, this would be a document showing a “tendency toward democratization” and respect of the rights of individuals, it were compiled with. (‘Political and Economic Conditions in Yugoslavia; Morale and Attitude of the People Toward Tito and the Present Regime’, CIA February 20, 1952, p. 11) (IMG)

concerning the cooperatives, and referring to Tito’s speech at Knezica, wherein Tito admitted that mistakes had been made and that these mistakes would be “amended” ... [the] responses of the peasants were always the same: “We are fed up with Communist lies”; or an impatient gesture indicating the same thing; “for years, we hear it everyday: ‘It will get better’, but instead it gets worse.” The peasants’ impossibility to rely on Tito’s promises is pungently expressed by them in this manner: “Tito speaks of one thing, thinks of something else, does still something else, and we (the peasants) come last.” With regard to Tito’s theory that “Democracy is not a matter of decree, but a question of consciousness of the citizens. The more consciousness and the fewer enemies of socialism, the more will our democracy grow”, if peasants did not dismiss the matter with a shrug of the shoulder, they answered to the effect that (as one peasant put it): “One cannot create any kind of consciousness by force.” (‘Political and Economic Conditions in Yugoslavia; Morale and Attitude of the People Toward Tito and the Present Regime’, CIA February 20, 1952, pp. 8-9) (IMG)

The promises of ‘improvements’ were phony:

The terror under which [the peasants] have been living ... is still there; they are still spied upon and fear to speak their thoughts, and go to jail if they fail to “conform” even if for the shorter terms than before. They are still compelled to attend “conferences”...; they are forced to perform “voluntary” labor; they are arrested without warrant’ detained without trial; sent to jail by administrative action; et cetera. (‘Political and Economic Conditions in Yugoslavia; Morale and Attitude of the People Toward Tito and the Present Regime’, CIA February 20, 1952, p. 10) (IMG)

Other important points are as follows:

A widely propagandized opinion is that the dissatisfaction of the Yugoslav people, and particularly the peasants, is actually directed against local Communist Party officials and not against Tito, who is looked upon as a hero and a great Yugoslav nationalist; that the

people hated the regime, but that they admire and respect, if not actually love Tito. This is definitely not true. If this propaganda is believed then it must also be believed that the Yugoslav is too stupid to understand that the low-level officials of his village, especially in a [Titoist pseudo-]Communist regime, cannot do anything which is not sanctioned or ordained by the hierarchy. It is true, naturally, that some officials with whom the peasants come in direct contact are more brutal than others, and that the peasants realize this; however, the peasants have no illusions as to who makes the policy of which these village officials are the instruments and the peasants the victims. Frequently in conversations regarding the present Yugoslav regime, peasants would remark, "The fish rots from the head." ('Political and Economic Conditions in Yugoslavia; Morale and Attitude of the People Toward Tito and the Present Regime', CIA February 20, 1952, p. 8) (IMG)

The foregoing is not to deny that Tito's new attitude toward the West and the subsequent [superficial] relaxation have ameliorated the difficult and tense situation in which the great majority of the Yugoslavs have been living since the liberation. It is to emphasize the fact that this amelioration is simply sugar over the pill and that fundamentally, no change has taken place. The Yugoslav people are aware of the situation, although they welcome the relief afforded them by the comparative "de-brutalizing" of the controls and pressures employed by the regime to force its "socialist state" on the people. Certainly, there is nothing in this change to justify the optimism of certain Western observers that slowly, but gradually, Tito is moving toward socialism or a western-type democracy, and that the Yugoslav people's view of the regime has definitely become at least tolerant, if not quite benevolent. ('Political and Economic Conditions in Yugoslavia; Morale and Attitude of the People Toward Tito and the Present Regime', CIA February 20, 1952, p. 11) (IMG)

the majority of the Yugoslav people still regard Tito [as someone] who ... murdered, imprisoned, tortured and persecuted millions of Yugoslavs. ('Political and Economic Conditions in Yugoslavia; Morale and Attitude of the People Toward Tito and the Present Regime', CIA February 20, 1952, p. 8) (IMG)

According to the fascist Yugoslav regime's main propaganda mouthpiece Borba, as cited by the CIA, the Yugoslav students avoided school: In certain education centers in Tuzla Srez, as many as 25 percent of children required to take premilitary schooling do not attend regularly. Some rural centers have only incomplete records of the children.

At most enterprises, such as the Banovici mine, all children go to school; but of 1,300 required to attend at Kreka mine, only 400 attend regularly.

('Sociological - Labor Supply; food consumption; schooling', Where Published: Yugoslavia, How Published: Daily newspapers, Language: Serbo-Croatian, Date of Information: 1949, Date Distributed: April 4, 1949, p. 3. Citing: SCHOOL ATTENDANCE IN BOSNIA, Borba, No. 34, February 9, 1949) (IMG)

The Yugoslav university students also arose against the regime, and were 'greeted' by truckloads of the regime's terrorist death squads. The Croatian-American historian at Yale University, Banac described, in a research book published by the Cornell University Press, the situation as follows:

A few groups of university students functioned almost publicly: at the Philosophy Faculty of the University of Belgrade, "Cominformists were occasionally caught when they sang Soviet songs or when they held some of their secret organizational meetings late in the evening." In April 1952, a secret Cominformist organization at the Technical Faculty in Belgrade decided to show its strength at a public meeting called by the faculty council and the party bureau for the purpose of expelling three students branded as Western propagandists. Despite the [allegedly] diametrically opposed political sentiments of the accused, the Cominformists interrupted the proceedings with exhortations: "Comrades, how long are we going to allow Tito and his gang to expel our colleagues from the university and deny them an education? We must openly fight against this." The wild brawl that erupted was stopped only by truckloads of armed militiamen. Injuries and arrests were extensive, and one student reportedly was killed. (With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism, Cornell University Press, Ivo Banac, 1988, pp. 232-233. Citing: HIA-TC "Jugoslovenski Kominformisti," interviews no. 66, p. 84 and no. 56, pp. 117-118.) (IMG)

Anti-regime dissent was widespread across Yugoslavia's universities and so was the brutal suppression thereof:

At the University of Zagreb, the UDB-a uncovered several groups of *ibeovci* [i.e. 'cominformists']. The student Communist leaders at the Technical Faculty expelled their organizational secretary, the secretary of SKOJ, and three other leading members as Cominformists. Outspoken *ibeovci* were physically assaulted at the Forestry Faculty. Their colleagues at the Economics Faculty created a highly successful thirty-member secret organization, called the Young Bolshevik Faction, which disseminated large quantities of Cominformist newspapers and leaflets. The group was discovered and arrested late in 1948. (With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism, Cornell University Press, Ivo Banac, 1988, p. 233) (IMG)

The following excerpts of a CIA document in 1950 detail how Tito's regime enslaved the ordinary Yugoslav people and forced them to work on its projects, how the quality of the government 'services' were terrible, how the peasants, workers, students, etc. all stood against the Yugoslav regime and carried out sabotage in a passive form:

1. (...). Passive resistance ... is widespread, and in urban areas underground organizations exist which spread the news from abroad, and inform the population as to what is happening outside the country. Leaders of these organizations are mainly members of former political parties.
2. Passive resistance among the workers consists mainly of absenteeism because of feigned illness. Absence from work has lately increased to such proportions that government authorities have been obliged to resort to severe control measures, sometimes even dismissing the workers, or sending them out on forced labor projects.
3. Most active in resistance activities are the peasants. They cultivate their land only to such extent as will allow them to live. As a result, government authorities have been obliged to institute severe controls in order to increase crop production. Peasants sabotage governmental plans by sowing seeds in inadequate soil; as a result, the summer crop of 1950 is very poor. It is estimated that this year's crop will be 30 percent below that of 1949. The effects of this form of sabotage are particularly pronounced in the city markets, where vegetables and fruits have been hard to get even at the height of the season; and if available, were so costly that few were able to afford them. As a consequence, greater starvation than in previous years is anticipated.
4. Government employees as well as laborers are engaged in passive resistance through the tactic of absenteeism excused by illness. The absence of government employees from work has become widespread, and has caused a setback in the government plans. Various

punitive measures have been undertaken by government authorities, such as dismissals and forced labor work; they have not proved satisfactory. Communist Party members, who are largely semi-literate and incapable of doing administrative work, replace the dismissed employees, and as a consequence, the government administration suffers increasingly.

5. The school-age youth is very active, and offers a strong element of resistance to the regime. Because of the large amount of sabotage carried out by students, the authorities have been obliged to send out entire school classes to forced labor projects.

6. Because of the increasing resistance among the population, government authorities have had to become more severe. This has created greater dissatisfaction in Yugoslavia.

7. Resistance by the broad masses manifests itself largely in the increasing avoidance of the people from the various political conferences and meetings of the regime. City block leaders are obliged to go from apartment to apartment and force the populace to attend meetings. When at such meetings Party members begin to explain to the population the feats of the government which have contributed to a better living standard of the working masses, the audience burst into laughter. The speakers find themselves in the awkward position of doing nothing or of having to arrest the entire audience. As a result, meetings of this type have become less frequent.

8. When in the spring of 1950, Tito made a speech in Split, government officials undertook all possible measures to increase the attendance. To this end, travel expenses and expenses for food and lodging in Split were paid for all those living in the outskirts of Split. Over 210,000 transportation tickets were issued, but in spite of all these measures, not more than approximately thirty thousand individuals attended.

(RESISTANCE TO THE REGIME IN YUGOSLAVIA, CIA, October 13, 1950, pp. 1-2) (IMG)

In spite of such overwhelming hatred against it, Tito's gang successfully maintained power through terrorism:

It may be taken for granted that the Tito regime is in no danger of being overthrown by the action of the Yugoslav population, not because the overwhelming majority of the Yugoslav people are not dead set against it, but because they are entirely impotent to do anything about it. The Yugoslav population has grown more anti-Tito and anti-regime than it was between 1945 and the middle of 1947. Physical power has become much more consolidated and widespread in the hands of the Security Police whose tentacles now reach as far as the community councils (opstinski odbor). ('Political and Economic Conditions in Yugoslavia; Morale and Attitude of the People Toward Tito and the Present Regime', CIA February 20, 1952, p. 1) (IMG)

As the CIA confirmed, the Yugoslav population became more anti-Tito after the expulsion of Tito's gang from the Cominform and the fascist hybrid coup that Tito's gang launched in 1948. These remarks by American intelligence serve as evidence to the claims of the Soviet state media:

The present Belgrade Government is as alien to its people as the people's interests are alien to it. Nowhere else, if you please, is there a government so hated by the people as is the Tito clique in Yugoslavia, and everything points to the fact that the gap yawning between the usurpers and the people is unbridgeable. What, then, is the social base which the Belgrade gang, beset as it is by the hatred of the people, leans for support? Anyone who is at all familiar with the situation in Yugoslavia will say straight out that the band has no [popular] social base, that the Tito clique has no support whatever among the people. (Tito Clique Lacks Support of Yugoslav People, I. Livanov, August 11, 1950. In: USSR Information Bulletin, Vol. 10, No. 15, p. 480) (IMG)

The social base of the Tito regime was limited to the comprador classes – the bureaucratic class, the parasitic elements of the intelligentsia, the kulaks, the lumpen-proletariat, comprador finance capital, and comprador mercantile capital – all of which were allied to, and backed by, Anglo-American and German finance capital.

The US National Security Council also confirmed, in reference to Tito's regime:

Power is in the hands of a small group of men [and women] who control all aspects of national life, including the armed forces and the security police, and who hold interlocking positions in the Communist party, the governmental apparatus and the main organization on a national as well as provincial level. The majority of the population is still opposed to the Tito regime... (NSC Staff Study on United States Policy Towards Yugoslavia, US NSC, 1954. In: "U.S. DIPLOMATIC RECORDS ON RELATIONS WITH YUGOSLAVIA DURING THE EARLY COLD WAR, 1948-1957", Nick Ceh, 2002, p. 404) (IMG)

The imperialist press depict Tito as the symbol of the embodiment of the 'Unity and Brotherhood' of the Yugoslav people. The Yugoslav masses found a common ground amongst themselves against the Yugoslav dictator. Even the conservative Serbian peasantry was drawn towards the Soviet Union for fighting Tito's regime. As the MI6-backed Cetniks minimized their anti-regime activity – they had no reason to seriously oppose an MI6-backed terror regime – the conservative Serb peasantry too was drawn towards supporting the Soviet Union and the Peoples' Democracies:

even conservative nationalists in the Serb community relied on the Soviets as the only hope for an improvement in Yugoslavia's political climate. (With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism, Cornell University Press, Ivo Banac, 1988, p. 234) (IMG)

Tito and his gang remained in power solely through terror.:

it is an error to contend that the Yugoslav people will support Tito against Soviet or Soviet-satellite aggression because, by comparison, the Tito regime is the lesser of the two evils. ('Political and Economic Conditions in Yugoslavia; Morale and Attitude of the People Toward Tito and the Present Regime', CIA February 20, 1952, p. 3) (IMG)

The Cominform resolution of 1949 stated:

The top fascist rulers rely on an enormously swollen military-police apparatus, with the aid of which they oppress the peoples of Yugoslavia.

They have turned the country into a military camp, wiped out all democratic rights of the working people, and trampled on any free expression of opinion.

(Communist Party of Yugoslavia in the Power of Murderers and Spies, Cominform, November 1949. MIA. The same document can be found in the 'Revolutionary Democracy Organization of India' archives section) (IMG)

Mass gatherings of the people protesting against Tito's regime was not the proper response under the conditions of fascist occupation; instead, guerrilla action was more effective. As a Yale University scholar Ivo Banac puts it:

But mass actions were not a good alternative in the circumstances, considering the effectiveness of the UDB-a and the Cominformists' reliance on bloc aid. Guerrilla engagements, which had to rely on mass support, and even occasional rebellions did occur from time to

time, however. (With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism, Cornell University Press, Ivo Banac, 1988, p. 234) (IMG)

The Cominform had also stated:

The Information Bureau considers that the bureaucratic regime created inside the Party by its leaders is disastrous for the life and development of the Yugoslav Communist Party. There is no inner Party democracy, no elections.... (Resolutions of the Communist Information Bureau Condemning Titoite Revisionism: Resolution of the Information Bureau Concerning the Situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, June 1948, MIA) (IMG)

Insofar as 'elections' happened, they were under the conditions of fascist terror. The 'elections' by the Yugoslav regime too were also fundamentally undemocratic and under conditions of fascist terror:

Federal elections conducted in the same atmosphere of terror as prevailed during the November 1945 elections. Each Central UDB (formerly OZNA) has a special section called "Election UDB" responsible for intimidation and terrorizing of the voters. (Internal Situation in Yugoslavia, CIA, Information as of November 1946, Distributed in March 4, 1947, p. 1) (IMG)

Over time, with the pressure of the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies against the Yugoslav regime, resistance against the Yugoslav regime was becoming more organized among the proletarians of Yugoslavia. The 'Cominformist' communist activists were forming guerrilla units. As a result of Titoist oppression, many brave Yugoslav communists in Montenegro and Macedonia for example, rose up to defend liberty. The regime's response was to throw the guerrillas' family members into jail in the thousands:

The Tito Government represses guerrilla fighters by transferring into another locality and placing into camps all family members of those who have joined the underground, confiscating all their movable property.... The largest concentration camp of this type is the one in Zavidovic in Bosnia. It contains approximately eight hundred and fifty families, totaling over 6,000 people. The inmates, who are fed very badly, are subjected to forced labor, and the death rate among them is very high. Another concentration camp of this type is at Capljina in Hercegovina. (Resistance in Yugoslavia; Government Measures to Counteract Nationalists and Cominformists, CIA, December 21, 1950, p. 1) (IMG)

In other cases, the family members of Cominformists were harassed, with many couples being forced to divorce:

The inmates' families were also targeted. Wives of inmates were ordered to divorce their husbands; other wives, out of loneliness, naively allowed themselves to be seduced by secret policemen. (Europe and War in the Balkans, Miron Rezun, Chapter: The Legacy of Tito, p. 102) (IMG)

Contrary to the accusations of the Yugoslav regime, the Cominformists did not collaborate with the reactionary bourgeois-nationalist organizations. As confirmed by the CIA:

The Cominformists avoid all contact with nationalists.... ('Resistance in Yugoslavia; Government Measures to Counteract Nationalists and Cominformists', CIA, December 21, 1950, p. 1) (IMG)

The Yugoslav communists and the Cominform were well aware of the fact that the 'nationalist' groups, such as the Ustase and anti-Soviet elements amongst the Chetniks, received the support of the MI6 during and after the Great Patriotic War and constituted a fake 'opposition' 'against', and served as spies for, the Tito regime. Tito's gang already collaborated with the German and Italian sponsors of the Ustase during the Great Patriotic War, and recruited many Ustase agents into the regime apparatus. For example, during the ethnocide against Macedonia, Tito's gang recruited the Ustase for this purpose (see C15S5). Collaboration with the fascist 'nationalist' fake 'oppositionist' terror groups would have exposed the Cominform-backed communist rebels to the agents of the Tito regime itself, rendering it easier for the regime to hunt down the socialist rebel cells.

Furthermore, certain terrorist activities, probably carried out 'thanks' to regime collusion, were, according to the Yugoslavs witnessing the events, conducted by non-communist groups but blamed by the regime on the communist rebels. As a Croatian Social Liberal Party politician put it:

The scope of Cominformist sabotage is difficult to assess. Other underground groups in Yugoslavia were committing terrorist acts at the same time. For example, though the authorities believed that arson in some six factories in Osijek (Croatia) was the work of the *ibeovci* [i.e. 'cominformists'], most citizens credited remnants of the and Chetnik groups with these actions. (With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism, Cornell University Press, Ivo Banac, 1988, p. 234) (IMG)

The Soviet Union and the Peoples' Democracies did not leave the Yugoslav communist resistance alone in the face of Tito's fascist regime. The CIA reported:

Cominform groups have been seen to operate in Montenegro and Macedonia.... The Cominformists ... operate principally along the Albanian border. (Resistance in Yugoslavia; Government Measures to Counteract Nationalists and Cominformists, CIA, December 21, 1950, p. 1) (IMG)

At least in Montenegro, with the backing of the Soviet Union and People's Democratic Albania, the communists were striving towards an independent Montenegrin People's Democracy:

Pro-Cominform Communists in Montenegro, operating with the support of the Soviet Union and Albania, are believed to be attempting to establish an anti-Tito resistance movement. This movement would endeavor to establish an independent Montenegrin Provisional Government which would be fully subservient to the ... the Cominform. One of the bases from which this movement operates is Shkoder, in Albania, where a so-called Montenegrin Communist Committee has been established. (Anti-Tito Resistance Movement in Montenegro, CIA, December 8, 1948, p. 1) (IMG)

For the longer-run, it was necessary that all of Yugoslavia would be liberated and then these independent nations of Yugoslavia would establish a democratic peace and federate into a socialist Yugoslavia; however, as a temporary expedient, it was necessary that Montenegro would be separated from Serbia and other areas, and would then serve as an independent base for the overthrow of the Yugoslav regime in the rest of Yugoslav territory. The Soviet-Albanian plan was that in this scenario, if the Tito regime would be overthrown, Kosovo would reunify with People's Democratic Albania, Macedonia would unify with Bulgaria, and then all these Slavic nations of Yugoslavia would federate with each other and Bulgaria into a People's Democratic Balkan Federation. The historical evidence shown throughout this book in other chapters backs this assertion.

Anyways, what mattered was that the USSR and the Peoples' Democratic Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania were all major bases for 'Cominformist' guerrilla activity against the Yugoslav regime. For one somewhat famous case, Djilas recalled:

It was at the beginning of winter at that same time, 1948-1949, that eleven or twelve pro-Soviet regional and town officials in Bijelo Polje, led by the Secretary of the Regional Committee, Ilija Bulatovic, fled into the forest. (Tito: the story from inside, Milovan Djilas, 1980, p. 80) (IMG)

Hence, in Montenegro, there were pro-Cominform:

Guerrillas led by one Bulatovic.... Outnumbered, the guerrillas retreated across the Albanian Frontier. (Arrests of Cominformists Continue, CIA, March 2, 1949, p. 1) (IMG)

They allegedly engaged in a battle against the regime forces:

A battle between Yugoslav troops and Cominform guerrillas allegedly took place recently at Kolasin in Montenegro. (Arrests of Cominformists Continue, CIA, March 2, 1949, p. 1) (IMG)

I cannot verify whether the battle took place and whether these guerrillas were real anti-Titoist resistance guerrillas; these kinds of regimes sometimes have their agents 'flee' from them so that these agents get hailed as 'heroes' of the resistance movement, thus being more able to infiltrate. Provisionally, one could say that the resistance in this case was genuine.

There were many cases of armed resistance against the Yugoslav regime, and many armed guerrilla cells were established. Banac provides more details:

The extent of Montenegrin Cominformist insurgency has already been noted. The rebellions in Montenegro continued in several waves. Mobile UDB-a forces suppressed the strongest outbreaks during the summer and autumn of 1948. The following year the security units of Komnen Cerovic destroyed the Cominformist strongholds in the Montenegrin portion of the Sandiak. Rebellions also broke out in the Zeta valley, between Nikic and Titograd, the capital of Montenegro; most party members there sided with the insurgents and fought alongside them. The participation of leading Cominformists from other areas – such as Stojakovic, former forestry minister in Bosnia-Herzegovina – indicates that some *ibeovci* [i.e. 'cominformists'] thought of Montenegro as a possible base area from which partisan warfare could spread to the other republics, especially Bosnia-Herzegovina and eventually Serbia. Nevertheless, despite its intensity, the Montenegrin movement was successfully halted. (With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism, Cornell University Press, Ivo Banac, 1988, p. 234-235) (IMG)

Again, elements in the military defected to the side of the revolution:

Large groups of saboteurs eluded detection for several years after the Resolution. Major Krste Vukcevic, a Montenegrin and the commissar of the Messerschmitt regiment at the Zemunik air base near Zadar, organized some twenty officers from his unit and the technical battalion. They bombed twelve planes in Zemunik in 1951, although some were saved. All were arrested as *ibeovci*. (With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism, Cornell University Press, Ivo Banac, 1988, p. 234) (IMG)

The rebels were backed by the communist subversive cells in the regime military, cells working to sabotage the Tito regime's war on the Yugoslav people:

The secret Cominformist cells in the armed forces were especially dangerous, as they could threaten a military seizure (as in the aborted plot of the Popovic-Malsevic-Rodic group in Sarajevo and Novi Sad) and maintain channels for the escape of prominent *ibeovci*, especially air force officers, to the bloc countries. Some of these networks operated through Soviet agents in the JA [i.e. Yugoslav Army]. They were also skillful at sabotage, and that was their main activity. (With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism, Cornell University Press, Ivo Banac, 1988, p. 233) (IMG)

The continued presence of the communist spies and Soviet agents in the Yugoslav regime's military surely was helpful in facilitating the anti-regime guerrilla activity from below. According to a CIA report, a local section chief of the Yugoslav intelligence stated that the USSR had helped infiltrate teams of anti-regime guerrillas into Yugoslavia:

Bogdan Markovic, a section chief in the Ministry of Interior, asserted that he did not believe the Soviets would attack openly but would continue, as in the past, to infiltrate teams of guerrillas. (Meeting of Officers of the Ministry of the Interior, CIA, November 15, 1949, p. 1) (IMG)

A CIA document confirmed;

In the Szeged and Papa Zones of Hungary, Yugoslav Cominformists are taking parachute training with Soviet equipment. (Troop Movement in the Balkans, CIA, July 11, 1950, p. 1) (IMG{Greece})

Then there was the mysterious Major Petar Subara, described as the communist 'Robin Hood'. "So little is known about Subara," Banac writes, that his activities can be reconstructed only in the broadest of strokes. Even his name is not certain. Subara was a nickname inspired by his characteristic headgear. (With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism, Cornell University Press, Ivo Banac, 1988, p. 235) (IMG)

According to Banac, the evidence shows that:

the group led by the mysterious Major Petar "Subara" (Fur Hat) was ... a more sophisticated Cominformist version of a sort of Robin Hood band.... (With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism, Cornell University Press, Ivo Banac, 1988, p. 235) (IMG)

As an anti-regime rebel guerrilla,:

Major Subara mixed politics with traditional outlawry, relying on local accomplices (yataks) for shelter, food, and information. (With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism, Cornell University Press, Ivo Banac, 1988, p. 235) (IMG)

A former guerrilla during the Yugoslav People's Liberation War, he reportedly rose up to rally the peasant masses against the traitorous regime of Tito:

It is certain, however, that he was a Serb from a village between Borovo and Vinkovci, in Slavonia, a major in the JA, and a Partisan veteran. After the Resolution he deserted with a group of followers and took to roaming central and eastern Slavonia, from the Papuk highlands to the Dalj collective farm, the former estate of the Serbian metropolitanate of Karlovci, on the banks of the Danube. His purpose clearly was to rouse the peasants by propaganda broadcast by his mobile radio station, by broadsheets printed on his small press, and by exemplary liquidations of party and security officials.

The peasants, especially the Serbs of the Dalj area, apparently responded positively and actively aided Subara's group. They were completely disaffected by the forced collectivization, which the government launched in 1948-1949 in a misguided effort to disprove Moscow's charges that rural Yugoslavia was held in thrall by "kulaks." Since the rebels disseminated the most elementary propaganda ("Brothers and sisters, rise up against the bloodsuckers of our people who steal and kill, etc.") the peasants took the message as a protest against collectivization. Observers reported that the slogan "Long live Subara" could be seen on the collective farms in the environs of Dalj and Bijelo Brdo. When asked about these inscriptions, the peasants replied that they referred to a man who would save them. Subara's band never incited a mass insurrection and it was finally liquidated, but before that happened his followers certified his reputation by attacking several UDB-a outposts and reportedly killing not only a handful of security officers but also a unit of six counterinsurgency specialists.

(With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism, Cornell University Press, Ivo Banac, 1988, p. 235-236) (IMG)

General Subara was able to recruit from among the peasants because those peasants were not really petit-bourgeois, but were rather state-owned semi-slaves/serfs, and unlike the petit-bourgeoisie who have small businesses to lose, semi-slaves barely own anything and thus have a high revolutionary potential. As well,:

Some [guerrilla] units consisted largely of foreign Communist émigrés, such as the Italian group formed in Rijeka by Alfredo Bonelli;

(With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism, Cornell University Press, Ivo Banac, 1988, p. 232) (IMG)

In Croatia and Bosnia too there were communist guerrillas rising up against Tito's fascist occupation:

Other instances of Cominformist insurgency took place in Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Except for a small group of Slovene Cominformists, who took to the mountains only to be decimated by the army and the UDB-a, these outbreaks were but a continuation of traditional primitive rebelliousness. (With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism, Cornell University Press, Ivo Banac, 1988, p. 235) (IMG)

Overall, the communist guerrilla operations:

detracted from the government's prestige, caused considerable damage, and generated further discontent. (With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism, Cornell University Press, Ivo Banac, 1988, p. 234) (IMG)

"The most successful of" the communist anti-regime guerrillas:

were based on a wide spectrum of grievances beyond the narrow Cominformist issues, usually wrongs that the peasants considered intolerable. (With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism, Cornell University Press, Ivo Banac, 1988, p. 234) (IMG)

Nonetheless,:

however widespread, sabotage could not destroy the government. (With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism, Cornell University Press, Ivo Banac, 1988, p. 234) (IMG)

And the guerrillas:

were usually suppressed quickly.... (With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism, Cornell University Press, Ivo Banac, 1988, p. 234) (IMG)

Again, this was because Yugoslavia did not have a large class of proletarians, let alone also kolkhozniks. Some peasants were basically state-owned slaves and thus had revolutionary potentials, but some others were petit-bourgeois and thus unwilling to risk a struggle against the comprador classes ruling Yugoslavia.

C12S4. The Yugoslav Regime, a Trotskyite State *** IMG-All-{Titoist Yugoslavia}

Sheng Shicai, as shown in C9S14, was the KMT commander who, in the 1930s, had risen to prominence in Sinkiang/Xinjiang, China, with the assistance of the Japanese fascists and its allied Islamic terrorist mercenaries. Upon overthrowing the Soviet-backed Sinkiang state, the Soviets imposed heavy pressure on him, leading to his cooptation by the Soviet intelligence service. Later on, with the Nazi invasion of the USSR, the Soviet intelligence presence in Sinkiang temporarily weakened, allowing Sheng Shicai to break the Soviet intelligence encirclement and cease the period of his cooptation. He rose to become the advisor to the CIA-backed KMT General Hu Zongnan, Chiang Kai-Shek's most trusted general and advisor. Committed to the KMT's anti-Soviet cause for the rest of his life, Sheng fostered numerous anti-Soviet slanders in his memoirs published in 'Sinkiang: Pawn or Pivot' (1958). Due to his credentials as a Japanese-backed KMT agent, a temporary cooptee of the USSR, and later prominent official in the KMT, his memoirs, published almost two decades after he had successfully gone out of the period of cooptation by the Soviets, served as a valuable anti-Soviet source on the events unfolding within the Eastern Bloc. On Tito's break with the USSR, Sheng comments the following:

The Trotskyite influence also accounted for Tito's defection from the Stalinist camp. While many factors lay behind the rupture between the two leaders, it is undeniable that the most important one was the influence of the Trotskyites in the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) who painstakingly plotted to create cleavages within the Soviet world and to isolate the Stalin regime. ("Sinkiang: Pawn or Pivot?", Allen S. Whiting & Sheng Shih-ts'ai, 1958, p. 172) (IMG)

Djilas and Rankovic, as indicated by Ivo Banac and to some extent also by the memoirs of Djilas himself, were both former Trotskyite followers of the notorious terrorist Petko Miletic. So extreme-left fundamentalist Djilas and Rankovic were, that they were labeled as 'Wahhabis' in the Yugoslav Communist Party. They along with Yugoslavia's Trotskyite-in-chief Tito surely played a major role in seeking to isolate the USSR. When the rift between Tito's gang and the Cominform was publicly revealed, the Trotskyite Fourth International interfered in support of Tito. As Robert J. Alexander – a US State Department researcher on labour relations, a lifelong member of the well-known American imperialist think tank 'Council on Foreign Relations' (CFR), a consultant for the AFL-CIO trade union network, and a well-known author on Trotskyism – wrote:

The Trotskyists established contacts with the Titoites. The Fourth International had some relations with the Yugoslav Embassy in Paris.

The International and the Embassy jointly arranged for sending work brigades of young French Trotskyists to Yugoslavia during the summer of 1950. ("International Trotskyism, 1929-1985: A Documented Analysis of the Movement", Robert Jackson Alexander, 1991, p. 315) (IMG)

The Cominform expelled Tito's gang:

Only two months after the end of the Second World Congress of the Fourth International.... This event, ... had the immediate effect of arousing great hope and support in Trotskyist ranks.

The Secretariat of the Fourth International dispatched a series of open letters to the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party. These sought a rapprochement with the Yugoslav party.

(“International Trotskyism, 1929-1985: A Documented Analysis of the Movement”, Robert Jackson Alexander, 1991, p. 315) (IMG)

Robert J. Alexander might not be a perfect source on this kind of an issue because Robert J. Alexander was a US State Department official linked to the Kennedy faction of the United States. The Kennedy faction, just like the Roosevelt faction, were the agent of the American proletariat within the US imperialist state and had an agenda of undermining the international weapons of American imperialism. They would have been against the Trotskyites and Titoists. Nonetheless, the remarks by Alexander are supported by the Trotskyite primary sources anyways.

Noting the “degeneration which you [Tito’s group] now discern in Russia,” the Secretariat of the Fourth International remarked:

Our organization, the Fourth International, originated in the Left Opposition of the Bolshevik Party, which 25 years ago already saw the germs of the degeneration of the Russian Communist Party which you are discovering.... (An Open Letter to Congress, Central Committee and Members of the Yugoslav Communist Party, International Secretariat of the Fourth International, July 13, 1948. From Marxists Internet Archive) (IMG)

As the letter of the Fourth International indicates, the Trotskyite view that the USSR had ‘degenerated’ was prevalent amongst Yugoslavia’s leading circles. In its letter to Tito’s gang, the Central Committee of the CPSU had stated:

We know that there are anti-Soviet rumours circulating among the leading comrades in Yugoslavia, for instance that 'the CPSU is degenerate', 'great power chauvinism is rampant in the USSR', 'the USSR is trying to dominate Yugoslavia economically' and 'the Cominform is a means of controlling the other Parties by the CPSU', etc. These anti-Soviet allegations are usually camouflaged by left phrases, such as 'socialism in the Soviet Union has ceased to be revolutionary' and that Yugoslavia alone is the exponent of 'revolutionary socialism'. It was naturally laughable to hear such statements about the CPSU from such questionable Marxists as Djilas, Vukmanovic, Kidric, Rankovic and others. However, the fact remains that such rumours have been circulating for a long time among many high-ranking Yugoslav officials, that they are still circulating, and that they are naturally creating an anti-Soviet atmosphere which is endangering relations between the CPSU and the CPY.

(...). Again, one might mention that, when he decided to declare war on the CPSU, Trotsky also started with accusations of the CPSU as degenerate, as suffering from the limitations inherent in the narrow nationalism of great powers. Naturally he camouflaged all this with left slogans about world revolution. However, it is well known that Trotsky himself became degenerate, and when he was exposed, crossed over into the camp of the sworn enemies of the CPSU and the Soviet Union. We think that the political career of Trotsky is quite instructive.

(‘Stalin complains to Tito of the anti-Soviet atmosphere in Yugoslavia and shortcomings of the CPY’, March 27, 1948. In: ‘Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, 1939-1973 : A Documentary Survey’, Stephen Clissold, 1975, pp. 172-17) (IMG)

The remarks by the CPSU Central Committee’s letter to Tito’s gang were reflected in the joint statement of the Cominform parties against the Yugoslav Communist Party. The “leaders of the Community Party of Yugoslavia,” the statement went,:

have taken a stand unworthy of Communists, and have begun to identify the foreign policy of the Soviet Union with the foreign policy of the imperialist powers, behaving toward the Soviet Union in the same manner as they behave toward the bourgeois states. Precisely because of this anti-Soviet stand, slanderous propaganda about the “degeneration” of the CPSU(B), about the “degeneration” of the USSR, and so on, borrowed from the arsenal of counter-revolutionary Trotskyism, is current within the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. (From the Resolution “Concerning the Situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia,” Passed at the Cominform Session of June 1948 in Rumania, in the Presence of the Most Responsible State and Party Leaders of the USSR and Eastern European Countries, Openly Calling Upon the Peoples of Yugoslavia to Rebel against, and Overthrow, their Legal Government. Retrieved From: The Yugoslav Exception, Seventeen Moments in Soviet History: An Online Archive of Soviet Primary Sources) (IMG)

The equation of the USSR with the imperialist powers laid for Tito and his fellow Trotskyites the theoretical basis for conspiring to mislead the anti-colonial peoples into a confrontation against the USSR and unofficially in favor of the imperialist camp. As it was best for imperialist masters to lead astray the anti-imperialist risings, the Fourth International instructed imperialist agent Tito to seize the leadership of the anti-colonial struggles:

you would have to become the champion ... of all colonial peoples revolting against their imperialist masters; (An Open Letter to Congress, Central Committee and Members of the Yugoslav Communist Party, International Secretariat of the Fourth International, July 13, 1948. From Marxists Internet Archive) (IMG)

By Tito’s ‘Third Force’, the seeds of the Non-Aligned Movement were sown, so to seduce the anti-colonial peoples back into imperial bondage under the false slogans of ‘neutrality’ and ‘independence’ from the two Cold War camps:

the Yugoslav dictator backs up the so called “Third Force” and the neutral block; his activities are very intense in this field, and especially so among the Asiatic peoples. He holds up the bream (backs up) the labourist [i.e. Labour Party] dissident Bevan ... while his diplomatic mission to Tehran numbers not less than thirty persons. (Tito’s True Face, Political Information (Analysis of Tito’s Relationship with Stalin and the West, CIA, November 28, 1952, p. 13) (IMG)

In those countries strategically close to the anti-imperialist forces, the call for ‘non-alignment’ is the call for distancing away from the anti-imperialist camp and shifting towards the pro-fascist camp. In countries strategically close to the pro-fascist forces, the call for ‘non-alignment’ is the call for distancing away from the pro-fascist camp and shifting towards the anti-fascist camp.

In the context of Yugoslavia, therefore, the call for non-alignment was nothing but support for American imperialist objectives. Lest one forgets that such blatant Trotskyist-Titoist attacks on the Two Camps thesis objectively favored the US-led camp, pro-fascist camp, for they equated the just and the unjust, the anti-imperialists and pro-imperialists. The epoch in question was but the conflict between the forces serving fascism and the forces harming it. There exist no alternatives to anti-fascism and pro-fascism. The ostensibly neutral forces objectively belonged only to either of the two forces of pro-fascism and anti-fascism, despite pretensions to the contrary (for a more in-depth discussion of the two camps thesis, see C1S3). In the case of Yugoslavia, the regime served imperialist-fascist secret services by infiltrating the anti-imperialist camp, under the cloak of ‘non-alignment’. The Third Force was a reflection of such reactionary ideologies as ‘Third-Worldism’ or ‘Third World Socialism’. The Third Worldists actively ignored the fact that the USSR was a war-torn country that had experienced a famine, not to mention the extermination of at least 27 million of its people by the Nazis, as well as the American imperialist plans to wipe it off the map through nuclear strikes as early as September 1945. Similar was

the case of the peoples of the Peoples' Democracies who had suffered under the savage persecution of fascists and the newly arising Anglo-American imperialist nuclear threats. Brushing off the victimized USSR and the Peoples' Democracies as though they mirrored the US-led camp, the Third Worldists and the 'Third Force' advocated a supposed 'neutral' bloc when in fact they were objectively on the side of imperialist-fascist secret services and were actively working to drive a wedge between the peoples of the colonized world and the peoples of the liberated socialist or popular-democratic countries. The very concept of a 'Third World' is reactionary. It seeks to conceptually separate the anti-colonial struggles outside the territories of the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies from the Soviet-led camp. At the same time, by not mentioning that most of such 'Third World' belonged to the 'First World' because of its domination by the Anglo-American imperialists, the term itself engages in colonialism denial. It is a pure propaganda term.

Though the 'Third-Worldist' concept is in-itself wrong, the idea could at times be used for progressive objectives, as a cloak for an anti-imperialist and anti-fascist agenda, for the 'Third World' nonsense plays the same function as the 'non-alignment' concept. Promoting 'Third World independence' rhetoric in a country aligned with the US-led camp would have served as a call for a shift away from the US-led camp, and promoting 'Third World independence' rhetoric in the Soviet-led camp would have meant support for a shift towards the US-led camp.

It is worth reminding the reader that Gamal Abdel-Nasser, the pro-communist leader of anti-imperialist Egypt, privately and unofficially rejected the concept of 'Non-Alignment' as well. In a conversation with Houari Boumediene, Abdel-Nasser declared:

non-alignment and impartiality has become empty talk, devoid of any truth! Because today, where is non-alignment to be found? We say be biased neither towards the East nor towards the West, but the West is standing against us and beating us! And we say 'we are neutral between East and West'? So how can I be neutral between the one who hits me and the one who does not hit me?! On the issue of neutrality and non-alignment, we are ready to reach [an agreement to] any extent, even to the point of making a joint defense agreement with the Soviet Union! (Minutes of the talks between President Gamal Abdel Nasser and Algerian President Houari Boumediene, Qasr al-Qubba, Cairo, July 10, 1967, from: nasser.bibalex.org (the archives of Gamal Abdel-Nasser's life), p. 12) (IMG{October Revolution & Civil War})

The above quote is straight from the archival records of Gamal Abdel-Nasser's conversations with foreign leaders. Abdel-Nasser was 'Non-Aligned' in the name only. The title of 'non-alignment' was a useful means by which he was able to cover his anti-imperialism with the façade of 'friendliness' towards imperialists, and hence his pretensions of 'non-alignment' was a correct move in terms of intelligence work. There were indeed many other anti-imperialists who rightly disguised themselves as 'non-aligned' in order to pretend to be 'harmless' to imperialists. In countries dominated by Anglo-American imperialism, calls for 'neutrality' in the international conflict meant and continues to mean a shift away from the camp of the Anglo-American imperialists and serves as a smokescreen for an alliance with the anti-fascist and anti-imperialist enemies of the Anglo-American imperialists.

A US intelligence document written approximately two years after the Cominform resolution, confirms more explicitly that Tito's gang maintained the Trotskyite stances condemned by the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies; firstly, Tito and his gang claimed that the Soviet state was a "degenerated bureaucracy" pursuing its own "imperialism" for "World domination" using the Communist parties as its "weapon." Secondly, they promoted the Kautskyite-Trotskyite notion of "ultra-imperialism" which sought to present imperialist powers as all engaged in peaceful alliances rather than engaged in inter-imperialist conflict (for a discussion of why this thesis is incorrect, see C1S2); in doing so, they also held the USSR responsible for causing the formation of such an ultra-imperial alliance. Thirdly, they argued that only through a "World Revolution" can communists "establish themselves in the Yugoslav population". The latter argument signified that solely by exporting "socialism" worldwide can socialism be built in Yugoslavia. The following are excerpts of the US intelligence document:

Yugoslav Communists publicly claim that their doctrine is the most accurate one for the strengthening of International Communism and for the creation of favorable conditions in other free countries for the ascent to power of the Communist regime. At secret Communist Party conferences (meetings) and in confidential conversations among Communists, the following ideas are mainly being propagated:

- The Soviet desire for World domination, and the Soviet degenerated bureaucracy becomes fatal with regard to the spreading of Communism throughout the World because many socialists and supporters of Marxist theory in capitalist countries will not join Communist parties, the latter have become a "weapon of Soviet imperialism" to the World public.
- The mistaken diplomatic tactics and international policies of the current Kremlin leaders have caused a reaction in capitalist States in the West, have resulted in their coalition against Communism (the Marshall Plan, the Atlantic Pact, and others).
- The threats of revolution and war by the Soviet Union, no matter how they may be camouflaged, greatly damage and can easily compromise the Communist World Revolution, which is the ideal of Yugoslav Communists and through which only the latter can establish themselves in the Yugoslav population, according to their opinion.
- The campaign of Communism against the democracies, before the current Communist Governments are sufficiently strong economically, and sufficiently armed, is provoked by the degenerated old men of the Kremlin. This premature war will be a sure defeat of World Communism, particularly and primarily in Yugoslavia.

(Economic Situation in FNR Yugoslavia, CIA, p. 10) (IMG)

Unmistakably, such hostile anti-Soviet theses constituted tenets of Trotskyism. One more observation in the CIA document deserves attention: the YCP conferences, aimed at determining the Party's ideological line, were held in a strictly secretive manner. In his letter to the CPSU Central Committee, Tito's gang explicitly confessed and proudly defended the absence of transparency on the Party line and conferences. Soviet leaders, Tito arrogantly wrote,:

are not acquainted with the nature of the Front in Yugoslavia and criticize us for not publishing reports of Party meetings and conferences. All the important decisions, from those of the Federal Government down, regarding all questions of social and state life, are either decisions of the Party or made on the initiative of the Party, and the people understand and accept them as such. Therefore, we do not feel it necessary to emphasize that this or that decision was made at this or that Party conference. ('Tito rejects the charges and defends his policies', April 13, 1948. In: 'Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, 1939-1973 : A Documentary Survey', Stephen Clissold, 1975, p. 180) (IMG)

In their letter criticizing Tito's gang, the Soviets also mentioned:

We readily admit that every Communist Party, among them the Yugoslav, has the right to criticize the CPSU, even as the CPSU has the right to criticize any other Communist Party. But Marxism demands that criticism be above-board and not underhand and slanderous, thus depriving those criticized of the opportunity to reply to the criticism. However, the criticism by the Yugoslav officials is neither open nor honest; it is both underhand and dishonest and of a hypocritical nature, because, while discrediting the CPSU behind its back, publicly they pharisaically praise it to the skies. Thus criticism is transformed into slander, into an attempt to discredit the CPSU and to blacken the Soviet system. ('Stalin complains to Tito of the anti-Soviet atmosphere in Yugoslavia and shortcomings of the CPY', March 27, 1948. In: 'Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, 1939-1973 : A Documentary Survey', Stephen Clissold, 1975, p. 172) (IMG)

By now, such remarks shall reveal no secrets to the reader. As mentioned previously, during the Great Patriotic War, the Trotskyite left-sectarianism of Tito's group was concealed behind his ostensibly 'pro-Stalin' flattery. The creation of the Proletarian Brigades on the birthday of the Soviet leader serves as the case in point. And as demonstrated in the above letter Stalin was well aware of such Trotskyite flattery. The letter continued:

We do not doubt that the Yugoslav Party masses would disown this anti-Soviet criticism as alien and hostile if they knew about it. We think this is the reason why the Yugoslav officials make these criticisms in secret, behind the backs of the masses. ('Stalin complains to Tito of the anti-Soviet atmosphere in Yugoslavia and shortcomings of the CPY', March 27, 1948. In: 'Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, 1939-1973 : A Documentary Survey', Stephen Clissold, 1975, p. 173) (IMG)

Such claims too were confirmed by Djilas, who admitted that the absence of public information and discussion led to the break with the 'Cominformists', the Yugoslav communists who supported the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies against Tito's regime. In Djilas's words:

In the state that Josip Broz Tito created and which created him, the absence of public notice, of public information and discussion, at least within the ruling Party, led to the crisis with the Cominformists [i.e. pro-Cominform Soviet-friendly communists]. It led to all kinds of excesses and aberrations. The ban on freedom of information is the source of evil.... This evil permeates society, seeps into its pores, prevents organic development, impels dictatorial authority to terror and violence.

If only there had been freedom of information, if only it had been possible to debate openly But that would have been a different Yugoslavia, a third Yugoslavia, of which, for the time being, we can only dream. (...). Even if there had been a camp, if the will of the leader and the intractable secret police had not dominated the Party, the regime in that camp would not have been such a monstrous combination of two right-minded groups, the security officials and the reeducated. (Tito: the story from inside, Milovan Djilas, 1980, p. 89) (IMG)

During the YCP's Fifth Congress which occurred shortly after the Cominform's expulsion of Tito's gang, Tito continued to live the proof of the CPSU's line: that Tito engaged in hostile anti-Soviet conspiracies while hypocritically flattering the USSR and in particular, Stalin. As reported by the CIA:

At the Fifth Congress of the Yugoslav Communist Party in July 1948, three weeks after Yugoslavia had been expelled from the Cominform, Tito ended his speech with the words "Long live the Soviet Union, long live Stalin!" This was neither so suicidal nor so naive as it appears. (YUGOSLAVIA: THE OUTWORN STRUCTURE, Reference Title: ESAU XLVII, Directorate of Intelligence, CIA, November 20, 1970, p. 3) (IMG)

The CIA document continued:

Perhaps more important than neutralizing these actual or potential enemies was the need for a new myth, a new ideological framework. In justifying his closing words at that Fifth Congress, Tito noted, according to his biographer Dedijer, that loyalty to Stalin and the Soviet Union had been the myth which had supported the Partisan resistance, and that he could not drop it overnight. Yet he could not persist in encouraging so treasonous a loyalty. Thus he now needed the support of the workers and the republics against Stalin and the Soviet Union. The formulation which eventually emerged, "self-management," has become the touchstone of Yugoslav Communism. (YUGOSLAVIA: THE OUTWORN STRUCTURE, Reference Title: ESAU XLVII, Directorate of Intelligence, CIA, November 20, 1970, p. 3) (IMG)

The 'self-management principle' emerged as the propaganda catch-phrase of the Titoist agents in the Soviet-led bloc. The promotion of the 'self-management' model by Tito's gang, a demagogical weapon for 'red'-washing decentralization, was upon the direct instructions of the Fourth International. The letter of the International Secretariat stated:

It is essential that the masses be induced to participate as actively as possible in the work of planning....

Complete sovereignty of the factory committees must be established in the plants, and genuine workers' control of production must be instituted. (...). In a word it is necessary to give the workers and poor peasants the clear feeling that they are the masters in the country, and that the state and the progress of the economy are in direct correspondence with their own interests. (An Open Letter to Congress, Central Committee and Members of the Yugoslav Communist Party, International Secretariat of the Fourth International, July 13, 1948. From Marxists Internet Archive) (IMG)

Officially:

"The Basic Law on Management of State Economic Enterprises and Higher Economic Associations by Working Collectives," the Magna Charta of Yugoslav self-management ... was adopted on 27 June 1950. (YUGOSLAVIA: THE OUTWORN STRUCTURE, Reference Title: ESAU XLVII, Directorate of Intelligence, CIA, November 20, 1970, p. 4) (IMG)

Yet:

even the ostensible democracy of the workers councils did not extend beyond the framework of a single firm. The new system could not solve any of the key questions of society and the nation. (YUGOSLAVIA: THE OUTWORN STRUCTURE, Reference Title: ESAU XLVII, Directorate of Intelligence, CIA, November 20, 1970, p. 4) (IMG)

Beside red-washing decentralization, a function of the 'self-management' concept was to combat the Soviets in the propaganda war. The Fourth International added that the Yugoslav trade unions must 'defend' the 'workers' against the supposedly 'anti-proletarian' USSR:

The trade unions must be granted their real function, which is to defend the interests of the workers, ... against the Soviet State.... (An Open Letter to Congress, Central Committee and Members of the Yugoslav Communist Party, International Secretariat of the Fourth International, July 13, 1948. From Marxists Internet Archive) (IMG)

For such anti-Soviet policy to succeed, the resistance of Yugoslav communists 'should' be broken, the Fourth International argued. This, the Secretariat stated, requires re-education programs to be set up against these communist cadres, a fact which would stir fierce Soviet criticism:

We do not at all conceal that such a policy will encounter very great obstacles in your country and even in your own ranks. A complete reeducation of your cadres ... would be necessary. Still less do we conceal that ... the present leadership of the Russian State would furiously attack your policy, for it would appear to them a mortal threat to their acquired positions. (An Open Letter to Congress, Central Committee and Members of the Yugoslav Communist Party, International Secretariat of the Fourth International, July 13, 1948. From Marxists Internet Archive) (IMG)

In agreement with the above statements, Tito would set up torture camps to 're-educate' the Yugoslav communists – as the Secretariat predicted, the Soviet media fiercely condemned such policies. Anyone voicing dissent against the self-management propaganda campaign would be accused of being Soviet-friendly and hence rounded up for:

the mere suspicion of opposition to self-management has since merited the immediate charge of "Corninformism." (YUGOSLAVIA:

THE OUTWORN STRUCTURE, Reference Title: ESAU XLVII, Directorate of Intelligence, CIA, November 20, 1970, pp. 3-4) (IMG)

The establishment of worker self-management was a highly demagogical way to actually promote bureaucratic chaos and corruption, for worker self-management was decentralization under the cover of 'worker domination'. As has been mentioned in C1S6, economic decentralization is a means of proliferating bureaucracy. Decentralization minimizes, or increases the costs of, the coordination of the different sectors of the economy, thus causing the economic disintegration exploited by the bureaucrats for filling pockets. It also allows for numerous bureaus to form. Hundreds of times more difficult than surveilling and monitoring the activities of one bureau is the surveillance and monitor of the activities of numerous bureaus – precisely that is willed by the corrupt bureaucrats, for they seek to prevent the surveillance and monitoring of their corrupt activities. Decentralization, which multiplies the number of powerful bureaus, thus once again contributes to the growth of a powerful bureaucratic oligarchic class. Decentralization, by increasing the number of bureaus, also increases the costs of the maintenance of so many bureaus, a factor that reduces finances for production, precisely what imperialism seeks for achieving its objective of preventing the development of the productive forces in the areas it colonizes. This was indeed the situation in Yugoslavia. The CIA reported:

Decentralization of the Yugoslav economy has produced near anarchy and cut-throat competition between enterprises. Confusion and inefficiency are greater today than in 1948. Each firm strives by any means available to gain a position of monopoly over its republic or geographical unit by gaining the exclusive representation of some well-known foreign export house. For example, various Yugoslav firms exerted considerable pressure in the form of price concessions and outright blackmail on foreign representatives in order to secure an exclusive contract from the West German optical firm, Carl Zeiss. No holds are barred in attempts to discredit competitors and to show profits. This results in unbelievable cases of wire-pulling in Belgrade, canceled contracts and various other uneconomic practices. Expediency, corruption and fraud, in the pursuit of personal gain, hold sway in the foreign trade field.

(General Views on Yugoslav Situation, CIA, April 4, 1954, p. 3) (IMG)

As further confirmed by the CIA, the economic decentralization assisted the corrupt bureaucrats; even the worker self-management model which the regime preached was but a demagogical tool with which to decentralize so to benefit the bureaucrats:

The decentralization law, for example, has only made it easier for top-level bureaucrats to evade responsibility; actually it has given no power or right of initiative to the workers or to the executive boards of enterprises. ('Political and Economic Conditions in Yugoslavia; Morale and Attitude of the People Toward Tito and the Present Regime', CIA February 20, 1952, p. 10) (IMG)

C12S5. CIA Support for the Titoist Current *** IMG-All-{Titoist Yugoslavia}

While the Americans were actively preparing for World War III against the USSR and countries of People's Democracy, such a costly war was not their preferred avenue for liquidating Soviet power. Instead, the American imperialists aimed to (1) wage a shadow or covert war via proxy terror groups such as the UPA, OUN, AK, etc., (2) utilize the network of American imperialist agents within the governments of the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies for combat against the socialist forces. The Titoist infiltrators and the fascist guerrillas would benefit each other, for the fascist guerrillas would provide the Titoists with the leverage and military backbone they need for a factional conflict against the communist factions in the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies, whereas the Titoists would serve as the high-ranking officials that would stab the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies in the back from above, opening the 'gates' for the CIA-backed terrorists to carry out their operations.

CIA support for Titoism was discussed in bodies as high-level as the US National Security Council (NSC) of the US President and top American intelligence, military, and State Department officials. A document titled NSC 58 was written, an excerpt of which follows:

COURSES OPEN TO US

29. In seeking to bring about the elimination of Soviet power from the satellite states, two principal courses of action are conceivable. One is war; the other is measures short of war.

30. Resort to war as a course of action is raised in this paper solely for the purpose of making clear that it should be rejected as a practical alternative. This course is rejected, if for no other reason, because it is organically not feasible for this Government to initiate a policy of creating a war. It therefore follows that this paper is necessarily addressed to measures short of war. However, if war in Eastern Europe is forced upon us, that is a different matter and one which would create a wholly new situation beyond the compass of this paper. It scarcely need be added that we should always be prepared for such a contingency.

31. There remains then the category of measures short of war. Before discussing them, we should at the outset have clearly in mind another set of alternatives between which we must make a conscious choice. In attempting to cause an elimination of Soviet power in these countries, we obviously cannot expect a vacuum to result. The type of government which might succeed to power is intimately related to the removal of Kremlin influence and control. Therefore, should it be our aim to replace, as a first step, Kremlin authority with (a) governments immediately friendly to us or (b) any governments free of Moscow domination, even though they be Communist regimes?

32. Our ultimate aim must, of course, be the appearance in Eastern Europe of nontotalitarian administrations willing to accommodate themselves to, and participate in, the free world community. Strong tactical considerations, however, argue against setting up this goal as an immediate objective. None of the Eastern European countries, except Czechoslovakia, has ever known any but authoritarian government. Democracy in the western sense is alien to their culture and tradition. Moreover, the non-totalitarian leadership, such as it is, in the satellite states has been thoroughly fragmented and crushed. It has little chance of coming to power save through armed

intervention from the west. Were we to set as our immediate goal the replacement of totalitarianism by democracy, an overwhelming portion of the task would fall on us, and we would find ourselves directly engaging the Kremlin's prestige and provoking strong Soviet reaction, possibly in the form of war or at least in vigorous indirect aggression. At best, we would find ourselves deeply enmeshed in the eastern European situation and saddled with an indefinitely continuing burden of political, economic and military responsibility for the survival of the uncertain regimes which we had placed in power.

33. If, however, we are willing that, as a first step, schismatic Communist regimes supplant the present Stalinist governments, we stand a much better chance of success. Admittedly, it would be a difficult task to attempt to bring about a severance of satellite ties with the Kremlin. But it would not be nearly so difficult as challenging at the outset, not only the whole complex of Communist ideology and method, but also the long heritage of authoritarianism.

34. The more feasible immediate course, then, is to foster a heretical drifting-away process on the part of the satellite states. However weak they may now appear, grounds do exist for heretical schisms. We can contribute to the widening of these rifts without assuming responsibility. And when the final breaks occur, we would not be directly involved in engaging Soviet prestige; the quarrel would be between the Kremlin and the Communist Reformation.

(United States Policy Toward the Soviet Satellite States in Eastern Europe, Report to the President by the National Security Council, S/S-NSC Files, Lot 63 D 351, NSC 58 Series, NSC 58/2, Washington, National Security Council (NSC) December 8, 1949. In: Foreign Relations of the United States, US Department of State, 1949 Vol. 5, pp. 50-51) (IMG)

As the above document clearly shows, Washington's goal in the Eastern bloc was to increase the leverage of the existing Titoist fifth column as means of reducing the influence of the proletariat in these states and paving the way towards the Titoization. The Cominform resolution of 1949 too confirmed:

The Yugoslav traitors, obeying the will of the imperialists, undertook to form in the People's Democracies political gangs consisting of reactionaries, nationalists, clerical and fascist elements and, relying on these gangs, to bring about counter-revolutionary coups in these countries, wrest them from the Soviet Union and the entire socialist camp and subordinate them to the forces of imperialism. (Communist Party of Yugoslavia in the Power of Murderers and Spies, Cominform, November 1949. MIA. The same document can be found in the 'Revolutionary Democracy Organization of India' archives section) (IMG)

In supplementing the above, another document, NSC 5607, reaffirmed that Washington will continue:

To stimulate nationalism within the satellite countries by reviving the historic traditions of these peoples and by suggesting the great benefits which can be derived from a courageous policy of defiance of Moscow such as Tito exhibited. (104. National Security Council Report, Washington, June 29, 1956., NSC 5607, STATEMENT OF POLICY ON EAST-WEST EXCHANGES) (IMG{Titoist Coup})

The Cominform also stated:

In this way the imperialists seek to undermine the Parties from within and subordinate them to themselves. They have succeeded in realizing this aim in Yugoslavia. (Communist Party of Yugoslavia in the Power of Murderers and Spies, Cominform, November 1949. MIA. The same document can be found in the 'Revolutionary Democracy Organization of India' archives section) (IMG)

The NSC 58 file made several other important points, worthy of highlight. Acutely aware of the scientific nature of communism and the danger which such science posed to imperial interests, American leaders sought to foster left- and right-deviationist tendencies so to subvert the communist labour movement from within. NSC 58 specified that "heretical communism" should be encouraged; it is no surprise, after so much revelations, that revisionism was to be fostered as American imperialism's tool against the socialist bloc:

A course of encouraging schisms within the Communist world cannot be pursued without reserve because such a course is a tactical expediency which, however necessary, must never be permitted to obscure our basic long-term objectives a non-totalitarian system in Eastern Europe. The problem is to facilitate the development of heretical Communism without at the same time seriously impairing our chances for ultimately replacing this intermediate totalitarianism with tolerant regimes congenial to the Western World. (United States Policy Toward the Soviet Satellite States in Eastern Europe, Report to the President by the National Security Council, S/S-NSC Files, Lot 63 D 351, NSC 58 Series, NSC 58/2, Washington, National Security Council (NSC) December 8, 1949. In: Foreign Relations of the United States, US Department of State, 1949 Vol. 5, pp. 53-54) (IMG)

Labelled as 'dogmatic', communism ('Stalinism') was an object of attack by Washington's revisionist proxies in the Eastern bloc:

This course is intimately related to and partly dependent upon the third course of action open to us an attack on the ideological front, specifically directed at the Stalinist dogma of satellite dependence upon and subservience to the U.S.S.R. This key doctrine should be unremittingly attacked all across the board in its political, economic and cultural applications. On the positive side, the reverse of the Stalinist dogma nationalism should be encouraged. The offensive should be maintained not only on the overt but also the covert plane. (United States Policy Toward the Soviet Satellite States in Eastern Europe, Report to the President by the National Security Council, S/S-NSC Files, Lot 63 D 351, NSC 58 Series, NSC 58/2, Washington, National Security Council (NSC) December 8, 1949. In: Foreign Relations of the United States, US Department of State, 1949 Vol. 5, p. 52) (IMG)

Akin to revisionism was the corruption of the bureaucrats, an ally of the United States and a phenomenon capable of liquidating the dictatorship of the proletariat and democracy. Corrupt officials, far from forming a national bourgeoisie who would for their own interests expand industrial production, actually represented (and represent) a parasitic class of money-capitalists fed off of sabotaging economic expansion. As such they would be hostile to popular advancement and socialism. In this regard, NSC 58 stated:

The Stalinist dogma undoubtedly had validity in the minds of satellite leaders when they were revolutionaries seeking power. At that time, there was little conflict between their interests and those of the Kremlin; they were wholly dependent upon Moscow and could hope to realize their revolutionary aims and personal ambitions only through subserving the interests of the U.S.S.R. But now that they have the appearance and considerable of the substance of power, subtle new forces come into play. Power, even the taste of it, is as likely to corrupt Communist as bourgeois leaders. **Considerations of national as well as personal interest materialize and come into conflict with the colonial policy pursued by the Soviet interests. When this happens, satellite officials may still remain, by force of other factors, Kremlin captives; but at least they are not entirely willing ones.** (United States Policy Toward the Soviet Satellite States in Eastern Europe, Report to the President by the National Security Council, S/S-NSC Files, Lot 63 D 351, NSC 58 Series, NSC

58/2, Washington, National Security Council (NSC) December 8, 1949. In: Foreign Relations of the United States, US Department of State, 1949 Vol. 5, pp. 48-49. Bold added.) (IMG)

The above excerpt did not explicitly endorse corruption but by claiming that the corruption of ‘satellite leaders’ would cause them to confront Moscow, it was de facto implying that corruption should be promoted. Corruption, as the invisible hand of sabotage, yields chaos and inefficiency, separates the Party and state from the masses, and creates room for bribery and blackmail thus allowing foreign intelligence infiltration. Imperialist fifth columns grow well in corrupt countries, for the corrupt bureaucratic oligarchs serve as a comprador bourgeois counter-weight against the influence of the proletariat in the socialistic state. The corrupt bureaucrats then, by fighting the proletarian enemies of finance capital, facilitate the penetration of the intelligence agents of finance capital into the socialist or socialist-leaning countries. Precisely for these reasons did American leaders embrace potential corruption in the People’s Democracies and the fostering of a red bourgeoisie, comprador capitalists cloaked as ‘communists’, who would destroy socialism.

To conclude, the course of action called for in the NSC was:

46. Our over-all aim with respect to the satellite states should be the gradual reduction and eventual elimination of preponderant Soviet power from Eastern Europe without resort to war.

47. We should, as the only practical immediate expedient, seek to achieve this objective through fostering Communist heresy among the satellite states, encouraging the emergence of non-Stalinist regimes....

48. It must, however, be our fixed aim that eventually these regimes must be replaced by non-totalitarian governments desirous of participating with good faith in the free world community.

49. More specifically, bearing in mind all of the qualifications set forth in the analysis of this paper, we should:

a. Seek to bring about retraction of Soviet military forces behind the borders of the U.S.S.R.;

b. Endeavor to cause an increasing isolation of the confirmed Stalinists from the nationalist elements of the party and from popular support in the satellite states toward the end that their power be reduced;

c. Attack the Stalinist dogma of satellite subservience to the U.S.S.R. and encourage nationalism;

d. Bring fully to bear on the Soviet-satellite relationship the economic forces which we control or influence.

(U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Satellite States in Eastern Europe, PPS Files, Lot 64 D 563, PPS Documents, Washington, Top Secret, Policy Planning Staff Paper, August 25, 1949. In: GENERAL POLICIES AND PROBLEMS. In: Foreign Relations of the United States, US Department of State, 1949 Vol. 5, pp. 25-26) (IMG)

And to be sure, all of these policies and plans were implemented upon US President Truman’s personal order:

As of December 13 President Truman approved the Conclusions of this Report and directed that they be implemented by all appropriate executive departments and agencies of the government under the coordination of the Secretary of State. (Footnote section of: United States Policy Toward the Soviet Satellite States in Eastern Europe, Report to the President by the National Security Council, S/S-NSC Files, Lot 63 D 351, NSC 58 Series, NSC 58/2, Washington, National Security Council (NSC) December 8, 1949. In: Foreign Relations of the United States, US Department of State, 1949 Vol. 5, pp. 48-49) (IMG)

For the victory of Titoism in the Peoples’ Democracies to bear fruition, the Americans had decided to assassinate communists. Hence the Americans hatched a plot called ‘Project X’ which, according to the U.S. News stated:

“strong-arm quads would be formed under American guidance [and] assassination of key communists would be encouraged.” (I Choose Peace, Konni Zilliacus, p. 212, citing: U.S. News) (IMG{ Titoist Coup})

Under this plan, strong-arm squads would be formed under American guidance. Assassination of key Communists would be encouraged. American agents, parachuted into Eastern Europe, would be used to coordinate anti-Communist action. (From Trotsky To Tito, James Klugmann, 1951, citing: U.S. News)

To summarize, the American imperialist objective was the promotion of the corrupt bureaucrat, as the class allies of Anglo-American finance capital and as the basis for the Titoist mafia, in the Soviet-led camp. The rise of the corrupt bureaucrats would liquidate socialism and allow room for a massive network of fifth columnists to be established, paving the way towards the division and collapse of the Eastern camp. America’s sponsorship of revisionism, particularly Titoism, was not exclusive to Eastern Europe; Titoism were and continue to be globally sponsored so to weaken the communist labour movement and advance the banners of the US-led bloc of imperialists. Titoists rose to power in the USSR, and they too liquidated socialism. Traitors as they were, they assisted other Titoists in the Eastern bloc to rise to power, liquidate socialism, roll back the influence of the proletariat in the state apparatus, and isolate the USSR as the US-led camp’s top strategic foe. This topic, however, will be explored in detail in later chapters.

Anyways, for the Anglo-Americans, a major strategic gain from the rise of Titoism in the Peoples’ Democracies was that a camp of closely allied Anglo-American-backed Titoist-fascist regimes hostile to Soviet power could be established. In particular, the founding of a Greater Yugoslavia was the explicit purpose of the American regime. In the words of the NSC document, the US-sponsored rise of Titoism:

could conceivably grow to the point where there would be **two opposing blocs** in the Communist world a Stalinist group and a non-conformist faction, either loosely **allied or federated under Tito’s leadership**. A situation of this description might eventually provide us with an opportunity to operate on the basis of a balance of forces in the Communist world and to foster the tendencies toward accommodation with the West implicit in such a state of affairs. (United States Policy Toward the Soviet Satellite States in Eastern Europe, Report to the President by the National Security Council, S/S-NSC Files, Lot 63 D 351, NSC 58 Series, NSC 58/2, Washington, National Security Council (NSC) December 8, 1949. In: Foreign Relations of the United States, US Department of State, 1949 Vol. 5, p. 51) (IMG)

In line with Anglo-American objectives, the Trotskyite Fourth International instructed to Tito on July 1948 the following:

You would have to develop and sharpen your propaganda in favor of the Danubian Federation by giving it its classical communist form and by launching the slogan for the Balkan Federation of Soviet Socialist Republics among the workers and poor peasants of neighboring countries, who would take it up with enthusiasm. (An Open Letter to Congress, Central Committee and Members of the Yugoslav Communist Party, International Secretariat of the Fourth International, July 13, 1948. From Marxists Internet Archive) (IMG)

The Danubian Federation – named after the Danube River which crossed through Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Romania, and Bulgaria – was envisioned to revive the Austro-Hungarian Empire as a bulwark against Soviet power. “[T]he idea of Vienna's becoming the capital of a large Danubian federation,” Churchill wrote to Roosevelt,:

has always been attractive to me, though I should prefer to add Hungary, to which Stalin is strongly opposed. (Dismemberment of Germany, Memorandum by the Assistant to the President's Naval Aide (Else), Top Secret, Truman Papers, 1945. In: Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, The Conference of Berlin, Vol. 1, 1945, p. 454)

Churchill's geostrategic agenda was also reflected in the objectives of the MI6 agent Lavrenti Beria. Sergo Beria, the son of Lavrenti, wrote in his biography of his father:

My father wanted an economic union of the Balkan countries, led by Yugoslavia, which would later join up with a unified Germany and a free Austria. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 209) (IMG)

My father ... saw no reason why Yugoslavia should not annex Albania. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 209) (IMG)

One of the MI6 agents who had collaborated with the MI6-backed network of the Gestapo agent Tito since 1943 was none other than Lavrenti Beria:

My father also relied on the [fake 'anti-Nazi'] resistance fighters who had remained in their own countries [because the Nazis, having killed many of the actual anti-Nazi guerrillas, had allowed these fake 'anti-Nazi' 'resistance' fighters to stay in their own countries]. He thought that ... Hungarian Nagy, the Czech Slansky and the entire Yugoslav group of Tito, Djilas and Rankovic had endorsed his view.... (...). In Yugoslavia, my father's networks and those of the British had collaborated with Tito during the war. My father followed with attention the affairs of that country. One day, when the Yugoslav leader Kardelj complained to him about Tito's tyrannical character, he replied: 'Don't you think that we are all in the same boat?' He took care to add, however, that heads of state who mattered always had negative sides. Rankovic, the head of Yugoslav security, was more primitive than Kardelj, but Tito had total confidence in him, which was why he often acted as intermediary between Tito and my father. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, pp. 196-197) (IMG)

In line with MI6 plans (which also had the CIA's backing), what Lavrenti Beria envisioned was the establishment of a Polish-led Intermarium (headed by the Gestapo agent Gomulka) plus a Titoist Balkan Zone that would later become a part of the German-led pan-Europe. Sergo Beria recalled:

My father would have liked to form two blocs, uniting the neutral countries of Central and Eastern Europe – one around Poland, the other around ... Tito's Yugoslavia. In his mind this arrangement should be completed by a unified and non-socialist Germany. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 196) (IMG)

Lavrenti Beria also aimed to establish close ties to the local bases of the fascist Vatican mafia in Poland, the same Vatican mafia which collaborated with Nazi Germany. Beria also aimed to cultivate an alliance with Nazi Germany and its helpers in Poland:

My father wanted to see a strong Poland, possibly because he had many agents there. He cultivated relations with the Polish Catholics in the hope of reaching, through them, the Catholics of Germany. He tried to use Prince Radziwill and put him into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He had saved the Prince's life and hoped to make him an agent of influence. Rich and noble, Radziwill had excellent relations with the Germans and the Americans, including business contacts with Harriman. However, Stalin did not agree. Neither did the British, because the Prince had compromised with the Germans. There was also Gomulka, who fell into disgrace in 1949. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 197) (IMG)

Indeed, upon the establishment of the Danubian Federation, the next step would have been for its subordination by Germany's colonial Pan-European efforts. According to the Anglo-American Cold War agenda, the Nazi Underground which ruled West Germany was to economically re-conquer Europe towards an anti-Soviet continental 'alliance' (see chapter 11). In line with such goals, Tito, at the 6th Party Congress, declared:

A revision of the imperialistic division and occupation of German and Polish territory committed by the Soviet Union, should be made in such a way that the national interest of German and of Polish peoples should be fully protected ... we want the German people to become united, having their own life as they please, and with the kind of democratic organization that would enable them to become a pillar of peace and cooperation not only in Europe, but in the entire world. ('Politics, Culture, and Economics: Reassessing the West German Guest Worker Agreement with Yugoslavia', Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 44, No. 4, Kaja Shonick, October, 2009, p. 724. Citing: VI Kongres KPJ, Kultura, Belgrade, Josip Broz Tito, 1952. Tito's speech was cited in: 'Yugoslav German Relations to be Normalized?', Radio Free Europe Research, Communist Area Yugoslavia: Foreign Relations, January 19, 1967, Open Society Archives (OSA), pp. 77-1-35) (IMG)

As demonstrated in C11S12, the 'Atlanticists', to which the French imperialists by the way eventually did not belong, had consistently rejected the Soviet call for jointly ending the military occupation of East and West Germany and for allowing a unified democratic German government with its own military. Washington and its satellite Bonn preferred a divided but US-occupied Germany over a united and democratic Germany. Unification, the American imperialists and their West German puppets held, was to be pursued through the takeover of East Germany.

Hence, Tito blamed the supposedly 'imperialistic' Soviet Union – the country that launched entire campaigns to block imperialist efforts to the partition of Germany – for the partition of Germany. The fascist tyrant also lied about the USSR's 'imperialistic division' of 'Polish territory', a myth debunked in C3S3 and C9S5. In doing so, the CIA agent Tito declared his support for the imperialist American and West German propaganda line on the German partition plan:

Tito ... supported the FRG's goal of German (re-)unification. ('Politics, Culture, and Economics: Reassessing the West German Guest Worker Agreement with Yugoslavia', Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 44, No. 4, Kaja Shonick, October, 2009, pp. 723-724) (IMG)

In its letter to Tito's gang, the Fourth International instructed Yugoslavia's Trotskyite rulers to call for an end to war reparations and military occupations with specific reference to Germany and Austria:

you would have to proclaim to the world the conditions for a just peace, without annexations or reparations; (...). With one blow you will gain the sympathy of the Austrian and German masses who today feel themselves deceived and betrayed by all parties. (An Open

Letter to Congress, Central Committee and Members of the Yugoslav Communist Party, International Secretariat of the Fourth International, July 13, 1948. From Marxists Internet Archive) (IMG)

The bulk of the war reparations were to rightly go to the USSR, the country with the greatest sacrifices during the Great Patriotic War. The demagogical call for ending reparations payments was a Trotskyite attempt at economic sabotage against the war-torn USSR. While Yugoslavia should as a first step gain control over the Balkans in an anti-Soviet alliance, the Trotskyite International argued, the second step to pursue would be Yugoslavia's subordination to a German-dominated Pan-Europe. This would be done through cooperation with pro-Trotskyite or pro-Titoist networks in the German and Austrian labour movement so to create a '**central axis**' for spreading Trotskyite 'socialism' to the world (including the allegedly 'degenerated' USSR). The Secretariat of the Fourth International wrote to Tito:

And finally it would be necessary to incorporate this propaganda within the concrete framework of propaganda for the SOCIALIST SOVIET UNITED STATES OF EUROPE; to convoke a conference at Belgrade of the trade-union and workers' representatives from all the countries of Europe, including Germany and Austria; to draw up with them a plan for the economic reconstruction of the continent ... and to make this socialist plan the central axis for revolutionary propaganda in Europe and in the world. (An Open Letter to Congress, Central Committee and Members of the Yugoslav Communist Party, International Secretariat of the Fourth International, July 13, 1948. From Marxists Internet Archive) (IMG)

The call for an anti-Soviet 'United States of Europe' of which Yugoslavia would be a member, resonated with Washington's leadership. "I am coming to believe," wrote US President Eisenhower in his June 11, 1951 diaries,:

that Europe's security problem is never going to be solved satisfactorily until there exists a United States of Europe, to include all countries now in NATO: West Germany and (I think) Sweden, Spain, Yugoslavia, with Greece definitely in if Yugoslavia is (if necessary, the United Kingdom could be omitted). (The Eisenhower Diaries, Dwight Eisenhower, Edited by: Robert Ferrel, 1981, p. 194) (IMG)

If Danubian 'Federalism' and German-dominated Pan-Europeanism were the first two steps towards directly subordinating Yugoslavia to the US-led bloc, the third step was Atlanticism itself: joining the Atlantic Pact also known as NATO. Tito's alliance with monarcho-fascist Greece and Turkey, the two countries not to be in the Danubian Federation, was the pathway towards that third step. As a US intelligence memorandum titled 'Status Report on the Greek, Turkish, Yugoslav Military Alliance' stated,:

Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia has accepted the principle of liaison between the projected tripartite alliance and NATO.... ('STATUS REPORT ON THE GREEK, TURKISH, YUGOSLAV MILITARY ALLIANCE', Office of Current Intelligence, CIA, June 29, 1954, p. 1) (IMG)

Israel was to be added to this military alliance of Yugoslavia, Turkey, and Greece. Yugoslavia pushed vigorously for Israel's inclusion into the anti-Soviet 'Balkan Pact' alliance. As a matter of fact, as confirmed by Jacob Abadi, a professor of history at the US Air Force Academy, in 1954,:

In his conversation with Ezra Yoran, Israel's Minister in Yugoslavia, a Yugoslav Foreign Ministry official argued ... that his country was willing to support Israel's candidacy to the Balkan Alliance. (Israel and the Balkan States, Middle Eastern Studies, Jacob Abadi, 1996, p. 298) (IMG{Israel})

In this anti-Soviet Balkan alliance, Yugoslavia achieved important aspects of step one – the creation of an anti-Soviet alliance in Eastern Europe – and moved towards steps two and three – alliances with the rest of Europe and North America. "There is also reason to believe," said a US National Security Staff study:

that through this association Tito hopes inter alia to gain some of the advantages of NATO membership.... Tito has clearly manifested a desire for firmer ties with other nations which would give him a feeling of security beyond that entailed in previous military arrangements. (...). The "Balkan Entente" has to some extent given him the political ties he desires, and in this way his confidence in and willingness for military planning with the West has been bolstered. (NSC Staff Study on United States Policy Towards Yugoslavia, US NSC, 1954. In: "U.S. DIPLOMATIC RECORDS ON RELATIONS WITH YUGOSLAVIA DURING THE EARLY COLD WAR, 1948-1957", Nick Ceh, 2002, pp. 401-402) (IMG)

It must be remembered that the Yugoslav regime's shift towards an alliance with NATO occurred at a time in which Tito's fascist gang had already been thoroughly exposed and unmasked by the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies. The rise to power of the Titoists in Moscow in 1953, however, meant that the project to unmask Tito's group was to almost cease, and hence Tito's group could re-mask itself as 'socialist' and 'anti-imperialist'. In such a circumstance, the Belgrade fascists aimed not to carry forward with the original plan to overtly join NATO and instead just went back to playing their old game of presenting themselves as 'neutrals' lying in between the pro-fascist and anti-fascist camps.

Tito had no choice but to declare that he did not intend to join NATO. "Despite this desire for political assurances," the NSC document continued,:

for the moment Tito probably means what he says when he publicly denies any intention to seek membership in NATO. At present he has almost no alternative to this position.... (NSC Staff Study on United States Policy Towards Yugoslavia, US NSC, 1954. In: "U.S. DIPLOMATIC RECORDS ON RELATIONS WITH YUGOSLAVIA DURING THE EARLY COLD WAR, 1948-1957", Nick Ceh, 2002, p. 402) (IMG)

Nonetheless,:

Tito has gone far in parallel directions to assure Yugoslavia the benefits of NATO. (NSC Staff Study on United States Policy Towards Yugoslavia, US NSC, 1954. In: "U.S. DIPLOMATIC RECORDS ON RELATIONS WITH YUGOSLAVIA DURING THE EARLY COLD WAR, 1948-1957", Nick Ceh, 2002, p. 402) (IMG)

Naturally, NATO, as the bigger historical-material force, reaped far greater benefits than the smaller force, Tito's fascist regime. During a 1954 North Atlantic Council session, the representatives of the Kingdom of Greece:

Stated [that the] alliance committed Yugoslavia to be on our side if attack made on other NATO power without formal commitment to Yugoslavia by NATO. (Subject: NAC Discussion Balkan Alliance, July 29, 1954. In: 760.5/7-2954: Telegram, The United States Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Hughes) to the Department of State, Top Secret, Paris, July 29, 1954, p. 1. In: Foreign Relations of the United States, United States Department of State, p. 671) (IMG)

All of these were for the purposes of joining the NATO for its war on the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies. Again, note that imperialist France was a rogue state within NATO, in the sense that French imperialism aimed to form an alliance with the progressive anti-imperialist forces in the struggle to break up the Anglo-American-German imperialist alliance, the rivals of French finance capital and the mainstream of NATO.

Anyways, a document written by the Israeli foreign minister Moshe Sharett, in his message to Eytan, discussed how Israel could join NATO in the fight against the USSR. In this document, the case of Yugoslavia was regarded as a historical precedent which Israel could follow in terms of forming the military bonds with the US-led camp. In the midst of mentioning the case of Yugoslavia as a precedent for Israel to follow, the document by Sharett nonetheless confirmed Yugoslavia's anti-Soviet WWII alliance with the NATO:

the Yugoslav Chief of General Staff visited Washington and met with the Chiefs of Staff, and Tito declared that Yugoslavia would fight with the West. (M. Sharett (New York) to W. Eytan, September 30, 1951. In: DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL, State of Israel Archives, Vol. 6, 1951, Edited by Yemima Rosenthal, Companion Volume, p. 293) (IMG{Israel})

Many Titoists in the Peoples' Democracies were indeed purged, however, rendering more difficult the pursuit of the American imperialist agenda. As explained by NSC 174,:

NSC 58/2 laid down a policy of fostering communist heresy among the satellites and encouraging the emergence of non-Stalinist regimes as temporary administrations even though communist in nature. However, as was noted in the third Progress Report on implementation of NSC 58/2, dated May 22, 1951, the Kremlin and its local agents have been successful in warding off any trend in the satellites comparable to that which led to the break between Moscow and Yugoslavia. In fact, in none of the satellites have there developed the capabilities such as rendered Tito's defection successful. (No. 51 Report to the National Security Council by the National Security Council Planning Board, Washington, December 11, 1953., top secret, NSC 174, Statement of Policy Proposed by the National Security Council on United States Policy Toward the Soviet Satellites in Eastern Europe) (IMG)

American intelligence has consistently corroborated the fact that the Soviets planned no invasion of Yugoslavia. A search through the US intelligence archives will bring about countless volumes of CIA documents serving as testament, but only two of such documents will be presented as follows:

An attack upon this country by regular Soviet forces would almost certainly result in starting another world war. If Russian armies could succeed in shortly crushing Yugoslav resistance, the establishment of a Soviet Stronghold in the area of Trieste with its menace to Italy and the Mediterranean would heighten the tension to an intolerable degree. STALIN knows this and will refrain from an open attack as long as he is the dominating figure in the Politburo. (Implications of the Tito-Stalin Conflict, CIA, November 14, 1949, p. 2) (IMG)

Although Satellite military, economic, and propaganda preparations indicate that a Satellite attack upon Yugoslavia is possible, it is unlikely that the Kremlin will launch such an attack within the period of this estimate. The risk of general war, made clear by US support of collective security and the provisions of US economic and military aid to Yugoslavia, will probably deter the Kremlin from this course of action, unless it is ready to accept general war. ('NIE-51: PROBABLE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN YUGOSLAVIA AND THE LIKELIHOOD OF ATTACK UPON YUGOSLAVIA, THROUGH 1952', (FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF THE BOARD)., CIA, November 30, 1951, p. 4) (IMG)

Should a war break out, Tito and his staff would have retreated to the islands of the Adriatic, to be protected by the US military. As confirmed by a CIA memorandum:

If the war breaks out before Stalin's death or before the conclusion of an accord between Tito and Moscow, ... all [Tito's] activities are dominated by prudent provisions which shall secure to himself and his faithfuls a safe and undisturbed retreat toward the Adriatic coast. To this end, magazines of food stuff, arms, and munitions, as well as fortifications on the Islands of Korcula, Vis, Cherso ... are already prepared for Tito and his intimate friends; they intend to take refuge there, under the protection of the American fleet. (Tito's True Face, Political Information (Analysis of Tito's Relationship with Stalin and the West), CIA, November 28, 1952, p. 11) (IMG)

A top official of the Yugoslav intelligence also confirmed in a conversation with American intelligence units, that the Soviets would not invade: Bogdan Markovic, a section chief in the Ministry of Interior, asserted that he did not believe the Soviets would attack openly.... (Meeting of Officers of the Ministry of the Interior, CIA, November 15, 1949, p. 1) (IMG)

Tito personally corroborated the CIA's account. While constantly spreading anti-Soviet slanders and fostering the fear of a Soviet assault on Yugoslavia, Tito had full knowledge that neither the USSR nor the Peoples' Democracies planned an invasion of Yugoslavia. In what became a notable example of diplomatic double-standards, Tito explained the strategic conditions in detail in the conversation with his friend Charles Peake, the British ambassador to Yugoslavia at the time. Charles Peake, the British ambassador to Yugoslavia at the time, wrote in a report to London:

Marshal Tito received me this morning prior to my departure for London.

2. I began by asking him his views about the Yugoslav dispute with the Cominform and how he thought the present situation was likely to develop. He said that he did not think it likely that there would be much change over the new few months. He was still firmly of the opinion that Stalin would not risk an act of overt aggression against Yugoslavia. He had no shadow of pretext for doing so. Yugoslavia was not a neighbour of the Soviet, and never had been, and so there could be no trumped-up case of territorial claims. If, therefore, the Soviet were to invade Yugoslavia, she would brand herself in the eyes of the whole world as an aggressor, and he expected that peace propaganda would be shown up as a sham and as being no more than a cloak for her predatory designs. This in itself, he thought, might be the strongest deterrent to the Kremlin. I said I was inclined to agree, but that Hitler had shown the world that a would-be aggressor would always trump up a case if his mind was bent on conquest. Tito replied that this was certainly so, but that he thought Stalin had more political wisdom, and a greater sense of reality than Hitler.

3. I told Marshal Tito in this connexion that I had been much disturbed to see in the Yugoslav press and in speeches of Yugoslav Ministers an assumption that an attack by the Soviet on Yugoslavia would necessarily bring about another world war. While I had no express instructions to speak to him on this subject, I was quite clear about your own views, and I must therefore tell him that it would be the height of unwisdom to put any confidence in such a prediction. If Yugoslavia should be the victim of aggression she would have the right and perhaps the duty of bringing the matter before the Security Council, but what would happen after that it was impossible to say.

I could not but feel that it was most unwise to encourage the public to indulge in speculations about the outbreak of a new war. Marshal Tito said that this was very likely so, but that it might be a deterrent to the Soviet Government, if, in fact, they did harbour such designs, to believe that they would not be allowed to pursue them unmolested. However, though it would also do no harm to Yugoslav morale for people to believe that they would not be left alone if they were attacked, he agreed with me that it was impossible to say what would happen if there was Soviet aggression, and he himself was indulging in no false hopes. I said that I was relieved to hear this and I should certainly report it to you. The Soviet Government were presumably able to take their own view of the situation, and I thought it would be most dangerous to threaten them with some action which in the end it might not be possible to perform. Complete silence about a future situation which no-one could predict seemed to me the only wise policy at present. (R 10502/10338/92, Yugoslav-Soviet Relations, Sir C. Peake to Mr. Bevin, Secret, November 2, 1949, Received: November 3, 1949. In Yugoslavia 1949, British Foreign Office, pp. 49-50. In: British Foreign Office (Balkans; 1949), pp. 277-278) (IMG)

In speaking how the situation might develop, Marshal Tito repeated that while he did not believe in the likelihood of overt action against his country by the Soviet Government, he thought that Yugoslavia's present situation would be made more difficult for her by her neighbours. He thought it likely that guerrilla activity similar to recent Hungarian incident reported in my telegram No. 1018 would continue throughout the winter. It would not in itself be serious, but would of course be designed to provoke some Yugoslav reaction which could be represented as provocation. (R 10502/10338/92, Yugoslav-Soviet Relations, Sir C. Peake to Mr. Bevin, Secret, November 2, 1949, Received: November 3, 1949, p. 50. In Yugoslavia 1949, British Foreign Office, p. 50. In: British Foreign Office (Balkans; 1949), pp. 278) (IMG)

In speaking of Hungary and Roumania Marshal Tito said that information available to the Yugoslav Government did not suggest that Soviet troop concentrations in those countries were such as to constitute a direct military threat to Yugoslavia.... (R 10479/10321/92, Relations with Hungary and Roumania, Sir C. Peake to Mr. Bevin, Secret, November 2, 1949, Received: November 3, 1949. In Yugoslavia 1949, British Foreign Office, p. 50. In: British Foreign Office (Balkans; 1949), p. 278) (IMG)

A 1949 CIA document confirmed:

Kremlin plans do not include direct Soviet and/or Satellite military aggression against Yugoslavia for the duration of 1949. (ESTIMATE OF THE YUGOSLAV REGIME'S ABILITY TO RESIST SOVIET PRESSURE DURING 1949, CIA, June 20, 1949, p. 1) (IMG)

Tito, as shown above, knew full well that the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies planned no aggression against Yugoslavia, and yet he was viciously spreading the myth of Soviet invasion plans in his media. The purpose of this is obvious: to launch an invasion of the Peoples' Democracies in collaboration with the Anglo-Americans if feasible and to portray the Soviets as the aggressors. The US knew that the Soviets had no invasion plans and yet the US armed Yugoslavia precisely for a war against the Peoples' Democracies. Tito formally asked for US military support, turning Yugoslavia into an American military base. John Lampe, the director of the Eastern European Program of the CIA front think tank 'Wilson Center', wrote:

The perceived threat of a Soviet-led military attack on Yugoslavia reached its peak in 1951. Border incidents exceeded 1,000. Yugoslavia's troop strength was increased from 450,000 to 600,000. (Yugoslav-American Economic Relations Since World War II, John Lampe, Russell Prickett, Ljubisa Adamovic, p. 40) (IMG)

Within barely one month of a Yugoslav request for raw materials for the army, President Truman had again used his executive authority over 10 percent of the MDAP funds to grant Yugoslavia \$29 million in needed supplies. On June 28 President Tito presented a formal request for military aid to Ambassador Allen. This led to the establishment of an American military mission (MAAG) in Yugoslavia the following year. At Yugoslav insistence the MAAG remained under the authority of the American ambassador. Under terms crafted to avoid both congressional and Soviet criticism, the Military Assistance Program expended \$296 million in Yugoslavia by mid-1953.... (Yugoslav-American Economic Relations Since World War II, John Lampe, Russell Prickett, Ljubisa Adamovic, p. 40) (IMG)

The British spy Tito shared so much intelligence material with the MI6 operative. Again, in another case, Tito continued to provide secret military intelligence on Bulgaria to the MI6 operative Sir C. Peake:

Conservation with Marshal Tito: Bulgaria.

I asked Marshal Tito whether he thought the Bulgarians were harbouring specially aggressive designs against Yugoslavia and what was his appreciation of the military situation there.

He said that according to his information some arms and ammunition were coming into Bulgaria from the Soviet [Union] via Roumania, but that he did not think the amounts were large. There was also a probable building up of troops along the South-West frontier of Bulgaria between Custendil and Petric. Here, again, guerrilla activity was to be anticipated, but he did not think it would be worse than that. He had every confidence that the Yugoslav army was well able to take care of the situation, and he did not think the Bulgars would be very keen to embark on active operations. The last was still something more than a memory to them.

(R 10482/10392/7, YUGOSLAV-BULGARIAN RELATIONS, Telegraphic, No. 1034, Sir C. Peake to Mr. Bevin, November 2, 1949, Received: November 3, 1949, In: British Foreign Office (1949): Bulgaria, p. 63) (IMG)

Tito's group treated the Anglo-American diplomatic corps so favorably while insulting the Soviet diplomats headed by ambassador Lavrentiev even prior to Tito's expulsion from the Cominform. The Soviet ambassador, Tito's group declared, had no right to obtain any information from anyone about the policies of Tito's regime. In their letter to the CC of the CPSU, Tito's gang stated the following in reference to Soviet ambassador:

We consider that he, as an ambassador, has no right to ask anyone for information about the work of our Party. That is not his business.

This information can be obtained by the CC of the CPSU from the CC of the CPY. ('Tito rejects the charges and defends his policies', April 13, 1948. In: 'Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, 1939-1973 : A Documentary Survey', Stephen Clissold, 1975, p. 179) (IMG)

Thus, once again Tito favoured the Anglo-Americans by furnishing the British diplomat with strategic intelligence assessments, while viciously insulting the Soviet ambassador and hypocritically declaring the latter as unworthy of obtaining even the slightest information from anyone in Yugoslavia.

Many people foster the incorrect view that Tito's gang were problematic because they were 'nationalists' and wanted a capitalist system. For start, such a 'class-neutral' concept as 'nationalism' bears no material existence. Tito's gang promoted what is referred to as 'bourgeois-nationalism'.

Bourgeois-nationalism promotes the supremacy of the ethnicity which it ostensibly represents, but also betrays it. People who think that the supporters of bourgeois-nationalism – not to be confused with anti-imperialist patriots and national-bourgeoisie – ever truly care about the respective nations, are deeply wrong. In order to achieve their objectives, supporters of bourgeois-nationalism both promote settler-colonialism in favour of a nation and at the same time terrorize that nation. Superficially, this appears self-contradictory, when in reality, these measures are dialectically correlated, serve the same class interests, and mark merely a new manifestation of the old secret service strategy of pincer assaults. Zionists have supported a Greater-Israeli Empire but/and have launched numerous terror attacks against Israelites, Beria promoted Georgian separatism but/and also sought to terrorize the Georgians through the widespread corruption and the Nazi takeover attempts, Saddam the non-Kurd barbarically terrorized the Kurds while also promoting the establishment of a Greater Kurdish Empire, and Hitler the German supremacist anti-Polish chauvinist was closely and openly allied with the Polish supremacist anti-German chauvinist gang of Pilsudski, etc.

The history of Tito's regime fully demonstrates their fanning of bourgeois-nationalism. The Tito-Rankovic group systematically fomented inter-ethnic hatred, promoting the supremacy of each ethnicity against the other. By carrying out a genocide against the Serbs during the Great Patriotic War, the Tito group helped the 'Croatian supremacist' Ustase and the Bosnian Handzar SS units which the Tito group welcomed. Tito and his gang, the promoters of Croatian supremacy against the Serbian nation, also supported Serbian settler-colonialism in Kosovo, carrying out a policy of systematic ethnic cleansing and genocide against the Albanians there. As for the Croats, suffice it to say that the Croats preferred the years of the Serbian bourgeois-nationalist Yugoslav monarchy. They tortured the Slovenes but/and promoted Greater Slovenia (especially regarding Trieste), they pauperized the Bosnian people but/and supported the Handzar SS (which was trained by the Palestinian terrorist leader Haajj Amin Al-Husseini), they barbarically oppressed Macedonians while also promoting Greater Macedonia, they handed Greece over to anti-Greek butchers while also siding with the proponents of the Greater Greece Empire project against Albania, etc. Tito's gang savagely oppressed the adherents of Islam but also promoted 'Islamic' fundamentalism against Muslims and Christians. Tito's gang supported Zionism but also were the agents of the perpetrators of the extermination of millions of Ashkenazim. The Titoist Yugoslav intelligence service pervasively collaborated with the Arab supremacist Saddamite Iraqi regime. To put it simply, Tito's gang did promote supremacy for certain ethnicities but also savagely terrorized the peoples of those ethnicities. Tito's gang had mastered the concept of the 'Alliance of Chauvinisms', supporting the alliance of the chauvinisms of different ethnicities against the proletarians of those ethnicities so to foment division among the proletarians and foster unity among the anti-proletarian reactionaries.

Another misconception of the 'nationalism' of Tito's gang is that Tito's gang allegedly represented Yugoslavia's national-bourgeois interests. Bourgeois-nationalism is fundamentally different than the national bourgeoisie. Had Tito's group been agents of a Yugoslav national industrial capitalism, communists would have had a duty to support them, because in that case, Tito's group would have represented the anti-colonial national bourgeoisie. This, however, was not the case in Titoist Yugoslavia. On the contrary and in fact, the Yugoslav regime was not serving the national-bourgeois interests, and the Yugoslav economy was not capitalist in the typical, industrial, sense of the term. The Yugoslav regime was a comprador fascist state that betrayed the 'national' interests of Yugoslavia, including, notably, the 'national' interests of Croatia and Serbia. The Cominform publicly stated:

Whereas, in June 1948 the meeting of the Information Bureau of the Communist Parties noted the change-over of the Tito-Rankovic clique ... to bourgeois nationalism, during the period that has elapsed since the meeting of the Information Bureau, this clique has travelled all the way from bourgeois nationalism to fascism and outright betrayal of the national interests of Yugoslavia. (Communist Party of Yugoslavia in the Power of Murderers and Spies, Cominform, November 1949. MIA. The same document can be found in the 'Revolutionary Democracy Organization of India' archives section) (IMG)

The Cominform states' media had repeatedly noted the fact that the Tito-Rankovic gang had been fascists long before 1948, but in the above excerpt, they meant that the Tito-Rankovic gang had, by 1949, successfully advanced the character of the Yugoslav regime from a bourgeois-nationalist state seeking to conquer the Balkans with the support of the Anglo-Americans, to a regime that was openly comprador fascist, further serving the interests of the Anglo-Americans. Indeed, the Cominform resolution clarified:

The change-over of the Tito clique to fascism was not fortuitous. It was effected on the order of their masters, the Anglo-American imperialists, whose mercenaries, it is now clear, this clique has been for long. (Communist Party of Yugoslavia in the Power of Murderers and Spies, Cominform, November 1949. MIA. The same document can be found in the 'Revolutionary Democracy Organization of India' archives section) (IMG)

To be clear, Tito's gang needed no 'orders' from the Anglo-American imperialists in such a shift of Yugoslavia into their camp, for Tito's gang would have transformed Yugoslavia along such fascist lines anyways, without 'orders' from 'above'. Tito's gang were indeed foreign agents but so is it also true that they represented the comprador classes, the slave-owners, the kulaks, the bureaucrats, and all of these comprador classes aggressively pushed for the conquest of Yugoslavia by these reactionaries; the reactionary classes of Yugoslavia saw the partnership with Anglo-American finance capital not as a 'submission' to but as a partnership with finance capital. To put it simply, there was no need for 'orders' to be received.

Furthermore, by definition, the national-bourgeoisie and national industrial capitalist development require there to be a movement for the independence of Yugoslavia, which was clearly not the case in the Tito regime, because that regime represented the interests of the comprador classes allied to Anglo-American finance capital. Hence, the Cominform continued:

Recent events show that the Yugoslav Government is completely dependent on foreign imperialist circles and has become an instrument of their aggressive policy, which has resulted in the liquidation of the independence of the Yugoslav Republic. (Communist Party of Yugoslavia in the Power of Murderers and Spies, Cominform, November 1949. MIA. The same document can be found in the 'Revolutionary Democracy Organization of India' archives section) (IMG)

Another misconception that exists is that Titoist Yugoslavia was a capitalist state. It was 'capitalist' in the sense that the Anglo-American finance capital as well as the corrupt bureaucratic oligarchs and kulaks as comprador bourgeoisie governed Yugoslavia. However, the word 'capitalist' in describing Yugoslavia often misleads people into thinking that Yugoslavia was a dictatorship of the national industrial bourgeoisie, which was clearly not the case. It is important to mention that in reality, feudalism and slavery – not national industrial capitalism – were the predominant domestic modes of production and the Cominform were very clear in stating this. There were many quotes from the Cominform states' media confirming this, but just to repeat one of them, here it is from the USSR Information Bulletin, the media organ of the Soviet Embassy in USA:

The Titoite's attempts to force the workers to accept conditions of slavery ... are meeting with constantly increasing resistance. (The Yugoslav People's Struggle Against the Tito Clique, P. Zyablov, September 8, 1950. In: USSR Information Bulletin, Vol. 10, No. 17, p. 544) (IMG)

There were CIA documents, excerpts of Djilas memoirs, and Soviet Foreign Ministry documents, previously cited, that confirmed that slavery was the mode of production in Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia was a 'capitalist' country only in the sense that Anglo-American and West German finance capital, as well as Yugoslavia's own parasitic mercantile bourgeoisie, kulak bourgeoisie, corrupt bureaucrat oligarchs, drug cartels, enslavement businesses, extermination market competitions, and settler-colonial businesses were running the show. Beyond such parasitic form of corrupt, comprador, and/or colonial capitalism, Titoist Yugoslavia was not a capitalist country, but was rather feudal and slave-owning. Inevitably, communist pressures did weaken the comprador bourgeoisie in Yugoslavia, allowing for some extremely limited rooms of operation for the national bourgeoisie, but all of that was thanks to communist support for anti-colonial progressive bourgeois-democratic struggles and in spite of Titoism. The Cominform stated:

The Yugoslav rulers demagogically and insolently deceive the people, alleging they are building socialism in Yugoslavia.

But it is clear to every Marxist that there can be no talk of building socialism in Yugoslavia when the Tito clique has broken with the Soviet Union, with the entire camp of socialism and democracy, thereby depriving Yugoslavia of the main bulwark for building socialism and when it has subordinated the country economically and politically to Anglo-American imperialists.

The State sector in the economy of Yugoslavia has ceased to be people's property, since State power is in the hands of enemies of the people.

The Tito-Rankovic clique has created wide possibilities for the penetration of foreign [finance] capital into the economy of the country, and has placed the economy under the control of [finance] capitalist monopolies.

Anglo-American industrial-financial circles investing their capital in Yugoslav economy, are transforming Yugoslavia into an agrarian-raw materials adjunct of foreign capital.

The ever growing slavish dependence of Yugoslavia on imperialism leads to intensified exploitation of the working class and to a severe worsening of its conditions.

The policy of the Yugoslav rulers in the countryside bears a kulak-capitalistic character.

(Communist Party of Yugoslavia in the Power of Murderers and Spies, Cominform, November 1949. MIA. The same document can be found in the 'Revolutionary Democracy Organization of India' archives section) (IMG)

C12S6. Titoists unleash Serbian Settler-Colonialism and Apartheid against Kosovar Albanians *** IMG-All-{Kosovo}

The Serbs were by no means the only victims of genocide by Tito's group. Starting from 1944-1945 onwards, Tito's gang, ever the masters of fomenting inter-ethnic division, also began to support Serbian settler-colonialism in Kosovo, and enforced a campaign of ethnic cleansing and systematic extermination against the Albanians of Kosovo as well. In mainland Serbia, the Serbs were to be the victims of a genocide, and in Kosovo, the Serbs were to be used for settler-colonization on the corpses of Albanians – such was the Titoist plan. At the same time, while ethnic cleansing against the Albanians of Kosovo was being pursued, Albanian 'Islamic' fundamentalist ultra-reactionary enemies of the Orthodox Christians, were placed in charge of the local Kosovar Albanian regime collaborating with the Serbian settler-colonizers. The anti-Serb chauvinists and Serbian chauvinists were allied and closely collaborative. As mentioned before, the 'Alliance of Chauvinisms' was something that Tito's gang were masters at; they supported seemingly 'contradictory' chauvinisms simultaneously, albeit in differing geographic zones, as a method of preventing popular unity and 'perpetuating' colonial rule. The Yugoslav regime was a pan-chauvinist terror regime.

What follows is a documentation of the ethnic cleansing and genocide against the Albanians of Kosovo, and the promotion of settler-colonialism against them, using documents from the archives of the USSR, People's Democratic Albania, CIA, US Congress, etc. Both the Cominform bloc media and US-led bloc sources confirm that a policy of ethnic cleansing and systematic extermination was pursued against the Albanians of Kosovo during this period, although the Cominform bloc media puts the scale of the genocide at a higher level than the CIA does.

Referring to Vaso Cubrilovic's 1937 memorandum, Joseph J. Dioguardi, a Republican Congressman and anti-Soviet scholar, admitted, in a briefing to the US Congress's Committee on International Relations, that one of the:

ultranationalist demons [who] were spawned by this paper, [was] Aleksandar Rankovic.... (The Future of Kosovo, Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 2003, p. 57) (IMG)

Thus, the Yugoslav intelligence chief was directly inspired by Vaso Cubrilovic. The Soviet media too confirmed that the Yugoslav regime leadership had researched into the archives of the previous regimes in order to foment inter-ethnic tension and hatred:

In their endeavour to undermine the unity of the peoples and to strengthen their domination in the country, the Belgrade fascists are fanning race hatred and chauvinism to the utmost. They have extracted from the archives and put into action all the features of the chauvinism of Greater Serbia, which is spearheaded against the Bulgarian, Albanian, Hungarian, Romanian and other national minorities within Yugoslavia. ('Tito's Yugoslavia, Country of Prisons And Concentration Camps', P. Zyablov, May 26, 1950. In: USSR Information Bulletin, Volume 10, p. 320) (IMG)

The following excerpts from the 1937 memorandum by Cubrilovic indeed served as the blueprint of the actions of Tito's gang against Kosovo:

Without doubt, the main cause for the lack of success in our colonization of these regions was that the best land remained in the hands of the Albanians. The only possible means for our mass colonization of these regions to succeed is for us to take the land away from them. This could have been achieved easily during the rebellion after the war, when the insurgents were active, by expelling part of the Albanian population to Albania, by refusing to legalize their usurpations and by buying up their pasture land. Here, we must refer once again to the gross error committed in our post-war strategy, that of the right to own land. Instead of taking advantage of the strategy used by the Albanians themselves for ownership of the land they usurped (scarcely any of them had deeds issued by the Turks, and those who did, got them only for land purchased), we not only legalized all these usurpations to the detriment of our state and nation, but worse still, we accustomed the Albanians to western European attitudes to private property. Prior to that, they could never have understood such concepts. In this way, we ourselves handed them a weapon with which to defend themselves, keeping the best land for themselves and rendering impossible the nationalization of a region of supreme importance to us. (The Expulsion of the Albanians – Memorandum, Vaso Cubrilovic, 1937. Retrieved from: Albanian History, Robert Elsie) (IMG)

Agitators, especially from Turkey, must be found as quickly as possible to promote the evacuation, if Turkey will provide them for us. They must laud the beauties of the new territories in Turkey and the easy and pleasant life to be had there, and must kindle religious fanaticism among the masses and awaken pride in the Turkish state. Our press can be of colossal assistance by describing how gently

the evacuation of the Turks from Dobruja took place and how easily they settled in their new regions. Such information would create the requisite predisposition for the masses of Albanians to be willing to leave.

Another means would be coercion by the state apparatus. The law must be enforced to the letter so as to make staying intolerable for the Albanians: fines, imprisonment, the ruthless application of all police regulations, such as the prohibition of smuggling, cutting forests, damaging agriculture, leaving dogs unchained, compulsory labour and any other measure that an experienced police force can contrive. From the economic aspect, this should include the refusal to recognize old land deeds. The work of the land registry should be accompanied from the start by the ruthless collection of taxes and the payment of all private and public debts, the requisitioning of all public and municipal pasture land, the cancellation of concessions, the withdrawal of permits to exercise an occupation, dismissal from government, private and municipal offices etc., all of which will speed up the process of evacuation. Health measures should include the harsh application of all regulations, even within homes, the pulling down of encircling walls and high hedges around private houses, and the rigorous implementation of veterinary measures which will result in a ban on selling livestock on the market, etc. All these measures can be applied in a practical and effective way. The Albanians are very touchy when it comes to religion. They must therefore be harassed on this score, too. This can be achieved through the ill-treatment of their clergy, the demolition of their cemeteries, the prohibition of polygamy, and especially the inflexible application of the regulation compelling girls to attend elementary school, wherever they are. Private initiative, too, can assist greatly in this direction. We should distribute weapons to our colonists, as need be. The old form of Chetnik action should be organized and secretly assisted. In particular, a mass migration of Montenegrins should be launched from the mountain pastures in order to create a large-scale conflict with the Albanians in Metohija. This conflict should be prepared and encouraged by people we can trust. This can be easily achieved since the Albanians have, indeed, revolted. The whole affair can be presented as a conflict between clans and, if need be, can be ascribed to economic reasons. Finally, local riots can be incited. These will be bloodily suppressed by the most effective means, though by colonists from the Montenegrin clans and the Chetniks, rather than by means of the army.

There remains one more method Serbia employed with great practical effect after 1878, that is, secretly razing Albanian villages and urban settlements to the ground.

(The Expulsion of the Albanians – Memorandum, Vaso Cubrilovic, 1937. Retrieved from: Albanian History, Robert Elsie) (IMG)

In view of all that has been said, it is no coincidence that in our examination of colonization in the south, we hold the view that the only effective means of solving this problem is the mass expulsion of the Albanians. Gradual colonization has had no success in our country, nor in other countries for that matter. If the state wishes to intervene in favour of its own people in the struggle for land, it can only be successful by acting brutally. Otherwise, the native, who has his roots in his place of birth and is at home there, will always be stronger than the colonist. In our case, we must keep this fact very much in mind, because we have to do with a hardy, resistant and prolific race which the late Cvijic described as being the most expansive in the Balkans. From 1870 to 1914, Germany spent billions of marks on the gradual colonization of its eastern territories by purchasing land from the Poles, but the fecundity of Polish women defeated German organization and money. Thus, Poland regained its Poznan in 1918. Our above-mentioned statistics of the 1921-1931 period show that it was the fecundity of Albanian women which defeated our colonization policy, too. We must draw our conclusions from this, and we must do so quickly while there is still time to correct matters. (The Expulsion of the Albanians – Memorandum, Vaso Cubrilovic, 1937. Retrieved from: Albanian History, Robert Elsie) (IMG)

From 1944 onwards, Tito's gang pursued the Trotskyite economic policy of superficially 'leaping' from feudalism, fascism and slavery straight to 'socialism'. The regime established rapid agricultural 'collectivization'. Given the absence of good quality machinery in Yugoslavia, and the extreme poverty of the peasants, this policy resulted in severe impoverishment. The collectors from the regime would come and steal almost all of the personal products of the Albanian peasants while offering very little in return. This was in vast contrast to the Soviet policy which gave agricultural machinery and technical instruments to peasants in exchange for grain collection (see C5S3). Prisons in Kosovo were filled up with poor starving Albanian peasants whose entire property was confiscated simply because they were too poor to pay their taxes to the regime (just like in the case of the Serbs). Numerous others were jailed simply because their relative was in jail. Still, others had the fruits of their labour confiscated upon false charges of lacking permits to sell their products, when in fact it was the regime itself which told the Albanian peasantry that they can sell their products. Excerpts of a CIA document on the topic are as follows:

In line with [Trotskyite] Communist economy, the Partisans began in 1944 with the establishment of collective farming or cooperatives. This contributed greatly toward the impoverishment of the population. The peasant who formerly had enough to live on eventually became quite poor, and consequently lost interest in his work or labor. He became indifferent to whether the crop was good or poor, since the State took all but the prescribed minimum for his own needs. Agricultural products and cattle were merely taken away from peasants by members of the local board of the Communist Party. Families with enough bread even on holidays were rare, for the State took away wheat from the Albanian peasant, and gave only a little corn in return. In addition to this, there were voluntary loans contributed to by the peasants, and organized by regional committees of the Party. In this regard a campaign would be launched, and the citizens called upon to compete in offering to the State the surplus of their crop in the form of grain, wool, meat, honey, or similar products. Collectors would then proceed from house to house seizing the property of undesirable persons such as those who were not Party members, ... or persons who had relatives in prison. Under such circumstances, how could one expect the peasant to work with zeal. He was obliged to sell all he had at home, and all the yields of his crop, or go to prison. This is the reason that there are so many Albanians in the penitentiaries of Gnjilane, Ferizaj, and Nis. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 11) (IMG)

When the Government had sequestered its share of the foodstuffs and crops of the peasants, it would issue a proclamation that they were free to sell their products on the open market. Only then could one note a handful of peasants coming to town to sell a few meager items and to purchase others. Usually the first day at the market would pass calmly. On the second or third day, however, the militia would appear, take the name of the sellers, and seize their goods on the grounds that they lacked permits to sell the merchandise in question. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 11) (IMG)

At the same time, the Yugoslav regime plotted the annihilation of the communists of Kosovo, obstacles to the Titoist agenda. A prominent figure among these Kosovar Albanian communists was none other than Miladin Popovic. In a 1989 interview with the Yugoslav regime press, Nijaz Dizdarevic, a prominent lifelong Yugoslav foreign affairs official under Tito, rendered a remarkable confession on the relations between Tito's gang, with which Dizdarevic officially identified, and Miladin Popovic. Dizdarevic said:

Popovic over-identified with the Albanians. He showed unsatisfactory firmness on some strategic questions, especially Kosova. Miladin caused problems and difficulties, making contact between us and the Albanian leadership difficult. Miladin was very close to Enver Hoxha, much closer than some individual members of the Albanian politburo. However, Miladin was killed so that he could not give his view of those relations. He suddenly began to speak about the Albanian Party being independent. (The Albanians: A Modern History, Miranda Vickers, p. 157. Citing: Interview with Nijaz Dizdarevic, Nin, January 29, 1989, pp. 20-21) (IMG)

Indeed, as Dizdarevic said, because Tito's group wanted to prevent Popovic from giving his view of those relations,:

On 14 March 1945, Haki Taha, a teacher, assassinated [Miladin] Popovic in Pristina. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 8) (IMG)

The assassination was almost certainly carried out upon the orders of Tito's gang. Miranda Vickers of the ICG think tank agrees:

Miladin Popovic ... was most probably killed by the Yugoslavs, due to his intimacy with the Albanian leadership – which as Dizdarevic says, made dealings with the Albanians at that time difficult. (The Albanians: A Modern History, Miranda Vickers, p. 266) (IMG)

In 1945, the Albanian Communist Party went along with the Yugoslav regime's narrative on the murder of Popovic. Later, when Albania grew independent of the Yugoslav regime, they clarified that Yugoslavia was responsible for murdering this hero of the anti-fascist liberation war, Popovic. Enver Hoxha too believed that Miladin Popovic was murdered by the Titoist Yugoslavs. After the assassination of M. Popovic, the death was in turn utilized by the Yugoslav regime as a pretext to annihilate another 1,600 Albanian communists from Kosovo:

The Slav Communists took revenge for the death of Popovic by shooting 1,600 Kosovar members of Communist brigades stationed at Bar, Montenegro. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 8) (IMG)

One gets the feeling that the Titoist regime was inspired by the lies and slanders against Stalin concerning the Kirov assassination – that Stalin supposedly 'ordered' the murder of Kirov, and then used that as an alleged 'excuse' to exterminate 'millions' of 'good' CPSU members.

Anyways, in a 1950 article, the Soviet Foreign Ministry's media reported that during this time period, as many as '10 times more Albanians' were slaughtered under Tito's regime than the overall death toll of Albanians under the rule of Yugoslavia's infamously anti-Albanian 'Karadjordje dynasty':

With the seizure of power by the Tito-Rankovic clique, however, the position of the Albanian national minority became even than under the monarchy. While the war was still going on Tito's agents began persecution of the Albanian population – The Titoites killed 10 times more Albanians between November, 1944, and March, 1945, that is, in half a year, than perished in the 30 years of the reign of Karadjordje. ('Tito's Yugoslavia, Country of Prisons And Concentration Camps', P. Zyablov, May 26, 1950. In: USSR Information Bulletin, Volume 10, p. 320) (IMG)

Enver Hoxha too wrote:

It emerges from the testimony of witnesses and documental facts that more than 40,000 innocent persons fell victim to the bullets, bayonets and poison of Tito's secret service during the years 1944-1948. ('WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CRIMES OF GENOCIDE IN KOSOVA?', Zëri i Popullit, Enver Hoxha, August 31, 1966) (IMG)

Indeed, as the Soviets rightly claimed, Tito's gang launched a war of extermination on large segments of the Albanian population in Kosovo. Tito's gang, as the Soviets rightly asserted, cruelly terrorized the Albanian population to the point that the Greater Serbian chauvinist Yugoslav monarchy appeared moderate compared to the new Titoist Yugoslav regime:

The Tito fascist gang is also subjecting the Albanian national minority of 900,000 to cruel terror. Before the war the Greater Serbia chauvinists mercilessly exploited the Albanians, seized their lands, and did not give them the opportunity to live in one place. During the war Albanians took an active part in the national liberation struggle, hoping that Yugoslavia's liberation from the fascist invaders would bring them a happy life and freedom. With the seizure of power by the Tito-Rankovic clique, however, the position of the Albanian national minority became even worse than under the monarchy. ('Tito's Yugoslavia, Country of Prisons And Concentration Camps', P. Zyablov, May 26, 1950. In: USSR Information Bulletin, Volume 10, p. 320) (IMG)

Enver Hoxha wrote:

After the publication of the Resolution of the Cominform in 1948 in which Tito's betrayal of Marxism-Leninism and the cause of socialism was denounced, the Yugoslav revisionist leadership stepped up its savage all-round oppression of the Albanian population in Yugoslavia, who during the years 1948-1950 and again in the period from 1951-1966 were subjected to a wave of killings, arrests and inhuman tortures.

The Titoites use every means to incite fratricide among the Albanians, they not only revive the old blood feuds but also create new ones through various manoeuvres. To increase these feuds, the UDB officers, through their agents, organize the kidnapping and rape of Kosova girls and women, and then incite the Albanians to kill each other, while the laws envisage light sentences for these crimes, in order to encourage them.

('WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CRIMES OF GENOCIDE IN KOSOVA?', Zëri i Popullit, Enver Hoxha, August 31, 1966) (IMG)

The details provided by a US intelligence document serve as a testament to the facts presented by the Soviets. Countless Albanians, as the CIA report stated, were forced to participate in demonstrations in order to provide the Yugoslav regime an aura of 'popularity'. Those who refused to demonstrate in support of the regime were subjected to brutal physical and psychological torture. Countless Albanians were falsely framed as counter-revolutionary, were assassinated, or disappeared without a trace. These facts are backed by a US intelligence report:

Immediately after the [Titoist] Communists seized power in the Kosovo, they launched an active propaganda campaign, distributing leaflets throughout the region and organizing indoctrination courses which was compelled to attend. Those who were absent without justification were accused of sabotage, arrested, beaten, and then paraded through the streets under the supervision of OZNA officials. The populace was obliged to demonstrate by following them, and anyone who did not interrupt his work to follow the demonstration was also beaten and taken along with the prisoner to share his fate. The latter known as the UDB, was particularly active in 1946.

Numerous persons were assassinated or simply disappeared. (...). No specific law existed providing for the punishment of individuals dissatisfied with the newly created situation, and OZNA was therefore obliged to frame them as political criminals. If this was not possible, individuals considered to be undesirable were accused of belonging to some political group and sentenced by the local People's Court to from six months to one year of heavy labor. Presidents of these courts were confidential agents especially appointed for this purpose. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 10) (IMG)

Note that Kosovo was a province of the 'Republic' of Serbia in Yugoslavia. Although the Serbs formed the majority in the Republic of Serbia, the prisons of this territory were disproportionately filled with the Albanians of Kosovo:

The situation of the Kosovars had never been dangerous and as serious as it was between 1944 and 1948 when their only alternatives were prison, suicide, or humble acceptance of the [Titoist] Communist and Slav yoke. During this time there were at least three times as many Albanians as there were Slavs in penitentiaries of the Republic of Serbia. Every town had two or three OZNA sections, and each section had its own prison, guarded by the Army. Even the militia had its own prisons. The prisons of the Kosovo, where there were never less than six thousand prisoners, were crowded with Albanians. The largest penitentiary in the Kosovo Region, where there were never less than a thousand prisoners, is located in Pristina. Currently the construction of a prison with a capacity for two thousand prisoners is under way in this city. The largest penitentiary within the Republic of Serbia is in Nis. It contains approximately five thousand prisoners, four thousand of whom are Albanians. Here, where the soul of the prisoner is shaped by tortures to the body, the most refined methods are applied to break the patriotism of the Kosovars through "re-education". The prison has two departments, one known as "Hell", and the other as "Purgatory". The latter contained four thousand convicts in 1946 to 1948, 2,500 of whom were Albanians. In the prisons of Mitrovica, Pozarevac, and Kragujevac, four-fifths of the convicts were Albanians. One-half of the inmates in the Idrizov penitentiary of Skoplje are Albanians from Macedonia who are mistreated by the guards in the same manner as the Kosovars. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 10) (IMG)

These remarks by the CIA confirm the Soviet state media claim that:

Fierce fascist terror is reigning now in the Albanian villages of Yugoslavia. Thousands of peaceful and innocent [Albanian] citizens have been driven into concentration camps. ('Tito's Yugoslavia, Country of Prisons And Concentration Camps', P. Zyablov, May 26, 1950. In: USSR Information Bulletin, Volume 10, p. 320) (IMG)

The massacres of the Albanians of Kosovo goes back to the days of the Great Patriotic War. For example, in 1943, the MI6-backed Chetniks and the MI6-backed Titoist 'partisans' carried out a massacre against Albanians:

In the winter of 1943 there were large-scale massacres of Kosovars in Rozaj. Five hundred men were killed by knives and machine gun fire in the attacks first by the Chetniks, and later by the Partisans. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 3) (IMG)

Enver Hoxha on the other hand referred to the massacres that occurred in 1944:

The Albanian population in Yugoslavia will never forget the tragic event of autumn 1944 when the Tito-Ranković gang arrested 10,000 Albanians in Tetova and shot 1,200 of them out of hand without trial, not to mention those who died in the prisons. Cynicism, savagery and fury to exterminate the Albanians have always characterized the actions of the Titoite bandits. When a group of Albanian patriots protested to the Titoite command about these crimes, General Apostolski, the then commander of the First Macedonian Brigade, answered: «This is nothing, we are just doing a clean-up. Those that were killed had to be got rid of.» And Vukmanović-Tempo who was present at that time ordered: «Are you still holding people in camps? Those you have to get rid of, clean them out quickly.» This order from the personal representative of Tito was carried out with great zeal. In November 1944 thousands of innocent Albanian peasants were shot down in the streets in Macedonia, burnt to death, or deliberately infected with typhoid which killed them.

Generation after generation the Albanian people in Yugoslavia will remember with irrepressible hatred for the bloody Titoite clique, the massacre of Drenica in winter 1944 when the Yugoslav divisions, under the pretext of cleaning up enemy elements, surrounded the liberated zone of Drenica and massacred about 30,000 Albanian men, women and children. The event at Drenica was sheer butchery, a systematic organized annihilation of the population of Albanian nationality in these regions.

(‘WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CRIMES OF GENOCIDE IN KOSOVA?’, Zëri i Popullit, Enver Hoxha, August 31, 1966) (IMG)

To kill the Albanians meant not just the physical destruction of Albanian individuals but also the destruction of the Kosovo Albanians' sense of nationhood, the spread of rootless cosmopolitanism among the Albanian populace. Hence, Tito's gang pursued some of its preliminary steps towards the ban on the Albanian language. Between 1944 and 1948, the Albanian language was technically not banned by the regime; however, some steps were taken towards an eventual ban. As will be shown later, this fact was described in 1950 by the Soviet press. For now, however, some of the details confirmed by the US intelligence will be presented here. Initially, in post-war Kosovo, the:

official language was Albanian, but this concession suffered various obstructions in March and April 1945. Thus for example, the [settler-colonial] Serbs pretended that Albanians lacked technical terms corresponding to those in Serb, especially in the field of administration. They also averred that the creation of special schools would be necessary, if the Albanian language were to be used, and this involved a great loss of time and great expense. As a result, the Serbs tried to persuade the Albanians that the existence of Albanian alongside Serbian was futile, since the Kosovars understood the latter. Gradually, the Serbian language replaced Albanian both in civilian and military offices, although some traces of the Albanian language could still be found in public offices until the latter part of 1945. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 12) (IMG)

In schools, the Yugoslav regime prevented the Albanians of Kosovo from being educated about their history. Those Albanians who knew the history of their country were being compelled to accept the blatantly revisionist historiography of the Serbian settler-colonists, who dared to openly question the Albanian ethnicity of Skanderbeg:

As was the case before the war, Albanian history was still not taught in the schools. Any student who knew any facts of Albanian history had learned them through his own patriotic initiative. The Serbs dared even to dispute the origin of Skanderbeg. Whenever the story of Skanderbeg came up for discussion, Party officials would declare that the problem had not as yet been solved. Its solution was finally entrusted to Dusan Mugosa. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 13) (IMG)

The poor-quality education for Albanians helped compel them to adopt Serbian as their language:

The schools continued to maintain correspondence in the Albanian language with the educational centers to which they were subordinate, but even this procedure went out of practice when necessity demanded a greater speed and efficiency in dealing with Communist officials. Translating into Serbian took time and rendered the work more laborious. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 12) (IMG)

Albanian textbooks for reading and arithmetic were published in 1946 and 1947, and were used in the first, second, and third grades of elementary schools. The speller was published at the same time. The reader and geography book for the fourth grade of elementary schools were likewise published in 1947. The science book for the first grade of high school was published in 1947, with the exception of the speller, all the above publications had been translated from Serbian. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 13) (IMG)

The Yugoslav regime authorities also employed various excuses to deprive the Kosovar Albanians of the opportunity to present cultural events in their own language:

When a group of Albanians desired to present a play in their own language, all types of excuses were fabricated to prevent them from renting a theater for this purpose. In response to requests, the Party would state that the principle and desire were legitimate, but that various difficulties were involved such as lack of Albanian costumes, lack of appropriate furniture, decorations, scenarios, et cetera.

These replies were as often as not delayed. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 13) (IMG)

With the expulsion of Tito's gang from the Cominform, the ruling fascist group in Yugoslavia unmasked itself ever more. The regime cruised with full force towards the settler-colonization of Kosovo. As stated by the Soviet press – particularly the USSR Information Bulletin, a media outlet of the Soviet foreign ministry – the Yugoslav regime depopulated the Albanian villages of Kosovo by enslaving their population. Referring to the situation in Kosovo, a Soviet press article stated:

Many villages are deserted since all the able-bodied population has been driven off to forced labor in the mines. ('Tito's Yugoslavia, Country of Prisons And Concentration Camps', P. Zyablov, May 26, 1950. In: USSR Information Bulletin, Volume 10, pp. 320-321) (IMG)

Decades, prior, Leon Trotsky had openly advocated for the 'militarization of labour' – the establishment of conscripted compulsory labour brigades, an extremely unpopular and reactionary idea aimed at enslaving the masses (see C5S1). Yet again, Trotsky's idea was implemented in Yugoslavia. The CIA confirmed:

A large number of young people from the Kosovo were compelled to work on construction projects such as canals, roads, and railroads, or on the reconstruction of Belgrade. Whatever construction projects were carried out in the Kosovo were not for the benefit of the Kosovars. New buildings erected were meant to quarter Serbian and Montenegrin officials. Likewise, in the interests of the Slav colonists, new homes were build, lands made fit for cultivation, factories constructed, roads laid down, and forests exploited; but the manpower for such work was provided by the Albanians. Albanians had to be satisfied with hard labor and a morsel of dry bread. Serbians and Montenegrins on the other hand were not to be seen at this type of work since more lofty jobs were reserved for them in government offices, within the militia, or in other supervisory capacities. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 11) (IMG)

This zone, populated overwhelmingly by Albanians, was openly ruled by non-Albanian settler-colonial Titoist bureaucrats who composed the ethnically privileged Slavic minority in Kosovo:

Yugoslav Communists upon assuming power, did not desire to find themselves in open contradiction to promises made to the Albanians in 1945 by leaders of the National Liberation Movement, and kept many senior officials of the Albanian minority in the Government. The majority of these officials demonstrated great flexibility in adapting themselves to the new situation. From 1950 on, however, the trend was to turn over the better positions to Serbians and Montenegrins. The Montenegrins in particular became easily assimilated with the population of the Kosmet. Gjoko Pajkovic from Berana became chief of the Regional Council, while numerous subsidiary, councils were headed by other Montenegrins. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 27) (IMG)

The Yugoslav regime exploited the suffering of the Serbs under the Nazi yoke as a pretext to oblige the Kosovo Albanians to accept Serbian settlers in their houses at terribly low rent prices, hence even forcing entire Albanian families to live in a single room to make way for the Serb settlers:

Albanians are obliged to take in Serbian employees coming to the Kosmet, as roomers. There have been cases when entire families were assigned to a single room to make way for the newcomer, who need only pay an illusory monthly rental of 150 dinars per room. This sum will not even cover the electricity consumed by the tenant. On the other hand, homes of Montenegrins and Serbians are not registered with the housing office. This is alleged to be done as a compensation for their suffering during the past war. In recent times, Serbians have been known to rent their rooms for a monthly profit of from 600 to 1,500 dinars. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 28) (IMG)

The fascist 'law' enforcement agencies of Tito's criminal gang cruelly discriminated against the Kosovo Albanians, crushing them with higher taxes and payment obligations, starving them with higher grain contributions, and repressing them with excessive application of the 'laws':

Albanians in Yugoslavia are not treated in the same way as are the Montenegrins and Serbians. Proof of this is in the excessive application of the laws when dealing with the Albanians as opposed to the Montenegrins and Serbians; also in the higher quotas which they must meet in grain contributions to the State, in higher taxes, and in higher payments for other obligations demanded by the Government. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 28) (IMG)

Deliberately, the regime made food very expensive for the Albanian minority in Yugoslavia. From the starvation of the Albanians, the regime profited:

A common laborer or simple employee with family was allotted the following daily supplies for his ration coupons: 1 kilogram of com, 750 grams of meat, 250 grams of sugars 250 grams of butter, 1,250 grams of potatoes, 1 kilogram of onions, 250 grams of oil, 2 kilograms of cabbage, 1 kilogram of eggs, two apples, et cetera. Such individuals could never pay for the entire ration from their meager daily salary of from 100 to 120 dinars. The prices for these foods are exorbitant considering the fact that these foods are obtained in the form

of gifts from the producers, and cost the Government nothing. The Government will not allow free market prices on food products because of the huge profits it makes through fixed prices. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 18) (IMG)

Let there be no doubt that such profits obtained by the regime were invested not in Kosovo (also known as Kosmet):

Kosmet area is not a direct recipient of aid.... (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 18) (IMG)

As can be seen, the Trotskyite economic policy of Tito's group – the ban on market prices even though they were cheaper – rendered the Albanians extremely miserable, paving the way for the reduction of the number of Albanians inhabiting Kosovo. Trotskyite economic policy was aimed at perpetuating the settler-colonial fascist apartheid project.

In Kosovo, many Albanians were poorly dressed because the textiles were even more expensive than food:

Materials and textiles are even more difficult to obtain than foodstuffs because of the extremely high prices for such items. It is a rarity to see anyone wearing a new suit, and if an individual is seen sporting such a garment, he is invariably suspected of black market activities at the expense of the population. The purchase of textiles and other merchandise is rendered difficult through lack of currency.

(Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 18) (IMG)

Economically, Tito's group was not consistently Trotskyite left-opportunist, however. So long as economically right-deviationist policies were useful to the settler-colonial ethnic cleansing project, they were adopted. Thus, unemployment among the Albanians in Kosovo was particularly high and was only on the increase. After being viciously exploited by their fascist bourgeois bosses, the Albanian workers, if injured during work, would be fired and left to starve; under the apartheid regime, many Serbian settler-colonial doctors would refuse to treat these handicapped Albanian workers:

The somewhat improved economic conditions in the Kosovo area have not alleviated the problem of unemployment, which appears to be steadily increasing. A brief visit to any of the towns in the Kosmet region, such as Pec, Kosovska Mitrovica or Pristina, will be sufficient to give the onlooker an idea of the situation. Here in public squares large groups of Albanian peasants will be seen waiting from dawn to dusk for some kind of manual labor. Speaking to each one of them will reveal a story of misery. They are starving perhaps because of having lost a limb in the mines of Serbia and having, as a result, been abandoned to a tragic fate. In many cases, Serbian doctors refuse to tend to them. It is of little assistance to be supplied with documents certifying to disability incurred in an industrial accident. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 19) (IMG)

High unemployment was valued by the Yugoslav regime, for it helped to increase the number of lumpen-proletarians instead of proletarians. The lumpen-proletarians constitute a reactionary stratum of individuals, who, having been extremely immiserated and devoid of contact with the productive forces, begin to resort to banditry. The lumpen-proletarians thus become useful recruits for international terrorism. Oppressed and poor as they have been, they become allies of the oppressors who got them into such a state, and serve as their terrorists. The pan-chauvinist Yugoslav regime, the regime of the parasitic classes above all finance capital, had every interest in under-developing those areas, preventing the rise of a proletarian class that would have resisted the regime in Kosovo. They opted for the lumpen-proletarianization of large segments of the population.

Why did the Albanians of Kosovo not rise up to resist such large-scale oppression? Surely, there was some resistance, but the bulk of the population failed to mount a resistance against the regime, and it was not just because the UDB was mighty; the reason why the bulk of the Kosovar Albanian population, just like most of the other peoples of Yugoslavia, failed to stand up against the regime was that years of colonialism had rendered those areas devoid of a high development of the productive forces, and hence devoid of a large 'army' of proletarians having nothing to lose but to stand up against finance capital. Instead, the bulk of the population was petit-bourgeois, and the petit-bourgeoisie – unlike the kolkhozniks and the grand bourgeoisie who are capable of taking risks thanks to the cushion provided by their large businesses – are unwilling to risk losing their small businesses by fighting against finance capital. The predominance of the petit-bourgeoisie in addition to the lumpen-proletarianization of portions of the population rendered resistance against the fascist Yugoslav regime, weak. This is much like how, with the exception of proletarianized cities such as Jenin, the bulk of the Palestinian Arab population in the West Bank has historically been unwilling to resist Zionist oppression even though they have much more economic resources than Gaza, and during those times in which they have 'resisted', most of these 'resisters' 'resisted' through terrorism against civilians in Israel proper instead of targeting the IDF terrorists. Insofar as is concerned the failure to resist, the situation in Kosovo was not entirely different than in the West Bank.

Anyways, in this right-deviationist terror struggle against the Albanian people, the bourgeois class and the religious priests became the allies of Tito's group:

Individuals who were discriminated against in 1945 such as businessmen whose property was confiscated, and other persons who were prohibited the practice of their religious functions were now being favorably approached. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 24) (IMG)

The Trotskyite leaps made during the mid-1940s were not progressive either; at the time, Kosovo needed an NEP; the confiscation of the properties of medium-sized businesses and the ban against religious priests was an extremely toxic left-sectarian measure. After a period of Trotskyism, when the communist revolutionary forces in Kosovo had been eroded in strength enough, the Tito regime was embarking on the right-opportunist course of installing the priestly stratum and the bourgeoisie in charge. The Tito regime, which had waged a Medieval-style campaign against Islam in Kosovo, began to support terrorist Muslim fanatics in that region. Tito's group deliberately employed terrorist Muslim fanatics as a force in pursuit of its settler-colonial objectives. As confirmed by a CIA report:

The main aim of Yugoslav internal policy in Kosmet, is to transform the Moslem Kosovars.... (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 23) (IMG)

And:

Men without conscience are chosen from among fanatic Kosovar Moslems ... and placed in the employ of the Serbian Government, either in administrative posts in the Kosovo, or in offices for public education. The purpose is to weaken the nationalist sentiments of the Kosovars. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 23) (IMG)

Thus, contrary to the depiction of Tito's clique as a group inspired by secular Enlightenment values, the fascist gang launched the struggle against Islam out of Medieval chauvinism. Supporting the terrorist 'fanatic Kosovar Moslems' in Kosovo gave Tito's clique the means to conduct terror attacks against Albanians. The regime's funding of jihadists worked to foster religious conflict between the Christians and Muslims and served the chauvinist drive to eliminate Yugoslavia's Muslim 'problem':

To separate Albanians of the Moslem faith from the Catholic Albanians, and thereby to do away for all time with the problem of an Albanian Moslem minority; (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 26) (IMG)

All of these “Yugoslav policies in the Kosmet region, the application of which Dusan Mugosa is largely responsible,” said the CIA document, were a part of the larger Titoist-fascist effort:

To take advantage of hostile dissensions among the population in order to eliminate Albanian nationalism. Thus in the event of a war, large-scale nationalist movements would be prevented at the very inception without the need to resort to much bloodshed, since one must keep in mind that in the event of hostilities, Albanian nationalists would not lack the support of the Albanian Government; (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 26) (IMG)

Having colonized the Albanians of Kosovo, and deprived them of basic living standards, the Yugoslav regime not only refused to sanitize the Kosovo region with its enormous medical supplies, but also deployed teams there to film the poorer regions of Kosovo, using these films to propagate the narrative among the non-Albanian Yugoslav public that the Albanians are incapable of achieving a higher standard of living:

A group of fifty sanitation officers came to the Kosmet in the summer of 1950 equipped with medical supplies of all kinds. Instead of alleviating human suffering, they gave lectures on socialism, and took films in the very poor homes of the gypsies. These films were later shown to the Yugoslav public under the title of "Life in the Metohij". Not a single two-story building was shown, nor for that matter, any of the picturesque castles of the region. The purpose of this type of propaganda was to convince the Communist public of the incapacity of the Albanian people to rise to a higher social plane, and of the prodigious efforts undertaken by the regime to improve the life of these semi-primitive people. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 28) (IMG)

Tito's gang propagated rootless cosmopolitanism, seeking to wipe out the Albanian language and culture in Kosovo. As the Soviet press – particularly the USSR Information Bulletin, a media outlet of the Soviet foreign ministry – rightly reported:

In many villages and districts where the population speaks only Albanian, as in Gornaya Reka or in Kichevsk Uyezd, teaching in the native tongue is not permitted. ('Tito's Yugoslavia, Country of Prisons And Concentration Camps', P. Zyablov, May 26, 1950. In: USSR Information Bulletin, Volume 10, p. 320) (IMG)

One of the goals of the Tito regime was:

To smooth the way for a census in the Kosmet in order to convince the interested Powers that the Albanians do not represent 85 per cent of the population but rather less than 50 per cent; (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, pp. 26-27) (IMG)

The goal of this propaganda was to break the hope of the Albanians of Kosovo and to prevent them from resisting the Titoist-fascist regime's oppressive rule. In pursuit of this settler-colonial project, the ruling gang initiated a policy of ethnocide against the Albanian population of Kosovo.

The US intelligence provided details supporting the Soviet claims:

Details of the plan to denationalize the Albanian minority were discussed at numerous secret meetings held in the Inspectorate for Education in Pristina, at Communist Party meetings, and in the home of Gjoko Pajkovic. In this regard, three meetings are known to have been held by Pajkovic, two by Dusan Mugosa, one by Petar Stambolic, president of the Republic of Serbia, one by Mosa Pijade, and one by Aleksis Aksentijevic, former finance minister in the Serbian Government. The result, of all these meetings was the decision to take positive action against any Albanian “chauvinists” who dared raise their voices to question those who pretended that their mother tongue was the Turkish language. The first two prominent men to oppose such measures were individuals whose patriotic records were by no means immaculate. Perhaps after seven years of numerous criminal deeds they rose to the defense of their people as a result of a guilty conscience! Fadil Hoxha was dismissed from his position as president of the Regional Council for having argued that such procedure was not included in the Party directives. His release was effective upon the orders of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, and only because of his past Partisan services was he given a purely formal position of Inspector within the Communist Committee for Serbia. Xhavid Nimani, the other to succumb, was released from his position in the Economic Directorate of the Region. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 24) (IMG)

Although Turks represented a rather tiny minority in Kosovo, a program to forcefully Turkify the Kosovo population was initiated. Initially, in order to deceive the Albanian masses, the program began through persuasion and government sponsorship rather than brute force and terror:

Prior to 8 March 1951 when Turkish schools were established in the Kosmet upon the wishes of the Yugoslav Communist Party, a propaganda machine to campaign in support of same was put into action under the direction of Alush Gashi. Members of the Communist Party in the Kosmet are amazingly successful in interpreting even the slightest desires of the Central Committee communicated to them either by voice or letter. During a meeting of the Regional Committee on 12 March 1951, Gjoko Pajkovic, Secretary General of the Party, said that the Government was ready to give full support to all those speaking their mother tongue, the Turkish language at home, and who hoped to educate their children in this language. It is in this manner that the Yugoslav Government is firmly resolved to solve the question of anti-Slavism in the Kosmet. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 24) (IMG)

Then:

The 8th of March, 1951, a festivity day for the Anti-fascist Women of the Communist World, was chosen by the government authorities as the opening day for the Turkish language schools in the Kosovo. Presiding at the inauguration was Xhavid Nimani, member of the Communist Central Committee, and the address was delivered by Shaqir Ali, and a member of the Communist regional committee. On the morrow of the festivities, the latter stated that he would prefer to be a gypsy rather than to again consider himself as of Albanian origin. In his speech he said that socialism had a tendency to march with gigantic and dynamic steps toward cultural heights, and that the Albanian language, by nature poor, could not maintain the rhythm required to reach these lofty summits, and that consequently, it was necessary to study the Turkish language in order to get there. The 8th of March was planned in all its details by Communist supporters such as Boro Milatovic, member of the Committee for Public Education in 1944, Mita Milkovic, formerly president of the same committee, later Serbian minister for public education Jagosh Gjilasi, a Montenegrin, currently an instructor, Nikola Vojdovic, and Nikola Jasicic assisted by Alush Gashi, member of the Inspectorate for Public Education, and by Stathi Kostari. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 23) (IMG)

Not much less disgraceful is the following fact mentioned in the above quote: “Shaqir Ali, and a member of the [Titoist] [pseudo-]Communist regional committee ... [o]n the morrow of the festivities ... stated that he would prefer to be a gypsy rather than to again consider himself as of Albanian origin.” Tito’s gang, the agents of the perpetrators of the Holocaust, fanned chauvinism against the ‘Roma’ or ‘gypsy’ people.

Anyways, from then on:

Parents are advised to send their children to the Turkish school, and on the opening day attendance is called on the basis of the list drawn up by the commission. In this manner, parents find themselves in a fearful dilemma, not knowing whether to bow down to force or to follow their own conscience and desires. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 25) (IMG)

Shortly after, the language of the government authorities became Turkish as opposed to Albanian:

In order to further their own interests, a portion of the city-dwelling population adopted the Turkish language for commerce and dealings with the government. With time, however, many families came to feel that Albanian should only be used to talk to uneducated persons. A purely worldly reason led several Kosovar families to speak Turkish, in much the same manner as in certain mundane drawing rooms there is a craze to speak in French rather than the mother tongue. After thirty years of Serbian domination, however, the Turkish language spoken by this group has been corrupted by an admixture of Albanian and Slav words. Even giving instruction in the Moslem faith in Turkish has become difficult for the Kosovars. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 23) (IMG)

The teachers in Kosovo were instructed to promote the Turkish language over Albanian. ‘Among basic themes developed at such meetings in Prizren’ said the CIA report, ‘the following ... taken from a teacher’s notebook’ is significant:

Tactics to be employed in order to achieve the desired result are [to tell the Albanians] that the Albanian language is not as well developed as the Turkish language, and that it is not possible to continue to maintain a slackened pace in cultural development; (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, pp. 24-25) (IMG)

Another point made in the teacher’s notebook was that Enver Hoxha and his communist line were denounced as ‘Albanian chauvinist’, ‘Ballist’, and associated to fascist dictator Xhafer Deva. The point was as follows:

Avoid Albanian chauvinism which cannot benefit you, and endeavor to uncover the "Ballist" followers of Enver Hoxha and Xhafer Deva; and ... your children should be educated in Turkish schools. The Government will assist you in this end. Albanian chauvinists to date have done nothing for you. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 25) (IMG)

However:

Albanian instructors were quite naturally opposed to the loss of their students and some were brave enough to voice their opposition. As a result approximately one tenth of the teachers and instructors in Albanian were either imprisoned or lost their position while others were expelled from Yugoslavia on 30 July 1951; the latter were instructors, who upon their dismissal were invited to take out Yugoslav citizenship but declined. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 25) (IMG)

Hundreds of:

teachers ... became destitute after the closing of Albanian schools in 1951-52. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 25) (IMG)

The numerically declining high-quality Albanian language teachers in Kosovo were transferred to the villages and the poor-quality Albanian language teachers were promoted in the cities; the purpose of this was to promote the Turkish language in the cities until at a later time, the language would also be extended to the villages. As confirmed by the CIA:

Another method employed by the Yugoslav Communist Party to weaken the Albanians was to transfer capable instructors from the large cities to smaller ones. Teachers who were less qualified were appointed to their posts and the excuse proffered was that it was imperative to send the capable instructors to smaller backward areas where they would be instrumental in helping to raise the cultural level. The truth of the matter is that since Turkish schools were located in the larger cities, it was in the interest of the Government that Albanian schools should exist among inferior conditions so that the population would be attracted to Turkish schools. Serbian and Turkish schools received ample government support, while Albanian schools had great difficulty in obtaining even a small financial assistance, and even their premises and classrooms were taken away from them. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 26) (IMG)

Much the same was happening to the Albanian language students. The UDB canvassed Albanian houses in Kosovo and forced families to enroll their students in Turkish-language, rather than Albanian-language, schools:

A commission made up of two UDB officers and various zone representatives, community councillors and members of the Regional Committee, is in charge of recruiting the youth for registration in Turkish schools. This is done by a door-to-door canvas. The campaign is carried out with great vigor in Pristina and Prizren, whereas the drive is somewhat more reserved in Kosovska Mitrovica, Pee, Vucitrn and Chjilane. An arbitrary list is drawn up of the prospective pupils. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 25) (IMG)

As such:

Approximately 500 students, largely of the elementary grades, but also including numerous students of the gymnasium level, were obliged to abandon Albanian schools and enroll in Turkish schools in the 1951-52 semester. This number includes students attending schools at Manuse, Stanovci, Vucitxm and two other areas in the district of Pristina, where Turkish is largely spoken because of its Circassian population. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 25) (IMG)

The data provided by the CIA indicates that between 1950 and 1952, more than 2,000 Albanian students in Kosovo were forced to go to Turkish language schools.

The overwhelming majority of Albanian students in Kosovo – 60% of prospective and 40% of continuing students – were barred from pursuing their post-secondary education:

Recent laws stemming from a reorganization of the public education system in Yugoslavia demand that 40 per cent of the Albanian high school graduates be barred from further pursuit of their studies. In connection with this steps were taken in 1951 to eliminate as many as 60 per cent of the students at the examinations required for higher learning. It is alleged that the doors of the law faculty are barred to Albanian students so that they may not be in a position to defend their rights. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 27) (IMG)

The scholarships of the Albanian students was taken away from them:

In the early part of July 1951, the Committee of the Serbian Communist Party called together a group of Albanian students.... Upon this occasion the students were informed that 50 scholarships granted by the State had been reduced to 15. Of the officials present, Dusan Mugosa, Mehmet Hoxha, and Fadil Hoxha are listed among other Communist personalities. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 27) (IMG)

In spite of the countless obstacles they faced in Tito's settler-colonial fascist apartheid regime, the Albanians of Kosovo managed to be as educated as the non-Albanians:

University students of the Albanian minority in Yugoslavia have been able to achieve an intellectual level equal to that of the [non-Albanian] students. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 23) (IMG)

Among the:

Yugoslav policies in the Kosmet region, the application of which Dusan Mugosa is largely responsible.... (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 26) (IMG)

was:

To keep the Albanian minority at a low cultural level; (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 26) (IMG)

In order to keep the Albanian masses at a low cultural level, the Yugoslav apartheid state continued its policy of creating obstacles for Albanian cultural and artistic presentations in Kosovo:

It is customary during any Albanian artistic or cultural, and particularly dramatic presentations, to commence with a long speech in praise of Tito and the Communist Party for their deep understanding of the arts, and to express appreciation for the permission accorded Yugoslav writers to present their work to the public. All presentations given in the Albanian language are translations from the Serbo-Croat. As such they are deprived of interest, since they are already known to the theater-going public in their original versions. At the end of the presentation, agitators who customarily attend all Albanian cultural showings whistle or mock the actors in order to provoke the Albanians and to uncover among the audience those who voice their protest. Albanian actors are advised by the Communist Party to be well prepared, since an unfavorable reaction on the part of the public would make it necessary to discontinue the performance. Various methods are employed to provoke and rouse Albanian artists, and thus to prevent them from further appearing in public. In the summer of 1951, six prominent actors in the Kosmet were expelled from the theater and replaced by practically unknown actors. The intention was to convince the public that the Albanians can not act. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 27) (IMG)

Scholastic Year

<u>1950-51</u>	<u>1951-52</u>
Prizren : 97	800
Pristina : 63	350
Mitrovica : 90	200
Pec : 70	120
Gnjilane : 34	100
Vucitrn : 26	83
<u>380</u>	<u>1,653</u>

‘The [above] is a partial list of statistics covering Albanian students forced to attend Turkish schools;’

(Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 25) (IMG)

To sum it up, the:

Current Yugoslav ambitions in the Balkans are seriously opposed to demands ... for [the] recognition of the rights of the Kosovar people. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 22) (IMG)

With ‘considerable brutality’, reported another CIA document, the UDB ‘repressed’ the ‘Albanians in Yugoslavia’:

Concentrated in Kosovo, the Albanians in Yugoslavia were repressed by the [fascist] Serbian-dominated Yugoslav secret police, under Rankovic's command, with considerable brutality. (National Intelligence Survey 21; Yugoslavia; Government and Politics, 21/GS/GP, CIA, April 1973, p. 44) (IMG)

As confirmed by an anti-Soviet Republican Congressman active in the US Congress's Committee on International Relations:

Aleksandar Rankovic ... killed many, many Albanians in the 1950s and 1960s.... (The Future of Kosovo, Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 2003, p. 57) (IMG)

All of the above facts – the Trotskyite economic policy of mass-starvation, extermination, torture, and enslavement of the Kosovo population – are a testament to the settler-colonial intents and deeds of the fascist apartheid regime of Tito's clique. As previously stated, Tito's terror gang, the UDB command, knowingly and willingly implemented the genocidal settler-colonial agenda of Vaso Cubrilovic, with a brutality unparalleled in Kosovo's modern history. They slaughtered anywhere between 1,600, an extremely conservative estimate that is unfair in favour of Tito's gang, to tens of thousands. Such a mass-slaughter was known for being a part of a broader policy of ethnic cleansing, apartheid, and settler-colonialism. In addition to the mass-slaughter, Tito's gang also caused serious bodily harm or mental harm to the Albanians of Kosovo, and deliberately inflicted on the Albanians conditions of life known to bring about the physical destruction, in whole or in part, of the Albanians of Kosovo. They also minimized health standards. All of such policies of the Tito regime were a part of a broader effort towards ethnic cleansing, apartheid, and settler-colonialism

against the Albanians of Kosovo. Hence, the policies of the regime of Yugoslavia can be justly labelled as a 'genocide'. The UN's Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide defined the term 'genocide' as:

any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

- (a) Killing members of the group;
- (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
- (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
- (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

(Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, UN, Approved and proposed for signature and ratification or accession by General Assembly resolution 260 A (III) of 9 December 1948 Entry into force: 12 January 1951, in accordance with article XIII. No screenshot.)

The Soviet media – particularly the USSR Information Bulletin, a media outlet of the Soviet foreign ministry – confirmed the fact of genocide carried out by Tito's fascist regime. To give an example, on August 1950, the Soviet media explicitly stated that to 'please' Tito's gang, a Nazi-collaborationist official working for the Yugoslav intelligence service continued the campaign to 'annihilate' the people of Kosovo:

With this in view, the Tito clique frees from jail all those who during the occupation collaborated with the German or Italian fascists and gives them jobs. Thus, before the recent elections to the Narodna Skupshtina, 7,000 hardened war criminals were released from jail long before the expiration of their sentences. These people, who assimilated the German fascists' methods in murdering Yugoslav patriots, are just the men for Rankovic. One of these is Sergeant Sergeni Sima. Formerly he served in the gendarmery, then he was with Mikailovich's Chetniks, and he collaborated with the Germans. After releasing him from jail, Rankovic gave him a police and an officer's rank. To please his bosses Sima does his best to terrorize and annihilate the populations of Kosovo and Metokhia. (Tito Clique Lacks Support of Yugoslav People, I. Livanov, August 11, 1950. In: USSR Information Bulletin, Vol. 10, No. 15, p. 480) (IMG)

Recall that after the bloody murder of Popovic, the Yugoslav regime massacred 1,600 Kosovar Albanian communists, and embarked on the systematic expulsion of Albanian teachers, both to undermine Albanian culture and as a method of ethnic cleansing:

The Slav Communists took revenge for the death of Popovic by shooting 1,600 Kosovar members of Communist brigades stationed at Bar, Montenegro. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 8) (IMG)

Albanian instructors were quite naturally opposed to the loss of their students and some were brave enough to voice their opposition. As a result approximately one tenth of the teachers and instructors in Albanian were either imprisoned or lost their position while others were expelled from Yugoslavia on 30 July 1951; the latter were instructors, who upon their dismissal were invited to take out Yugoslav citizenship but declined. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 25) (IMG)

The fascist tyranny of the CIA agent Tito and his spy ring unleashed an unprecedented war of extermination upon the Albanian masses of Kosovo. At the time of writing, however, not a word is said about this genocide in the likes of the CNN, Washington Post, New York Times, BBC, etc. Of course, little can be expected of the media of the US-led bloc, the bloc whose Titoist agents were responsible for turning Kosovo into a slaughterhouse. Why is it that a shockingly tiny number of sincere anti-imperialists and progressives have even heard a word about this genocide? There was a time when the press of the Cominform-affiliated organizations provided extensive coverage on the settler-colonial project of Tito's fascist regime against the people of Kosovo. However, by the late 1950s, Albania had become one of the very few states to provide a significant coverage of the genocide in Kosovo. Why? As will be explored in greater detail in the next few chapters, a network of Titoist agents led by the MI6 agent Beria and his henchmen Malenkov, Bulganin, Khrushchev, and Mikoyan, on behalf of the Anglo-American intelligence services and the corrupt bureaucrats in the Soviet Union, successfully launched a hybrid coup against the USSR and some of the Peoples' Democracies, de facto decriminalized imperialist espionage and sabotage, and as such, 'legitimized' the regime of the CIA agent Tito and his ring of Anglo-American spies. With the launching of the Titoization program in the USSR and most of the Peoples' Democracies, the genocide against Kosovo was successfully covered up. This is why so few are aware of the Tito regime's genocide against Kosovo. This is why the construction of bunkers throughout Albania, a policy aimed at defending Albania against an Anglo-American-backed genocidal Yugoslav invasion, has been so ridiculed.

In light of all of Tito's genocidal war of extermination against the people of Kosovo, it should not be a surprise that:

Eighty percent of the Albanians in the Kosmet area do not like the Yugoslav regime. (...) They live in the hope of reunion with Albania. ('1. Yugoslav-Albanian Relations 2. Yugoslav Attitude vis-à-vis the Soviet Union 3. League of Albanian Refugees (Prizren Committee)', CIA, January 3, 1955, p. 1) (IMG)

Hence existed the popular base for Kosovo's national-liberationist action against Tito's crime band. In Kosovo,:

Many out of despair have joined the resistance, operating in groups. Such clandestine nationalist groups seriously worry government authorities, who fear that mere arrests will be insufficient to eliminate such activity. Every possible repressive measure is utilized to achieve results. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 23) (IMG)

The Kosovo people seriously needed assistance in liberating themselves from the fascist yoke. People's Democratic Albania was too weak to defend itself against Anglo-American-Yugoslav aggression, let alone significantly fund Kosovo national liberation struggle. As such, in 1948, upon the invitation of the Albanian government, the Soviet Red Army forces entered Albania to assist that country.

As early as 1947, Stalin had personally supported Kosovo seceding from Yugoslavia and joining Albania. As confirmed by the well-known Serbian scholar and pro-Milosevic politician Smilja Avramov:

On April 19, 1947, a delegation headed by Edvard Kardelj was received by Stalin in Moscow. On that occasion, Kardelj announced that Yugoslavia intended to cede Kosovo and Metohija to Albania, a plan which received Stalin's backing. (Genocide in Yugoslavia, Smilja Avramov, p. 195) (IMG)

The Soviet Red Army supported the anti-colonial liberation of the Kosovo people from the fascist yoke of Tito's gang. Thus:

With the arrival in Tirana of the Soviet military mission, headed by General Feodor Artemovic-Kovpak, the following stipulations were placed before the Central Committee of the Albanian Communist Party: (Split in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Albania, CIA, March 15, 1949, p. 1) (IMG)

According to a report which the CIA deemed as 'reliable', the Soviet Red Army made an agreement with Albania regarding a strategic alliance against Yugoslavia. Among the stipulations of this agreement was the call to:

Foster an irredentist move in Albania hostile to Yugoslavia which would claim incorporation with Albania of the Albanian minority regions of Kosovo and Metohija (Yugoslavia). (Soviet Activity in Albania, CIA, December 28, 1948, p. 1) (IMG)

Hence:

In Tirana, a secret "Kosovo committee" was formed to act as the "guiding spirit" in the fight for action on the Metohija-Kosovo territory. Any such action will be carried out under the supervision of the Soviet military mission in coordination with the aid of other committees in Bulgaria, Rumania, and Hungary, to be established by the Cominform. (Split in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Albania, CIA, March 15, 1949, p. 2) (IMG)

Because the Albanian military had not been sufficiently developed, it made sense for the USSR to supervise the Kosovo Committee for the purpose of the national liberation of Kosovo. The formation of the Kosovo Committee also served as a strategic response to the Yugoslav regime's aggressive-subversive terrorist activities against People's Democratic Albania. Hence,:

After 1948, Moscow ... continued to work for revolution on the borders of Albania and Bulgaria. ('1. Yugoslav-Albanian Relations 2. Yugoslav Attitude vis-à-vis the Soviet Union 3. League of Albanian Refugees (Prizren Committee)', CIA, January 3, 1955, p. 2) (IMG)

Years later, the Moscow Titoists headed by Beria and later on the Malenkov-Khrushchev group seized power and showed a highly favorable attitude towards the Yugoslav regime. This apparently further emboldened the Yugoslav regime, allowing it to step up its genocide against the people of Kosovo. At least according to Hoxha:

Tito charged Ranković personally and formed a staff to which the people most notorious for their barbarity, the most rabid chauvinists, hardened criminals whose hands were stained with the blood of the Albanian people of Kosova, were appointed to carry out the criminal operation to the letter and direct the punitive expeditions. This staff was led by Dušan Mugoša, Gjoko Pajković, UDB colonel Čedo Mijović, Čedo Topalović, Xhavit Nimani, Xhevdet Hamza, and others. ('WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CRIMES OF GENOCIDE IN KOSOVA?', Zëri i Popullit, Enver Hoxha, August 31, 1966) (IMG)

Hundreds died under torture by the UDB executioners or a few days later. Many others, unable to withstand the tortures for a second or third time, tragically took their own lives. Thousands were left crippled and unable to work and are suffering to this day from the injuries caused at that time. And to cap their activity of hangmen, the Yugoslav authorities issued a categorical order that the Albanians injured during the tortures of the years 1955-1956 were not to be admitted to the hospitals for treatment. ('WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CRIMES OF GENOCIDE IN KOSOVA?', Zëri i Popullit, Enver Hoxha, August 31, 1966) (IMG)

However, back in the 1940s and early 1950s, the USSR showed a favorable attitude to the people of Kosovo and helped mount the patriotic resistance against Titoist-fascist yoke.

Chapter 13

C13S1.1. The People's Liberation War in Albania *** IMG-All-{Albania}

Tito's gang alleged that the Yugoslav Communist Party (YCP), not Hoxha and his comrades, founded the Albanian Communist Party. The lie fabricated by this bully and his clique was in turn picked up and further propagated by the Anglo-American press. In reality, as a 1958 US intelligence document confirmed:

Hoxha founded the Albanian Communist Party in 1941, and he immediately began making positive plans for Communist take-over of the country. (ENVER HOXHA: ALBANIA'S ANTI-TITOIST, Background on Communism, IPS/SM/AK, No. 58-193, US Information Agency, CIA, Andrew Keller, May 1958, p. 1) (IMG)

Another US intelligence document confirmed that Hoxha (sometimes written as 'Hodja', 'Hoca', or 'Hodza') was the founder of the Albanian Communist Party:

HODJA, founder of the present Communist Party in Albania, made a name for himself as an underground resistance leader during the war. (POPULARITY STRUGGLE BETWEEN HODJA AND SHEHU, Information Section, XI Stockholm 268, 3628, CIA, October 15, 1951, p. 1) (IMG)

High-ranking US military figures noted that Hoxha was:

the founding First Secretary of the Albanian Communist Party. (Albania – Observations on a Changing Nation, Center for Strategic Leadership, U.S. Army War College, Volume 4-08, By Professor Bernard F. Griffard, Colonel William R. Applegate and Colonel Patrick O. Carpenter, April 2008, p. 1) (IMG)

In addition,:

Hoxha, a former schoolteacher who became first secretary of the Albanian Communist Party (ACP) in 1941, was a prominent wartime resistance leader and was largely responsible for the success of the communists in achieving a position of political dominance towards the end of the war. (Albania: A Country Study, Federal Research Division, Federal Research Division, US Library of Congress, Raymond Zickel, Walter R. Iwaskiw, April 1992, p. 172) (IMG)

The US intelligence staff agreed that Hoxha:

has considerable personal charm and is an excellent orator, with a rather appealing platform manner. He also has a marked capacity for leadership. (ENVER HOXHA: ALBANIA'S ANTI-TITOIST, Background on Communism, IPS/SM/AK, No. 58-193, US Information Agency, CIA, Andrew Keller, May 1958, p. 3) (IMG)

The attempt to build a popular front was of course, upon the recommendations of the Comintern, which encouraged communist parties to foster broad alliances of both proletarian and progressive-bourgeois forces against fascism. A US intelligence document stated:

During a period when his countrymen were attempting to repel first the Italian and then the Nazi invaders, Hoxha set as his task the maneuvering of non-Communist and anti-Communist factions in Albania into fighting for the Communist cause under the [banner] of nationalism. He formed the National Liberation Front as a rallying point for Albanians determined to liberate their country. (ENVER HOXHA: ALBANIA'S ANTI-TITOIST, Background on Communism, IPS/SM/AK, No. 58-193, US Information Agency, CIA, Andrew Keller, May 1958, p. 3) (IMG)

The Federal Research Division of the US government acknowledged that this course of action by the Party boosted its popularity among the Albanian masses. The people of Albania viewed the Party as a committed non-sectarian anti-fascist force. Indeed:

party leaders increased their popularity by ... muffl[ing] their Marxist-Leninist propaganda and call[ing] instead for national liberation.

In September 1942, the party organized a popular front organization, the National Liberation Movement (NLM), from a number of resistance groups, including several that were strongly anticommunist. (Albania: A Country Study, Federal Research Division, Federal Research Division, US Library of Congress, Raymond Zickel, Walter R. Iwaskiw, April 1992, p. 35) (IMG)

However, the document by the Federal Research Division of the US government, not free from its bourgeois pro-Titoist bias, falsely claims that the formation of the popular front by the Albanian Party was upon:

Tito's order.... (Albania: A Country Study, Federal Research Division, US Library of Congress, Raymond Zickel, Walter R. Iwaskiw, April 1992, p. 35) (IMG)

That is certainly a lie, because in fact, as previously quoted from US intelligence, Hoxha, not Tito, 'set as his task' the formation of the popular front and it was he who 'formed the National Liberation Front'. Of course, in this regard, General Hoxha was assisted by his comrades in the Albanian Communist Party. However, clearly, Hoxha, not Tito, played the main role in the founding.

The popular front, while being communist-led, was of course not communist:

For example, a proclamation issued on July 10, 1943, stated: "All Albanians must understand and brand as foreign propaganda the anti-national propaganda campaign which alleges the movement of National Liberation is a Communist movement." (ENVER HOXHA: ALBANIA'S ANTI-TITOIST, Background on Communism, IPS/SM/AK, No. 58-193, US Information Agency, CIA, Andrew Keller, May 1958, p. 4) (IMG)

Popular fronts are non-sectarian front of communist and non-communist organizations aiming to combat finance capital and the latter's allied parasitic classes. The formation of popular fronts is beneficial to the proletarian movement as it mobilizes the anti-imperialist progressive national-bourgeoisie into an alliance against the great imperial menace.

In this midst existed a feudal movement known as the 'Balli Kombetar' ('National Front'). The feudal class opposes the rise of an anti-colonial national bourgeoisie and the proletariat, and thus naturally allies with finance capital. It was all the more natural, then, that the Balli Kombetar would strategically partner with the German fascists. The Federal Research Division of the US Library of Congress reported:

A nationalist resistance to the Italian occupiers emerged in October 1942. Ali Klissura and Midhat Frasheri formed the Western-oriented and anticommunist Balli Kombetar (National Union), a movement that recruited supporters from both the large landowners and peasantry. (...). The Balli Kombetar's leaders acted conservatively, however, fearing that the occupiers would ... confiscate the landowners' estates. The nationalistic Geg chieftains and the Tosk landowners [who were the support base of the Balli Kombetar] often came to terms with the Italians, and later the Germans, to prevent the loss of their wealth and power. (Albania: A Country Study, Federal Research Division, Federal Research Division, US Library of Congress, Raymond Zickel, Walter R. Iwaskiw, April 1992, p. 35) (IMG)

Yet, for demagogical purposes, the Albanian feudal movement presented itself as 'anti-fascist' movement, 'aiming' to 'liberate' the Albanian homeland from the Axis occupation. In reality, the Ballists were the allies of the Axis. In this midst, in early August 1941, the Albanian partisans led by General Hoxha launched an alliance offensive against the feudal party Balli Kombetar: the Albanian revolutionary rebels invited the Ballists into a common front against the Axis forces, as a means of discrediting the Ballists. As James Klugmann, an MI6 officer with rhetoric sympathetic to the USSR, put it, the Balli Kombetar:

formed and guided by the ... Albanian feudal nobility, presented itself as a national liberation movement, but in practice was holding the people back from joining the People's Liberation Army (Albanian Partisans) in resistance to the Axis occupationists. But in the ranks of the Balli Kombëtar were many honest but misguided Albanian patriots.

The aim of the Central Committee of the Albanian Communists was to try, in the first instance, to win the genuine patriots in the Balli Kombëtar away from their reactionary leaders.

(From Trotsky to Tito, James Klugmann, 1951, Chapter 2) (IMG)

To undermine the Ballist leadership,:

On 1-2 August 1943, the exponents of "Balli Kombetar" gathered at Mukaj [Mukje], where they met the leaders of the National Liberation Movement (Communists) to decide about the policy to follow in connection with future military operations against the Italians.

It was then that the "Committee for National Salvation" was formed and was given full power to wage war.

(A Survey of Albania, 10M/6, 621.01, .U517th CIC Detachment, CIA, January 29, 1951, p. 22) (IMG)

Regarding the status of Kosovo as a part of Yugoslavia vs. Albania:

The delegates at Mukaj agreed that a plebiscite should be held in Kosovo to decide the matter; (Albania: A Country Study, Federal Research Division, Federal Research Division, US Library of Congress, Raymond Zickel, Walter R. Iwaskiw, April 1992, p. 36) (IMG)

However, at the point in time, the more important matter was the unity of all the anti-fascist forces in the armed struggle against the Axis occupation. The Albanian communists, aware of the Axis-collaborationist Balli Kombetar's demagogical self-branding as an army of struggle 'against' fascism for the liberation of Albania, aimed to expose the treachery and hypocrisy of the Balli Kombetar, by launching an 'invitation offensive' or alliance offensive (see C1S2) against the Balli Kombetar. Essentially, this boiled down to the Albanian communists inviting the Balli Kombetar to establish an alliance for a struggle against the Axis occupation forces, such that the Albanian communists would have means of monitoring whether or not the Balli Kombetar really fights against the Axis or not. Should Balli Kombetar have refused, they could then be exposed in the eyes of the public as the

fake 'anti-fascist' right-sectarian movement which they were. Should they have accepted the establishment of such an agreement, they would have been coopted and obliged to materially aid the anti-fascist cause by deploying troops and participating in battles. Should they have betrayed their agreement with the Albanian communist-led popular front, the Albanian communists and progressives could then use their monitoring capabilities, gained through such an agreement with the Balli Kombetar, to obtain evidence of such collaboration and distribute it widely.

In his memoirs, Hoxha wrote that he explained to a Yugoslav Titoist, the purpose behind the deal with the Balli Kombetar as such:

Irrespective of its true aims, the Balli Kombëtar, which was created later as reaction against the National Liberation Front, for purposes of demagogy and deception, came out with slogans of the 'war', 'independence', 'ethnic Albania, etc. Naturally, some people were deceived by these slogans. The heads of the Balli Kombëtar also formed a few 'çetas' [i.e. fighting units] and are trying to form others. Of course, they have not carried out any action against the Italians and will not do so, but their demagogy has not failed to have some effect. This being so, if we had risen against them with the rifle right from the start, this would have had grave and unpleasant consequences. I'm not talking about the possibility of losing ten or twenty of the heads of the Balli Kombëtar. As far as we are concerned, they were gone from the beginning, they have never been and never will be with us. But our concern is with that part of the population that is deceived, as well as with a number of elements of the middle strata who associated themselves with the slogans of the Balli Kombëtar and whom we must win over at all costs. Had we taken the axe to the Balli Kombëtar from the start, we would have created erroneous views among these people and antagonized them. How then can you call this stand wrong? (The Titoites, The Naim Frasheri Publishing House, Enver Hoxha, 1982, pp. 65-66. Prepared for the Internet by: David Romagnolog, 1999)

That quote from Hoxha explained, in essence, what was illustrated in the tree diagram. Sometimes, especially when evil-doers are hypocritically portraying themselves as the force of good in the struggle against fascism, a way to weaken such evil-doers is to publicly invite them to uncomfortably do good. Such was the strategy of Albania's communists and progressives. As one might have expected, the Balli Kombetar accepted the deal but were not very inclined towards abiding by it. The communist-led LNC partisans aimed to be as non-sectarian as possible. However, clearly, it was difficult to imagine how the feudal warlords and the LNC could get along for far too long. The US intelligence official William Griffith wrote:

The Albanian Communist partisans' program of social and economic revolution so antagonized the nationalistic Geg chieftains and the Tosk landowning beys that these two elite groups became inclined if necessary to come to terms with the Italians and later with the Germans to prevent the loss of their wealth and power. (Albania and the Sino-Soviet Rift, The MIT Press, William E. Griffith, 1963, p. 14) (IMG)

In fact, it was:

The Balli Kombetar group ... who opposed the merger of Nationalist and Partisan resistance groups during the War.... (Albania, CIA, Central Intelligence Group, August 15, 1947, p. I-4) (IMG)

In the end, the feudal Balli Kombetar went on to collaborate with the Axis powers. John Prados, a senior research fellow at the US National Security Archive confirmed:

Albanian leaders, those of the Balli Kombetar, or National Front, centered in Rome and Athens [after the war], had collaborated with the Germans and Italians in the war.... (Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA, John Prados, September 14, 2006, p. 61) (IMG)

The feudal landlords had no incentives to participate in the struggle of the anti-colonial national bourgeoisie and the proletariat against fascism; fascism itself fed from and fought for backwardness, the state which the feudal landlords of Albania too desired. For all practical purposes, the Albanian communist 'alliance' with the Ballists served as a channel for Albanian communist intelligence penetration into the Ballist network and the obtaining of evidence of Ballist collaboration with the occupiers.

In September, the Italian forces were defeated in Albania. The communist-led anti-fascist guerrilla forces defeated the Italian occupation forces:

With the overthrow of Mussolini's fascist regime and Italy's surrender in 1943, the Italian military and police establishment in Albania buckled. Albanian fighters overwhelmed five Italian divisions, and enthusiastic recruits flocked to the guerrilla forces. The communists took control of most of Albania's southern cities, except Vlorë, which was a Balli Kombetar stronghold, and nationalists attached to the NLM gained control over much of the north. (Albania: A Country Study, Federal Research Division, Federal Research Division, US Library of Congress, Raymond Zickel, Walter R. Iwaskiw, April 1992, p. 36) (IMG)

Once the Italians left Albania, fighting broke out between the communist-led guerrillas and the:



Balli Kombetar forces, igniting a civil war that was fought for the next year, mostly in southern Albania. (Albania: A Country Study, Federal Research Division, Federal Research Division, US Library of Congress, Raymond Zickel, Walter R. Iwaskiw, April 1992, p. 36) (IMG)

And the Albanian LNC partisans did their best to expose the criminal treasons of the Balli Kombetar ('National Front'):

One device employed by Hoxha to discredit the National Front was to attribute to it the ruin of every village burned by the Nazis. Another was to portray National Front members as Fascists in the pay of Italy. The National Front was unable to withstand Hoxha's all-out attack and, with its disintegration, Hoxha turned his attention to the army. (ENVER HOXHA: ALBANIA'S ANTI-TITOIST, Background on Communism, IPS/SM/AK, No. 58-193, US Information Agency, CIA, Andrew Keller, May 1958, p. 4) (IMG)

This strategy of the LNC, as expected from the tree diagram, proved effective and expanded the popular base of the Albanian communist-led guerrillas.

The Gestapo agent Tito's Trotskyite-fascist gang aimed to sabotage such an invitation offensive so to benefit the Balli Kombetar and the Axis occupation forces. According to Klugmann,:

The first stage of Titoite intervention into the affairs of the Albanian patriots was the accusation of opportunism made against the Central Committee of the Albanian Communist Party, headed by Enver Hoxha, in connection with their attitude towards the nationalist organisation, the Balli Kombëtar.

(...). The Titoites, who demanded immediate and direct action against the whole Balli Kombëtar, a seemingly 'left' policy, in actual fact did nothing but aid the Italian Blackshirts who were trying to push it into direct action against the Yugoslav Partisans.

(From Trotsky to Tito, James Klugmann, 1951, Chapter 2) (IMG)

Enver Hoxha too mentioned this in his 'The Titoites'. The reader can refer to that book for more details. Klugmann's and Hoxha's works would be accused of harbouring anti-Titoist and pro-Soviet biases. However, their remark is also confirmed by the US intelligence which states that the Titoist Yugoslav agent Vukmanovic, denounced not just by Hoxha but also by KKE leader Zachariadis as a stabber in the back of the anti-fascist liberation struggles, dissolved the Mukaj agreement that embodied the invitation offensive, thus wasting the lives of the Albanian communist-led anti-fascist forces and the naïve followers of Balli Kombetar by pitting them against each other into a fratricidal war:

Following instruction from high and official sources in YUGOSLAVIA, VUKMANOVIC dissolved the agreement reached at Mukaj and created a strong antagonism within the Albanian forces, which at that time, were struggling among themselves. (A Survey of Albania, 10M/6, 621.01, .U517th CIC Detachment, CIA, January 29, 1951, p. 22) (IMG)

At the same time, the Nazi Germans invaded Albania to 'fill the vacuum' left by the Fascist Italians:

Germany occupied Albania in September 1943, dropping paratroopers into Tiranë before the Albanian guerrillas could take the capital, and the German army soon drove the guerrillas into the hills and to the south. Berlin subsequently announced it would recognize the independence of a neutral Albania and organized an Albanian government, police, and military. The Germans did not exert heavy-handed control over Albania's administration. Rather, they sought to gain popular support by backing causes popular with Albanians, especially the annexation of Kosovo. Some Balli Kombetar units cooperated with the Germans against the communists, and several Balli Kombetar leaders held positions in the German-sponsored regime. (Albania: A Country Study, Federal Research Division, Federal Research Division, US Library of Congress, Raymond Zickel, Walter R. Iwaskiw, April 1992, p. 36) (IMG)

The collaboration of the Balli Kombetar has also been confirmed by Prados who stated:

One [Balli Kombetar] leader had been interior minister under the Germans, directly implicated in a February 1944 massacre. Another had been justice minister for the Italian occupation government. (Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA, John Prados, September 14, 2006, p. 61) (IMG)

Over time, and with the assistance of the Soviet Red Army, the Albanian communist-led guerrillas were able to destroy their Axis foes. Referring to the Albanian Communist Party, the CIA stated:

By October 1944 their "People's Army" had liberated three-fourths of the country, their "National Liberation Councils" were in effective local political control of the liberated areas.... In November 1944 their "Democratic Government" moved into Tirana....

The popular themes of the resistance movement continued to be emphasized through the election of December 1945, in which the National Liberation Front, the only party permitted to participate, succeeded in turning out an impressive vote in favor of its nominees. Only after this vote had been recorded did the regime ... [pursue] its specific program, which it preceded to put into effect as in response to a popular mandate.

(Albania, CIA, August 15, 1947, p. I-2 to I-3) (IMG)

The Balli Kombetar lost its base among the masses by 1947:

Its membership early in 1947 probably did not exceed 300. (Albania, CIA, Central Intelligence Group, August 15, 1947, p. I-4) (IMG)

By contrast, the Albanian Communist Party was very popular. Referring to the Albanian Communist Party, the CIA confirmed:

the popular support it enjoyed at the time of the 1945 elections. (Albania, CIA, Central Intelligence Group, August 15, 1947, p. I-4) (IMG)

The CIA confirmed that the Albanian communists enjoyed popularity among the poor peasantry, who formed the majority in Albania:

The Communist take-over in Albania was greatly facilitated by the promises made by the Communist-dominated National Liberation Front during World War II of basic economic and political reforms which would grant the people "freedom, bread, and land." The program for political independence from foreign rule and the improvement of social and economic conditions had a dynamic appeal, particularly among the intellectuals, youths, and poor peasants in central and southern Albania where living conditions were wretchedly poor and systematic exploitation by the local feudal land-owners was the rule. (ANTI-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE POTENTIAL IN THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC, National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), No. 10-58, submitted to: Director of Central Intelligence, concurred in by the: Intelligence Advisory Committee, CIA, March 4, 1958, p. 7) (IMG)

The intellectual youth of the southern and central regions of Albania were different than the intelligentsia of many other parts of the world, in that such intellectuals came from impoverished family backgrounds and were attracted to anti-feudal national-bourgeois and progressive programs. Hence, they, unlike most of the intelligentsia, supported the communist-led popular front.

Another point that deserves to be mentioned regarding the Albanian people's liberation war is with regards to the assistance that Albania provided to the Yugoslav partisans. Remarkably, unlike Tito's band which did nothing for the Albanian anti-fascist partisans but claimed all the credit, the Albanian partisans did much for the Yugoslav partisans, but never received the due credit. In fact:

During the war, Albanian partisans in the strength of two divisions once rescued TITO's trapped forces. (Popularity Struggle Between Hodja and Shehu, Information Section, XI Stockholm 268, 3628, CIA, October 15, 1951, p. 1) (IMG)

And yet, Tito's group claimed that they liberated Yugoslavia entirely on their 'own', 'without' the assistance of the Soviet Red Army or of the Albanian revolutionary partisans.

C13S1.2. Titoist Conspiracies against People's Democratic Albania *** IMG-All-{Albania}

The settler-colonial ambitions of Tito's group were not confined to the official boundaries of Yugoslavia; Tito and his gang dreamed of the conquest of the entire Balkans, starting from Albania and Bulgaria. A 1950 article by the USSR Information Bulletin, a media outlet of the Soviet foreign ministry, reported:

Inspired by the imperialists, the Belgrade fascists, as is known, tried to carry out their dastardly plans to liquidate people's democracy in the countries of Central and Southeastern Europe and set up a so-called "Balkan federation," or Greater Serbian empire. But the vigilance of the peoples doomed these criminal plans to disgraceful failure. The trials of Yugoslav spies in the people's democracies have revealed the Titoites to the entire world as enemies of peace, democracy, and socialism as a storm detachment of the warmongers. Lies and slander have always been the weapons of traitors. And the Belgrade rulers are committing monstrous acts of provocation against Bulgaria, Albania, and Hungary. ('Tito's Yugoslavia, Country of Prisons And Concentration Camps', P. Zyablov, May 26, 1950. In: USSR Information Bulletin, Volume 10, p. 320) (IMG)

Indeed, as the article stated, horrifically aggressive provocations were carried out by the Yugoslav regime against the Peoples' Democracies for the goal of the establishment of a Greater Serbian settler-colonial empire in the Balkans. In the ranks of the communist movement of Albania, the Titoist Yugoslav intelligence service had a number of agents, Koci Xoxe and Mehmet Shehu among them. In Albania's communist movement, the proletariat had the upper hand. However, the enemies of the proletariat inevitably existed and constituted a not insignificant contingent in the Albanian communist movement. All of this was reflected in the configuration of power inside the Albanian leadership. The upper hand of the proletariat was reflected in the fact that Enver Hoxha was the leader of People's Democratic Albania'; the strength of the anti-proletarian reactionaries, which had a powerful minority stake in the Party, was manifested in the fact that the Titoist Yugoslav agent, the traitor to Albania, Koci Xoxe was at the helm of the Albanian intelligence service, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, with his henchman Mehmet Shehu as his deputy in the Ministry. On behalf of Tito's gang, Koci Xoxe would soon foment the Titoist subversion aimed at defeating the communist faction of the Albanian Communist Party, led by Enver Hoxha. As stated by the Federal Research Division of the US Library of Congress:

Yugoslav control of the Ministry of Internal Affairs ran deep in the years immediately following World War II. Its chief, Koci Xoxe, was part of the pro-Yugoslav faction of the party and a rival to Hoxha. (Domestic Repression under Hoxha. In: 'Albania: A Country Study', Federal Research Division of the US Library of Congress, Raymond Zickel and Walter R. Iwaskiw, 1994.) (IMG)

With the aid of the Xoxe-Shehu gang in charge of the Ministry of Interior, Tito's gang extended its influence over the Albanian People's Democracy and embarked upon an aggressive campaign for the settler-colonial conquest of Albania, employing all types of economic projects in pursuit of its annexationist objectives. These ranged from financial entanglement, to the 'joint' exploitation of minerals, to the attempt to turn Albania into an agrarian appendage for Yugoslavia. Describing the situation favourably towards the Yugoslav regime, a report based on the US Federal Research Division stated:

The Yugoslav government clearly regarded investment in Albania as investment in the future of Yugoslavia itself. Joint Albanian-Yugoslav companies were created for mining, railroad construction, the production of petroleum and electricity, and international trade. Yugoslav investments led to the construction of a sugar refinery in Korçë, a food-processing plant in Elbasan, a hemp factory at Rrogozhine, a fish cannery in Vlorë, and a printing press, telephone exchange, and textile mill in Tiranë. (The Albanian-Yugoslav Tensions. In: 'Albania: A Country Study', Federal Research Division of the US Library of Congress, Raymond Zickel and Walter R. Iwaskiw, 1994.) (IMG)

Note that the Yugoslav investments were made primarily on light industries and agriculture, as opposed to heavy industry and the economy's commanding heights. All of this was in spite of the fact that Albania was extremely resource-rich and had plenty of natural petroleum. These 'free lunches' by Tito's group gave Tito's gang the economic claims and political leverage over Albania, pressuring the latter to divert its budget into the less critical sectors of the economy and thereby preventing the rapid development of the Albanian industry. To use the words of a memorandum by the British Embassy in Belgrade, such economic projects by Tito's group were nothing but an attempt to perpetuate the:

fiction of Albanian independence. (R 6105/514/90, Yugoslav Control Over Albanian Economy, Mr. Peake to Mr. Bevin, Belgrade, May 11, 1948; Received: May 20, 1948, No. 111, Confidential. Foreign Office (Balkans, 1948), p. 311) (IMG)

The memorandum further described the financial integration of Albania with Yugoslavia, which was paving the way for an exploitative EU-style currency union between Albania and Yugoslavia:

Under the Yugoslav-Albanian Economic Agreement signed in Belgrade on 26th November, 1946, Albania was required to adapt her currency, price and tariff systems to the Yugoslav model. In particular she was to equalize the value of her currency unit, the Albanian lek, with that of the Yugoslav dinar within three months of the date of signature. After that date the currency circulation in Albania was to be kept proportionately equal to the currency circulation in Yugoslavia. Meanwhile both the price system and the actual prices existing in Yugoslavia were to be introduced into Albania. Finally a Yugoslav-Albanian customs union was to be established within a month of the signature of the agreement on the basis of the customs tariffs and tariff system already in force in Yugoslavia. (Memorandum on Yugoslav Control Over Albanian Economy, Enclosure in No. 10. Part of: R 6105/514/90, Yugoslav Control Over Albanian Economy, Mr. Peake to Mr. Bevin, Belgrade, May 11, 1948; Received: May 20, 1948, No. 111, Confidential. Foreign Office (Balkans, 1948), p. 311) (IMG)

One US intelligence document commented:

On 27 November 1946 Albania forfeited its economic independence by signing an all-inclusive pact with Yugoslavia. (Albania, CIA, Central Intelligence Group, August 15, 1947, p. II-2) (IMG)

Referring to Albania, a CIA-funded researcher, who would later work for Zbigniew Brzezinski, admitted:

It did not, for example, participate in Cominform meetings; it was represented in them by the Yugoslavs. (Albania and the Sino-Soviet Rift, The MIT Press, William E. Griffith, 1963, p. 14) (IMG)

These measures, the US intelligence confirmed, made Albania 'a complete dependency of' Yugoslavia:

During this period a series of political, social, economic and military "agreements" was concluded between Yugoslavia and Albania which in effect made the latter a complete dependency of the former. Yugoslav "advisors" and technicians came in considerable number to Albania to assist in the utilization of the material aid which their Government provided, and no occasion was lost by the [Titoist] Albanian leaders to extoll the virtues of their Yugoslav "friends and allies". (Country Plan Albania – 0029, OBOPUS BG FIEND, Vol. 1, CIA, June 15, 1949, p. 4) (IMG)

Assessing the matter, Charles Peake, the British pro-Titoist diplomat in Belgrade and an MI6 handler of the British spy Tito (see C12S5), told UK Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin:

I find it difficult to believe that Italian control over Albanian economy before Mussolini's annexation of Albania ever approached the extent of the control now exercised by the Yugoslav Government. (R 6105/514/90, Yugoslav Control Over Albanian Economy, Mr. Peake to Mr. Bevin, Belgrade, May 11, 1948; Received: May 20, 1948, No. 111, Confidential. Foreign Office (Balkans, 1948), p. 311) (IMG)

However, over time, resistance against Titoist oppression began to mount, as the anti-Titoist faction spoke out:

The head of Albania's Economic Planning Commission and one of Hoxha's allies, Nako Spiru, became the leading critic of Yugoslavia's efforts to exert economic control over Albania. Tito distrusted Hoxha and the other intellectuals in the Albanian party.... (The Albanian-Yugoslav Tensions. In: 'Albania: A Country Study', Federal Research Division of the US Library of Congress, Raymond Zickel and Walter R. Iwaskiw, 1994.) (IMG)

In response:

Tito ... through [Koci] Xoxe and his loyalists, attempted to unseat them [i.e. anti-Titoists in the Albanian Communist Party]. (The Albanian-Yugoslav Tensions. In: 'Albania: A Country Study', Federal Research Division of the US Library of Congress, Raymond Zickel and Walter R. Iwaskiw, 1994.) (IMG)

And:

In 1947 Yugoslavia's leaders engineered an all-out offensive against anti-Yugoslav Albanian communists, including Hoxha and Spiru. In May Tiranë announced the arrest, trial, and conviction of nine People's Assembly members, all known for opposing Yugoslavia, on charges of antistate activities. A month later, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia's Central Committee accused Hoxha of following "independent" policies and turning the Albanian people against Yugoslavia. (The Albanian-Yugoslav Tensions. In: 'Albania: A Country Study', Federal Research Division of the US Library of Congress, Raymond Zickel and Walter R. Iwaskiw, 1994.) (IMG)

Then,:

On January 26, [1948,] Tito formally requested from Hoxha a base for the Yugoslav divisions at Korce, opposite Grammos, [ostensibly] so that the Yugoslav units would be able to intervene quickly in case of Greek nationalist provocation. (With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism, Cornell University Press, Ivo Banac, 1988, p. 40) (IMG)

Yugoslavia was trying to utilise the fear of Greek warfare against Albania to militarily occupy the country. Thanks to Hoxha, Stalin was well-informed of such Titoist schemes:

Convinced that the Yugoslav occupation of Albania was imminent, Hoxha secretly, on his own authority, appealed to Stalin for protection. (With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism, Cornell University Press, Ivo Banac, 1988, p. 40) (IMG)

In a conversation with the Yugoslav delegation in Moscow, Stalin condemned the Yugoslav plans for a military occupation (and coup) in Albania. This is confirmed by Griffith, a CIA-funded American professor who became the advisor to NSC chief Zbigniew Brzezinski. Griffith wrote:

Stalin protested the Yugoslav plans to send army and air force units to Albania as support for the Greek Communist rebels.... (Albania and the Sino-Soviet Rift, The MIT Press, William E. Griffith, 1963, p. 20) (IMG)

On February 1948, the agents of the Yugoslav regime in Albania stepped up their campaign against the communist faction. Authoritarian as the Titoists were, they even forced Hoxha to self-criticize and to criticize Nako Spiru:

There Xoxe (with Belgrade's support) launched an intensified offensive to overthrow Hoxha and to bring the Albanian leadership totally under his (and Yugoslav) control. At the Albanian Eighth Plenum in February-March 1948 Hoxha was forced to make self-criticism for allegedly supporting Spiru (although he did not lose his position as General Secretary. (Albania and the Sino-Soviet Rift, The MIT Press, William E. Griffith, 1963, p. 20) (IMG)

By now Tito was seriously endeavouring to consolidate Yugoslavia's special influence on the other East European states, independent of the Soviet Union. Under Tito's orders, Xoxe accelerated his drive to overthrow Hoxha and to bring the Albanian Party once and for all under Yugoslav control. And so the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party sent an emissary, Savo Zlatic, to Albania to assist Xoxe in the convocation of a Central Committee meeting intended finally to overthrow his opponents. The Eighth Plenum duly met on 26 February 1948, and its proceedings reflect the extent to which the Xoxe faction nearly succeeded in ensuring a long-term Yugoslav presence in Albania. Hoxha was forced to perform self-criticism and to join in the condemnation of Spiru in order to maintain his post as secretary-general. The Plenum expelled Spiru's widow, Liri Belishova, and demoted the Chief of the Albanian General Staff, Mehmet Shehu. The Eighth Plenum also approved Xoxe's proposals to merge the Albanian and Yugoslav economies and armed forces. Because Hoxha's position within the ACP leadership was now very weak, he stayed discreetly in the background at the height of all this factional strife. Following the Eighth Plenum, Hoxha's position was further weakened. However, fortunately for him plans were already

being made in Moscow to dismiss Yugoslavia from the Cominform. In March, Stalin launched his offensive against Tito in a series of letters accusing the Yugoslavs of every imaginable Leninist deviation. (The Albanians: A Modern History, I. B. Taurus and Co. Ltd, Miranda Vickers) (IMG)

Moscow was alarmed:

A recent study of events in Yugoslavia and Albania in late 1947 and early 1948 indicates that the dispute between Tito and the Kremlin was reflected in Tirana almost as soon as it began. The Kremlin clearly intended to ... prevent Tito from carrying the little country out of the Soviet orbit. (Country Plan Albania – 0029, OBOPUS BG FIEND, Vol. 1, CIA, June 15, 1949, p. 4) (IMG)

On April 1948, Xoxe and his fellow Albanian collaborators officially:

proposed appealing to Belgrade to admit Albania as a seventh Yugoslav republic. (The Albanian-Yugoslav Tensions, Raymond Zickel and Walter R. Iwaskiw, editors. *Albania: A Country Study*. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1994.)

These moves by Albanian Titoists would have doomed Hoxha to:

a firing squad. (The Albanian-Yugoslav Tensions. In: 'Albania: A Country Study', Federal Research Division of the US Library of Congress, Raymond Zickel and Walter R. Iwaskiw, 1994.) (IMG)

By July 1948, Tito and his group had exposed their bloody hands not only to Albania but also the other Peoples' Democracies and the communist parties in Europe. Details on how Tito's gang had engaged in monstrous conspiracies against the communist parties outside of Albania will be provided later. However, in July of 1948, Tito's gang were expelled from the Cominform, upon the consensus of all the communist parties and popular fronts. This had a vigilance-raising effect on communists worldwide, precisely the objective of the Soviet leadership. In a letter to the Czechoslovak leader Gottwald, Stalin wrote:

I have to say that we Muscovites have not been and are not counting on so early a defeat of Tito's group. Our objective in the first stage was to isolate it in the eyes of other Communist parties, and to reveal its shady machinations. We have attained this objective. The second stage will be a matter of gradually detaching Communist-Marxist groups within the Yugoslav Communist Party from Tito and his group. This takes time and we have to be good at waiting. I see that you lack patience. But I advise you to arm yourself with patience, for there is no doubt that Marxism-Leninism will in time prevail in Yugoslavia. (Stalin letter to Gottwald, July 14, 1948. In: *The Report on the Murder of the General Secretary*, Karel Kaplan, 1990, p. 4) (IMG)

The condemnation of the Yugoslav regime in public gave an excellent opportunity to all the communists in the communist parties to purge the Titoist fifth column among them, while helping them who were unaware of the crimes of Titoism to wake up to it:

Accordingly, when the dispute erupted, the Albanian Ministers lined up promptly on the side of the Kremlin, joined shrilly in the recriminations directed at Tito and his ilk, and promptly abrogated all the agreements which had bound them to Belgrade. The Yugoslavs in Albania were unceremoniously ejected, and the border between the two countries closed. (Country Plan Albania – 0029, OBOPUS BG FIEND, Vol. 1, CIA, June 15, 1949, p. 4) (IMG)

Xoxe was exposed by the Hoxha faction, the communist faction, in the Party. Subsequently Xoxe:

was arrested, convicted in a secret trial, and executed. (Domestic Repression under Hoxha. In: 'Albania: A Country Study', Federal Research Division of the US Library of Congress, Raymond Zickel and Walter R. Iwaskiw, 1994.) (IMG)

There is no doubt that since Xoxe was a Tito-Rankovic agent and since the Tito-Rankovic group were CIA-Mossad spies (C12S1), Xoxe was a CIA agent as well. Nonetheless, the following quote regarding Xoxe and the "CIA's third force" is also interesting:

In all the major purge trials the communists give top billing as "villain" to Dulles and his so-called CIA "dirty tricks" department – Xoxe in Albania, Gomulka in Poland, Slansky in Czechoslovakia, Kostovo in Bulgaria. Plainly, CIA's third force is hitting the Russians where it hurts. (THE MYSTERIOUS DOINGS OF THE CIA: America's Secret Agents: Part Two, The Saturday Evening Post, Richard Harkness, Gladys Harkness, November 6, 1954, p. 68. In: CIA archives) (IMG{GDR})

The expulsion of Tito's gang from the Cominform helped Hoxha's faction:

Had the break not occurred, Hoxha's ... days were numbered; Stalin probably saved [Hoxha] from Xoxe's firing squads. (Albania and the Sino-Soviet Rift, The MIT Press, William E. Griffith, 1963, p. 20) (IMG)

Stalin's cooperation with the Albanian communists won him Hoxha's gratitude. Subsequently, Titoist agents within the Albanian Communist Party lost momentum and were purged:

Albanian Communists [Titoists] who had become too compromised by blind devotion to Tito were, of course, purged. (Country Plan Albania – 0029, OBOPUS BG FIEND, Vol. 1, CIA, June 15, 1949, p. 4) (IMG)

Some Yugoslav regime agents remained in the Party of Labour of Albania, but the Titoist fifth column lost its mighty hand since the time of the Xoxe purge. The Federal Research Division of the US Library of Congress reported:

Albania entered an orbit around the Soviet Union, and in September 1948 Moscow stepped in to compensate for Albania's loss of Yugoslav aid. The shift proved to be a boon for Albania because Moscow had far more to offer than hard-strapped Belgrade. The fact that the Soviet Union had no common border with Albania also appealed to the Albanian regime because it made it more difficult for Moscow to exert pressure on Tiranë. In November at the First Party Congress of the Albanian Party of Labor (APL), the former Albanian Communist Party renamed at Stalin's suggestion, Hoxha pinned the blame for the country's woes on Yugoslavia and Xoxe. Hoxha had had Xoxe sacked as internal affairs minister in October, replacing him with Shehu. After a secret trial in May 1949, Xoxe was executed. The subsequent anti-Titoist purges in Albania brought the liquidation of fourteen members of the party's thirty-one-person Central Committee and thirty-two of the 109 People's Assembly deputies. Overall, the party expelled about 25 percent of its membership. Yugoslavia responded with a propaganda counterattack, canceled its treaty of friendship with Albania, and in 1950 withdrew its diplomatic mission from Tiranë. (The Albanian-Yugoslav Tensions. In: 'Albania: A Country Study', Federal Research Division of the US Library of Congress, Raymond Zickel and Walter R. Iwaskiw, 1994.) (IMG)

Tito's regime, in collaboration with Anglo-American imperialism, hatched new plots for a settler-colonial war against Albania. In 1947 at least: no organized resistance movements remain in the country [i.e. Albania]... (Albania, CIA, Central Intelligence Group, August 15, 1947, p. I-4) (IMG)

The only major militant subversive organizations in Albania during 1947 were a 'few hundred bandits' operating in the mountains:

The few hundred bandits still operating in the northern mountains would probably resist any Central Government and are not motivated by any ideological opposition to Communism. (Albania, CIA, Central Intelligence Group, August 15, 1947, p. I-4) (IMG)

One of the thousands of ways in which Tito's gang backstabbed Albania was to harbor a prominent Albanian anti-communist guerrilla: Bajraktari took part in guerrilla actions against the Albanian Government forces up until June 1947, when he was wounded and forced to take refuge in Yugoslav territory. ('BAJRAN BAJRAKTARI, ALBANIAN RESISTANCE LEADER, RELEASED', CIA, February 8, 1949, p. 1) (IMG)

A prominent Albanian anti-communist guerrilla leader, Bajram Bajraktari was the brother of the Albanian Nazi-collaborationist commander Muharrem Bajraktari (see 'Deva, Xhafer', CIA, March 15, 1955, pages 3 & 6) who had covertly colluded with the Third Reich's military command as well as the Albanian Nazi leader Xhafer Deva. Until mid-1947, Bajram Bajraktari was conducting military operations against the Albanian People's Democracy. However, once he was defeated, he took refuge in Yugoslavia.

The Red Army-backed Kosovo Committee marked Albania's attempt to counter the Yugoslav efforts for fascist overthrow, while intensifying the class war in Yugoslavia. The expulsion of Tito's group led the Yugoslav fascist terrorists to unmask its criminal face ever more. The Tito Regime's collusion with Bajram Bajraktari's band became all the more clear on October 1948 when the gang got Bajraktari to establish a committee to 'liberate' People's Democratic Albania:

On 3 October 1948, the Yugoslav Government released from prison Bajram Bajraktari, a former Albanian anti-Communist resistance leader and brother of Colonel Muharrem Bajraktari, also an anti-Communist leader. Upon his release he was sent to Prizren, Yugoslavia, to organize Albanian refugees into guerrilla bands for operations against the Albanian Communist Government. ('BAJRAN BAJRAKTARI, ALBANIAN RESISTANCE LEADER, RELEASED', CIA, February 8, 1949, p. 1) (IMG)

When exposed, the Titoist fifth column of the Albanian military defected to Yugoslavia and thereupon joined the Yugoslav intelligence service, the UDB:

Albanian officers have been particularly well received of late and met at the border by Montenegrin officers. Many of the officer refugees currently occupy important positions, and 70 per cent of them in the Kosovo are to be found either in the Army or in the UDB. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 15) (IMG)

Albanian Titoist emigres of course escaped to Yugoslavia:

Since 1948 all Albanian Communists seeking refuge from Enver Hoxha's dictatorship have been welcomed in Yugoslavia. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 15) (IMG)

These individuals were in turn trained by the UDB to be sent back to Albania to carry out intelligence operations against the Albanian People's Democracy:

Koci Xoxe followers are furthering pro-Tito propaganda in Albania. Groups of such men are sent into Albanian territory from Yugoslav frontier posts and entrenchments. They maintain contacts with Albanian citizens, direct propaganda activities and assist dissatisfied Albanians to escape from their country. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 14) (IMG)

Training courses headed by loyal UDB officials are given in Yugoslavia for Albanian party ... leaders and agitators for the purpose of replacing the government of Enver Hoxha (at some time in the future when Yugoslavia that this regime will be overthrown) with a pro-Tito man who will be favorable to the inclusion of Albania as an additional republic in Federated People's Republics of Yugoslavia. The training center in Danilovgrad, Montenegro, is headed by Capt. Pero Musanovic and Lt. Vido Ivanovic. The center at Gucij, which is approximately seven kilometers from the Albanian border, is headed by Capt. Gjoka Masaleri. The center in Djakovo is headed by Hysea Prisha, and the currently six trainees. The center in Titograd has currently 19 trainees. Guerrilla warfare is taught at Kosovska Mitrovica, Pristina, Prizren and Ohrid. Courses for parachutists are likewise given at Kosovska Mitrovica. (Attitude of Yugoslav Government Towards Albania and Albanian Refugees, May 14, 1952, CIA, p. 2) (IMG)

Much the same was done with the nationalist anti-communist terror groups whom the UDB trained, armed, and sent back to Albania:

Much propaganda was likewise disseminated during 1948 by Yugoslav authorities to persuade Albanian nationalists to come to Yugoslavia.(...). It was only in the latter part of 1949 that Albanian refugees were received in the capacity of emigres. Some among them were even armed by the Yugoslavs and sent back to Albania to fight in the resistance against Hoxha. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 15) (IMG)

The Prizren Committee served as the Tito regime's tool for pursuing a fascist shadow war against Albania:

The role of the Prizren Committee is a political one. They have no independence of decision or action and are a frontier for Yugoslav activities. ('1. Yugoslav-Albanian Relations 2. Yugoslav Attitude vis-à-vis the Soviet Union 3. League of Albanian Refugees (Prizren Committee)', CIA, January 3, 1955, p. 3) (IMG)

As part of the fascist terror campaign launched by the Yugoslav regime against People's Democratic Albania,:

Koci Xoxe followers are furthering pro-Tito propaganda in Albania. Groups of such men are sent into Albanian territory from Yugoslav frontier posts and entrenchments. They maintain contacts with Albanian citizens, direct propaganda activities and assist dissatisfied Albanians to escape their country. Often officials and workers of both sexes are kidnaped and brought into Yugoslavia where they are interrogated by the UDB and released at a later date with the excuse of mistaken identity. (Albanian Minority in Yugoslavia, CIA, January 7, 1953, p. 14-15. Underline added.) (IMG)

A 1953 US intelligence document confirmed:

The Yugoslav policy on Albania may be summarized as follows: Liberation of Albania and attachment to her of the districts of Kosove and Metohijes and the incorporation of Albania as the 7th Republic in the Federated People's Democracy of Yugoslavia. (Albanian Refugee Organization in Yugoslavia, CIA, May 29, 1953, p. 2) (IMG)

With the backing of the Anglo-Americans, the Yugoslavs hatched further plots to aggress Albania and to present it as a 'revolution' and a 'civil war':

In the event that Hoxha troops should put up an unexpectedly strong or extended resistance or that Soviet troops should intervene, the Albanian formations would break down into minor units and conduct guerrilla warfare in an attempt to establish a state of revolution and civil war in the country. (YUGOSLAV PLAN FOR THE INVASION OF ALBANIA, CIA, July 23, 1953, p. 1) (IMG)

All of these were of course done in coordination and collaboration with the US intelligence. In mid-1949, the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), the covert special operations wing of the CIA, began Operation FIEND:

On 22 Jun 1949, OPC initiated implementation of a project, whose ultimate objective was, and remains, the overthrow of the Hoxha regime in Albania and the substitution thereof of a representative type government oriented towards the Western Powers. The operation was undertaken with the approval of the Departments of State and Defense. (OBOPUS BGFIEND VOL. 14 (BGFIEND OPERATIONS)_0046., p. 1, CIA, September 27, 1949)

As always, the Anglo-American imperialist special operation involved employing the remnants of the Axis forces from Albania against the People's Democracy:

The first phase of the combined project involved the formation of a national committee or council which would (1) be parallel in structure to other national committees operating in the United States and would include representatives of major and relatively untainted Albanian groups currently in exile.... (...). Initial exploratory conversations were undertaken in the Mediterranean area by OPC representatives in April and included contact with ex-King Zog and Midhat Frasherri. Detailed and complicated negotiations began in early July with the arrival of a full time OPC. (OBOPUS BGFIEND VOL. 14 (BGFIEND OPERATIONS) 0046., p. 1, CIA, September 27, 1949)

On May 29, 1951, Yugoslavia threatened to invade Albania:

[T]wo Yugoslav Army divisions have been recently transferred to the Northern Albanian border. One has established headquarters at Podgoric and the other, a motorized division, is located at Skopije. A regiment of the motorized division had been stationed between Dibra and Ochrid.

Albanian Government authorities are said to be obviously alarmed; as a result, they arrested 150 persons in the border zone whom they considered dangerous or suspect.

Members of the DMP [stands for: People's Defense Division] and the Communist Party, in a panic, allegedly have approached the families of political refugees and so-called "reactionaries" and have cautiously given them help of various types, apparently as reinsurance, in the event that the present regime should be overthrown.

Government propaganda, inspired by the USSR, has reported tried to make the Albanian people believe that the Anglo-Americans have planned an invasion of Albania and the division of the country into three zones, to be occupied by Greece, Yugoslavia, and Italy, respectively.

(YUGOSLAV TROOPS ON ALBANIAN BORDER: ALBANIAN REACTION TO RUMORS OF INVASION, CIA, May 29, 1951, p. 1) (IMG)

Perhaps the goal of this was less so military warfare, but more so psychological warfare – to terrorize the population of People's Democratic Albania, and to feed the Titoist agents inside the Albanian state with the excuse for supporting a policy of capitulationist 'negotiations' with the Yugoslav regime. In any case, the presence of the Soviet Red Army acted as a deterrent against the invasion plans. In 1952, the Yugoslav regime took some steps for cooperating with the exile Albanian monarcho-fascists led by King Zogu and his collaborators. The Tito regime representative was:

Colonel Cedo Mijovic ... in the Yugoslav Ministry of Interior. (Albanian Refugees in Yugoslavia and the League of Albanian Refugees (Prizren Committee), CIA, February 26, 1954, p. 1) (IMG)

Mijovic, the intelligence agent of the Gestapo agent Tito, did not conceal his fascist sympathies. In this dialogue:

The Albanian delegation [of King Zogu] took note of the open sympathy and great interest shown toward the fascist groups especially by [the Yugoslav Titoist delegate] Mijovic who commented favorably on Markagjoni, Mirakaj, and others. (Meeting of Representatives of King Zog and Marshal Tito, CIA, October 23, 1952, p. 2) (IMG)

Having engaged in a conversation with Tito's representatives, the delegates of King Ahmet Zogu stated that their intention was the expulsion of Albania from the Cominform, and that they did not mind the rise of a Titoist regime in Albania:

Suddenly, Colonel Mijovic asked what King Zog and his lieutenants think about the Albanian Communists. Ohri [King Zog's representative] replied that the Albanian Communists [of the Titoist type] are close brothers to Albanians of other political persuasions and that King Zog has no intention of avenging himself against them. The King's only desire is to see Albania rid of the Cominform, after which the Albanian Communist Party and all other Albanian parties will be able to defend themselves freely before the court of public opinion. (Meeting of Representatives of King Zog and Marshal Tito, CIA, October 23, 1952, p. 3) (IMG)

By 1954 Cedo Mijovic had become a leading figure in the Prizren Committee, the committee founded by Tito and the Bajraktaris for a fascist war against People's Democratic Albania:

General Dusan Mugosa is not only so-called "responsible" for the Albanian refugees, but is in charge of organizing refugees from all of Moscow's satellites. Colonel Cedo Mijovic also is engaged in the direction of Albanian affairs from his office in the Yugoslav Ministry of Interior. Both Mugosa and Mijovic are Montenegrins and speak Albanian fluently. (Albanian Refugees in Yugoslavia and the League of Albanian Refugees (Prizren Committee), CIA, February 26, 1954, p. 1) (IMG)

Headquartered in Prizren, Kosovo, the Prizren Committee was a camp in which Albanian Titoist refugees resided. Those Albanians who escaped to Yugoslavia were all forced by the UDB to participate in fascist shadow war efforts against People's Democratic Albania. Refusal would have assured brutal torture:

Every Albanian who flees to Yugoslavia is forced to join the Prizren Committee. If he refuses to do so he does not receive an identity card, nor food and clothing ration cards. If he is between the ages of 15 and 60 he is put in a concentration camp where use of the whip is not unknown. In the case of women, children, or old men, those who refuse to join are left to their own devices, without food and shelter. Anyone, therefore, who does not wish to die of hardships is forced to join the Committee whose entire organization and direction is in the hands of UDB officers. (Albanian Refugees in Yugoslavia and the League of Albanian Refugees (Prizren Committee), CIA, February 26, 1954, p. 1) (IMG)

Rights of the Albanian members of the Committee are limited to those of spying on each other. Its UDB (Yugoslav IS) officers use all available means, including bribery, threats, flattery, and torture in order to penetrate their Albanian charges thoroughly. Corruption has reached such a point as to seriously weaken the emigration and render it less effective for Yugoslav purposes than it would be if its morale were higher.

(Albanian Refugees in Yugoslavia and the League of Albanian Refugees (Prizren Committee), CIA, February 26, 1954, p. 1) (IMG)
Mijovic and his fascist friends were training the Albanian Titoist refugees in the Prizren Committee. The Yugoslav intelligence utilized the refugees for espionage and subversion against People's Democratic Albania:

Those Albanian refugees who are physically fit and who have had experience in their country's background are forced by the UDB to undertake intelligence and operation missions back into Albania. The following are the objectives of UDB in this connection:

- a. Information concerning Albanian fortifications, troop movements, and morale of local populations.
- b. Attempting to learn the location in Albanian territory of Cominform, anti-Tito Yugoslav organizations which are given hospitality and encouraged by the Albanian government.
- c. Information concerning the identity of Albanians favoring and those opposing the programs of Tito's Yugoslavia.
- d. Dissemination of Yugoslav propaganda leaflets.

(Albanian Refugees in Yugoslavia and the League of Albanian Refugees (Prizren Committee), CIA, February 26, 1954, p. 3) (IMG)
The intelligence activity against People's Democratic Albania would be done in active collaboration with the CIA. Though the Yugoslav junta was already dominated by the CIA agent Tito and his Anglo-American fascist agent ring, full-scale collaboration between the UDB and the CIA for a fascist war against Albania was yet to be established. In 1953, the Yugoslav intelligence agreed to facilitate the movement of CIA units into Albania:

[T]he Yugoslav UDB agrees "in principle" to collaborate in intelligence work regarding Albania, to facilitate the movement of CIA agents into and out of Albania, to provide small amounts of Albanian currency, and to a meeting between CIA and UDB Albanian experts to discuss questions of mutual interest. It was further specified that the time and place of the meeting and the number of persons to participate would be decided by General Rankovic within the next ten days. (OBOPUS BFIEND VOL. 24 (BGFIEND OPERATIONS)_0004., CIA, Date of Information: January 1, 1953, Written: February 5, 1953, p. 1) (IMG)

In the settler-colonially occupied Kosovo, the Yugoslav regime was training 50,000 Albanian terrorist contras for the invasion of Albania. Plan R-7, it was called. A CIA document titled 'Yugoslav Plan for the Invasion of Albania' reported:

The Yugoslav Military program concerning Albania was drawn up over a year ago by Generals Peko Dapcevic, Svetozar Vukmanovic, and Kosta Nadj. It is known as Plan R-7 and its general outline provides for a conquest of Albania mainly by [exile and subversive] Albanian troops with the aid of some Yugoslav Kosovar elements. (...) In connection with this plan, the Yugoslav Communist Party estimates that the organized Albanian force would be able to increase its strength to approximately 50,000 during its march on Tirana, and that it would be able to complete mission within a very short time. It is also that once Tirana fallen, the Soviet troops in Albania would fall back to Saseno Island where they could be evacuated. (YUGOSLAV PLAN FOR THE INVASION OF ALBANIA, CIA, July 23, 1953, p. 1) (IMG)

C13S1.3. People's Democratic Development in Albania *** IMG-All-{Albania}

People's Democratic Albania embarked on centralizing the economy so to minimize economic chaos and reduce bureaucracy. Albania also laid emphasis on heavy industry for its development. Miranda Vickers, a scholar for the Soros-sponsored International Crisis Group (ICG), wrote:

The Albanian regime faced perhaps the most difficult internal situation of any of the socialist states because of the relatively backward conditions and low standard of living. The communist leadership attempted to deal with this situation by adopting the standard Stalinist model of a highly centralized planned economy, with strong emphasis on self-sufficiency in heavy industry. (The Albanians: A Modern History, Miranda Vickers, 2011) (IMG)

A campaign for the electrification of Albania began, in addition to the development of consumer goods to meet the needs of the population: emphasis was increasingly concentrated on the development of industry. The two-year economic plan from 1949 to 1950 laid the foundation for the subsequent five-year plans. During this plan large projects were begun, such as the Lenin hydro-power plant to meet the needs of the Tirana district, the Stalin textile mills and the Maliq sugar refinery. (The Albanians: A Modern History, Miranda Vickers, 2011) (IMG)

Again, producer goods were prioritized over consumer goods. The USSR provided aid for the industrialization of People's Democratic Albania during this period. The CIA reported:

The amount of Soviet credit extended to Albania is not known. The first reported credit arrangement was signed in February 1951. Within the framework of a 4-year trade agreement, Albania was to receive industrial equipment and technical aid to be repaid over a number of years. Subsequent reports indicate that industrial equipment and technical assistance have been received for the construction of various industrial installations including a hydroelectric plant, a tanning extract plant, an oil refinery, a textile combine, a sugar mill, and a woodworking plant. ('SOVIET ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC: LOANS, CREDITS, AND GRANTS', Intelligence Memorandum, CIA, August 20, 1956, p. 13) (IMG)

Unlike the Yugoslav regime which sought to colonize Albania, the USSR established favorable currency conditions wherein Albania would provide the Dollars and the USSR would take a loss in rubles:

The Albanian Government has little use for dollars, except to buy other foreign exchange, since Albanian commerce with the United States and Canada is practically non-existent. The Soviet offer to take a loss on rubles in order to acquire dollars cheaply doubtless proves quite satisfactory to both parties. (ECONOMIC AND AGRICULTURAL SITUATION IN ALBANIA, CIA, April 17, 1951, p. 3) (IMG)

Furthermore, as confirmed by the US intelligence official William Griffith:

The USSR bought the exports of Albania at doubled price. Imports from the Soviet Union were to be delivered at half prices. Furthermore, the USSR renewed all the credits previously given by the Yugoslavs. (Albania and the Sino-Soviet Rift, The MIT Press, William E. Griffith, 1963, p. 21. Citing the Munich-based 'Wissenschaftlicher Dienst Südosteuropa' (WDSOE), 1958, No. 3, p. 43) (IMG)

This fact could indicate again that the Yugoslavs had been exploiting Albania by purchasing its goods for half the price. The same author had stated: Until 1948 Albania remained a Yugoslav ... satellite. (Albania and the Sino-Soviet Rift, The MIT Press, William E. Griffith, 1963, p. 14) (IMG)

Furthermore, prior to the 1948 Yugoslav-Albanian break.:

Relations between Albania and Yugoslavia declined, however, when the Albanians began complaining that the Yugoslavs were paying too little for Albanian raw materials and exploiting Albania through the joint stock companies. In addition, the Albanians sought investment funds to develop light industries and an oil refinery, while the Yugoslavs wanted the Albanians to concentrate on agriculture and raw-material extraction. (The Albanian-Yugoslav Tensions. In: 'Albania: A Country Study', Federal Research Division of the US Library of Congress, Raymond Zickel and Walter R. Iwaskiw, 1994.) (IMG)

The Albanians were complaining that the Yugoslav regime was paying too little, and after the break the USSR did indeed purchase Albanian goods at a doubled price. All of these are indications of the Yugoslav regime's colonial agenda against Albania.

Regarding the situation with the supply of goods and services in the economy of war torn Albania, the Soros agent Vickers added:

In January 1949, a new system of procurement and supply was introduced by the Central Committee to improve economic relations between the town and countryside. The state guaranteed market-supplied goods at fixed prices to working people on the basis of ration cards; the barter market supplied peasants with industrial commodities in exchange for their agricultural surpluses; and the free market served those in urban towns and rural areas whose needs were not met by the other two markets, either because they were not supplied with ration cards or were not engaged in cooperative agricultural production. Prices in the free market were much higher than in the others, and in this way it was hoped that money accumulated by the country's richer elements would be gradually mopped up. (The Albanians: A Modern History, Miranda Vickers, 2011) (IMG)

The CIA reported that the Albanian People's Democracy brought tax benefits, financial grants, and farming machinery so to incentivize the collectivization of agriculture:

In addition to the propaganda in favor of the Kolkhoz and the great benefits to be derived from the system of collective farms, the grants of money made by the government to the Kolkhozes and the reduction of taxation on them (amounting to about 40 percent, as well as the furnishing of farm machinery), constitute a strong inducement for farmers to enter the collectives. In spite of all this, the farmers are slow to change, and the collectivization has made little progress this year. According to one report, only 5 percent of the total farm population has joined the collective farms. Such farms are to be found only in the plains around the urban centers. (ECONOMIC AND AGRICULTURAL SITUATION IN ALBANIA, CIA, April 17, 1951, p. 3) (IMG)

However, as with the rest of Eastern Europe in the 1950s, collectivization and agricultural production in general suffered due to poor climate, which is why, as stated above, the pace of collectivization was slow. Nonetheless, the state provided relief programs for the farmers:

The objective of the first five-year plan was to prepare the ground and create conditions for the rapid development of collectivization. The resulting dislocation, accentuated by two consecutive very dry years, 1951 and 1952, cut grain production, as well as cattle, sheep and goat populations, between 10 and 25 per cent, and caused very acute food shortages which threatened to jeopardize the whole plan. Stopgap measures - such as a temporary halt to further collectivization, the drastic reduction of compulsory delivery quotas, the cancellation of quotas in arrears, and the free distribution of grain to peasants — had no lasting effects. Grain production continued to be erratic and always fell below target, as did the numbers of cattle, sheep and goats. (The Albanians: A Modern History, Miranda Vickers, 2011) (IMG)

When Albania's collectivization needed to slow down, Mehmet Shehu, an agent of Yugoslav officer Koci Xoxe who pretended to oppose Xoxe, advocated the Trotskyite-style aggressive pursuit of the collectivization program, so to sabotage agriculture, to make collectivization unpopular, and to drive a wedge between the peasants and the state:

If an occasion ever arises for eliminating Shehu, Hoxha has two charges he can bring against him: first, his [i.e. Shehu's] wartime brutality; second, in 1952 or 1953 while Hoxha was away on a trip to Moscow, Shehu publicly announced an intensification in the collectivization program which was promptly repudiated by Hoxha on his return. ('1. ALBANIAN REACTION TO GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION 2. NEW ECONOMIC POLICY 3. RAPPROCHEMENT WITH YUGOSLAVIA', CIA, March 13, 1955, p. 1) (IMG)

However, as the CIA document above stated, Hoxha prevented Shehu from advancing his sabotage agenda. Nonetheless, Shehu continued to live on with his criminal life until the three decades later when he was duly demoted. Where there were state crimes committed in Albania's Popular-Democratic development, they were typically committed by the enemies of the communist faction - i.e. by such people as Mehmet Shehu, who was also later purged during the Hoxha era. Shehu's brutality is also confirmed by the CIA. Referring to Shehu, the CIA stated:

As Minister of the Interior since 1948, he has been the man primarily associated with the regime's repressive activities.... (SITUATION IN ALBANIA, CIA, May 8, 1953, p. 2) (IMG)

Indeed, even as late as the 1970s.:

Through his power base in the Sigurimi, Shehu had managed to consolidate his grip on the mechanisms of the state. (The Albanians: A Modern History, Miranda Vickers, 2014) (IMG)

On the other hand, the Party of Labour of Albania embarked upon a project of increasing the share of the blue-collar elements inside the Party, even though Albania was not an industrial country:

The social strata in the Party are as follows: prior to the 1st Congress, no accurate returns on the strata were available, because social origin was confused with social status, and origin itself was misinterpreted. At present, the party members and candidates of working class social origin constitute 8.08 per cent, and those of working class social status make up 11.5 per cent of the Party's effective. Of the total number of workers engaged in production, 9.73 per cent are organized in the Party. As can be seen, the number of worker party members or candidates is small. This has been influenced by the fact that our working class is new and small in numbers, and now it is growing and becoming stronger parallel with the development of industry. Notwithstanding this, the growth rate of the Party with working class elements is not satisfactory, though there are improvements in this respect. After the 1st Congress, the workers admitted to the Party constituted 28.06 per cent and the candidates of working class origin made up 21.28 per cent. This growth in such a short period is not bad, indeed it is encouraging, if the period of suspension of admissions because of the verification period is taken into account. (REPORT AT THE 2nd CONGRESS OF THE PLA, Central Committee of the Party of Labour of Albania, Enver Hoxha, March 31, 1952. In: Enver Hoxha Selected Works, Vol. 2, The "8 Nëntori" Publishing House, Tirana, 1975, p. 211. MIA)

The relative increase in the blue-collar elements certainly strengthened the position of communists in the Party, against the likes of Shehu and other bureaucrats who exercised influence in the Sigurimi.

The people of Albania sympathized with communism. For start, the Albanian people were opposed to Anglo-American imperialism ('free world'). As confirmed by the US intelligence, as late as May 1958,:

the Albanian people have been persuaded to believe that the whole of the free world has sinister designs on their little country. (ENVER HOXHA: ALBANIA'S ANTI-TITOIST, Background on Communism, IPS/SM/AK, No. 58-193, US Information Agency, CIA, Andrew Keller, May 1958, p. 5) (IMG)

Furthermore, as late as 1958, the Albanians regarded Stalin as a hero:

Albanian youth looks to Moscow for cultural and ideological guidance. Despite the downgrading he has undergone in his own country and elsewhere, the late Soviet dictator Stalin is still a hero to Albanians. (ENVER HOXHA: ALBANIA'S ANTI-TITOIST, Background on Communism, IPS/SM/AK, No. 58-193, US Information Agency, CIA, Andrew Keller, May 1958, p. 5) (IMG)

C13S2. Titoist Regime Oppression in Bosnia *** IMG-All-{Titoist Yugoslavia}

Every ethnic group in Yugoslavia was terrorized by Tito's fascist gang. The 'economic development' projects that Tito's group initiated in Bosnia were for the purposes of building up the military-industrial backbone for a potential imperialist-fascist assault on the Peoples' Democracies. The income that Tito's group generated went not for the Bosnian people but for the imperialist aggression schemes. This is why Bosnia too was an extremely poor province:

However, the extent of military-related investment in the 1950s and 60s proved to be a mixed blessing. Because of the volume of investment, Bosnia was long treated in official policy as a "developed republic" and denied the civilian investments channeled into Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro, even though it remained objectively one of the poorest parts of Yugoslavia. Bosnia's development fell further behind the other republics. In 1953, it had a per capita income of 74 percent of the Yugoslav average; by 1971, this had fallen to 53 percent. By 1971, only 1 percent of the population had completed university training and 36 percent had less than three years of primary education (Ramet 1992). (Peacebuilding and Civil Society in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ten Years After Dayton, Berghof Research Center, Martina Fischer, 2007, p. 13) (IMG)

While impoverishing and economically terrorizing the people of Bosnia, Tito's group also, as noted previously in C12S1, promoted the Handzar SS, the notorious Nazi 'Islamic' army of terror that officially worked for the Vatican-sponsored 'Islamic State' of Bosnia headed by the Pagan warlord Pavelic (see C9S18). Tito's group accepted the entry of 2,000 Handzar SS terrorists into the ranks of the Yugoslav 'Communist' Party and the Yugoslav regime army. Tito's group, as mentioned in C12S6, placed Islamic extremists in charge of the administration of Kosovo. The simultaneous recruitment and elevation of 'Islamic' fascists on the one hand and the impoverishment of Bosnia by Tito's group was a godsend to the NATO-sponsored Al-Qaeda death squads that emerged in Bosnia and Kosovo years later.

C13S3. The Massacre at Katyn *** IMG-All-{Katyn}

In September 1951, the American regime began questioning the facts on Katyn, casting doubts on the so-called 'Soviet narrative', leading the US Congress to 'reinvestigate'. The investigation by the Congress coincided with the completion of the CIA's special study, in cooperation with the Office of the Chief of Military History of the Pentagon, on the Soviet treatment and interrogation of war prisoners. Dated and published in September 1951, the American intelligence service's study presented a picture that starkly contrasted with the Nazi 'facts' which the Congressional 'investigators' planned to hear. Hereby follows an excerpt of the US intelligence document:

B. Soviet Instructions Issued in 1940

A set of instructions concerning the collection, interrogation, and evacuation of prisoners (or deserters) was issued by the Deputy Peoples' Commander of Defense in February 1940. The Germans found a copy of these instructions in Poland in the captured files of a Russian tank unit. (...). Many of the 1940 instructions apparently remained in force, at least in principle, throughout the war.... (Russian Methods of Interrogating Captured Personnel World War II, CIA, the Office of the Chief of the Military History, US Department of the Army, Kermit Stewart (Major, Infantry, US Army), Orland Ward (Major General, USA Chief), September 1951, pp. 138-139, underline original) (IMG)

The CIA-Pentagon document added:

Article 13 of the instructions stated that "all military personnel . . . must be generous to an enemy prisoner and render any assistance in order to save his life." In keeping with this general rule, Soviet military personnel was specifically forbidden to take from or exchange with a prisoner the latter's gas mask, personal (toilet) kit, uniform, underclothing, footwear, belt, personal belongings, and money. Collection and search of prisoners during battle was to be carried out in terrain protected from enemy fire. (Russian Methods of Interrogating Captured Personnel World War II, CIA, the Office of the Chief of the Military History, US Department of the Army, Kermit Stewart (Major, Infantry, US Army), Orland Ward (Major General, USA Chief), September 1951, p. 141) (IMG)

Elsewhere the American intelligence document stated:

While the killing of prisoners was tolerated by lower echelon commanders it would appear that the Soviet high command disapproved from the beginning. A directive (No. 1798) of the Soviet Government, dated 1 July 1941, reiterated humanitarian aspects of the 1940 instructions and categorically ordered: "It is prohibited to insult and maltreat prisoners." A general order issued in December 1941 revealed that the supreme command was dissatisfied with interrogation results, that it censured military personnel because so few prisoners ever arrived at array head-quarters for interrogation and prohibited the killing of prisoners by combat troops. (Russian Methods of Interrogating Captured Personnel World War II, CIA, the Office of the Chief of the Military History, US Department of the Army, Kermit Stewart (Major, Infantry, US Army), Orland Ward (Major General, USA Chief), September 1951, p. 161) (IMG)

While writing in probabilistic terms, the document nevertheless stated that the 'Soviet high command disapproved from the beginning' 'the killing of prisoners' and that as early as '1940', these 'instructions . . . remained in force'. Citing 'a copy of these instructions in Poland in the captured files of a Russian' which the 'Germans found . . . in Poland', the US intelligence arrived at the conclusion that the '1940 instruction' contained 'humanitarian aspects'. Writing in definitive terms, the CIA stated that the 'general rule' for the 'Soviet military personnel' was to not take actions that would lead to the death of the prisoner and to abide by 'Article 13' which called for generosity towards the prisoners. Thus, while not explicitly

mentioning Katyn, the author of the US intelligence document, who based his research off of numerous CIA and German intelligence documents, practically agreed – at times with a dose of probabilism and sometimes in a definitive form – that the Soviet high command was opposed to maltreating prisoners.

Among the most important pieces of evidence is that the bodies of the individuals arrested by the Nazis had been found at Katyn. A US Congress report – which blamed the Soviets for the Katyn massacre – nonetheless admitted:

in several instances families were officially informed by the Germans that bodies of people who ... had been arrested during the German occupation had been found at Katyn. (FACTS AND DOCUMENTS CONCERNING POLISH PRISONERS OF WAR CAPTURED BY THE U.S.S.R DURING THE 1939 CAMPAIGN. In: “The Katyn Forest Massacre: Hearings Before the Select Committee to Conduct and Investigation of the Facts, Evidence, and Circumstances of the Katyn Forest Massacre”, 82nd Congress, Parts 5-7. 1952, p. 1738) (IMG)

It goes without saying that finding the bodies of individuals whom the Nazis captured shows that the Nazis, not the Soviets, were the forces handling the fate of those captured individuals: death in Katyn.

In his intelligence report (written in an abbreviated way) from the US Embassy in Moscow to the US State Department, the prominent anti-Soviet Cold Warrior Averell Harriman remarked:

[It] Appears [that the] Soviets [are] conducting very detailed examination [of] each body by autopsy and by examination [of] clothing, remaining personal effects, and papers. Evidence which made greatest impression to strengthen [the] Russian case was:

(One) Most soldiers exhumed to date were enlisted men rather than officers, as Germans claimed.

(Two) Methodical method of execution, each having been killed by one shot at base of skull.

(Three) Dates of papers exhibited from November 1940 to June 1941.

(Four) Testimony by witnesses re[garding] unsuccessful attempt to evacuate Poles at time of German breakthrough to Smolensk and re[garding] Poles engaged [in] road work in area for Russians and Germans in 1941.

(“Telegram From United States Embassy”, To: President and Secretary of State, by: William Averell Harriman, Strictly Confidential, Moscow, January 25, 1944. In: “The Katyn Forest Massacre: Hearings Before the Select Committee to Conduct and Investigation of the Facts, Evidence, and Circumstances of the Katyn Forest Massacre”, 82nd Congress, Parts 5-7. 1952, p. 2124) (IMG)

Though Harriman was a Roosevelt-era US official affiliated with the Democratic Party, his vehement anti-Sovietism and anti-communism is well-documented and not disputed. Stanley Meisler, the former deputy director of the Office of Evaluation and Research in the US intelligence front ‘Peace Corps’, wrote:

Walter Lippmann, the influential columnist, believed that the United States was deliberately and dangerously humiliating the Soviet Union. The American delegates, Lippmann believed, had fallen under the sway of the hard-line anti-Soviet views of Ambassador Harriman. When Harriman told a news conference in San Francisco that "our objectives and the Kremlin's objectives are irreconcilable," Lippmann walked out. (United Nations: A History, Stanley Meisler, 2011) (IMG)

It is worth noting that the remarks made by Averell Harriman, the anti-Soviet Cold Warrior, were in no way under the pressure of the fact of the official ‘alliance’ between the USSR and the USA. The following excerpts of the conversation between Harriman and another well-known anti-Soviet US official O’Konski are instructive:

Mr. O’KONSKI. The reason why I ask that is that it leads up to the second question I have.

All during this time that you were the Ambassador, there were some 15,000 Polish officers murdered, and our Government here in Washington did not show enough interest to request you to find the essential facts concerning the case; is that correct? Not once were you communicated with for information. They did not care what happened to those officers; did they?

Mr. HARRIMAN. I cannot say they did not care, but it is a fact they did not ask me to do it. (...).

Mr. O’KONSKI. If the answer is not that they did not care, the other answer is that they were so afraid they might learn the truth about who murdered them that again they might get afraid of that great big thing; that Joe Stalin might get mad at us and make a separate peace with Hitler.

Mr. HARRIMAN. I don’t think that would be the case at all. I never saw any evidence of that. There was a constant effort on the part of the United States Government to protect the interests of the Poles insofar as it was possible to do so.

(“The Katyn Forest Massacre: Hearings Before the Select Committee to Conduct and Investigation of the Facts, Evidence, and Circumstances of the Katyn Forest Massacre”, 82nd Congress, Parts 5-7. 1952, pp. 2124-2125) (IMG)

Averell Harriman’s claims regarding the massacre at Katyn are backed up by the report of his daughter. In her intelligence report for the US Embassy in Moscow and the State Department, the American intelligence operative and diplomat Kathleen Harriman Mortimer stated:

it is my opinion that the Poles were murdered by the Germans. The most convincing evidence to uphold this was the methodical manner in which the job was done, something the Commission thought not sufficiently important to stress. (Report Written by Mrs. Kathleen Harriman Mortimer After Visiting Katyn in January 1944, [Enclosure No. 2 to Despatch No. 207 dated February 23, 1944, from American Embassy, Moscow]. In: “The Katyn Forest Massacre: Hearings Before the Select Committee to Conduct and Investigation of the Facts, Evidence, and Circumstances of the Katyn Forest Massacre”, 82nd Congress, Parts 5-7. 1952, p. 2133) (IMG)

Again, Kathleen Harriman Mortimer was not under pressure to reach any of her conclusions throughout her report, either:

Mr. O’KONSKI. (...). Did anybody exert any pressure or any force or any hint to you at all in arriving at your conclusion?

Mrs. MORTIMER. No.

(“The Katyn Forest Massacre: Hearings Before the Select Committee to Conduct and Investigation of the Facts, Evidence, and Circumstances of the Katyn Forest Massacre”, 82nd Congress, Parts 5-7. 1952, pp. 2147-2148) (IMG)

The method of execution alluded to by Kathleen Harriman was, as Averell Harriman also stated, the one shot at the base of the skull. This fact about the method of Nazi execution has also been corroborated by Paul Sturman of the ‘Foreign Language Service’ of the US government’s ‘Office of War Information’ (OWI). In a letter to Alan Cranston of the OWI, Paul Sturman described the “shot in the nape of the neck” as:

a method practiced by Nazi executioners. (Letter by Paul Sturman to Mr. Alan Cranston. From Washington D.C. to 12370 Hilltop, Los Altos, Calif. November 5, 1952. In: “The Katyn Forest Massacre: Hearings Before the Select Committee to Conduct and Investigation of the Facts, Evidence, and Circumstances of the Katyn Forest Massacre”, 82nd Congress, Parts 5-7. 1952, p. 2180) (IMG)

Reporting to Washington during the Second World War, the US State Department official John Melby remarked:

On balance, however, and despite loopholes, the Russian case is convincing. (“The Katyn Forest Massacre: Hearings Before the Select Committee to Conduct and Investigation of the Facts, Evidence, and Circumstances of the Katyn Forest Massacre”, 82nd Congress, Parts 5-7. 1952, pp. 2124-2125. Note the Select Committee was citing an excerpt of the report by Melby.) (IMG)

Melby denied that he was under pressure for making such a report:

Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. Melby. did you discuss your visit to Katyn, and what you saw there, with the Soviet officials on your way back to Moscow?

Mr. MELBY. I don't remember talking about it to the Soviet officials. There were one or two people from the Foreign Office who escorted us, and I don't remember any others. I don't remember discussing it with them.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Did any Soviet official suggest to you that you might come up with the conclusion that it was the Germans that did this!

Mr. MELBY. The Commission themselves that investigated it.

Mr. PUCINSKI. I mean on the train, in personal conference.

Mr. MELBY. No.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Did you feel at the time you wrote this report ... [the] conclusion that the Germans did this – did you feel that possibly was the answer your superiors in the State Department and Washington would prefer?

Mr. MELBY. No; I had not reason to have any idea as to what kind of answer they would want.

Mr. PUCINSKI. You had no reason?

Mr. MELBY. No.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Nevertheless, you knew that there were very close relations at that time between the United States and the Soviet Union?

Mr. MELBY. Yes sir.

Mr. PUCINSKI. And did you feel that might be somewhat putting yourself in an unfavorable light if you drew your conclusions on the basis of your reasoning and the rest of your report, and concluded the Soviets did this?

Mr. MELBY. No sir; not at all.

Mr. PUCINSKI. There was no such fear in your mind?

Mr. MELBY. No, sir; not at all.

Mr. PUCINSKI. How long were you there, Mr. Melby?

Mr. MELBY. We arrived early one morning, 7 or 8 o'clock, and were there in the area until about 2 a.m. the following morning.

(...). Mr. PUCINSKI. And you are certain that nobody asked you to voice a conclusion on your visit to Katyn?

Mr. MELBY. Absolutely certain.

Mr. PUCINSKI. How long were you in Russia before you went to Katyn?

Mr. MELBY. I arrived there in May 1943.

Mr. PUCINSKI. How many months before?

Mr. MELBY. It would have been about 7 months.

Mr. PUCINSKI. How long were you there after you went to Katyn.

Mr. MELBY. Until April 1945, a little over a year more.

(“The Katyn Forest Massacre: Hearings Before the Select Committee to Conduct and Investigation of the Facts, Evidence, and Circumstances of the Katyn Forest Massacre”, 82nd Congress, Parts 5-7. 1952, pp. 2152-2153.) (IMG)

When the Eisenhower Administration ascended to power, John Melby was demoted on charges of close relations with the Soviet intelligence service. Therefore, it is possible that he may have been ‘biased’ in favor of the USSR. Nonetheless, his remarks are supported by the remarks of the viciously anti-Soviet Averell Harriman and his daughter Kathleen.

The Anglo-American media claims that, behind the scenes, Roosevelt agreed that the Soviets were responsible for the Katyn Massacre. Not true. In fact, when George Earle presented ‘evidence’ of Soviet responsibility for the massacre, Roosevelt, as quoted by Earle himself, responded:

George, this is entirely German propaganda and a German plot. I am absolutely convinced the Russians did not do this. (“The Katyn Forest Massacre: Hearings Before the Select Committee to Conduct and Investigation of the Facts, Evidence, and Circumstances of the Katyn Forest Massacre”, 82nd Congress, Parts 5-7. 1952, p. 2204) (IMG)

The pseudo-‘evidence’ presented by the Nazi Germans is documented by American intelligence to have been obtained through torture and terror. The viciously anti-Soviet American intelligence operative Harriman Mortimer reported:

In the spring of 1943 the Germans published stories in the three quisling local papers telling of the murder of Poles at Katyn during March and April 1940, by the NKVD. (...). Next the Germans searched out witnesses to confirm their story. We saw three men who had been questioned and beaten by the Gestapo, one of whom was the Gnezdov station master, the two others peasants. All three were tortured into signing documents, the contents of which they did not understand. (Report Written by Mrs. Kathleen Harriman Mortimer After Visiting Katyn in January 1944, [Enclosure No. 2 to Despatch No. 207 dated February 23, 1944, from American Embassy, Moscow]. In: “The Katyn Forest Massacre: Hearings Before the Select Committee to Conduct and Investigation of the Facts, Evidence, and Circumstances of the Katyn Forest Massacre”, 82nd Congress, Parts 5-7. 1952, p. 2137) (IMG)

3. Documents found on the Polish Corpses: The final act of the Germans was to route out and either kill or deport any person who might have information proving the whole Polish incident was a fake. They caught all but a few of the men they had beaten into signing false evidence and the three girls who had been servants at the Goat Hill datcha.

Despite the thoroughness of the pocket ripping by the Germans, out of the seven hundred corpses the Commission have so far investigated, 146 items have been found. The earliest date was found on a postcard — March the latest — an unmailed postcard dated June 20, 1941. We were shown all these documents and trinkets and the most important and significant ones were translated for us. They included letters from Warsaw and Moscow dated in the winter of 1940, receipts for valuables dated in the Spring of 1941 and numerous newspaper clippings dated from early 1940 through early 1941. (Report Written by Mrs. Kathleen Harriman Mortimer After Visiting Katyn in January 1944, [Enclosure No. 2 to Despatch No. 207 dated February 23, 1944, from American Embassy, Moscow]. In: “The Katyn Forest Massacre: Hearings Before the Select Committee to Conduct and Investigation of the Facts, Evidence, and Circumstances of the Katyn Forest Massacre”, 82nd Congress, Parts 5-7. 1952, p. 2138) (IMG)

As further confirmed by K. Harriman Mortimer, the Nazi Germans also looted, from the pockets of as many Polish units as possible, the documents dated later than April 1940 so to 'prove' that the massacre was carried out in April 1940:

As they were dug up, the Germans tagged each corpse with a metal number, slit open the pockets and removed all papers they could find that bore dates later than March and April 1940 and looted the pockets of any money and valuables. They imported a corpse specialist called "Butz" from Berlin to make an investigation and to prove scientifically that the bodies found were buried in the Spring of 1940. (Report Written by Mrs. Kathleen Harriman Mortimer After Visiting Katyn in January 1944, [Enclosure No. 2 to Despatch No. 207 dated February 23, 1944, from American Embassy, Moscow]. In: "The Katyn Forest Massacre: Hearings Before the Select Committee to Conduct and Investigation of the Facts, Evidence, and Circumstances of the Katyn Forest Massacre", 82nd Congress, Parts 5-7. 1952, pp. 2137-2138) (IMG)

Again, none of these remarks in the report by K. Harriman Mortimer, the henchwoman of Averell Harriman, were under the pressure of the official 'alliance' with the USSR.

A document published by the Yale University Press through researching the archives of Poland stated that in the killing field,:

two calibers of firearms were used in the executions: in the overwhelming majority of cases, smaller than 8-mm, that is, 7.75 mm or less; in a lesser number, larger than 8-mm, that is, 9-mm. (Katyn: A Crime without Punishment, Yale University Press, Head Office of State Archives in Poland, Federal Archival Agency of Russia, Wojciech Materski, p. 321) (IMG)

The only two German pistols listed, the Parabellum P08 and the Walther P38, are both 9 mm. (Europe Central, William Vollmann)

The Soviet military did not have access to 9 mm pistols until long after the Second World War, as the following table from the CIA suggests:

TCS No. 4408-65

or Release 2001/08/26 : CIA-RDP79B00972A000100140011-4

ITEM	25X1B4d	Documentary Sources		Collateral		First Visual Sighting		
		Earliest Date	Earliest Date	Defectors and Repatriates Earliest Date	Other Sources Earliest Date	In Groups of Forces	USSR	With Forces of Other Bloc Countries
Mortars								
82mm M1937 M43 Mod		1947	-	-	1946?	1945	1945	1952
120mm M1938		1943	-	-	1946	1946	1945	-?
120mm M1943		1947	-	-	1946	-	-	-?
160mm M1943		1950	-	-	1947	-	-	-
160mm M-60		1958	-	-	1953	1957	-	-
240mm M-240		1958	-	-	1953	-	-	-
Antitank Recoilless								
82mm B-10 (M-51)		1958	-	1955	1958	-	-	-
107mm B-11 (M-50)		1957	-	1956	1956?	1958	-	-
AT Launcher RPG-2		1961	-	1956	-	-?	-	1955
AT Launcher M62-(?)		-	-	-	1962	1964	-	-
Infantry Weapons								
9mm Pistol Makarov (PM)		1956	-	1954	1957	-?	-?	-?
9mm Machine Pistol								
Stetchkin (APS)		1959	-	1955	1957	-?	-?	-?
7.62mm Carbine SKS		1949	-	1948	1949	1954	-	-
7.62mm Assault Rifle								
AK-47		1952	-	1949	1954	1954	-	1958
7.62mm Assault Rifle AKM		1963	-	-	1962	-?	-	-
7.62mm Machinegun RFD		1956	-	1952	1954	-?	-	-
7.62mm Machinegun RPK		1962	-	-	1960	-?	1961?	-
7.62mm Machinegun RP-46		1952	-	-	1947	-?	-	-
7.62mm Machinegun SGM		1958	-	1956	1955	1958	-	-
12.7mm Machinegun								
DShK M1938/46		1957	-	-	1955	1957	-	-
14.5mm SFU-2 & ZFU-4		1958	-	1954	1954	1956	1954	-?

(‘Production of Soviet Land Combat Equipment<Sanitized> 1944-1962’, CIA, NSA, 1962-1963, p. 61) (IMG)

There is also pseudo-‘evidence’ presented by Mikhail Gorbachev during the era of Perestroika ‘proving’ Soviet responsibility for Katyn massacre. “Who is thy witness?” they asked a fox. ‘My own tail’, the fox replied” – so goes a Persian proverb. Never mind that the ‘documents’ presented by the Gorbachev group have been seriously challenged as having been fabricated. As I have documented in C24S4, Mikhail Gorbachev himself admitted in his post-1991 memoirs that he was a British spy providing top secret nuclear-military intelligence to Margaret Thatcher. In the context of Katyn, the conflict of interest implies that MI6 spy Gorbachev and his ‘evidence’ or ‘documents’ were not reliable on Katyn. It is also regrettable, though not in the least surprising, to see that a revisionist author like Domenico Losurdo sided with Gorbachev in supporting such anti-Soviet propaganda. Like Khrushchev, the reactionary intellectual Domenico Losurdo played the role of the token ‘communist’, the anti-communist disguised as a useful ‘confessor’ from an ostensibly ‘communist’ viewpoint in the favour of the reactionary forces. Not just over the issue of the Katyn massacre, but as well on a number of other important issues, Losurdo worked to mislead progressive-minded individuals. Citing Losurdo or Gorbachev for their anti-communist ‘confessions’ is analogous to citing the pro-communist ‘confessions’ of a pro-Soviet official in the US government, such as Harry Hopkins. Throughout this book, even when I cited James Klugmann, the MI6 officer tasked by Britain’s Communist Party to write an anti-Titoist book, I addressed the involvement of a pro-Soviet ‘bias’ in his works and ensured that the claims for which Klugmann’s work was cited would be backed up by anti-Soviet sources from anti-Soviet intelligence services. Or when I cited Yehuda Bauer, Yad Vashem’s and IHRA’s Mapam-affiliated Holocaust researcher with likely pro-Soviet views, I made sure to address the potential presence of a pro-Soviet ‘bias’ in his works, and used anti-Soviet sources to back up all the major claims for which Bauer’s work was cited. I had initially cited the work of the Kennedy-era Chief of US Special Operations Command, General Fletcher Prouty, but later deleted that excerpt cited, precisely because of the affiliations of Prouty with the Kennedy faction. For the same reason, I deleted most of the excerpts I cited from the works of Gar Alperovitz, because he too had ties to the Kennedy team. I

had cited Kennedy-era and Carter-era US State Department official George Ball on Yugoslavia's role in the 1956 reign of terror in Hungary, but decided to delete that cited excerpt as well. Much as how the socialist forces had their own Khrushchevs and Gorbachevs, there were officials in the US and Israel who, while officially condemning the socialist forces, secretly had pro-communist views – and depending on the case, I either did not cite them at all, or minimized my citation of those individuals, or backed up any citation of those individuals by citing confirmed anti-Soviet intelligence service sources. Contrast this strict and meticulous methodology with the Anglo-American imperialist methodology; the latter relies on the “fox's own tail” for ‘proving’ anti-Soviet accusations: Gorbachev and his followers.

C13S4.1 The Home Army (AK) was funded by Nazi Germany's Japanese Fascist Allies / The AK was an Anti-Semitic Group that did Not fight the Nazis *** IMG-All-{Poland}

In Poland, there was a non-communist ‘resistance’ organization that was called the Home Army (AK). The Anglo-American media outlets claim that the Home Army was combatting the Nazi German occupation forces and that it was ‘unjustly’ ‘persecuted’ by the Soviets. To the pro-Soviet individuals and to many Ashkenazim who have lived, or have relatives, in Poland, the Nazi-collaborationism and anti-Semitic terrorism of the Home Army would be a common-sense intuition. However, to date, the pogromism and Nazi-collaborationism of the Home Army has not been well-studied minus in a number of works by Ashkenazi authors and in the Soviet and People's Democratic archives. It goes without saying that probably for the first time, the fascist Nazi-collaborationist, and anti-Semitic pogromist character of the MI6-backed Home Army will be exposed in detail throughout this section and the subsequent ones, using not ‘biased’ pro-Soviet archival sources but, as always, using mostly anti-Soviet intelligence sources.

The Home Army, whose high command was based in London, was a front for the British intelligence service, and thus the activity of the Home Army reflected the interests of the MI6. For this reason, much as with the MI6 itself, the period of the activity of the Home Army in Poland is divided into three main phases: (1) 1939 to late 1940 or early 1941, (2) 1941 to late 1942 or early 1943, (3) 1943 and beyond. During the period 1939 to late early 1941, the MI6 regarded the Nazi Germans as unofficial allies against the USSR, and hence the ‘Polish Underground’ – also known as the Home Army – was allied with the fascists. According to the Nazi German intelligence chief Walter Schellenberg, as early as 1940, the Polish Underground was actively and covertly collaborating with Japanese diplomatic channels:

the Secret Service of the Polish resistance movement was working in collaboration with the Manchoukuoan Embassy, which was the same thing as saying the Japanese Embassy. In other words, they were obviously working with the Japanese Secret Service. (Hitler's Secret Service, Original title: The Labyrinth, Walther Schellenberg, Introduction by Alan Bullock, Translation by Louis Hagen, first published: 1956, p. 138) (IMG)

Based on intelligence gathered by the Germans:

it was plain that the Japanese were availing themselves of this organization [i.e. Polish Underground] and the extensive information network that was being built up there. (Hitler's Secret Service, Original title: The Labyrinth, Walther Schellenberg, Introduction by Alan Bullock, Translation by Louis Hagen, first published: 1956, p. 140) (IMG)

Imperial Japan provided financial support for the Polish AK:

the Japanese Secret Service had taken notice of the organization and methods of the Polish resistance from a very early point of its development. At first the resistance consisted not so much of fighting units of officers and soldiers, but of loosely organized resistance centers with an extensive information service. The Japanese decided to provide this movement with financial aid, as it could be of use to their own intelligence organization. The Japanese almost always availed themselves the services of nationals in those countries in which they were operating. Poland was an especially interesting field for them, as it could be used for intelligence work in two directions, against the Germans and [more importantly] against the Russians. They supplied the Poles with financial support, technical equipment and specially trained couriers, and even went so far as to naturalize their Polish agents and supply them with diplomatic passports. (Hitler's Secret Service, Original title: The Labyrinth, Walther Schellenberg, Introduction by Alan Bullock, Translation by Louis Hagen, first published: 1956, p. 142) (IMG)

As one may expect, the Japanese did not utilize the Polish Underground state as much against Germany as against the Soviet Union. Indeed, as Schellenberg put it, in using these Polish Underground, the Japanese were mainly engaged:

in the construction of a Secret Service net against Russia.... (Hitler's Secret Service, Original title: The Labyrinth, Walther Schellenberg, Introduction by Alan Bullock, Translation by Louis Hagen, first published: 1956, p. 143) (IMG)

It should come as no surprise that according to a document by the Cambridge University Press,:

One leaflet distributed in 1941 characterized the PPR leaders and their ideas as simply spokespersons of the Soviet government. “The aim of the Polish Worker's Party [PPR],” the leaflet stated, “is the struggle against the Polish Government, the Polish Army, and the Polish Nation.... The PPR is preparing the fifth partition of Poland.” (The Polish Underground and the Jews, 1939-1945, Cambridge University Press, Joshua D. Zimmerman, June 5, 2015, p. 120) (IMG)

In 1941 came the second phase of the activities of the Home Army, when the MI6 genuinely turned against the Nazi Germans, and hence the Home Army too turned against the Nazi Germans. The vast majority of the weight for fighting the Nazi Germans was again placed on the Polish communist-led popular front and the USSR. Nonetheless, one can at least be grateful for the fact that the AK did not outright ally with the Nazis against the communists and the USSR, even though elements within the AK continued to carry out hostile anti-Soviet activities in favor of the Nazis.

In the meantime, at the behest of the MI6, the Polish government-in-exile negotiated a treaty of alliance with the USSR against Nazi Germany. Stalin, calculating that the promotion of MI6-backed elements would be useful for combat against Nazi Germany, engaged in such an alliance and released the Polish regime military' commanders from prison. These military commanders, among whom was the infamous Menachem Begin, formed an MI6-directed military force known as the ‘Anders Army’, which would in turn be, shortly thereafter, responsible for strategically commanding the Home Army units in Poland. Naturally, the MI6 agent Beria conspired to use this Polish-Soviet alliance as means of promoting those pro-MI6 generals in the Polish Army and of establishing the ‘Intermarium’ a Polish-led confederation of Central Europe envisioned by General Pilsudski (see C3S3):

The formation of a Polish army in the USSR was approved, but Stalin was extremely reluctant when it came to equipping this army. My father showed no surprise at this attitude. He had even expected it. Eventually, since this army seemed destined never to be used, my

father interceded for it to be allowed to leave the USSR in spring 1942. (...). Merkulov nevertheless asked Anders to leave behind a group of officers whom my father planned to introduce into the Polish Communist army led by Berling. Anders would not hear of this, and he made a mistake there, for his men would have occupied high positions in Poland. Later he was to admit his mistake.

At that time my father regarded Poland as very important. He wanted that country to be the nucleus of a confederation of Central European states which would include the Baltic states. (...). My father, however, thought that there was nobody more suitable than a Polish patriot like Anders to carry out the plan for a confederation. He hoped that this belt of states, more advanced than the USSR, would contribute to our development and 'get the cart of the Communist economy out of the rut it was stuck in.'

(‘Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin’s Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 73) (IMG)

Beria’s behaviour was also reflected in the involvement of the Georgian Menshevik military officers in the Underground Polish State. In the words of the scholar of Beria’s biography, Francoise Thom:

This may be explicable by the close links that existed between the émigré Mensheviks and the Poles. In 1920 Georgia had signed a military alliance with Poland. In 1921, after the establishment of the Bolshevik regime in Georgia, Poland welcomed several hundred Georgian officers who were between the Paris Mensheviks and the Georgian officers in Poland. Several of these officers joined Anders’ army. The writer of these notes [Francoise Thom] is grateful for this information to Akaki Ramishvili, the son of Noah Ramishvili, the Minister of the Interior in the Menshevik Government of Georgia. (‘Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin’s Kremlin’, Sergo Beria, p. 326) (IMG)

During 1941, the Nazi Germans expanded their already-existing network of agents within the Home Army. Referring to a German intelligence officer Hans Hermann Merz as the ‘SUBJECT’, the CIA reported that the German intelligence officer was able to infiltrate the Polish Home Army’s high command early on in the war. Some time in 1941 or 1942,:

SUBJECT succeeded in penetrating the Armia Krajowa (Home-ARMY - AK) central coordinating headquarters. (MERZ, HANS_0017, USAREUR Central Registry (Prov), 513th INTC Group, APO 154, US Forces, April 17, 1963, p. 1) (IMG)

The CIA document cited allegations that in 1942, Merz and a Polish Home Army General ‘Albrecht worked out a plan whereby AK would cease its partisan activity’:

Allegedly, in 1941 or 1942, SUBJECT succeeded in recruiting and vetting, as an informant, a Colonel fnu Albrecht, not further identified, formerly with the Polish Army, later chief of staff of the underground partisan movement, Zwiasek Walki Zbrojny (Union of Armed Battle - ZWZ), within the AK. It was further alleged that SUBJECT and Albrecht worked out a plan whereby AK would cease its partisan activity in return for a German guarantee of Polish national independence, a larger proportion of Poles in the central government of Poland and easing of the occupation costs and restrictions placed upon the Poles. (MERZ, HANS_0017, USAREUR Central Registry (Prov), 513th INTC Group, APO 154, US Forces, April 17, 1963, p. 1. Note: ‘fnu’ stands for ‘first name unknown’.) (IMG)

The plan that Colonel Albrecht and Merz allegedly envisioned was indeed implemented by the Nazi Germans and the Home Army. Indeed, until 1944, the Polish Home Army refused to engage in any significant combat against the forces of the Third Reich. In an article for Haaretz, Shlomo Avineri – Israel’s former Director General of Foreign Affairs and currently a Fellow at the Munich Centre for Applied Policy Research – posed the following rhetorical questions:

The first question concerns the timing of the Polish Warsaw uprising, in August 1944, when the Soviet Army reached the Vistula. (...). Why did the Armia Krajowa, the Polish underground, controlled by the Polish government-in-exile in London, strike at this particular moment, when the Germans were already retreating, eastern Poland was already liberated and the Soviet army was about to liberate Warsaw itself? (...). Why did the Polish underground not rise against German occupation over the preceding four years? Why, for example, didn’t Armia Krajowa strike against the Germans during the Jewish Warsaw Ghetto Uprising in April 1943? Why did the Polish underground not try to disrupt the Germans’ systematic extermination of three million Jews, all Polish citizens?

One sometimes hears arguments about how many guns the Polish underground sent – or did not send – to help those participating in the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising. But that is not the critical question. The question is why did the Polish underground just stand by when the remnants of the 300,000 Jewish residents of Warsaw rose against the German occupation? German suppression of the ghetto uprising took weeks, and on the “Aryan side,” the Polish population of Warsaw saw and heard what was happening in their own city – and did nothing. It is difficult to know what would have happened if the Polish underground had joined the uprising – not only in Warsaw but all over occupied Poland, where it had prepared thousands of its members in numerous cities and villages for a possible revolt. Had this taken place, it would certainly have made it more difficult for the German SS troops to liquidate the Warsaw Ghetto. Moreover, had Armia Krajowa joined what was seen as a “Jewish” uprising, it would have been a powerful proof of solidarity with the Polish Jews.

It is a tough question. But is it totally unjustified to raise the moral dimension involved in deciding to start an uprising in order to prevent Warsaw from being liberated by the Soviets – but not doing anything to prevent the organized murder of three million Polish Jews or to help the ghetto uprising?

(Quo Vadis, Poland?. Ha’aretz, Shlomo Avineri, September 3, 2016) (IMG)

Shlomo Avineri had been promoted by the Yitzhak Rabin cabinet. Rabin himself was a crypto-communist and his team had many Mapam activists. The Mapam was rooted in the Hashomer Hatzair, the ‘Socialist Zionist’ movement that was involved greatly in the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising. For more information on the Mapam, see C16S6. By the 1940s, the Hashomer Hatzair emerged as a major pro-Soviet ‘Socialist Zionist’ movement; Shlomo Avineri’s links to the Rabin team could perhaps result in accusations that he may have had a ‘pro-Soviet’ bias. Nonetheless, the claims made by Avineri are well-documented. Timothy Snyder, a leading anti-Soviet professor of history at Yale University and an important member of the CIA’s Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), acknowledged:

Warsaw Home Army commanders had strategic concerns that militated against giving the Jews any weapons at all. (Bloodlands: Europe

Between Hitler and Stalin, Timothy Snyder, p. 284) (IMG)

Yitzhak Zuckerman had been a commander of the Yiddish rebels in the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising. He was a traitor to the uprising he led and betrayed the Yiddish fighters. He later served as the viciously anti-Soviet American intelligence agent responsible for promoting Zionist mass migration from

Poland. This American intelligence agent, describing the attitude of the Armia Krajowa (AK) towards the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, admitted the hostility and anti-Semitism of the AK towards the Yiddish freedom-fighters:

They knew about the negative attitude of the AK (Armia Krajowa) to us and advised us. The smaller force of the PPR underground, which was understanding and sympathetic to us, had few weapons and, despite its good will, caused us a serious crisis when a group of our fellows who had gone to help them, to join the partisans near Lublin, was captured by the Nazis.

Armia Krajowa (AK), the major force in the Polish underground, not only suspected us but was even hostile to us. Externally, it was disbelief. Instead of saying: "I hate you," it was easier for them to say: "I don't believe you; you don't defend yourself." Later, after the January Uprising, they had another excuse: that is, we were pro-Soviet. After the first Uprising, we heard a lot of praise; then this political pretext of "pro-Soviet" came up. But at this time, it was easy for them to say: "We don't believe you, and we don't have many weapons either; you didn't defend yourselves and went like sheep to the slaughter." The only thing we asked them for was weapons. We told them that, if they gave us weapons, we wouldn't go "like sheep to the slaughter."

Furthermore, Arye Wilner came back to the ghetto and reported to us soon after that his friends in the Scouts had told him that the representatives of the AK wouldn't talk to him because they didn't consider He-Halutz, Dror, and Ha-Shomer Ha-Tza'ir partners for negotiations, but only a youth movement. (His friends in the Scouts could only have been Hubert Kaminski, who later played an important role in the Polish underground and was the editor-in-chief of the AK newspaper, Information Bulletin.) If that was how we looked to them, the whole thing could be dead. They pretty much said: You don't really represent the Jews, since you're nothing but "members of a youth movement," and the Delegatura, that is, the representatives of the Polish Government-in-Exile, do not talk with youth movements. If they didn't want to give us weapons, they could also use this excuse.

(A Surplus of Memory: Chronicle of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, Yitzhak Zuckerman, 1993, pp. 219-220) (IMG)

Zuckerman himself was not pro-Soviet and in fact was anti-Soviet as he admitted elsewhere in his memoirs (see C16S6). However, the martyr Mordechai Anielewicz, the Hashomer Hatzair 'Socialist Zionist' revolutionary who was the commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, was staunchly sympathetic towards the Soviet Union. The AK was not really hostile to Zuckerman himself either, but was definitely very hostile to the Yiddish rebels whose post-Anielewicz commander, Zuckerman, was betraying. Still elsewhere Zuckerman, by 1993 a veteran CIA agent, once again admitted to the hostile attitude of the AK towards the Yiddish rebels:

I don't know how many weapons the Poles of the AK had. I don't think the PPR had many weapons, as I learned in the Polish Uprising. What was our argument? What did we talk about with the AK? Did we ask them to give us thousands of weapons? Altogether we asked for a few score, and they didn't give them to us. That was their crime! After all, they probably had them. They had grenades, too, and they could have given us some. In January, they claimed they didn't trust us, because "Jews didn't defend themselves"; and when we came and said we wanted to defend ourselves, they didn't believe us. Afterward, they claimed that we were nothing but a branch of Moscow. They always saw us as a foreign body.

I'm talking about the AK (Armia Krajowa), the regular, dominant force, which had weapons. Most villagers were members of AK, the priest was a member of AK, the former officer was a member of AK, since there were no Communist officers. You couldn't buy in the black market. We had more than ten pistols (weapons we got from the AK), but in those days, too, what we bought during the Great Aksamit wasn't bought from the AK, but in other places I don't know about because I wasn't involved in it. Every pistol, every grenade we got was hidden somewhere, so we couldn't test whether they were in working order. They might have given us defective grenades. At any rate, we only had a few weapons, and all the talk about dissension over the distribution of weapons is absolutely meaningless.

(A Surplus of Memory: Chronicle of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, Yitzhak Zuckerman, 1993, p. 254) (IMG)

The AK engaged in many pogroms and picked up the mantle of the Nazis in this respect:

Aharon Carmi's story of how he was integrated into the militia after the Liberation is also interesting. (I still remember him in the uniform of the UB, the Polish Security Service.) That's the story of our fighters in the partisan unit. And that's not the whole story of Jews in partisan units. We're talking only about the partisans connected with us. Some of them, for example, those in Koniecpol, hid because they could have been murdered, and ceased partisan activity because of the Polish hostility. Apparently, the murderers weren't members of NSZ, but of AK who were wandering around Wyszaków. The only ones who survived were those in contact with the Soviet partisans. But these were only a few individuals. And that was probably not a solution for hundreds or thousands. (A Surplus of Memory: Chronicle of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, Yitzhak Zuckerman, 1993, pp. 477-478) (IMG)

But we didn't get to the people; we don't even know how many survived the Polish Uprising. After that, everyone lived on his own. When the Poles left Warsaw, the Germans stayed and searched for Jews. Many Jews, like many Poles, were killed in bombings. But many Jews were also murdered by AK soldiers; even in our own neighborhood.

That's the story of Jurek Grossberg, Luba Gewisser's boyfriend, who was killed by the AK at the start of the Polish Uprising, when many Jews thought salvation had come and left their hideouts. Jurek had a gun, he shot out the door of his hideout, and was immediately picked up by AK members on Komitetowa. He tried to call on Hubert Kaminski, but his captors ignored his explanations and killed him.

(A Surplus of Memory: Chronicle of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, Yitzhak Zuckerman, 1993, p. 479) (IMG)

In many North Atlantic countries, to say that the Home Army was an anti-Semitic terrorist organization would lead angry hordes to immediately bring into question one's sanity. The MI6-backed media has the audacity to openly glorify the Home Army as a consistently 'pro-democracy' 'anti-totalitarian' force 'fighting' oppression, be it Nazi oppression or Soviet 'oppression'. On the question of Nazi-collaborationism, there exists a spirit of Polish exceptionalism in Anglo-American historiography in the academia.

For portraying themselves as freedom-fighters to the Western liberal audience, the AK terrorists cited the cases of their 'inclusion' of the Yiddish fighters into their ranks, but the truth was that the AK utilized these Yiddish fighters as pawns, low-ranking soldiers to be wasted in war:

The Polish Uprising began in August 1944. During the Uprising, when the Poles freed the prisoners in the Gesiówka jail in Warsaw (hundreds of Jews from Hungary and Czechoslovakia were freed there in an attack by the AK), the Poles didn't know what to do with them and those Jews had a very hard time. They were saved by the AK, who would send them to the barricades as cannon fodder against the German tanks. I got interested in their fate and asked Sak to deal with civilian matters, including their case. He contacted the AK and the AL; most of the Jews were under the AK command but for a very short time. The AL offered us generous help. (A Surplus of Memory: Chronicle of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, Yitzhak Zuckerman, 1993, p. 469) (IMG)

Not only did the communist-led popular front organization PPR and its military force AL provide generous aid to the Warsaw Ghetto rebels, the PPR/AL had leading positions throughout the conflict.

According to a book published by the Cambridge University Press, the Home Army commanders, representing the MI6 were concerned about the rise of the communist-led popular front in Poland, the PPR, and thus established Section K to eventually combat the communist-led popular front:

By July 1942, Gen. Rowecki sent a note to his commander in London, expressing concern that the communist partisan underground was active and gaining influence. If nothing were done, the Home Army would likely lose members to the communists, he concluded. The formation of the PPR led to the creation of a separate division within the Home Army dedicated to combating communist influence. Although it was not formally established until November 1943, a precursor functioned in 1942 under the name of Section K. The section that came to be called “Antyk,” a subdivision of BIP, distributed anti-Soviet and anti-communist leaflets in 1942 as well as filed intelligence reports on PPR activities. From its inception, Antyk was preoccupied with Jews as perceived communists. In the first report in March 1942, the anti-communist division discussed communist influence in the Warsaw ghetto. Jewish youth in the Warsaw ghetto, it claimed, “are undoubtedly the element most susceptible to communist slogans.” The concern was not without a basis in fact. In the early summer of 1941, it has been estimated that out of a total of 900 members of the PPR in Warsaw, 500 lived in the Warsaw ghetto. In May 1940, approximately fifty fighters of the PPR’s military wing — the Gwardia Ludowa (GL) — were residents in the Warsaw ghetto as well. (The Polish Underground and the Jews, 1939-1945, Cambridge University Press, [Joshua D. Zimmerman](#), June 5, 2015, pp. 119-120) (IMG)

The author further states:

On July 4, 1942, Rowecki received a communication from Sikorski regarding the necessity of Home Army readiness in the case of a Soviet victory over Nazi Germany. “The Home Army has to be strong,” Sikorski wrote, “in particular in the east where Vilna and Lwów must be held.” Rowecki agreed wholeheartedly, writing subsequently that it was vital that the Polish uprising against the Germans take place first in the northwest and southwest, and then gradually following the German withdrawal. (The Polish Underground and the Jews, 1939-1945, Cambridge University Press, [Joshua D. Zimmerman](#), June 5, 2015, p. 121) (IMG)

Referring to the activities of the Polish Home Army, the book published by the Cambridge University Press stated:

any communist organization that emerged was from the outset to be viewed by all other organizations as a Soviet creature. This suspicion, even before Soviet military victories brought the Red Army closer to Polish territories, determined the nature of debates within the underground. (...) Another leaflet, “To the Polish Nation,” similarly appealed to ethnic Poles, warning that the PPR was composed of Soviet agents whose aim was the permanent annexation of Eastern Poland. “Only the Polish Government and its Government Delegate in the Homeland, as well as the Prime Minister and the Commander of the Home Army, can distribute commands. The Nation decides on Polish issues — never foreign agents.” A leaflet titled “Two Totalitarianisms. Two Enemies,” portrayed Soviet Russia as an enemy equal to the Germans. It ignored the fact that there had been a German invasion of Soviet Russia and the restoration of Polish-Soviet diplomatic ties. (The Polish Underground and the Jews, 1939-1945, Cambridge University Press, [Joshua D. Zimmerman](#), June 5, 2015, pp. 119-120) (IMG)

The core of the Home Army units were not to actively and materially mobilize against the PPR until late 1942 or early 1943, for until then, the Nazi Germans were regarded as the greater menace to British imperial interests, whereas from late 1942 or early 1943, the Soviets were triumphing in Stalingrad, the USSR was growing to pose the bigger threat. Activity against communists by the AK units prior to late 1942 would have been anti-MI6 sabotage by Nazi infiltrators in the AK command. Therefore, it could not have represented the core of the AK. Rather, the AK was to leave almost all of the work on the communist-led popular front, so that the latter and the Nazis, supposedly representing the ‘two totalitarianisms’, would be eroded in combat against each other.

In contrast to the AK, which did not actively combat the Nazi German occupation forces, the communist-led popular front actively engaged in the struggle against the Axis. A notable source in this regard is Halik Kochanski, who studied:

Modern History at Balliol College, Oxford and then completed a PhD at King's College London. She has taught at both King's College London and University College London and presented papers to a number of military history conferences. She has written a number of articles and is the author of *Sir Garnet Wolseley: Victorian Hero* (1999). She is a Fellow of the Royal Historical Society. She has been a member of the councils of the Army Records Society and Society for Army Historical Research and remains a member of both societies. She is also a member of the British Commission for Military History and the Institute for Historical Research [not to be confused with ‘Institute for Historical Review’]. (The Eagle Unbowed: Poland and the Poles in the Second World War, Halik Kochanski, 2012) (IMG) Halik Kochanski has taught at both King’s College London and University College London. She is a Fellow of the Royal Historical Society and a member of the British Commission for Military History. (About the Author(s), *The Eagle Unbowed*, Harvard University Press)

Kochanski herself did not admit that the Polish Home Army refused to combat the Nazi Germans, nor did she admit that the Polish Home Army instead attacked the Yiddish citizens of Poland. Nevertheless, she acknowledged that ‘Jewish historians’ ‘agree with’ the claim ‘that only the GL-AL and Soviet partisans undertook armed action against the Germans’:

Historiography has further confused the matter: for post-war political purposes, the communists claimed that only the GL-AL and Soviet partisans undertook armed action against the Germans. Jewish historians tend to agree with this claim, adding that the AK not only failed to attack the Germans but concentrated on killing Jews. (The Eagle Unbowed: Poland and the Poles in the Second World War, Halik Kochanski, 2012) (IMG)

Polish communist partisans represented a strong tendency amongst the Warsaw Ghetto rebels. Snyder wrote:

After September 1942, the Warsaw ghetto was essentially a Jewish labor camp inhabited predominantly by young men. Fathers who might earlier have feared to endanger their families no longer had that reason for restraint. Left-wing politics came to the fore. The Jewish Left in prewar Poland had been divided over a number of fundamental issues: whether to leave for Palestine or stay in Poland, whether to trust or distrust the Soviet Union, whether to agitate in Yiddish or Polish or Hebrew, and so on. The most radical form of left-wing politics, communism, reappeared among Warsaw Jews at this time. (Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin, Timothy Snyder, p. 283) (IMG)

Referring to the members of the Polish communist-led movement, Snyder added:

Some of its Polish-Jewish activists ... smuggled themselves into the Warsaw ghetto, where they urged armed resistance. (Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin, Timothy Snyder, p. 283) (IMG)

Even the Polish Home Army acknowledged that:

the Soviets, and thus the Polish communists, were urging the local population to take up arms immediately against the Germans. The Soviets wanted to provoke partisan warfare in Poland in order to weaken the Germans.... (Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin, Timothy Snyder, p. 284) (IMG)

By contrast, the Menshevik 'Jewish Labour Bund' refused to engage in combat against the Third Reich. As Snyder pointed out,:

The largest Jewish socialist party, the Bund, was much less inclined to use violence. (Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin, Timothy Snyder, p. 283) (IMG)

The USSR provided plenty of support for Poland's anti-fascist partisans throughout the War. In this regard, the Foreign Technology Division, now called the 'National Air and Space Intelligence Center', of the United States published a 1983 report, examining the military equipment of the Polish resistance forces during the Great Patriotic War. The military intelligence document details the extent of Soviet military aid, the various tanks such as T-34 and T-70, to the Polish resistance groups including the Communist-led 'Polish People's Army' (LWP), whose origins:

can be traced principally to the First and Second Polish Armies organized by Moscow on Soviet territory in 1943. (THE POLISH ARMED FORCES: WARSAW PACT RELIABILITY IN QUESTION, Naval Postgraduate School, Michael Edward Duffy, December 1983, p. 19) (IMG)

as well as the Soviet-organized anti-fascist 'Tadeusza Kosciuszki First Infantry Division' (1 DP).

Below is an excerpt of the mentioned US military document exploring the extensive aid provided by the Soviets to the Polish resistance:

The division and units of the Polish People's Army formed during World War II were equipped with Soviet battle equipment. The Soviet Union produced then tanks and light, medium and heavy self-propelled armored guns. On the whole, 23 varieties of tanks and armored guns were produced during this period. The range of types in the field of battle vehicles was caused by the need for their rapid improvement and adaptation to the actual demands of war. The principle of building battle vehicles on the base of those vehicles already recognized as successful was taken into the developmental design.

During 1943 3 types of battle vehicles existed: the T-70 light tank, the T-34 medium tank and the KW heavy tank. These made up the basis for the building of even better armored equipment. Light self-propelled guns were built on the chassis of the T-70, medium type tanks and self-propelled armored guns on the chassis of the T-34 and heavy tanks and self-propelled led guns on the KW tank's base.

The main directions in the development of battle vehicles were: increasing the power and firing unit and the armor's resistance to enemy armor piercing weapons while maintaining a sufficient mobility. In evaluating the quality of the design, production and battle worth of the armored equipment of those days, it is necessary to ascertain if that was high class equipment.

During World War II, the Soviet Union had at its disposal 26 types of heavy vehicles and tractors, which were not produced in sufficient quantity to entirely satisfy the need. Despite these difficulties, the Soviet Union obligated itself to equip the divisions and tactical and operational units of the Polish Armed Forces.

On May 15, 1943, the Tadeusza Kosciuszki First Infantry Division (1 DP) was formed at Sielci nad Oka. It consisted of 3 infantry regiments, one tank, light artillery and fighter plane regiment each, two mortar units and a student and women's battalion, as well as specialized subunits.

The First Heroes of the Westerplatte Tank Regiment, formed within the framework of the 1 DP's organizational structure, was the embryo of the Armored and Mechanized Forces of the Polish People's Army. The 1st tank regiment was composed of the following battle subunits: 3 T-34-76 medium tank companies, one T-70 light tank company, a rifle Company and an anti-armor gun company. This regiment's weaponry consisted of 32 medium tanks, 10 light ones and 3 BA-64 armored cars.

On August 19, 1943, the formation of the First Corps of the Polish Armed Forces (KPSZ) was begun. The Armored Brigade entered into the framework of the corps, formed on the basis of the first Tank Regiment. The 1st Brigade's striking forces consisted of 3 T-34 medium tank battalions

From its organizational make up, the 1st KPSZ was composed of a possessing a types of a powerful, tactical force, possessing all types of units. The Polish Armed Forces was able to further expand on the basis of individual types of units. The decision taken on April 1, 1944 led to the " transformation of the 1st KPSZ into the 1st Polish Army.

The organization of the First Armored Corps was foreseen in the plans for the formation of the 1st Army. The Armored and Motorized Forces Division was appointed to the General Staff in order to facilitate the formation of armored and motorized units. The armored and motorized forces, growing in number and quality, began to play a more important role as a fighting unit. Evaluating the import of these forces, Order #053 of May 17, 1944 created the Armored and Motorized Forces Command. In this way a new type of force was created in the Polish Armed Forces.

The liberation of the eastern part of Poland in the second half of July created the conditions for the expansion of the Polish Armed Forces. On July 22, 1944, the Polish National Liberation Committee announced its Manifesto, in which it emphasized that the principal task of the Polish people is to effectively increase its contribution to the country's total liberation, as well as defeating Hitlerite Germany. The High Command of the Polish Army in order #8 from August 28, gave instructions for the formation of the 2nd Polish Army.

With regard to the personnel difficulties, the 2nd corps was limited to 4 infantry divisions, one armored brigade, one heavy tank regiment, one armored artillery regiment, one heavy artillery brigade, an anti-aircraft artillery division, a mortar regiment, an engineering brigade and security units. As a result, the 1st Polish Army, in comparison with Soviet armies, by its organizational structure, resembled an infantry corps, powerful in its infantry formations, but at the same time dependent upon the support of armored and artillery forces of a higher grade.

The armored forces of the 2nd Army were composed of: 16 armored brigades, 4 heavy tank regiments and 28 armored artillery regiments. The armored forces possessed a total of 65 medium tanks, 21 heavy tanks, 21 medium armored guns and 5 armored cars.

At the same time, the difficult process of creating the 1st Armored Corps continued. At the end of December 1944, the personnel state of the corp reached a permanent status. In January and February 1945, the armored corps received a full complement of armored equipment and a significant part of the anticipated permanent automobiles from the Soviet Union. Ultimately, the formation of the corps was completed with success. The 1st Armored Corps possessed newly produced armored equipment and was made up of powerful tactical units of armored and motorized forces. It possessed 273 tanks and armored guns, 78 armored cars and transports as well as powerful artillery, including 8 M-13 rocket launchers. Moreover, 804 various motor vehicles were found in the corps.

In the first half of March, the 1st Armored Corps was subordinated to the 2nd Army.

The battle divisions of the 2nd Army, at this time, had a total of 341 tanks and armored guns, 86 armored cars and transports, 2157 motor vehicles of various kinds as well as around 190 motorcycles. The Corps' command possessed 3 U-2 airplanes. The 2nd Army became a powerful tactical force.

At this same time the 1st Polish Army increased the number of vehicles in its battle units to 2288.

A comparison of the equipment of the 1st and 2nd Armies when they obtained complete battle readiness, shows a quantitative and qualitative change in the development of the Armed Forces of the Polish People's Army. Stress was placed above all on the development of armored and motorized forces. This development led in two basic directions: the increase of fire power by the introduction of a new type of fighting equipment with larger caliber weapons; the increase in mobility by equipping battle units with motor vehicles.

(THE MILITARY TECHNOLOGY OF THE POLISH PEOPLE'S ARMY, 30 YEARS OF DEVELOPMENT, DTIC, Foreign Technology Division, H. Latos, December 20, 1983, pp. 63-67) (IMG)

The anti-Soviet media often claims that the AK was larger than the LWP/AL, as supposed proof that the AK was more popular. However, according to a paper by Canada's Department of National Defense, by:

May 1945 the total strength of the LWP was 400,000 men. (WARSAW PACT: THE QUESTION OF COHESION PHASE II - VOLUME 2 POLAND, GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC AND ROMANIA, Operational Research and Analysis Establishment, Canada Department of National Defense, Teresa Rakowska, Harmstone Christopher, D. Jones Ivan Sylvain, November 1984, p. 43) (IMG)

'Rivalling' the Polish People's Army (LWP) was the British proxy organization known as the 'Home Army' (AK). According to that same paper by the Department of National Defense, in 1944, the Home Army:

was the largest of all European Resistance formations; (WARSAW PACT: THE QUESTION OF COHESION PHASE II - VOLUME 2 POLAND, GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC AND ROMANIA, Operational Research and Analysis Establishment, Canada Department of National Defense, Teresa Rakowska, Harmstone Christopher, D. Jones Ivan Sylvain, November 1984, p. 16) (IMG)

In reality, as confirmed by the top Polish Home Army General Stanislaw Tatar (nicknamed 'Tabor'), by 1944, the Polish Home Army had only 250,000 units, of which only 32,000 were armed for active combat. John Erickson, the high-ranking anti-Soviet British military official wrote:

General Tabor struggled to win more support for the Armija Krajowa; at a plenary meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on 12 June the general presented a full report on the strength of the AK – approximately 250,000 men (6,500 platoons) of which only twelve percent, or 32,000 men, were armed.... (The Road to Berlin, John Erickson) (IMG)

The AK is said to have numbered 250,000 in 1944. The LWP numbered 400,000 in 1945. Although there is a year of difference, the manpower statistics are nevertheless drastically different. This has major implications. In Poland, the communist-led people's resistance movement was by far one of the largest in Europe, if not the single largest. This strength of the pro-communist tendency in Poland can be explained by the demonstrable seriousness of the Soviet-backed Polish communist-led partisans in fighting fascism; in the face of German settler-colonial plans for genocide against the Polish people, the commitment of the Red Army and the Polish People's Army won the masses over to their side against the settler-colonial fascist occupation. The people of Poland were supportive of the communist-led popular front troops. In the words of Snyder:

The People's Army did have some popular support.... Polish politics had shifted to the left during the war, as was the case throughout occupied Europe. (Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin, Timothy Snyder, p. 310) (IMG)

Although the majority of the Polish people were non-communists, they bore sympathies with the communist-led initiatives, nonetheless.

The third phase of the activities of the Home Army began precisely during the Battle of Stalingrad, in late 1942 or early 1943. From then on, the Home Army (AK), an MI6 front, unleashed waves of terror almost unmatched, assisting the Nazi German occupation forces and the UPA criminals who carried out a genocide against the Polish people in Wolyn. Gestapo spies who had infiltrated the ranks of the communist movement assisted the MI6-sponsored Nazi-collaborationists of the AK, by murdering those AK-affiliated individuals who, as a rogue current, aimed to combat the Nazis rather than to collaborate with them.

C13S4.2. The Gestapo Spy Spsychalski, with Gomulka's Support, Denounces the Communists and Non-Communist Anti-Fascists to the Nazi Secret Service *** IMG-All-{Poland}

Anti-fascist work, as stated many a time before, requires that communists ally with non-communist anti-fascist forces. To expose the yet-unexposed Nazi-collaborationists, communists must launch invitation offensives (see C1S2) against the Nazi collaborationists – that is, by inviting the Nazi collaborationists to join the fight against the Nazis, and upon the refusal of the Nazi collaborationists, the latter is exposed in the eyes of the public. This would have been the correct course of action for the communist-led anti-fascist resistance to undertake in Poland. However, the Spsychalski-Gomulka clique ensured that this does not occur.

The Nazis were aiming to strengthen the pro-Nazi tendency in the AK, while undermining the communist-led anti-fascist resistance. They used the Gestapo spy Spsychalski for this purpose. To begin with, Spsychalski's suspicious ties to the Gestapo have been documented by the CIA already. Mieczyslaw Walczak and Piotr Mankiewicz were:

Two wartime members of the party.... (SOVIET STAFF STUDY: Gomulka and Polish Communism, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), February 28, 1958, p. 42) (IMG)

whom:

Spychalski supported ... in their advance within the ranks of the PPR. According to [Polish defector to CIA,] Swiatlo, both had indeed been in contact with the Gestapo during the war, but on the express orders of PPR central committee member Jerzy Albrecht, a fact which was known at that time by other PPR leaders. (SOVIET STAFF STUDY: Gomulka and Polish Communism, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), February 28, 1958, p. 42. Note: Jerzy Albrecht is not to be confused with Colonel Albrecht of the AK.) (IMG)

Via Hryniewicz, Spychalski held top level meetings with Nazi German intelligence officials and Nazi-collaborationist Russians. This has been well-documented by the Soviet and Polish intelligence officers' interrogations of Spychalski after he was arrested in the post-War years for his Gestapo espionage. However, this has also been confessed by Robert Spalek, a prominent historian and employee of the Branch Office of Public Education of the current anti-communist Polish state's Institute of National Remembrance in Warsaw. Spalek wrote:

At the end of September 1943, Hryniewicz told Spychalski that he was making contact with the German police "in order to decipher the section of anti-communist work there". Spychalski decided that the plan was "very bold" but worth implementing. (...).

In the fall of 1943, Hryniewicz met with Abwehr's associate Włodzimierz Bondorowski and Gestapo officer Wolfgang Birkner. These characters are by all means interesting. Tsarist second lieutenant Bondorowski was one of the "white" Russians working for the Abwehr. Lieutenant Birkner, on the other hand, was a specialist in preparing police provocations and an expert on the Polish underground. The fragmentary records in the historical literature allow him to be identified as an officer of the IV-N Gestapo Division in Warsaw, who had been staying here since October 1939. This department had at its disposal intelligence networks that dealt with matters of particular importance.

There are many indications that on July 3, 1941, Birkner, as the head of Department IV-N, left for Białystok to support the Einsatzgruppe B, 28-person unit of the Białystok Commando, operating there. "For over a month, Birkner" cleared "the area of Białystok and Bielsk Podlaski, mainly murdering Jews, writes historian Edmund Dmیتrów (" Wokół Jedwabnego ", Warsaw 2002).

During the meeting, Hryniewicz, Bondorowski and Birkner agreed that the Gestapo would support the still existing Sword and Plow by providing members of this organization with weapons, passes and money. In return, the Nazis demanded help in combating leftist organizations. Hryniewicz together with Władysław Byszek, a member of the new management of Miecz and Pług, received money from the Germans three times - a total of about PLN 2 million. He met with Birkner and Bondorowski "mostly late in the evening for dinners, which were expensive." They were founded by Birkner - convinced that Hryniewicz is a loyal collaborator of the Gestapo.

Also with lieutenant (later captain) Bondorowski, chief of intelligence in the staff of the ROA (Russian Liberation Army, a collaborative formation fighting alongside the Third Reich), Hryniewicz contacted regularly from the spring of 1943 to August 1944. According to information, the MBP carried out many robberies together. Hryniewicz did not hide this acquaintance from Spychalski, telling him that "tsarist Bondorowski, who is organizing the ROA on behalf of the Wehrmacht, has contacts with the Gestapo."

Spychalski took note of Hryniewicz's contacts with the Germans. Moreover, in order to make his agent credible in this environment, he provided him with information and materials that were of little importance from the point of view of the PPR or were already "burned". Spychalski gave him - for Birkner's use - the numbers of the communist press, the already known Gestapo (according to his information) the text of the agreement between the GL and the PAL (Polish People's Army, established in April 1943), representing the fragmented socialist and democratic circles that did not comply The Government Delegation), information on the course of the first meeting of the National Council of the National Council, a list of "reactionaries and doubles" who were presented in the information as communists, as well as the address of the Home Army printing house.

("Communist Operative, Gestapo Agent", THE SECOND WORLD WAR: AL AGAINST AK, Gazeta Wyborcza no. - 03/02/2007, Robert Spalek, 2007) (IMG)

Further evidence of Spychalski's activities for the Gestapo is provided in the following:

Kupecki offered Hryniewicz a job at his place - initially "as technical assistance, and after a trial period, when [this candidature] was approved by the delegation, as an official of the delegation, Kupecki's associate". Hryniewicz communicated with Spychalski and obtained his consent along with an order to "collect data on the anti-communist action (...) select the names of communists from Kupecki's materials and pass them on to Spychalski."

Kupecki thought of Hryniewicz as a man who, after being under the Soviet occupation after 1939, learned the hard way what communism is. He also believed that thanks to him it would be possible to subordinate the Sword and Plow to the Home Army. Initially, he was assigned purely office tasks consisting mainly in rewriting various data into the files. After some time, he began to entrust him with more responsible tasks.

Hryniewicz had so much work that at the beginning of 1944 he ceased to cope with the gathering of information - "there was no way he could write down at least some of the names worked out by the Communist Delegation". Then he presented Spychalski with a plan to kill Kupecki and take over the archive - with the hands of the Gestapo. The matter was so urgent that Hryniewicz found in the file a photo of Spychalski along with a copy of his data from a false ID card.

("Communist Operative, Gestapo Agent", THE SECOND WORLD WAR: AL AGAINST AK, Gazeta Wyborcza no. - 03/02/2007, Robert Spalek, 2007) (IMG)

To keep their hands 'clean', and to foster infighting and splits among the anti-Nazi forces, the Gestapo sought to utilize Spychalski's Titoist gang for launching the assault on the AK archives:

For a long time, Birkner had no interest in the contents of the Delegation's archives. In order to change this, Hryniewicz used a trick and accused Kupecki of complicity in "liquidating" the Germans. Nevertheless, the Gestapo officer did not want to involve his people in this action. According to Hryniewicz, he did not intend to come into conflict with "Mr. Eugeniusz" - Kupecki's superior. "Mr. Eugeniusz" is Eugeniusz Gitterman, deputy head of central intelligence at the Delegation's Security Department. According to many historians, he was an agent of the Gestapo. On May 13, 1943, Gitterman provided the head of the Sonderkommando IV AS in Warsaw

with a list of 89 communists. In May 1945, he was shot - according to some reports, on the order of Stefan Korboński's government delegate.

Birkner suggested to Hryniewicz that he should take over the archive of Kupecki by the forces of the people from Sword and Plow. This, however, could not entrust the MiP-men a matter so important to the communists. The problem was partially solved by Bondorowski, who was present at the discussion. He offered Hryniewicz "two, maybe three people".

("Communist Operative, Gestapo Agent", THE SECOND WORLD WAR: AL AGAINST AK, Gazeta Wyborcza no. - 03/02/2007, Robert Spalek, 2007) (IMG)

Obviously, such an operation by Spychalski was a Trotskyite sectarian policy line which aided the Nazis, destroyed the AK's healthy elements with whom there was room for communist cooperation, while further strengthening the reactionary pro-Nazi elements in the AK. According to declassified documents uncovered by the nationwide 'centrist' (by year-2007 Polish state standards) Polish newspaper Rzeczpospolita, Spychalski's group wrote in September 1943 a letter to the Gestapo.... (Komonistyczny donos do gestapo, Rzeczpospolita, Archiwum, May 5, 2007) (IMG)

This:

letter contained a list of about 50 people described as "acting directly or eminently sympathetic and agitating for communism." The ... denunciation [campaign], of which the letter was a part, was directed by Marian Spychalski, the future marshal of the PRL, and his then companion (both in private and organizational life) Stanisław Sowińska. In the autumn of 1943, they headed the intelligence service of the militia - the People's Guard. (Komonistyczny donos do gestapo, Rzeczpospolita, Archiwum, May 5, 2007) (IMG)

Thus, Spychalski committed treason against the Polish people's liberation movement by naming and identifying communists for the Gestapo. Sowińska was well aware of the fact that the names of the AK forces were to be drawn and handed over to the Gestapo:

Only in the fall of 1943, in the presence of another employee of the PPR intelligence service, Romy Romanowicz Spychalski, told [Sowińska]: "We will have to start the work of extracting the real names and addresses of Home Army activists and adding fictitious functions in the PPR and GL to these names and addresses, sending these letters to the Gestapo, supposedly as communists, in the form of anonymous, with the indication that these letters were sent by the enemies of communism." The list was to contain from a dozen to thirty some names. ("Communist Operative, Gestapo Agent", THE SECOND WORLD WAR: AL AGAINST AK, Gazeta Wyborcza no. - 03/02/2007, Robert Spalek, 2007) (IMG)

As a cover for espionage work for the Nazis, Spychalski was adding the 'fictitious functions in the PPR and GL' so that upon capture by the PPR counter-intelligence, he would have the excuse to claim that he was 'fooling' the Nazis. In reality, the main part of his espionage work to which to pay attention was that he provided the real names and addresses of the AK activists.

Sowińska extensively collaborated in the plot to assist the Gestapo. As such:

Sowińska and Romanowicz independently chose the names for the list. (...). Spychalski set an exact date for them and ordered that the envelope with the list be thrown "into the box by the door of the private apartment of one of the Gestapo directors". He gave the name and address of the Gestapo man. He obtained them earlier from Hryniewicz, who was well-known in these circles. After a few days, he approved the content of the anonymous, and Romanowicz threw it into the Gestapo's mailbox. ("Communist Operative, Gestapo Agent", THE SECOND WORLD WAR: AL AGAINST AK, Gazeta Wyborcza no. - 03/02/2007, Robert Spalek, 2007) (IMG)

Contrary to the pretensions by Spychalski's gang though, the list provided to the Gestapo was a list of real names. Indeed:

The Gestapo received a list with the real names of members of the independence underground. ("Communist Operative, Gestapo Agent", THE SECOND WORLD WAR: AL AGAINST AK, Gazeta Wyborcza no. - 03/02/2007, Robert Spalek, 2007) (IMG)

Hence to summarize the role of Hryniewicz:

On February 17, 1944, one of the archives of the Home Army was attacked. The action was attended by: a Gestapo officer, two soldiers of a collaborative Russian formation and two partisans of the People's Guard. The action was led by Bogusław Hryniewicz - a Soviet spy cooperating with the Polish Workers' Party.... ("Communist Operative, Gestapo Agent", THE SECOND WORLD WAR: AL AGAINST AK, Gazeta Wyborcza no. - 03/02/2007, Robert Spalek, 2007) (IMG)

Through this operation, Spychalski and his gang successfully assisted the pro-Nazi tendency in the AK to eliminate the anti-Nazi resistance fighters, the healthy elements, in the AK. This was in addition to Spychalski's espionage against the communists in the PPR. No, the targets of the Spychalski network were not just the AK but certainly also, likely even more so, the communists and pro-communists of the PPR. All of this was done under the guise of combatting anti-communist reactionaries in the AK. Evidence to Spychalski's own close collaboration with the Gestapo tendency in the AK is in the fact of Spychalski close association to Marshal Rola-Zymierski, a prominent commander in the Polish army before World War II, and a Gestapo agent. A reliable source on Zymierski's agency for the Gestapo is Frank Gibney who:

studied at the Navy's Japanese Language School at the University of Colorado. He served in the Pacific as an intelligence officer, and was stationed in Japan during the postwar occupation by the United States. (Frank Gibney, 81, Writer and Authority on Asia, Dies. The New York Times, Margalit Fox, April 14, 2006) (IMG)

According to the US intelligence officer:

In the immediate pre-war days, [Spychalski] was the effective force behind Marshal Rola-Zymierski, the cashiered pre-war General.... (The Frozen Revolution, Frank Gibney, 1959 p. 76) (IMG)

whose:

pre-war service as Vice-Minister of National Defense was climaxed by a six year jail sentence for corruption in office. (The Frozen Revolution, Frank Gibney, 1959 p. 76) (IMG)

And:

During World War II, [Zymierski] offered his services to the Home Army.... He ultimately became a double agent, working for the Gestapo and Soviet intelligence, and performing good service for both. (The Frozen Revolution, Frank Gibney, 1959 p. 76) (IMG)

As can be seen, Zymierski was a Home Army and Gestapo infiltrator into the Soviet secret service.

Another evidence of Spychalski's fostering of close ties to the very AK whose healthy elements he assaulted, is in the following case. Referring to:

W. Lechowicz ... and A. Jaroszewicz.... (Stalinism in Poland, 1944-56: Selected Papers from the Fifth World Congress of Central and East European Studies, Warsaw, 1995, written by: Krystyna Kersten, edited by Richard J. Hill, p. 90) (IMG)

Krystyna Kersten, a vehemently anti-Soviet Polish historian, wrote:

Both [W. Lechowicz ... and A. Jaroszewicz] ... during the war had worked, on the recommendation of Marian Spychalski, in intelligence and counter-intelligence for the Polish underground state [i.e. the Home Army]. (Stalinism in Poland, 1944-56: Selected Papers from the Fifth World Congress of Central and East European Studies, Warsaw, 1995, written by: Krystyna Kersten, edited by Richard J. Hill, p. 90. Krystyna Kersten is a 'Polish historian and publicist. She worked in Institute of History of Polish Academy of Science. Her field was modern history of Poland, especially years 1944-1956'. (Goodreads, Krystyna Kersten)) (IMG)

Such close ties between the Gestapo spy Spychalski and the Home Army serves to expose the vast network of imperialist-fascist secret services in Poland. What is more important perhaps, is that Gomulka was well aware of the fact that Spychalski was a Gestapo agent, but he covered up Spychalski's crimes, emerged as Spychalski's closest ally and friend, and actively promoted him throughout the power struggles. In the words of Spalek:

In February 1944, when Spychalski continued his plan to denounce political opponents to the Gestapo, the Germans closed down the communist printing house at pl. Grzybowski in Warsaw and arrested two PPR men working there. Spychalski learned about it from Hryniewicz. It was shocking for him, as he had previously provided Hryniewicz with the address of this printing house as the Home Army printing house in order to be smashed by the Germans. (...). Spychalski understood that he had unwittingly poured out his companions. Now he was threatened with provocation and betrayal, and even with a bullet to the head. (...). In this situation, Spychalski put everything on one card. Besides, he had no other choice. At the end of February or the beginning of March 1944, he goes to Gomulka's apartment to tell him about his over half a year of cooperation with Hryniewicz, and through him - about his contacts with Germany. About the attack on the Delegation's archive in Kupecki's apartment, about the fratricidal denunciation of political opponents, and finally - about the consequences of this action, i.e. the unexpected mishap of the guards' printing house.

Gomulka remembered that Spychalski came without an announcement. He considered the loss of the printing press his fatal mistake. He intended "by renouncing this action to seek some forgiveness" of the new party leader. All the more so as Józwiak started accusing him of a deliberate provocation. (...). Taking this self-criticism at face value, it must be remembered, however, that Spychalski says this in the second year of his stay in the prisons of the Ministry of Public Security. Characteristically, he does not blame Józwiak, although the Chief of Staff of the GL could have been an "equal" co-creator of the idea of denouncing Home Army activists to the Germans. However, in 1951, Spychalski was imprisoned, and Józwiak was a member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party and chairman of the Central Party Control Commission, one of the militant accusers of Spychalski and Gomulka. In this situation, casting any suspicions on him would be a suicidal step for Spychalski.

In 1944, after talking to Spychalski, Gomulka considered him a naive who could be led by the nose. According to his letter to Bierut, Gomulka "could not imagine that the Gestapo would agree to Hryniewicz taking documents [from Kupecki's archives], especially those relating to the communists, without first acquainting himself with it, to discredit and discredit the PPR". Gomulka banned Spychalski from further actions of this type and **"said that he would bring the matter to the Central Committee"**.

However, this did not happen. In the face of the problems with installing the communist government in Poland, the problems associated with the occupation soon became irrelevant.

("Communist Operative, Gestapo Agent", THE SECOND WORLD WAR: AL AGAINST AK, Gazeta Wyborcza no. - 03/02/2007, Robert Spalek, 2007. Bold added) (IMG)

Anyways, Spychalski helped the Gestapo in eliminating the PPR freedom-fighters as well as the rogue agents, the affiliates of the anti-Nazi tendency, within the AK. Spychalski, at the same time, fostered close ties to the pro-Nazi tendency in the AK. The pro-Nazi tendency grew very dominant over the organization as a whole. The Nazi Germans enforced such an alliance with the Home Army (AK) through using their agents in the communist-led Polish anti-fascist resistance movement. The key Nazi agents in the Polish communist-led resistance movement were Marian Spychalski, Wladyslaw Gomulka, and their close associates in the movement. Through having the fake 'communists' as the culprits of the murders of anti-Nazi elements in the AK, the Nazis on the one hand assisted the MI6 and the pro-Nazi AK terrorists in presenting the real communists as traitors, and on the other hand, systematically assisted the AK terrorists in dominating their death squads. Needless to say is that Spalek, a staunch anti-communist, had every motivation to present Nazi-collaborationism as though it was emanating 'primarily' from the PPR, when in fact the main force of Polish Nazi-collaborationism was the AK. Forget not that in the AK, anti-Nazism was a rogue current, whereas in the PPR, Nazi-collaborationism was the rogue current.

C13S4.3. The AK Receives Arms from the Nazi Germans, Italian Fascists, and Hungarian fascists / AK Anti-Semitic Terrorism *** IMG-All-Poland}

From 1943, when the MI6 turned in favor of the Nazi Germans, the Home Army became for the most part a fascist death squad pretending to be opposed to the Nazi Germans. Instead of fighting the Germans, the Home Army criminal bandits engaged in anti-communist guerrilla operations throughout Poland – and in so doing, they of course received the support of the Nazi Germans. Stefan Korbonski, a founder and head of the Polish Underground State, recognized that the weapons of the Home Army came from the German forces:

Weapons that the Home Army had at its disposal came from four different sources: arms buried by the Polish armies on the battlefields of the September campaign; arms **purchased** or captured **from the Germans**; arms manufactured by the Home Army; and arms received from the air drops. (The Polish Underground State: A Guide to the Underground, 1939-1945. Stefan Korbonski, p. 34. Bold added) (IMG)

This, by the way, was the case well into mid-1947, with the majority of the weapons of the Polish Underground guerrillas being of German origin. According to the CIA:

The Partisans are universally well armed, mostly with automatic and semi-automatic weapons. Most of these arms are of German origin, but many of Soviet manufacture have been captured from the Soviet and Polish military forces. (Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 3) (IMG)

Korbonski added that the Hungarian and Italian armies also provided arms to the Polish Home Army:

Transactions with Italian and Hungarian branches stationed in Poland, which they were happy to sell, were easier to deal with in the Polish underground. (The Polish Underground State: A Guide to the Underground, 1939-1945. Stefan Korbonski, p. 35) (IMG)

These weapons were specifically handed to the Polish Home Army to help them combat the Soviets. For instance, according to the British military researcher Kochanski, certain branches of the AK showed a:

favourable response to the suggestion by the Germans in the Nowogrodek and Wilno provinces that the AK should accept arms and supplies from the Germans in return for engaging in anti-partisan warfare. On 9 December 1943, days after the bulk of his unit had been disarmed by the Soviet partisans as described above, Captain Adolf 'Gora' Pileh signed an agreement with the Germans and began to receive supplies from them, as did Lieutenant Jozef 'Lech' Swida in Lida and Aleksander 'Wilk' Krzyanowski in the Wilno area. All these agreements were condemned by AK command and by General Sosnkowski in London. (The Eagle Unbowed: Poland and the Poles in the Second World War, Halik Kochanski, 2012) (IMG)

The 'condemnation' of the Polish Home Army branches' collaboration with the Nazi Germans by General Sosnkowski was hypocritical, since that man had been a Nazi-collaborationist long before World War II. Rolf-Deter Muller – the scientific director of the German Armed Forces Military History Research Office, the official research wing of the military of the Federal Republic of Germany – noted the 1930s interaction between Polish General Sosnkowski and the notorious Nazi German General Goring for an alliance, supposedly 'defensive' in nature, against the USSR:

On his hunting trip, Göring initially spoke to General Kazimierz Sosnkowski, the army inspector responsible for the eastern border area Polesia. It seems evident that they discussed options for defence against the Soviet Union. Sosnkowski, who was standing, as it were, directly opposite the Red Army, had explained a few days beforehand to the French ambassador and his military attaché that any kind of cooperation between France and the USSR was undesirable from a Polish perspective. It would be insane to imagine that, in the event of a Franco-German war, thousands of Soviet bombers would attack Berlin to help the French citizenry. In the case of a Polish-Soviet war, which Sosnkowski expected within two or three years, German military assistance would be extremely desirable - and how would France be able to help Poland in that case? The Polish general was thinking above all of a defensive battle, because a joint assault on the USSR would entail enormous dangers and, even if it were to succeed, it might well be that the Ukrainians would 'prefer to work for the king of Prussia. (Enemy in the East: Hitler's Secret Plans to Invade the Soviet Union, Rolf-Deter Muller, 2014, pp. 51-52) (IMG)

Another example of Nazi-AK collaboration is given by the military historian and British military's medical officer Prit Buttar:

Krzyanowski held negotiations with German officials, including Seidler von Rosenfeld, a local SD officer, and Julian Christiansen, the head of the local branch of the Abwehr (German military intelligence) in January and February 1944 respectively. Christiansen suggested a detailed protocol, in which Germany offered to arm Krzyanowski's men, including with light artillery, in exchange for a cessation of hostilities between the Home Army and German forces, and Polish cooperation with the occupying authorities in terms of economic production. (Between Giants: The Battle for the Baltics in World War II, Prit Buttar, p. 191) (IMG)

As such:

Krzyanowski ... came to an arrangement with Christiansen whereby the Germans would ensure that weapons and supplies were left in weakly guarded areas, where they could easily be captured by the Home Army and used against pro-Soviet partisans. (Between Giants: The Battle for the Baltics in World War II, Prit Buttar, p. 191) (IMG)

The CIA reported:

The AK ... included all political groups except the Communists.... (Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 4) (IMG)

Having included 'all political groups' implies fascists as well. The AK went on to merge with the Polish fascist 'National Armed Forces of Poland' (NSZ), which in its official party newspaper confessed their true aims, namely to combat the communists and to leave off the anti-Nazi struggle for later (read: for never):

It is time to awake and commence with the systematic liquidation of centres under the command of the Communists, and as soon as territory is cleared in this fashion to undertake the planned struggle with the German occupier. The sincere joint work of Polish military and civilian organizations will certainly make it possible for us to pull out the Bolshevik weeds and cleanse the terrain. The PPR, Peoples' Guard, and various 'red' partisans must vanish from the surface of the Polish land. (The Eagle Unbowed: Poland and the Poles in the Second World War, Halik Kochanski, 2012; citing the NSZ newspaper 'The Rampart') (IMG)

In other words, the National Armed Forces would have refused to launch a campaign against the Nazis so long as Poland had communists – and Jews. Beside the Nazis, the:

principal perpetrators of anti-Jewish violence in the name of anti-communist activity were units owing allegiance to the right-wing NSZ.... (The Eagle Unbowed: Poland and the Poles in the Second World War, Halik Kochanski, 2012) (IMG)

They also actively collaborated with the Nazis, handing over the Yiddish sons and daughters of Poland to the German military occupation:

The NSZ was quick to take up the sword. On 22 July 1943, they destroyed a GL-AL unit Warynski at Stefanow near Kielce in retaliation for a GL-AL attack on the NSZ earlier that year. The most notorious clash between the two groups came on 9 August 1943, when a NSZ detachment ambushed and murdered 26 GL-AL partisans and 4 civilians near the village of Borow in Lublin province. The NSZ was openly anti-semitic and would kill Jews in the forests or betray them to the Germans. (The Eagle Unbowed: Poland and the Poles in the Second World War, Halik Kochanski, 2012) (IMG)

The NSZ was made up of Polish pre-war fascist commanders, the disciples of Pilsudski's gang. As a 1947 CIA document stated:

The leaders of Partisan bands – particularly NSZ groups – are frequently professional officers of the old Polish Army, with long experience in guerrilla fighting. (Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 3) (IMG)

The American intelligence officer Curt Riess predicted:

Certain countries, or forces in those countries, will undoubtedly become the logical allies of the Nazi underground – the Finnish circles around Baron von Mannerheim, for instance, or the Polish colonels' clique, which once so ardently fought for everything the Nazis fought for and which, except for the fact that it was thrown out of its own country, has not changed at all. (The Nazis Go Underground, Curt Riess, May 1, 1944, p. 192) (IMG{Nazi Underground})

The “Polish colonels’ clique” was the regime that handed Poland to the Nazis in 1939 and formed the London-based Polish government-in-exile that formed the Polish Secret State, the military force of which was the Home Army. In 1944, the Nazi-collaborationist NSZ and the AK merged. In the words of Kochanski:

the right-wing NSZ ... remained outside the structure of the AK until March 1944.... (The Eagle Unbowed: Poland and the Poles in the Second World War, Halik Kochanski, 2012) (IMG)

The merger of the AK with an openly anti-Semitic anti-communist Nazi-collaborationist terror army is itself explanatory of the character of the AK. The AK had allied with the Nazis against Soviet power. Approximately five months later, top SS commander Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski initiated attempts to entrench the German alliance with the Home Army against the Red Army. Snyder remarked:

Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski did show signs of wanting to recruit the Home Army as a future ally in a final struggle against the Soviets; he ... agreed to negotiate with the Home Army command as with a defeated adversary in late September. (Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin, Timothy Snyder, p. 308) (IMG)

More evidence of the AK’s Nazi-collaborationism will be presented in the next series of sections.

C13S4.4. The Warsaw Rebellion of 1944, a Case of AK Collaboration with the Nazis in the Desertification of Poland / Soviets Wanted to, but were unable to, Assist the 1944 Warsaw Rebels *** IMG-All-{Poland}

By August 1, 1944, the Soviet Red Army troops:

were ... only 10 kilometers away from the [Warsaw] city in the outskirts of Praga, which was held by little more than a single German division. (Tactical Operations of the Eighth Air Force, 6 June 1944 – 8 May 1945. US Air Force Historical Study No. 70, Prepared by USAF Historical Division, Air University, 1952, pp. 153-154) (IMG)

Several communist-led uprisings in the Polish capital had occurred in the years prior. However, for the first time in 1944, the AK launched its rebellion against the Nazi occupiers in Warsaw. It has been widely alleged, however, that the Soviets ‘ignored’ the AK rebel attempts to coordinate with the Red Army. This could not be farther from the truth. According to the Historical Division of the US Air Force, for the Warsaw rebels:

it had been impossible to establish communications with them [i.e. Soviets]; (Tactical Operations of the Eighth Air Force, 6 June 1944 – 8 May 1945. US Air Force Historical Study No. 70, Prepared by USAF Historical Division, Air University, 1952, p. 154) (IMG)

It was unlikely that the AK had been physically unable to establish communications with the Red Army; rather, the AK leaders refused to establish connection with the Soviet leaders because Soviet assistance to the AK in the struggle against Nazi Germany would have been utilized by the Soviets as a channel for elevating Soviet agents in the high ranks of the AK, thus rendering that organization into one under Soviet intelligence influence at the high levels.

In addition, although the Red Army was in the proximity of the Polish capital, the time for a popular revolt against the Germans was not yet ripe – and the AK high command well knew this. This has been confirmed by revelations from the Polish archives studied by the staunchly anti-Stalinist Polish fellow at Oxford University named Dr. Alexandra Richie, who:

received her DPhil at St. Antony's College, Oxford, and was later a Fellow of Wolfson College [in Oxford]. She has lectured on international politics and history across the world, from Warsaw University to the Getty Museum in Los Angeles. She lives in Warsaw with her husband and two children. (About the Author (2014), ‘Warsaw 1944: Hitler, Himmler and the Warsaw Uprising’, Google Books) (IMG)

Days prior to the uprising, the AK high command was informed of intelligence reports that the Germans were mobilizing their troops to Warsaw. The AK commander:

Osmecki made one of the most important revelations of the days leading up to the uprising. ‘There is new unverified information that fresh Panzer units, as yet unidentified, have appeared on the right side of the Vistula in the forests between Wyszaków and Jabłonna. Also, parts of the Hermann Göring Division, one of the best units of the German army, have arrived in Żyrardów. According to our intelligence the Hermann Göring Division was withdrawn from the Italian Front and moved by train to Warsaw. The first units have been moved in secret into the forests by Wyszaków and Jabłonna.’ (‘Warsaw 1944: Hitler, Himmler and the Warsaw Uprising’, Alexandra Richie, p. 169) (IMG)

However, certain individuals within the AK high command ignored these highly critical intelligence reports. For instance:

General Okulicki ... confidently declared that the new forces were of no importance, because the tanks ‘are simply there to protect the retreat of the 2nd Army’. Osmecki countered with a new piece of information. Intelligence had informed him that the ‘German headquarters in Warsaw had demanded from the railway office the immediate dispatch of 2,000 empty wagons to remove factories from the city’. However, rather than simply send the empty trains from Berlin to Warsaw, as might have been expected, the headquarters announced that ‘a few thousand wagons of ammunition and equipment will be sent in the nearest future to Warsaw’ in those same trains. The wagons were to be unloaded, and only then sent back to Germany with the dismantled factories. ‘A few thousand wagons of supplies and ammunition,’ Osmecki said, ‘suggests that the Germans are going to defend themselves.’ Again Rzepecki and Okulicki downplayed the idea, and referred to the attempt on Hitler's life the previous day, concluding: ‘The German army could fall apart at any time.’ (‘Warsaw 1944: Hitler, Himmler and the Warsaw Uprising’, Alexandra Richie, pp. 169-170) (IMG)

AK General Okulicki – who, as will be evidenced later, was a staunch supporter of Nazi Germany – actively pushed for an uprising ‘against’ the Germans. This, though appearing paradoxical, is not surprising. A foundational strategy of warfare is: attack the foes where they are weak, avoid assaulting them where they are strong, and continuously strike them from where they are weak so that they will be deprived of their capability to uphold even their strengths. To sabotage a military force, advocate an assault on the enemy forces’ strong points and prevent strikes against their weak points. As a pro-Nazi commander within the Polish Home Army, Okulicki encouraged the AK to attack the Nazi Germans where the latter were strong, thus systematically wasting the Polish people’s resistance potential, inflicting heavy casualties on a Polish people which, at the opportune time and with Soviet assistance, could well rise up against the Nazis and inflict great damage upon the Axis forces. The deliberately inopportune timing of the uprising was the act of strategic sabotage committed by the Home Army command in favour of the Nazis. As the people of Warsaw

were inevitably going to rebel against the Nazi German occupiers at some point, much 'better' it was, from an AK Nazi-collaborationist perspective, to have the rebellion occur at a time when the Nazi forces have not disintegrated and when they have the military capability to crush the Polish rebels. The premature and poorly-timed rebellion helped the Nazis repel the Polish people's resistance where the Nazis were stronger and the resistance was weaker. It gave the Nazi agents of German finance capital the excuse by which to obliterate much of Warsaw, a city which would soon become an ally of Soviet power, so to reduce the strength of a future Soviet ally. The Home Army, vehemently anti-communist, supported this Nazi project and thereby assisted the occupiers in levelling off the city. The pro-Nazi saboteurs, appealing to Polish bourgeois-nationalist emotions, excused such tactical and strategic sabotage against the resistance by stating that the AK's takeover of Warsaw would help them be the 'hosts' of the Soviets, thus giving Poland greater leverage in negotiations with the Soviets:

The guiding thought was to ... greet the Soviets as "hosts." Szostak later reported that he had presented several operative misgivings about this sudden change of course—the Warsaw AK was too weak, and first there had to be guaranteed a substantial air support by the Allies – but Pelczyński and Okulicki apparently ignored these objections. (The Warsaw Uprising of 1944, Włodzimierz Borodziej, p. 63) (IMG)

Of course, this 'greet the Soviets as hosts' thesis was a mere Polish bourgeois-nationalist cover and excuse for helping the Nazis destroy a city that would soon come under the influence of the communist-led anti-fascist forces. We know for a fact that Okulicki and Bor-Komorowski, the supreme commanders of the AK rebels in Warsaw, were allied to the Nazis. This will be revealed in more detail later.

The intelligence report 'that fresh Panzer units, as yet unidentified, have appeared on the right side of the Vistula in the forests between Wyszaków and Jabłonna' were thus deliberately ignored by Okulicki, but turned out to be correct. One day prior to the start of the rebellion, the Germans launched a major counter-offensive against the Red Army on the outskirts of Warsaw. As Richie wrote:

The third decisive event was Field Marshal Walter Model's counter-offensive, which began only hours before the start of the uprising. It was the only major offensive launched by the Germans against the Soviets in the summer of 1944, and it too would have far-reaching consequences. On 31 July the people in the countryside around the pretty town of Radzymin, thirty-five kilometres east of Warsaw, felt the earth shaking underfoot as if in an earthquake. Smoke and dust filled the air as countless tanks rumbled across the sandy fields and into position. The battle against the Soviets was about to begin.

Model and Guderian had amassed some of their best troops for the attack: the Waffen SS Viking Panzer and Totenkopf Divisions, the Luftwaffe's Hermann Göring Division, General von Saucken's 39th Panzer Korps and the 4th and 19th Panzer Divisions. It was a formidable force, and it slammed into the unsuspecting Red Army as it made its way towards Warsaw, changing the course of the war. Like Bagration itself, these battles are now largely forgotten, but they were titanic clashes, with the loss of hundreds of tanks. The Battle of Wolomin was the largest tank battle fought on Polish soil in the entire war, and it saw the German Panzer divisions crush the Soviet 3rd Tank Corps and maul the 8th Guards Tank Corps. Fierce fighting raged for weeks throughout the area; indeed, the Soviets would succeed in finally pushing all of the German forces over the Vistula Only in January 1945. One consequence was that even if Hitler had wanted to send regular troops in to retake Warsaw there were simply none available; all were needed at the front.

(‘Warsaw 1944: Hitler, Himmler and the Warsaw Uprising’, Alexandra Richie, p. 11-12) (IMG)

This has also been confirmed by other anti-Soviet, highly scholarly sources including Norman Davies, who, from 2000 to 2006:

was a Supernumerary Fellow at Wolfson College, [in] Oxford [University].... (Biography of Norman Davies, Norman Davies Official Website) (IMG)

Afterwards, until 2008, he was:

a Visiting Fellow [in] Cambridge at Clare Hall and Peterhouse. In Cracow, he holds the position in the UNESCO Chair of Translation Studies and a part-time lectureship in the Oriental Institute. In Warsaw, he presents periodic lectures at the European College in Natolin. In 2011, he returned to St. Antony's College, Oxford, where is an Honorary Fellow. (Biography of Norman Davies, Norman Davies Official Website) (IMG)

Davies confirmed:

Even as the AK were taking their guns from their hiding-places, and gathering in cellars and warehouses, the German Ninth Army was moving across the Vistula bridges to launch a counter-attack against the Soviets. (Heart of Europe: The Past in Poland's Present, Oxford University Press, Norman Davies, 1984, New Edition in 2011) (IMG)

Another source is Włodzimierz Borodziej who is a:

Professor for Contemporary History at the University of Warsaw. Chairman of Academic Committee of Imre Kertész Kolleg, Jena; since 2003 editor in chief of *Polskie Dokumenty Dyplomatyczne*, published by the Polish Institute of International Affairs (24 volumes). Chairman of Academic Committee, House of European History, Brussels. (Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. Włodzimierz Borodziej, University of Vienna)

Borodziej describes the military situation as follows:

On July 30 the battles in the east could be heard more clearly in Warsaw than on previous days. The Second Tank Army now moved north and took the whole area east of Warsaw. (...). The military problem of the Red Army in late July 1944 – like that of its predecessor twenty-four years before – was that the victories of the last weeks had taken the advancing troops far from their supply units; problems with fuel and munitions especially made it hard for the tank units of the Second Army. They operated in a constantly expanding area and pursued the goal, which only a few weeks ago had been a very abstract one, of crossing the Vistula, possibly even near Warsaw. According to this latest plan, the Second Tank Army was set to attack Praga on July 30, but on that day, its commander warned his superior Rokossovskii: "I'm running out of breath." In fact, the Second Tank Army now came upon an unexpectedly strong counterfront: east of Warsaw five German tank divisions, including the Fourth SS Tank Corps ("Viking" and "Deaths Head" Divisions) as well as the elite "Hermann Goring" Division stood at the ready. Even if the German troops were as weak as the tank corps of the Second Army, they were still strong enough to force the Soviets into an immediate battle on July 31. On August 1, at 4 A.M., the Second Soviet Tank

Army went on the defensive. Of the 810 tanks it had on July 18, only a third could still be deployed on August 4. (The Warsaw Uprising of 1944, Włodzimierz Borodziej, pp. 70-71) (IMG)

The most important source in this regard is Colonel Glantz. The following is a brief description of his credentials in the US military:

Colonel Glantz earned degrees in modern European history from the Virginia Military Institute and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He is a graduate of the Defense Language Institute, the US Army Institute for Advanced Russian and Eastern European Studies, the US Army Command and General Staff College and the US Army War College. His over 30 years of service included field artillery assignments with the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) in Europe and II Field Force artillery in Vietnam and intelligence assignments with the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence in US Army Europe. He also served on the faculty of the United States Military Academy, West Point, NY; the Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; and the US Army War College, Carlisle, PA. During his last eight years of service, he founded and directed the US Army's Foreign Military Studies Office, Combined Arms Command, Fort Leavenworth, KS. He has authored many articles and books and is now the editor of The Journal of Slavic Military Studies. (The Soviet-German War 1941-1945: Myths and Realities: A Survey Essay, Strom Thurmond Institute of Government and Public Affairs, Clemson University, A Paper Presented as the 20th Anniversary Distinguished Lecture, David M. Glantz, October 11, 2001, p. 2) (IMG)

Glantz confirmed that the Soviet attempts to reach Warsaw were stalled as a result of a German counter-offensive:

On 24 July Rokossovsky's forces captured Lublin and pushed on westward towards the Vistula River south of Warsaw. By 2 August, the 1st Belorussian Front's left wing armies seized bridgeheads over the Vistula River at Magnuszew and Pulawy and commenced an almost two-month struggle with counterattacking Wehrmacht forces to retain these vital bridgeheads as launching pads for future, even larger-scale offensives into heart of central Poland toward Berlin.

During the advance by the 1st Belorussian Front's left wing to the Vistula River, the Polish Home Army staged an insurrection in Warsaw. Only days before, the Stavka had ordered Rokossovsky to dispatch his 2nd Tank Army in a dash toward Warsaw's eastern suburbs, protected on the right by a cavalry corps (the 2nd Guards) and the 47th Army. The tank army reached the region east of Warsaw on 29 July, but before the 47th Army could reach the region, from 30 July through 5 August, two panzer corps (XXXIX and IV SS) delivered a counterstroke against the tank army and forced it to withdraw with heavy losses. At the time, the bulk of the 1st Belorussian Front's center and right wing were struggling to overcome German defenses north of Siedlce on the approaches to the Narew River.... (The Soviet-German War 1941-1945: Myths and Realities: A Survey Essay, Strom Thurmond Institute of Government and Public Affairs, Clemson University, A Paper Presented as the 20th Anniversary Distinguished Lecture, David M. Glantz, October 11, 2001, p. 79) (IMG)

'In fact,' said Glantz, adding more details:

in late July 1944 the *Stavka* ordered its 2nd Tank Army to race northward to Warsaw with the 47th Army and a cavalry corps in its wake. After encountering two *Wehrmacht* divisions defending the southern approaches to Warsaw, the tank army tried to bypass the German defenses from the northeast but ran into a counterstroke by four *Wehrmacht* panzer divisions, which severely mauled the tank army and forced it to withdraw on 5 August. During the ensuing weeks, while the Warsaw uprising began, matured, but ultimately failed, the forces on the 1st Belorussian Front's right wing continued their advance against Army Group Center northeast of Warsaw. For whatever motive, however, the forces on the 1st Belorussian Front's right wing focused on defending the Magnuszew bridgehead south of Warsaw, which was being subjected to heavy German counterattacks throughout mid-August, and the forces on the *front's* left wing continued their advance to the Bug River north of Warsaw and attempted to seize crossings over the river necessary to facilitate future offensive operations.

Throughout the entire period up to 20 August 1944, the 1st Belorussian Front's 47th Army remained the only major Red Army forces deployed across the Vistula River opposite Warsaw. On that date the 1st Polish Army joined it. Red Army forces north of Warsaw finally advanced across the Bug River on 3 September, closed up to the Narew River the following day, and fought their way into bridgeheads across the Narew on 6 September. Lead elements of two Polish divisions finally assaulted across the Vistula River into Warsaw on 13 September but made little progress and were evacuated back across the river ten days later.

Political considerations and motivations aside, an objective consideration of combat in the Warsaw region indicates that, prior to early September, German resistance was sufficient to halt any Soviet assistance to the Poles in Warsaw, were it intended. Thereafter, it would have required a major reorientation of military efforts from Magnuszew in the south or, more realistically, from the Bug and Narew River axis in the north in order to muster sufficient force to break into Warsaw. And once broken into, Warsaw would have been a costly city to clear of Germans and an unsuitable location from which to launch a new offensive.

(The Soviet-German War 1941-1945: Myths and Realities: A Survey Essay, Strom Thurmond Institute of Government and Public Affairs, Clemson University, A Paper Presented as the 20th Anniversary Distinguished Lecture, David M. Glantz, October 11, 2001, p. 84) (IMG)

Due to the German counter-offensive, the Red Army, while having arrived in the outskirts of Warsaw, was not able to immediately liberate the Reich-occupied Polish capital and to thereby assist the Warsaw rebels. Nevertheless, the next day, without any coordination with the Red Army:

On 1 August 1944, Polish partisans under the command of Lt. Gen. T. Bor-Komorowski seized several key areas in the Sadyba district of German-held Warsaw. The object was to keep control of the old city section until the Russian forces driving west could take Warsaw; (Tactical Operations of the Eighth Air Force, 6 June 1944 – 8 May 1945. US Air Force Historical Study No. 70, Prepared by USAF Historical Division, Air University, 1952, p. 153) (IMG)

The rebellion brought joy to the Nazis. Thanks to Okulicki's efforts, Hitler and Himmler now had an opportunity to raise all of Warsaw and cause massive casualties:

'Mein Fuhrer,' Himmler said, 'the timing is unfortunate. But from a historical point of view it is a blessing that the Poles are doing this. We will get through the four or five weeks [it will take] and then Warsaw, the capital city, the brain, the intelligence of this sixteen - to-seventeen-million-strong Polish nation will have been obliterated. This nation, which has blocked our path to the east for seven hundred

years and since the first battle of Tannenberg, has always been in the way. Then the historic problem will no longer be a major one for our children, for all those who come after us, or for us either.' Hitler, ever the opportunist, agreed.

He and Himmler drafted the Order for Warsaw that evening. It stands as one of the most chilling documents of the war.

Warsaw was to be razed to the ground - 'Glattraziert' - so as to provide a terrifying example for the rest of Europe. Himmler passed the order on to General Heinz Reinefarth personally. It read: '1. Captured insurgents ought to be killed regardless of whether they are fighting in accordance with the Hague Convention or not. 2. The part of the population not fighting, women and children, should likewise be killed. 3. The whole town must be levelled to the ground, i.e. houses, streets, offices - everything that is in the town.'

In one evening Himmler and Hitler had decided that the entire population remaining in one of great capital cities was to be murdered in cold blood. Then the city — which Himmler referred to as 'that great abscess' — was to be completely destroyed. Hitler had often talked before about the utter destruction of cities — Moscow, Leningrad, Minsk — but this was the first and only time he was actually able to put his insane ideas into practice. Tragically, this order was largely fulfilled.

(‘Warsaw 1944: Hitler, Himmler and the Warsaw Uprising’, Alexandra Richie, p. 3) (IMG)

It was not just Warsaw's industrial or strategically important zones which the Nazis were after. The Hitler gang had the grand agenda of finance capital. Finance capital wills to roll back the development of the productive forces in many areas it colonizes, for with the advancement of productive forces comes the advancement of progressive classes and with the roll back of the productive forces comes the roll back of the progressive classes. Hitler and his fascist gang, as agents of finance capital aimed to desertify the areas they conquered, as desertification is the climax of the destruction of the productive forces and will thus yield the maximum rollback of the progressive classes. In the absence of progressive classes that would promote a progressive culture, the humans that would grow up in the non-urban desert areas would be totally deprived of a civilized psyche. They would be like the humans in nomadic Arab tribes of the non-urban desert areas or the Mongol barbarians of the deserts – Pagan savages fiercely resisting a civilized life, focusing their lives on spilling blood and setting fire, and capable of becoming good humans only if militarily crushed ruthlessly. The Nazis, a radical Pagan movement committed to cultivating inter-tribal hatred and mass destruction, envisioned the desertification of much of the world so to bring into being such barbaric sanguivorous tribal societies. Hitler's idea of levelling off Warsaw, with the assistance of his friends in the Home Army high command, was not 'insane'. It was strategic sanity of a kind in service to finance capital, as finance capital benefits from promoting the kinds of barbarians in the non-urban desert areas. Finance capital benefits from humans similar to Mongol barbarians or the kinds of Arabs vehemently denounced in Quran's Surat el-Towbeh verses 97-102. Behold the great services that the non-urban nomadic desert tribes of Arabia have provided for Anglo-American finance capital. While in the past, they formed a major base of the sanguivorous Pagan barbarians, today they generate the Wahhabi current. Assisted by these desert barbarians, Anglo-American imperialism conquered the oil resources and thereupon exported Wahhabi fascist terror. The destruction and obliteration of much of the world brings the strategic gain of desertifying the world as a material base for the desert barbarism of the kind seen in Saudi Arabia. Imperialism thrives through desertification and barbarization.

One aspect of the rebellion that certainly helped the Nazis was the AK's lack of coordination with the Red Army. Any uprising without coordination with the Red Army would have been amateurish at best. This reality, however, did not stop the AK high command from taking adventurist action and leading many brave patriotic Polish fighters into death at the hands of the Germans. In a letter to Churchill, Stalin remarked:

I am convinced that the Warsaw action represents a reckless and terrible adventure which is costing the population large sacrifices. This would not have been if the Soviet command had been informed before the beginning of the Warsaw action and if the Poles had maintained contact with it. (Message from Josef Stalin to Winston Churchill on Aug. 16, 1944. Allied support for Warsaw: Roosevelt-Churchill-Stalin communications. Selected documents, From: Warsaw Uprising 1944, August 1 – October 2) (IMG)

While large portions of the Viking SS, Death Head SS, and Hermann Goring SS divisions of the German army were deployed to fighting the Soviets, other wings of the same SS fighters were deployed to fighting the Warsaw rebels:

The German garrison in Warsaw was strengthened by the dispatch of the SS Viking Panzer Division, the SS Herman Goering regiment, by units of military police, and by the infamous Dirlewanger and RONA Brigades. This force, commanded by General von dem Bach-Zelewski and containing a strong admixture of penal battalions, convicts, and desperate ex-Soviet Volunteers, was given the chance of smashing the Rising in isolation. (Heart of Europe: The Past in Poland's Present, Oxford University Press, Norman Davies, 1984, New Edition in 2011) (IMG)

Against the will of the AK command which was to assist the Nazis in desertifying Warsaw, the Soviet Red Army maximized efforts to assist the Warsaw rebels, not to help the AK command but to save the Polish people from the desertification of their civilization. As the rebellion was taking place:

Pressure was soon brought to bear on the British and Americans by the Polish government [AK's political command] in London to furnish supplies to the Warsaw underground, and on 13 August negotiations were started for the Eighth Air Force Warsaw supply drop, which was first called FRANTIC VI but was finally executed on 18 September as FRANTIC VII. (Tactical Operations of the Eighth Air Force, 6 June 1944 – 8 May 1945. US Air Force Historical Study No. 70, Prepared by USAF Historical Division, Air University, 1952, p. 155) (IMG)

According to the US Airforce, the Anglo-Americans consulted the Soviets on dropping supplies to the Warsaw rebels. In response, the Soviets: stated that they did not object to American and British planes dropping supplies to the Poles.... (Tactical Operations of the Eighth Air Force, 6 June 1944 – 8 May 1945. US Air Force Historical Study No. 70, Prepared by USAF Historical Division, Air University, 1952, p. 155) (IMG)

In fact:

the Soviet[s] ... requested a coordinated Anglo-American-Russian plan for the drop.... (Tactical Operations of the Eighth Air Force, 6 June 1944 – 8 May 1945. US Air Force Historical Study No. 70, Prepared by USAF Historical Division, Air University, 1952, p. 155) (IMG)

of arms supplies to the Warsaw rebels. However:

no representatives were sent to Russia by the British or the Americans to draw up a plan; they apparently considered the invitation superfluous when Russia agreed to the Eighth Air Force drop. (Tactical Operations of the Eighth Air Force, 6 June 1944 – 8 May 1945.

US Air Force Historical Study No. 70, Prepared by USAF Historical Division, Air University, 1952, p. 156)

The AK mercenaries of the MI6 were unwilling to cooperate with the Soviets since they knew that military cooperation with the Soviets would serve as the channel for Soviet intelligence penetration into the top ranks of the AK, and the gradual cooptation of the AK by the Soviets into a force that genuinely combats fascism rather than kill the Yiddish citizens of Poland. Furthermore, the AK command sought to destroy Warsaw, because such destruction was the a priori destruction of a capital city that would be allied to the USSR in just a few years to come.

Thus, it was the Anglo-Americans, not the Soviets, that refused to step up aid for the Warsaw rebels. Nonetheless,:

The Russians ... on 10 September consented to American and British use of Russian bases. (Tactical Operations of the Eighth Air Force, 6 June 1944 – 8 May 1945. US Air Force Historical Study No. 70, Prepared by USAF Historical Division, Air University, 1952, p. 155)

(IMG)

The Soviets should have been cautious so as to not permit the Anglo-American air forces utilize their presence in Soviet air bases as a channel of anti-Soviet espionage.

As well, the Soviets themselves provided military supplies to the Warsaw rebels. The US Air Force confirmed:

the Russians themselves started dropping supplies to Warsaw and indicated to Maj. Gen. John R. Deane, head of the American Military Mission in Moscow, that they would continue to do so as long as a need existed. (Tactical Operations of the Eighth Air Force, 6 June 1944 – 8 May 1945. US Air Force Historical Study No. 70, Prepared by USAF Historical Division, Air University, 1952, p. 155) (IMG)

Finally, after approximately two months of fighting and having allowed the genocidal destruction of Warsaw, the Polish Home Army leadership decided to capitulate to the Germans, as their leadership defected to the side of the Third Reich. The leadership of the AK rebels in Warsaw did not have positive intentions, nor were they sympathetic to the cause of the Polish people. For one, as will be shown later, Okulicki was secretly pro-Nazi. For another, as previously stated, German intelligence had infiltrated the top ranks of the Home Army. Furthermore, General Bor-Komorowski, the main commander of the AK rebels in Warsaw had a dubious background. The German General-Lieutenant:

Hans Kallner, like Fegelein, had been a professional tournament rider and had made friends with General Bor. ('Warsaw 1944: Hitler, Himmler and the Warsaw Uprising', Alexandra Richie, p. 663) (IMG)

Hermann Fegelein was listed by Guderian as a member of:

Hitler's Intimate Circle.... (Panzer Leader, Heinz Guderian, 1950) (IMG)

So close was Fegelein to Hitler that the relationship between the two men was also reflected in Fegelein's

marriage to Eva Braun's sister.... (Panzer Leader, Heinz Guderian, 1950) (IMG)

Eva Braun was the official 'girlfriend' and supposedly the future 'wife' of Hitler. In addition:

Fegelein ... was an SS-Brigade Leader, [and] Himmler's permanent representative.... (Panzer Leader, Heinz Guderian, 1950) (IMG)

In the words of the prominent Nazi commander Heinz Guderian:

Bor-Komorowski was an old acquaintance of Fegelein's whom he had frequently met ... before the war. (Panzer Leader, Heinz Guderian, 1950) (IMG)

Thus, General Bor-Komorowski had a history of friendship with the German General-Lieutenant Hans Kallner and had won the deep admiration of Fegelein. With Komorowski's enthusiastic blessing, the Home Army began negotiations for capitulation to the Third Reich.

Fegelein's influence on the uprising came about in part because of his skill as a horseman. Before the war he had competed in a number of events on the international circuit, and had even created the equestrian facilities for the 1936 Berlin Olympic Games. One of his long-time competitors, and a man he admired, was a Polish cavalry officer named Count Tadeusz Komorowski, who trained the Polish eventing team which won a silver medal at the Olympics. What Fegelein did not know that Brigadier-General Bor-Komorowski, as he was now known ('Bor' being his wartime code-name), had, a few months before the lavish wedding party, been appointed commander of the Polish Home Army based in Warsaw. Even as the SS cavalry officer was quaffing champagne and flirting with Eva Braun, General Bor was planning the uprising that would link the two men once again. ('Warsaw 1944: Hitler, Himmler and the Warsaw Uprising', Alexandra Richie, p. 24) (IMG)

Even on early October of 1944, after much of fighting between the Polish rebel forces and the Nazi Germans, Fegelein described Komorowski as a:

"A fantastic guy! (...)." ('Warsaw 1944: Hitler, Himmler and the Warsaw Uprising', Alexandra Richie, p. 582) (IMG)

The consequence of the Home Army's lack of thorough coordination with the Red Army was the Nazis' genocidal burning of Warsaw as a city. After much of the city was already in flames, the Home Army forces led by German-linked commanders Komorowski and Okulicki began signing the deals for a full-on defection to the German side, under the guise of 'surrender'. An agreement was signed between the two parties on early October. The following is an excerpt of the agreement provided by UNESCO official and prominent anti-Soviet scholar of history, Norman Davies:

Capitulation Agreement between the German Army and the Home Army

(Translated by Wanda Wyporska)

On 2 X 1944 an agreement was reached in Ozarow on the cessation of military operations in Warsaw. The authorized contracting party for the German side is the Commander of the Warsaw area, SS-Obergruppenfuhrer und Gen. der Polizei, von dem Bach. The contracting parties for the Home Army are authorized on the basis of a power of attorney issued by the commander of the Home Army, General Komorowski (B6r): 1) Certified Colonel Kazimierz Iranek-Osmecki (Jarecki), and 2) Certified Lieutenant Colonel Zygmunt Dobrowolski (Zyndram).

The agreement reads:

1) On 2 X 1944 at 20.00 hours German time (21.00 hours Polish time) military operations will cease between German forces and all Polish military units fighting in the city of Warsaw area. All Polish formations tactically subordinated during the fighting, to the Home Army Commander from 1 VIII 44 up to the date of signature of this agreement, are to be regarded as Polish units. Henceforth they will be called 'Home Army Units'.

2) The soldiers of the Polish units mentioned above will lay down their arms....

(Rising '44: The Battle for Warsaw, Norman Davies, Appendix 29) (IMG)

The Home Army command was already an accomplice of the Third Reich. The Nazis and the AK only aimed to further these bonds into the development of a full-scale alliance. It was at this time that German General Bach, who was in charge of the negotiations with the Home Army, was aiming:

to recruit the Home Army as a future ally in a final struggle against the Soviets; (Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin, Timothy Snyder, p. 308) (IMG)

What Komorowski did after the surrender to the Nazis, therefore, should not come as a surprise. Citing German intelligence, Dr. Alexander Perry Biddiscombe – a University of Victoria history professor and a noted scholar on Nazi terrorism – stated:

Gerhard Teich, the chief intelligence officer of 'Zeppelin' and a man in a position to know about the nature of German intrigues along the Eastern Front, later described Komorowski as having 'deserted to the Germans after the fall of Warsaw'. (Teich int., 21/1/46, ETO MIS-Y-Sect. CSDIC/WEA Final Interrogation Reports 1945-47, RG 338, NA. Cited in: The SS Hunter Battalions: The Hidden History of the Nazi Resistance Movement 1944-45, Perry Biddiscombe, 2006) (IMG)

Komorowski, the man embraced by the Anglo-Americans as an 'anti-fascist' 'resistance' champion, defected and began full service to the Axis. After Komorowski's treason, Okulicki became the head of the Polish Home Army. According to a German intelligence report cited by Dr. Biddiscombe, General Okulicki, the leader of the Polish Home Army, in his New Year's Address in 1945 declared:

Today the Polish people are threatened with absolute annihilation from the East. Therefore, we must direct our attention in this direction. I am no soothsayer, but the moment approaches in which the AK will emerge from the underground and serve as a Polish Army, side-by-side with Germany, against the Bolshevik wave, the centuries-old foe and enemy of Christendom. Since political matters are still momentarily unresolved, I ask you, AK soldiers, to avoid all unnecessary sabotage against Germany because no one knows whether today's enemy will be our friend tomorrow. (C/Auswertung 101: Neujahrsrede Niedwietzkis (Niedzviadek), February 13, 1945, T-78, r. 566, fr. 389, NA. Cited in: The SS Hunter Battalions: The Hidden History of the Nazi Resistance Movement 1944-45, Perry Biddiscombe, 2006) (IMG)

Thus, the Home Army led by the pro-Nazi Okulicki, officially proposed the formation of an alliance with the Third Reich. The Nazis of course welcomed this. In another German intelligence report cited by Biddiscombe, Reinhard Gehlen, the head of the German intelligence in the Eastern Front, noted:

According to impressions that seem certain, the intelligence service and the Polish resistance movement are prepared – with the official approval of the émigré government – to enter into cooperation against Bolshevism without political conditions. They are also prepared, if the need exists, to supply the necessary weapons for battle-worthy Agenten-Aufklärung. It would therefore be possible... to get a foothold in broad form with a Frontaufklärung agent net in all of Poland. Since the London Polish Government has officially disbanded the resistance movement, it will secretly reconstruct it in the Soviet-occupied sector. (Vortragsnotiz über zur Aktivierung der Frontaufklärung, Reinhard Gehlen 2/1930, February 25, 1945, BMA. For offers of 'anti-communist collaboration' by the Polish legation in Lisbon, see ULTRA/ZIP/ISK 131826, 17/1/45, HW 19/222, NAUK. Cited in: The SS Hunter Battalions: The Hidden History of the Nazi Resistance Movement 1944-45, Perry Biddiscombe, 2006) (IMG)

The Soviet leader Joseph Stalin personally informed the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill of the active collaboration of the Home Army with the forces of the Third Reich. In his memoirs, Churchill pointed to a letter by the Soviet leader, dated May 5, 1945. An excerpt of the letter was as follows:

I must comment especially on [another] point of your message, in which you mention difficulties arising as a result of rumours of the arrest of fifteen Poles, of deportations and so forth.

As to this, I can inform you that the group of Poles to which you refer consists not of fifteen but of sixteen persons, and is headed by the well-known Polish general Okulicki. In view of his especially odious character the British Information Service is careful to be silent on the subject of this Polish general, who "disappeared" together with the fifteen other Poles who are said to have done likewise. But we do not propose to be silent on this subject. This party of sixteen individuals headed by General Okulicki was arrested by the military authorities on the Soviet front and is undergoing investigation in Moscow. General Okulicki's group, and especially the General himself, are accused of planning and carrying out diversionary acts in the rear of the Red Army which resulted in the loss of over 100 fighters and officers of that Army, and are also accused of maintaining illegal wireless transmitting stations in the rear of our troops, which is contrary to law. All or some of them, according to the results of the investigation, will be handed over for trial. This is the manner in which it is necessary for the Red Army to defend its troops and its rear from diversionists and disturbers of order.

(The Second World War Triumph and Tragedy, Volume 6, Winston Churchill, p. 436) (IMG)

The joint Anglo-German support for the Home Army yet again exposed the covert collaboration of Britain with the Third Reich. This collaboration was of course for strategic reasons. Throughout its history as a maritime imperial power, Britain had always pitted one side in European conflicts against another. That the British were collaborating with the Nazis was a natural manifestation of Britain's objectives for strategic balancing and bleed-out in Europe. Britain was helping Germany prevent the further advance of the Red Army westwards.

C13S4.5. The AK Steps Up Nazi-style Anti-Semitic Pogroms

From 1945 onwards:

The right-wing A.K. (Armja Krajowa) and the fascist NSZ (Narodowe Sily Zbrojowe) resumed their armed activities, this time with the object of driving the Soviets and their Polish allies out of the country. An era commenced of what in fact was civil war. Soon only the larger towns were in the government's hands, whereas the countryside generally and the Carpathian mountain range in particular were controlled by the insurgents. The old A.K. had dissolved, and the successor organizations assumed various names, such as WIN. Despite the existence among them of some moderate social democratic or liberal elements, these organizations were predominantly right-wing,

and they tended to continue the old, violent and bloody prewar Polish anti-Semitism, fortified and barbarized by the example set by the Nazi conquerors.

The Jews were now an easy target indeed. Having dwindled to an insignificant percentage of the population, they were completely dependent on the protection afforded by the government.

(Flight and Rescue: Brichah, Yehuda Bauer, 1970, pp. 113-114) (IMG)

Referring to the Yiddish members of the PPR, Bauer continued:

the fact of their Jewish origin served as a butt for attacks of the WIN and fascist NSZ on the regime. Jews and Communists were equated in right-wing propaganda in the well-worn Nazi manner. The Jew-hatred of many Poles, and especially among the peasantry, was now whipped up [in vain] for anti-government attacks. This of course tended to make the Jews even more dependent on the government, and their situation became difficult in the extreme. (Flight and Rescue: Brichah, Yehuda Bauer, 1970, pp. 114-115) (IMG)

On behalf of the London-based so-called Polish government-in-exile, a new wave of anti-Semitic terrorism was launched by fascist extreme-right organizations:

The first serious anti-Jewish outbreaks occurred in Cracow. On August 11, riots occurred and a Jewish school was burned down. This followed the distribution of leaflets by the underground forces chiding Cracow for not activating its anti-Jewish committee. The WIN leaflets declared that the riots had been instigated by Jews and the "perpetrators were the Jews themselves and the NKVD [Russian secret police]." Several Jews were killed, and similar though lesser outbreaks were recorded in Radom and Czestochowa. Contemporary reports relate how members of the right-wing groups went through villages where individual Jews or small groups tried to maintain a foothold and encouraged actions against the Jews in the name of the London government-in-exile of the anti-Communist Poles. (Flight and Rescue: Brichah, Yehuda Bauer, 1970, p. 115) (IMG)

Although Professor Bauer himself was affiliated with the Mapam, a pro-Soviet political party in Israel, and may have had a pro-Soviet view, his claims are voluminous supported by the overwhelming evidence of AK-Nazi collaboration provided from anti-Soviet Zionist intelligence sources such as Yitzhak Zuckerman (cited previously) and the CIA-Mossad JDC operative Ruth Gay.

Another case of AK terrorism against the Yiddish people was reported by Pat Frank, a member of the US government's Office of War Information responsible for promoting official US government propaganda. Frank described the case as such:

Luba Zindel of Kracow, was having a baby at the hospital when the train departed. I talked to her at Camp Karlov. This is her story: With her husband and an earlier child, she had spent three years in the Nazi concentration camp at Lublin. After the Russians captured that city, the family was released. They returned to their home in Kracow on June 20 1945. On the first Saturday in August, while the family was attending services, the synagogue was attacked and stormed by uniformed AK troopers. "They were shouting, she told me, that we had committed ritual murders. They began firing at us and beating us. My husband was sitting beside me. He fell down on his face full of bullets." The widow was among those selected by the Jewish Committee in Krakow to be given a chance to escape to Czechoslovakia. She arrived here aboard the first of three trains". ('Patton Turned Back 600 Jews Fleeing Terror in Poland', Pat Frank. In: Brichah, William Leibner. In: jewishgen.org.) (IMG)

A US intelligence report in 1946 stated that "Stefan JANECZEK, former NKVD Captain and former Major in the Polish Security Troops" (p. 1), upon returning to Poland,:

also began being informed of the many anti-Jewish manifestations fostered by the AK and the NSZ bands who were working against the present Government.

('SUBJECT: Interrogation Report of Michael PINES c. Stefan JANECZEK, former NKVD Captain and former Major in the Polish Security Troops', Office of Origin: Vienna, Austria, SCI/A, Headquarters of the US Forces in Austria, SSU, WD Mission to Austria, APO 777, Reference: Project SYMPHONY, Field Hq. File No. LVX 231, period covered: present, made by: DD 110, Date: May 9, 1946, p. 14. In: 'SYMPHONY VOL. 1_0033', CIA.) (IMG)

UN reports confirm the AK's terrorist activity against the Yiddish sons and daughters of Poland. One such report was cited by Ruth Gay, the editor of the 'JDC Review', a journal of the 'American-Jewish Joint Distribution Committee' (JDC). The JDC or 'Joint', as will be shown in C16S1, was an American-Israeli intelligence organization, of which Ruth Gay was a leading figure. Citing a detailed report by the US-led 'United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency' (UNRRA), Ruth Gay remarked:

H. J Fishbein, director of an UNRRA Team in Berlin, delivered a detailed report for the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, in which he gave more specific reasons for the flight: "The story of their experiences during the past six months," he wrote of the new arrivals, "is a monotonous one as it is repeated by all refugees coming out of Poland. They tell of letters received from a Polish organization known as 'A.K.' [Armia Krajowa] meaning Patriotic Army ... and in opposition to the present Government of Poland. These letters threaten the Jews with outright murder if they continue to live in that locality. They are usually given a period of 24 to 48 hours to leave. These letters are further confirmed by actual terroristic acts of pillage and murder by this organization, committed as recently as several weeks ago." It was a catastrophic moment to be a displaced person. (Safe Among the Germans: Liberated Jews After World War II, Ruth Gay, p. 183. The phrase "[Armia Krajowa]" including its square brackets is original to Ruth Gay's text.) (IMG)

Clearly, the narrative that the AK was engaged in pogroms is no 'Soviet propaganda'.

C13S4.6. The Conspiracies of the Polish 'Underground' against the New Poland / Home Army Terror and the Titoist Betrayals by the Gomulka-Spychalski Group *** IMG-All-{Poland}

According to the report by Gomulka:

Up to the elections reaction thought that factories and heavy industry would pass after these into their hands and now there may be sabotage in production resulting in non-accomplishment of the three-year plan showing up PPR as inefficient. The blowing up of the Martin furnace in the Glivitz region is the first act of sabotage by underground men. (Political Report made by First Secretary Executive Committee Polish Communist Party (PPR), CIA, August 7, 1947, p. 2) (IMG)

Referring to the above paragraph by the First Secretary, the CIA agent who had translated Gomulka's report re-emphasized:

this really happened.... (Political Report made by First Secretary Executive Committee Polish Communist Party (PPR), CIA, August 7, 1947, p. 2) (IMG)

That is, the CIA agent emphasized that the Underground's sabotage operation against the Martin furnace occurred for the purpose of depicting the 'PPR as inefficient' and that more of such sabotage operations may occur. The 'Underground', the term used for the various cells of the Home Army (AK), was engaged in combat against Poland's industrial production, so to render Poland weaker.

Throughout the next six years, several US intelligence reports frequently confirmed the criminality and exposed the fascist nature of the Polish Underground State. Note that unlike the foregoing report by Gomulka, which the CIA agent nevertheless acknowledged as 'truthful', the following intelligence documents were not translations of the public statements of Polish government and PPR officials, but were rather reports written and submitted by CIA agents themselves.

A 1947 CIA document confirmed that the 'Right extremists' held the upper hand in the Polish Underground guerrilla movement:

Politically, the Resistance includes all elements ranging from the anti-Stalinist to the reactionary groups. Generally, the extremists, particularly the Right extremists, are stronger among the Partisan formations, while the moderates and liberals are more likely to be found in the Underground. (Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 1) (IMG)

In particular, the fascist Nazi-collaborationist NSZ represented one of the largest, if not the largest, movement among the partisan bands in the Polish Underground:

The NSZ appears to be the largest of the organized Resistance groups. Politically it stands on the extreme Right, having developed chiefly out of such pre-war elements as ONR and Stronnictwo Narodowe (National Party) – now outlawed. Although the NSZ officially deplors mistreatment of the Jews, it has been responsible for anti-Semitic excess in a number of cases. The head of the NSZ in Poland is reliably reported to be Boleslaw Piasecki, successor to the late Stanislaw Piasecki (no relation). Its military head is reported to be Colonel Andrzej Rutkowski (not identical with Colonel Rutkowski, Chief of Informacja [i.e. Polish intelligence]). (Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 4) (IMG)

The WIN, the second largest Polish Underground guerrilla movement after the Great Patriotic War, was 'similar politically' to the NSZ in that they too were fascist bandits:

Wolnosc i Niepodleglosc (Freedom and Independence)

Next to the NSZ (to which it is similar politically) WIN is considered the largest Partisan organization.

(Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 4) (IMG)

Both of these organizations were the bulk of the guerrilla bands and were headquartered in Poland:

The largest and most important groups ... [are] NSZ (National Armed Forces) and WIN (Freedom and Independence) ... [which] have their headquarters in Poland. (Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 2) (IMG)

Of course, the ultimate headquarters of these terror organizations was in London.

Much as how some criminal gangs and syndicates are named after their godfathers and crime bosses, many of the Polish Underground guerrillas were named after their chiefs as well. Indeed, the WIN and NSZ were not coherent organizations, but were rather coalitions of fascist bandits. Both organizations were made up of godfather-named local gangs. Referring to the WIN and NSZ, the US intelligence document stated:

To these latter groups belong also their numerous guerrilla bands which owe allegiance solely to their own chieftains. (Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 2) (IMG)

This was of course the situation with other guerrilla bands as well:

In addition to these groupings ... there are numerous local bands, of varying strengths which are sometimes nameless, and sometimes identified only by the noms de guerre of their chiefs. (Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, pp. 3-4) (IMG)

The very name of a guerrilla movement matters much because it sheds light on the group's ideology or platform; the fact that the Polish Underground guerrillas were named not after a particular ideology, 'ideal', or slogan, but rather after their warlords and godfathers reveals the fascist cult-like mentality of the bandit 'movement'. Indeed, it is questionable if one could call these guerrillas 'partisans' at all considering their banditry. These:

pseudo-Partisan bands ... although they profess to identify themselves with one anti-Government or another, must be considered as purely bandit groups with no political objectives whatever. (Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 1) (IMG)

The name 'Freedom and Independence' (WIN) and the 'National Armed Forces' (NSZ) were solely professional liberal names acting as propaganda cover for the banditry of the Polish Underground.

There of course were other smaller guerrilla organizations in Poland:

Polska Armia Wyzwolenia (Polish Army of Liberation)

The AW is a numerically insignificant group. Claims have been made that the AW has from 300,000 to 400,000 organized troops with reserves of over a million, and that it is the successor to the AK.

Comment: There has been no confirmation of these exaggerated estimates, and they seem to be the product of wishful thinking.

(Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 4) (IMG)

Wojska Powstancze (Insurgent Troops)

One of the smaller Rightist Partisan groups.

(Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 4) (IMG)

Some reasons for joining the Underground guerrillas were 'to escape the authorities', 'excitement and adventure' or to become mercenaries:

The composition of the ranks is heterogeneous. Although some join as a result of political conviction, some to escape the authorities and others for excitement and adventure, there are those attracted by mercenary considerations. (Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 3) (IMG)

Another CIA document titled 'Polish Underground' provides more specific details about the character of the Polish Underground guerrillas. The document acknowledged that the 'great majority' of the Polish Underground were criminals:

A large percentage of underground members are common criminals such as speculators, black marketeers, smugglers, thieves, robbers and murderers. Another group in the underground is that of the “professional” resistance man who knows no other way of life. (...). The great majority of those who live illegally and who hide in the forests of Poland are, therefore, army deserters, common criminals, young men who have committed a misdemeanor, youthful war-time underground assistants – unwitting couriers, ammunition keepers and the like – who continued to associate with the underground and who, since the war have been either unwilling or unable to rehabilitate themselves. (Polish Underground, CIA, Date Distributed: 7 October 1952, pp. 1-2) (IMG)

A smaller portion of the Polish Underground was made up of the ‘lesser’ criminals:

There are other elements of the Polish population which provide lesser numbers of men to the clandestine resistance forces. These include young persons who have no political or ideological motivation, but who have joined because they have committed some minor crime and because they dread the few months in jail.... (Polish Underground, CIA, Date Distributed: 7 October 1952, pp. 1-2) (IMG)

This category included such people as:

a youngster who may have drunkenly tried to molest a girl.... (Polish Underground, CIA, Date Distributed: 7 October 1952, p. 2) (IMG)

That is, the ‘lesser’ criminals were, at ‘best’ case scenario, rapists. The criminals were led by the wartime leaders of the Polish Underground:

These forest underground groups are almost always directed by experienced war-time underground members who now either live illegally under assumed names or who have managed to reappear as accepted citizens while concealing their present interest in anti-regime action. (...). Almost universally, the chiefs are motivated by political considerations such as hatred of Russia, Polish nationalism, hatred of Communism or personal political ambition. (Polish Underground, CIA, Date Distributed: 7 October 1952, p. 2) (IMG)

The information presented by the CIA document clearly demonstrates that the Polish Underground did not respect freedom of opinion and expression and that they engaged in terrorist activity. The Polish Underground conducted terrorist operations against non-combatant communists:

These groups ... conduct actions against Communist agitators propagandizing collectivization and speaking for the USSR; (Poland: Polish Underground, CIA, Date Distributed: 7 October 1952, p. 2.) (IMG)

The Polish Underground guerrillas were literally bandits. They attacked trains and public warehouses to loot whatever material they needed:

The procurement of supplies appears to present no problem. Whatever cannot be obtained in any other way is gotten by holding up trains and looting public warehouses. (Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 3) (IMG)

Attacks on infrastructure were common. The CIA document commented:

It is believed that the underground was responsible for the following incident: The flow of power to electric trains was suddenly cut off one day in the spring of 1952 for several hours. Trains running on the Warsaw-Pruszkow and Warsaw-Grojec lines halted. Because of this some 360,000 workers were unable to report for work that day. It is not definitely known whether the interruption was due to sabotage or to a technical breakdown. (Poland: Polish Underground, CIA, Date Distributed: 7 October 1952, p. 3) (IMG)

More tellingly, after the War, the Polish Underground attacked the farms, especially the collective farms. They attacked Gminna Spółdzielnia ‘Samopomoc Chłopska’ (Communal Cooperative ‘Peasant Self-Help’), the Spółdzielnie Produkcyjne (Production Cooperatives), and Polskie Gospodarstwa Rolne (Polish Farms):

Communist collective offices, such as Samopomoc Chłopska, Spółdzielnie Produkcyjne and Polskie Gospodarstwa Rolne also provide targets for active opposition. (Poland: Polish Underground, CIA, Date Distributed: 7 October 1952, pp. 2-3) (IMG)

Western propagandists have always alleged that the Polish Underground received the support of the majority of the Polish population. Not true. As the CIA confirmed, among the Polish people,:

A certain feeling arose against the Partisans, based on the accusation that by continuing their senseless struggle they were only aggravating the serious economic condition of the country, causing needless bloodshed.... (Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 7) (IMG)

Furthermore, the CIA document was absolutely clear that behind these Polish Underground guerrilla was General Anders and his so-called ‘Polish government-in-exile’ in London:

At the same time, political alignments became clearer: Behind the Partisans stood General Anders and the “London” Poles, and behind them stood the British. In the minds of the Polish people, Anders and the London group are identified with the large capitalists and feudal landowners. (Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 7) (IMG)

The deep ties between the MI6-backed group led by General Anders and the terrorists in Poland led to the overwhelming hatred of the Polish proletariat and peasantry at the time towards the so-called ‘Polish government-in-exile’:

it cannot be said that many Poles would want the London group in control of the Polish State. The workers and peasants especially feel that should the London group come to power it would mean a return to the intolerable conditions of 1939, with the ... distasteful dictatorship of the Right. (Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 7) (IMG)

Contrary to the reports of the CIA-backed press, the Polish people at that time despised the MI6-backed ‘London Poles’, after having experienced the harsh conditions prior to 1939, as well as the terrorism and treason of the Polish Underground guerrillas during and after the War. The Polish government’s intelligence service:

are interested in the Resistance primarily because some of its [i.e. Resistance’s] elements not only receive material support from abroad but provide assistance to foreign intelligence agencies [e.g. MI6] in their anti-Polish and anti-Soviet operations. (Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 2) (IMG)

Many people ... deprecate [Partisan] activities on the grounds that they cause senseless bloodshed and will accomplish no permanent good. In such regions as Rzeszow, Bialystok, Lublin, and the Swietokrzyskie Mountains – where Partisan activity is strongest – ... even those elements which otherwise would be inimical are kept in line by fear of the Partisans. (Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 3) (IMG)

Those Poles located near the mountains or forests suffered the most, because those terrains best served the guerrillas leading to their mass concentration there:

There is Partisan activity of one sort or another throughout Poland, but it is concentrated in terrain which affords protection and concealment, i.e., in areas which are forested or mountainous or both. Thus, the Partisans are strongest in the northeast, the southeast, along the Polish-Slovak border, and in the Kielce area of central Poland. (Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 4) (IMG)

The extreme unpopularity of the Polish Underground guerrillas is also reflected in the relatively small number of recruits they had:

It is difficult to make even an approximate estimate of Partisan strength. On the basis of information at hand, however, it is felt that 40,000 to 50,000 men would be a reasonable approximation for the autumn of 1946. (Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 3) (IMG)

According to conservative estimates, the "Freedom Movement" has about 25,000 members, many of whom are armed with automatic weapons. (Government Moves Against the Underground, CIA, December 16, 1949, p. 1) (IMG)

Note that the 'Freedom Movement' was simply an alternative term for:

Anti-Communist Underground activists in Poland.... (Government Moves Against the Underground, CIA, December 16, 1949, p. 1) (IMG)

Compiling numerous reliable reports into one major study on Ukrainian fascism, a study by the US intelligence confirmed that the Anders group, which headed the military wing of the Polish Underground and the 'Polish' government-in-exile, closely collaborated with the Ukrainian anti-Polish fascist terror group, the OUN (which headed the UHVR), as means of combatting Soviet power and establishing an MI6-backed Intermarium. Indeed, the US intelligence reported:

Further, conferences were held between the Polish ANDERS Group and UHVR representatives at Bellagio (May 21, 1946), Rome (June 3-11, 1946), and Castelgandolfo in order to effect a rapprochement between the Ukrainian and Polish resistance movements and to conclude a close alliance in the struggle against the Soviets.

UHVR was represented by the OUN member and terrorist Nicholas LEBID, Secretary General of the Foreign Affairs Department, and by Alexis SOKIL, permanent delegate in Rome. Negotiations to coordinate Intelligence Services of the 2nd Polish Army Corps and the Ukrainian IS took place. The agenda also included such matters as the delimitation of frontiers, anti-Ukrainian propaganda in the Polish press, the INTERMARIUM CONFEDERATION (see above, PROMETHEUS MOVEMENT), and the formation of an anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations. Political negotiations, however, were postpone pending study of reports and delimitation of Polish and Ukrainian zones. It is significant that the UHVR, which can be traced back to the anti-Polish OUN, should now seek an alliance with the anti-Warsaw Poles. Both factions, of course, now have a common enemy in Soviet Russia and Communism.

(THE UKRAINIAN NATIONALIST MOVEMENT: AN INTERIM STUDY', US intelligence, authors: William Holzmann and Zolt Aradi, October 1946, p. 27) (IMG)

The report further added that the fascist NSZ and the UPA also closely collaborated:

some cooperation has been stipulated between UPA and NSZ.... (THE UKRAINIAN NATIONALIST MOVEMENT: AN INTERIM STUDY', CIA, authors: William Holzmann and Zolt Aradi, October 1946, p. 27) (IMG)

The strength of the counter-revolutionary partisan movement, therefore, ranged between 25,000 to 50,000 which, relative to the 400,000-strong Polish People's Army (AL) during the Great Patriotic War, was rather small. It also was far smaller than the 500,000 to 1,000,000 members of the PPR in 1947. As the Underground guerrillas served as the successor organizations to the Polish AK, their stronghold was also in Central Poland and they were led by General Szary:

Throughout the war [Gory Swietokrzyskie in Central Poland] was an AK stronghold, and it still is the headquarters of Szary, one of the most famous Partisan leaders in Poland. [According to the] former deputy to the UBP Commandant of the Kielce area, Szary's forces number between 7,000 and 80,000 men. (Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 6) (IMG)

According to conservative estimates, the "Freedom Movement" has about 25,000 members, many of whom are armed with automatic weapons. (Government Moves Against the Underground, CIA, December 16, 1949, p. 1) (IMG)

It is difficult to make even an approximate estimate of Partisan strength. On the basis of information at hand, however, it is felt that 40,000 to 50,000 men would be a reasonable approximation for the autumn of 1946. (Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 3) (IMG)

In Eastern Poland, the local partisan formations were far smaller. Nevertheless, they exaggerated their membership figures:

One report estimated Partisan strength in [Byalistok in Eastern Poland] at 10,000 but this is considered exaggerated. (Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 5) (IMG)

The suppression of the Polish Underground guerrillas was the job of Polish organizations:

Korpus Bezpieczenstwa Wewnetrznego (Internal Security Corps)

The burden of anti-Partisan operations in the field falls on the KBW, a well-equipped and politically reliable elite formation which resembles ... the MVD Internal Troops. The KBW is organized in motorized regiments and independent battalions strategically stationed throughout Poland.

(Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 2) (IMG)

Milicja Obywatelska (Police) and Ochotnicza Milicja Obywatelska (Voluntary Police)

The MO and OMO perform ordinary police functions and have no authority in political matters. They are therefore, only occasionally involved in anti-Partisan operations....

(Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 2) (IMG)

After the War, given the shortage of the military cadres, the Polish government accepted some of the old military commanders into the Army. For this reason, the Army was somewhat unreliable and needed a thorough purge. Hence:

The Army takes part in anti-Partisan fighting only as a last resort in cases where Partisan strength is too great to be dealt with by the KBW or [Polish intelligence]. One reason for not committing the army against the Partisans except when absolutely necessary is the questionable political reliability of the rank and file, who often sympathize with the Resistance and allow themselves to be disarmed

without a struggle. To discourage this practice the General Staff issued an order prescribing the death penalty for those who surrendered their arms to the Partisans. (Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 2) (IMG)

The Polish government's crackdown on the guerrillas proved to be quite effective:

The high point of Partisan strength in Poland was reached in the winter and spring of 1946. Since that time it has been steadily declining, partly because of the Government action.... (Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 8) (IMG)

Soviet Red Army involvement in the fight against the Polish Underground guerrillas would have been a massive propaganda boost for the terrorists as it would have depicted the conflict as one between the 'Russian imperialists' and the 'Polish freedom movement'. Since the AK-affiliated terrorists intensively propagated the narrative that Poland was a Soviet 'colony', direct Red Army involvement would have boosted such propaganda. As such, to the extent possible, the Soviet Red Army avoided direct involvement in the conflict:

Soviet units in Poland are forbidden to participate in battles against the Partisans. Only if they are attacked may they defend themselves. Even when the Polish authorities call on the Soviets for help, the answer is always, "without specific instructions from Moscow we cannot join you"; this, in spite of the fact that many members of the Soviet Army, among them high officers, have been killed by the Partisans. Such special units as the MVD have greater authority and a freer hand to engage in anti-Partisan combat, but even they rarely become involved. (Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, pp. 6-7) (IMG)

Note that the MVD specialized in cracking down on terrorists and fostering internal security. Of course, because the Soviets were not directly involved in the military operations, the Titoist infiltrators in Poland could reverse the narrative and argue that the 'Red Army is not directly involved in the war against the terrorists! The Polish guards are being used as Russia's cannon-fodder!' or words to that effect. Later on, when only fewer and fewer fascist bandits remained and the fight against the guerrillas became less important, the Soviet government did directly engage the partisans; however, again, to prevent a propaganda boost for the guerrillas, Red Army general Rokossovsky, himself ethnically Polish, was involved in the conflict with the assistance of the Soviet intelligence service MVD:

It may be assumed that "Freedom Movement" activities are a reason for Soviet Marshal Rokossovsky's appointment to Poland, and it is believed that he has been given the task of eliminating members of this resistance group. Rokossovsky's handling of this assignment will probably prove to be a test of his ability and, should he fail, it is believed that the Cominform will remove him from Poland. To combat the "Freedom Movement", Rokossovsky has been given about 2,000 MVD agents who are to penetrate the Polish Underground. As far as is known, the Underground is aware of the assignment. (Government Moves Against the Underground, CIA, December 16, 1949, p. 1) (IMG)

However, added to the Underground fascist guerrillas were their Titoist agents, the traitors to the proletariat, in the top ranks of the Polish People's Democracy who stabbed the communists in the back. On the one hand, there existed the Underground guerrillas; on the other hand, allied to them were the 'conspirational Underground' which aimed to infiltrate the government:

The resistance movement in Poland can be divided roughly into two groups: the Partisans, who favor direct, armed resistance to the Government through guerilla warfare; and the conspirational Underground, a broader but loosely organized movement which prefers to act indirectly through propaganda and infiltration of government agencies. (Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 1) (IMG)

Prior to the 1947 elections, the PPR-led popular front promised to the people amnesty to the partisans and increased internal stability:

Amnesty and internal stability were the pre-election slogans which secured a victory for the [communist-led] bloc. (Public Reaction to Political Events, CIA, September 22, 1947, p. 1) (IMG)

As the CIA confirmed, the amnesty issued by the PPR was for the purpose of revealing and hunting down the Home Army terrorists:

The amnesty is used by the PPR solely as a means for revealing and exterminating the Underground. (Public Reaction to Political Events, CIA, September 22, 1947, p. 1)

There is no evidence that the amnesty offer was a promise to be broken, upon mass surrender by the terrorists. After accepting the amnesty offers, the Underground guerrillas would then turn themselves in and be integrated in the rest of the society, disarmed, identified, and easier to surveil. Such ex-guerrillas could well live a normal life if they behaved as good citizens. However, should the ex-guerrillas plot to launch the slightest sabotage against the progressive forces, they could be hunted down and purged by the Polish counter-intelligence which had been surveiling them all along. Amnesty to the guerrillas was the efficient way of engineering a split among the terrorists, to facilitate the identification and surveillance of such ex-terrorists who would return to the mainstream of the Polish society.

The Anglo-Americans and their PSL stooges wanted German settlers to continue to occupy Polish territories:

Wide public interest in the Moscow Conference was stimulated by two questions in the Polish mind: would the western frontiers be confirmed? Would there be peace or war? Secretary Marshall's demand for revision of the western frontier in favor of Germany spread fear among the transferred people. (Public Reaction to Political Events, CIA, September 22, 1947, p. 1) (IMG)

The Anglo-Americans acted against the Polish people, who in turn naturally grew hostile to the Anglo-Americans. By contrast, the Soviets and the PPR were the champions of Polish socialist patriotism, and advocated the expansion of Poland's boundaries westwards.

As these repatriates, brought from the East, find themselves about to be ousted from the West, suspicion and even hatred is replacing their friendliness and goodwill toward Anglo-Saxons. This growing hatred is nurtured by Soviet propaganda which blames the Anglo-Saxons for Poland's plight. (Public Reaction to Political Events, CIA, September 22, 1947, p. 1) (IMG)

All of these factors led the PPR to gain the support of the Polish masses. The January 1947 elections brought the PPR to government with a landslide. The reason why the partisans were promised amnesty was not so much that the PPR was soft on terrorist guerrilla activity per se, but rather the goal was to cause splits in the ranks of the terrorist guerrillas, so to more easily surveil these counter-revolutionary elements and purge them off.

After the elections:

the amnesty was widely publicized and the UB and MO [Polish intelligence and security services] were told to stop their activities during the amnesty period.... (Public Reaction to Political Events, CIA, September 22, 1947, p. 1) (IMG)

Although on the surface, the policy of amnesty may appear as a sign of weakness, in reality it was to be:

used by the PPR solely as a means for revealing and exterminating the Underground. (Public Reaction to Political Events, CIA, September 22, 1947, p. 1) (IMG)

That is not to imply that the promise of amnesty would be broken. Rather it meant that the counter-revolutionary forces would be disarmed and compelled to resort to so-called 'civil' means of counter-revolutionary opposition. They would be surveilled, and, later on, upon continued counter-revolutionary activity, would be purged – that was the plan. That is why the policy of amnesty faced the opposition of the PSL:

The PSL was striving to eliminate the amnesty. There also existed other currents to the same end. (Political Report made by First Secretary Executive Committee Polish Communist Party (PPR), CIA, August 7, 1947, p. 2) (IMG)

The PSL and the fascist Underground were deeply linked:

The strength of the Fascist underground will fall if the PSL (the Polish Peasant Party) is disintegrating. (Political Report made by First Secretary Executive Committee Polish Communist Party (PPR), CIA, August 7, 1947, p. 2) (IMG)

As a result of the amnesty:

Underground elements are starting to crumble. (Political Report made by First Secretary Executive Committee Polish Communist Party (PPR), CIA, August 7, 1947, p. 2) (IMG)

Thus, the PSL and the former Partisans had to resort to intelligence activities against the Polish government by joining the conspirational Titoist Underground:

The ex-Partisans and former AK men have channeled their hostility to the Government into the Underground. Thus, as the Partisans have become weaker, the Underground has become stronger. Now that Mikolajczyk's "legal" opposition has been "defeated" in the recent elections and an amnesty proclaimed for the Partisans, it can be expected that this process will continue, and that the PSL as well as the ex-Partisans will increasingly turn to the Underground as the only remaining possibility of actively continuing resistance against the Government. (Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 8) (IMG)

The Titoist conspirators in Poland were initially organized as individual cells.

The usual form of organization in the [conspirational] Underground is that of the small cell. These are found throughout Poland, but are concentrated chiefly in the cities. (Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 7) (IMG)

However, over time, the network of Titoist conspirators took shape. The CIA reported that the conspirational Underground:

are becoming more closely-knit as their number increases, and eventually may form a tightly organized, long-term clandestine opposition. (Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 7) (IMG)

The Titoist 'Underground', Gomulka reported with 'absolute' 'truthfulness', aimed to conduct industrial sabotage against People's Democratic Poland:

The lack of props at the mines, motors covered with coal dust, sabotage, laziness – all is the fault of the managers and the foremen. These must be removed and disciplined. At each mine 200 workers are used for private tasks, 200 are on leave and in social work, 200 are sick, and 400 do not come to work. (Political Report made by First Secretary Executive Committee Polish Communist Party (PPR), CIA, August 7, 1947, p. 3) (IMG)

In response, the Polish government initiated a program of surveillance over the factory management teams:

there will be in each shop a triumvirate of PPR's who will watch out for efficiency, output, and completeness of work done. In case of finding sabotage or deficiency in work, they will immediately notify the industrial sections of the UB (secret police). Decisions taken by the PPR cell are decisive for the personnel section. Each mine or foundry must get 4 such cells of 3 PPR's each. Once a month conference of the technical organization will be held. (Political Report made by First Secretary Executive Committee Polish Communist Party (PPR), CIA, August 7, 1947, p. 3) (IMG)

However, sabotage was not the only aim of the Titoist Underground. It would be wrong to think that the conspirational Titoist Underground, which did not engage as actively in guerrilla warfare, was not violent. Indeed, assassination attempts were a goal of the anti-communist forces. In the speech whose content was presented by the CIA as absolutely truthful, Gomulka noted:

Reaction has not given up the fight and will continue to hunt our more important [Party or government] members. (Political Report made by First Secretary Executive Committee Polish Communist Party (PPR), CIA, August 7, 1947, p. 2) (IMG)

Unlike the guerrillas which were frequently engaged in fighting, the conspirational Titoist Underground practically served as an intelligence service infiltrating the government, assassinating officials, blowing up statues, etc.:

The Underground envisages a long period of planning and preparation before it will be in a position to act decisively. At present, therefore, the chief concern of the Underground is the development of its organization. At the same time, great emphasis is placed on infiltrating the PPR [Polish Workers' Party] and governmental agencies with reliable men on the widest and highest levels.

As distinguished from the overt operations of the Partisans, the [conspirational] Underground's operations are clandestine. Occasionally a Soviet statue is blown up or a prominent official is assassinated, but this is done mostly for morale purposes, and not as a result of general policy.

(Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 8) (IMG)

To destroy People's Democratic Poland, the conspirational Underground:

also embraces, however, anti-Communists from the Polish Socialist Party, and renegade Communists from the Polish Workers' Party. (Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 7) (IMG)

The plan was that an MI6-backed Titoist coup would be staged. It was to be led by Gomulka and his henchman in the military, General Spychalski. Andrew Michta – a prestigious US military scholar at the US Naval War College, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Hoover Institute and Harvard University – wrote:

General Tatar was a prewar officer, a lecturer in the Higher Military School, and an artillery commander during the 1939 German invasion. Captured by the Germans in 1939, Tatar managed to escape and between 1940 and 1943 was placed in charge of operations within the underground Home Army General Headquarters in Poland. In 1944, Tatar was moved to London, where he became deputy

chief of staff for home operations to the commander in chief of the Polish Armed Forces in the West. ('Red Eagle: The Army in Polish Politics, 1944-1988', Andrew A. Michta, pp. 47-48) (IMG)

Tatar was a staunch supporter of Titoism. In the words of a scholar at the British Commission for Military History, the Polish Home Army General Tatar:

espoused a form of national communism for Poland, free of the Soviet Union.... ('Poland Alone: Britain, SOE and the Collapse of the Polish Resistance, 1944', Jonathan Walker) (IMG)

Obviously, in the vocabulary of Anglo-American imperialism, the phrase 'national communism ... free of the Soviet Union', as if to mean that the USSR had colonized Poland, in reality meant 'Titoism ... hostile to the Soviet Union'. Furthermore, in the vocabulary of the Anglo-American imperialists, 'national communism', as if the Soviet-friendly Polish communists were not Polish socialist patriots, is a euphemism for a pro-MI6 and pro-CIA pseudo-communism, i.e. Titoism. For instance, the CIA stated that in the 1920s, before even the birth of Titoism, the:

"national" Communists ... were the forerunners of Titoism. ('Bagirov, M D/Beria, L P', CIA, August 19, 1953, p. 1) (IMG{Iran})

In 1947, as the commander-in-chief of the 'London Poles', Tatar tried to smuggle large sums of dollars and silver into Poland:

Tatar returned to Poland in July 1947; shortly thereafter he traveled several times to London and brought back with him the silver and dollar deposits of the Fund of National Defense; ('Red Eagle: The Army in Polish Politics, 1944-1988', Andrew A. Michta, p. 48) (IMG)

Such funds were to be used for financing the bribe-and-blackmail operations required for orchestrating such a coup. According to the official press of People's Democratic Poland, this was part of a group of top-ranking:

Polish generals' conspiracy against the Polish state. (Miscellaneous Polish Army Information, CIA, April 30, 1953, p. 3) (IMG)

A 1953 CIA document accused Spsychalski, Mossor, Tatar, and 'others' of involvement in the conspiracy mentioned above:

Generals SPYCHALSKI, MOSSOR, TATAR, and others ... were involved in the conspiracy which was uncovered in 1948. (Miscellaneous Polish Army Information, CIA, April 30, 1953, p. 3) (IMG)

The CIA agent reporting stated that he/she first heard of the case of these conspirators in the Polish newspapers. That, however, does not mean that the source used above was the Polish state media; the CIA agent evaluated the matter on his/her own and stated in the definitive sentence form that the above generals listed were involved in the conspiracy.

The claim of the above-mentioned CIA document matched the claims of the Polish government, though the latter provided more details. During:

the General Tatar trial of 1951, ... high Polish army officers, including four generals, were accused of espionage relations with the US Embassy, Titoism, and preparation of an armed coup to seize power for the "Gomulka-Spychalski clique." (Situation Summary, CIA, Officer of Current Intelligence (OCI), January 21, 1955, p. 6) (IMG)

In addition:

The indictment of nine former senior Polish Army officers on trial in Warsaw emphasizes their alleged efforts to create a "Titoist Fascist regime" in Poland.... (Daily Digest, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence, August 2, 1951, p. 2) (IMG)

It remains a fact, confirmed directly by the memoirs of the Mossad operative Yitzhak Zuckerman (see C16S2 for more details), that Spsychalski was an American-Israeli spy providing top secret military intelligence on communist military presence in Eastern Europe. There is no doubt about the above claim by the Polish government. Spsychalski was a former Gestapo agent, whereas Tatar was the head of the MI6-backed Nazi-collaborationist Home Army. Spsychalski was on the team of the Titoist Gomulka, and Tatar aimed to establish a Titoist state 'free of the Soviet Union'. As confirmed by the CIA, Spsychalski, Tatar, Mossor, and their top-ranking collaborators in the Polish military aimed to create a fifth column so to combat the Polish government. Using Tatar's financial aid, they were conspiring to eventually establish their Titoist fascist rule.

Spsychalski's plots reflected the aims of Gomulka as well. The fact that the CIA cited one report by Gomulka as absolutely truthful and reliable should not blind one to the treacherous character of Gomulka. Perhaps quite the opposite – the fact that the CIA regarded Gomulka's report as reliable may itself be an indication of Gomulka's treachery.

In the words of the CIA, Marian Spsychalski, the commander who conspired against the Polish state, 'reflected [Gomulka's] outlook completely':

Gomulka ... had also built up a personal staff among the ... party leadership, who reflected his outlook completely. That group by this included Zenon Kliszko, Marian Spsychalski, Wladyslaw Bienkowski, Alexander Kowalski, Ignacy Loga-Sowinski, Micyslaw Moczar, Marian Baryla, Ignacy Korczynski, and others. Several of them had charge of important spheres of activity in the party – Spsychalski, for example, in the armed forces, Kliszko in party cadres, Kowalski in youth organizations, Moczar in the police and Bienkowski in the cultural sphere. (SOVIET STAFF STUDY: Gomulka and Polish Communism, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), February 28, 1958, p. 23) (IMG)

Indeed, the Polish government also accused Gomulka of deliberately harbouring these conspirators:

The indictment accuses former Polish Communist Party Secretary Gomulka ... of protecting these officers. (Daily Digest, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence, August 2, 1951, p. 2) (IMG)

Gomulka aimed for a power grab to establish a corrupt authoritarian regime, a dictatorship of the corrupt bureaucratic class allied to Anglo-American finance capital. A CIA document stated that Gomulka's deeds were 'indicative' of his dictatorial manners, that 'the charge' against him was 'justified', and that Gomulka's dictatorial manners were indeed 'common knowledge in the party':

Gomulka was accused of having a dictatorial attitude "contrary to the precepts of a united action leadership" and also was taken to task for "his irritating and non-party-like attitude toward criticism and his complete lack of all self-criticism." Gomulka's failure to obtain prior clearance from the politburo of his speech to the central committee plenum in June was indicative of the characteristics that justified the charge. Gomulka's dictatorial behavior was common knowledge in the party. (SOVIET STAFF STUDY: Gomulka and Polish Communism, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), February 28, 1958, p. 38) (IMG)

Gomulka was surrounded by a team of anti-Polish and anti-Soviet counter-revolutionaries – one of these was Zenon Kliszko, who as mentioned above had a prominent role in the Party and in Gomulka's team. In late 1949, the CIA reported:

Polish Government officials, who have been mentioned in international press reports on the current reshuffling of the Polish Government, seem to be linked with the "Freedom Movement" ... and some have been removed from their posts for failure to neutralize this movement. (Government Moves Against the Underground, CIA, December 16, 1949, p. 1) (IMG)

Again, the so-called 'Freedom Movement' was simply another term for the Polish Underground, be they guerrillas or the conspirational networks. The CIA reported that Zenon Kliszko, the Polish Vice Minister of Justice and the close friend of Gomulka 'who reflected his outlook completely', 'seem[s] to be' too lenient on the fascist Underground:

Government charges against Vice Minister of Justice Zenon Kliszko of having issued inadequate instructions to the law courts on methods for handling anti-Communist cases, seem to be justified. Kliszko has also been criticized by his Communist Party superiors for failure to intimidate members of the "Freedom Movement". (Government Moves Against the Underground, CIA, December 16, 1949, p. 1) (IMG)

There were many more cases of Gomulka surrounding himself with dubious characters. The CIA agent Swiatlo confirmed to his American bosses that Wanda Podgorska who, after the War, was:

Gomulka's former secretary.... (SOVIET STAFF STUDY: Gomulka and Polish Communism, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), February 28, 1958, p. 42) (IMG)

had been a member of the AK during the War:

According to Swiatlo, she was indeed a member of the AK during the war.... (SOVIET STAFF STUDY: Gomulka and Polish Communism, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), February 28, 1958, p. 43) (IMG)

The Gestapo agent Gomulka fanned anti-German chauvinism, in part to drive a wedge between People's Democratic Poland and the German Democratic Republic:

Gomulka's hostility to the Germans, as a result of his wartime experience and as a result of his having supervised the expulsion of Germans from the "recovered territories" immediately after the war, was exceptionally strong even for a Pole. This quality made it difficult for him to become reconciled to any Germans – even Communists – and undoubtedly affected his relations with the East German Communists. (SOVIET STAFF STUDY: Gomulka and Polish Communism, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), February 28, 1958, p. 35) (IMG)

The virulent anti-German racism which the Nazi agent Gomulka was busy promoting could help him in weakening the government of East Germany, which by the way was the state that constituted the first line of defense against Nazi German anti-Polish terror:

The [East] Germans will be supported by their Communist allies in East Europe, and Germans and Poles will fight side by side against the Neo-Nazis. (SED and East German Communist Views on Unification, CIA, November 12, 1952, p. 2) (IMG)

Gomulka opposed the creation of the Cominform and clashed with Zhdanov on the question of collectivization:

As Secretary general of the party, Gomulka issued invitations and acted as host to the delegates who attended the founding session of the Cominform in western Poland in September 1947. He later admitted that he had been opposed to [Cominform's] creation and implied that, despite the fact that the Polish party had been the official host, the initiative for the meeting had come from another quarter. (SOVIET STAFF STUDY: Gomulka and Polish Communism, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), February 28, 1958, p. 25) (IMG)

According to Vladimir Dedijer, Gomulka at this meeting openly opposed the establishment of the Cominform, but later yielded with the request that its establishment remain secret. He also clashed with Zhdanov at the meeting on the question of collectivization in Poland. (SOVIET STAFF STUDY: Gomulka and Polish Communism, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), February 28, 1958, p. 25) (IMG)

By 1951, Gomulka and many others in his network were hunted down. Interrogations against them began. During the period of his arrest, Gomulka was well-treated and faced no torture, as confirmed by the CIA:

Gomulka was finally arrested in July 1951. (...). Gomulka was imprisoned in a special villa maintained by the security apparatus in a suburb of Warsaw and during the period of his imprisonment (from July 1951 to December 1954) he was reasonably well treated. Little, if any, physical violence was used on him. (SOVIET STAFF STUDY: Gomulka and Polish Communism, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), February 28, 1958, p. 45) (IMG)

Unfortunately, the turn of events would later result in the release of Gomulka from prison and his installation as the fascist head of Poland.

By 1952, with the purge of the Slansky group at its highest point in Czechoslovakia, the interrogations allowed for some of the elements belonging to Slansky's network to be found in Poland. As such:

It was at this time that the Soviet advisor to Department X of the MBP [i.e. Poland's Ministry of Public Security] SIGACHOV, began making inquiries as to how the Zionist affair stood in Poland. (JEWISH PURGE IN POLAND, CIA, date of distribution: March 22, 1954, p. 2. The date for the information is some time around 1952.) (IMG)

Hence, referring to the anti-Zionist purges in Poland, the CIA reported:

The chief of Department X was given instructions to formulate a project against ... Zionists. Shortly afterwards, a raid was conducted against the Joint Distribution Committee and on the basis of documents, uncovered, the first Jewish arrests began. The early victims were Jakub EGIT, leader of AJAP, a Jewish Communist organization in Lodz; Gittel BARSKI, secretary-general of the Joint Distribution Committee; and General KOMAR, chief of O-2. (...). The KOMAR case was given special handling. The affair did not quiet down until widespread purges were completed, especially in the Polish Army. (JEWISH PURGE IN POLAND, CIA, March 22, 1954, p. 2) (IMG)

In this midst:

Jakub BERMAN himself was accused of pro-Zionist tendencies.... (JEWISH PURGE IN POLAND, CIA, March 22, 1954, p. 2) (IMG)

Documents from Poland indicate that Berman was accused of harboring the Joint Distribution Committee, the infamous CIA-Mossad front. I cannot confirm if the accusation against him was true. Through his secretary Anna Duracz, who was later arrested for her CIA crimes against Poland, Jakub

Berman established an intelligence connection with the infamous CIA spymaster Noel Field (see C15S2), knowing that such a connection with Field would be dangerous:

The eleven were soon joined by a twelfth, Anna Duracz, who had fought together with Tonia Lechtman in the Polish communist underground in France. There, she met Noel Field and his wife, Herta, who supported the Polish comrades in their fight against the Nazis, and they established a line of communication linking the Poles in exile in Switzerland and in France. After the war, Duracz became the secretary of the head of security, Jakub Berman. In February 1949, Noel Field came to visit her in Warsaw to ask Berman to put him in touch with an old acquaintance, P. F. Yudin, then the Soviet representative in the Cominform. Field was trying to clear up doubts regarding his wartime activities and to disperse, once and for all, the distrust he encountered everywhere in the satellite countries. Berman made sure not to see him, but let him know that he could leave a letter for Yudin with Duracz and that he could expect a reply on his next visit to Warsaw. (Show Trials: Stalinist Purges in Eastern Europe, 1948-1954. George H. Hodos, 1987, p. 142) (IMG)

The intelligence connection with Field was made, even though Berman himself knew that it was dangerous to make any contacts with Field, which is why Berman's contacts with Field were covert, through Anna Duracz. A CIA memorandum for the FBI summarized the findings of an Anglo-American-German intelligence agent and vehemently anti-Soviet scholar on the subject, Karel Kaplan. Referring to Field's efforts to travel to the Peoples' Democracies and to gather intelligence ('research') on them, the attached file containing Kaplan's findings in the CIA memorandum for the FBI stated:

[Noel Field] hoped to get all this without difficulty in the East. He made the rounds of friends he had made during the war, all of them now holding down important jobs. He considered as beginning, settling down for a while in Prague and writing a book for Western readers about the people's democracies. He had already begun gathering the necessary data. (Revelations of Karel Kaplan, Intelligence Memorandum for Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, CIA, May 3, 1977, p. 8) (IMG)

In Poland, too, [CIA operative] Field asked his old friends for help. He made contact with Jakub Berman, a member of the Politburo, in charge of intelligence, and then the number-2 man in Poland. Berman promised to help him. (Revelations of Karel Kaplan, Intelligence Memorandum for Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, CIA, May 3, 1977, p. 9) (IMG{GDR})

Having said that, it is worth noting that Berman did help in the efforts to purge Gomulka. Essentially, Berman was a Polish version of Malenkov. Like Malenkov, Berman was a Mossad-linked Titoist, but was the kind of a Titoist who frequently spoke in favor of the communist and anti-Titoist faction.

As in elsewhere, some Zionists in Poland pretended to 'oppose' the MI6-backed elements such as Gomulka, and had left-deviationist colorations. This was in spite of the fact that the Mossad agents in Poland were covertly allied to Gomulka through the MI6-backed Gestapo spy and CIA-Mossad agent Spsychalski (see C16S2). As such, these CIA-Mossad agents were coopted against the Gomulka-Spsychalski faction. This is why:

STALIN allegedly told BIERUT that a better balance was necessary and that the [Zionist] Jews whom BIERUT would release as a consequence should be given corresponding posts in other government departments. The purges were to be effected so as not to lose the loyalty of those removed in order that the UB could re-employ them if the need arose. (JEWISH PURGE IN POLAND, CIA, March 22, 1954, p. 2) (IMG)

Needless to say – the allegation that Stalin was chauvinistically targeting the Yiddish officials is an anti-Semitic slander, for it depicts as 'anti-Semitic' the commander who liberated the Yiddish people from the Nazi annihilation camps and fought for Israel's independence from British colonialism and Palestinian pogromism. The above document already indicated that it was referring to the Zionist agents, and not mere 'Jews', in the Polish state apparatus.

However, the important part of the above quote is regarding the phrase 'better balance' and the notion that the Polish intelligence 'could re-employ' 'those removed' 'if the need arose'. While the word 'allegedly' is used to describe Stalin's remark to Bierut, the allegation is nonetheless very credible, for Stalin's strategy of combat against the comprador agents in the socialist state apparatus was to allow for two comprador-dominated parallel unofficial intelligence networks, one left-opportunist and the other right-opportunist in rhetoric, and to pit these comprador-dominated intelligence networks against each other, even though, behind the scenes, these two parallel intelligence networks were covertly allied and would form a bloc, a pincer assault with a left-opportunist flank and a right-opportunist flank, against the Stalin faction. Stalin pursued this strategy with the Trotskyite left and the Bukharinite right, the left-opportunist Yezhov network and the right-opportunist Yagoda network, the right-opportunist Beria network and the left-opportunist Malenkov network. In each round of the fight, the Stalin faction would ally with comprador network 1 so to decimate, but not annihilate, the comprador network 2, and thereupon the Stalin faction would encircle comprador network 2 and coopt it against comprador network 1, and the cycle would go on so forth. Again, the two comprador networks are secretly allied, but, because they seek to launch a pincer assault on the communist centrist part of the spectrum, they divide themselves into two flanks, the left-opportunist flank (e.g. Trotsky, Malenkov) and the right-opportunist flank (e.g. Bukharin, Beria). The Stalin-led network would utilize these ostensible 'hostilities' between the covertly-allied left-opportunist and right-opportunist so to compile dossier against each of them, demote their members, erode their strengths, and thereby push for a gradual purge of all such comprador agents. To moderate the 'heat' of revolutionary transformation, the left-opportunist and right-opportunist would be used to respectively heat up and cool down the revolutionary transformation, like two components of a thermostat. The rhetoric of 're-employ[ing]' 'those removed' 'if the need arose' would make sense in this light.

C13S5.1. Economic Growth in the New, People's Democratic Poland / The Communist-Led Forces in Poland were Popular during and after 1947 Elections *** IMG-All-{Poland}

The 1947 elections in Poland involved the victory of the communist-led PPR popular front. Progressive politics had a strong social base in Poland. It must be remembered that as confirmed by Timothy Snyder of the CIA's Council on Foreign Relations,:

Polish politics had shifted to the left during the war, as was the case throughout occupied Europe. (Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin, Timothy Snyder, p. 310) (IMG)

As such, in 1946, the majority of the Polish voters voted 'yes' to all the three questions in the 1946 referendum and voted for the PPR in the 1947 elections. The PPR, not a communist organization but a communist-led progressive anti-fascist organization, had demonstrated great initiative in the war against the fascist occupation. This had a great propaganda advantage for the communist-led progressive Party, winning many Polish voters to its side. Moreover, referring to the PPR, the CIA had reported:

Amnesty and internal stability were the pre-election slogans which secured a victory for the [communist-led] bloc. (Public Reaction to Political Events, CIA, September 22, 1947, p. 1) (IMG)

On the other hand, the Anglo-Americans and their PSL stooges wanted German settlers to continue to occupy Polish territories:

Wide public interest in the Moscow Conference was stimulated by two questions in the Polish mind: would the western frontiers be confirmed? Would there be peace or war? Secretary Marshall's demand for revision of the western frontier in favor of Germany spread fear among the transferred people. (Public Reaction to Political Events, CIA, September 22, 1947, p. 1) (IMG)

The Anglo-Americans acted against the Polish people, who in turn naturally grew hostile to the Anglo-Americans. By contrast, the Soviets and the PPR were the champions of Polish socialist patriotism, and advocated the expansion of Poland's boundaries westwards.

As these repatriates, brought from the East, find themselves about to be ousted from the West, suspicion and even hatred is replacing their friendliness and goodwill toward Anglo-Saxons. This growing hatred is nurtured by Soviet propaganda which blames the Anglo-Saxons for Poland's plight. (Public Reaction to Political Events, CIA, September 22, 1947, p. 1) (IMG)

All of these factors led the PPR to win the trust of the Polish masses.

Contrast the PPR with the Mikolajczyk and his 'Polish People's Party' (PSL). After the War, the Nazi-collaborationist AK militants either joined the guerrilla groups, the infiltrators, or the legal opposition led by the PSL. The CIA reported:

The AK ... no longer exists as an organization. Its members have joined other Partisan or Underground groups, associated themselves with the legal opposition parties, or gone over to the Government. (Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 4) (IMG)

Indeed, a disproportionate number of the PSL supporters, the CIA confirmed, were made up of the veterans of the Nazi-collaborationist AK terror organization:

The Underground includes all elements, but its chief support is among the moderate, middle-of-the-road groups akin to the PSL. A great many members of these are former AK men. (Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 7) (IMG)

The program of these AK veterans was very close to the PSL led by Mikolajczyk:

the Underground ... is closer politically to the moderate socialist and land reform program of Mikolajczyk and the Polish Peasant Party (PSL). There are innumerable exceptions to and variants from this general pattern.... (Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 1) (IMG)

Unfortunately, in the 1947 election, Mikolajczyk and his 'Polish People's Party' (PSL) were able to participate. It is well known that Mikolajczyk and his 'Polish People's Party' (PSL) were the representatives of the Polish government-in-exile and the Anders Army. Note that as previously documented, the Anders group was a terrorist organization heading the military branch of the Polish government-in-exile and collaborating with the Ukrainian anti-Polish terrorist OUN as early as 1946. Mikolajczyk and his PSL were the electoral wing of the Polish government-in-exile and Anders group. There was absolutely no right whatsoever for the Mikolajczyk group, the agents of the sworn enemies of the Polish nation, to participate in the elections. The mere fact of their right to participate was a violation of not just democracy but also sanity. Nonetheless, at the time, the Soviets and the Anglo-Americans were still ostensibly 'allied' to one another. To maintain the façade of such an 'alliance', and in the face of Anglo-American lobbying pressures, the Soviets were compelled to accept the participation and candidacy of the Mikolajczyk group in the 1947 elections. Hence, that the Soviets and communist Poles allowed these renegades to participate in the elections was not really owing to communists' 'generosity' – the Soviets and Polish comrades were not generous towards criminals. Nonetheless, the Soviets and Polish comrades were involved in arresting many of the politicians in the Mikolajczyk camp, something that was ferociously condemned by the Anglo-American media as 'evidence' of the 'unfair', 'unfree', and 'farical' character of the 1947 elections.

Anyways, they won the election in 1947. In terms of political development in Poland, it must be noted that the communist-led anti-fascist resistance movement in Poland had 400,000 members during the Great Patriotic War. The numbers only increased after the War. A 1947 CIA document presented a translation of a report by Gomulka, the First Secretary of the Executive Committee Polish Communist Party (PPR). The CIA agent, who sent the copy of Gomulka's report, stated that Gomulka's report was absolutely truthful and reliable:

This is an evaluation of the internal situation in March 1947 and directives for action in various sectors. The truthfulness and reliability of this report is absolute. Changes have only been made in the form of presentation if you compare this with instructions by Central Committee PPR and is especially reported for the lower ranks of PPR and adapted to the territory where they are binding. (Political Report made by First Secretary Executive Committee Polish Communist Party (PPR), CIA, August 7, 1947, p. 1) (IMG)

The Party's popularity, Gomulka said with 'absolute' 'truthfulness' in that report, kept growing. The PPR:

now have 500,000 members and by the end of [19]47 ... will have 1 million. On the 1st of January 1947 there were 120,000 [PPR] members in Silesia alone. (Political Report made by First Secretary Executive Committee Polish Communist Party (PPR), CIA, August 7, 1947, p. 3) (IMG)

Note that the Party leadership denounced and discouraged any attempt to coerce the masses into joining the Party. Regarding PPR recruitment, Gomulka's report stated with 'absolute' 'reliability' that Party leaders:

don't want coercion.... (Political Report made by First Secretary Executive Committee Polish Communist Party (PPR), CIA, August 7, 1947, p. 3) (IMG)

Thus:

the PPR increased its membership ... to 800,000 in the spring of 1947. (SOVIET STAFF STUDY: Gomulka and Polish Communism, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), February 28, 1958, p. 21) (IMG)

The new constitution of Poland, also known as the 'Little Constitution' or the 'Small Constitution' ushered in a new era of rule by 'democratic spirit'. Gomulka reported with – in CIA's words – 'absolute' 'truthfulness' when he said:

The March constitution was one which gave the basis for a Fascist and big landowner expansion. The small constitution will us to rule in a democratic spirit. (Political Report made by First Secretary Executive Committee Polish Communist Party (PPR), CIA, August 7, 1947, p. 1) (IMG)

By 1949, Poland too began the process of establishing heavy industry and centralizing the economy. According to a paper by the Federal Research Division of the US Library of Congress and sponsored by US Department of the Army,:

In 1945 the Polish economy was completely disorganized and urgently needed reestablishment of its prewar industrial base. The initial central planning organization that began work in Poland in late 1945 stressed [libertarian] socialist rather than communist economic goals: relative decentralization, increased consumer goods production to raise the standard of living, and moderate investment in production facilities. In 1949, however, that approach was scrapped in favor of the completely centralized Soviet planning model. During the 1950s, planners followed Stalin's requirements for a higher growth rate in heavy industry than the overall industrial rate and a higher growth rate in the steel industry than that of heavy industry as a whole. This approach neglected the other economic sectors: agriculture, infrastructure, housing, services, and consumer goods. The sectors that were emphasized were all capital-, fuel-, and material-intensive. (Country Studies: Poland, Federal Research Division of the US Library of Congress, Sponsored by US Department of the Army, Glenn E. Curtis, October 1992) (IMG)

Anti-communist sources propagate that the Polish electorate 'continued' to be vehemently anti-communist, were 'supportive' of Anglo-American imperialist efforts, and 'regarded' themselves as 'captives' of the USSR. A CIA document that parroted such propaganda nonetheless admitted:

Soviet propaganda has quite cleverly exploited some popular sentiment in favor of a variety of social reforms which are loosely described as socialism. Whereas the Soviets have had a hard time finding acceptance of collectivization among all but the most rabid Polish Communists, the widespread program to establish health resorts for workers and peasants, state care for children, establishment of village libraries and other steps designed to eliminate illiteracy, and similar measures have been rather popular. Soviet propaganda insists that the US would eradicate every trace of this program if it gained any influence in Polish affairs, and would establish the influence of foreign [finance] capital as a means of exploiting Poland. The ... attitude of the average Pole is no complete protection against such propaganda claims.... (COMMENTS ON POLITICAL SITUATION, CIA, October 18, 1950, p. 2) (IMG)

Hence, the Poles were indeed influenced by the pro-Soviet line, thanks to the popular measures enacted there.

Furthermore, the people of Poland regarded the VOA unfavorably:

It has been implicit from some of the foregoing [remarks in this intelligence report] that the Voice of America is not very favorably received in Poland. (COMMENTS ON POLITICAL SITUATION, CIA, October 18, 1950, p. 3) (IMG)

Agricultural collectivization too began in a highly cautious manner. The high level of caution in Poland was necessary since Poland did not have as much industry to provide the machinery to farmers as incentives for joining kolkhozes.

Furthermore, rather than force the peasants into kolkhozes, the communists in Poland used the mechanism of persuasion, in the form of propaganda as well as the incentive of settling in the newly liberated lands that Poland acquired from Germany:

The Soviets used two methods of establishing collectivization. In central Poland they tried persuasion by pointing out to the farmers the advantages of collective farming and that it would be a big step forward in scientific agriculture. ('STATUS OF THE PRPZ / THE CHURCH / LIBERATED TERRITORIES OF POLAND', CIA, November 8, 1953, p. 3) (IMG)

The Polish government has proceeded cautiously in its collectivization program. In order to obtain support for, or at least avoid strong opposition to collectivization, a drastic land reform to distribute the lands of the large estates among the needy peasants, particularly in Old Poland, was launched. The peasants in Old Poland have stubbornly resisted collectivization, and up to 1951 the government has not seen fit to invite a showdown in this area. In the newly acquired German territories, however, the resettlement of groups of Polish peasantry has been made contingent on collective cultivation of the land made available to them, and a large proportion of existing collectives are found in these former German territories.

Early in 1951, new collectives in Poland were being created at a rate of a little more than 160 a month, slightly less than the monthly rate in early 1950. There are about 2,500 small collectives in Poland, representing about 2 percent of the arable land. Only about half of the collectives are modeled after the Soviet kolkhoz, the remainder differing in terms of ownership and remuneration. The area of grain land cultivated collectively is too small to have any appreciable effect on acreage or production in 1951.

(THE EUROPEAN SATELLITE POWER COMPLEX: PART I: INDIVIDUAL SATELLITE COUNTRIES: STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES: POLAND, CIA, Office of Research and Reports (ORR), July 10, 1951, pp. 34-35) (IMG)

Another CIA document stated:

The postwar program of the PPR stressed the subordination of socialist to national goals, repudiated collectivization in agriculture, and maintained that private enterprise would enjoy a ... role in the economy. It also played down any conflict with religion.

Between 1944 and 1947 the Soviet government encouraged this policy. In fact, certain statements by Stalin even lent it public support, by implying that Soviet institutions and methods would not be desirable or likely to succeed in Poland.

(SOVIET STAFF STUDY: Gomulka and Polish Communism, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), February 28, 1958, p. 19) (IMG)

The Polish policy of mechanizing and collectivizing agriculture, concurrently with the growth of industrial machinery, was correct policy and should not have caused problems in agriculture. However, Poland had poor luck, as, much like most of the Eastern European Peoples' Democracies, the weather was unfavorable to agriculture for at least two years:

1. Northern Area (East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia)

A drought in the fall of 1951 (September and December) reduced the sown acreage and adversely affected germination of winter-sown grains (wheat and rye) throughout most of the area. Poland probably suffered more than East Germany or Czechoslovakia. Deep-plowing plans were not fulfilled: that is, official Czech statements claimed that the machine-tractor stations (MTS) had completed only 50 percent of their work as of 6 December 1951.

Spring plowing and planting operations were delayed by snow, rain, and cold weather in February, March, and the first part of April. Favorable planting weather prevailed from 15 April to approximately 17 May, when an abnormal 2-week period of cold and rain with frost swept over most of the area. The frost damaged early vegetables and fruit crops and returned the growth of cereals.

Incomplete weather data indicates normal and below-normal amounts of precipitation for the months of June and July, respectively. Although low precipitation and high temperatures in July were favorable for late-planted vegetables (some replanted as a result of May frost), corn, forage, and root crops. Poland, as of 30 July, had experienced a 5-week period of little or no rain.

Grain yields probably will be slightly less than in 1951 because of the unfavorable planting and growing season for winter grains. Should the present dry spell continue into August, a severe reduction in yields of corn, potatoes, sugar beets, and foreign crops will occur.

(CROP CONDITIONS IN THE SOVIET BLOC, CIA, Office of Research and Reports (ORR), September 15, 1952, p. 4) (IMG)

A. Northern Area (Poland, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia)

In the northern area of the European Satellites the fall of 1952 was characterized by above-normal precipitation, with the result that fall plowing and sowing of grains for harvest in 1953 were considerably hampered. Despite the fact that spring plowing and sowing were aided by favorable weather over most of the area, it is believed that the over-all acreage of bread grain will be less than prewar, because of failure to fulfill the fall sowing plans for winter wheat and rye.

Available weather information and reports from the American Embassy in Moscow indicate that cold and lack of rain characterized the spring much of Poland, although more abundant rainfall appears to have occurred in June. Favorable conditions for spring work were reported in East Germany and Czechoslovakia. Rainfall appears to have been gradually adequate to abundant in the late spring and summer months, and in July heavy rains were reported to have caused harvesting difficulties for grain and cultivation difficulties for root and vegetable crops.

(‘CROP CONDITIONS IN THE SOVIET BLOC, 1953 (RR IM-379)’, CIA, Office of Research and Reports, September 23, 1953, p. 4) (IMG{GDR})

The result of all of these was that on the one hand agrarian Poland began to industrialize and had a high level of growth in that sector, whereas the poor weather conditions caused a decline in agriculture, and hence a decline in consumer goods, in spite of the correct policy pursued in agriculture. The following table from a CIA document shows the large level of growth in heavy industry or producer goods, and the decline in consumer goods:

**Sector and Gross National Product Indexes for Poland
1938 and 1948-53**

		(1950 = 100)						
	Value-Added Weights	1938	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953
Gross national product		106	85	92	100	101	103	107
Industry	29.4	80	77	88	100	105	115	123
Producer goods	18.7	69	78	88	100	107	123	137
Consumer goods	10.7	99	76	88	100	103	100	97
Agriculture	30.3	119	80	89	100	92	86	86
Transport and communications	5.6	79	78	91	100	118	132	145
Construction	3.0	114	87	96	100	114	118	131
Services	15.7	126	96	98	100	102	104	106
Trade	15.7	117	103	100	100	102	101	99

(CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPEAN SATELLITE GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT ACCOUNTS, CIA, Office of Research and Reports (ORR), April 15, 1955, p. 21) (IMG)

C13S5.2. Soviet Economic Aid to Poland in Exchange for Polish Coal *** IMG-All-{Poland}

The USSR had a major role in assisting Poland in the latter’s People’s Democratic development. The CIA-MI6 propaganda bullhorns trumpet the narrative that Poland, an alleged ‘colony’ of the USSR, was tasked by its ‘colonizer-in-chief’ Stalin to supply the USSR with the coal that the Soviets ‘needed’, and that the USSR ‘forced’ Poland to reorient its trade towards the Eastern bloc. The reality, as acknowledged by the CIA’s Intelligence Memorandum is that the Polish provision of coal to the USSR was just part of the normal trade between the two countries, in which the strategically generous USSR provided emergency shipments of grain to the much-impooverished post-war Poland, as well as funds for Poland with which to purchase capital goods from the West, a fact which debunks the myth that USSR was ‘forcing’ Polish trade to be oriented away from the West to the East. The Intelligence Memorandum reported:

During the period 1947-48, Poland received from the USSR a loan of \$28 million in gold and a commodity credit valued at \$36 million. The gold loan was to be used by Poland to import raw materials and capital goods from the West and was to be repaid in Polish raw materials, mainly coal. The commodity credited provided, in part, for emergency shipments of 800,000 tons of grain, which was to be repaid over a period of years in Polish commodities (such as coal and agricultural products) and by adjustment of transit charges owed by the USSR to Poland. (‘SOVIET ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC: LOANS, CREDITS, AND GRANTS’, Intelligence Memorandum, CIA, August 20, 1956, p. 14) (IMG)

Undoubtedly, it was strategically necessary for Poland to shift its trade away from the West and reorient to the USSR and the Peoples’ Democracies so to minimize the economic leverage of Anglo-American finance capital in Poland, hence to minimize the lobbying power of the CIA-MI6 agents in Poland. The Soviet-backed communists in Poland did pursue the plan to reorient Polish trade towards the USSR and other Peoples’ Democracies, but the Soviet state did not ‘colonially’ ‘impose’ such a reorientation.

The CIA reaffirmed that Poland’s provision of coal to the USSR was in exchange for the large-scale amounts of Soviet economic aid in the form of machinery, credits, and equipment for promoting Poland’s industrialization. Under the heading ‘Loans and Credits for Economic Development’, the CIA’s Intelligence Memorandum stated:

The first and most important credits issued to Poland for economic development was extended in 1948 in the amount of \$450 million for Soviet machinery and materials to be delivered during the execution of Polish Six Year Plan (1950-55). This large credit was extended for Soviet deliveries of equipment for a new iron and steel mill, power plants, and chemical and cement plants. The agreement stipulated that payment for this equipment was to be made by Poland over a period of 9 years beginning at the date of delivery of the given item, and room the output obtained from these installations. In 1950 this credit was increased to \$550 million, and the period for deliveries was extended to 1958. Repayment was to be made in coal and textile deliveries in installments over a 10-year period with the first payment on each loan to be made at the time of the first delivery.

In recent years the USSR has provided equipment for more than 40 Polish factories, plants, mines, and electrostations. A major investment in Poland during its Six Year Plan was the \$200-million Lenin Metallurgical Plant near Krakow, for which the USSR may have supplied as much as 85 percent of the machines and installations.

(‘SOVIET ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC: LOANS, CREDITS, AND GRANTS’, Intelligence Memorandum, CIA, August 20, 1956, p. 11) (IMG)

The ‘Problems of Communism’, which was the publication of the US government’s ‘US Information Agency’ (USIA), also reported:

Polish coal deliveries to the USSR in “exchange” for Soviet shipments of German reparations to Poland constituted the most prominent example of what may be called political exports – that is, exchange of economic considerations for political favors or advantages. (Problems of Communism, No. 1, Vol. VI, January-February 1957, p. 17) (IMG)

The USSR is often criticized by the Anglo-American press, as it is said that Moscow took Polish coal for cheap and then distributed it to its other Eastern European allies. However, the CIA reported:

In 1946, Poland exported to the USSR, beside the regular delivery, 5,700,00 tons of coal, plus 2,300,000 tons [of] which went on the USSR’ account to other countries of the Eastern bloc, including East Germany. In each of the years 1947-1950 there was to be delivered, in the same manner, 13 million tons of coal (in 1947 changed to 6,500,000 tons annually), and thereafter 12 million tons (probably also changed) annually so long as East Germany remained occupied by the USSR.

These deliveries, which took place at very low prices, were to be regarded as a kind of payment for the turning over by the USSR to Poland of the entire Upper Silesian industrial region.

(POLAND’S STEEL AND COAL PRODUCTION AS OF MID-JUNE 1952, CIA, May 19, 1953, p. 16) (IMG)

Thus, according to the CIA, a large part of the deliveries of cheap coal to the USSR were in return for the fact that the USSR turned over the entire Upper Silesian industrial region. Since Germany was directly occupied by the Soviet and Anglo-American militaries until 1946, the USSR was obviously in charge of providing the coal deliveries to Eastern Zone of Germany until 1946. Note also that the Soviet access to German machinery was due to the agreement on reparations payments to the USSR.

C13S6. The Nazi-Backed Terror Gangs in the Baltics *** IMG-All-{Baltic-Finland}

The role of the Baltic anti-Soviet guerrillas as fascist terror organizations has rarely been studied, beside a number of articles that rely on Soviet and pro-Soviet sources. It goes without saying that most likely for the first time in scholarly history, this section uses anti-Soviet intelligence sources to shed light on the role of the Baltic anti-Soviet guerrillas as Nazi-collaborationist terror organizations.

As the forces of the Third Reich were retreating, they also laid behind them fascist terrorist partisans that would fight off the Red Army for the coming years. In the Baltics, the Germans had established the ‘Forest Brothers’, an army that had many other closely related names. The translator of a book by a leading Estonian ‘Forest Brother’ partisan noted:

The Forest Brothers, called Metsavennad in Estonian, had a number of names – partisans, members of the Green Battalion, guerrillas, men of the Green army, and woodsmen. The Soviet authorities called them "bandits." These names are used interchangeably throughout the text, but refer to the same group of people resisting Soviet rule. (War in the Woods: Estonia’s Struggle for Survival, 1944-1956. Mart Laar, Translated by: Tina Ets, p. XIX)

A 1954 CIA document confirmed that the ‘Green Brothers’ were guerrilla forces created to support the army of the Third Reich against the USSR. The document added that the Green Brothers engaged in terrorist activity against the collective farms:

Zelenyye Brat’ya Movement (Green Brothers)

This movement was organized during World War II in the Estonian SSR by patriots. The specific aim was to aid Germans in driving out the Soviet army and Soviet officials. After the war its organized units devoted most of their efforts to attacking army units, warehouses, and collective farms. In some cases, they even carried out assassinations of government officials. In 1949, Soviet MVD and army units wiped out all active organized resistance in Estonia, including the Zelenyye Brat’ya movement. However, a train had been attacked by partisans in the fall of 1952.

(‘1. Government Measures to Retain Popular Support 2. Resistance Activities and Potential’, CIA. Date Distributed (CIA): August 31, 1954. Date Distributed to US Army: September 30, 1954. p. 4) (IMG)

In a US intelligence report on the interrogation of Eerik Heine, a member of the Estonian wing of the ‘Forest Brothers’, it was stated that theft was a ‘common’ practice among the anti-Soviet guerrillas:

HEINE claims to have been a member of the "Forest Brothers," an Estonian partisan unit belonging to the anti-Soviet underground. HEINE succeeded in joining this movement following his escape from the Tallinn prison camp together with another Estonian prisoner whose relatives were members of the underground. As a member of the partisan unit, HEINE states that he engaged in various activities common to this existence: he foraged for food to survive, he robbed and stole, he conducted minor forays against Soviet establishments or convoys. (Attached “Summary Analysis” of Eerik Heine, Memorandum for the Record, in: HEINE, ERIK, VOL. 3_0050, CIA, May 10, 1966, p. 10) (IMG)

In Latvia, it was much the same. Latvju Vards, an anti-Soviet newspaper cited by the CIA, stated that the Latvian partisans were equipped with arms from the German Army:

The partisans in Latvia are equipped with arms of the former German Kurzemes (Kurland) Army. Special MVD units for combating the partisans are located in Riga, Daugavpils, and several small cities of Latvia. The partisans recently attacked a fairly large MVD camp in Lilaste. All “Chekists” (secret police members) were killed and their quarters burned down. The attacking partisans were under the command of a colonel of the former Latvian Army. (Latvju Vards, March 2, 1950. Cited in: STOCKHOLM REPORT ANTI-SOVIET ACTIVITY IN WESTERN USSR, CIA, Date of Info: 1949-1950, Date of Distribution: October 19, 1950, p. 3) (IMG)

That the Latvian partisans controlled German weapons in particular should not come as a surprise. The Latvian guerrillas in fact incorporated countless Nazi German military units. A 1949 article cited by the CIA and written by a Latvian nationalist newspaper located in West Germany stated:

Many German prisoners of war who hope to return to their country have joined the [Latvian] partisans. (Says Partisan Movement Revived in Baltic Countries. Newspaper Source: Latvija, No. 108, 1949. In: CIA, Date of Information: 1949, Date Distributed: December 12, 1949.) (IMG)

Another CIA report acknowledged the reality about the anti-Soviet Lithuanian guerrillas – that the leading 12% of the ‘Lithuanian’ anti-Soviet partisans were actually German Wehrmacht and SS officers who trained the rest of the guerrillas, and that another 10% of the partisans were deserters from the Red Army, who had joined the openly fascist and Nazi-collaborationist ‘Vlasov Army’. The partisans, the CIA document added, utilized force to prevent collectivization from occurring. Below is an excerpt of the CIA document:

1. The territory of the Lithuanian SSR is only nominally under Soviet control and the Soviets can be said to be actually in charge of only such cities as Kaunas, Vilnius (Vilna), Alytai, Kalvariya, Virbaliai (Virballen), Ukmerge, Penevezis (Ponewesch, Ponovesh), Siauliai (SohauLen), Tauraje (Taugoggen), Klaipeda (Hemel), Palanga, Utena, Birzai anti Telsiai. In the country, the predominant social and political factors are the anti-Soviet guerrillas.

2. There are at present about 20,000 guerrillas in Lithuania. (...). The main object of the guerrillas is to prevent by force of arms the collectivization of the land. They seek to drive away the farmers who have been brought to Lithuania from the Soviet Union and sometimes even kill them. Farmers who escaped from East Prussia and took over abandoned farms in Lithuania are not molested.

3. On a percentage basis, the guerrillas are made up of:

70 percent Lithuanians

12 percent Germans - There are about 500 former officers of the Wehrmacht and SS who were trapped at the time of the German retreat. They are generally responsible for the good training the guerrillas have received in the use of arms and tactics.

10 percent Russians - Mostly from the Vlassov Army and the Auxiliary Volunteers who fought on the German side during the war. About 500 of them are former Soviet guerrillas who operated in the Vilna area. In November 1944 they were incorporated, into the regular Soviet Army: in June 1945 they deserted because of harsh treatment by the Soviet military authorities. Their operational region is between Trakai (Stare Troki), Jeznas, (Yeznas) and Valkininkai. SW [Southwest] of Vilna.

(‘1. Guerrilla forces in Lithuania, 2. Soviet Troops in Lithuania’, CIA, Date Distributed: November 8, 1949, p. 1.) (IMG)

A paper by the CIA staff reminded that in 1949, the US intelligence had already confirmed the active collaboration of the Lithuanian partisans with the Germans:

By the end of the 1940s, the CIA's initial reluctance to use pro-Nazi Germans and Eastern European collaborators as intelligence sources and, indeed, as operatives had waned considerably. The wartime roles of many of these individuals and groups became a negligible factor as the CIA began active operations behind the Iron Curtain. The Agency downplayed accounts of the brutality of many of the Eastern European émigré groups and their collaboration with the Nazis. DCI Hillenkoetter, for example, responding to an inquiry from the chairman of the Displaced Persons Committee in the spring of 1949 about the status of certain groups, stated:

A curious anomaly has developed since the end of the war. Several of these organizations (for example, the Melnik and Bandera groups and the Lithuanian Partisans) sided with the Germans during the war ... on the basis of a ... a strong anti-Soviet bias. In many cases their motivation was primarily nationalistic and patriotic with their espousal of the German cause determined by the national interests. Since the end of the war, of course, these opportunistically pro-German groups remain strongly anti-Soviet and, accordingly, find a common ground with new partners.

(Chapter Six: Common Ground with New Partners, Draft Working Paper 0007, CIA, p. 27. In: CIA and Nazi War Crim. And Col. Chap. 1-10.) (IMG)

The facts clearly demonstrate that the Nazi-aligned anti-Soviet partisans engaged in terrorist activity and banditry against the ordinary people of the Soviet Union. A late 1951 CIA document confirmed that in Estonia:

In order to obtain supplies, the partisans often raid the cooperative stores and dairies, seizing cash, foodstuffs, and other necessities such as clothing footwear, etc. Attacks are also made on cars carrying money. On one occasion in the late autumn of 1948 or 1949, a mail train was held up between Valga (E57-46N, 26-03E) and Voru (57-51N, 27-00E) and cleared of all valuables.

Civilians who may cross their path are not always molested by the partisans, except suspected Communists on whom the party card is found, or one who has a permit to carry firearms and is discovered armed. Such people are killed without further ado. Similar treatment is also applied to persons who have been active during deportations; and in various parts of the country it has not infrequently happened that militia informers have been too keen" have disappeared, and later their bodies have been found with a note attached stating the "cause of death".

(Partisan Activity in Estonia, CIA, December 13, 1951, p. 1) (IMG)

Another CIA document emphasized that within the Latvian guerrilla movement, there were numerous ‘criminals and adventurers’:

The group of partisans were organized over the whole country. It is to be emphasized, however, that ... in the forests there were also criminals and adventurers. (The Latvian Resistance, CIA, June 17, 1952, p. 2) (IMG)

The US intelligence documented the looting and banditry conducted by the partisans against ordinary people:

In the winter of 1949-50 partisans robbed stores in many communities on the east coast of Kurzeme. the store in Valgaciems (N57-24, E22-58) was said to have been robbed three or four times; the store in Berziems was robbed three times. In Roja (N57-30, E22-49) the fishing artel storehouse was robbed, and among other items stolen were rubber boots. Other places, too, were robbed in the winter of 1950-1951. This same winter the farmer who collected the milk quota from each farm was robbed three times between Upesgriva (N57-23, E23-00) and Kaltene (N57-28, E22-54). The robberies occurred in the morning between 0400 and 0500. Twice the collectors were found dead. The third time a woman was the collector, and she was robbed but not otherwise molested. (...). The stores in Mersrags (N57-21, E23-07) was also robbed this winter. The partisans took mostly clothes, dry goods, and sugar. Usually these men traveled by truck, loaded the loot onto the truck, and disappeared into the forest. Occasionally they traveled on foot. As the partisans shot some of the people who got in the way, the Latvians thought they were not real partisans but rather Soviet bandits. It was also said that they were

not real partisans but rather Soviet houses the Communists lived and in which houses the non-Communists, and although the source could not cite specific instances it was generally believed that the Latvian partisans robbed not stores but private Communist homes. The Latvian partisans were believed to be supported by the population and therefore would not have had to resort to robbery. In two cases, one in the winter of 1949-50, one in the winter of 1950-51, the MVD captured Latvian partisans in the woods. The source heard of the first instance; the second she knew of more directly because she heard shots and saw blood in the woods later. In (N57-15, E22-35) and Lauciena (N57-14, E22-49), where the woods were very thick; there they captured about 30 partisans while they were eating. In the winter of 1950-51, shortly before Christmas, in the woods near Vandzene (N57-20, E22-48), the Soviets discovered and liquidated a partisan group of 11 persons, one of whom was a woman. The Soviets attacked the partisans as they were going from the woods to a house on the edge of the woods; source thought probably someone who knew of their plans to visit this house had alerted the Soviets. In this fight three or four MVD men and two or three partisans were killed. The fight could be heard as far away as Upesgriva. Six partisans were later sentenced to life imprisonment in Siberia. ('Conditions in Talsi, Mersrags, and Upesgriva', CIA, August 7, 1953, pp. 1-2) (IMG)

The terrorist activity of the Baltic partisans can be explained by their kulak backgrounds. Many of the ethnically Baltic partisans came from kulak backgrounds, which is why collectivization harmed them the most. Having resisted the Soviet efforts to deport the kulaks, these individuals joined the Baltic partisans against the Red Army. Morgon Tidningen, the official newspaper of the anti-Soviet 'Swedish Social-Democratic Party' cited by the CIA, reported:

Partisan activity has been handicapped considerably in that the private farms have been replaced by kolkhozes. Previously, private farmers sympathetic to the partisans were able to provide them with food, that happens rather seldom now.... (PARTISANS ACTIVE IN BALTIC AREA, Morgon Tidningen, July 30, 1950. Cited in: STOCKHOLM REPORT ANTI-SOVIET ACTIVITY IN WESTERN USSR, CIA, Date of Info: 1949-1950, Date of Distribution: October 19, 1950, p. 2) (IMG)

US intelligence also confirmed that Lithuanian:

Partisan activity was confined almost exclusively to small raiding expeditions on the kolkhozes, in order to obtain supplies. (General Information on Current Conditions in Lithuania, CIA, September 10, 1952, p. 6) (IMG)

Listing the known sabotage operations by the Lithuanian partisans, the US intelligence document added:

during the period 1947-1948 ... railroad tracks located in the area of SIAULIAI-MAZEIKIAI were blown up. (General Information on Current Conditions in Lithuania, CIA, September 10, 1952, p. 6) (IMG)

The partisans were also violently chauvinistic towards 'all Russians':

Partisan activities are anti-Russian and anti-Communist, directed against all Russians, all Communist Lithuanians, and against all informers and traitors. (General Information on Current Conditions in Lithuania, CIA, September 10, 1952, p. 6) (IMG)

The Lithuanian partisans, another CIA document again confirmed, stole from the collectivist peasantry:

On the other hand, from farmers who sympathize Communists or who are activists, the partisans, after warning these persons, take everything they need. From the kolkhozy the partisans take pigs and other animals. (Partisan Activity and General Conditions in Lithuania, CIA, October 27, 1952, p. 5) (IMG)

Under the bloody terror of the fascist bandits, the collectivist peasants (the kolkhozniki) had no choice but to 'support' the bandits in order to survive:

The kolkhozniki often support the partisans and give them what they need. (Partisan Activity and General Conditions in Lithuania, CIA, October 27, 1952, p. 5) (IMG)

In addition:

food was taken [by partisans] from warehouses. (Partisan Activity and General Conditions in Lithuania, CIA, October 27, 1952, p. 4) (IMG)

In addition:

the plundering of cooperatives [by the partisans] occurred frequently – mostly when the cooperatives supplied with goods or when some employee was going to the rayon bank with cooperative money. (...). There were always judicial investigations after such plunders. Suspicious persons were arrested and were released only if there was no evidence against them. Money has been taken also from the smaller railroad stations. (Partisan Activity and General Conditions in Lithuania, CIA, October 27, 1952, p. 5) (IMG)

Lastly,:

Money has been taken [by the partisans] also from the smaller railroad stations. (Partisan Activity and General Conditions in Lithuania, CIA, October 27, 1952, p. 5) (IMG)

In the late 1940s, in what seemed to be one of their many coordinated attacks, the guerrilla bandits reportedly conducted sabotage operations against Soviet infrastructure:

According to a report from Riga to an Estonian weekly periodical in Stockholm, Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian partisans, the so-called "Brothers of the Forest," recently carried out an attack on the Riga-Pskov railroad line. (STOCKHOLM REPORT ANTI-SOVIET ACTIVITY IN WESTERN USSR, CIA, Date of Info: 1949-1950, Date of Distribution: October 19, 1950, p. 2) (IMG)

There also have been some absurd conspiracy theories stating that the entire Baltic terrorist guerrilla network was a fake opposition network created 'by' the Soviet intelligence service itself and that the Soviet government was 'not' really interested in combating the terrorists. One can rest assured that this allegation is not true, because as the CIA stated:

The Bolsheviks continually try to exterminate the partisans. (Partisan Activity and General Conditions in Lithuania, CIA, October 27, 1952, p. 2) (IMG)

In 1951 occurred the Soviet government's deportations of the partisans and most likely their kulak support base:

In 1951, 6-7000 Lithuanians were deported to Krasnoyarsk, the Donbas, Mongolia, and Vorkuta. The deportations affected the following categories of Lithuanians:

a. all persons connected with the partisan movement, e.g. contact men, the relatives of partisans, partisan supporters

b. all those substantial farmers who had in any way manifested opposition to collectivization.

(‘1. Deportations and Arrests in Lithuania’, CIA, September 3, 1952, p. 1) (IMG)

The phrase ‘substantial farmers’ obviously referred to the kulaks who formed the base for the terrorist partisans attacking the kolkhoz peasants. According to Hiden – a top consultant for the British defence and foreign policy ministries – and Patrick Salmon – the official chief historian for the Foreign Commonwealth Office of the United Kingdom – the deportations of the Baltics during and after World War II indeed ‘deprived partisans of support among the rural population’:

For the Soviet authorities the elimination of opposition and the transformation of the Baltic economies went hand in hand. Deportations were a key instrument of Soviet policy. They both deprived partisans of support among the rural population and removed the chief opponents of the collectivisation of agriculture. Carried out between 1944 and 1952, the deportations involved much larger numbers and represented a more deliberate attempt to reshape Baltic society than those of 1940-1. After the initial Soviet takeovers in 1940, agricultural land had been confiscated and distributed among landless peasants and smallholders, with only a limited amount of voluntary collectivisation taking place. (‘The Baltic Nations and Europe: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in the Twentieth Century’, Routledge, John Hiden, Patrick Salmon, 2013) (IMG)

Note that the phrase ‘only a limited amount of voluntary collectivisation [was] taking place’ does not imply that only a small portion of the collectivization efforts in the Baltics were voluntary, and that the rest were forced; indeed, as confirmed by Stephen Kotkin of the Hoover Institute: the USSR had refrained from forced collectivization in the Baltic states; (Stalin: Waiting for Hitler, 1929-1941. Stephen Kotkin, 2017, p. 1069) (IMG)

C13S7. Ukraine

The year 1943 also saw the expansion of Bandera’s Ukrainian fascist organization and the development of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA):

Ukrainian underground movement has been the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. The Army was formed initially during World War II from the merging of a number of partisan bands which had been operating in the western areas of Ukraine.... (...). However, in 1943 the Bandera organization began to expand its area of control in the Ukraine, until by force or persuasion it had absorbed under its authority virtually all the anti-Russian partisans. The name, Ukrainian Insurgent Army, was adopted and a Bandera supporter, Roman Shukevich, was appointed head of the Army under the pseudonym General Taras Chuprinka. (Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas – Ukraine, CIA, August 1957, p. 23) (IMG)

Bandera’s gangs engaged in terrorist activity:

According to an OSS report of September 1945, Bandera had earned a fierce reputation for conducting a “reign of terror” during World War II. (Cold War Allies: The Origins of CIA’s Relationship with Ukrainian Nationalists, Kevin C. Ruffner, Central Intelligence Agency, p. 27)

Referring to Volhynia, the CIA reported:

The population is predominantly Ukrainian but there are important Polish minorities, and the two national groups have historically fought one another. It was here during World War II that Ukrainian-Polish rivalries were most strongly expressed. (Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas – Ukraine, CIA, August 1957, p. 106) (IMG)

The CIA document puts the matter mildly at best; it fails to account for the important fact that in 1943, the UPA systematically carried out a genocide against the Polish population of Volhynia (Wolyn). According to Timothy Snyder of the US Council on Foreign Relations:

One of their major tasks as UPA partisans was the cleansing of the Polish presence from Volhynia. Poles tend to credit the success in this operation to natural Ukrainian brutality; it was rather a result of recent experience. People learn to do what they are trained to do, and are good at doing what they have done many times. Ukrainian partisans who mass-murdered Poles in 1943 followed the tactics they learned as collaborators in the Holocaust in 1942: detailed advance planning and site selection; persuasive assurances to local populations prior to actions; sudden encirclements of settlements; and then physical elimination of human beings. Ukrainians learned the techniques of mass murder from Germans. This is why UPA ethnic cleansing was striking in its efficiency, and why Volhynian Poles in 1943 were nearly as helpless as Volhynian Jews in 1942. It is one reason why the campaign against Poles began in Volhynia rather than Galicia, since in Volhynia the Ukrainian police played a greater role in the Final Solution. This links the Holocaust of the Jews and the slaughter of the Poles, since it explains the presence of thousands of Ukrainians in Volhynia with experience in genocide. But why did Ukrainian nationalists decide to eliminate Poles from Volhynia? How did people with such plans come to be in a position to order the ethnic cleansing of Poles in 1943? In 1942 Ukrainian policemen took orders from Germans to kill Jews; from whom did UPA partisans, largely the same people, take orders in 1943 to kill Poles? (‘The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569-1999’, Timothy Snyder, p. 162) (IMG)

Through its genocide against the Polish population of Western Ukraine, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army was able to deploy Ukrainian settler-colonizers in Volhynia; the settler-colonizers were of course grateful to the fascist UPA/OUN. As such, the Banderite militants gained a strong popular and social base in Western Ukraine, especially in the areas that were settler-colonized. The movement grew among Western Ukrainians throughout the Second World War:

By the end of 1943 a central headquarters for the underground partisans had been set up, and the [Ukrainian Insurgent] Army had established itself as a para-military armed force with regular formations operating in some areas and with a carefully defined organization. Throughout 1944 and the first part of 1945 the Insurgent Army continued to grow in importance: it operated openly against Soviet forces; it made no attempt to conceal its major centers; it controlled important areas of the Western Ukraine. (Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas – Ukraine, CIA, August 1957, p. 23) (IMG)

A number of cities in particular became centers of Ukrainian fascist activity during the War:

For an important period of time the area bounded by the four towns of Kovel’, Lutsk, Kostopol, and Vladimirets was completely dominated by nationalist bands.... (Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas – Ukraine, CIA, August 1957, p. 106) (IMG)

However:

With the re-occupation of the Ukraine by Russian troops at the close of World War II, the nationalist partisans who during the war had fought ... against the Soviet forces were incorporated within the Soviet Union. (Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas – Ukraine, CIA, August 1957, p. 19) (IMG)

The fascist partisans who were responsible for the settler-colonial occupation of territories inhabited by Polish civilians refused to go back to where they came from:

Many of the partisans were unwilling to accept Soviet rule and consequently did not return to their homes, but remained in the sheltered areas they had controlled during the German occupation and continued to oppose Russian forces. (Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas – Ukraine, CIA, August 1957, p. 19) (IMG)

By 1945, the Ukrainian fascist forces were largely defeated:

in the spring of 1945 the Soviet Army inaugurated a major military offensive against the insurgents, and by the end of 1945 most units of the Insurgent Army had been defeated and perhaps fifty per cent of its troops captured. The remainder of the Army broke up into small units which operated in only inaccessible forested areas.... (Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas – Ukraine, CIA, August 1957, p. 23) (IMG)

Nevertheless, it was the UPA:

which has been responsible for most post-war resistance activity. (Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas – Ukraine, CIA, August 1957, p. 19) (IMG)

In the:

districts of Volynia and Galicia ... large numbers of the inhabitants ... began to support the partisans actively, providing them with food and supplies and offering them shelter. As a result, a solid base for opposition to the Soviet Union was established. An active resistance movement appeared, centered primarily in the Ukraine's Western, newly acquired districts, and dominated by Ukrainian nationalists. (Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas – Ukraine, CIA, August 1957, p. 19) (IMG)

Such Ukrainian fascist had a top ally in the Kremlin: MI6 agent Lavrenti Beria. As confirmed by his son:

'There are two dominant forces in man: love and national feeling,' he [Lavrenti Beria] said to me. Any attempt to eradicate them would be a grave mistake. One should, on the contrary, base oneself on them. (...). After his post-war disappointment, when he realized that the Soviet people, while wanting an improvement in their standard of living, were incapable of demanding the conditions needed for that to come about, my father decided to wager on the non-Russian republics. He counted on both their national aspirations and the thirst for prosperity. (...). The Ukrainian nationalist movement might have been destroyed a hundred times. My father did not destroy it. He wanted to have all the nationalist movements on his side. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 294) (IMG)

C13S8. The 1946-1947 Polish and Soviet Deportations of some Reactionaries among the Ukrainians *** IMG-All-{Poland}

After the War, in what became known as Operation VISTULA, the Polish and Soviet governments deported those elements they considered to be sympathetic to the partisan cause. This of course was deeply detrimental to the Ukrainian fascist terror network:

There is no question but that partisan warfare was carried on by the Ukrainians on a considerable scale against the Red Army and the Communist regime after Russian reoccupation of Ukrainian territory. The mass deportation of Ukrainian families by the Poles and Russians in the latter part of 1946 appears to have affected the UPA organization very seriously, and as a result of this move, the UPA had to adopt a decentralized organizational set-up and split up into small units. In any event since 1947 heavily armed Ukrainian partisans have been crossing in small groups into the American Zone from Czechoslovakia or Austria. (QRPLUMB, Vol. 1_0007, Chapter 11: The Ukrainian Element, CIA, p. 102) (IMG)

In Poland, along the CURZON line, the Ukrainian resistance has been severely impaired because of deportation; for this reason numerous followers of the resistance movement are now living in the guise of Poles in the former German provinces of SILESIA, East PRUSSIA, and POMERANIA. (Ukrainian Resistance, AERODYNAMIC, Vol. 11, Operations 0007, April 1953, CIA, p. 4) (IMG)

By July [1947], Vistula had reduced the [Ukrainian fascist] UPA to a small underground force. (MI6: Inside the Covert World of Her Majesty's Secret Intelligence Service, Stephen Dorril, p. 237) (IMG)

The Polish government deported the Ukrainians that lived in the west of Poland. This was absolutely justified since the Ukrainians who lived in the west of the San River (east of the Soviet-Polish border) actively and materially supported the UPA fascist terror squads, the mass-murderers who carried out the genocide of the Polish people in Wolyn:

Ukrainians living on the right side of the San co-operate with those UPA bands by affording them shelter and protecting them from authorities and the Polish population. The Ukrainian population on the left of the San in Jaroslaw county is particularly terrorized by UPA bands and is anti-Polish. People in this area recently demonstrated their "lack of appreciation" by refusing to pay taxes. (MINORITIES IN POLAND, CIA, September 16, 1947, p. 3) (IMG)

As such, it was critically important to prevent those Ukrainian terrorist-mind settler-colonial populations from living in that territory. Furthermore, the ones deported were the Boykos, Lemkos, and mixed-Polish-Ukrainians who lived predominantly in the mountainous area of western Ukraine. As in Chechniya, the mountainous terrain of that region had rendered the development of the productive forces weaker. As the progressive classes often advance concurrent with the productive forces, the progressive classes had not developed much in a mountainous zone not growing economically. As such, with the low level of the advancement of the progressive classes had come the low development of a civilized culture among the inhabitants of that mountainous zone, leading many of those inhabitants to be supportive of the UPA and allied fascist forces.

Beyond this exceptional zone in Ukraine, which represented a small minority of Ukrainians, the Soviet state did not face any popular hostility by the non-Russian Ukrainians. This was the case well until 1957:

Resistance in other parts of the Ukraine has appeared only sporadically and in a limited way, and apart from the nationalists, only small and unimportant bands of individuals have been involved. (Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas – Ukraine, CIA, August 1957, p. 19) (IMG)

C13S9. Carpatho-Ukraine's People Join the USSR *** IMG-All-{Czechoslovakia}

Of the regions inhabited by non-Russian Ukrainians, in fact one of the most welcoming to the Soviet Union was Carpathia. In 1944, the Soviet Red Army defeated most of the Axis forces in the areas bordering Western Ukraine. One area bordering Western Ukraine was the Carpathian region. Formerly occupied both by Czechoslovakia and Hungary, the Carpathian people were very strongly sympathetic to the Red Army and chose to join the USSR. In the words of one US intelligence document:

Because of their disappointment with the Czechoslovak regime and their hatred for the Hungarian occupation, not only the Communist-supported partisans but also the Ruthenian nationalist underground viewed the Soviet Army as a liberation force in 1944. For the same reasons politically vocal elements among the Ruthenians favored the incorporation of the area subsequently known as the Carpathian oblast (Zakarpatska oblast) into the Ukrainian SSR. A public drive for signatures in favor of incorporating the Carpatho-Ukraine into the USSR was apparently quite successful. To understand this one must bear in mind the people's reaction to Hungarian misrule and the effectiveness of propaganda which at that time was or less echoed by Western information media. In November 1944 a council or rada was convened at Mukacevo and voted unanimously to join the USSR. (Past and Present Developments Concerning Carpatho-Ruthenia, CIA, May 12, 1953, p. 3) (IMG)

The area of the Carpathian oblast, located beside the Carpathian mountains, was relatively more fertile and had a significant potential for the development of the productive forces and thus of the progressive classes advancing concurrently with the productive forces. The influence of the progressive classes in that zone, coupled with the ethnic oppression of the people in that region, rendered the situation favourable to pro-Communist and pro-Soviet currents.

The popular support for the government is also demonstrated in the fact that:

initial reaction to collectivization in the Carpathian oblast was likewise favorable and ... there was no significant opposition to it as late as 1950. Large landholders, especially Hungarians and churches, had owned most of the land in Carpatho-Ruthenia prior to collectivization, whereas the majority of the people led a sub-standard existence. When the Soviets transformed the former estates into big collectives, many Ruthenians were therefore pleased. (Past and Present Developments Concerning Carpatho-Ruthenia, CIA, May 12, 1953, pp. 2-3) (IMG)

There is already a surplus of literature on the support enjoyed by the Soviet state from the Russians of Ukraine. After all, the Russians made up the largest portion of the partisan resistance against the Nazi occupation.

C13S10. Contact with Civilians Forbidden in Operation BAGRATION / Some Deportations from Latvia *** IMG-All-{Baltic-Finland}

In June of 1944, the Red Army gloriously struck yet another devastating blow at the forces of the Third Reich in Byelorussia and other zones. Codenamed Operation BAGRATION, it is considered by many scholars to be the greatest defeat ever suffered by the German armed forces. In case any doubts exist regarding the treatment of the civilian population during Operation BAGRATION, a paper by US Major Pirnie of the Analysis Branch of the US Army Center of Military History confirmed that contact with civilians was prohibited by the Soviet high command:

On 29 May, the Supreme High Command issued a directive to the fronts involved in Operation BAGRATION (1st Baltic, 1st, 2nd, 3rd Belorussian). According to this directive, all redeployment was to be by night marches. Movement during the day was limited to small groups during non-flying weather. Troops were to be camouflaged during the day and contact with civilians was prohibited. (Soviet Deception Operations during World War II, US Army Center of Military History, Analysis Branch, Washington DC, Major Bruce R. Pirnie, 1985, p. 10) (IMG)

In Latvia, the Germans had installed a puppet regime, which of course had its own police officials and guardsmen. Upon the liberation of Latvia, these Nazi-installed police officials were deported by the Soviet state in May 1945:

In May 1945, the Soviet authorities arrested and deported all police officials, home guardsmen, and people who were suspected of having cooperated with the German troops or occupation forces. Many of these deportees were put to work on the Stalin Canal, and, although some of them later returned to Latvia, they were deported again in later deportations. ('1. Partisan Activity and Deportations in Latvia 2. Economic Conditions in Latvia', CIA, May 19, 1953, p. 2) (IMG)

Chapter 14

C14S1. Beriaite-Nazi Activities in Georgia and the Stalin Faction's Purge of the Georgian Bourgeois-Nationalists *** IMG-All-{The Georgia Purge}

Until May 5, 1942, countless cities and villages were recaptured and liberated by the Red Army, as the Nazis were retreating westwards. After May 5th, the Germans began to regain ground and opportunity. The German offensive against the Soviet Caucasus region resumed and the assault on Stalingrad began. Citing German intelligence, the CIA noted that:

strongly nationalist movements were reported [by the German intelligence] in Georgia.... (Soviet Defections to the Germans in World War II, CIA, November 19, 1952, p. 31) (IMG)

This could be explained by the fact that Beria, who was in charge of the Caucasus region during the War, had used the opportunity to install anti-Soviet bourgeois-nationalist elements of his clan in the top ranks of the Georgian SSR, as well as the Soviet intelligence service. Beria supported separatist causes throughout the USSR:

'There are two dominant forces in man: love and national feeling,' he said to me. Any attempt to eradicate them would be a grave mistake. One should, on the contrary, base oneself on them. (...). After his post-war disappointment, when he realized that the Soviet people, while wanting an improvement in their standard of living, were incapable of demanding the conditions needed for that to come about, my father decided to wager on the non-Russian republics. He counted on both their national aspirations and the thirst for prosperity. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 294) (IMG)

Georgian bourgeois-nationalism nonetheless was one of the top separatist tendencies that Beria promoted because Beria had established close contacts with the MI6-sponsored Menshevik exiles as was shown in C4S4. Beria therefore promoted such bourgeois-nationalist rhetoric:

When the nationalism of the Georgians or that of other peoples of the USSR was mentioned in his [Beria's] hearing he never failed to observe that it was a reaction to the imperial policy of the 'Russian chauvinists' (he used that expression). ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 295) (IMG)

The US intelligence noted that Beria was:

a Mingrelian in origin. This Georgian national group, although it numbers only 150,000 people, has its own language, and its members in general are very ... predisposed to politics and political intrigues. Most Mingrelians are clannish and help each other to higher positions whenever they can. (The Beriya-Malenkov Struggle for Power, CIA, July 30, 1953, p. 2) (IMG)

As a promoter of Mingrelian bourgeois-nationalism:

BERIA had never forgotten his clan and after this time [when he became NKVD head], he started promoting Mingrelians not only to local government and Party positions in Georgia but to positions throughout the USSR, especially to positions with the NKVD in Moscow. During World War II, BERIA was appointed Deputy President of the USSR Council of Ministers and Member of the national Defense Council. In this capacity he was entrusted with the organization of defense of the Caucasus, and he used his extraordinary powers to strengthen the Mingrelian positions in Georgia and in the national MGB. (The Beriya-Malenkov Struggle for Power, CIA, July 30, 1953, p. 2) (IMG)

Sergo Beria confirmed that as a result, well until the 1950s:

my father ... was strengthening his influence over a certain group. Stalin undertook to discredit him, first of all in the eyes of the Georgians, so as to destroy the support he enjoyed in that republic. The Mingrelians ... had acquired a dominant position in the [Georgian] republic. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 240) (IMG)

Loyal to Beria, the Mingrelian bourgeois nationalists had helped Beria create a wide network throughout the Soviet intelligence networks as well as the Georgian SSR. As a supporter of Georgian bourgeois-nationalism, Beria pursued nepotism, making sure that his close Mingrelian friends remained in charge – much the better for Beria if his friends were corrupt, because after all, corruption promoted the bureaucratic class at the expense of the proletariat in the Soviet state. The nepotism of Beria's allies in the Mingrelian clan indeed resulted in:

many irregularities, cases of most shameless favoritism, numerous misappropriations, etc., going on in the Georgian SSR. (The Beriya-Malenkov Struggle for Power, CIA, July 30, 1953, pp. 2-3) (IMG)

These were cases which

STALIN personally discovered.... (The Beriya-Malenkov Struggle for Power, CIA, July 30, 1953, p. 2) (IMG)

in his:

trip to Georgia in 1951.... (The Beriya-Malenkov Struggle for Power, CIA, July 30, 1953, p. 2) (IMG)

Subsequently a purge began in Georgia, known as the 'Mingrelian Affair'. The CIA reported:

Following this trip, a large purge took place in Georgia in November 1951. (The Beriya-Malenkov Struggle for Power, CIA, July 30, 1953, p. 2) (IMG)

In Georgia, Beria's top:

personal friend and henchman, [was] A. N. RAPAVA, the MGB Minister of the Georgian SSR.... (The Beriya-Malenkov Struggle for Power, CIA, July 30, 1953, p. 2) (IMG)

Sergo Beria confirmed:

Rapava was very close to my father, and his wife, a niece of the former [Georgian] Menshevik President Noah Jordania, was my mother's best friend. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 217) (IMG)

Beria and Rapava both had family connections to the exile Georgian Mensheviks.

However, during the War, the corruption of MI6 agent Beria's network in Georgia had not yet been exposed. As such, a network of Georgian bourgeois-nationalists serving Beria took shape in the Georgian SSR. And because it had been increasingly clear to Beria's British bosses that the Third Reich was losing the War, it made sense for Beria's group to negotiate a deal with the Germans such that an independent fascist Georgia hostile to Soviet power would replace the Georgian SSR, if the Nazis would take over that territory. A report by the US Congress pointed to reports that in the event of a German takeover of Georgia, the covert network of Beria's friend Rapava would take over fascist Georgia:

Men, especially sent as emissaries, went over to the Georgian Legion fighting on the German side and brought news that Georgia was ready to detach itself from Russia and that, indeed, a government was already formed and ready to take over. It is believed that Rapava, the Minister of the Interior of Soviet Georgia, headed this underground government. Rapava was a close personal friend of Beria, and it has been said that Beria knew of his negotiations with the Germans and even encouraged him. (Communist Takeover and Occupation of Georgia, Special Report No. 6 of the Select Committee on Communist Aggression, House of Representatives – Eighty-Third Congress – Second Session under authority of H. Res. 346 and H. Res. 438, Select Committee on Communist Aggression, 1954, pp. 28-29) (IMG)

Beria surely had contacts with the 'Georgian Legion', a German-made SS division made up of Georgian Nazis who had betrayed the cause of the overwhelmingly pro-Bolshevik Georgian people and had instead resorted to the advancement of the objectives of the Nazis. Multiple sources corroborate that Nina Beria's nephew was a prominent Georgian member of the Nazi SS. After the War, Lavrenti Beria saved Nina's nephew. Stalin reportedly found out about this only since 1951, when the conflict between him and Beria had intensified. The best source in this regard is Sergo Beria himself, according to whom, during the Great Patriotic War:

my cousin was also put to test. At the beginning of the War, Teimuraz Shaudia studied at the Podolsk Machine-Gun School. In the autumn of 1941, he was captured wounded, along with other combatants. When the Germans began to create a [Georgian] national formation, he joined one of these battalions. (My Father is People's Commissar Beria, Sergo Beria) (IMG)

Amy Knight, a scholar from the US Library of Congress and the Wilson Center, supports this claim, adding that in particular, Shavdia served in the Georgische Legion which was a German-created Georgian SS division. Knight wrote:

Nina Beria's nephew, Teimuraz Shavdiia ... served in the so-called Georgian Legion, organized to combat resistance to German occupation forces. (Beria: Stalin's First Lieutenant, Amy Knight, p. 149) (IMG)

Lavrenti Beria tried in vain to help Nina Gegechkori Beria's nephew. In the footnotes section of Sergo Beria's biography of his father, Françoise Thom – the French historian, sociologist and editor of Sergo Beria's book – wrote:

Nina Beria had also a nephew, Teimuraz Shadia, who, having been taken prisoner by the Germans, became a commander in the Georgian national legion which fought alongside the Wehrmacht. Later he joined the SS and combated the resistance in France. After the Liberation he was helped by Gegechkori and discreetly picked up in Paris in 1945 by Sharia [Beria's agent] on Beria's orders. (Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 363. Citing: Stolyarov, Palachi t zherty, pp. 230-231) (IMG)

The British historian Mark Levene, in a book published by the Oxford University Press, confirmed that Shavdiia was personally involved in Wehrmacht atrocities in France, and that he returned to the Soviet Union under "his uncle's protection":

Teimuraz Shavdiia, Beria's own nephew by marriage, was involved in the putative formation of a German 'Georgian' Legion out of Soviet POWs like himself, and was personally implicated in Wehrmacht atrocities in France, but at the war's end was brought back to the USSR under his uncle's protection. (Annihilation: Volume II: The European Rimlands 1939-1953, Oxford University Press, Mark Levene, p. 476. Citing: Arkady Vaksberg, Stalin Against The Jews. trans. Antonia W. Bouis (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1994), 275-276.) (IMG)

However, Beria conducted this operation in 1945 without Joseph Stalin's knowledge. In fact:

Stalin learnt of this from Rukhadze in December 1951 and had [Teimuraz Shadia] arrested (Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 363. Citing: Stolyarov, Palachi t zherty, pp. 230-231) (IMG)

Thus, in 1952, Shavdiia was thrown into jail, based on the Soviet state's correct accusations:

that Teymuraz changed his homeland [during the War], served in SD, had the title of unterscharfuhrer [SS corporal or sergeant], and they say that even the "great caring uncle did not save him from his deserved punishment – under pressure, the traitor was sentenced to 25 years of correctional labour." (My Father is People's Commissar Beria, Sergo Beria) (IMG)

Note that the SS and SD were both German intelligence agencies and special operations forces.

However, years later, with the help of Nikita Khrushchev's group, Teimuraz Shavdiia

was released [from jail] in 1955.... (My Father is People's Commissar Beria, Sergo Beria) (IMG)

Clearly, all of these facts demonstrate that Beria had established close contact with his prominent Georgian SS relative, and that therefore he had cooperated with elements belonging to the Third Reich as early as 1945. It is, however, likely that Beria had established direct contacts with the Third Reich even as early as 1943. Reports by unnamed Georgian refugees consulted by the US intelligence support this claim:

There were other reports from Georgian refugees to the effect that Beria and other Georgian leaders sent a representative to Berlin in 1943 to approach Hitler about the possible creation of an independent state of Georgia. (Purge of L. P. Beria, CAESAR-10, CIA, August 17, 1954, p. 17) (IMG)

Again, Beria's actions in the Georgian SSR did not represent in any ways the Georgian people, who were overwhelmingly supportive of the Socialist Soviet state.

Beria sabotaged Stalin's attempt to lure Evgeni Gegechkori, the notorious MI6 agent and former leader of Menshevik Georgia, back to the Soviet Union. Needless to say, had Gegechkori been lured back to his home country, the purges that would have occurred afterwards would have immensely damaged the Beriaste network in the USSR. Sergo Beria recalled:

Stalin tried to persuade Evgeni Gegechkori, my wife's uncle, to return to the USSR. No need to say what would have happened to him! My father never, if he could manage it, sacrificed people who worked with him and were useful to him. He warned Gegechkori that he was going to be invited to come to Georgia and that he must on no account agree. He also sabotaged the repatriation to Georgia of the Menshevik leaders, and prevented the return to the USSR of all the Georgian national treasures which, he claimed, might be embezzled. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 241) (IMG {Titoist Coup})

After the Great Patriotic War, the campaign against the Beria-Rapava faction in Georgia continued. The CIA reported:

The first check to the practically sovereign power of BERIA in Georgia came in 1947 when his personal friend and henchman, A. N. RAPAVA, the MGB Minister of the Georgian SSR, was dismissed for misappropriation of several million rubles during the USSR currency devaluation reform. With BERIA's assistance, RAPAVA escaped arrest and eventually was given a less important position in the Georgian Government, namely the position of Minister of Justice. The MGB Ministry of the Georgian SSR was given to N. M. RUKHADZE, who allegedly came from the Army and was not a BERIA man. Although a blow, this was not enough to shake BERIA's position in the USSR Government, as he was supported by large numbers of adherents he had planted in Georgia and in the MGB agencies throughout the country. (The Beriya-Malenkov Struggle for Power, CIA, July 30, 1953, p. 2) (IMG)

Nevertheless, these anti-corruption purges:

marked the start of a campaign against BERIA's sovereignty in Georgia. (The Beriya-Malenkov Struggle for Power, CIA, July 30, 1953, p. 2) (IMG)

Then:

In 1948 Stalin began to bring pressure to bear on Rapava, Georgia's Minister of Internal Affairs, to provide him with a compromising dossier on my father. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 217) (IMG)

However:

Rapava did nothing [against my father].... ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 217) (IMG)

As time went by:

Rumors of many arbitrary actions of [Beria-linked] Georgian officials and the creation of a "national bourgeois movement" the Republic became more and more persistent. (The Beriya-Malenkov Struggle for Power, CIA, July 30, 1953, p. 2) (IMG)

Purges were to begin against the corrupt leaders. For the purges to be carried out:

Ignatiev's tool in Georgia was Rukhadze, who headed the local MGB. Stalin knew that this wretch hated my father and had chosen him for that very reason. Mgeladze was not against that policy but did not actively engage in it. Stalin sent for the Georgian leaders, including Rukhadze, and told them to compile a dossier. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 240) (IMG)

Those purged:

were charged with various crimes, each according to his official position.... (The Beriya-Malenkov Struggle for Power, CIA, July 30, 1953, p. 3) (IMG)

The Stalin faction:

appointed a new First Secretary for Georgia, Mgeladze. This man was not directly connected with the head of the State Security, Ignatiev.... (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 240) (IMG)

However:

what was most significant, in addition to these individual crimes, all of them [officials] were accused of promotion of a "national bourgeois movement" [sic; meant bourgeois-nationalist movement] in the Georgian SSR. (The Beriya-Malenkov Struggle for Power, CIA, July 30, 1953, p. 3) (IMG)

In what became known as the 'Mingrelian Affair', the Stalin faction systematically purged thousands of the affiliates of this Mingrelian bourgeois-nationalist network, which it officially accused of collaboration with the Menshevik circles in France and the British intelligence service.

C14S2. Deportations of the Reactionary Kalmyks, Tatars, Chechens, Ingush, and Kabardinians *** IMG-All-{WWII Deportations}{Titoist Coup}
Areas that leave little room for the development of the productive forces often end up being filled with low civilizational development in general and a high presence of ultra-reactionary tribes. The Chechniya region, with its mountains, and the desert parts of Mongolia and Saudi Arabia are cases in point. 'Daghestan', an area proximate to and politically associated to Chechniya, means the 'Land of the Mountains'. In Chechniya and the areas surrounding it, there were the Kalmyk, Chechen, Ingushis, and Kabardinian populations who lived very close to the mountainous areas, had experienced a low level of development of the productive forces, thereupon a low development of the progressive classes. Inevitably, they came under the immense influence of fascist reaction. For a long time, the Chechens were Pagan extremists; later on, upon conversion to Islam, they adopted Sufism as a liberal current that would allow continued Paganism albeit with an 'Islamic' appearance; (and much later on, Chechniya became a zone of Wahhabi terror). During the Great Patriotic War, the high ultra-reactionary presence there increased the sympathies of large segments of the population there with the Nazis. In particular, and in spite of the generous support that they had received from the Soviet state, including their statuses as Autonomous SSRs, the overwhelming majorities of the Kalmyk, Tatar, Chechen, Ingush, and Kabardinian populations had actively, covertly, and overtly collaborated with the forces of the Third Reich against the USSR. CIA documents have repeatedly confirmed this reality:

In the areas of the USSR overrun by the Germans during World War II, certain minority nationalities collaborated actively with the invaders. Notable among these were the Kalmyks, the Crimean Tatars, the Chechens, and the Ingushi. After the liberation of the areas inhabited by these peoples, the Soviet Government decided to punish them for their disloyalty by liquidating their autonomous governments. To prevent them from aiding any future invader, it was decided to transfer these peoples en masse to the interior of Soviet Siberia. These secret decisions were taken by the Soviet Government in mid-1943. (Forced Transfer of Soviet Minority Nationalities, CIA, March 18, 1954, p. 1) (IMG)

In the Crimea, the tatars wanted to organize a volunteer unit to fight alongside the Germans.... (Study of Intelligence and Counterintelligence Activities on the Eastern Front and in Adjacent Areas during WW II, CIA, p. 10) (IMG)

One could call such deportations a 'punishment'. A punishment as it was, it also served as a reward. Populations that had been under the influence of the ultra-reactionary tribal cultures for so many years had a very slow development; moving these people out of the mountainous areas and onto flatter lands for work in collective farms was an advancement of these societies. Sure, deportations were individual punishments, but in the grand scheme of historical development, they were also collective rewards.

The following is an excerpt of a CIA document about the deportation of Kabardinians:

Beginning 4 March 1944, some fifty or sixty Kabardinian families from village of Kamennomost (Akhalshehi) [N 43-45, E 41-55] were loaded into trucks and deported to Siberia and Central Asia. These were families which had overtly collaborated with the Germans; however, many other families who had also collaborated were not deported because there were not enough trucks. This was the closest thing to a large deportation that occurred. ('1. Deportation of Kabardinians 2. Resistance in the Caucasus', CIA, Date Distributed: September 15, 1950, p. 1) (IMG)

Not every single member of these Caucasus nationalities was deported. A small minority were allowed to remain in their homeland either because they were too old, or disabled, or because they had not demonstrated pro-Nazi tendencies. For instance:

Some Kabardinians who were prisoners during the war have been returned to their native area by the Soviets. ('1. Deportation of Kabardinians 2. Resistance in the Caucasus', CIA, Date Distributed: September 15, 1950, p. 1) (IMG)

Nor was it the case that everyone in these populations was deported. No, the Soviet state, while aware that the vast majority of these peoples did support the Nazis, also showed awareness that there were many Chechens, Ingushis, Kalmyks, etc. who were law-abiding citizens of the USSR if not also progressive or communist individuals. The many reactionaries among these ethnic groups were carefully identified and deported en masse onto the Soviet interior. The Soviet intelligence service meticulously collected the names of each and every single one of the individuals who collaborated or aimed to collaborate with the Nazis. Only those categories of individuals, and possibly some of their dependents, were to be deported. Below is an excerpt of a CIA document about these procedures or each nationality:

1. The first group to be affected were the Kalmyks. MVD (then NKGB) Colonel Mikhail Stulov, personally took part in this action. Towards the end of 1943, officers from various territorial offices of the then NKGB (oblastnye upravleniya NKGB) were detailed to a special task force which was sent to the Kalmyk ASSR. The job of this group was to prepare the ground for future deportation. For three months or so, they collected the names and addresses of the most anti-Soviet elements among the Kalmyks, studied the terrain, and, in general, made plans for the round-up operation. All of this activity was carried out in secret. In early 1944, detachments of the Special Purpose Division (DON-Diviziya osobogo naznacheniya) of the NKVD were moved into place and,

under the guidance of the NKGB task force, carried out the simultaneous round-up of the entire Kalmyk population. The Kalmyks were packed into freight trains assembled for the purpose and shipped off to the Kazakh SSR.

2. the next operation was that involving the Chechen and Ingush minorities. NKGB officers from Siberia and Far East, detrained near Ordzhonikidze (N 41-22, E 69-22) in early February 1944. Here they were briefed on the job. First, they were told to take off their NKGB insignia, as they were to pass themselves off as engineer officers. They were divided into small groups and assigned to the various districts of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR. Each officer was eventually given an area for which he was solely responsible. The preliminary work consisted of establishing the names and addresses of the most anti-Soviet elements, determining the location of "bandit" groups, arms caches, names of all inhabitants, etc. Detachments of the DON were already in place, masquerading as regular soldiers assigned to local defense duties. Every day during early February 1944 the male population throughout the ASSR was assembled and marched out of the towns to dig trenches. This was done to accustom them to the idea of being assembled. The attitude of the local population towards the Soviet authorities was hostile. The throats of several officials were cut and no one ventured forth after dark. The actual round-up took place throughout the Chechen-Ingush ASSR on 15 or 16 February 1944. [A]ll the males were assembled on the town square as usual early in the morning. There were between 1,500 and 2,000 of them. Once they were assembled they were surrounded by soldiers of the DON detachment. [A] group (some 60 officers) then appeared before them and read the decision of Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, according to which the Chechen-Ingush ASSR was to be liquidated and its population transferred to Kazakhstan. This news was received with tears and lamentation but no resistance was offered. All individual, were then passed through lines of soldiers, who searched them for weapons, checked their names against previously prepared lists, and escorted them to waiting trains. During the rest of the day the women and children and the aged and infirm were rounded up and also packed into the trains. They were kept separate from the men. Each household was allowed to take 30 kg of baggage. This meant that most of their possessions had to be left behind. By evening everything was silent; the only noise to be heard was the lowing of un milked cows and the howling of abandoned dogs.
3. On 23 February 1944, the youngest and fittest officers and a suitable number of troops were sent into the mountains to round up the inhabitants of remote villages. The same procedure was followed. In several cases, however, the inhabitants, who were now forewarned, resisted actively. Several were killed. Once rounded up, the population of each village was marched down to the foothills, where trucks were waiting to take them to the entraining points. After the main evacuation job had been done, most of the NKGB officers returned to their units. Special task forces (opergruppy) were left behind to clean up the "bandit" groups that were still holding out in the hills. The clean-up operation lasted another six months. During the evacuation there was a considerable amount of looting, especially on the part of local militsiya personnel. Russians from the central oblasts were immediately settled in the evacuated towns and villages.
4. (...).
5. Later in the spring of 1944, the same operation was carried out with the Crimean Tatars. [T]hey resisted actively and several months were required to complete the operation.

(Forced Transfer of Soviet Minority Nationalities, CIA, March 18, 1954, pp. 1-2) (IMG)

Once they were resettled to the Soviet interior, they engaged in collective farming and mining. The CIA reported:

most of the deported North Caucasians in Kazakhstan work almost exclusively in kolkhozy or coal mines. ('1. Deportation of Kabardinians 2. Resistance in the Caucasus', CIA, Date Distributed: September 15, 1950, p. 1) (IMG)

Beria, by contrast, did everything to prevent the implementation of this plan. Referring to the deportation of these predominantly Nazi Caucasus nationalities in his biography of his father, Sergo Beria remarked:

My father [Lavrenti Beria] opposed it, orally and in writing. He had dealings with these peoples, and they had trusted him. He did not want to lose face before them by seeming to be a man who had failed to keep his word. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, pp. 95-96) (IMG)

C14S3. Beria Military Sabotage against Soviet Power / Communist-Coopted Beriaite Agent Abakumov Clashes with the Beria-Malenkov Network / Beria pursues an Alliance with Nazi Germany *** IMG-All-{Beria betrayals during War}{Titoist Coup}

During the Great Patriotic War, Beria was sabotaging the Soviet military. General Voronov, the Red Army's Chief Marshal of the Artillery, remarked:

THE LEADERSHIP of the Main Artillery Directorate took energetic measures to ensure that new equipment quickly reached the points where new artillery formations and units of Supreme Headquarters reserve were being formed. Each artillery formation was a complex organism. In addition to a variety of artillery ordnance, it had also to be supplied with diverse engineering equipment, communications equipment, prime movers, automotive transportation, and much else. We were given effective help by the People's Commissariat of Defense. The most complicated matter was to obtain auto transport. Here we were confronted by many unexpected obstacles.

One day Stalin ordered a fully equipped artillery corps to be transferred immediately to one of the Army Groups.

"The corps is ready, but it cannot be sent. We have no auto transportation," I replied.

Stalin frowned. "How many trucks do you need?" he asked. I answered that 900 trucks were required, according to the schedule

Stalin turned to Malenkov and Beria. "Go and find out where to get them. And you stay," he told me. "Report on the progress of the new formations."

He was satisfied with my report.

When I left, I was met by Malenkov and Beria. "Take 400 trucks, and let's hear no more about it!" said Beria gruffly.

"Nine hundred trucks are needed for an artillery corps. That is the minimum," I replied.

The conversation became increasingly sharp. I was advised to limit myself to 450 trucks, then to 500—

"I shall go back and report to the Supreme Commander in Chief that I cannot send the corps," I finally answered firmly.

"Where should the trucks be sent?" Malenkov then asked in quite a different tone.

I named the formation points. The next day, 900 trucks were there. Supreme Headquarters' urgent request was carried out. Such, at times, were the difficulties which accompanied the creation of new formations....

As a rule, once a month, N. D. Iakovlev and I (and when I was away, he alone) would report a draft concerning the distribution of armaments and munitions for the next month of war to Supreme Headquarters.

Once in the process of approving this list, Stalin's eye fell on the figures: "50,000 rifles for the NKVD." He showered us with questions: Who, specifically, had made this request; why did the NKVD need so many rifles? We said that we too were surprised but that Beria insisted on it. Beria was immediately summoned. The latter attempted to give an explanation in Georgian. Stalin interrupted him ... and ordered him to answer in Russian [so that the Russian commanders present could understand what Beria was saying]: Why and for what purpose did he need so many rifles?

"They are needed to arm newly formed NKVD divisions," Beria said.

"Half – 25,000 – will be enough."

Beria began to insist stubbornly. Stalin made two attempts to reason with him. Beria did not want to listen.

Then, irritated to the limit, Stalin said to us: "Cross out what is written there and write in 10,000 rifles."

He then approved the list. When we left Stalin's once, Beria overtook us and said malevolently: "Just wait, we'll fix your guts!"

He hurled this phrase at N. D. Iakovlev and me more than once when he was dissatisfied with our reports or actions. At that time, we did not attach the proper significance to these words, considering this to be some kind of Oriental joke. Only later did we learn that this monster and traitor usually carried out his threats.

(Stalin and his generals : Soviet military memoirs of World War II, Seweryn Bialer, pp. 457-459. Originally published: N. N. Voronov, "Podvig sovetskogo naroda," Istoriiia SSSR, 1965, No. 4, pp. 21-22; N. N. Voronov, Na sluzhbe voennoi (moscow, 1963), pp. 194-195) (IMG)

Citing Voronov, the US Library of Congress and Wilson Center scholar Amy Knight wrote:

Colonel General of Artillery N. N. Voronov was ordered by Stalin to transfer a fully equipped artillery corps to one of the army groups. In response to Voronov's request for nine hundred trucks to transport the troops, Stalin directed Beria and Malenkov, who were present at the time, to see about obtaining them. Outside Stalin's office, Beria and Malenkov had a sharp exchange with Voronov, trying (unsuccessfully) to force him into accepting only half the number of trucks needed. (Beria: Stalin's First Lieutenant, Amy Knight, p. 116. Citing: Seweryn Bialer, ed., Stalin and His Generals. Soviet Military Memoirs of World war II (New York: Pegasus, 1969), pp. 457-459) (IMG)

Viktor Abakumov, a Beria agent, was coopted by the Stalin faction to combat the Beria mafia and was thus chosen as the head of the Counter-Intelligence Directorate (SMERSH) during the Great Patriotic War. Abakumov went on to uncover speculative business operations and thereupon arrest several allies of Beria and Malenkov. This included Shakhurin and Merkulov:

Early during World War II, Abakumov became chief of the Counterintelligence Directorate (Smersh) and was in constant contact with Stalin. During this period, his agentura disclosed a network of speculative [business] operations in the Ministry of Aviation Industry, which included the Minister himself, Col. Gen. A. I. Shakhurin, who was later dismissed and arrested. This disclosure reflected directly on the position of Malenkov, who was responsible for this ministry during the war as a member of the State Committee of Defense. In addition, this also undermined the authority of one of Beriya's closest friends, Army General V. N. Merkulov, Minister of Defense, who was removed from his position on orders of the Central Committee. (Background on The Execution of Abakumov and the Leningrad Case of 1949, CIA, January 14, 1955, p. 3) (IMG)

Merkulov had always been an old associate of Beria:

Army General Vsevolod Nikolayevich Merkulov, an old "Chekist", worked with Beriya in the Caucasus for a long time. (BERIYA PURGE, CIA, May 28, 1954, p. 4) (IMG)

However, after the Great Patriotic War, the Beria agent Merkulov was demoted from a security job to an economic job, and his agent Kobulov went there with him:

Merkulov was removed from the post of Minister, and Abakumov was appointed in his place. Several other responsible workers of the Ministry of State Security were removed simultaneously with Merkulov, including the first Deputy Minister, Colonel General B. Z. Kobulov. Merkulov was appointed Chief of the Chief Directorate for Soviet Property Abroad, which was sharp demotion. Kobulov turned up in the same department, as did other MGB members who had fallen into disgrace. This department was jokingly called "The Chief Directorate of Sinners." It should be noted that Beriya did everything possible to have Merkulov retained in his post; but, in spite of high regard for him, to everybody's surprise, he did not succeed for some incomprehensible reason. (BERIYA PURGE, CIA, May 28, 1954, pp. 4-5) (IMG)

Colonel General B. Z. Kobulov, an old "Chekist", worked with Beriya in the Caucasus. He was Merkulov's deputy, carrying out the immediate direction of the former Second Chief Directorate (counterintelligence) of the MGB. (BERIYA PURGE, CIA, May 28, 1954, p. 6) (IMG)

As mentioned, Abakumov, an agent of Beria, had been encircled by communist agents and thus coopted to fight the Beria network:

After Stalin's death Abakumov told my father what had happened. He claimed that he had only been obeying formal orders from Stalin to complete a dossier against my father. Abakumov protested his devotion to my father and claimed to have done nothing about it. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 217) (IMG)

The communist-coopted Abakumov's clashes with his secret mafia boss Beria led the two to attack each other ferociously and without mercy:

From then on, the relationship between Beriya and Abakumov became strained, which caused much talk in the Ministry. It is noteworthy that the Minister of Internal Affairs, Sergey Nikiforovich Kruglov, and his deputy, Ivan Aleksandrovich Serov, who were considered as men promoted by Beriya, likewise became unfriendly towards Abakumov, especially Serov. Serov openly dropped remarks of a very obscene character about Abakumov, and called him an "upstart", "humbug", "coward", etc. (BERIYA PURGE, CIA, May 28, 1954, pp. 4-5) (IMG)

The Beria agent Serov denounced Abakumov on behalf of Beria. Serov himself later became the head of the KGB and opportunistically turned 'against' Beria as well on the overt level, even though his covert sympathies continued to remain with Beria.

Another official of the Soviet intelligence targeted by communist-coopted Beria agent Abakumov was the Beria agent Goglidze:

Colonel General S. A. Goglidze, an old "Chekist", had worked for a long time with Beriya in the Caucasus. For more than ten years he was chief of the MGB for the Khabarovsk Kray, and at the same time held the post of representative of the Central Committee of the Communist of the USSR for the Far east. He was very influential in the central apparatus of the MGB and was close to Merkulov and Beriya. (...). After Abakumov's appointment to the post of Minister of State Security, the position and influence of Goglidze were considerably shaken. Abakumov considered him a rival and did everything possible to discredit him. This is illustrated by the fact that during the period from 1947 to 1950 a number of commissions were sent to check on the work of the administration of the MGB for the Khabarovsk Kray; this had not happened before Abakumov's time. (BERIYA PURGE, CIA, May 28, 1954, pp. 5-6) (IMG)

Other cases of sabotage of course occurred in Georgia. Beria was actively working to help the Germans destroy the Soviet defenses in the Caucasus region. In a 1960 article, General Ivan Tiulenev remarked:

IN RECALLING the defense in the foothills of the Caucasus I cannot pass over in silence the base role of the villainous enemy of the people, Beria. He arrived at the Transcaucasian front on August 22, 1942, as the representative of Supreme Headquarters, and stayed two weeks. Along with Beria came a large group of his "henchmen"—Kabulov, Mamulov, Piiashev, Tsanova, and others. Beria issued all his orders in the name of Supreme Headquarters and demanded that they be carried out without fail. On any grounds, and even without grounds, he and his closest aide, Kabulov, exceeded their authority and discredited generals of the Soviet army.

R. Ia. Malinovskii, thanks to his straightforwardness, was the object of special hostility on their part. They heaped all kind of slander upon him and even threatened him with arrest.

When a particularly serious situation developed at the front, I posed before Beria the question of placing fifteen to twenty thousand NKVD troops at our disposal. In reply to this, he burst into foul abuse and threatened to break my back if I even tried to mention it again. There were often instances when Beria and Kabulov issued instructions over the head of the Army Group's command, thereby organizing the work of headquarters. Taking advantage of his unlimited powers, Beria set up at Transcaucasian Army Group headquarters a parallel group for the defense of the chief Caucasus range and placed at its head his NKVD favorites, who were ignoramuses on military questions.

To ensure the successful defense of the Supreme quarters had planned to send us several units and formations regular troops from its own reserve. But Beria spoiled that, too. Instead of the reserves of Supreme Headquarters, there arrived in the new units of the NKVD, which could not be utilized in active combat.

When I was in Moscow on November 15, 1942, I again raised the question of subordinating to our command at least some units of NKVD troops stationed in the Transcaucasian zone. Stalin approved my suggestion, but Beria, who was present, objected sharply and, moreover, coarsely abused the Army Group command. He agreed to place a certain number of troops at the disposal of the Army Group only after Stalin insisted.

All during his brief stay at the front, Beria did not once display a serious interest in the defense system worked out by the Army Group military council and approved by Supreme Headquarters. Although saboteurs and spies were frequently dropped by parachute, Beria and his retainers Rukhadze and Kabulov did not take effective steps to catch and destroy them.

Beria's trips to the defense lines in the area of Makhachkala, Groznyi, Vladikavkaz, and Sukhumi boiled down to and noise, to the creation of a semblance of concern about the organization and consolidation of defense. As a matter of fact, by his criminal attitude and conduct he only disorganized, hindered, and essentially disrupted our work.

(Stalin and his generals : Soviet military memoirs of World War II, Seweryn Bialer, pp. 451-452. Originally published: I. V. Tiulenev, Cherez tri voiny (Moscow, 1960), pp. 196-197.) (IMG)

By damaging the Soviet Red Army's defenses especially in the Caucasus, Lavrenti Beria was serving the Third Reich. Sergo Beria stated that the British policy of support for the weaker Nazis against the more powerful Soviets from 1943 onwards was 'our own' (Beria's) policy:

Everybody was amazed at the Fuhrer's stupidity. He had let himself be made a fool of by the British! As for the latter, to them we ascribed the policy which had been our own: wait until the contending powers had bled each other white, then prolong the struggle by supporting the side that was about to succumb. Even Maisky, though pro-British, shared that view: 'When the Germans have given us a good thrashing,' he said, 'the British will decide it's time to lend us a helping hand.' ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 74) (IMG)

As was mentioned before in C9S3, Dekanozov had been a top-ranking intelligence agent of Beria in the Soviet intelligence service until late 1942. Dekanozov continued to remain as an intelligence agent but had been demoted to the position of deputy in the Soviet Foreign Ministry, engaged in subversive activities against the Molotov faction of the Foreign Ministry:

After Dekanozov's transfer to work in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a number of very important operational telegrams to foreign representatives were found unsent in his personal safe. In spite of this and other serious shortcomings in his work, Dekanozov was not held accountable and, what is more, was appointed Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs in charge of personnel. According to the stories told by persons who worked with him in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dekanozov continued to act in the same way, and sometimes went so far as to get into arguments with Molotov, which, from the viewpoint of employees of all ranks in the Ministry, was completely unbelievable. (BERIYA PURGE, CIA, May 28, 1954, p. 5) (IMG{Titoist Coup})

To say that Dekanozov just disagreed is to put the matter lightly. Dekanozov is well-known for his Nazi German intelligence connections for 1943. Dekanozov was an agent of Beria and Beria was an agent of the MI6. In late 1942 or early 1943, the MI6 decided to ally with Nazi Germany and so did Beria and most likely his agent Dekanozov. There have been numerous reports of Dekanozov's suspicious ties to Nazi Germany in late 1942 or early 1943:

Dekanozov was also a key figure in the contacts which the USSR is reported to have attempted with the Germans in 1942-3. According to these reports, the USSR made contact with the chief of the Ostland Branch in the Main Political Directorate of the German

Ostministerium in an effort to arrange meetings between German and Soviet officials in Sweden. One of the Soviet official was to be Minister Dekanozov, and the object of this meeting was said to be the arranging of a separate peace between Germany and [the Beria faction in] the USSR. (Purge of L. P. Beria, CAESAR-10, CIA, August 17, 1954, p. 17) (IMG)

There is no doubt that the Stalin faction could not benefit from a peace with Nazi Germany and that the plot for a peace with Nazi Germany was a Beriaite plot. On this matter, Pavel Sudoplatov has made an important confession. Sudoplatov was Beria's close intelligence associate, a so-called 'Beria man'. According to Amy Knight of the CIA front think tank Wilson Center:

Among the Beria supporters who remained in leading MGB posts throughout this period were ... Pavel Sudoplatov.... (Beria: Stalin's First Lieutenant, Amy Knight, p. 167) (IMG{Factional Conflict & Great Purge})

Sudoplatov agrees that the allegations that Stalin wanted to establish a separate peace with the Third Reich are unfounded:

However, in his memoirs, Khrushchev, who knew all these details, nevertheless preferred to adhere to the previous version that Beria was negotiating with Hitler about a separate peace, caused by Stalin's panic. In my opinion, Stalin and the entire leadership felt that an attempt to conclude a separate peace in this unprecedentedly difficult war would automatically deprive [the USSR] of power. Not to mention their truly patriotic feelings, of which I am absolutely sure; any form of peace agreement was unacceptable to them. (Special Operations: Lubyanka and the Kremlin 1930-1950, Pavel Sudoplatov, chapter 6) (IMG)

In the foreign ministry, Dekanozov also engaged in:

unbelievable romantic adventures.... (BERIYA PURGE, CIA, May 28, 1954, p. 5) (IMG{Titoist Coup})

Hence,:

Dekanozov's behavior finally gave Molotov a chance to insist that Dekanozov should be removed from the Ministry. His unbelievable romantic adventures, some of which were scandalously publicized in the Ministry, served as a valid reason for Molotov to decide to dismiss him. (BERIYA PURGE, CIA, May 28, 1954, p. 5) (IMG)

Chapter 15

C15S1. Romanian Resistance against the Axis and the Monarchy / The People's Democratic Revolution in Romania / Class Struggles and Economic Development in Romania / From Trotskyite pro-Nazi Elements to Titoist agents of the Mossad; the Threat against the Romanian Proletariat ***
IMG-All-{Romania}

In Romania, upon the initiative of the Romanian Communist Party, the popular front of the anti-fascist parties formed:

In June 1943 the National Peasants, National Liberals, Communists, and Social Democrats, responding to a Communist Party proposal, formed the Blocul National Democrat (National Democratic Bloc – BND), whose aim was to extricate Romania from the Nazi war effort. (Armistice Negotiations and Soviet Occupation, Country Studies, Federal Research Division, US Library of Congress; from: Ronald D. Bachman, ed. Romania: A Country Study. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1989.) (IMG)

As the Red Army was getting closer to Romania, King Mihai (or King Michael) could not but feel threatened. Thus, he set about to switch sides in the War. In the words of the Federal Research Division of the US government, on August 23, 1944,:

King Michael, a number of army officers, and armed Communist-led civilians supported by the BND locked Ion Antonescu into a safe and seized control of the government. (Armistice Negotiations and Soviet Occupation, Country Studies, Federal Research Division, Federal Research Division, US Library of Congress; from: Ronald D. Bachman, ed. Romania: A Country Study. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1989.) (IMG)

Emilian Ionescu, a military general of the Romanian monarcho-fascist era, provided some details on the circumstances of Antonescu's downfall. According to a website that documents the biographies of all the commanders of World War II, Emilian Ionescu had the following positions in Romania during each time period:

1940-02-01 – 1941-01-10 Chief of Staff, Inspectorate-General of Motorized-Mechanized Units

1941-01-10 – 1944-03-16 Commanding Officer 1st Armoured Regiment

1944-03-16 – 1947-XX-XX Adjutant to the King

1948-01-01 – Retired

(Ionescu, V. Emilian. Generals.dk, The Generals of World War II) (IMG)

Inonescu's political fortunes, as the above evidence shows, rose in 1941 with the rise in strength of the fascists in Romania. His political fortunes fell and he was forced to 'retire' in 1948 when the monarcho-fascist regime was overthrown. The correlation of his rise and fall with the rise and fall of the fascist forces, along with the fact that he was a trusted agent of the king, are reflective of his political loyalties. In the late 1960s, the Romanian military commander Emilian Ionescu wrote an article for the Romanian Party press. Robert R. King, the senior analyst for the CIA's Radio Free Europe and former National Security Council (NSC) staff member under Brzezinski, quoted that article by Inoescu:

the party was described as "the initiator, organizer, and the leader of the action to overthrow the military-fascist dictatorship,".... (A History of the Romanian Communist Party, Robert R. King, 1980, p. 42) (IMG)

Some may argue that the royalist military commander's article was biased given its publication by the Romanian Party press in the 1960s. Perhaps that is true for other aspects of his article, but what is for certain is that his claim that the ousting of the Antonescu regime was by the Romanian Communist Party is neither biased nor incorrect. In contrast to the CIA-MI6 propaganda narrative that the Romanian Communist Party played a marginal role in the overthrow of Antonescu and that King Mihai's group played the most important role, a 1974 US intelligence document acknowledged that Romania's 'pro-Nazi regime was ousted by the Communist[s]':

The Romanian Iron Guard was a political movement founded after World War I for the purpose of strengthening the economic conditions, eliminating semitism and foreign influence, achieving educational reform, boycotting industrial and government interests and promoting interest in peasantry. The movement was pro-monarchy, pro-Germany, and anti-communist, and was active in the 1930's and early 1940's when the pro-Nazi [Antonescu] regime was ousted by the Communist[s]. (Bishop Viorel Trifa The Romanian Orthodox

Church In America, CONFIDENTIAL, United States Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation Headquarters, Best Available Copy, declassified by the CIA, August 14, 1974, p. 8) (IMG)

Hence, the Antonescu regime was overthrown, and Radescu was installed as the chief of the Romanian state alongside the Romanian King. From late 1942 onwards, the Anglo-American intelligence began to side with the fascist Axis and the Radescu movement followed along with the Anglo-Americans. This fascist agent of the Anglo-American intelligence services was the head of the Romanian state and had the backing of the King.

With the entry of the Soviet Red Army into Romania, the Romanian communist leader Gheorghiu-Dej was liberated:

When Frimu was shot in a strike of Rumanian railroad men in 1933, Dej became his successor as president of the trade union of railroad workers. When the Communist Party was banned in Rumania, Dej went underground and lived illegally in the country until 1938. He was then seized by the Rumanian police and remained under arrest until his liberation by the Soviets in 1944. (BACKGROUND OF TOP LEVEL COMMUNIST LEADERS IN RUMANIA, CIA, March 11, 1955, p. 2) (IMG)

From then on, even though he was not the General Secretary of the Party, he nonetheless was its main organizer:

Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej [was] the man with the "iron fist" who organized the Rumanian Communist Party in 1944. (INTERPRETATION OF PURGE OF ANA PAUKER, CIA, September 11, 1952, pp. 1-2) (IMG)

The Romanian Communist Party operated freely and was thus able to attract supporters and quickly grow in membership. This growth in membership had many obvious benefits since it allowed the Romanian Communist Party to pursue its popular front agenda, and mobilize a larger base in Romanian society:

In August 1944, the Party was composed of only a few hundred members, most of them in prison including Gheorghiu-Dej. Since 1924, the party had existed illegally. In this interlude of twenty years, the small organization was filled with minor agents and members of questionable character. In a few weeks after the country's [liberation] by the Russian Army, the Party membership was inflated to several hundred thousand and in four years to nearly a million. There is no similar growth even in Eastern Europe after 1945. (INTERPRETATION OF PURGE OF ANA PAUKER, CIA, September 11, 1952, p. 2) (IMG)

Many questionable members were added to the Party but the increase in membership of questionable elements in the Party was controlled, such that the Party would not be hijacked by its new members. At the time, the increase in membership was a useful temporary political measure with which to increase numerical strength in a controlled manner and with which to compile a larger count of Party activists for the purpose of regime change in Romania.

The Anglo-American agent Radescu was in charge of Romania, and he was hardly democratic. Nonetheless, with the backing of the Soviets, the large Romanian Party was able to plant one of its top members in charge of the Romanian Ministry of Interior: Teohari Georgescu. Georgescu was an agent of Ana Pauker and therefore had connections of a treasonous and counter-revolutionary nature to imperialist secret services. Nonetheless at the time, even planting a disloyal, albeit communist-coopted, member of the Romanian Communist Party at the helm of the Ministry of Interior could serve as a channel for infiltrating the Party's loyal intelligence agents into the Ministry. Hence, the rise of Georgescu to the Interior Ministry was objectively beneficial for the Party, at the expense of the Anglo-American intelligence and the comprador Romanian regime which the communists sought to overthrow. As such, Radescu and his gang conspired to oust Georgescu from his position, thereby prompting large-scale communist-backed protests:

On December 8, 1944, Radescu presented his proposed list of the new cabinet members to the King who approved it. On the same day, the new cabinet took the oath of office. Radescu, besides being the Prime Minister, was also Minister of the Interior. A series of misunderstandings made Radescu oppose certain proposals made by the Undersecretary of State for the State Administration in the Ministry of Interior. Radescu requested Dr. Groza, Vice-President of the Council of Ministers, to approve the dissolving of the Undersecretariate of State for State Administration. It was approved and Teohari Georgescu was attempted to be dismissed. This incident caused a misunderstanding between Radescu and the Leftist parties, which came to climax with the demonstration and shootings of February 24, 1945. (Confidential Biographic Data, Name: RADESCU, Lt. General Nicolae, OSS Post: Bucharest, Rumania, OSS, May 7, 1946, p. 1) (IMG)

The Office of Strategic Services (OSS - the central US intelligence agency preceding the CIA) provided a detailed account of the protests organized by the communist-led popular front known as the 'National Democratic Front' (FND) for overthrowing the Radescu regime:

The following account of the FND demonstration in Bucharest on 24 February 1945 and the ensuing disorders in front of the National Palace represents the combined information obtained by several members of our staff.... ('SUBJECT: FND demonstration and demonstration at Palace', Original Report Number: GR-269, Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Source: Z, Sub-Source: as stated, date of information: February 25, 1945, date of report: February 25, 1945, p. 1. In: 'RADESCU, NICOLAE VOL. 1_0050', CIA archives) (IMG)

On February 24, 1945, an estimated 100,000 FND demonstrators marched in the streets calling for the overthrow of Radescu:

The demonstrators, organized in occupation groups with numerous banners, began arriving at the Piatza Natziunei shortly after 1300 hours [i.e. 1:00 PM]. The bulk of demonstrators marched from concentration points in the city area. Numbers however, were transported from outside the city limits by truck from points as far removed as Ploesti and as many as 2000 were reported as having arrived from other points in the country by train. The demonstration officially began with speeches at 1445 [i.e. 2:45 PM]. Preliminary estimate of the number of demonstrators in 75,000 to 100,000.

The following banners were most numerous:

"Down with Radescu!"

"We want an FND government!"

"Death to the Fascists!"

"Down with Maniu!"

"Down with the saboteurs in the government!"

"Long live the King, Chief of the army!"

"Long live the Rumanian Army!"

There were ... also pictures of Stalin (largest and most numerous), the King, Churchill and Roosevelt. Practically each group carried Rumanian, American, British and Russian flags, also a few French flags.

(‘SUBJECT: FND demonstration and demonstration at Palace’, Original Report Number: GR-269, Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Source: Z, Sub-Source: as stated, date of information: February 25, 1945, date of report: February 25, 1945, pp. 1-2. In: ‘RADESCU, NICOLAE VOL. 1_0050’, CIA archives) (IMG)

Under the guise of ‘supporting’ the Romanian King, the communist-led FND was overthrowing the King’s agent Radescu. Under the guise of supporting the Anglo-American imperialists, who by then had become allies with the Axis, the communist-led FND was seeking the overthrow of the regime of Radescu, the agent of the Anglo-Americans. Hence, the pro-monarchist slogan of the communist-led FND protesters was a cover with which to drive a wedge between Radescu’s and the King’s supporters, further isolate the King, and pave the way for a democratic republic. The US intelligence further reported:

The temper of the crowd was mixed and enthusiasm appeared to be concentrated in the immediate vicinity of the speakers’ platform. The demonstration as a whole was quiet and orderly. No Rumanian police were observed at the scene but a few Russian patrols, in groups of two or three, circulated through the fringes of the crowd. In general, the contents of the speeches contained repeated sentiments of the placards. Teohari Georgescu, deposed Under-Secretary of Interior, was the principal speaker. The crowd began disbanding at 1600 hours [i.e. 4:00 PM]. The demonstrators, following instructions, proceeded in orderly manner to the square in front of the Royal Palace and the Ministry of Interior. (‘SUBJECT: FND demonstration and demonstration at Palace’, Original Report Number: GR-269, Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Source: Z, Sub-Source: as stated, date of information: February 25, 1945, date of report: February 25, 1945, p. 2. In: ‘RADESCU, NICOLAE VOL. 1_0050’, CIA archives) (IMG)

A massive crowd began demonstrating in front of the palace and the Ministry of Interior:

Demonstrators began arriving in quantity at the palace area square about 1545 hours [i.e. 3:45 PM] and consisted largely of the organized demonstrators. It is estimated that 20-25,000 reached the palace area. About 1700 hours [5:00 PM] the demonstrators moved in large numbers toward the Ministry of Interior building. At 1710 hours [5:10 PM] several small calibre pistol shots were fired from the crowd, then shots of larger calibre were heard and the crowd panicked in front of the Ministry building. A few moments later there were several volleys of rifle and machine-gun fire over the heads of the crowd from guards on the upper floors of the Ministry of Interior. During the next hour, sporadic firing took place as the crowd dispersed and reformed intermittently. During this time, speeches and shouting were in progress. (‘SUBJECT: FND demonstration and demonstration at Palace’, Original Report Number: GR-269, Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Source: Z, Sub-Source: as stated, date of information: February 25, 1945, date of report: February 25, 1945, p. 2. In: ‘RADESCU, NICOLAE VOL. 1_0050’, CIA archives) (IMG)

According to the OSS, elements from within the crowds tried to get into the Interior Ministry building. If true, then the demonstrators were probably making a mistake since this would have provoked clashes. And clashes did occur. The guards shot at least 150 bullets and in response a reported 30 bullets were shot from the crowd:

The size of the active groups in front of the Ministry was estimated at less than one thousand and their intention was to gain entrance to the Ministry building. Two attempts were made to storm the door unsuccessfully. By 1900 hours [7 PM] the guards in the Ministry building had fired approximately 150 shots and the demonstrators had fired a minimum of 30 in return. Ascertainable casualties were one demonstrator and one soldier wounded. The guard at the Ministry had orders to shoot into the air and fire only when fired upon. The crowd began dispersing at about 1900 hours. By 2000 hours [8 PM] there were small groups of demonstrators left at the square totalling probably 200. (‘SUBJECT: FND demonstration and demonstration at Palace’, Original Report Number: GR-269, Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Source: Z, Sub-Source: as stated, date of information: February 25, 1945, date of report: February 25, 1945, p. 2. In: ‘RADESCU, NICOLAE VOL. 1_0050’, CIA archives) (IMG)

To prevent further clashes:

According to one report, Gheorghiu-Dej, communist Minister of Communications, spoke to the crowd and urged them to go home, promising that the Russians would investigate the situation fully. (‘SUBJECT: FND demonstration and demonstration at Palace’, Original Report Number: GR-269, Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Source: Z, Sub-Source: as stated, date of information: February 25, 1945, date of report: February 25, 1945, p. 2. In: ‘RADESCU, NICOLAE VOL. 1_0050’, CIA archives) (IMG)

Thus,:

The Chief of Staff of the Soviet Military Command at Bucharest interviewed General Radescu at about 1800 hours [6 PM] in the Ministry of Interior building. General Radescu exhibited two bullet holes in the window of his private office which appeared to have originated from the crowd in the square. Radescu stated that he would not leave the building and would not turn over the country to mob rule. The Russian officer stated that General Moskvitan, military commander of Bucharest, had previously issued orders to the Russians not to interfere with the demonstration or with the Rumanian army. After the shooting started he informed General Teodorescu, Rumanian Commander of Bucharest, that firing against the crowd must cease immediately. General Moskvitan also stated that he was telephoning Marshal Malinovski to report on the happenings. Twelve Soviet guards were promised to Radescu to guard the Ministry building, and permission was granted to keep all the Rumanian troops in the building for the Ministry’s protection. (‘SUBJECT: FND demonstration and demonstration at Palace’, Original Report Number: GR-269, Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Source: Z, Sub-Source: as stated, date of information: February 25, 1945, date of report: February 25, 1945, pp. 2-3. In: ‘RADESCU, NICOLAE VOL. 1_0050’, CIA archives) (IMG)

Regarding the corroboration of the above report, the OSS document stated:

Persons at the Palace window facing the square during the entire demonstration confirmed the above statements concerning the events in the Palace square. (‘SUBJECT: FND demonstration and demonstration at Palace’, Original Report Number: GR-269, Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Source: Z, Sub-Source: as stated, date of information: February 25, 1945, date of report: February 25, 1945, p. 3. In: ‘RADESCU, NICOLAE VOL. 1_0050’, CIA archives) (IMG)

Also:

A report was given to the King at Sinaia that the FND had staged three other demonstrations simultaneously; at Craiova, crowds stormed the Prefecture and occupied it with no casualties since the guards had orders not to fire; at Caracal, the crowds stormed the Prefecture

unsuccessfully because of army resistance and several persons were killed and wounded; at Brasov the National Peasants and FND rallies clashed.

At about 2045 hours [i.e. 8:45 PM], several hundred National Liberal and National Peasant supporters marched by the Palace in Bucharest singing the National Anthem and shouting "Long live the King", and "Radescu and order". Counter-demonstration lasted at least an hour and the crowd was last seen marching down the boulevard burning FND signs hanging from street-car wires.

(‘SUBJECT: FND demonstration and demonstration at Palace’, Original Report Number: GR-269, Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Source: Z, Sub-Source: as stated, date of information: February 25, 1945, date of report: February 25, 1945, p. 3. In: ‘RADESCU, NICOLAE VOL. 1_0050’, CIA archives) (IMG)

At the time, three renegades in the communist labour movement, Patrascanu, Luca, and Pauker, had to pretend to be staunch ‘anti-fascists’, and thus, outwardly, played a positive role in the events. To promote the public image of these renegades and infiltrators in the communist movement, Radescu ferociously denounced them and presented them as his biggest enemies. In so doing, Radescu created a false polarity and wrongly depicted Pauker and Luca as ‘communist’ ‘heroes’ ‘genuinely’ ‘opposed’ to him. The OSS reported:

According to report from source close to the Palace, Patrascanu, communist leader, stated that the government was guilty of firing on the people and he requested the Marshal of the Palace to ask the King to come to Bucharest as soon as possible in order to solve the crisis.

At approximately 2200 hours [8 PM] General Radescu addressed the nation over the radio. He referred to events of the afternoon, both in Bucharest and in the provinces and attacked FND as the instigators of these disorders. He specifically blamed Ana Pauker, Moscow-trained [pseudo-]communist leader, and "Hungarian" Vasile Luca, secretary of the Communist party and stated that they were people without country and without God. He also stated at 2115 hours [9:15 PM] two persons were killed and eleven wounded in front of the Ministry of Interior by machine-pistol fired from a moving car. This followed the National Peasant demonstration mentioned in paragraph 4 above, but connection between the two incidents has not been established. He concluded by rallying the nation to support him and the army in maintaining order.

(‘SUBJECT: FND demonstration and demonstration at Palace’, Original Report Number: GR-269, Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Source: Z, Sub-Source: as stated, date of information: February 25, 1945, date of report: February 25, 1945, p. 3. In: ‘RADESCU, NICOLAE VOL. 1_0050’, CIA archives) (IMG)

Following these large-scale protests, one major step towards regime change in Romania occurred, the fascist renegade Radescu was ousted, and the Romanian communists were able to plant their leaders in the top ranks of the government of Mr. Groza, the latter being a conservative pro-British politician that was more submissive to communists than Radescu was:

The result was that the cabinet and Radescu were dismissed, following pressure by Vishinski on the King and the Groza regime came to power. Following this Radescu was taken under British protection and lived in their building for nine weeks until an agreement between the British and Russian Governments was reached, assuring the former that Radescu would not be harmed on returning home. He was placed under domicile, and only completely free early in 1946. (Confidential Biographic Data, Name: RADESCU, Lt. General Nicolae, OSS Post: Bucharest, Rumania, OSS, May 7, 1946, p. 1) (IMG)

Petru Groza, the former Prime Minister and present President of the National Assembly, was and is a tool for covering the power play behind the Rumanian Communist scene. (BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF GHEORGHIU-DEJ, CIA, October 17, 1952, p. 5) (IMG)

Over time, Petru Groza, another conservative element, was further demoted as well:

Now [Groza] is rewarded with a post of no political importance. Gheorghiu-Dej has become the Soviet head puppet in Rumania; but the real power in Rumania remains with the Central Committee of the PMR.... (BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF GHEORGHIU-DEJ, CIA, October 17, 1952, p. 5) (IMG)

Petru Groza, who had only served until now to smother and conceal the struggle between Gheorghiu-Dej, was finally shoved aside and as payment for his submissiveness he received the unimportant post of president of the National Assembly. (BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF GHEORGHIU-DEJ, CIA, October 17, 1952, p. 2) (IMG)

Hence, the political position of the Romanian communists in Romania’s bourgeois government increased and a project for industrializing that country went forward:

Shortly thereafter Gheorghiu-Dej became Minister of Public Works, and in december 1945, Minister of Economy in the new government of Petru Groza. Gheorghiu-Dej’s economic line from the beginning was that prescribed in advance by the Kremlin: advancement of the country through industrialization. This was shown in his newspaper article and his speeches, which were published in brochure form in 1951. Industrialization and subsequent proletarianization of the country were the main goals of the five-year plan, according to his own words. (BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF GHEORGHIU-DEJ, CIA, October 17, 1952, p. 4) (IMG)

In the first Rumanian government coalition, Dej was Minister for Industry and Trade. In 1946, he attended the peace conference in Paris as the Rumanian delegate. After the elections of 1946, Dej became Minister of Labor and, at the same time, deputy secretary general of the Rumanian Communist Party under Ana Pauker, who then was secretary general. Dej later replaced Ana Pauker as secretary general of the Communist Party and also became president of the Council of Ministers. (BACKGROUND OF TOP LEVEL COMMUNIST LEADERS IN RUMANIA, CIA, March 11, 1955, p. 2) (IMG)

Besides [Dej's] work in connection with the first five-year plan, [Dej] applied himself to the program for the electrification of the country, for the realization of which he worked vigorously. In his "Articles and Speeches" he emphasized the lack of criticism and self-criticism among officials. (BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF GHEORGHIU-DEJ, CIA, October 17, 1952, p. 4) (IMG)

The communist faction of the Party headed by Dej enjoyed popular support especially among the proletarians. The CIA reported that Dej knew how to be popular among Romanians:

Gheorghiu-Dej has grown up in a hard school. He understands, in spite of his submissiveness to the Soviet power, how to remain a popular Rumanian Communist leader. (BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF GHEORGHIU-DEJ, CIA, October 17, 1952, p. 5) (IMG)

As late as 1955, the CIA admitted:

Dej, a self-taught person of great will powers, enjoys a certain popularity among the Rumanian people.... (BACKGROUND OF TOP LEVEL COMMUNIST LEADERS IN RUMANIA, CIA, March 11, 1955, p. 2) (IMG)

In a 1952 report, the CIA admitted that Dej was always regarded as Rumanian workers' true representative, unlike Pauker:

In contrast to Ana Pauker, Gheorghiu-Dej was always regarded as a true representative of the Rumanian working class. (BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF GHEORGHIU-DEJ, CIA, October 17, 1952, p. 4) (IMG)

Gheorghiu-Dej led the labor group and had for his chief lieutenants his fellow agitators who formed the core of leadership in the railroad strike of 1933. (RECENT PURGES IN RUMANIAN COMMUNIST PARTY, CIA, August 12, 1952, p. 1) (IMG)

The predominantly revolutionary-minded Rumanian railroad proletarians held a prominent role in Romania's communist Party and supported Gheorghiu-Dej:

A prominent role is played by the railroad men who have always been the radical element of the Rumanian workers' movement. (...). Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, the representative of the trade union of railroad men therefore plays a dominant role in the country, while the other trade unions have not sent representatives into the top leadership of the country. (BACKGROUND OF TOP LEVEL COMMUNIST LEADERS IN RUMANIA, CIA, March 11, 1955, p. 1) (IMG)

The Soviets were well aware that Dej was popular:

In the new light of the Stalinist doctrine, [Dej] is a true son of the people as Moscow sees it. (BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF GHEORGHIU-DEJ, CIA, October 17, 1952, p. 4) (IMG)

Describing Dej's personality, the CIA stated:

he bends his entire energy and his innate intelligence to making himself an important party-fellow. He has always shown great eagerness to learn. His colleagues say he is slow ... but has genuine ability. He is not ashamed to show his ignorance in technical and economic problems and does not hesitate to let himself be instructed until he understands fully. (BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF GHEORGHIU-DEJ, CIA, October 17, 1952, p. 5) (IMG)

According to Enver Hoxha (see 'The Titoites' and 'The Khrushchevites'), Gheorghiu-Dej was a favorite of the Stalin-era Soviets. They said many positive things about him. This is backed up by the CIA which states:

Gheorghiu-Dej has an excellent standing with the Moscow Politburo.... (INTERPRETATION OF PURGE OF ANA PAUKER, CIA, September 11, 1952, p. 2) (IMG)

Later on, that same Dej became a militant opponent of the Kremlin Titoists who seized power in 1953.

With the regime change in Romania and the ascent to power of the communist-led forces, Romania got into the path for the establishment of a communist-led bourgeois-democracy, the first state of People's Democratic governance. It was therefore high time that the Party of millions would gradually narrow down its broad popular front and purge members who would have been problematic in its ranks:

The troubles of the Rumanian Communist Party lie elsewhere. (...). The purge of the last years has eliminated some 180,000 members (about 18 percent) but the Party is still far from the desired cohesion and uniformity. General Secretary Gheorghiu-Dej's statement that the Party is filled with anarchists, with rebels against Party discipline and with nepotists, is certainly correct. (INTERPRETATION OF PURGE OF ANA PAUKER, CIA, September 11, 1952, p. 2) (IMG)

Hiding behind the banner of a dogmatic (Trotskyite) interpretation of 'Leninism', Patrascanu was up against Lenin's pupil Stalin. Patrascanu, the Romanian Tito, was pursuing a hostile Trotskyite policy against the USSR, portraying the Soviets as degenerating Romania. He, who was a leader of Romania's Titoist movement, was duly purged. The US intelligence reported:

Patrascanu, formerly Minister of Justice, headed the intellectual group and adhered to a strict interpretation of Leninist Socialism. He became more and more critical of the Soviet spoilation of Rumania; he was, indeed, a Rumanian Tito before the advent of Titoism. Toward the end of 1947 he and his adherents were stripped of all political power and his ultimate fate is uncertain. (RECENT PURGES IN RUMANIAN COMMUNIST PARTY, CIA, August 12, 1952, p. 1) (IMG)

At the plenary session of the Rumanian Communist Party Central Committee in July 1946, Gheorghiu-Dej attacked in sharpest terms the supposed nationaistic tendencies in Rumania and denounced the so-called "chauvinistic provocationism" of Patrascanu, who, charged with being an agent of Western imperialism, was dismissed as Minister of Justice and arrested. (BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF GHEORGHIU-DEJ, CIA, October 17, 1952, p. 4) (IMG)

For this reason, even as late as 1952, the CIA stated:

Titoism has made no inroad in Rumania.... (INTERPRETATION OF PURGE OF ANA PAUKER, CIA, September 11, 1952, p. 2) (IMG)

The CIA also admitted:

Ana Pauker was unpopular in Rumania, in fact she was hated by the working class. (BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF GHEORGHIU-DEJ, CIA, October 17, 1952, p. 1) (IMG)

This fact:

was known in Moscow.... (BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF GHEORGHIU-DEJ, CIA, October 17, 1952, p. 1) (IMG)

Ana Pauker knew that she was unpopular especially among the proletarians of Romania. For this reason, her best course for seizing power in the Party was through the violation of the principles of democratic centralism, and the formation of a counter-revolutionary bloc, a counter-revolutionary intelligence network aimed at overthrowing the Party's democratic pro-communist majority which supported Dej. Pauker, the Titoist agent of the Mossad, formed her bloc with Luca and Georgescu:

It is because Ana Pauker aspired to real influence within the Rumanian Central Committee that she was eliminated. She tried to form her own group with Luca and Georgescu in the Politburo. (...). The ambitious Luca and Georgescu wished to use Pauker's popularity [among revisionists] but were easily broken by Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej.... (INTERPRETATION OF PURGE OF ANA PAUKER, CIA, September 11, 1952, pp. 1-2) (IMG)

Pauker lacked Party discipline and failed to dismiss certain unnamed foreign service officials whose work was unsatisfactory to the Central Committee. (Reasons for Pauker's Dismissal from Politburo, CIA, July 2, 1952, p. 1) (IMG)

Dej's most dangerous antagonist was Vasile Luca.... (BACKGROUND OF TOP LEVEL COMMUNIST LEADERS IN RUMANIA, CIA, March 11, 1955, p. 2) (IMG)

Romania's comprador classes, allied to Anglo-American finance capital, had as their commander-in-chief Ana Pauker, who, as revealed in C16S2, was an agent of the CIA and Mossad. Georgescu, the agent of Pauker, was the chief of the Ministry of Interior, the ministry responsible for counter-intelligence matters. "Teohari Georgescu," the CIA document added, was:

the former astute and dangerous Minister of Interior.... (RECENT PURGES IN RUMANIAN COMMUNIST PARTY, CIA, August 12, 1952, p. 1) (IMG)

Hence, through Georgescu, the comprador forces held some influence in Romania's counter-intelligence sector. Until 1950, Pauker's bloc in the Party advocated a terroristic Trotskyite-style forced 'collectivization' of agriculture, as a means of discrediting collectivization among peasants, and for driving a wedge between the peasants the Party, hence to undermine team Dej's position. The CIA reported:

Gheorghiu-Dej was charged with the supervision of the national economic plans for the first two years, 1949 and 1950. In his report to the plenary session of the PMR Central Committee (3-5 March 1949) he dealt with the problem of cooperation between the industrial proletariat and the peasantry. He recommended the retention of the middling peasant properties, which he viewed as the key to raising the conditions of the villages. He made from this formula a principle for realizing the "social construction" of agriculture. In this connection he emphasized, in opposition to the Ana Pauker group, the necessity of free consent of the peasantry to collectivization. (BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF GHEORGHIU-DEJ, CIA, October 17, 1952, p. 4) (IMG)

Dej supported collectivization, but was against such Trotskyite-style forcing of it, unlike Pauker's group. Unsurprisingly, the forced 'collectivization' policy advocated by the CIA-Mossad agent Pauker and her group systematically sabotaged Romanian agriculture. The United States Information Agency (USIA), an official propaganda and intelligence analysis organ of the US government, reported:

The effects of the 1950 collectivization drive were: (1) An exodus of the well-to-do peasants, who either left their land or were expropriated; (2) reduced activity among the recalcitrant middle peasants who preferred to produce only the necessary quantities to cover their personal needs and the delivery quotas in kind. As a result, the productivity of the collective farmers – in the kolkhozes and agricultural associations alike – barely reached the average of the remaining private farmers. The low agricultural output in 1950 could only be ascribed to the agricultural policy of the regime. ("New Course" in Rumanian Agriculture, Daniel Norman. In: 'Problems of Communism', July-August 1955, Number 4, Vol. 4, United States Information Agency, p. 40) (IMG)

After sabotaging agriculture and associating the image of collectivization with agricultural failure, Ana Pauker's group, the very network responsible for such failure, opportunistically flip-flopped and came out as the staunch opponents of collectivization, thus presenting themselves as the 'saviors' seeking to 'rescue' the peasants from agricultural failure. The USIA reported:

The leadership of the party split on future agricultural policy. Those who later were to be called the "right-wing deviationists," led by Vasile Luca and including his bosom friend Teohari Georgescu, as well as Ana Pauker, were in favor of a pause during the period of industrialization. Their argument was based on the limited capacity of heavy industry to produce tractors and agricultural machinery – hence they wanted to halt collectivization temporarily until the collectives, lagging behind for want of machines, were consolidated. The September 1951 resolution calling for a slowing down of collectivization reflected this point of view. ("New Course" in Rumanian Agriculture, Daniel Norman. In: 'Problems of Communism', July-August 1955, Number 4, Vol. 4, United States Information Agency, p. 40) (IMG)

As such, the left-opportunist Trotskyite group of Luca and Georgescu flip-flopped and reincarnated as right-opportunist Bukharinite opponents of collectivization. The CIA too acknowledged that these men were right-deviationists:

Ana Pauker's name is now disappearing from the Party indictments against the Rightist deviationists, Vasile Luca and Teohari Georgescu. (INTERPRETATION OF PURGE OF ANA PAUKER, CIA, September 11, 1952, p. 1) (IMG)

Against the right- and left- deviations of the CIA-Mossad-backed faction, the communist revolutionary leader Gheorghiu-Dej supported the development of the productive forces in conjunction concurrent with revolutionary changes in the property relations. The USSR supported Dej's line:

Moscow appears to understand that in Rumania a balance between the production of the country and the resulting development of Communism is necessary. This concurrence of Moscow's in the Gheorghiu-Dej point of view is quite remarkable; (BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF GHEORGHIU-DEJ, CIA, October 17, 1952, p. 4) (IMG)

Opposing agricultural collectivization and forcing 'collectivization' were both revisionist lines opposed by team Dej. Dej, the committed supporter of the scientific socialist line of Stalin, fought against the left- and right- deviations and revisionisms:

Gheorghiu-Dej was steadily insistent on making the Marx-Lenin doctrine his own, but he did not forget, by his own words, to remain true to the new directive of "his beloved comrade Stalin." He showed himself a sturdy fighter against every deformation or deviation. And therein lies the explanation of his success. (BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF GHEORGHIU-DEJ, CIA, October 17, 1952, p. 5) (IMG)

Pauker's:

position was still more shaken in 1950, when a staged trial against Lucretiu Patrascanu was opened. (BACKGROUND OF TOP LEVEL COMMUNIST LEADERS IN RUMANIA, CIA, March 11, 1955, p.3) (IMG)

In other words, Pauker's survival depended on the strength of the Titoist agent Patrascanu in Romania. Nonetheless, so blatantly Trotskyite was Patrascanu that even Luca and Pauker, for the sake of their own political survival, felt compelled to take a stance against him:

Ana Pauker was the chief of the third group. The leadership of this faction was composed largely of Soviet trained Communists who resided in the USSR during World War II and a few militant Communists who started their Communist activities in the early 1930's when Ana Pauker was working in the Central Committee. (RECENT PURGES IN RUMANIAN COMMUNIST PARTY, CIA, August 12, 1952, p. 1) (IMG)

The fourth group was headed by Vasile Luca, another Soviet-trained Communist enjoying the confidence of Moscow. (RECENT PURGES IN RUMANIAN COMMUNIST PARTY, CIA, August 12, 1952, p. 1) (IMG)

The two Soviet trained factions [of Luca and Pauker] allied themselves with Gheorghiu-Dej in causing the collapse of the Patrascanu faction. The three victors then formed an alliance and when the Popular Republic was constituted Ana Pauker and Vasile Luca were given posts in the ministry and made vice premiers of the Council of Ministers. (RECENT PURGES IN RUMANIAN COMMUNIST PARTY, CIA, August 12, 1952, p. 2) (IMG)

The fact that Pauker's gang were compelled to denounce Patrascanu's Trotskyism though, obviously weakened the imperialist intelligence network in Romania, hence damaging Pauker's group itself as well. It is also worth noting that Pauker, while having resided in Moscow, was not a 'Stalin protégé', nor was she really a loyal friend of the USSR. In fact:

Stories that Ana was Stalin's special protégé are based on insufficient knowledge of the Communist hierarchy. In that hierarchy she belonged in the propaganda department and was never considered as a person of theoretical or political ability, which means that her presence or absence within a Party's leadership did not modify its political weight or color. (INTERPRETATION OF PURGE OF ANA PAUKER, CIA, September 11, 1952, p. 1) (IMG)

The CIA-MI6 media mercenaries propagate the image of Ana Pauker as the 'first Jewish communist woman leader', and claim that she was eventually purged in a series of supposedly 'anti-Semitic' 'misogynistic' purges. However, contrary to the CIA-Mossad propaganda narrative which accuses the Romanian communists of 'anti-Semitism', the CIA itself admitted:

It has been suggested that Pauker's collapse is an indication of a new anti-semitic vogue in the Rumanian Communist Party. This hypothesis has just been refuted, however, by the rise to power of the Bessarabian Jew, Joseph Chisinevski who is now second in command to Gheorghiu-Dej. (RECENT PURGES IN RUMANIAN COMMUNIST PARTY, CIA, August 12, 1952, p. 3) (IMG)

Ana Pauker's Jewish background has often blinded many to her anti-Semitic betrayals. A Titoist reactionary who would serve as an agent of the CIA and Mossad, Ana Pauker was, during the Romanian people's liberation struggle, a Trotskyite who promoted a left-sectarian policy in the face of the fascist occupation of Romania. She opposed communist cooperation with the bourgeois parties against Nazism. The Radio Free Europe reported:

When she arrived to Romania in 1944, she was -- as was later time and again brought up against her by both Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and post-Communist Romanian nationalists -- criticizing the "home Communists" headed by Dej for having collaborated with the "bourgeois" parties in the ouster and arrest of Romania's war-time dictator Ion Antonescu. The move, she believed, had hindered the immediate establishment of a Communist regime with Red Army support. ('Stalinism With A Human Face? Part 2: Ana Pauker And The Liquidation Of Lucretiu Patrascanu', Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), East European Perspectives: June 27, 2001, Volume 3, Number 12, Michael Shafir, June 27, 2001) (IMG)

Having a female from an ethnic minority background in a top position in the People's Democracy is ceteris paribus a progressive thing, albeit of tertiary importance. However, to this day, among Titoist circles, Ana Pauker, a Trotskyite traitor to the Yiddish people, is admired as the 'First Jewish Communist Woman' foreign minister of Romania. This was the case back then too. Pauker was overrated for this reason:

Ana Pauker's case is not a critical issue in the Communist World. Her importance has always been exaggerated because she was a colorful personality and one of the few outstanding [pseudo-]Communist women leaders. (INTERPRETATION OF PURGE OF ANA PAUKER, CIA, September 11, 1952, p. 1) (IMG)

Having said that, she does deserve credit for being the first female traitor-in-chief in the camp of the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies. In terms of the command structure of the anti-Romanian intelligence network in Romania, she was at the top.

Malenkov, the Trotskyist-Titoist agent of Beria, lobbied in favor of the Mossad agent Pauker:

Malenkov intervened in the Rumanian purge and saved Pauker from confinement to her home in Bucharest by having her moved to the Crimea at the end of June 1952. (INTERPRETATION OF PURGE OF ANA PAUKER, CIA, September 11, 1952, p. 1) (IMG)

Of course, Malenkov lobbying in favor of Pauker may have been not an unfavorable outcome towards the Dej faction, because Pauker could provide weight against Chisinevski, another traitor to People's Democratic Romania. Chisinevski himself had been an agent of Pauker (see C23S1), but he opportunistically turned against Pauker on the overt level in order to save himself from the anti-Pauker purges. As such, while covertly allied, Chisinevski and Pauker were, on the overt level, 'enemies'. It follows that purging Pauker completely at the time would have been a strategically stupid move. Indeed, this is why:

Gheorghiu-Dej['s] ... position is not threatened by Malenkov's action to save Ana Pauker. (Interpretation of Purge of Ana Pauker, CIA, September 11, 1952, pp. 1-2) (IMG)

By the time of the Doctors' Plot campaign, the Pauker faction again became the priority, and thus:

Ana Pauker was arrested in February 1953 and accused of serving as an agent of international Zionism. (Moscow's Surprise, Wilson Center, Laurent Rucker, p. 32) (IMG{Israel})

In this midst, Chisinevski again emerged as the bigger threat to People's Democratic Romania. The case of the Trotskyite torturer Chisinevski will be explored in greater detail in C23S1.

Whereas the previous regimes had established a Romanian chauvinist reign of terror against the ethnic minorities, such as the Yiddish and the Hungarians, the new People's Democratic Romania pursued a policy of tolerance towards language and the non-religious aspects of culture. The MI6 station in Bucharest reported:

In previous reports and intelligence summaries I have mentioned agitation by Communist forces among the Hungarian and other minority populations in Roumania; I feel, however, that it may be of value if, following M. Luca's example, I choose this moment to summarize the present situation.

3. The Roumanian Workers' Party has from the outset made some play with the liberality of its minority policy. (...). It is logical from the point of view of the Roumanian Workers' Party, however, that the liberality shown to the minorities in matters of language and culture should not be extended to religion [particularly to Catholicism]. (R 13149/17/37, No. 21, COMMUNIST SOLUTION OF THE NATIONALITY QUESTION IN ROUMANIA, Mr. A. Holman to Mr. McNeil, Bucharest, November 15, 1948, Received November 20, 1948. Foreign Office (Balkans, 1948) - Romania, p. 55. Foreign Office (Balkans, 1948) - Whole Book, p. 275) (IMG{Orthodox Church})

In the above-cited document, the MI6 official who wrote the report specified that the religion that was lesser tolerated by the Romanian authorities was Catholicism. For more details on the communist opposition to Catholicism, see C15S7.

C15S2. The Rajk Network; Yugoslav Intelligence and UDB Terror in Hungary *** IMG-All-{Hungary}

The most important of the imperialist agents in Hungary's communist movement was Laszlo Rajk, who:

came from a Saxon (German) family of Transylvania. He had two brothers. His original name: REICH. (Background of the Rajk Case, CIA, May 23, 1956, p. 1) (IMG)

The family's original name was congruent with their politics. In the late 1940s, Rajk declared himself as:

an Aryan, and a pure one, because I'm a Saxon on one side of my family. (Report on the Murder of the General Secretary, Karel Kaplan p. 29) (IMG)

His two brothers were prominent members of the Hungarian Nazi 'Arrow Cross' organization:

Rajk's two brothers both had been leading members of the Arrow Cross party. (FACTIONALISM IN THE HUNGARIAN WORKERS (COMMUNIST) PARTY (1945-1956), CIA, January, 28, 1957, p. 26) (IMG)

There were already great contrasts in the RAJK family. His brother was completely in favor of the Nazi ideology and has glorified Nazism. (Background of the Rajk Case, CIA, May 23, 1956, p. 1) (IMG)

RAJK's brother was an active Nazi (arrow-cross)... (Background of the Rajk Case, CIA, May 23, 1956, p. 1) (IMG)

The three Rajk brothers, these 'pure' 'Aryan' Saxons, were all fascists. Yet, one of them, Laszlo Rajk, would infiltrate the communist labour movement on behalf of his brothers.

Upon the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War, communists and democrats worldwide heeded to the call of the Comintern and travelled to Spain as 'International Brigades' (C8S4) in order to defend freedom against the fascist rebels and Axis aggressors. This outflow of communists was undoubtedly for the noble cause of defending democratic Spain so to contain the Axis. Yet this mass-travelling of communists also presented a great opportunity for fascist police-spies to infiltrate this flow of communists, and hence to infiltrate the lines of and backstab the Spanish Republican forces.

Upon the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War, Laszlo Rajk and a number of other Hungarians who posed as communists 'volunteered' 'on behalf' of the Comintern in the fight against the Spanish fascists:

Approximately one thousand Hungarian volunteers joined the brigade, formed the so-called "Rakosi Battalion" and thus acquired paramilitary experience that was of major importance during WWII. The commander of the brigade was Ferenc Munnich, former officer in the Bela Kun army and by now a Communist of international reputation. Both Erno Gero and Mihaly Farkas reportedly were involved in the fighting, Gero allegedly as special representative of the Comintern. Among the ... leaders of the Hungarians was ... Laszlo Rajk, who performed ... as political officer of the Rakosi Battalion. (FACTIONALISM IN THE HUNGARIAN WORKERS (COMMUNIST) PARTY (1945-1956) (REFERENCE), CIA, January 28, 1957, p. 10) (IMG)

It is worth reminding, however, that while he travelled to Spain officially as a Communist Party leader, Rajk was not really a communist:

The experiences in Spain formed a convinced communist of RAJK who before has not been completely communist in his belief. (Background of the Rajk Case, CIA, May 23, 1956, p. 1) (IMG)

In Spain, the fake 'communist' Rajk was welcomed enthusiastically by Dr. Ferenc Munich, the political commissar of the brigade:

The young Rajk arriving from Hungary has been received with great enthusiasm and the commander of the Hungarian brigade ZALKA Mate immediately detailed RAJK to his side and here RAJK made a close friendship with MUNICH Ferenc Dr. the political commissar of the brigade. (...). First, MUNICH nominated RAJK as cell-trustee then later he received larger and larger political roles. (Background of the Rajk Case, CIA, May 23, 1956, p. 2. The bad spelling is original.) (IMG)

The commander of the Hungarian communist brigade in Spain was Bela Frankl, nicknamed 'Mate Zalka':

After the defeat of the 1919 revolution many Hungarians escaped abroad. One member of the Mateszalka directorium (local soviet) – Mateszalka is a small city about 3-40 Kilometers from Nyiregyhaza – also took the flight. His name, even today, is unknown in Hungary. This man emerged in the Soviet Union and under the name of ZALKA Mate (the city's name transposed Mate-szalka) [and] did some writings. The Hungarian communists living in Moscow designated him as commander of the Hungarian brigade operating in the Spanish civil war and he served there under the names of ZALKA Mate and general LUKACS. (Background of the Rajk Case, CIA, May 23, 1956, p. 2) (IMG)

The big obstacle to Rajk's career as a fascist agent in the Hungarian brigade was indeed General Zalka himself, who unlike Ferenc Munich, did not trust Rajk as much:

General ZALKA also ... was somewhat reserved toward RAJK. (Background of the Rajk Case, CIA, May 23, 1956, p. 2) (IMG)

The fascist infiltrators in the Communist Party murdered the anti-fascist martyr Zalka. Referring to General Zalka, the CIA confirmed:

The communists themselves eliminated him. (Background of the Rajk Case, CIA, May 23, 1956, p. 2) (IMG)

Cui bono? Rajk's group, if not behind the assassination of Zalka, certainly benefited from such a murder by other fascist agents in the communist movement, as the elimination of Zalka and the relieving of his staff from their positions paved the way for the rise of Rajk:

As a matter of fact RAJK's carrier in Spain began after the death of general ZALKA. At that time, the staff of the brigade has been relieved and in the new staff RAJK already had a serious, leading role. (Background of the Rajk Case, CIA, May 23, 1956, p. 2) (IMG)

At the end of the Spanish Civil War, Rajk and his group moved to France. Therein, they established contacts with the notorious American intelligence spymaster Noel Field.

There exists a far-fetched allegation that Noel Field was 'in reality' a Soviet spy who had infiltrated the OSS. This allegation is unfounded. The far-fetched claims are also seriously challenged by George H. Hodos who, after the Great Patriotic War, returned to Hungary as an editor of economic journals and a correspondent for western newspapers. He has been arrested on charges of espionage for the CIA and later on was able to flee to the US-led camp. He later taught East European history at the University of Vienna and served as a Scientific Advisor of the Yearbook of Historical Research about Communism at the University of Mannheim in Germany. Given his background as a scientific advisor for Yearbook of Historical Research about Communism as well as his ties to Western correspondents, Hodos's work is a valuable source. A staunchly anti-Soviet scholar, Hodos admits that Noel Field could not possibly be a double agent working 'in reality' for the Soviets. As Hodos wrote:

During the war, a number of Soviet espionage agents were active in neutral Switzerland primarily, of course, in pursuit of military intelligence. (...). The Russians were not interested in Field, who had been aiding emigré communists. Had they asked him to provide

information about fascists, Field would have aided them in good conscience, but the role of enlisted [Soviet] agent was totally foreign to his character. (Show Trials: Stalinist Purges in Eastern Europe, 1948-1954. George H. Hodos, 1987, p. 29) (IMG)

In addition, Hodos criticizes Stewart Steven for his book 'Operation Splinter Factor', in which Steven claims that Noel Field was a Soviet double agent.

At this point, Steven's report moves away from historical fact and introduces half-truths and distortions. He claims that Dulles felt he had been duped by Field, who was not a simple humanitarian but a devious communist, betraying his trust and embarrassing him severely in Washington by tricking him into actions that placed communists in power in Germany, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. Dulles, according to Steven, did not forget this and vowed revenge. (Show Trials: Stalinist Purges in Eastern Europe, 1948-1954. George H. Hodos, 1987, p. 30) (IMG)

Anyways, Rajk and his group not only were tied to Field, but also contacted certain Yugoslav leaders. In those:

French internment camps, following the close of hostilities, a number of the participants in the Spanish Civil War were brought into close contact with representatives of Western relief agencies, including Noel Field, and with Yugoslav members of the International Brigade. During this period (1939- 41), ... [in] these internment camps, Rajk and certain other Hungarians participated in discussions of Communist theory with Yugoslav leaders and apparently formed personal friendships.... (FACTIONALISM IN THE HUNGARIAN WORKERS (COMMUNIST) PARTY (1945-1956) (REFERENCE), CIA, January 28, 1957, p. 10) (IMG)

Soon, Rajk was to return to Hungary and continue his fascist anti-communist subversion there.

Throughout the inter-war years, the Communist Party of Hungary had been the sole major anti-fascist resistance organization:

During the period between World Wars I and II the communists were the only subversive group in Hungary.... (Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas Hungary, CIA, August 1957, p. 1) (IMG)

With the onset of the Second World War, Hungarian communist-led anti-fascist resistance against Horthy's regime intensified. The Hungarian communist-led democratic resistance movement was:

Soviet-sponsored and [was] led by Matyas Rakosi.... (Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas Hungary, CIA, August 1957, p. 1. Citing: National Intelligence Survey 19, Section 57, September 1955, CIA, p. 3) (IMG)

The communist-led anti-fascist freedom-fighters resisted the Axis forces:

An orthodox Communist-dominated Committee of Liberation ostensibly under Smallholder Endre Bajcsi-Zsilinszky (subsequently arrested and executed by the Arrow Cross) was belatedly established to coordinate the activities of all resistance groups ten days after a pro-German coup [in Hungary].... (Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas Hungary, CIA, August 1957, p. 1. Citing: National Intelligence Survey 19, Section 57, September 1955, CIA, p. 3) (IMG)

Indeed, the communists were active in several front organizations. Two of the groups which:

participated in the resistance [were] the Students' Resistance Movement, the membership [of] ... which had a one-third orthodox Communist representation.... (Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas Hungary, CIA, August 1957, pp. 1-2. Citing: National Intelligence Survey 19, Section 57, September 1955, CIA, p. 3) (IMG)

and:

the Union of the Friends of the U.S.S.R., which was under orthodox Communist domination. (Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas Hungary, CIA, August 1957, p. 2. Citing: National Intelligence Survey 19, Section 57, September 1955, CIA, p. 3) (IMG)

In those days especially, every blow against the Axis, however small, was still significant. Many Hungarian communists and democratic freedom-fighters sacrificed their lives for the defeat of the fascists and thereby contributed to the Soviet victories on the Eastern Front.

By late December 1942, the Nazi army failed to achieve its objectives in Stalingrad and the Caucasus, and therein began to retreat. As mentioned in C11S2, this was the time in which Anglo-American imperialism commenced an alliance with the Axis. At this time, the OSS, through its top operative in Europe, Noel Field, transported Rajk to Hungary via Yugoslavia. Nigel West – the prominent British author on intelligence studies, the European Editor of the International Journal of Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence and lecturer of the history of postwar intelligence at the intelligence think tank 'Centre for Counterintelligence and Security Studies' – wrote:

Field had indeed aided Rajk's return to Hungary in 1943, having arranged his escape from an internment camp in France, doubtless with OSS's help, but [took] his route through Yugoslavia.... (Cold War Counterfeit Spies: Tales of Espionage: Genuine or Bogus?, Nigel West, September 28, 2016) (IMG)

With the help of his new American intelligence handler, Rajk was released from the fascist internment camp and returned to Hungary. The OSS, led in Europe by Dulles, assisted Rajk's group to return to Hungary:

Field contacted Dulles, who agreed to furnish money, U.S. and Yugoslav uniforms, and letters of recommendation so that they could be smuggled through France, Italy, and Yugoslavia to Hungary. The other joint operation involved parachuting German antifascists into Germany to organize resistance against the disintegrating Nazi administration. The persons in the group included communists suggested by Field. (Show Trials: Stalinist Purges in Eastern Europe, 1948-1954. George H. Hodos, 1987, p. 30) (IMG)

Thus, by:

the beginning of 1943 RAJK ... is with KADAR Janos the leader of the Communist Party of Hungary. (Background of the Rajk Case, CIA, May 23, 1956, p. 4) (IMG)

Janos Kadar was a close partner of Rajk. Along with his partner Kadar, Rajk wormed his way up in the Party and became the de facto leader of the Hungarian Communist Party, fostering also a close partnership with his friend Gabor Peter:

Perhaps it might even be stated that already [Rajk] was the first person (of the party). Beginning from this time he was in close friendship with PETER Gabor who later became the head of the AVH. (Background of the Rajk Case, CIA, May 23, 1956, p. 4) (IMG)

Laszlo Rajk [was] leader of the underground communist movement.... (THE TANGLED WEB: Allied deception operations in Hungary. In: 'Studies in Intelligence: A collection of articles on the historical, operational, doctrinal, and theoretical aspects of intelligence', CIA, p. 32) (IMG)

During the People's Liberation War against the Horthy regime, Rajk had opposed the popular front policy of alliance with progressive bourgeois-democratic parties against fascism. Instead, Rajk had supported the Trotskyite view (held also by his comrade, Tito) that Hungary needed to leap straight to 'socialism' instead of undergoing the progressive bourgeois-democratic revolution. Geoffrey Swain of the BBC wrote:

Apart from Szönyi himself, the obvious target for suspicion was Laszlo Rajk. He had served in Spain, had been interned in France for three years, and he had returned to Hungary in 1941 to head the underground Central Committee of the Communist Party. While under his leadership the Party had operated the 'Titoist', '1919', popular front 'from below' strategy aimed at limiting the number of concessions made to 'bourgeois' parties, the policy that the returning Rákosi had confronted on his arrival from Moscow. (Eastern Europe Since 1945, Geoffrey Swain, Nigel Swain, 2018, p. 70) (IMG)

With the strategic triumph of the USSR in the Battle of Stalingrad, the tide turned, and the US began to strategically realign with Nazi Germany since late 1942, shortly after which Rajk returned to Hungary with the assistance of the pro-Nazi Allen Dulles. This meant that the US would also eventually enter into an alliance with the Trotskyite elements that had worked to the benefit of the Nazis – for example, Laszlo Rajk. Thus, on March 1944, American intelligence launched operation SPARROW in order to enter fascist Hungary into an alliance with the United States:

On Monday, 13 March 1944, OSS Team Sparrow dropped from an RAF Halifax into Hungary, near the town of Nagykanizsa, close to the Yugoslav border. The team members had not been told that the Germans probably knew of their mission, but were instructed to establish contact with General Ujzaszy, Chief of Hungarian Military Intelligence and Security, to negotiate for the Hungarians to ... join the Western Allies. (THE TANGLED WEB: Allied deception operations in Hungary. In: 'Studies in Intelligence: A collection of articles on the historical, operational, doctrinal, and theoretical aspects of intelligence', CIA, p. 31) (IMG)

One of the links between American and Hungarian intelligence services was the Rajk-Kadar group. Throughout:

1944 PETER Gabor, KADAR Janos, and RAJK Laszlo were hidden at the same place.... The place was the apartment of BABITS Antal, university professor, at the Deak Ferenc square, where a room has been walled in (and separated from the apartment) and the trio lived there. One might say, that at this time PETER and RAJK were the best of friends, in fact they spun the yarn of a dream that they will co-operate. (Background of the Rajk Case, CIA, May 23, 1956, p. 4) (IMG)

Even as Horthy's secret police 'continued its fight against the communists' and the anti-fascist democratic resistance, Rajk was busy backstabbing the anti-fascist movement by allying with and receiving funds from the secret police:

RAJK actually came into contact with the Hungarian counter-intelligence service which continued its fight against the communists. This happened in October 1944. Governor HORTHY already saw that the fight has been lost and wanted to save his position (power) somehow and first turned to the British for help.... Horthy then ... looked for connections to the underground, leftist elements. This job was trusted to UJSZASZY Istvan, major-general, head of the intelligence and counter-intelligence departments. In October 1944 ... UJSZASZY contacted RAJK, as the leader of the underground communist organisation. RAJK asked for arms and munitions, and UJSZASZY promised both. These meetings took place at the infamous Hadik Barracks (the counter-intelligence barracks), where RAJK and his former pursuer and persecutor [i.e. UJSZASZY] even contracted an alliance. (Background of the Rajk Case, CIA, May 23, 1956, p. 4) (IMG)

Note that at this point in time, Rajk, Kadar, and Peter were living in the same place. Not surprisingly, a US intelligence document confirmed that Kadar was 'an associate' of the head of Horthy's secret service:

Ujzaszy and an associate, Janos Kadar, ... [took] part in SPARROW. (THE TANGLED WEB: Allied deception operations in Hungary. In: 'Studies in Intelligence: A collection of articles on the historical, operational, doctrinal, and theoretical aspects of intelligence', CIA, p. 32) (IMG)

Project SPARROW was the American intelligence project for an alliance with fascist Hungary. That Kadar, an associate of Horthy's fascist intelligence chief, took part in project SPARROW goes on to expose Kadar's loyalties. After the 1956 Red Army intervention in Hungary, Kadar, the topmost henchman of Imre Nagy, was planted at the helm of the Hungarian state with the lobby of Andropov, Khrushchev, and Tito, hence sabotaging the 1956 anti-fascist intervention in that Nazi-stricken country. Kadar went on to lead 'socialist' Hungary well until the 1988. More on this will be mentioned in C20S13.

Rather than get their spies to travel all the way to a directorate of the imperialist-fascist secret service, imperialist-fascist secret services instead officially 'arrest' their own spies and then interrogate them. The 'arrest' and interrogation provides a cover for getting those spies to travel all the way to the secret service office and provide full intelligence briefings or any other intelligence cooperation that the secret services wishes to have.

In late 1944, Rajk was 'arrested' by the Nazis. However, due to his anti-communist service for Horthy's secret police, his role in liaising American intelligence with Horthy's intelligence, as well as his family bonds to the Arrow Cross leaders, it would have been a serious strategic mistake on the part of the Nazis to purge this valuable asset of the American-German intelligence:

After the 15 of October 1944, RAJK's brother became "Arrow cross" (Hungarian Nazi) secretary of state. When RAJK Laszlo's case came up, charged with treason, before the military court – the judge has been DOMINICS Vilmos, military judge major – RAJK's brother appeared and participated in the trial in "Arrow Cross" uniform as secretary of state. (Background of the Rajk Case, CIA, May 23, 1956, p. 5) (IMG)

According to a paper published by the research staff of the US Department of State – who operated under cover of researchers in Stanford University – Rajk was saved directly upon the intervention of his Nazi brother who as the Assistant Secretary of State in the Arrow Cross regime in Hungary:

In 1944 [Rajk] was ... captured by the Nazis and sentenced to death with the other leaders. Several of his brothers were however ardent Nazis and one of them was Assistant State Secretary. This brother was in office during the 1944 Nazi SZALASI REGIME IN Hungary. After Rajk was arrested, they saved his life and he was the only captured underground leader who escaped with a life sentence and was liberated in a few weeks. ('THE TACTICS AND STRATEGY OF COMMUNISM IN HUNGARY 1919-1949', Stanford Research Center of Stanford University, External Research Staff of the US Department of State, Series 3, No. 30, September 13, 1950, p. 285) (IMG)

In the end, this valuable asset was not purged by a Nazi secret service, which anyways was lenient towards its agent. Rajk then contacted Hungary's communist-led democratic movement:

Returning from German deportation RAJK naturally contacted the party immediately. (Background of the Rajk Case, CIA, May 23, 1956, p. 5) (IMG)

According to the CIA, in 1945,:

The anti-semitism was awakened in RAJK at the first time in this period. REVAY, GERO, and FARKAS strongly attacked RAJK, saying that the anti-Semite period is over in Hungary. (...). RAKOSI closed the discussion [by saying] that communism does not know denominations, does not know religion. This is how the REVAI, FARKAS against RAJK struggle started. GERO, knowing the [anti-Semitic] situation in Hungary, retreated on this ground. (Background of the Rajk Case, CIA, May 23, 1956, p. 5. 'retreated' should have been written as 'retreated'.) (IMG)

In fact, Rajk had always been an anti-Semite, as evidenced by his collaboration with Horthy's secret service. Not surprisingly, Rajk's support base was predominantly from the remnants of the former Nazi regime as well as Trotskyite infiltrator elements in Budapest's labour movement:

Rajk's ... following contained diverse elements ranging from extreme left-wing of Budapest and other key centers of industry to former Arrow Cross members who supported the one outstanding non-Jewish leader of the party. (FACTIONALISM IN THE HUNGARIAN WORKERS (COMMUNIST) PARTY (1945-1956) (REFERENCE), CIA, January 28, 1957, p. 27) (IMG)

Rajk, who received support from the left-opportunist tendencies as mentioned above, had held the Trotskyite view that communists should not ally with the progressive bourgeois-democratic parties – this is not surprising since Rajk himself was a Nazi agent. Rajk was a Trotskyite preacher of fanatical emotional behaviour. Contrasting the characters of the communist 'Stalinist' leader Rakosi, Erno Gero (the Hungarian version of Malenkov), and Laszlo Rajk, the US State Department report stated:

While Rakosi had important features of "cooled down" wisdom of age and experience, Gero was cold machinelike soulless party fanaticism [sic; fanaticism] in itself, dry and without any appeal to the emotions; Rajk was full of emotions. He preached hatred.... ('THE TACTICS AND STRATEGY OF COMMUNISM IN HUNGARY 1919-1949', Stanford Research Center of Stanford University, External Research Staff of the US Department of State, Series 3, No. 30, September 13, 1950, p. 285) (IMG)

According to the Anglo-American-German intelligence agent Karel Kaplan, the CIA operative Noel Field asked Allen Dulles to sponsor Tibor Szonyi. 'In April 1945, during the final weeks of the conflict,' the Kaplan revelations presented in a US intelligence memorandum stated, Field sent to Allen Dulles:

a letter asking that backing be given to Tibor Szonyi, a Hungarian anti-fascist and communist.... (Revelations of Karel Kaplan, Intelligence Memorandum for Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, CIA, May 3, 1977, p. 7) (IMG{GDR})

The CIA-backed Tibor Szonyi was relied on by the Gestapo agent and Anglo-American agent Rajk to appoint Rajk loyalists onto Party cadres. Geoffrey Swain of the BBC wrote:

It was his communist contacts which, towards the end of the Second World War, aroused the interest of the American undercover organisation the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in Field. Alan Dulles, the Head of OSS and brother of John Foster Dulles, future US Secretary of State, contacted Field to help organise the return of émigré groups of German and Hungarian communists to their respective countries. It was this Hungarian operation that was to be so controversial: in December 1944 money provided by Dulles was used by Field to organise the return to Hungary of a small émigré group headed by Tibor Szönyi. Field obtained surplus Yugoslav partisan uniforms and planned a return route via France, Italy and Yugoslavia, a partisan route run by the Yugoslavs. A Hungarian link between Tito and American imperialism had been established. (...). To make matters worse, after 1945 Rajk had often asked Szönyi, who became head of the Party's Cadre Department, to find jobs for various veterans of the Spanish Civil War. At the same time, at least this was the complaint of the Soviet representative on the ACC, he had systematically removed from positions of authority in the police service those officers who had spent the war years in the Soviet Union. (Eastern Europe Since 1945, Geoffrey Swain, Nigel Swain, 2018, p. 70) (IMG)

The rise of Rajk to power also led to the elevation of Janos Kadar as Rajk's deputy and associate. It also involved the appointment, almost certainly with the approval of Szonyi, of 'former' Zionist activist Horvath at the media sector:

In the general distribution of rewards to ... Communists, Rajk took over leadership of the Budapest party organization with Kadar as his deputy, pending Rajk's appointment as minister of the interior in March 1946. Marton Horvath, resistance leader and reputed former Zionist, became editor of Szabad Nep and members of the Debrecen Communist cell received important posts: Kallai and Losonczi were awarded key propaganda positions; Ferenc Donath was appointed to the Ministry of Agriculture; Sandor Zold to the Ministry of Interior and Szilard Ujhelyi to the Ministry of Social Welfare. Other local Communists were provided with seats in parliament or jobs in the party apparatus. (FACTIONALISM IN THE HUNGARIAN WORKERS (COMMUNIST) PARTY (1945-1956) (REFERENCE), CIA, January 28, 1957, p. 21) (IMG)

In the meantime, with Szonyi in charge of the appointments of the Party cadres, and Rajk in charge of the counter-intelligence sector, the fascist intelligence network led by Rajk was able to freely release from internment camps many people who were openly Nazis, including Rajk's own Nazi brothers. Rajk then proceeded to install these Nazis in local positions in the provinces and to promote his own hatred towards the Yiddish proletarians. According to a document by the US State Department's external research wing,:

His brothers fled to Germany with the Nazis, [but] some of them came back to Hungary later, [and] Rajk who by that time was already Interior Minister secured their releases from the internment camp and even helped them to obtain some small position in the provinces. In Hungary former "small Nazis" were considered a good ideological investment. The Communist Party gave a chance to tens of thousands of former Nazi Party members, rank and file, in that category to make good the errors of their past by entering the Communist Party. Rajk enthusiastically backed this Communist Party move. This and his extreme anti-semitism were well known facts in Hungary. ('THE TACTICS AND STRATEGY OF COMMUNISM IN HUNGARY 1919-1949', Stanford Research Center of Stanford University, External Research Staff of the US Department of State, Series 3, No. 30, September 13, 1950, p. 285) (IMG)

Rajk, the hateful anti-Semite, helped expel the Yiddish people from Hungary, thus stockpiling cannon-fodder for Moshe Dayan and Ariel Sharon. Furthermore, the Rajk era had seen an elevation of the 'former' Zionist elements in the media sector of Hungary. By contrast, Rakosi, a Yiddish-Hungarian, was the leading anti-Zionist purger in Hungary (see C16S2). The fascist spies in Hungary had as their base the comprador classes, such as the bureaucrats and kulaks. In any case, he CIA reported::

Peasants who had received farms under the land reform and joined the party may also have looked to Rajk as a possible opponent of Soviet-style collectivization. (FACTIONALISM IN THE HUNGARIAN WORKERS (COMMUNIST) PARTY (1945-1956) (REFERENCE), CIA, January 28, 1957, p. 27) (IMG)

Given his Trotskyite credentials and emotional behaviour, what Rajk probably advocated was a combination of forced 'collectivization' in order to foster mass resentment towards collectivization, and at the same time a liberal economic policy in favor of the kulaks. This was the classic anti-collectivization pincer assault strategy used by the Titoists in the bloc.

Rajk was also a Yugoslav and American intelligence agent. A declassified US State Department and intelligence analysis document states clearly:

In February 1948, Rajk went secretly to Belgrade where Tito brought him into contact with the intelligence agents of the American embassy and he started to work for them from that time onwards. On that Belgrade meeting they also agreed on the establishment of a Southeastern European union independent of Moscow under the leadership of Tito and one of their officers in that organization would be the Bulgarian Kostov deputy prime minister. ('THE TACTICS AND STRATEGY OF COMMUNISM IN HUNGARY 1919-1949', Stanford Research Center of Stanford University, External Research Staff of the US Department of State, Series 3, No. 30, September 13, 1950, p. 290) (IMG)

Hence, by February 1948, Rajk was already an American spy, collaborating closely with Tito and his agent Traicho Kostov, Bulgaria's Deputy Prime Minister, towards Hungary's and Bulgaria's incorporation into a hostile anti-Soviet Greater Yugoslav Empire. Hungary and Bulgaria, not just Albania, were subject to Tito's aggressive ambitions. An excerpt of Rajk's conversation with a prison cellmate several months later is telling:

The impulse for the first campaign against Rajk followed Cominform's Yugoslav resolution, with which Rajk didn't completely agree, as he later admitted to a prison cellmate:

The truth is that I have a different opinion than Rakosi on some issues, for example concerning Yugoslavia. I never concealed that. I never believed that Tito was a traitor. I always believed this accusation would cause fateful disunity of the socialist camp.

(Report on the Murder of the General Secretary, Karel Kaplan, 1990, p. 26) (IMG)

Having gained a foothold in the Hungarian government:

Rajk, who ... was obviously allowed latitude in selecting his subordinates, installed former Spanish Civil War comrades in important posts in the civil police.... (FACTIONALISM IN THE HUNGARIAN WORKERS (COMMUNIST) PARTY (1945-1956) (REFERENCE), CIA, January 28, 1957, p. 26) (IMG)

Note that Rajk's friends in the Spanish Civil War had risen up in the ranks as a result of the murder of General Zalka, the anti-fascist commander opposed to Rajk. From 1948 onwards, Rajk formed a powerful Titoist fifth column in Hungary's police/security service.

First RAJK tried to place his own men into the key positions.... His political secretary of state, who had the power in his hands, was a former lawyer from Szeged, SZEBENYI Endre, the two chiefs of the police section were: EKES Istvan, lieutenant colonel and MARSCHALL Laszlo, colonel. RAJK's friendship with MARSCHALL dates back from France. MARSCHALL was the chief director of the police instruction matters. [The] press department was headed by CSERESNYES Sandor a former fighting comrade of his from Spain. (Background of the Rajk Case, CIA, May 23, 1956, p. 7) (IMG)

Marschall – in the name of communism, so to discredit communism – engaged in Trotskyite-style anti-popular police terrorism against the Hungarian masses, with the aim of provoking mass resentment towards the Hungarian state, the USSR, and scientific socialism. Referring to Marschall, the CIA confirmed:

The organization of the interment (concentration) camps, the nightly disappearances, the unlawful arrests, the atrocities of the AVH all are connected with his [Marschall's] name. (...). Never, has so many men been in jail in Hungary than in his time. (...). At the same time together with PETER Gabor, he was the preparator of the Soviet military murders at the Octagon square which furnished the reasons to reinforce the AVH. (Background of the Rajk Case, CIA, May 23, 1956, p. 7) (IMG)

While such terrorism did assist the Rajk group in fomenting unrest among significant segments of the population, especially the intelligentsia, the bulk of the Hungarian masses were against Rajk and held him responsible for the terror:

RAJK was less popular in parliament and in public ... because he was repeatedly mentioned as the director of the ... terror. (Background of the Rajk Case, CIA, May 23, 1956, p. 7) (IMG)

He was already unpopular enough in public and the Hungarian parliament. A number of factors undermined the Rajk faction. Firstly, the denunciation of Tito's group by the Cominform raised vigilance against Titoism through the region, thus keeping in check the network to which Rajk belonged. This allowed the communist faction to move ahead and demote Rajk and his collaborators:

When RAJK Laszlo was removed from the heavy of the ministry of interior, the public opinion of the country breathed a little more freely. Everybody believed that no worse, no more wicked, no more cruel a person could replace him. (Background of the Rajk Case, CIA, May 23, 1956, p. 10) (IMG)

Eventually Rajk and his group were purged, with Rajk being executed for sabotage and espionage. The interrogation and trial of Rajk, during which Rajk stated his ties to Nazi German intelligence and his links to Tito's circle, further exposed the fascist character of the Yugoslav state. Karel Kaplan, a West German intelligence agent, remarked:

The political fallout of Rajk's trial was Cominform's second resolution on Yugoslavia, of November 1949, with the suggestive title, "The Yugoslav Communist Party in the Hands of Murderers and Spies." The trial and this resolution resulted in intensified persecution of "enemies" within Communist parties, and in escalating Soviet-bloc attacks against Yugoslavia. (The Report on the Murder of the General Secretary, Karel Kaplan, 1990, p. 30) (IMG)

In that rather famous resolution, part of which has been cited previously, Tito, his gang, and his regime were denounced as 'fascist'. The Yugoslav intelligence service provided support for the Titoist networks whom Rajk headed.

Yugoslavia became the country hosting the MI6 bases for terrorist operations against the Hungarian People's Democracy:

A typical low-level agent, Gorka collected information on heavy industry, mining and transport for his M16 contact in Vienna, 'Mr Thompson'. He carefully noted the types of Russian vehicles, armour and tanks and their number plates which enabled M16 to compile

a breakdown of the Russian units stationed in Hungary or in transit through the country. The group also provided details on the construction of the largest Russian military airport in eastern Europe.

Gorka claims that the group's most important intelligence-gathering coup was sight of Russian documents that detailed contingency plans for the complete takeover of the country and government by their Hungarian puppets in the event of the further deterioration of the situation in Yugoslavia. Interestingly, Gorka reveals that once relations between Stalin and Tito had been settled to the satisfaction of the West, M16 began using Yugoslavia as a launching pad for sending couriers and agents into Hungary. Yugoslav intelligence officers worked hand in glove with their M16 counterparts. One Hungarian agent told Gorka about a meeting in Belgrade for an infiltration mission with a wartime SOE officer who had undertaken undercover operations into German-occupied Serbia.

(MI6: Inside the Covert World of Her Majesty's Secret Intelligence Service, Stephen Dorril, p. 177) (IMG)

In mid-1950, a CIA report stated that several Hungarian and Romanian Titoist refugees to Yugoslavia, after being tortured by the Yugoslav regime's intelligence service, were forcibly sent back to Hungary and Romania:

The concentration camp at Zrenjanin was established during World War II by the Nazis and later taken over by the UDB. Its capacity is not known, although between February and November 1949, there were approximately 800 persons incarcerated there. At present the camp is used to hold refugees from Hungary and Rumania. The commandant of the camp is UDB Captain Joseph Tubic, who speaks Hungarian. (...). Outside these barracks are concrete bunkers, two and one-half meters deep and two and one-half meters long, inside which are wells in which prisoners sentenced to solitary confinement are kept in a crouching position. The entire camp is surrounded by a barbed wire fence and guarded by troops of the UDB. New arrivals are told by Tubic that the camp is the end of their journey; that anyone who breaks the rules will be shot. (...). Treatment of the prisoners is very harsh; the daily food ration consists of tea, 400 grams of bread, and thin soup. neither fuel nor blankets are issued during the winter months. The most minor infractions of the camp rules are punishment by ten days' confinement in the bunkers. There is considerable corruption among the UDB guards who, in exchange for personal possessions, will obtain some food, mostly vegetables for the prisoners. (...). At various times during 1949, but especially in March, April, and July, an unspecified number of prisoners was taken to the border and forced back into Hungary and Rumania. ('The Concentration Camp Near Zrenjanin, Serbia', CIA, July 24, 1950, p. 1) (IMG{Yugoslavia})

The CIA pointed to reports by Hungaria – a Munich-based Hungarian anti-communist opposition newspaper, controlled by the Horthy-era head of the National Bank of Hungary, Baron Antal Radvanszky – stating that upon arrival to Yugoslavia, the Hungarian 'refugees':

were all captured by Yugoslav border guards, forced by OZNA (old form of UDB – Security Police) agents to enter the Titoist propaganda service and to return to Hungary.

Indoctrination of the refugees is directed by ex-Major Andrew Kenocze, former head of instruction of Hungarian secret police. At the time of the Rajk conspiracy, he managed to escape into Yugoslavia in time to avoid agents of the Cominform. Kenocze's friendship with Rajk and association with Yugoslav Communist partisans began in the days of the Spanish revolution. Every refugee is interrogated by Kenocze and his agents, who coerce the fugitives to return clandestinely to their country, bearing Tito's counterpropaganda pamphlets. (FLEEING EVACUEES TURNED BACK, Hungaria, September 1, 1950. Cited in: HUNGARIAN REFUGEES FORCED TO BECOME TITO AGENTS, CIA, Date Distributed: November 9, 1950, p. 1) (IMG)

C15S3. People's Democratic Hungary: Economic Development *** IMG-All-{Hungary}

Hungary, a country with a large peasant population, needed to collectivize its agriculture in order to get the petit-bourgeoisie out of small businesses and onto big collectively-owned businesses, so that these kolkhozes can – unlike the petit-bourgeoisie who do not have businesses big enough to provide cushion for the risk of confronting imperialism – take risks and serve as a class base for confrontation against Anglo-American finance capital. Hungary also needed industrialization obviously to increase the population of the proletariat, to mechanize agriculture, and to prepare its military-industrial backbone for combat against foreign aggression of fascist mercenaries through cross-border infiltration.

Mark Lundell – an economic historian on Eastern Europe, a prominent World Bank official with positions in Russia, China, Brazil, and Central Asia, as well as the World Bank Country Director for several African countries – basically confirmed that Hungary's agricultural collectivization program was not forced, by admitting 'private farming was still allowed':

The collectivization of Hungarian agriculture then officially began on August 13, 1948 with Decree 8,000 on Production Group Cooperatives. This decree supported collective field operations of any kind, although private farming was still allowed. The Agricultural Production Cooperatives (APC), which involved the joint cultivation of crops, began forming in the beginning of 1949. At end of 1949, 1,367 APC's were operated by 36,405 members. Three years later, after the definitive consolidation of Communist power in Hungary, 369,203 members worked in 5,110 APC's amount of land farmed by the APC's had increased eightfold from 1949 to 1952. A quarter of Hungarian farmers were collectivized in APC's by 1952. (Central and Eastern European Land Tenure Patterns: A Brief Historical Overview, Mark Lundell, September 1994, p. 10) (IMG)

At the same time, a greater emphasis was laid on heavy industry, which led indirectly, in the long-run, to the growth of light industry. The statistics provided by the CIA's Office of Research and Report (ORR) prove beyond doubt that upon the election of the communist-led popular front in 1947, Hungary's economy began to actually grow for the first time since 1938. Far surpassing the pre-war levels, Hungary's rapid economic growth, which the Anglo-American media has never called a 'miracle', was both in the sphere of consumer goods and in the industrial/producer goods. The CIA Economic Intelligence Report was as follows:

In August 1947 the economy began to operate under the Three Year Plan (1947-1949). Under this Plan, light industry reached 62 percent of its prewar level of production by the end of 1947 and 86 percent in 1948. The goals of the Three Year Plan were to restore industry to its prewar level and to achieve a greater degree of industrialization as a basis for ultimately improving the standard of living. (...). Although production by light industry was behind schedule in 1947-1948, by 1949 light industry had exceeded the Plan, reaching 116 percent of its prewar (1938) value of production and 29 percent of the gross value of Industrial production.

The Three Year Plan was completed 6 months ahead of schedule, and the First Five Year Plan, which followed, firmly established the trend started in the first year of the Three Year Plan. Increased industrialization, which was to be the basis for ultimately raising the standard of living, was the foremost goal of the planners, and the standard of living temporarily was subordinated to this increased


industrialization. During the First Five Year Plan the development of heavy industry was stressed at the expense of light industry; and although production by light industry increased considerably, this increase was well below that of heavy industry.

(‘LIGHT INDUSTRY IN HUNGARY 1947-57’, Economic Intelligence Report, Office of Research and Reports, CIA, July 31, 1957, p. 8) (IMG)

The rapid economic development which Hungary, a country with a large petit-bourgeois peasant population, experienced as a result of the scientific central planning introduced a high level of development to a country that just like Germany, was once a hub of extreme reaction and barbarism:

The Five year plan promises new and never known chances in the everyday living standards – it offers it, however, to a new type of Soviet man.... (...). The people in villages will use the electricity and Health Centers and other material benefits which may reach them through the Plan. (...). As far as world community is concerned, the changes which may occur in the living standards of the population in Hungary the effects will be that broad masses, many of them for the first time, will get acquainted with civilization in the form of modern planning, electric light and household appliances. (‘THE TACTICS AND STRATEGY OF COMMUNISM IN HUNGARY 1919-1949’, Stanford Research Center of Stanford University, External Research Staff of the US Department of State, Series 3, No. 30, September 13, 1950, pp. 305-306) (IMG)

HUNGARY
GROSS VALUE OF PRODUCTION OF CONSUMER GOODS AND PRODUCER GOODS
1938, 1948-57, and 1960 plan



Between the years 1948 and 1953, the screenshot of the CIA graph above shows, Hungary witnessed a steady economic growth both in the consumer goods and the industrialization, far surpassing the prewar levels. The post-1953 economic decline, resultant from a greater economic influence by the Titoists, will be explained in subsequent chapters.

See: (‘LIGHT INDUSTRY IN HUNGARY 1947-57’, Economic Intelligence Report, Office of Research and Reports, CIA, July 31, 1957, p. 8) (IMG)

The prior absence of industry and the petit-bourgeois mode of the majority had allowed for fascism to easily reign in that land. The collectivization of agriculture, which transformed the agrarian petit-bourgeoisie into kolkhozniks, and industrialization, which transformed the petit-bourgeoisie into proletarians, strengthened the basis of the socialist forces in the population, and rendered weaker the backwards classes.

The CIA-MI6 media mercenaries charge that the USSR ‘stole’ Hungary’s industry, once the Red Army ‘occupied’ Hungary. In so propagating, they distort the picture of the reality. According to the Hague Convention, the army which defeats its enemy force in a specific territory has the legal right to seize those enemy economic assets as a type of reparation (see C18S2). The USSR exercised this legal right. Furthermore, the Yalta Agreement reaffirmed this right of the USSR:

2. Reparation in kind is to be exacted from Germany in three following forms:

(a) Removals within two years from the surrender of Germany or the cessation of organized resistance from the national wealth of Germany located on the territory of Germany herself as well as outside her territory (equipment, machine tools, ships, rolling stock, German investments abroad, shares of industrial, transport and other enterprises in Germany, etc.), these removals to be carried out chiefly for the purpose of destroying the war potential of Germany.

(YALTA CONFERENCE AGREEMENT: DECLARATION OF A LIBERATED EUROPE, Roosevelt, Churchill, Stalin, February 11, 1945) (IMG)

After the Soviet victory in the Great Patriotic War and the defeat of the Axis forces in Hungary, the USSR took over the Nazi German assets in Hungary as part of reparation, and converted them into the USSR's stock companies (A/Os). The CIA admitted:

Prior to 1 October 1952, all former German industrial plants and other economic enterprises in Hungary which were taken over by the USSR after World War II were united under so-called stock companies (aktsionernyye obschestva – A/Os). These A/Os were fully controlled by the Soviets and were directly subordinate to ... Moscow. This organization in Hungary was called the Directorate for Soviet Property in Hungary (USIV). (SOVIET ECONOMIC ENTERPRISES IN HUNGARY, CIA, May 27, 1955 / June 21, 1955, p. 1) (IMG)

With the Soviets exercising their legal right according to the Hague Convention, the former Nazi German assets seized were fully subordinate to the Soviets:

All general directors and other key officials in these A/Os were Soviets. To all intents and purposes these A/Os were fully controlled and owned by the Soviets though the Hungarian Government may have owned a small percentage of the stock in some of the subordinate concerns. (SOVIET ECONOMIC ENTERPRISES IN HUNGARY, CIA, May 27, 1955 / June 21, 1955, p. 2) (IMG)

As with the rest of scientific central planning, the enterprises owned by the Soviets in Hungary would first draw up their own plans and would submit them to the central authorities in Moscow, so that the central authorities coordinate plans as part of the scientific central plan. The planning made with regards to the Soviet enterprises in Hungary would also be coordinated with the government of Hungary, such that the assets can be duly integrated into the Hungarian economy as well. As the CIA reported, information about the economic conditions in the Soviet-seized assets in Hungary would be collected and each enterprise would make plans:

such matters as yearly capital investment and yearly production plans for USIV enterprises ... were first drawn up by individual plants for the coming year and submitted to the A/O under whose jurisdiction they happened to be. Each A/O administrative staff would then review these plans and work out a joint plan for the A/O. (SOVIET ECONOMIC ENTERPRISES IN HUNGARY, CIA, May 27, 1955 / June 21, 1955, p. 2) (IMG)

The central authorities of the A/O would:

then review these plans and work out a joint production and capital investment plan for all of USIV. After review ... in Moscow, these plans were returned to .. Hungary and had to be integrated with the economic plans of Hungary. (SOVIET ECONOMIC ENTERPRISES IN HUNGARY, CIA, May 27, 1955 / June 21, 1955, p. 2) (IMG)

The CIA-MI6 mainstream media outlets propagate the narrative that the USSR utilized these joint-stock companies as means of importing cheap materials to its own economy. Such claims by media are debunked by the CIA, which not only admitted that the USSR coordinated its plans regarding its holdings in Hungary with the Hungarian government, but also admitted:

The majority of products manufactured by USIV plants were sold on the Hungarian internal market. Only a relatively small proportion of the goods was exported to the West or to the USSR. (SOVIET ECONOMIC ENTERPRISES IN HUNGARY, CIA, May 27, 1955 / June 21, 1955, p. 4) (IMG)

The majority of the goods produced by USIV plants was also sold to the Hungarian government. (SOVIET ECONOMIC ENTERPRISES IN HUNGARY, CIA, May 27, 1955 / June 21, 1955, p. 2) (IMG)

Furthermore, since the Hungarian government cooperated in integrating the Soviet enterprise plans with Hungary's economic plans, the goods sold to the Hungarian government by these assets were for extremely low prices:

Industrial undertakings working for the Russians, mostly for reparation accounts, received all possible aid which the Hungarian government could offer, and the Russian military commanders, appointed for each of the factories up on the first day of occupation, did their utmost to increase the intensity of work. Governmental aid was, however, calculated only to stimulate production, since financial aid accorded to the industrial companies was compensated by setting of very low prices and backlogs in payments for deliveries made on orders placed by State agencies. (Foreign Holdings in Hungary, CIA, October 4, 1948, p. 3) (IMG)

Throughout the time in which the Soviets maintained their holdings in Hungary, the Soviets invested heavily in improving the conditions of the plants, multiplying its production. USSR also provided all kinds of welfare benefits for the predominantly-Hungarian workers in the plants:

From the time they were taken over by the Soviet Government after World War II until they were sold to the Hungarian government in October 1952, a large amount of capital was invested in USIV plants. On the average, the capacity of these plants was increased to double that of the prewar capacity by the construction of new shape and the addition of modern equipment and machinery. New living quarters for workers, nurseries for children of plant workers, rest centers, etc. were also constructed. In general these plants were more modern and better in every way than the average Hungarian plant. (SOVIET ECONOMIC ENTERPRISES IN HUNGARY, CIA, May 27, 1955 / June 21, 1955, p. 4) (IMG)

Note that the vast majority of those employed in the Soviet Property in Hungary were Hungarians:

Altogether there were perhaps 200 to 300 Soviets and several thousand Hungarians employed in USIV. (SOVIET ECONOMIC ENTERPRISES IN HUNGARY, CIA, May 27, 1955 / June 21, 1955, p. 1) (IMG)

By 1952, the USSR turned over several of these USIV enterprises to Hungary, as part of its aid to the Hungarian Peoples' Democracy, and turned some of these USIV companies it owned into joint-stock companies wherein Hungary received 50% of the shares:

In October 1952, an agreement was reached whereby the enterprises in Hungary were turned over to the Hungarian government. Under this agreement the USSR received a sum of money for those plants and enterprises which were turned over but source did not know the specific terms of this exchange. At the same time the USSR formed four joint stock companies with the Hungarian government with the stock divided on a 50-50 basis. These four joint stock companies were composed of all former Soviet holdings not sold outright to the Hungarian government as well as Hungarian enterprises in the same economic field. In addition, USSR contributed a portion of perhaps all of the money received from the sale of their holdings in Hungary to this joint venture. These joint Soviet Hungarian companies were known as:

Maszolaj – the joint stock company which controlled the petroleum industry in Hungary. (...).

Mazobal – the joint stock company which controlled the Aluminum industry in Hungary. (...).

Maszovlet – the joint civil aid stock company in Hungary.

Meszhart – the joint stock company which controlled Danube shipping facilities in Hungary.
(SOVIET ECONOMIC ENTERPRISES IN HUNGARY, CIA, May 27, 1955 / June 21, 1955, p. 5) (IMG)

C15S4. Bulgarian Resistance *** IMG-All-{Bulgaria}

When the Nazis occupied Bulgaria,:

Scattered and apparently spontaneous acts of armed resistance to the Bulgarian government made their appearance.... (Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas, Bulgaria., Department of the Army, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence Washington D.C., CIA, September 1, 1957, p. 10) (IMG)

Thus, the embryo of the Bulgarian people's resistance against the regime took shape in mid-1941. With Soviet backing:

In the summer and autumn of 1941 a number of Communist saboteurs were parachuted into northeastern Bulgaria or landed along the Black Sea coast in inflated rubber boats for the purpose of organizing sabotage and local resistance efforts. (Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas, Bulgaria., Department of the Army, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence Washington D.C., CIA, September 1, 1957, p. 10) (IMG)

A few months later:

in 1941 or early in 1942 a pseudo-underground radio station, calling itself "Khristo Botev" after a famous Bulgarian revolutionist, went into action in the Crimea [i.e. in USSR] and broadcast repeated appeals to the Bulgarian people to unite against the regime. While appears that these first resistance efforts met with little success, the action of the USSR gave heart to subversive elements within Bulgaria and helped to provide the necessary impetus towards the formation of a national resistance movement. (Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas, Bulgaria., Department of the Army, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence Washington D.C., CIA, September 1, 1957, p. 10) (IMG)

At the same time, an anti-fascist popular front of communists, progressives, and the anti-fascist right was taking shape in Bulgaria:

Matters took a different turn in the winter of 1941-1942 when representatives of the major opposition political parties – Agrarians, Communists, Social Democrats, and [the right-wing militarist-nationalist] Zveno – opened secret negotiations in Sofia. Out of these meetings came a coalition known as the "Fatherland Front" which henceforth was to dominate all organized resistance activity within Bulgaria. (Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas, Bulgaria., Department of the Army, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence Washington D.C., CIA, September 1, 1957, p. 10) (IMG)

The case of the Bulgarian Communist Party's alliance with Zveno is particularly noteworthy. According to the prominent BBC journalist and advisor to the US and European governments Misha Glenny:

Zveno (The Link) ... maintained close ties with influential figures in the illegal Military League. (The Balkans: Nationalism, War, and the Great Powers, 1804-2012: New and Updated, Misha Glenny)

The organization had:

corporatist authoritarian tendencies.... (The Balkans: Nationalism, War, and the Great Powers, 1804-2012: New and Updated, Misha Glenny)

However it also had:

strongly republican sentiment.... (The Balkans: Nationalism, War, and the Great Powers, 1804-2012: New and Updated, Misha Glenny)

Zveno had the appearance of the Italian Fascist movement but was anti-fascist. Furthermore, though it partially was elitist and held a spirit of authoritarian culture, it clearly had republican tendencies as well. Zveno became a partner of the Bulgarian Communist Party in the fight against fascism. This historical case is a lesson against the left-opportunist currents, which treat all right-wing forces as inherently 'fascist' or as 'not' real partners against fascism.

The alliance of the Communist Party with the progressive 'peasant organizations' and the anti-fascist right proved effective. According to their agreement, whereas Zveno and the Agrarians were tasked with mobilizing and activating the subversive elements in the army and the countryside respectively, the Bulgarian Communist Party was in charge of the guerrilla operations against the Boris Regime:

The clandestine work of the Fatherland Front was divided into three departments: active resistance, employing tactics of partisan warfare; passive resistance, with emphasis placed upon organization of the peasantry in order to secure failures in agricultural and infiltration of the government services primarily through the establishment of secret anti-German cells within the Bulgarian clear demarcation of interests was achieved between the members of the Front. The control of the partisans was left for the most part to the Communists, since they had most experience in this type of operation and could most effectively command support from inside the USSR. The Agrarians, with a long tradition of grassroots political organization in the countryside, worked principally with the peasants. Zveno, drawing upon its army associations, was most effective in establishing subversive cadres within the officer corps. (Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas, Bulgaria., Department of the Army, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence Washington D.C., CIA, September 1, 1957, p. 11) (IMG)

The Fatherland Front had some initial successes. The militants:

excelled [in] the assassination of several leading pro-German politicians in Sofia during 1942. (Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas, Bulgaria., Department of the Army, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence Washington D.C., CIA, September 1, 1957, p. 11) (IMG)

Nevertheless, there were major setbacks for the movement as well. In this fight, the Boris regime:

had all the advantages of superior equipment, police organization, and a highly developed system of intelligence. (Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas, Bulgaria., Department of the Army, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence Washington D.C., CIA, September 1, 1957, p. 12) (IMG)

Therefore, reported the CIA,:

The first partisan units put into the field by the Front were speedily isolated by the secret police and hunted down. In April 1942 the greater part of the central and local leadership of the Front was betrayed, with the result that only three members of the Central military escaped capture. There was a similar disaster early in 1943 when more members of the central committee were apprehended. (Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas, Bulgaria., Department of the Army, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence Washington D.C., CIA, September 1, 1957, p. 11) (IMG)

The principal of the Fatherland Front in 1942 and the first months of 1943 was survival. (Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas, Bulgaria., Department of the Army, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence Washington D.C., CIA, September 1, 1957, p. 12) (IMG)

In 1943, these setbacks culminated. The defeats experienced by the Partisans reached its highest level:

By the end of 1943 it was clear that resistance operations could no longer be directed from Sofia because of the danger of detection. The headquarters of the Front were shifted to Plovdiv.... (Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas, Bulgaria., Department of the Army, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence Washington D.C., CIA, September 1, 1957, p. 11) (IMG)

The situation began to improve during:

the summer of 1943 when the death of Tsar Boris and German reverses the Eastern Front opened the way for more extended resistance activity. (Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas, Bulgaria., Department of the Army, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence Washington D.C., CIA, September 1, 1957, p. 12) (IMG)

From then on, the tide began to turn. The Germans and their puppet forces, in spite of the casualties they inflicted upon Bulgarian civilians and resistance fighters, were far more frequently struck by the resistance guerrillas:

From 1 September 1943 to 1 March 1944, according to captured German documents, no less than 1,118 resistance incidents were recorded in Bulgaria and in the Bulgarian-occupied sections of Macedonia. In clashes with resistance elements during the same period, the losses in killed and wounded amounted to 131 German army personnel, 418 Bulgarian army and police personnel, 197 insurgents, and 355 civilians. The government and the German forces struck back vigorously, but it is noteworthy that the number of reported resistance incidents mounted to 687 during the month of June 1944 alone.

German observers who studied the growth of resistance in Bulgaria make repeated mention of partisan bands which were beginning to establish themselves as major factor in the internal unrest. The German military attaché, summarizing developments in the first quarter of 1944, declared that the improved organization and numbers of the partisans could be felt in their repeated attacks on heavily-defended military establishments. In Sofia the government vainly attempted to allay the partisan menace by effecting a reshuffle of the cabinet, ousting obnoxious pro-Germans from the police force, and releasing from detention more than 15,000 political prisoners and relatives of persons in the underground. These measures were correctly interpreted by the Fatherland Front as a sign of weakness. By mid-August 1944 the estimated number of active partisans within Bulgaria had grown to between 3,000-5,000 persons, with an additional 6,000-8,000 partisans in Greek and Serbian Macedonia.

(Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas, Bulgaria., Department of the Army, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence Washington D.C., CIA, September 1, 1957, pp. 12-13) (IMG)

As the Soviet Red Army was reaching Bulgaria, the Partisans began to gain control over all of Bulgaria:

By the end of August 1944, with the German armies everywhere on the run and the Red poised upon the approaches to Bulgaria, the Fatherland Front decided to bring its full resources into the open. On 2 September 1944 a general insurrection was ordered. The partisans came down from their mountain hide-outs and joined forces with clandestine organizations in the villages and cities. By 3 September much of northeast Bulgaria was under partisan control; on 5 September Pleven fell; on 6 September Plovdiv was occupied; and on the night of 8 September the inevitable coup d'état occurred in Sofia. (Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas, Bulgaria., Department of the Army, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence Washington D.C., CIA, September 1, 1957, p. 14) (IMG)

Upon achieving victory:

The new Fatherland Front government immediately opened armistice negotiations with the USSR, which had declared war on Bulgaria on September, and sent the Bulgarian Army to fight [along] with mission and Yugoslav forces against the retreating German. Meanwhile the Bulgarian Communists, following the pattern so successfully employed in other Eastern European countries, [attained] the vital Ministries of Interior and Justice in the new government.... (Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas, Bulgaria. Department of the Army, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence Washington D.C., CIA, September 1, 1957, p. 14) (IMG)

C15S5. People's Democratic Bulgaria vs. Titoist Fascist Yugoslavia / The Yugoslav Regime's Plans for Conquest of Bulgaria / Ethnocide and Reign of Terror against the People of Macedonia / Bulgarian Communist Purge of the Gang of Kostov, the Agents of Titoist Yugoslavia / Yugoslav Regime Supports the Goryani Terror Network

Backed by the Anglo-American imperialist enemies of the USSR, the Gestapo agent Tito envisaged a Yugoslav colonization of the Bulgarian peoples, through a British-style 'divide and conquer' strategy, according to which the people of mainland Bulgaria would be separated from their coethnic brethren in Pirin Macedonia and Yugoslav-occupied Macedonia. And upon the division of these people into the three territories, they would all be conquered, colonized and ethnoidally victimized by the Greater Serbian Settler-Colonial Empire, a settler-colonial fascist entity to which Tito's group officially referred as the 'Balkan Federation'. In a document published by the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College, Craig Nation, the Director of Russian and Eurasian Studies, reported:

In early November 1944 the Yugoslavs brought dialogue with the Bulgarians to a higher level by sending a project for federation to Sofia by special courier. Between November and January an intense discussion was pursued, in the course of which a number of variants for association were exchanged. The Yugoslav side was in general more avid, posing the goal of a "unitary federal state" and suggesting the creation of a joint military command with Tito as commander in chief. The intention was to unite the Bulgarian and Yugoslav Macedonian regions (Pirin and Vardar Macedonia) as a single federal entity, with the remainder of Bulgaria joining the federation as a seventh republic, a "6+1" approach to federation building (the Titoists having already decided to recast the new Yugoslavia as a federation of six republics — Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia) that would advantage the

Yugoslavs and reduce Bulgaria by separating it from Pirin Macedonia. The Bulgarian proposal emphasized the need for gradualism, refused to consider a transfer of Pirin Macedonia, and suggested a “1+1” approach in which Bulgaria and Yugoslavia would federate as equal partners. Despite intensive negotiations, these basic differences could not be resolved. (‘WAR IN THE BALKANS, 1991-2002’, Craig Nation (Director of Russian and Eurasian Studies at the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle), Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, August 2003, p. 59) (IMG)

The Soviets, whose sympathies lied with the Bulgarian side, supported the establishment of a liberated Greater Bulgaria. The CIA reported:

The Soviet Union wished to create a “Macedonian Republic” from the Yugoslav Macedonia (today the People’s Republic of Macedonia), the PIRIN Macedonia (today in Bulgaria) and from the Greek Macedonia. This Republic was supposed to form a part of Bulgaria. Thus the Soviet Union wished to strengthen the Bulgarian Communist Party.... (TRANSMITTAL OF DOCUMENT RELATIVE TO THE MACEDONIAN QUESTION IN YUGOSLAVIA, CIA, February 17, 1950, p. 1) (IMG)

The North Macedonian communists too sided with the USSR:

The Macedonian Communist authority is pro-Bulgarian. (...). It tends toward Sofia. It is suspicious of whatever comes from Belgrade. (...). The Macedonian Republic is the most unstable Tito’s Republic. Her Communists are pro-Bulgarian. Their view of the Macedonian question is pro-Russian. Their cultural links with Sofia are stronger than those with Belgrade. The Macedonian Parliament is in a revolutionary mood. The first forceful quake will separate Macedonia from the remaining Republics. (TRANSMITTAL OF DOCUMENT RELATIVE TO THE MACEDONIAN QUESTION IN YUGOSLAVIA, CIA, February 17, 1950, p. 8) (IMG)

Even after the break with Yugoslavia, Dimitrov continued to publicly for the federation of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. Why would the federation of the progressive states with fascist Yugoslavia be a good idea? In this context, federating these states was for the purpose of helping in the launching of a great purge against the Titoists.

Federation is not always an establishment of the ‘loving unity and friendship’ of two states. Sometimes it is used as a purge strategy. The Syrians called for Unity with Egypt in 1958 not for the pipe-dream of the ‘unity of two Arab countries’ that shared no borders but rather because Syria’s military was heavily infiltrated by the CIA due to the series of coups, whereas Egypt was not as infiltrated, and so Egypt could help purge the CIA elements in Syria. The reactionary reverse of this was done as well. The Hashemites in Jordan and Iraq pursued a federation not at all for the ‘loving unity’ of the Iraqi and Jordanian peoples but rather for the purpose of having Jordan help Iraq in its purge of Nasserists. As early as the late 1940s, the MI6 had been hatching plots to establish a ‘pan-Arab’ and ‘pan-Syrian’ federation led by Hashemite Jordan. This MI6-led ‘pan-Syrian’ federation, eventually denounced by the pan-Syrian activist Antun Sa’adeh due to Jordanian royalist leadership thereof, would then subordinate Israel via the Ben-Gurion regime (see C16S7). Naturally, such a ‘pan-Arab’ ‘federation’ plan was radically different in intent than the Nasserist vision. The Hashemite vision was a pro-imperialist and anti-Arab vision whereas the Nasserist vision was anti-imperialist. The pan-Europe that Germany sought to establish had a similar reactionary nature and purpose. Hence, federation between states is not always an ‘ideal’ but is sometimes a strategy for diluting the fifth columnists’ power and for launching a purge.

Indeed, people from the camp of the USSR and the Peoples’ Democracies favored the Balkan Federation for the purpose of diluting Tito’s power so to help the communists in launching a Balkan-wide purge of the Titoists; therefore, their vision of the Balkan Federation was diametrically opposed to the Titoist vision of the Balkan ‘Federation’, the latter being nothing short of a settler-colonial fascist apartheid state which Tito’s gang sought to establish. The federation of a Greater Albania (Albania plus Kosovo) and a Greater Bulgaria (Bulgaria plus Macedonia) with Yugoslavia such that Greater Albania and Greater Bulgaria would have votes equal in power to that of Yugoslavia would have caused the pro-Soviet member states in this federation, Albania and Bulgaria, to jointly outnumber Titoist Yugoslavia, dilute Tito’s power in this mix of states, and hence duly pursue the purge of Tito’s gang. This is why, before the 1948 expulsion of Tito’s group, Stalin and Zhdanov supported such a federation. And this is why Beria, a Titoist agent of the MI6, opposed the Stalin-Zhdanov plan for such an anti-Titoist Balkan federation, while supporting a Titoist fascist settler-colonial Balkan ‘federation’:

Zhdanov favoured [the] plan for a Balkan Federation. His conception of it differed, naturally, from my father’s. He saw this federation as ... an extension of the Soviet state. My father wanted an economic union of the Balkan countries, led by Yugoslavia, which would later join up with a unified Germany and a free Austria. He hoped that Tito would come to renounce the monopoly of the Communist Party and agree to a people’s-front-type government. On the other hand, he saw no reason why Yugoslavia should not annex Albania. From the summer of 1948, not long before his death, Zhdanov played a decisive role in the anti-Tito campaign. For this dogmatist, ... the people’s democracies ought to be exact copies of the USSR. (‘Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin’s Kremlin’, Sergo Beria, pp. 209-210) (IMG)

For the same reason, Tito tried his best to prevent the kind of a Balkan Federation which Dimitrov, Zhdanov, and Stalin advocated, and instead promoted bourgeois-nationalism. Even after the Cominform’s expulsion of Yugoslavia, Dimitrov continued to publicly preach for a Bulgarian-Yugoslav federation while he also denounced Tito’s fascist gang:

Under the newly created domestic and international conditions, the vital interests of the Bulgarian and Yugoslav peoples made it imperative that both nations seek the closest rapprochement which would quickly lead to their economic and political unification – to the establishment of a federation of South Slavs. Such a federation, resting firmly on friendship with the USSR and fraternal collaboration with the other new democracies, could have successfully defended the freedom and independence of its peoples and ensured their proper development toward socialism. Within the framework of such a federation would have been solved correctly, all the old unsolved problems legated by the bourgeois-monarchic regimes regarding the unification of the Macedonians from the Pirin district with the People’s Republic of Macedonia, as well as the return to Bulgaria of the purely Bulgarian Western Border Region which the Yugoslavia of King Alexander had grabbed after World War I. (...). Our Party has always advocated and continues to advocate, that Macedonia belongs to the Macedonians. True to the traditions of the Macedonian revolutionaries, together with all honest Macedonian patriots, we are deeply convinced that the Macedonian people will translate into reality their national unity and will ensure their future as a free nation with equal rights only within the framework of a federation of Southern Slavs.

In the past, the unification of the South Slavs has always met with the stubborn resistance of German imperialism. Today the new pretenders for world domination – the American and British imperialists – oppose the unification and merger of the Southern Slavs. They have acquired worthy allies in the present Yugoslav leaders.

Assured of the support of the USSR, the new democracies and the world forces of democracy, the Southern Slavs will be able to smash the opposition of the imperialists and realize their vitally necessary unity. The main obstacle to the federation of the Southern Slavs are

today the traitors to Marx-Leninism, the nationalist leadership in Belgrade and Skopje, the Titos, Djilases, Kulishevskys, Vlahovs. But history is marching on and sweeps aside everything which stands in the way of progress. The cause of the unification of the Southern Slavs, including the Macedonian people, will triumph.

(‘Political Report Delivered to the V Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party’, Georgi Dimitrov, December 19th, 1948, Sofia, 1949, p. 62, pp. 64-70. Dr. Vijay Singh of the Revolutionary Democracy Organization of India found and published Dimitrov’s speech under the title ‘The South Slav Federation and the Macedonian Question’) (IMG)

In order to materialize his goal of establishing a Balkan Empire wherein the Bulgarians and their Macedonian coethnic brethren would be separated from one another, divided, and colonized, Tito's regime tried to drive a linguistic wedge between the Macedonian and Bulgarian languages, two languages so immensely similar that many regard Macedonian as a mere offshoot or dialect of Bulgarian. It is obvious that this measure by Tito was a classic colonial divide-and-conquer strategy. Through driving this linguistic wedge, Tito could more easily separate the mainland Bulgarians from the Macedonian-Bulgarians hence to conquer both of them more easily. In a speech to the Bulgarian Communist Party’s fifth congress, summing up the situation in the Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations and regarding Macedonia, Georgi Dimitrov said:

The nationalist and chauvinist policy of the Titos and Kulishevskys, which is the other side of the coin of their anti-Soviet course, is not only directed against Bulgaria and the Bulgarian people but also against the Macedonian people. This policy has adopted the methods of the Bulgarian and Serbian nationalists and is sowing hatred among the Macedonian people, inciting one part against the other, resorting to terror and persecution against those who disapprove of the official course of the present Yugoslav leaders. In this way the realization of the age-old ideal of the Macedonian people – their national unification – is being artificially delayed. (...). We are well aware that the nationalist and chauvinist policy of the Belgrade and Skopje leaders of the Tito and Kulishevsky type do not have the approval of the majority of the Macedonian people who are convinced that their national unification will be built on an understanding between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, in cooperation with these peoples and with the powerful assistance of the USSR. (‘Political Report Delivered to the V Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party’, Georgi Dimitrov, December 19th, 1948, Sofia, 1949, p. 62, pp. 64-70. Dr. Vijay Singh of the Revolutionary Democracy Organization of India found and published Dimitrov’s speech under the title ‘The South Slav Federation and the Macedonian Question’.) (IMG)

The US intelligence reported:

Tito thought that by creating the Macedonian language he would win the Macedonian people, above all the weak Macedonian intelligentsia who were mostly educated in Bulgaria and thought pro-Bulgarian. (TRANSMITTAL OF DOCUMENT RELATIVE TO THE MACEDONIAN QUESTION IN YUGOSLAVIA, CIA, February 17, 1950, p. 7) (IMG)

Thus, Tito's gang

created the Macedonian language. All family names were altered. Books are printed in Macedonian, which the Macedonians do not understand. (TRANSMITTAL OF DOCUMENT RELATIVE TO THE MACEDONIAN QUESTION IN YUGOSLAVIA, CIA, February 17, 1950, pp. 5-6) (IMG)

The Ustase criminals enthusiastically welcomed the colonial policy line of Tito's regime and tried to promote this artificially-engineered 'Macedonian' culture:

A Macedonian opera was founded. Joca SRKULJ, formerly director of the Belgrade Opera, was called to organise the new institution. The Macedonian Minister of Enlightenment demanded that all operas be sung in Macedonian. In vain SRKULJ argued the difficulty and unnecessary efforts linked with such undertaking. He argued that because of cadres and other Operas in the country it is far better that they are sung in Serbo-Croat. Yet “Cavalleria Rusticana” was sung in Macedonian. SRKULJ, in the end, refused to fight about with the new language, in spite of the high salary which he was offered, and returned to Belgrade. However, the Ustashi Colonel, and former martial band leader, Lovro MATAČIĆ, PAVELIĆ’s director of the Zagreb Opera, adopted the Macedonian language with “great zeal”. He is now the conductor of the Macedonian Opera. He went to Macedonia straight from the Prison. (TRANSMITTAL OF DOCUMENT RELATIVE TO THE MACEDONIAN QUESTION IN YUGOSLAVIA, CIA, February 17, 1950, pp. 6-7) (IMG)

This was in line with the general policy of Tito’s regime which was to use the Ustase not only for military and intelligence purposes but also for the realm of culture:

Deputy Leader Mile Budak, a writer of popular novels with a nationalistic and pious theme, provided the NDH with culture. He made it his business to win over fellow novelists, poets, artists and sculptors, especially those who had not been Croat separatists. Among those bullied or buttered up was the world-famous sculptor Ivan Metrovic, who was persuaded, after a few weeks in prison, to take an NDH art exhibition around Europe. The leading Croatian poet Vladimir Nazor eventually joined the Partisans, but in 1941 he composed verses very acceptable to Budak:

This is no time for music and mandolins
Now is the time for each of us
To live as wolves and lions,
In other words as Croats.

The country's leading surrealist writer, Miroslav Krleža, who had been a Communist in the 1920s and later supported the Tito regime, was allowed to remain in Zagreb throughout the war, thanks to Budak's protection.

(Tito: And the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West)

As mentioned, the people of Macedonia did not understand this colonially-engineered language:

The [Titoist] Communist attempt to create a “Macedonian Republic” proved a failure. (...). They created a language which nobody understands. (TRANSMITTAL OF DOCUMENT RELATIVE TO THE MACEDONIAN QUESTION IN YUGOSLAVIA, CIA, February 17, 1950, p. 7) (IMG)

Standing against the Ustase and Gestapo agent Tito, the communists of Macedonia opposed this newly created language colonially imposed by the Tito regime:

Many Communists oppose the new language. (TRANSMITTAL OF DOCUMENT RELATIVE TO THE MACEDONIAN QUESTION IN YUGOSLAVIA, CIA, February 17, 1950, p. 6) (IMG)

In addition:

Ceda MINDEROVIC, secretary general of the Yugoslav Writers League (Udruzenje Knjizevnika Jugoslavije), was resolutely against the Maedonian language as director of the publishing organisation of Serbia, "PROSVETA", and refused to print books in Macedonian. Meanwhile the idea prevailed that a Macedonian language had to be created and it is being created now.... (TRANSMITTAL OF DOCUMENT RELATIVE TO THE MACEDONIAN QUESTION IN YUGOSLAVIA, CIA, February 17, 1950, p. 6) (IMG)

The Macedonians who resided in Belgrade would have wished to return to their homeland as well, but decided not to, given the colonial conditions in their homeland:

The Belgrade Macedonians [i.e. Macedonians who lived in Belgrade] who worked and longed for a "Macedonian State" for years, did not go the newly created Macedonia. For them she remained alien and unfamiliar. They are afraid of her. Their emigree conception of Macedonia was different. (TRANSMITTAL OF DOCUMENT RELATIVE TO THE MACEDONIAN QUESTION IN YUGOSLAVIA, CIA, February 17, 1950, p. 4) (IMG)

The Cominform, however, sided with the people of Macedonia and Bulgaria; the Cominform did not leave the Macedonian communists alone in the face of Tito's project for a Balkan Empire. The Macedonian comrades were joyful for this fact:

The [Cominform's anti-Tito] Resolution was accepted with joy by the Communist authorities in Macedonia. The Macedonian Parliament (Narodno Sobranje) was ready to proclaim the cession of the People's Republic of Macedonia from Yugoslavia and its incorporation into Bulgaria. The Communist authorities in Macedonia believed that the time has come from the realisation of their idea and desire. Events proved that it was too early. Marshal Tito and his Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party were still going strong. The episode was concluded by the dismissal of a few Ministers of the Macedonian Government, a regular trial at SKOPLJE, the dismissal of all suspected Communists. Some of them escaped to Bulgaria, among them Communist MPs from the Macedonian Parliament. Others, who publicly approved the Resolution, were arrested. The separatist idea, though not realised, is nursed secretly by ruling Macedonian Communists. At a favourable moment it will appear again (such are the statements of Ing. HARALAMOVIC, employed in a factory near SKOPLJE; of Metodije BOSKOVIC, graduated lawyer, department head of the Executive People's Committee of SKOPLJE. Both are Macedonians and reliable men [for the CIA]). (TRANSMITTAL OF DOCUMENT RELATIVE TO THE MACEDONIAN QUESTION IN YUGOSLAVIA, CIA, February 17, 1950, p. 4) (IMG)

Against the Macedonian communist and Cominform resistance, Yugoslavia's fascist regime responded even more unscrupulously and launched a massive political cleansing project to eliminate anyone local Macedonian government officials who dared to stand up against the Balkan Empire agenda, and to silence the Macedonian people's resistance against this agenda:

All people, respectively Communists, with different ideas [than that of Tito's Central Committee] have been eliminated from the leading positions. The Macedonians do not show their attitude. They are quiet, waiting for the proper moment to realise their idea. They are afraid of Belgrade, because the Central Committees of the Yugoslav CP has other views. It believes that the Macedonian Republic should remain within Yugoslavia. Communists with views other than this are traitors to the Party. (TRANSMITTAL OF DOCUMENT RELATIVE TO THE MACEDONIAN QUESTION IN YUGOSLAVIA, CIA, February 17, 1950, p. 2) (IMG)

The terroristic elimination of the Macedonian patriots opposing the Greater-Serbian chauvinism of Tito's fascist regime was also confirmed by the Soviet state media which reported:

Tito's Belgrade gang fans chauvinism not only against the Albanians, Bulgarians, Hungarians, Romanians and Slovaks. It is also intensifying its persecution of such peoples as the Montenegrins, Macedonians, Bosnians and Herzegovinians, who are putting up particularly active resistance to the fascist tyranny. In Montenegro, Bosnia, Vojvodina, Macedonia, and other national territories, the local officials are being squeezed out as "unreliable," and in their place are being put primarily Greater Serbia chauvinists, Titoite toughs from Belgrade and other towns of Serbia. Nor is there anything surprising in the fact that top-ranking posts in the fascist state apparatus are held by such prominent figures of the old regime and ideologists of Greater Serbia chauvinism as the royal diplomat, Simic, the publisher of a privately-owned reactionary newspaper, Ribnikar, and others. ('Tito's Yugoslavia, Country of Prisons And Concentration Camps', P. Zyablov, May 26, 1950. In: USSR Information Bulletin, Volume 10, p. 320) (IMG)

While the communists were suppressed, the progressive bourgeois democrats too were suppressed in this highly anti-democratic environment:

There are even less Socialists. These can be formed from a democratic atmosphere, in a future Macedonian Republic. (TRANSMITTAL OF DOCUMENT RELATIVE TO THE MACEDONIAN QUESTION IN YUGOSLAVIA, CIA, February 17, 1950, p. 8) (IMG)

Such was a fascist dictatorship, a 'republic' in the name only, established, suppressing the popular masses of Macedonia:

They created a State, alien to the citizens in it. The citizens are afraid of their State, they hate it. Only the name is reality, the rest is deceit. The Macedonians therefore did not greet the new Republic. They withdrew and wait. They think that the present situation is only a transition period. (TRANSMITTAL OF DOCUMENT RELATIVE TO THE MACEDONIAN QUESTION IN YUGOSLAVIA, CIA, February 17, 1950, p. 7) (IMG)

Hence:

The Macedonian citizens are suspicious of the [Titoist] regime. They do not like it. The activities of the Government have no appeal to them. They are foreign and unintelligible. They wish to get rid of the rulers at a favourable moment. (TRANSMITTAL OF DOCUMENT RELATIVE TO THE MACEDONIAN QUESTION IN YUGOSLAVIA, CIA, February 17, 1950, p. 8) (IMG)

The fascist character of the Titoist settler-colonial rule over Macedonia was exposed explicitly in Soviet state media:

The national minorities in Tito Yugoslavia are being subjected to unprecedented repressions and despotism. The same terror reigns today in Yugoslav Macedonia as did during the years of fascist occupation. ('Tito's Yugoslavia, Country of Prisons And Concentration Camps', P. Zyablov, May 26, 1950. In: USSR Information Bulletin, Volume 10, p. 320) (IMG)

In Titoist-occupied Macedonia, the mode of production was not as capitalistic as one may think. Rather, slavery was an important form of property relation there. As confirmed by US intelligence, in Titoist-occupied Macedonia:

The traces of slavery are still clearly visible. (TRANSMITTAL OF DOCUMENT RELATIVE TO THE MACEDONIAN QUESTION IN YUGOSLAVIA, CIA, February 17, 1950, p. 8) (IMG)

Nonetheless, thanks to the sanctions imposed by the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies, thanks to the covert and overt resistance of the communists, progressives, and anti-fascists of Yugoslavia,:

the efforts of the Yugoslav Communist Party with regard to Macedonia, failed. (TRANSMITTAL OF DOCUMENT RELATIVE TO THE MACEDONIAN QUESTION IN YUGOSLAVIA, CIA, February 17, 1950, p. 7) (IMG)

The issue regarding Macedonia therefore became a thorn on Tito's side. Indeed:

The Macedonian question, a sore and touchy point for all Governments of old Yugoslavia, has become more so for the Government of "Marshal" Tito. It has become the first worry of the Communist Government. The differences on the Macedonian question between the Soviet Union and Marshal Tito have once again proved the nationalistic ideas of the Marshal. (TRANSMITTAL OF DOCUMENT RELATIVE TO THE MACEDONIAN QUESTION IN YUGOSLAVIA, CIA, February 17, 1950, p. 1) (IMG)

During the fascist repression of Macedonia, the Yugoslav regime also sponsored the Bulgarian contras whose aim was the fascist overthrow of the People's Democratic order in Bulgaria. It was known as the 'Goryani' terror network. Describing the Goryani terror network, Mihail Gruev who has been the chief of the Bulgarian State Archives Agency, wrote:

Perfectly in keeping with folktales, the mountains were seen as a sort of parallel world, where one whose life was in danger could hide, save himself and wait for help from some external "superpowers." Thus, more than once the goryani would claim that, in fact, they were in the mountains "waiting for the Americans." The primary motivation — to save themselves for repression and terror — filled the forests with staid, middle-aged people with established livelihoods, families and children. They represented a wide variety of social backgrounds and ideological predilections (anarchists, agrarians, disappointed [i.e. Titoist] [pseudo-]communists, nationalists, fascists). ('Bulgaria under Communism', Authors: Ivaylo Znepolski, Mihail Gruev, Momtchil Metodiev, Martin Ivanov, Daniel Vatchkov, Ivan Elenkov, Plamen Doynov, 2019) (IMG)

The Goryani comprador terror network – a network of Tsarist-fascists, Titoists, and kulaks – had the support of fascist Yugoslavia:

By the early 50-ties, the Goryani had ... training camps in Yugoslavia and France. (International conference Crimes of the Communist Regimes: an assessment by historians and legal experts proceedings, Institute for the Study of Totalitarian Regimes, February 26, 2010, p. 246, 'The conference took place at the Main Hall of the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic (24–25 February 2010) and at the Office of the Government of the Czech Republic (26 February 2010)') (IMG)

The people of Bulgaria preferred friendly relations with the USSR, and opposed Yugoslav colonialism. Paul Mason, an MI6 operative and British diplomat to Yugoslavia, wrote to London:

The Bulgarians, in my opinion, prefer to continue their present pro-Soviet policy ... rather than to exchange it for a subservient position to Yugoslavia. This feeling is cleverly exploited by the present Bulgarian leaders and their Soviet masters. (N 11009/10124/38, INFLUENCE OF TITOISM IN BULGARIA, Mr. Paul Mason to Mr. Ernest Bevin, No. 279, Secret, Sofia, December 21, 1949, December 28, 1949, In: British Foreign Office (1949): Bulgaria, p. 65) (IMG)

Nonetheless, there was a Yugoslav agent in Bulgaria who pretended to be an anti-Titoist, but who also sought to drive a wedge between not only the Bulgarian People's Democratic government and the Bulgarian people, but also between the USSR and the Bulgarian nation, so to pull Bulgaria towards colonization by Tito's Balkan Empire; his name was Traicho Kostov. Kostov knew Tito as early as 1933 and was working towards a 'federation' of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. This is backed up by a US intelligence report:

Traycho Kostov had known Tito since 1933 and continued to maintain relations with him and fought for a federation of Slavs of the South.... His trial, from 7 to 14 December 1949, was one against nationalism, Titoism, Yugoslav federalism, and interior resistance, fought in general, against the man who in 1940 was secretary of the clandestine Central Committee and who held that position until his arrest by Royal Police on 29 April 1942 in Sofia. (BULGARIAN POLITICAL REVIEW, CIA, July 21, 1954, p. 2) (IMG)

Kostov indeed was an agent of Tito, working in collaboration with the Hungarian Titoist Laszlo Rajk (see C15S2) towards the establishment of a Great Serbian Empire hostile to Soviet power:

In February 1948, Rajk went secretly to Belgrade where Tito brought him into contact with the intelligence agents of the American embassy and he started to work for them from that time onwards. On that Belgrade meeting they also agreed on the establishment of a Southeastern European union independent of Moscow under the leadership of Tito and one of their officers in that organization would be the Bulgarian Kostov deputy prime minister. ('THE TACTICS AND STRATEGY OF COMMUNISM IN HUNGARY 1919-1949', Stanford Research Center of Stanford University, External Research Staff of the US Department of State, Series 3, No. 30, September 13, 1950, p. 290) (IMG)

Kostov was under surveillance by the Bulgarian counter-intelligence units. When Kostov was on the verge of a purge, Tito publicly denounced Kostov so to discredit, and present as 'Titoist-backed', the anti-Kostov campaign. Nonetheless, his denunciation of Kostov does serve as a useful confession. Indeed, George Hodos, an anti-communist Hungarian journalist, remarked:

Tito ... in a speech in April 1949, ... delivered a shameful denunciation of his Bulgarian comrade just two months before Kostov's arrest. "Kostov was arrested during the reign of King Boris together with a number of other Communists. Although he was one of the main leaders of the party, his life alone was spared. Why?" Tito answered his own question. "Today we have proof that among some Communist parties, certain capitalist states infiltrated their own agents." ('Show Trials: Stalinist Purges in Eastern Europe, 1948-1954', George H. Hodos, p. 17) (IMG)

Within Kostov's intelligence network was:

General Trunski [who] as a student of Tito would be more in favor of being under Yugoalvia than having a real and true independence for Bulgaria; (POLITICAL CLIMATE AFTER CHERVONKOV DEMOTION AND STALIN DENIGRATION, CIA, October 31, 1956, p. 6) (IMG)

General Ivan Mihailov [who] is well supported in Yugoslavia.... (POLITICAL CLIMATE AFTER CHERVONKOV DEMOTION AND STALIN DENIGRATION, CIA, October 31, 1956, p. 7) (IMG)

Another person closely associated with Kostov was Anton Yugov. Prior to the establishment of the Bulgarian People's Democracy, Yugov had been a student of Tito. In fact, according to a 1956 CIA report:

Yugov ... in 1934 ... underwent two consecutive years of intensive training at the School of Marxism and Leninism (directed by Tito).... (POLITICAL CLIMATE AFTER CHERVONKOV DEMOTION AND STALIN DENIGRATION, CIA, October 31, 1956, p. 3) (IMG)

Not surprisingly:

Yugov ... certainly is friendly with the Yugoslavs.... (POLITICAL CLIMATE AFTER CHERVONKOV DEMOTION AND STALIN DENIGRATION, CIA, October 31, 1956, p. 3) (IMG)

A US intelligence document described Yugov as a:

Kostov supporter.... (DEMOTION OF BULGARIAN PREMIER CHERVENKOV, NSC Briefing, CIA, April 24, 1956, p. 1) (IMG)

As the chief of Bulgarian police, Yugov engaged in terrorist action against the Bulgarian civilians, so to provoke anti-state unrest. This policy succeeded in turning elements, especially of the intelligentsia, against the Bulgarian communists. However, it fell short of rendering the bulk of the Bulgarian population against the communists. The campaign against Kostov and Titoism turned the tide and assisted the communists in re-canalizing the popular rage against Yugov himself:

The great masses of the Bulgarian people do not forget Yugov's connection with the murders of 1944 when he was chief of Police and it is remembered of him that "his hands are soiled with blood." (POLITICAL CLIMATE AFTER CHERVENKOV DEMOTION AND STALIN DENIGRATION, CIA, October 31, 1956, p. 9) (IMG)

In the trial of Kostov in Bulgaria, many parts of the transcript of which I have read, Kostov's dogmatic left-deviationist sectarian line was strongly highlighted. These accusations against Kostov were absolutely correct. Even Paul Mason, the MI6 operative and British diplomat to Bulgaria, reported to the British foreign minister Bevin, that Kostov was a:

bigoted Communist in all matters of doctrine.... (R 3990/1015/7, EXPULSION OF M. KOSTOV FROM THE BULGARIAN POLITBURO, Mr. Paul Mason to Mr. Ernest Bevin, April 9, 1949, Received: April 13, 1949. In: British Foreign Office (1949): Bulgaria, p. 22) (IMG)

Since Dimitrov was ill, he left Bulgaria. Similar was the case of Kolarov. In this situation, Kostov took the lead. The MI6 confirmed that Kostov was the 'economic dictator' of Bulgaria:

the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party ... produced on 15th July a resolution [against Yugoslav regime].... Having seen this resolution safely through the party, Dimitrov retired to the Black Sea coast or to Russia (no one knows which) to recuperate, while Kolarov went off to take the cure at Karlsbad [in Czechoslovakia]. The business of Government was left to Kostov in virtue of his position as second ranking member of the Politburo (which was confirmed at the party meeting in December) and as virtual economic dictator. He remained in charge throughout the autumn of last year till the elder statesmen returned for the Communist Party meeting in December: and not long afterwards (on 30th January last) it was announced that Kostov was proceeding on six weeks' leaves of absence to recuperate from the strain of his exertions. (R 3990/1015/7, EXPULSION OF M. KOSTOV FROM THE BULGARIAN POLITBURO, Mr. Paul Mason to Mr. Ernest Bevin, April 9, 1949, Received: April 13, 1949. In: British Foreign Office (1949): Bulgaria, p. 23) (IMG)

Kostov was the autocratic head of the Bulgarian government in general and not just the 'economic dictator'. Indeed there was:

the autumn period when, as stated above, in the absence of the elder statesmen [such as Dimitrov,] Kostov was left in charge of the Government. (R 3990/1015/7, EXPULSION OF M. KOSTOV FROM THE BULGARIAN POLITBURO, Mr. Paul Mason to Mr. Ernest Bevin, April 9, 1949, Received: April 13, 1949. In: British Foreign Office (1949): Bulgaria, pp. 23-24) (IMG)

No doubt the revolutionary transformation of Bulgaria necessitated a campaign against religion, a purge of the fascist or pro-feudal elements in the clergy. However, during this period, the Kostov faction of the Bulgarian government went too fast in attacking the Orthodox Church, hence driving a wedge between Bulgaria's religious peasant majority and the state, and at the same time, weakening the hold of the Soviet intelligence in Bulgaria since as mentioned in C15S7, the Soviets had coopted the Orthodox Church as a weapon against the fascist Vatican mafia. The MI6 stated:

Outwardly this period passed without event, though there is reason to believe that Kostov went faster than Dimitrov desired in attacking the Orthodox Church. (R 3990/1015/7, EXPULSION OF M. KOSTOV FROM THE BULGARIAN POLITBURO, Mr. Paul Mason to Mr. Ernest Bevin, April 9, 1949, Received: April 13, 1949. In: British Foreign Office (1949): Bulgaria, pp. 23-24) (IMG)

Kostov was a Yugoslav agent posing as 'anti-Titoist', an anti-Soviet element publicly praising the USSR, a vicious anti-communist who undercut communism through Trotskyite-style dogmatism. He spoke in favor of the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies but acted against them behind the scenes. He was very dictatorial in his behaviour despite being presented in the West as 'pro-democracy'. The MI6 station in Bulgaria further reported:

There is reason to believe that this meeting produced, not only the heart-searching enjoined by Moscow but also, in the course thereof, a good deal of antagonism within the local party itself. It is impossible to believe that in this friction Kostov himself was not a prominent element: it is not inconceivable that at this stage he may have given expression to criticism of Soviet policy on the lines indicated above and it is very likely that his normally masterful bearing may have aroused resentment and given rise to, or at least support to the ... charge ... that he was out to seize leadership. It is at least tempting, in the light of what has since passed, to note that the resolution passed by the Bulgarian Communist Party on that occasion [of condemning Titoism] condemned undue autocracy and individual action on the part of "individual leaders" without preliminary discussion in the Politburo itself. (...). In Dimitrov's absence it fell to Kostov to deliver the annual speech on the state of the nation on the eve of 9th September. In it he hit out in furious terms against the national elements in Yugoslavia, paid the normal tributes to the Soviet Union and boasted of Bulgaria's economic achievements. He could hardly have done less: yet it must have been during this period in charge that he was at the same time alienating the Soviet authorities by his non-cooperative attitude, and at the same time offending his rivals such as Chervenkov and [Kostov's covert ally but ostensible 'rival'] Yugov by his dictatorial attitude. (R 3990/1015/7, EXPULSION OF M. KOSTOV FROM THE BULGARIAN POLITBURO, Mr. Paul Mason to Mr. Ernest Bevin, April 9, 1949, Received: April 13, 1949. In: British Foreign Office (1949): Bulgaria, pp. 23-24) (IMG)

In addition to the Cominform resolution which undermined the Yugoslav regime influence in Bulgaria hence weakening Kostov, Kostov's authoritarianism and heavy-handedness led Yugov – a Titoist, a Yugoslav agent, and a right-opportunist head of the Bulgarian intelligence service who was secretly allied to Kostov – to be compelled into joining Chervenkov in denouncing Kostov:

No doubt Kostov took every opportunity while in command last year to strengthen his claims: as I have said before, he is an ambitious man.... But in so doing he undoubtedly allowed rivals like Yugov and Chervenkov – rivals incidentally to each other – to engineer a successful move against him. (R 3990/1015/7, EXPULSION OF M. KOSTOV FROM THE BULGARIAN POLITBURO, Mr. Paul Mason to Mr. Ernest Bevin, April 9, 1949, Received: April 13, 1949. In: British Foreign Office (1949): Bulgaria, p. 24) (IMG)

The behind-the-scene story of Yugov and his counter-revolutionary affiliations will be exposed later in C20S19.

With the downfall of Kostov, came the rise of Chervenkov, a man staunchly committed to the invincible theses of historical materialism and scientific socialism, and a communist fighter against the left-deviations and right-deviations. The following is how the MI6 spy and British diplomat to Sofia, Paul Mason, described Chervenkov:

It would be premature to discuss here how the succession struggle will develop with the removal of Kostov. I would only record my personal belief that the strongest candidate is the dour and forbidding Chervenkov, the arch-doctrinaire of the Bulgarian Communist Party, the former teacher at the Lenin school in Russia (where Tito is reported to have been a pupil of his), the son-in-law of Dimitrov, of giant physical and, I should say, of considerable mental stature. I have already had a talk with him and he gave me a far greater impression of complete certainty of aim and competence in action than any of the other Ministers I have met. (R 3990/1015/7, EXPULSION OF M. KOSTOV FROM THE BULGARIAN POLITBURO, Mr. Paul Mason to Mr. Ernest Bevin, April 9, 1949, Received: April 13, 1949. In: British Foreign Office (1949): Bulgaria, pp. 24-25) (IMG)

Chervenkov and his faction, in an alliance with the Yugov group's right-deviation, undid some of the Trotskyite left-opportunist excesses of Kostov and brought NEP-like measures to Bulgaria:

This resolution was published in the press of 21st June, together with the full text of the massive report by Vulko Chervenkov, on which the resolution is based.

2. The resolution runs true to Marxist form in that it combines self-congratulation on the "brilliant victory" of the elections with a large amount of self-criticism. The self-criticism, however, in this case, is unusually lengthy and strong, and the decisions registered in the resolution indicate genuine changes of policy.

3. The first section, after the preamble, deals with economic policy in the countryside. It is difficult to see that the policy now envisaged makes economic sense, but it is certainly an attempt to alleviate the main causes of peasant discontent. The first of them is that too low prices are paid for grain. These are to be raised. Secondly, it appears that, even after fulfilling their quotas to the State, peasants have been compelled to dispose of further stocks through official agencies as official prices, e.g., by the granting of monopoly purchase rights to co-operative unions. The peasant is now to be allowed to dispose more freely of his surplus once his quota to the State has been met. It is apparently realised that the natural effect of these measures will be to raise prices for the consumer. It is, however, admitted that it is "of enormous importance for our national economy and for our goods turnover with foreign countries ... to lower the prices of agricultural products." The only way suggested for meeting these conflicting claims is "to achieve a radical reduction in expenditure on middlemen's services." This is to be done by a campaign against bureaucratism and parasitism and by allowing "health[y] competition" between State and co-operative trading organizations.

4. This is tantamount to an admission that the attempt to organise distribution on a Socialist basis has been carried too far too fast. It is also difficult to see how the better prices and greater latitude now to be allowed to the peasant can fail to benefit not only the middle and poor peasants, but also the "kulaks" (who are, however, still the butt of propaganda). In other words the policy seems to be to slacken the pace which some party zealots have been showing in their attempts to socialise the countryside and to show that undue haste in this process is not only dangerous in its effects (because it alienates the peasants and prevents proper co-operation between workers and peasants) but is actually a serious error in Marxist-Leninist doctrine. The pace of formation of co-operatives is also to be slackened by the reassertion of the "voluntary" principle and the "rectification of mistakes" made in numerous areas where too drastic measures had been taken to force farmers and peasants into the co-operative system.

(COMMUNIST POLICY IN BULGARIA: Resolution of the Plenum of the Central Committee, Mr. Dunnett to Mr. Beving, Sofia, June 23, 1949, Received: June 28, 1949. In: British Foreign Office (1949): Bulgaria, p. 29) (IMG)

Upon taking out Yugov, the Chervenkov faction was able to go after such Kostov allies and Titoist agents as General Trunski:

General Slavko Tr[u]nski, a friend of Marshal Tito, is not in the good graces of the Bulgarian Communist Party but continues to hold his Army command. He is a candidate for the position of Councilman for Sofia. (BULGARIAN OPPOSITION; CONTACTS WITH JAILED POLITICAL LEADERS, CIA, June 1, 1949, p. 1) (IMG)

In the wake of these, the purge was to spread in 1950 and 1951 to all the former Communist partisan adversaries and other adversaries (particularly the first) of the policy of Chervenkov.... It was then that the following were released from the Army and excluded from the Central Committee, or were arrested: (...); General Slavcho Trunski, commander of 3 Army; (BULGARIAN POLITICAL REVIEW, CIA, July 21, 1954, p. 3) (IMG)

Such purges reduced the influence of the comprador classes in the Bulgarian armed forces, thus allowing the proletariat to expand its share of influence over the Bulgarian means of violence. However, Yugov, another Yugoslav intelligence agent who had denounced his own ally Kostov so to remain in power and continue Kostov's Titoist activity post-Kostov, continued to exercise influence in Bulgaria. Thus:

On the other hand, Yugov, returned in August 1952 to vice-presidency of the Council of Ministers and now occupies a choice position in the Politburo to which he was elected on 4 May 1954. Already a rival of Chervenkov's in 1949, he is still a dangerous adversary, though he is hated in all Bulgaria because of the blood with which he covered himself as Minister of Interior after the Communists came to power in 1946. (BULGARIAN POLITICAL REVIEW, CIA, July 21, 1954, p. 2) (IMG)

By contrast, even as late July 1954, Chervenkov was popular in Bulgaria. A 1954 CIA report confirmed:

Chervenkov ... is the brother-in-law of Dimitrov. He is young, supple, capable, and relatively popular. He is used to his position. (BULGARIAN POLITICAL REVIEW, CIA, July 21, 1954, p. 3) (IMG)

Referring to Chervenkov, the document stated:

A faithful servant and imitator of the Stalinian severity, he is ... the champion of anti-Tito policy. (BULGARIAN POLITICAL REVIEW, CIA, July 21, 1954, p. 3) (IMG)

Furthermore:

Chervenkov ... constitutes, by his very presence, a major obstacle to attempts to seduce Yugoslavia. (BULGARIAN POLITICAL REVIEW, CIA, July 21, 1954, p. 3) (IMG)

The Bulgarian people, as the reader shall remember from the MI6 document cited previously, preferred friendly relations with the USSR and opposed subservience to the Yugoslav regime. Chervenkov, as the representative of this pro-Soviet anti-Titoist policy line, was naturally the choice of the Bulgarians.

One common propaganda narrative promoted against the friendly relations between the USSR and Bulgaria is that the USSR was colonizing Bulgaria, through control of specific assets in Bulgaria. In accordance to the Hague Convention (see C18S2), the USSR had the legal right to seize Nazi

Germany's military-industrial assets in the territories which its Red Army troops liberated ('occupied'). The USSR exercised this right and established joint-stock companies in Bulgaria, hence actually splitting the shares with the Bulgarians. Referring to the USSR's "shares in three joint-stock companies engaged in shipbuilding, construction and production of building materials, and civil aviation", the CIA admitted:

The Soviet shares in these companies [were] largely acquired through Soviet contributions of German assets seized at the end of the war.... ('SOVIET ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC: LOANS, CREDITS, AND GRANTS', Intelligence Memorandum, CIA, August 20, 1956, p. 14) (IMG)

The CIA-MI6 mainstream media portrays the USSR's turning of Nazi German assets into joint-stock companies as Soviet 'colonization' and 'theft' of Bulgarian resources. Yugoslav agent Kostov promoted this myth as well. In addition to the Hague Convention however, the Yalta agreement reaffirmed the right of the USSR to seize Nazi German assets:

2. Reparation in kind is to be exacted from Germany in three following forms:

(a) Removals within two years from the surrender of Germany or the cessation of organized resistance from the national wealth of Germany located on the territory of Germany herself as well as outside her territory (equipment, machine tools, ships, rolling stock, German investments abroad, shares of industrial, transport and other enterprises in Germany, etc.), these removals to be carried out chiefly for the purpose of destroying the war potential of Germany.

(YALTA CONFERENCE AGREEMENT: DECLARATION OF A LIBERATED EUROPE, Roosevelt, Churchill, Stalin, February 11, 1945) (IMG)

The Soviet state greatly assisted People's Democratic Bulgaria in the latter's development of heavy industry. The US intelligence also reported:

In 1947 the USSR granted Bulgaria an investment credit amounting to \$5 million, which was to be repaid by shipments of tobacco and other goods in 5 years. Among the projects toward which the credit was to be used were the following: the Stalin Chemical Combine in Dimitrovgrad, a combine capable of producing 70,000 tons of fertilizer per year; the Maritsa III Thermal Power Plant, with 50-megawatt capacity; a 30-megawatt hydroelectric station; and a 25-megawatt thermal-electric station. In 1948 a second credit was issued to be used in conjunction with the building of the Karl Marx Soda Plant, the Lenin State Metallurgical Plant, and two automobile repair shops. ('SOVIET ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC: LOANS, CREDITS, AND GRANTS', Intelligence Memorandum, CIA, August 20, 1956, p. 12) (IMG)

C15S6. Soviet Support for the Greek Communist-led Revolutionary Rebellion / Yugoslav Regime Stabs in the Back of Greece's Communists and Progressives *** IMG-All-{Greece}

In building an alliance of working class and bourgeois-democratic anti-fascist parties, the Communist Party of Greece (KKE), pursued the popular frontism strategy and replaced communist slogans with patriotic and progressive bourgeois-democratic anti-fascist slogans, thereby boosting the Party's image in public and challenging the Axis occupation. The archives of the OSS and CIA confirm this. The US intelligence reported:

[T]he people ... soon formed underground resistance groups. The leftist EAM (National Liberation Front), with its own army ELAS (National Popular Army of Liberation), became the largest of these groups.... (...). EAM was dominated by KKE (Greek Communist Party). By stressing patriotic motives and with the advantage of a well-integration organization, the Communists succeeded at first in enlisting the support of many liberals and republicans and even some of the clergy and royalists who saw in EAM the best means of resisting the common enemy. (CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP THE GREEK SITUATION, ORE 6/1, ORE 6/1, CIA, February 7, 1947, p. 6) (IMG)

An attached memorandum prepared by Lieutenant Edmon of the Greek Desk in Cairo supports the belief that the most numerous and effective resistance organization in Greece is the EAM with its guerrilla force known as the ELAS (National People's Liberation Army). According to the Union of Democratic Control, a London organization informing the British public on resistance movements in forming the British public on resistance movements in occupied Europe, the EAM emerged following the German occupation of Greece in 1941. The nucleus appears to have been the Liberal, Socialist, Communist and Agrarian groups who led the opposition to the Metaxas regime. In any event, it is known to embrace today the only groups of organized labor in Greece, including the transport, dock, industrial, building and service trades, white collar, government and commercial workers. With these and other forces, EAM has directed a series of strikes aimed against the Greek quisling government and has also struck at German communications by destroying bridges, tunnels, etc. (Report on Labor Desk Activities in Middle East Theater Relative to Greece, Secret, OSS, 1944, p. 2. In: 'OSS - GREEK MISSION, GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE, 1944', OSS, 1944. In: CIA Archives.) (IMG)

Nonetheless,:

Differences between the Government-in-Exile and the underground forces of resistance grew steadily. In the summer of 1943, representatives of EAM and other resistance groups, including EDES, visited Cairo, where the government was then established, in an unsuccessful effort to secure representation in the government for the underground forces.... (CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP THE GREEK SITUATION, ORE 6/1, ORE 6/1, CIA, February 7, 1947, p. 6) (IMG)

However, this was met with the:

persistent refusal of the King and his Cabinet to form a coalition government.... (CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP THE GREEK SITUATION, ORE 6/1, ORE 6/1, CIA, February 7, 1947, p. 6) (IMG)

Among the Greek militant organizations, "all except EDES and a few minor groups," said US intelligence,:

had in common their dislike of the Tsouderos government and the King. Most Greeks had not forgotten the King's violation of the constitution in condoning a dictatorship. (CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP THE GREEK SITUATION, ORE 6/1, ORE 6/1, CIA, February 7, 1947, p. 6) (IMG)

The widespread Greek mass hatred towards the exiled king also led the resistance movement to seek:

to obtain from the King a promise not to return to Greece until the people had had an opportunity to express their wishes on the matter by plebiscite. (CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP THE GREEK SITUATION, ORE 6/1, ORE 6/1, CIA, February 7, 1947, p. 6) (IMG)

Naturally, the British-backed Greek royalist government-in-exile, refused. Thus,:

Shortly thereafter, EAM formed in Greece a Political Committee of National Liberation (PEEA) to counteract and dispute the authority of the Government-in-Exile. The persistent refusal of the King and his Cabinet to form a coalition government had led to general dissatisfaction, and eventually even to serious mutinies in the Greek armed forces in the Middle East. Finally the British, who had consistently supported the King and the government, assisted in the suppression of the mutinies and installed as Prime Minister the anti-EAM George Papandreou. (CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP THE GREEK SITUATION, ORE 6/1, ORE 6/1, CIA, February 7, 1947, p. 6) (IMG)

Nonetheless, in the words of Allison B. Herrick who had years of experience working in USAID and authored the Area Handbook for Greece in the American University's Foreign Areas Studies Division,:

Papandreou met in Lebanon with delegates of EAM, and later in Caserta they signed an agreement which recognized the authority of the new Government and placed all Greek forces under British control. The Caserta Agreement allowed the British to land troops in Athens and take control of all ELAS forces **insofar as military operations against the retreating German Army were concerned**. (Area Handbook for Greece, American University (Washington D.C.), Foreign Areas Studies Division, Vol. 550, Issue 87, Allison Butler Herrick, p. 41. Bold added.) (IMG)

Hence:

Papandreou set out to form a coalition as agreed upon in May 1944 in Lebanon, where representatives of all resistance groups from inside Greece had met with the Government-in-exile. Three members of the PEEA and two Communists joined the Cabinet. In September, the new government moved from Cairo to Caserta, Italy, and there in a formal agreement received assurances of collaboration from EAM and EDES, who placed themselves under the orders of the Commander of the British forces in Greece. The government entered Athens on 19 October 1944. (CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP THE GREEK SITUATION, ORE 6/1, ORE 6/1, CIA, February 7, 1947, p. 6) (IMG)

Furthermore, as confirmed by a case study of guerrilla warfare in Greece, created under contract by the US Department of the Army:

EAM/ELAS honored the Caserta provisions in the main during the German withdrawal. No guerrillas entered the Athens area; there was no attempt to seize power. (Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II, American University (Washington D.C.), Special Warfare Research Division, Operating under contract with Department of the Army, Doris M. Condit, 1961, p. 89) (IMG)

The British, however, betrayed the agreement by ordering ELAS to give up arms. In response:

ELAS disregarded Scobie's order to lay down its arms, reminding him that his authority extended only to operations against the Germans. The EAM ministers resigned from the government and held a demonstration in Athens on December 3, 1944, to protest the British demand. The police fired into the crowd to disperse it, and that action set off a chain reaction of violence between government troops and ELAS.

The Battle of Athens – the second round in the civil war – lasted one month. The British, who intervened against ELAS, were compelled to withdraw two divisions from the Italian front to reinforce their hard-pressed forces in the Greek capital. The renewed fighting also had the unpleasant aspect of pitting Greek government forces, which now included some who a short time before had been active collaborationists, against men who had taken leading parts in the resistance. The United States Mission in Athens had been instructed to remain neutral....

(Area Handbook for Greece, United States Department of the Army, Eugene K. Keefe, p. 30) (IMG)

The fact that the British and their allied comprador Greek regime utilized Axis fighters to combat the communist-led popular front once again exposes the covert WWII-era Anglo-Axis alliance against the USSR and Popular-Democratic forces. The British moved ahead with their agenda of disarming the Greek fighters:

Churchill temporarily defused the controversial question of the monarchy by persuading George II to appoint as regent the archbishop of Athens, Damaskinos, a heroic figure during the occupation who was respected by both sides. Papandreou resigned as prime minister, and the regent appointed a republican to succeed him. The change in government paved the way for a cease-fire. Thirty-three days of street fighting cost 11,000 lives and left sections of Athens in ruins. Under the provisions of the armistice ELAS laid down its arms, the KKE and the EAM agreed to reorganize as legal political parties, and parliamentary elections and a plebiscite on the king's future were scheduled to be held within the year. (Area Handbook for Greece, United States Department of the Army, Eugene K. Keefe, p. 30) (IMG)

The damage inflicted by the MI6-backed forces against the KKE-led fighters rolled back the communist faction in the KKE and strengthened the capitulationist Titoist tendency led by Markos Vafeiadis. This increased the MI6 lobby in the KKE, allowing for a laydown of the arms by segments of the ELAS. However, the KKE/EAM/ELAS continued to retain large parts of their arms in secret, or else there was no way that they would be able to launch the rebellion later on.

Signed in "In ATHENS, at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 12th February, 1945," it was a deal between the "The Delegation of the Central Committee of EAM" and the "The Delegation of the Hellenic Government" and was known as the Varkiza Agreement. "ARTICLE IX" of the Agreement, titled "Plebiscite and elections," explicitly stated that the plebiscite was to be held prior to the elections, partly so that the Greek electorate would be assured that the King would no longer be able to violate the constitution and condone a dictatorship, as he had done before. It was as follows:

At the earliest possible date and in any case within the current year there shall be conducted in complete freedom and with every care for its genuineness a plebiscite, which shall finally decide on the Constitutional question, all points being submitted to the decision of the people. Thereafter shall follow as quickly as possible elections to a Constituent Assembly for the drafting of the new Constitution of the country. The Representatives of both sides agree that for the verification of the genuineness of the expression of the popular will the great Allied Powers shall be requested to send observers. (868.00/3-645, Agreement Between the Greek Government and EAM, [Translation], Athens, February 12, 1945. Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, United States Department of State, p. 113) (IMG)

However, in a blatant violation of the Agreement,:

In November 1945 a caretaker government, composed of a broad coalition that excluded the Communists, announced parliamentary elections for the following March. When a communist request for postponement of the election until after the plebiscite was denied, the KKE pulled out its candidates and asked supporters to abstain from voting. (Area Handbook for Greece, United States Department of the Army, Eugene K. Keefe, p. 30) (IMG)

The Anglo-American-backed fascist regime in Greece created an atmosphere of fear among Greek voters. The unfree, unfair, and illegal elections held under the shadow of a Nazi-collaborationist state gave the pro-fascist candidates a 'plurality' of the votes:

An Allied commission monitored the elections, which were marked by a swing to the right.... (Area Handbook for Greece, United States Department of the Army, Eugene K. Keefe, pp. 30-31) (IMG)

Then occurred the illegal and phony 'plebiscite' which happened post-elections, against the Varkiza Agreement:

The plebiscite, held in September, returned a 69-percent majority in favor of George II's returning to Greece as king. He died the next spring and was succeeded by his brother, Paul.

During 1946 a series of isolated uprisings by leftists in various parts of the country escalated into a third round in the civil war. The KKE organized the so-called Democratic Army of Greece as ELAS' successor, and it conducted a classic guerrilla war against a static defense by conventional forces. The main guerrilla activity was in the Peloponnesus and in Macedonia and Epirus close to the sanctuary of the Yugoslav, Bulgarian, and Albanian borders, across which the communist forces could retreat to rest and regroup before returning to combat. Across these borders also ran the lines of supply for the Greek Communists.

The government imposed martial law, permitting arrests without warrants. In 1947 it outlawed the KKE....

(Area Handbook for Greece, United States Department of the Army, Eugene K. Keefe, p. 31) (IMG)

As is well-known, General Markos was considered a Tito agent. Like most imperialist-fascist secret service agents in the freedom movements, Markos promoted the view that there was no need for strategic coordination with the friend of the Greek communist-led rebels, the USSR, that the Greek communists should jump straight to rebellion without such coordination:

according to the Yugoslavs, the second Greek insurrection of 1947 was undertaken by agreement between Markos and Tito without previous policy coordination in Moscow. (THE ZHDANOV-MALENKOV RELATIONSHIP, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), July 29, 1953, p. 14) (IMG)

Early on in the War, in addition to the Tito agent Markos, defeatist renegades such as Siantos and his group were up against the Zachariadis faction:

1. Georgios Siantos and other leaders who signed the Lebanon Agreement for the Greek Left-wing, are now fighting against Nikolaos Zachariades and Ioannis Ioannides in an effort to cause the abandonment of their "policy of illegality" and to bring about a surrender of arms in exchange for a policy of forming a legal party.

2. (...). Zachariades, however, still argues that a surrender of arms would mean being murdered at the hands of the extreme Right. To support his stand, he cites the murders at Gythion and Sgala, the killing of the Salonika news-printers....

(SCHISM IN GREEK LEFTIST FORCES, CIA, 1947, p. 1) (IMG)

The Anglo-American imperialists provided assistance of all kinds to the fascist regime in Greece:

By 1947 the British had reluctantly admitted their inability to continue substantial aid to the Greek government. In March of that year, by covering Greece in the Truman Doctrine – which set limits on American tolerance to communist expansion in the area – the United States replaced Great Britain as Greece's protecting power. American military and economic aid was crucial during the final phase of the civil war and would remain vital to Greece's subsequent recovery, reconstruction, and development. A joint American-Greek general staff in Athens directed the war effort against the Communists, and American military advisers assisted Greek government units in the field. American political and economic advisers also worked closely with Greek officials in planning and supervising programs financed by American aid. (...). Total United States military and economic aid from 1946 to 1975 amounted to US\$4.3 billion, more than 60 percent of it in military assistance and more than 90 percent in direct grants. (Area Handbook for Greece, United States Department of the Army, Eugene K. Keefe, p. 31) (IMG)

The Anglo-American imperialists and comprador Yugoslav sources have perpetuated the myth that the USSR refused to provide assistance to the communist-led Greek democratic rebels. Once again, the imperialist and comprador media have been spreading lies. Of course, it cannot be expected that a country far more devastated than the Anglo-Americans as a result of the Great Patriotic War, would be capable of 'showering' the Greek rebels with weapons and training. Nonetheless, to the extent of its abilities, the USSR provided military and diplomatic assistance to the Greek rebels covertly through the Peoples' Democracies. For start, the Soviets really desired the triumph of the Greek revolution:

In the hope of bringing about a Greek government less unsympathetic to the USSR, the Soviets will seek to weaken and discredit the present rightist royalist government by promoting insurgent activities in Greece. (CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP THE GREEK SITUATION, ORE 6/1, CIA, February 7, 1947, p. 12) (IMG)

After all:

The guerrillas are useful in the Soviet war of economic attrition against the US. (Continuing Satellite Aid to the Greek Guerrillas, CIA, October 8, 1948, p. 3) (IMG)

Thus, the Soviets were expected to actively encourage the Peoples' Democracies to support the rebels:

The Soviets ... will concentrate on intensifying the present dissatisfaction and unrest in Greece. To accomplish the purpose, they will provide clandestine aid to Greek leftists through their satellites.... (CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP THE GREEK SITUATION, ORE 6/1, CIA, February 7, 1947, p. 13) (IMG)

Nor were Kremlin leaders by any means afraid to support the Greek Guerrillas:

There is no evidence that the Kremlin feels that, because of the strong US interest in Greece and current US assistance to the Greeks in the form of money, material, and advisors, it would be wise to defer further guerrilla action until US interest had waned.... It also seems unlikely that the Soviets would be deterred from supporting the guerrillas by any fear of UN action to seal Greece's northern borders. (Continuing Satellite Aid to the Greek Guerrillas, CIA, October 8, 1948, p. 3) (IMG)

“The insurgents have a variety of arms,” said one CIA document, adding that among these arms held by Greek rebels: Soviet arms ... have also been reported. (CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP THE GREEK SITUATION, ORE 6/1, CIA, February 7, 1947, p. 12) (IMG)

According to the 1947 CIA report, the “Soviets will ... continue to” provide “clandestine aid to Greek” rebels:

The Soviets will ... continue to work through their satellites (Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria) to intensify the dissatisfaction and unrest in Greece by providing clandestine aid to Greek leftists, disseminating propaganda against the Rightist Greek government, opposing the retention of British troops in Greece, and maintaining troops along the northern borders as a psychological threat. (CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP THE GREEK SITUATION, ORE 6/1, CIA, February 7, 1947, p. 2) (IMG)

And precisely as expected by the American intelligence, the USSR indeed covertly sponsored the rebels through Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania:

Under Soviet direction, Greece’s northern neighbors – Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania – are conducting a drive which presumably has for its ultimate objective the establishment of a Communist Greece. (CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP THE GREEK SITUATION, ORE 6/1, CIA, February 7, 1947, p. 12) (IMG)

William Donovan – the founder of the America’s centralized intelligence service, an agent of the MI6, and a mentor of CIA Director Allen Dulles – confirmed that the Soviets were behind the campaign of supporting the communist and progressive guerrillas in Greece:

Since the formal ending of World War II, under the threat of the Red Army, the Soviet Union by use of penetration, domination of political groups, economic pressures, has in 5 years without firing a shot, set up between itself and the West, a bulwark of satellite South Eastern States which can be of great military and economic importance.

The Soviets sought to bring Greece within that group through proxy military invasion. Under the guise of civil war-organized guerrilla forces under Soviet trained leaders were placed in the mountains with light detachments sent out to burn, to pillage and to terrorize.

In Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria, schools, hospitals, and supply dumps were established for replacements, indoctrination and training. In each of the countries, but especially Albania, were places of refuge for the Communist guerrillas when hard pressed.

(‘LECTURE BY WILLIAM J. DONOVAN ON PARTISAN WARFARE ARMY WAR COLLEGE, FORT LEAVENWORTH, TEXAS’, CIA, William Donovan, January 11, 1951) (IMG)

An American imperialist secret service document cited a CIA informant connected to Tito’s secret service regarding information that the Soviet airfields in Yugoslavia were to provide supplies to communist-led Greek rebel forces:

The informant learned from a member of the Yugoslav Secret Information Service that the Yugoslav General Staff is continuing to furnish meteorological data to Soviet airfields (locations unknown) whose planes supply Markos troops. It is alleged that four air transports are sent to Rebel territory nightly from these fields. (GREEK REBEL CONTACTS WITH YUGOSLAVIA, CIA, December 28, 1948, p. 1) (IMG)

The USSR shipped weapons to the revolutionary guerrillas in Greece in part through ‘Split’, a city located in Yugoslavia, now in modern-day Croatia. By the middle of 1948, however, the CIA agent Tito (see C12S1) and his group, who secretly sided with the Greek monarcho-fascist regime, successfully expanded their influence in Yugoslavia at the expense of the Soviet-backed elements. Thus, even prior to the expulsion of Tito’s gang from the Cominform, the former stabbed the Greek rebels and the USSR in the back. Indeed:

Shortly prior to the Cominform rift considerable war materiel, sent by the Soviets from Odessa to Split for transshipment to the Greek rebels, was seized by the Yugoslav Army. This included 70 tanks since distributed among the Yugoslav forces. Subsequent attempts by Rebel delegates to negotiate with Marshal Tito for a return of these arms have proved to be in vain. (Yugoslav Aid to Greek Rebels Halted, CIA, July 19, 1949, p. 1) (IMG)

After the expulsion, Tito’s betrayal of the communist-led Greek rebels intensified:

The following measures were taken by the Yugoslavs against the Greek Rebels in the recent past:

- a. Two camps in Bosnia (location unspecified), long used for basic training and as a rest centers by the Rebels have been closed.
- b. All foreign volunteers training in Yugoslavia for eventual incorporation into the Rebel forces have been sent to Greece, but their weapons and supplies were confiscated. Even those not desiring to go to [Greece] have been forced across the frontier.
- c. Wounded Rebel soldiers recuperating in Yugoslavia and Rebels inadvertently crossing into Yugoslav territory have not been permitted to return to their respective units.
- d. Two Rebel radio stations in Yugoslavia have been closed.

(Yugoslav Aid to Greek Rebels Halted, CIA, July 19, 1949, p. 1. Underline original.) (IMG)

Some Yugoslav anti-fascists and/or communists, whom the Yugoslav regime called ‘Cominformists’, dared to disobey the commands of the Titoist mafia:

Despite an order issued by the Yugoslav Government in February 1949 to all nationals fighting with Greek partisans to return immediately to Yugoslavia, approximately 450 Yugoslavs, mostly Cominformists, are still with the Rebel forces. (Yugoslav Aid to Greek Rebels Halted, CIA, July 19, 1949, p. 1) (IMG)

So significant was the CIA agent Tito’s assistance to the Greek monarcho-fascists that the US intelligence stated:

The three main factors in the survival of an independent [read: pro-Western] Greece have been US-UK military aid, the Greek military effort, and Tito’s defection from the Cominform. (Current Situation in Greece, CIA, February 28, 1950, p. 3) (IMG)

Tito’s betrayals failed to stop the USSR from continuing its assistance to Greek rebels. Well into 1948, the CIA expected the Soviet Union ‘to continue to supply ... the guerrillas’, clearly implying that the USSR was already supplying the guerrillas:

Soviet intention of ultimately bringing Greece under Communist domination still obtains. For the following reasons the Kremlin may be expected to **continue** to supply Continuing and use the guerrillas.... (Continuing Satellite Aid to the Greek Guerrillas, CIA, October 8, 1948, p. 2-3. Bold added.) (IMG)

The CIA, citing the Turkish diplomatic intelligence in Greece, stated that:

on 27 September 1948 Russian airplanes made drops of all kinds of war materiel to the guerrillas in various parts of Macedonia and Epiros. ('Turkish Embassy in Athens Reports on Markos, Repatriation, Diplomats in Rumania and Aid to Guerrillas', CIA, November 2, 1948, p. 1) (IMG)

The Turkish Consulate, as cited by the CIA reported that:

The guerrillas of the Papades region are being supported quite openly by the Bulgarian military authorities on the Greek-Bulgarian border. ('Turkish Embassy in Athens Reports on Markos', Repatriation, Diplomats in Rumania and Aid to Guerrillas, CIA, November 2, 1948, p. 2) (IMG)

In addition:

The Turkish Consulate in Salonika [Greece] has reported to the Embassy in Athens that General Markos Vafiades ... is receiving war materiel of Soviet origin and will make new attacks on Western Macedonia. ('Turkish Embassy in Athens Reports on Markos, Repatriation, Diplomats in Rumania and Aid to Guerrillas', CIA, November 2, 1948, p. 1) (IMG)

Hungary and Romania also provided military assistance to the Greek rebels:

The Greek Guerrilla training center formerly located in Siklos, Hungary has been moved to Pecs. (...). An unconfirmed report places the existence of an international brigade of 25,000 men near Szeged. A recruit training camp has been established in Rumania where 4,200 Greek Guerrillas are reported. (Troop Movement in the Balkans, CIA, July 11, 1950, p. 1) (IMG)

Following the large-scale purge of many Titoist elements in Albania, People's Democratic Albania was able to more closely align with the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies. Albania's government was strengthened and, according to the CIA, became 'a Soviet supply base for the Greek guerrillas':

Despite Soviet attempts to strengthen Albania following the defection of Tito and the increasingly important role assigned to Albania in supplying the Greek guerrillas and resisting Tito, isolated Albania will probably one of the weakest of the Soviet Satellites. Gradual build-up of Albania into a full-fledged Satellite began in late 1948 with a purge of the nationalistic elements in Albanian government. Then, as a Kremlin favorite free from Yugoslav influence, Albania signed trade agreements with Rumania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. More recently, a number of actions underlined the Kremlin's determination to strengthen Albania. An unusually ostentatious reception was given the Albanian delegation which went to Moscow to sign a trade agreement, and Albania was belatedly brought into the Council of Economic Mutual Assistance. However, it is still difficult to determine if these Soviet actions have accomplished anything more than to enable Albania to continue resisting increasing pressure from Tito and to serve as a Soviet supply base for the Greek guerrillas. (WEEKLY SUMMARY NUMBER 47, CIA, April 22, 1949, pp. 7-8) (IMG)

The Greek regime posed a menace to the whole camp of the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies. The monarcho-fascist leaders of Greece had territorial ambitions which the Soviet Union and its Popular Democratic allies sought to, and successfully did, block:

The Soviets [are] determined to prevent the expansion of Greece through territorial revisions at the expense of Albania and Bulgaria. So far they have been successful, since the Council of Foreign Ministers has not recognized Greek claims for boundary changes. (...). Accomplishment of this end would constitute an important step towards the ultimate goal. (CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP THE GREEK SITUATION, ORE 6/1, CIA, February 7, 1947, p. 12) (IMG)

"The Soviets," the CIA continued, "will":

continue to oppose the retention of British troops in Greece, and exert psychological pressure by retaining troops along the northern borders. (CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP THE GREEK SITUATION, ORE 6/1, CIA, February 7, 1947, p. 13) (IMG)

The CIA also expected that the Soviets would:

disseminate propaganda to discredit the government.... (CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP THE GREEK SITUATION, ORE 6/1, CIA, February 7, 1947, p. 13) (IMG)

Indeed, diplomatically, too, the Soviet Union pressured for the expulsion of Britain from Greece:

The USSR member, Andrei Gromyko, repeated these counter-charges and added that one main cause of all the troubles was the presence of foreign (i.e. British) troops in Greece. (CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP THE GREEK SITUATION, ORE 6/1, CIA, February 7, 1947, p. 5) (IMG)

The Soviets in fact constantly complained about the British occupation:

The Soviets are constantly protesting against the presence of the British occupation forces in Greece. (CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP THE GREEK SITUATION, ORE 6/1, CIA, February 7, 1947, p. 14) (IMG)

And they took firm diplomatic action in support of the revolution:

The USSR has been able to block any decisive UN action and probably feels confident that ... no UN member (especially the US) would be willing to send troops to Greece. (Continuing Satellite Aid to the Greek Guerrillas, CIA, October 8, 1948, p. 3) (IMG)

C15S7. Destroying Christianity by Supporting 'Christianity': Orthodox Christianity Coopted as a Tool of Soviet Intelligence / USSR support for Islam / Romanian Communist use of Orthodoxy, Judaism, and Protestantism against Catholic Church *** IMG-All-{Orthodox Church}

An in-depth explanation of the history of the rise of Judaism and Christianity is beyond the scope of this work. However, a number of points will be briefly made to provide context. The Tanakh or 'Old Testament' preaches genocide and terror. Yet, tens of times more genocidal and terroristic than the 'God' of the 'Old Testament' was the 'God' of the 'New Testament', which covertly, shrewdly, foxily, and sneakily spread propaganda for the Roman colonizers. Christianity, an eclectic mix of Roman colonial Paganism and Judaism, was an evil genius work of the Roman conquerors for the aim of enslaving, expelling, and mass-incinerating the nation of Israel. Applied in the context of Ancient Israel, the eclectic mix Roman colonial Paganism and Judaism smuggled Roman colonial ideas into Israelite culture, whereas when promoted among the Roman Pagans, it smuggled Judaic monotheism into Roman culture in correlation with the rise of feudalism (as a replacement of slavery) in the Roman Empire. Thus, Christianity, an anti-Semitic invention for terror against Israel, played an ultra-reactionary role when preached among the Israelites and a progressive role when preached among the Roman Pagans.

Yet, in the post-feudal society, Christianity grew entirely vestigial. The objective of the Soviet socialist state was to cleanse the Earth from this religion, and from religion in general. The campaign to destroy this feudal, colonial, and pogromist religion called 'Christianity' required both a direct

dialectical materialist denunciations thereof, along with the smuggling of a communist current into the religion. Such was why the Soviet state, a foe of the Church, coopted the Orthodox Church and began utilizing it as a communist intelligence weapon aimed at engineering splits and deepening schisms in the international Christian Church networks.

The cleansing of Orthodox Christian influence from the USSR, along with much the rest of the ideological campaign against religion, was a correct process that actually continued throughout the history of the USSR in its first 35 years.

After the Bolshevik revolution, when all connections with Russia were severed, the Orthodox Church in the Levant faced the problem of finance and education. With no outside aid, the Church maladministered and misappropriated its rich religious bequests (awqaf) and, with Russian higher schools closed to them, the clergy fell into ignorance and laity, having few schools of its own and no colleagues, was forced to attend the numerous Catholic schools which enjoyed the support of the Latin powers. (SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THE PATRIARCHATE OF ANTIOCH, CIA, November 12, 1948, p. 1) (IMG)

Many of the Orthodox Christian priests were closely associated with the regime of the Tsar and thus had ties to British and Axis intelligence services. As such, there was much conflict between the Orthodox Church and the Soviet state in the early decades of Soviet power. The influence of the Orthodox Church on the country dramatically reduced, paving the way for the greater secularization of Soviet peoples, and the spread of the scientific socialist mindset. By the time of the Great Patriotic War, therefore, much of the hostile anti-Soviet elements in the Orthodox Christian Church had been isolated and weakened, whereas healthier elements of the Orthodox Church gained greater strength over the reactionaries. Many new priests, for example, came from kolkhoznik backgrounds, thus increasing the influence of the progressive classes in the Orthodox Church networks.

The Great Patriotic War presented new crises and opportunities concerning the role of Orthodox Christianity. By 1943, the MI6 had re-established its alliance with the fascist Vatican mafia, and the Anglo-Americans and the Axis had begun joint efforts for using the Catholic Church as a weapon against Soviet power. In this context, an excellent weapon for undermining the influence of the Catholic Church and the MI6-backed fascist Vatican mafia was the Orthodox Christian Church. The Soviets continued their campaign against religion in general, Orthodox Christianity included. However, in order to exploit intra-Christianity differences in a manner that undermines imperialist-fascist secret services including the latter's tool Christianity, the USSR began to sponsor the Orthodox Church as a weapon of the intelligence war. Lenin rightly condemned the infiltration of 'Christian socialist' ideas into the communist movement, for the smuggling of 'Christian socialism' into the socialist movement would pull the socialist movement away from socialism onto such a feudal, colonial, and pogromist religion as Christianity. By contrast, the 'smuggling' of 'Christian socialist' or 'Christian pro-communist' ideas into Christian circles is not only not reactionary, but is in fact progressive, for it smuggles the socialist current into the Christian movement.

The following conversation between Enver Hoxha and Stalin is instructive:

During the talk with Stalin I pointed out to him the stand of the clergy, especially the Catholic clergy in Albania, our position in relation to it, and asked how he judged our stand.

"The Vatican is a centre of reaction," Comrade Stalin told me among other things, "it is a tool in the service of capital and world reaction, which supports this international organization of subversion and espionage. It is a fact that many Catholic priests and missionaries of the Vatican are old-hands at espionage on a world scale. Imperialism has tried and is still trying to realize its aims by means of them." Then he told me of what had happened once in Yalta with Roosevelt, with the representative of the American Catholic Church and others.

During the talk with Roosevelt, Churchill and others on problems of the anti-Hitlerite war, they [particularly the British] had said: "We must no longer fight the Pope in Rome. What have you against him that you attack him?!"

"I have nothing against him," Stalin had replied.

"Then, let us make the Pope our ally," they had said, "let us admit him to the coalition of the great allies."

"All right," Stalin had said, "but the anti-fascist alliance is an alliance to wipe out fascism and nazism. As you know, gentlemen, this war is waged with soldiers, artillery, machine-guns, tanks, aircraft. If the Pope or you can tell us what armies, artillery, machine-guns tanks and other weapons of war he possesses, let him become our ally. **We don't need an ally for talk and incense.**"

After that, they had made no further mention of the question of the Pope and the Vatican.

"Were there Catholic priests in Albania who betrayed the people?" Comrade Stalin asked me then.

"Yes" I told him. **"Indeed the heads of the Catholic Church made common cause with the nazi-fascist foreign invaders right from the start, placed themselves completely in their service and did everything within their power to disrupt our National Liberation War and perpetuate the foreign domination."**

"What did you do with them?"

"After the victory," I told him, **"we arrested them and put them on trial and they received the punishment they deserved."**

"You have done well," he said.

"But were there others who maintained a good stand?" he asked.

"Yes," I replied, **"especially clergymen of the Orthodox and Moslem religion."**

"What have you done with them?" he asked me.

"We have kept them close to us. **In its First Resolution our Party called on all the masses, including the clergymen, to unite for the sake of the great national cause, in the great war for freedom and independence. Many of them joined us, threw themselves into the war and made a valuable contribution to the liberation of the Homeland.** After Liberation they embraced the policy of our Party and continued the work for the reconstruction of the country. We have always valued and honoured such clergymen, and some of them have now been elected deputies to the People's Assembly or promoted to senior ranks in our army. In another case, a former clergyman linked himself so closely with the National Liberation Movement and the Party that in the course of the war he saw the futility of the religious dogma, abandoned his religion, embraced the communist ideology and thanks to his struggle, work and conviction we have admitted him to the ranks of the Party."

"Very good," Stalin said to me. "What more could I add? If you are clear about **the fact that religion is opium for the people and that the Vatican is a centre of obscurantism, espionage and subversion against the cause of the peoples,** then you know that you should act precisely as you have done."

(With Stalin, Hoxha, Meeting 3. Bold added.) (No IMG)

Contrary to the remarks of the Maoist revisionists and Khrushchev's group, the Stalin-era Soviet state did not stop the campaign against Orthodox Christianity. Rather, (1) it continued the campaign to undermine the reactionary priests, (2) it continued the campaign to penetrate the rank and file of the Church through the installation of Soviet intelligence agents as well as priests from kolkhoznik and proletarian backgrounds into the Church networks, (3) it continued to denounce religion in general as an 'opium of the masses', as indicated in Stalin's remarks to Hoxha, and, during Zhdanovschina, explicitly stepped up the campaign for dialectical materialist atheism at the expense of religion, (4) but also utilized a pro-communist current inside Russia's version of Christianity, the Orthodox Christianity, to wage the Cold War against the Vatican.

As with any other religion, the USSR was critical of Catholicism both because of the fact that it was a religion and because of its ideological content. However, the USSR, while opposed to the idea, bore not much more hostility to the Catholic ideology in-itself than to Orthodox Christianity in-itself. Rather, its particularly tough measures against the Catholic Church arose out of the fact that they worked as fronts for the MI6, the Nazis, etc. Had Italy been a socialist country and if the Vatican had been thoroughly purged of the fascists, then the Vatican could be converted into a center of intelligence activities for the socialist countries. In that kind of a hypothetical scenario, supporting the spread of the well-purged Catholic Church could have been an excellent soft power and intelligence penetration weapon, as a strategy of the longer-term goal of rooting out religion from the planet. However, at the time, the Vatican was controlled by fascist reaction. Hence, there was the need to promote a type of Christianity opposed to the Catholic Church.

Soviet intelligence/diplomatic archives too prove that the USSR utilized the Orthodox Christianity as a weapon with which to combat Vatican influence. In a document that detailed the instructions for the Soviet Embassy in Israel to carry out military and political espionage against the Anglo-American imperialists in Israel, it was also stated that the Soviet Embassy must promote the Russian Orthodox Church in collaboration with the Jerusalem Patriarchate against the influence of the fascist Vatican mafia:

The legation must help the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission in strengthening and spreading the influence of the Russian Orthodox Church in Palestine and in its struggle, conducted jointly with the Jerusalem Patriarchate, against the increased activity of the Vatican. (INSTRUCTIONS TO THE MINISTER OF THE USSR IN THE STATE OF ISRAEL, Secret, Ershov. Part of: COPY: AVP RF, F 089, OP.2, P.3, D.8, LL.2-11, I.N. Bakulin to A.A. Gromyko (Moscow), Moscow, 29 September 1949, Secret. In: "Documents on Israeli-Soviet Relations, 1941-1953, Parts 1-2", p. 538) (IMG {Israel})

The Soviet embassy operatives throughout the Levant did indeed act upon such instructions and promoted the Orthodox Church as a bulwark against Vatican influence. Regarding the role of the Orthodox Christianity in the Levant, a CIA document stated:

2. After the Bolshevik revolution, when all connections with Russia were severed, the Orthodox Church in the Levant faced the problem of finance and education. With no outside aid, the Church maladministered and misappropriated its rich religious bequests (awqaf) and, with Russian higher schools closed to them, the clergy fell into ignorance and laity, having few schools of its own and no colleagues, was forced to attend the numerous Catholic schools which enjoyed the support of the Latin powers.

3. A new era of hope opened for the Orthodox Church members of the Levant with the opening in 1944 of the Legation in Beirut by the Soviet Union, which had by then ... become the protector of the Orthodox Church. Soviet propaganda reached not only the Orthodox mission, far too ignorant to have any conception of the true position of the Church in the Soviet Union, but also those members of the Orthodox hierarchy of Antioch, Alexander Tahhan, a man of eighty-three, was influenced by the Soviet propaganda, but the only two men with sufficient education or prestige to succeed Tahhan as Patriarch are not considered pro-Soviet. (SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THE PATRIARCHATE OF ANTIOCH, CIA, November 12, 1948, p. 1) (IMG)

Surely there are and have been well-meaning anti-fascist Christian priests, be they Catholic, Orthodox, Protestant, etc. And by all means, communists should cooperate with such priests wherever possible. To refuse an alliance with the crypto-progressive and crypto-secular religious leaders against imperialists and fascists is to pursue a sectarian left-deviationist line. Nonetheless, one must be wary of the fact that many of the priests who cooperated with Soviet intelligence and Soviet embassies, did so out of opportunism. Many of these priests had retained their connections to the remnants of the Tsarist intelligence and would have gladly cooperated with anti-Soviet intelligence organizations. However, since corrupt priests were representatives of the Orthodox Christianity and since the USSR had coopted Orthodox Christianity against the Vatican, the corrupt priests had little choice but to cooperate, or otherwise they would lose their position in the Orthodox Christian Church.

There was for instance an Orthodox Christian priest named Samahah who reportedly was distrusted by the Soviets due to potential links to the Tsarist networks, but was nonetheless willing to engage in some cooperation with the USSR. For example, according to a CIA report:

At the celebration of the 500th Anniversary of the Moscow Church, held in Moscow in July 1948, which the representatives of the Patriarch of Antioch attended with an eye to the reestablishment of the same direct financial assistance which Antioch had enjoyed under the tsars, Samahah proposed a toast to Stalin as the "defender of the Orthodox Church." Source states that the representative of the Patriarchate of Antioch evidently made a poor impression on their Russian colleagues. (SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THE PATRIARCHATE OF ANTIOCH, CIA, November 12, 1948, p. 2) (IMG)

In spite of the poor impression he allegedly made, Samahah nonetheless cooperated with the Soviets:

Samahah has been reported by several sources of varying reliability to be engaged in propaganda and espionage activities for the Soviets. (ACTIVITIES OF MEMBERS OF GREEK AND RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCHES, CIA, March 31, 1949, p. 1) (IMG)

Archimandrite Samahah's activities in supplying pro-Soviet articles to the Lebanese press have called forth a protest from the Lebanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and notables of the Greek Orthodox Community, who have requested Tahhan to recall Samahah. (ACTIVITIES OF MEMBERS OF GREEK AND RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCHES, CIA, March 31, 1949, p. 1) (IMG)

The Soviets provided him with funds and utilized their alliance with him as a means of pressuring Tahhan to line up into a pro-Soviet stance. The US intelligence reported:

1. [T]he recent visit of Archimandrite Basilios Samahah to Syria and Lebanon was made at the suggestion of the Russian Orthodox Church in Moscow. The purpose of the trip was to obtain the financial support of Greek Orthodox Patriarch Alexandros Tahan of Antioch for the creation of a seminary in Moscow for Greek Orthodox priests.

2. When Archimandrite Samahah's initial efforts to gain the Patriarch's support were unsuccessful, he appealed to the Soviet Legation in Beirut to bring pressure to bear on Patriarch Tahan. After referring the matter to Moscow, the Soviet Legation told Archimandrite Samahah that the Russian Orthodox Church in Moscow was prepared to provide him with 300,000 rubles against a promissory note signed by the Patriarch Alexandros Tahan.

3. This project was successfully arranged, and Archimandrite Samahah left Damascus on 6 January to return to Moscow, via Iran. (VISIT OF ARCHIMANDRITE SAMAHAH TO SYRIA AND LEBANON, CIA, February 27, 1951, p. 1) (IMG)

In addition to these duties, source states that Archimandrite Samahah is acting as Oriental Advisor to the Russian Orthodox Church. His outgoing mail is routed via the Soviet Foreign office to the Soviet Legation in Beirut. (ACTIVITIES OF MEMBERS OF GREEK AND RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCHES, CIA, March 31, 1949, p. 1) (IMG)

Another person named by the CIA was Archbishop Karam, one of those Orthodox Christian leaders funded by the Soviets:

Other Soviet supporters in the Church in addition Salibi are Archbishop Karam, Metropolitan of Mt. Lebanon, who source states, definitely takes money from the Soviets and Archimandrite Samahah, who is a Soviet Intelligence agent. (SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THE PATRIARCHATE OF ANTIOCH, CIA, November 12, 1948, p. 2)

Archbishop Karam has denied that he is pro-Soviet, but admits that he received three hundred pounds from Daniel Solod, Soviet Minister to Lebanon, for expenses toward his trip to Moscow. (ACTIVITIES OF MEMBERS OF GREEK AND RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCHES, CIA, March 31, 1949, p. 1) (IMG)

Regarding the activities of Karam and Samahah, the US intelligence stated:

Archimandrite Basilios Samahah, who accompanied Ilyas Karam (the Greek Orthodox Archbishop of Mount Lebanon) to Moscow in December 1947, has remained in Moscow. He is reported by a well-placed source to have been appointed by the Patriarch of Antioch to take charge of a monastery in or near Moscow that has belonged for many years to the Church of Antioch. Samahah also acts as Tahhan's representative in matters between the Greek and Russian Orthodox Churches, according to source. (ACTIVITIES OF MEMBERS OF GREEK AND RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCHES, CIA, March 31, 1949, p. 1) (IMG)

Karam, the CIA stated, cooperated with the Soviet Attaches in exploiting the splits that occurred in the Greek Catholic Church in Lebanon:

Fyodot Pissarenko and Aleksandr Sergeyevev, Soviet Attaches, are very much interested in the current internal dispute in the Greek Catholic Church. At Sergeyevev's request, Dikran Tosbath of the Beirut daily newspaper, Le Soir, and Tawfiq Wahbah of Dunya collect information on this subject. Comment: The interest of these Soviet officials in this dispute may have some connection with Archbishop Ilya Karam's attempt to exploit the discontent of the Greek Catholics and perhaps to win some of them back to the Orthodox fold. Karam sent Archimandrite Jammal, who was formerly a Greek Catholic, to make overtures to two of the leading malcontents, a Greek Catholic, to make overtures to two of the leading malcontents, Afif Sawaya and Yusuf Ilyas Riyashi. (ACTIVITIES OF SOVIET OFFICIALS IN LEBANON, CIA, December 8, 1948, p. 1) (IMG)

Another US intelligence document stated:

1. The Holy Synod of the Antioch Patriarchate of the Greek Orthodox Church met in Damascus, Syria, on 16 May 1961. The discussion at the meeting chiefly concerned the coming election for the "Regent," (executive assistant) to Patriarch Alexandros Tahan. The three candidates being considered for the post are Atanesios Skaf of Zahle, Lebanon; Malatios Suwayti of Damascus; and Ilyas Barbari of Beirut.

2. [T]he candidate favored by the Soviet Legation in Beirut is Ilyas Barbari. The Soviet Minister, Vasili Belyayev, discussed Barbari's candidacy with Archbishop Ilyas Karam of Mount Lebanon when the latter visited him at the Soviet Legation in Beirut on 15 May. (GREEK ORTHODOX CHURCH ELECTION, CIA, August 9, 1951, p. 1) (IMG)

According to the CIA, the Patriarch of Antioch attended:

the celebration of the 500th Anniversary of the Moscow Church, held in Moscow in July 1948.... (SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THE PATRIARCHATE OF ANTIOCH, CIA, November 12, 1948, p. 2) (IMG)

During this celebration, the CIA reported, resolutions against the MI6-backed fascist Vatican mafia were passed:

When the Russians began to present pre-arranged resolutions which were in conflict with the Greek members of the Church thought to be the real reason for the gathering ... the Greek members left the conference. The Antioch representatives, despite the warnings of the Greek members of the Church, then joined in anti-Papal resolutions. The only material gain that Antioch received from the Soviets, however, was a promise of the revenue of one church in Moscow. (SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THE PATRIARCHATE OF ANTIOCH, CIA, November 12, 1948, p. 2) (IMG)

Still, another figure cooperating with the Soviets was:

Ilyas Salibi, the Metropolitan of Beirut. (...). Politically, Salibi has made an alliance with Habib Abu-Shahlah, Greek Orthodox deputy from Mt. Lebanon and lawyer for Tapline, and Niqola Rizqallah, Muhafis of Beirut, which alliance source states has been advantageous to all three. Salibi proclaims openly that the Soviet Union is going to win the "coming war with the West," and the Patriarchate of Antioch should "jump on the band-wagon." Source states positively that Salibi do not take money from the Soviets but is following the Soviets line because he hopes that they will make him the next Patriarch of Antioch. He is spending considerable sums of money to ensure his election. Salibi has great influence over Patriarch Tahhan, who has been heard to echo Salibi's statements on an eventual Soviet victory. (SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THE PATRIARCHATE OF ANTIOCH, CIA, November 12, 1948, p. 2) (IMG)

Through its own Orthodox Church in Moscow, the Soviet Union also influenced Tahhan to increase Orthodox Christian influence in the Levant:

Alexis, the Patriarch of Moscow, is reported by a reliable source to have sent a sum equivalent to 1,500 pounds sterling to the Patriarch of Antioch, Alexandros Tahhan (who lives in Damascus), for distribution among the Orthodox refugees from Palestine. This sum is to be divided between Damascus, Jerusalem, and Alexandria, with an allocation of the equivalent of 250 pounds sterling for Armenian refugees. (ACTIVITIES OF MEMBERS OF GREEK AND RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCHES, CIA, March 31, 1949, p. 1) (IMG)

Frank Roberts – the MI6 official, advisor to Churchill, anti-Soviet ambassador to the USSR, and a NATO hawk – corroborated the points made by the CIA regarding the USSR's cooptation and promotion of Orthodox Christianity for influence in the Middle East. He wrote:

Traditionally, the main source of Russian influence in the Near East has been the Orthodox Church. In Tsarist days Russia vied with France as the protector of Christians throughout the Near East, and more particularly in the "holy places" of Palestine. There seems little doubt that one of the motives behind the new official toleration and even encouragement of the Orthodox Church in the Soviet Union is to promote Soviet influence abroad. The new Patriarch's visit to Jerusalem and to other religious centres in the Near East, the earlier visit to Moscow of Orthodox Patriarchs from the Near East for the coronation of the Russian Patriarch, and claims not being put forward on behalf of the Moscow Patriarchate for the leadership of the Orthodox Church, coupled significantly with attempts to gain control of the Constantinople Patriarchate, are all signs of a renewed active Soviet policy in the Near East. This recalls the similar

encouragement given by the lay French Republic in the early 20th century to French religious missions in the Levant, despite the expulsion of the same religious orders from France itself. The official propaganda line of the Armenian and Georgian Churches also fits this general pattern. (E 797/797/65, Mr. Roberts to Mr. Bevin, author: Frank Roberts, No. 30. Secret, Moscow, January 16, 1946, Received: January 25, 1946. In: British Foreign Office (1946), top pp. 16-17 / bottom pp. 22-23. Note: in the British Foreign Office documents book, there are two page numbers per each page. One page number is on the top and the other is at the bottom. The one at the bottom and the one at the top do not match each other) (IMG)

The prominent Syrian politician Akram Howrani, reflecting in 1946 on the attitude of the USSR towards ethnic minorities in the Middle East, wrote:

It is natural for the Soviet and Anglo-American policies in the East to be in complete contradiction, due to the different goals, interests, and objectives. The circumstances of the war allowed the visionary advocacy to freely undertake a great effort in the Arab countries that left some important traces. The Arab East continues to be the subject of great attention because it has become one of the main sensitive fields in the world that The Anglo-American and Soviet influences are wrestling face to face.

The Soviet policy, through its wide propaganda, aimed to establish focal points for its influence from religious and racial minorities in order to reach the same results that it reached in Iran. It strikes British influence and interests at the heart in appropriate circumstances. On this basis, she tried to establish special relations – in the name of **Orthodoxy** [Orthodox Christianity] – but it did not succeed against the sweeping nationalist trend. It also facilitated for this purpose the way for Armenian immigration.

(Akram Al-Howrani Memoirs, 2000, pp. 546-547. Bold added) (IMG{Israel})

However, contrary to what Howrani mentioned, the USSR did not succeed ‘against’ the sweeping Arab ‘nationalist’ trend because the Stalin-era USSR supported secular pan-Arabism (‘Arab nationalism’) as shown in C16S5. And, as Howrani correctly stated, the USSR facilitated the Armenian right of return to the Soviet Caucasus, decades after the genocide by Turkish fascist reaction.

Another religion to which the USSR aimed to coopt was Islam. The Quran was never as genocidal and colonial an obstacle as Biblical scripture. However, it did promote misogyny, such as in Surat el-Nisaa Ayah 34, in which it explicitly tells men to ‘idrabuhonna’ – to beat women – if the wives dare disobey the husband, not to mention the Quran’s frequent support for sex with ‘ma malakat aymankom’ – ‘those whom you most rightly own’, the slaves. Hoxha famously denounced Islam for its inherently misogynistic character, and Stalin in private denounced it for being so ‘outdated’. Yet, both Stalin and Hoxha supported the promotion of the progressive elements among the Muslim clergy. The Soviet state sought to coopt not just Orthodox Christianity but also Islam as a soft power tool and an intelligence weapon. Frank Roberts – the MI6 official, advisor to Churchill, anti-Soviet ambassador to the USSR, and a NATO hawk – reported to London:

But useful though the Orthodox and Armenian Christians may be to Soviet policy, the Soviet Union are unlikely to repeat the mistake made by Tsarist Russia and later by France of identifying themselves with Christian minorities in an overwhelmingly Moslem area. Although little first-hand information is available regarding those territories in the Soviet Union which were formerly part of Islam, there are signs that the Soviet Union, like Britain, also regards herself as a great Moslem Power. Islam now seems to be receiving within the Soviet Union the same relatively sympathetic treatment as the Orthodox Church, while Soviet foreign policy is groping its way towards improving Soviet connections with the Moslem, and particularly with the Arab world. The staffs of Soviet legations in Middle East countries include Moslem secretaries, and when the new Soviet policy of claiming separate international status for the Union Republics has been developed to cover the central Asiatic Republics, no doubt these will be encouraged to exchange separate diplomatic missions with Moslem States. This in turn would promote closer contacts, exchanges of visits, &c., between religious leaders of Islam within and outside the Soviet Union and Islamic studies will no doubt be encouraged in the Soviet Union. An important sign of the times is the recent pilgrimage of important Moslems from the Soviet Union to Mecca, for which air and other facilities were provided by the Soviet Government. (E 797/797/65, Mr. Roberts to Mr. Bevin, author: Frank Roberts, No. 30. Secret, Moscow, January 16, 1946, Received: January 25, 1946. In: British Foreign Office (1946), top p. 17 / bottom p. 23. Note: in the British Foreign Office documents book, there are two page numbers per each page. One page number is on the top and the other is at the bottom. The one at the bottom and the one at the top do not match each other) (IMG)

As for the myth that the USSR ‘banned’ pilgrimage to Mecca, the above excerpt already debunks such a myth.

Regarding the conditions of the Church in Latvia and practice of religion in general in the USSR, the MI6 reported:

The practice of religion is free in Latvia, as it is in other parts of the Soviet Union, but in Riga church-going apparently does not carry with it inconveniences for officials and other outstanding people as it does in Russia. In Riga the churches which have not suffered war damage are in excellent state of repair, both outside and in, and churches in rural districts are bright with recent redecoration. (N 15687/8873/59, Mr. Roberts to Mr. Bevin, Moscow, No. 791 Confidential. October 29, 1945. Received: November 16, 1945. Enclosure in No. 26. Report by Mr. Sharman on a Visit to Riga. October 1945, In: Foreign Office (1945), p. 403) (IMG{National Cultures in the USSR})

It is also worth reminding that while the CPSU was to be made up of communist atheists, the Soviet government apparatus, not to be confused with the Party, employed both communist and non-communist (e.g. Christian) officials.

One of the first zones in which the Orthodox Christianity weapon against Vatican influence was active was in Western Ukraine. The Soviets utilized the weapon of taxation against the Catholic Church in Ukraine. A 1946 US intelligence document claimed:

2. The Western Ukraine. In the western province, the official church is the Greek Catholic or Uniate, which combines Orthodox ritual and Catholic dogma and recognizes the leadership of the People. (...). After the occupation of the Ukraine and White Russian territories (formerly Polish), the Soviets used excessive taxation as a weapon against the church; otherwise, the clergy continued their activities unmolested.

(APPENDIX A: THE UKRAINIAN CHURCH AND ITS RELATION WITH THE GERMANS, Patriarch Mstyslaw, p. 1. Note: ‘Patriarch Mstyslaw’ was a title for Stepan Ivanovych Skrypnyk who was a Ukrainian Church hierarch, a Nazi agent, and nephew of Petliura. In: ‘THE UKRAINIAN NATIONALIST MOVEMENT: AN INTERIM STUDY’, CIA, authors: William Holzmans and Zolt Aradi, October 1946, Appendix A, p. 1 (p. 35 of the PDF document)) (IMG)

Referring to the ‘Banderite’ bands in Ukraine, the British state media’s consultant and specialist on British intelligence Stephen Dorril wrote:

Even though they remained a destabilising factor in Ukraine émigré politics, MI6 continued to back them to the hilt. Support also came from the Vatican, which lobbied the British and Americans to render material assistance to the Ukrainian nationalists, and the Uniate Church, which ‘maintained intensive contacts with guerrilla leaders and secret representatives of the Vatican’. During the summer of 1947, MI6 moved to enlarge the ABN [Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations] into a body to co-ordinate and organise the activities of all the

émigré groups it covertly supported. (...). Not all the émigré groups joined the ABN because of the dominance of the Ukrainians and the OUN-B. (MI6: Inside the Covert World of Her Majesty's Secret Intelligence Service, Stephen Dorril, p. 237) (IMG{Poland})

As Dorril stated, the Uniate Church collaborated closely with the Anglo-American intelligence services, and Ukrainian bourgeois-nationalists. During World War II and until 1945, the Soviets did not directly campaign against the Uniate Church, and mainly worked to undermine its supporters, the Axis powers. After the Great Patriotic War, however, the USSR began a large-scale campaign of purging Western Ukraine off of the Uniate Church and the Roman Catholic Church, which were espionage-sabotage front organizations for the MI6-backed fascist Vatican mafia and had collaborated with the Nazi agents in Ukraine. The Greek and Roman Catholic Churches were not outright banned, and not all the Uniate/Catholic priests were purged. Nonetheless, the crackdown was so heavy that it left little room for Catholic Church presence. Instead, the priests that remained helped form the new Orthodox Church movement in that region. The US intelligence reported:

Until 1945, the Soviets were correct in claiming that they did not bother the church, the clergy, or religious ceremonies in the Western Ukraine. However, 1945 marked the beginning of anti-church agitation and persecution of leading churchmen. The first anti-church articles appeared.... (...).

In an attempt by the Soviets to eliminate the Greek Catholic Church, a "Group for the Merger of the Greek and Russian Orthodox Churches" was founded on 28 May 1945. (...). The group was officially recognized by the Soviet Government.

The group called a congress of bishops. Since [almost] all Greek Catholic bishops had been arrested, new ones were appointed.... (...).

At the congress, ... the following resolutions were passed:

1. Annulment of the Berest Union of 1596.
2. Separation from the Church of Roma
3. Return to the Orthodox Ancestral Church.
4. Merger with the old Russian Orthodox Churches in the Soviet Union.

Heavy pressure was exerted by the NKGB on [formerly Uniate] priests to join the new church. An NKGB representative for Church matters, whose task was to supervise church services, was appointed for the area. Many [Uniate] priests fled, were deported, or retired to civilian life. The result was that hardly any [Uniate] priests were left. The new Orthodox church was boycotted by the population.

Anti-church action was undertaken against monks also. The monastery of the Order of Redemptionists, located in the suburbs of Lvov, was seized by the government and the monks were forbidden to hold services. (...). Convents also were disbanded. The nuns, however, continued to circulate as nurses in the Carpatho-Ukraine, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland and brought useful information back from their travels.

(...). Also in the fall of 1946, a trial was instigated in Kiev against the Greek Catholic archbishops. (...).

A similar fate befell the Roman Catholic Church in Lvov. The ... Roman Catholic churches were closed.

(SUPPRESSION OF CHURCHES IN THE WESTERN UKRAINE, CIA, September 2, 1947, p. 1) (IMG)

Still, another area of Soviet use of Orthodox Christianity was in China. It has to be remembered that the US has actively sought to spread its own Christianity in China since as early as the 1910s. Thus, a Soviet-dominated Orthodox Christianity could help undermine US influence. A US intelligence document stated:

Activities of the Russian Orthodox Mission in Peiping are under the complete control of Tichvinsky, Acting Consul General of the USSR Consulate in Peiping. Upon his instructions, Archbishop Viktor has separated the clergy of the mission into three categories: Soviet clergy, Chinese clergy and non-Soviet (? White Russian?) clergy. The last group has been excluded from the life and activities of the mission. All efforts are being made to indoctrinate the Chinese clergy with pro-Soviet sentiments. (POLITICAL INFORMATION: ACTIVITIES OF ARCHBISHOP VIKTOR, CIA, October 1949, p. 1) (IMG)

As shall be seen in C20S10, the British agent Khrushchev, in agreement with Mao Zedong, launched a devastating purge of the Orthodox Church as means of undermining Soviet intelligence.

The same kind of a policy was pursued in the Peoples' Democracies. Albania's case has already been briefly mentioned. People's Democratic Romania harboured attitudes similar to those of the Soviets. Due to the soft power influence of the communists over the Orthodox Christians and Jews, and because of the relatively progressive character of Protestantism, those religions were promoted by the Romanian communists as a force with which to confront the Catholic Church. The progressive religions were regarded as easier to penetrate using the communist intelligence service, whereas the Catholic Church was seen as less penetrable, thus facing a tougher communist stance. The MI6 station in Bucharest reported:

Churches have a hold over [many of] their followers which the all-pervading Roumanian Workers' Party is reluctant to tolerate. The long-term Marxist solution is of course to breed a population of atheists; the short-term solution is to penetrate and control such Churches as are unable to resist infiltration and subsequent loss of independence. I have already reported the fate of the Roumanian Orthodox and Uniate Churches.

4. The attitude of the Roumanian Workers' Party to the minority Churches indeed reflects the party's estimate of their strength as an obstacle to communism. As reported in Chancery letter No. 116/58/48 of 18th September, the Minister of Cults classified religions as centrifugal and non-centrifugal, which being interpreted means impenetrable and penetrable respectively]. Into the penetrable non-centrifugal category he places the Orthodox, Jewish and Protestant Churches; into the impenetrable centrifugal category he places the Catholics and Neo-Protestants (i.e. Jehovah's Witnesses). It is on the Vatican and on the Churches acknowledging Papal supremacy, however, that has been turned the unbridled hatred and hostility of the party. That the overt attack fell first on the Uniate Church was due solely to its greater vulnerability. Its public capitulation under the ruthless intimidation of the Roumanian Government presents at once a useful elimination of a centre of resistance and a warning example to others. The fate of the Lutherans, Calvinists and other minor sects will depend on their spiritual resistance to dialectical materialism. Present indications suggest, however, that these Protestant Churches will be tolerated for the present in the hope that they can be used to undermine the strength of the Roman Catholic Church, hose members will be bribed, persuaded and coerced, like their [U]niate brethren, to forswear their faith.

(R 13149/17/37, No. 21, COMMUNIST SOLUTION OF THE NATIONALITY QUESTION IN ROUMANIA, Mr. A. Holman to Mr. McNeil, Bucharest, November 15, 1948, Received November 20, 1948. Foreign Office (Balkans, 1948) – Romania, p. 55. Foreign Office (Balkans, 1948) – Whole Book, p. 275) (IMG)

C15S8. Czechoslovak anti-Axis Resistance / The Communist Proletarian Revolution in Czechoslovakia / People's Democratic Development / Soviet Economic Aid / Titoist Stabs in the Back *** IMG-All-{Czechoslovakia}

With the assistance of the Soviet intelligence and the Red Army, the Czech anti-fascist resistance forces, at the forefront of them the Czechoslovak communists (KSC), coalesced to form a democratic popular front to combat the Nazi occupation forces. The Federal Research Division of the US Congress reported:

The democratic groups-ON, PU, and PVVZ-united in early 1940 and formed the Central Committee of the Home Resistance (Ustiedni vybor odboje domacih – UVOD). Involved primarily in intelligence gathering, the UVOD cooperated with a Soviet intelligence organization in Prague. Following the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, the democratic groups attempted to create a united front that would include the KSC. Heydrich's appointment in the fall thwarted these efforts. By mid-1942 the Nazis had succeeded in exterminating the most experienced elements of the Czech resistance forces.

Czech forces regrouped in 1942 and 1943. The Council of the Three (R3), in which the communist underground was strongly represented, emerged as the focal point of the resistance. The R3 prepared to assist the liberating armies of the United States and the Soviet Union. In cooperation with Red Army partisan units, the R3 developed a guerrilla structure.

Guerrilla activity intensified after the formation of a provisional Czechoslovak government in Kosice on April 4, 1945. "National committees" took over the administration of towns as the Germans were expelled. Under the supervision of the Red Army, more than 4,850 such committees were formed between 1944 and the end of the war. On May 5 a national uprising began spontaneously in Prague, and the newly formed Czech National Council (Ceska narodni rada) almost immediately assumed leadership of the revolt. Over 1,600 barricades were erected throughout the city, and some 30,000 Czech men and women battled for three days against 37,000 to 40,000 German troops backed by tanks and artillery. On May 8 the German Wehrmacht capitulated; Soviet troops arrived on May 9.

(Czechoslovakia: A Country Study, Federal Research Division of the US Library of Congress, Ihor Gawdiak, Research Completed August 1987, published 1989, pp. 49-50) (IMG)

Slovakia was primarily agrarian and contained a large conservative-minded petit-bourgeois population, rendering anti-fascist work more difficult in that zone. Nonetheless, anti-fascist discontent was widespread enough in Slovakia. As the US Major Sean Judge acknowledged, the fascist Axis maltreatment of the Slovak people ripened the conditions for an anti-fascist guerrilla uprising led by the Democratic Party and the Communist Party of Slovakia:

The Tiso regime and its Catholic heavy handedness, ... alienated the Slovak protestant populace, who in the Czechoslovak construct. The progress of the war and allegiance to Nazi Germany began costing Tiso support, with the disaffection resulting in two primary resistance groups: the Democratic Party under Jozef Lettrich and the Communist Party of Slovakia (CPS). (Slovakia 1944: The Forgotten Uprising, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base (Alabama), Air Command and Staff College, Air University Press, Sean M. Judge (Major, US Airforce), May 2008, p. 6) (IMG)

Communist Party members formed half of the anti-fascist resistance:

The opposition groups began cooperating in 1943 and consolidated their efforts into one movement under the Christmas Agreement of 1943, which created the Slovak National Council (SNC) with 50 percent membership from both groups. (Slovakia 1944: The Forgotten Uprising, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base (Alabama), Air Command and Staff College, Air University Press, Sean M. Judge (Major, US Airforce), May 2008, pp. 6-7) (IMG)

The Czechoslovak Titoist leader later slandered the Soviet Union for alleged lack of support to the Slovak resistance:

Alexander Dubček, [the] future leader of communist Czechoslovakia ... [who] put the blame for ... [alleged] lack of support squarely on the Soviets.... (Slovakia 1944: The Forgotten Uprising, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base (Alabama), Air Command and Staff College, Air University Press, Sean M. Judge (Major, US Airforce), May 2008, p. 10) (IMG)

In contrast to Dubček's lies, General Sean Judge, a Major in the US Air Force, confirmed in reference to Soviet aid to the Slovak rebels:

In contrast, the Red Army delivered lavish supplies to Slovakia.... (Slovakia 1944: The Forgotten Uprising, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base (Alabama), Air Command and Staff College, Air University Press, Sean M. Judge (Major, US Airforce), May 2008, p. 10) (IMG)

The supplies were part of the Soviet effort to help the Czechoslovak resistance against the fascists:

The Soviet Union, in advance of its main force attack of the summer, had begun fomenting a partisan movement ... in Slovakia.... (Slovakia 1944: The Forgotten Uprising, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base (Alabama), Air Command and Staff College, Air University Press, Sean M. Judge (Major, US Airforce), May 2008, p. 8) (IMG)

In addition, USSR provided funds, training, and equipment for the Slovak resistance. This is confirmed by the US intelligence officer Edward Hymoff who:

During World War II ... served in the Office of Strategic Services [OSS; CIA predecessor].... (Edward Hymoff, Goodreads) (IMG)

In a 1965 article, Hymoff wrote:

Soviet agents had helped ... two brigades of Slovak troops, trained and equipped by the Soviets.... (The OSS Revolt that Failed, Edward Hymoff, displayed in the CIA website, April 1965, p. 2) (IMG)

The Soviet-backed revolutionary rebellion against the Slovak Regime was so strong that it:

forced the Tiso government to appeal to Germany for assistance, resulting in German occupation of Slovakia beginning on 29 August 1944. (Slovakia 1944: The Forgotten Uprising, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base (Alabama), Air Command and Staff College, Air University Press, Sean M. Judge (Major, US Airforce), May 2008, p. 8) (IMG)

By then, a total of at least 47,000 Slovak militants began to mobilize against the fascist occupation forces:

The initial breakdown of strength inside Slovakia showed 18,000 army troops with the uprising, ... and 29,000 reservists joining the revolt.... (Slovakia 1944: The Forgotten Uprising, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base (Alabama), Air Command and Staff College, Air University Press, Sean M. Judge (Major, US Airforce), May 2008, p. 9) (IMG)

The resistance forces of Slovakia:

managed to seize a portion of Slovakia and fought gallantly to hold it while waiting for Allied, especially Soviet, support. (Slovakia 1944: The Forgotten Uprising, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base (Alabama), Air Command and Staff College, Air University Press, Sean M. Judge (Major, US Airforce), May 2008, p. 9) (IMG)

In contrast to the Soviet Union, which aided the anti-fascist rebellion, there was a:

lack of large-scale aid from the West [which] is [often] generally forgiven or overlooked. (Slovakia 1944: The Forgotten Uprising, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base (Alabama), Air Command and Staff College, Air University Press, Sean M. Judge (Major, US Airforce), May 2008, p. 10) (IMG)

In the meantime, the Czechoslovak government-in-exile led by Benes formed an alliance with the Soviet-backed Slovak National Council (SNC):

Motivations for the uprising created the strange bedfellows of Beneš and the SNC. The exile government needed some form of overt resistance under the Czech banner to increase its legitimacy and negotiating power at the end of the war, while the SNC needed to justify its own claim to lead the Slovak people, so the two agreed to work together. (Slovakia 1944: The Forgotten Uprising, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base (Alabama), Air Command and Staff College, Air University Press, Sean M. Judge (Major, US Airforce), May 2008, p. 7) (IMG)

A document by Richard Nyrop, an official of the US State Department, stated:

Czech forces regrouped in 1942 and 1943. The Council of the Three (R3), in which the communist underground was strongly represented, emerged as the focal point of the resistance. The R3 prepared to assist the liberating armies of the United States and the Soviet Union. In cooperation with Red Army partisan units, the R3 developed a guerrilla structure.

Guerrilla activity intensified after the formation of a provisional Czechoslovak government in Kosice on April 4, 1945. "National committees" took over the administration of towns as the Germans were expelled. Under the supervision of the Red Army, more than 4,850 such committees were formed between 1944 and the end of the war. On May 5 a national uprising began spontaneously in Prague, and the newly formed Czech National Council (Ceska narodni rada) almost immediately assumed leadership of the revolt. Over 1,600 barricades were erected throughout the city, and some 30,000 Czech men and women battled for three days against 37,000 to 40,000 German troops backed by tanks and artillery. On May 8 the German Wehrmacht capitulated; Soviet troops arrived on May 9.

(Czechoslovakia: A Country Study, edited by: Richard F. Nyrop, April 1981, p. 42) (IMG)

Once again, these facts are testament to the reality on the ground: the Czechoslovak people emancipated themselves from fascist oppression thanks to the tremendous support of the Red Army.

As confirmed by the CIA, the Czechoslovak Communist Party (KSC) emerged from the Czechoslovak People's Liberation War with tremendous popular support:

The Czechoslovak Communist Party emerged from World War II with power and popular support.... (Situation in Czechoslovakia, ORE/EG, CIA, December 12, 1947, p. 2) (IMG)

Communism had tremendous popularity among the Czechoslovak people, a population largely made up of proletarians. The CIA confirmed: many Czechoslovaks favor friendly relations with the USSR, and are sympathetic with theoretical communism.... (Situation in Czechoslovakia, ORE/EG, CIA, December 12, 1947, p. 3) (IMG)

Even the CIA acknowledged:

Czechoslovakia has considerable independence in the conduct of its internal affairs; (Situation in Czechoslovakia, ORE/EG, CIA, December 12, 1947, p. 1) (IMG)

Moscow could not and did not 'order' the Czechoslovaks to cancel Marshall Plan ties, for Czechoslovakia was independent in the conduct of internal affairs. Yet, the Marshall Plan 'aid' was rejected, for the class-conscious Czechoslovak proletarians already were well aware of the sanguivorously anti-proletarian character of Anglo-American finance capital and, using the mighty KSC, lobbied their government to not accept such imperialist 'free lunch'. Moreover, the CIA admitted:

The average Czechoslovak Communist is loyal first to his country and secondly to Moscow.... (Situation in Czechoslovakia, ORE/EG, CIA, December 12, 1947, p. 4) (IMG)

Despite the conceptual distinction, no practical difference exists between commitment to the cause of the Soviet proletariat and to the cause of the Czechoslovak proletariat, for the cause of each country's proletariat is that of a world proletariat permeating across boundaries. That the Czechoslovak communists were loyal to the Czechoslovak proletariat 'first' means also that they were loyal to the Soviet dictatorship of the proletariat and to the proletariat of the United States, Britain, Germany, etc. Nonetheless, an appreciable aspect of the above quote from the CIA is that it admits to the absence of a 'chain of command' according to which the KSC leaders would have been the 'satraps' of General-Secretary Stalin. Confessing to the independent thought of the Czechoslovak communists, the CIA thus implicitly debunks the myth that Czechoslovakia's communists were 'commanded' by the Soviet state. The Soviets would have increased pressure on Czechoslovakia to not accept Marshall Plan 'aid' had the Czechoslovak leadership aggressively pursued the acceptance of such 'aid', but thanks to the strong influence and class-consciousness of the Czech proletariat, a mighty homegrown movement against the Marshall Plan 'aid' had already developed anyways.

Furthermore, as admitted by the CIA, in Czechoslovakia:

a freely operating parliamentary government rules the country. (Situation in Czechoslovakia, ORE/EG, CIA, December 12, 1947, p. 1) (IMG)

Until 1948, Czechoslovakia was a Soviet-friendly bourgeois democracy, Soviet-friendly because the KSC, with such overwhelming popular support, won the largest votes and was able to install communist agents into key positions. The ascendancy of the KSC increased the power of the proletariat over the Czechoslovak state, for, the KSC, compositionally proletarianized in membership and ranks, was a socialist Party of the proletariat. Peter Hruby of the CIA media 'Radio Free Europe' confirmed:

The main [Czechoslovak Communist] Party organ then claimed...: "If in 1947 workers formed 50 per cent of the Party membership, then in 1967 the number of active manual workers represented only 26.4 per cent." (Fools and Heroes: The Changing Role of Communist Intellectuals in Czechoslovakia, Peter Hruby, 1980, p. 142) (IMG)

The popularity of the Czechoslovak Communist Party was reflected in the electoral victories of the Party during the May 1946 elections, which even the CIA rightly described as ‘free national elections’. The Czechoslovak Communist Party won the largest number and percentage of votes and seats, and by establishing an alliance with the Czechoslovak Social Democrats, gained a majority in the parliament:

The present National Front Government in Czechoslovakia was first established in March 1945, and in May 1946 free national elections were held. Five parties of major importance emerged: Communist (114 seats in Parliament), Social Democrats (37), National Socialists [not to be confused with Nazis] (55), Peoples (46), Slovak Democrats (43). The Communists became the strongest single party, and together with the Social Democrats gave the Leftists a slim parliamentary majority over the moderate parties. All parties agreed upon the broad principles of the government’s domestic program, including extensive nationalization of industry, but lively controversy developed over the application of these principles. The Communists have adhered until recently to parliamentary rules in their disagreements with the moderates and during the first year and a half under the present government, neither side gained any significant advantage over the other. (Situation in Czechoslovakia, ORE/EG, CIA, December 12, 1947, pp. 1-2) (IMG)

Thanks in part to this overwhelming popular support, the Czechoslovak Communist Party gained a large influence in all the major ministries of the Czechoslovak government:

In addition to Premiership, the key ministries of Interior, Information and Finance, and the Under Secretaryship for Foreign Affairs are held by Communists, who also control the Security Police and many local governing bodies in Bohemia and Moravia. Communist infiltration and effective control of the Army have been achieved through close collaboration with the USSR, a promotion policy favoring officers trained in the USSR and the appointment of top officials sympathetic to the Soviet Union. Moreover, the Communist Party wields effective control over labor through its domination of ROH, the national trade union organization. (...). On the propaganda front, too, the Communists have had a powerful weapon in their ability to point to the Soviet Union as Czechoslovakia’s chief protection against a resurgent Germany. (Situation in Czechoslovakia, ORE/EG, CIA, December 12, 1947, pp. 2-3) (IMG)

Notably, Vaclav Nosek, a prominent KSC member, headed the Ministry of the Interior. According to the Federal Research Division of the US Library of Congress,:

At the end of World War II, when President Benes established the first postwar government at Kosice, control of the Ministry of Interior was sought and obtained by the KSC. Party member Vaclav Nosek was appointed minister.... (CZECHOSLOVAKIA – A COUNTRY STUDY, US Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, 1987) (IMG)

In government, the KSC embarked on a large-scale media counter-offensive to expose and discredit the Slovak Democratic Party, which as the CIA confirmed, had ‘many’ members who “had questionable connections with Tiso’s pro-German regime during the war”:

The Slovak Democratic Party, organized only in Slovakia, is the focal point of Communist activity against the opposition. The Party is a logical choice as the Communists’ first target because of its vulnerability.... Outspokenly conservative, and supported by the Catholic Church, the Slovak Democrats have not given whole-hearted support to the Government’s program.... The Communists are exploiting the Slovak Democratic Party’s lack of homogeneity which results from the strong antagonism between its Protestant and Catholic adherents. The Party has also become a refuge for rightist elements in Slovakia, many of whom had questionable connections with Tiso’s pro-German regime during the war. (Situation in Czechoslovakia, ORE/EG, CIA, December 12, 1947, pp. 6-7) (IMG)

A drought struck Czechoslovakia. Fulfilling the prerequisites for collectivization, the KSC proposed a millionaire’s tax to fund the farmers suffering from the drought. The comprador ministers, including the millionaire Masaryk vociferously rejected the KSC proposal. The KSC, having overwhelming representation in the trade unions, struck back by denouncing all those officials opposed to the millionaire tax and threatened with a proletarians general strike:

The first crisis developed out of a Communist proposal for a millionaire’s tax to provide funds for farmers who had suffered losses from last summer’s drought. In the face of solid opposition by all non-Communist parties, the Communists launched a smear campaign against all Ministers who had voted against the proposal. So vicious was the attack that Foreign minister Jan Masaryk, who normally remains aloof from domestic issues, published a special statement identifying himself as a millionaire and recording his vote with the eleven other Cabinet Ministers who had voted against the Communists. The Communists threatened to call a general strike of all industrial workers to force acceptance of their proposal. Lausman, then Social Democratic Minister of Industry, submitted his resignation in protest against Communist party interference in nationalized enterprises and irresponsible provocation of strikes. (Situation in Czechoslovakia, ORE/EG, CIA, December 12, 1947, pp. 8-9) (IMG)

The USSR furnished support for the Czechoslovak communist-influenced bourgeois-democracy in the face of drought and shortage of raw materials for industry. A week after the first cabinet ‘crisis’, another ‘crisis’ occurred:

About a week after the millionaire tax proposal, the National Front was again threatened when three leaders of the Social Democratic Party, ... signed a pact with the Communists reaffirming the “socialist bloc” within the National Front. The pact came as a complete surprise to most of the Social Democratic party leaders. The party executive approved the pact on the ground that having been signed it could not be disavowed, but emphasized that the pact did not constitute a merger between the Communists and the Social Democrats. Moderate Social Democrats, however, were strongly opposed and the National Socialists refused to join the bloc. (Situation in Czechoslovakia, ORE/EG, CIA, December 12, 1947, p. 9) (IMG)

Not to be confused with the Nazis, the Czech National Socialist Party was a right-wing bourgeois pro-Zionist party of which President Edvard Benes was a prominent member. The strengthening of the alliance between the KSC and the Social Democrats served as a propaganda blow against the Czech ‘National Socialists’:

The Communists hoped by this maneuver to ... embarrass the [Czech] National Socialists by forcing them to choose a more leftist policy or to face the accusation of deserting the cause of the working man as represented by the united Communist and Social Democratic parties. (Situation in Czechoslovakia, ORE/EG, CIA, December 12, 1947, p. 9) (IMG)

To assist the people suffering from the drought, there was:

the recent Soviet offer of grain. (Situation in Czechoslovakia, ORE/EG, CIA, December 12, 1947, p. 11) (IMG)

Indeed the Soviet Union rendered:

an emergency shipment of 600,000 tons of grain, in addition to sizable quantities of iron ore, manganese, and cotton. ('Soviet Economic Assistance to the Sino-Soviet Bloc: Loans, Credits, and Grants', Intelligence Memorandum, CIA, August 20, 1956, p. 14) (IMG)

A credit of \$23 million was provided to Czechoslovakia, which probably included the grain sent by the USSR:

In 1947 a credit of \$23 million was extended to Czechoslovakia for the purpose of financing imports from the USSR. ('Soviet Economic Assistance to the Sino-Soviet Bloc: Loans, Credits, and Grants', Intelligence Memorandum, CIA, August 20, 1956, p. 14) (IMG)

Finally on February 1947, KSC member Vaclav Nosek, who headed the Ministry of the Interior, stepped up the purge of the anti-communist personnel of the police:

Vaclav Nosek ... began the process of converting the security forces into arms of the party. Anticommunist police officers and officials were fired, noncommunist personnel were encouraged to join the party or its youth organization, and all were subjected to heavy doses of communist propaganda. (CZECHOSLOVAKIA – A COUNTRY STUDY, US Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, 1987) (IMG)

In Romania, the Minister of Interior Teohari Georgescu was a traitor the proletariat. However, as he was accountable to the Party of the proletariat, the installation of Georgescu at the helm of the Ministry of Interior increased the influence of the Party of the proletariat in the Radescu regime, thus paving the way for the revolutionary ouster of the comprador agents in the Romanian regime. In Czechoslovakia, Nosek himself was no communist loyalist, but, as an infiltrator into the KSC, was nonetheless accountable to and coopted by his Party, the Party of the proletariat. Note again that the KSC membership was compositionally proletarianized and democratic centralist, thus compelling even traitors to the Party to be accountable to the interests of the class-conscious proletarian mass that made up the Party's largest percentage membership. As such, the increased influence of Nosek implied the increased influence of the proletariat in the security and intelligence bodies, even if Nosek himself was not as loyal to the cause of the proletariat.

The increased influence of the communist agents of the proletariat in the security bodies marked the increase in the influence of the proletariat's agents over the means of violence. This in turn translated into the proletarian agents' increased capability to re-engineer the make-up of the cabinet, to find compromising materials on the comprador cabinet ministers so to force their resignations. The comprador ministers resigned 'in protest' and the KSC gleefully accepted their resignations:

It was Nosek's packing of the police hierarchy with communists that caused the protest resignation of anticommunist government ministers in February 1948.... (CZECHOSLOVAKIA – A COUNTRY STUDY, US Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, 1987) (IMG)

The resignation of a government official can at times be canalized to raise the vigilance of that percentage of the electorate which has supported the resigning official, so to agitate that part of the electorate into mass protests. As such, ordinarily, the resignation of such ministers could have sparked a street backlash by a significant minority of the Czechoslovak population. Yet, to bring about such protests, one must have incitement, agitation, and propaganda capabilities concentrated in the media. In all countries, the security and intelligence bodies have, and utilize, the bribe-and-blackmail capability to get the mainstream media outlets in line. As a law of history, the class struggle for dominance over the means of violence determines the outcome of the class struggle for dominance over the means of communication. To get the media in line, the fascist agents use bribes and terror threats. To get the media in line, the revolutionary forces provide promises of 'promotion' and higher pay, as a legal form of a bribe, and use not terror threats but rather kompromat-finding, threats of demotion, and the placement of 'advisors' and 'assistants' (read: spies) into the person's office, for achieving the objective of getting the major media outlets in line. In Czechoslovakia in the late 1940s, having lost dominance over a critical security and intelligence body as the police, the agitation and propaganda capabilities of the anti-communist faction sharply declined, disabling them from inciting riots. Secondly, the opposition to the millionaire's tax further reduced the popularity of the comprador forces. With pro-communist opposition growing and the anti-communist forces disabled in the security and media spheres, the KSC, overwhelmingly represented in the trade unions, had the ability to mobilize proletarian demonstrations while facing minimal anti-communist counter-demonstrations.

Klement Gottwald, the leader of the KSC and Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia, demanded the Czechoslovak President Edvard Benes to accept the resignation of these anti-communist government ministers. When Benes refused, massive communist-led protests swept the country, forcing Benes too to resign:

Twelve of the non-Communist ministers resigned in protest. The Communists arranged street demonstrations and called out of the pro-Communist workers' militia; Gottwald threatened President Benes with a civil war unless he accepted the resignation of the 12 ministers. (The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Foreign Intelligence, CIA, October 1960, pp. 19-20) (IMG)

Massive armed demonstrations led by the communist Party overtook the streets of Czechoslovakia. The result was the February Revolution of 1948. For the first time in history, a largely industrialized bourgeois-democracy had been overthrown by a popular revolution of the proletariat for the establishment of a socialist People's Democracy. Czechoslovakia's communist revolution was therefore under the condition envisioned by Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. The CIA's Senior Research Staff on International Communism remarked:

Among the European Satellites of the USSR, Czechoslovakia is in a class by itself, since it is the only one ... which was a highly developed industrial country, practically unscathed by the war. Czechoslovakia is, therefore, the best example of Communism in action under the conditions envisaged by Marx, although it misses being a perfect example because of the country's geographical proximity to the USSR. (COMMUNISM IN EASTERN EUROPE POST-STALIN DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SATELLITES: Part II/D: Czechoslovakia, CIA, Senior Research Staff on International Communism, December 31, 1958, p. 1) (IMG)

Czechoslovakia was the first industrial bourgeois-democracy to transition to a workers' state, a dictatorship of the proletariat, through the launching of a proletarian revolution in 1948. Unlike the other Peoples' Democracies, Czechoslovakia could drastically shorten the period of the NEP-style capitalist mode of production and bourgeois influence in statecraft, and transition almost directly to socialism. Hence, People's Democratic Czechoslovakia, unlike the other Peoples' Democracies, swiftly emerged as a socialist state instead of being for long a first-stage People's Democracy, a communist-led progressive bourgeois-democracy. In spite of unmistakable facts of the revolutionary nature of the overthrow, CIA-MI6 propagandists were quick to call it 'The Czech Coup'.





Wenceslas Square, Prague, February 25, 1948





Wenceslas Square, Prague, February 25, 1948
A careful look at the photos will reveal to the reader, the flag of the KSC, which had the hammer and sickle





Old Town Square, Prague, February 21, 1948

A careful look at the photos will reveal to the reader, the flag of the KSC, which had the hammer and sickle

The proletarian revolution in Czechoslovakia was a devastating blow to the American imperialist presence in Europe, reducing industrial supplies to Washington's military allies, and inflicting great costs on the front industrial companies of American finance capital:

a communist Czechoslovakia would further curtail trade between Eastern and Western Europe, materially increasing the need for US aid to the European recovery program. (Situation in Czechoslovakia, ORE/EG, CIA, December 12, 1947, p. 1) (IMG)

The next step was for the KSC to increase its membership, recruit the best of the working class, to educate the social-democratic workers towards scientific socialist thinking, and, in the process, to screen the new Party membership:

Membership rolls were further increased when the Social Democrats, led by pro-Communist Zdenek Fierlinger, joined the KSC en masse on 26 June 1948. By August 1948, total Party membership, including the Slovak Communist Party which merged with the KSC on 28 September 1948 and became a regional unit of KSC, was nearly two and a half million. This mass influx of members into the Party, however, was terminated by a resolution of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the KSC passed on 15 August 1948. In conformity with this resolution, a screening, the Party's first, of all Party members and candidates for membership took place between 1 October 1948 and 31 January 1949. During this period, 2,418,199 members were screened, 76,638 were struck off the membership lists, 30,495 were expelled and 522,683 were demoted to the status of candidates for membership. A ban was placed on the admission of new members to the Party in November 1948 which remained in effect until the 9th Party Congress in May 1949 when Stakhanovites were allowed to enter. (The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Foreign Intelligence, CIA, October 1960, pp. 20-21) (IMG)

With the support of the progressives and communists among the proletarians, the Party of two and a half million embarked on the campaign of socialist development, further boosting its already-high international prestige. The CIA reported:

At a session of the Central Committee the following November, Gottwald announced as the Party's major tasks the limitation and repression of capitalist elements in the country and support of the cooperative movement in agriculture. The general of the 9th Congress of the KSC, which took place in the Industrial Palace in Prague on 25-29 May 1949, was the "building of socialism in Czechoslovakia". The Party was assigned the primary task of mobilizing all forces in the country to fulfill the first Five Year Plan which sought the large scale industrialization of Czechoslovakia. As a secondary task, the Party was instructed to socialize the villages and agriculture by collectivizing the farms. Other points stressed at the 9th Congress were the education of a working class intelligentsia, the National Front as the correct way to unite the working people of city and country, and close relations with the Soviet Union as a requisite to the building of socialism in Czechoslovakia. A record number of delegates attended the congress, 2346 in all, including 2068 voting delegates and 273 non-voting delegates. An indication of the extent to which the reorganization from local cells to factory cells had progressed is given by the fact that of the voting delegates, 1366 were members of factory cells and 702 were members of Local cells. There were 1766 men and 302 women. In addition, 31 delegates attended from the ... foreign parties [attended.] (The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Foreign Intelligence, CIA, October 1960, p. 20) (IMG)

People's Democratic Czechoslovakia would go on to arm the freedom forces across the world. Among these, by 1950, were the communist Parties of France, Italy, and Spain:

European Parties which need arms much more urgently, namely Italy, France and Spain to a lesser extent, are being supplied with arms and ammunition via contraband shipments. (Shipments of Czechoslovakian Arms to Latin American Communist Parties, CIA, March 31, 1950, p. 1) (IMG)

This was a part of the larger effort by the Cominform, mistakenly referred to by the CIA in the following document as the 'Comintern', to fund the communist-led popular liberation struggles. In fact:

A special branch was recently formed in the Comintern for the sole purpose of investigating means by which the Communist Parties of capitalist countries might be supplied with arms. This branch includes a Latin American department. (Shipments of Czechoslovakian Arms to Latin American Communist Parties, CIA, March 31, 1950, p. 1) (IMG)

To the Communist Party of Ecuador, the Czechoslovak state promised military assistance whenever possible:

It has recently been learned that before Nela Martinez Espinosa, prominent woman Communist of Ecuador, left Ecuador in April 1949 for an extended trip through Europe, she was instructed by Pedro Saad, who is the real director of the Partido Comunista del Ecuador (PCE) to investigate the status of the arms shipment which the PCE expected from Czechoslovakia. She was not told whom to consult in Czechoslovakia and therefore asked the advice of an influential Party member in whose home she lived in Prague. He made arrangements for her to see an official in the Czechoslovakian Ministry of Government and accompanied her to the meeting. The interview was private, however, except for the presence of an interpreter. (Shipments of Czechoslovakian Arms to Latin American Communist Parties, CIA, March 31, 1950, p. 1) (IMG)

Martinez has stated that she spent more than an hour with the official. She said that he spoke very good English and said that he had lived in the United States for several years. He questioned her about the situation in Ecuador and South America and exhibited some knowledge of the history of Ecuador. After this general discussion he said that, he was aware of the purpose of Martinez' visit and that he had been authorized to inform her of the following:

- a. Certain difficulties have prevented the shipment of combat arms to the countries of the American continent...
- b. One of the difficulties has been in assuring safe conduct for the shipments, since shipment via normal commercial channels has proved unsatisfactory in the past and will be avoided in the future, if possible.
- c. Some Latin American Parties, especially the Brazilian Party, are very eager to obtain arms and they as well as the PCE, will be supplied when the current difficulties are overcome, although no effective arrangements can be made at the present time.
- d. (...). The PCE should do nothing about securing arms until further information is received by it from the Comintern.
- e. The parties which desire arms must give assurances of safekeeping until the arms are really needed for furtherance of the international movement. It is a definite policy not to supply arms to be used in routine internal uprisings; the arms supplied must be kept secret until the final battle.

f. The Latin American area has no immediate priority, but the Latin American parties will receive arms eventually and should realize that the main battle is being fought in Europe and Asia at the present time.

(Shipments of Czechoslovakian Arms to Latin American Communist Parties, CIA, March 31, 1950, pp. 1-2) (IMG)

As will be covered in greater detail in C16S5, the Czechoslovak government also provided military funding for the anti-imperialist Arab governments of Syria and Egypt during the 1948 War. The USSR and the Peoples' Democracies, aiming to establish a Hebrew People's Democracy in the territory of Israel, vigorously opposed the Palestinian pogromist objective of wiping out Israel but also opposed Israel's CIA-backed comprador regime. The progressive Arab forces dominating the military commands of Syria and Egypt were sympathetic to the views of the Stalin-era Soviets, and militarily confronted both the reactionary forces that dominated the IDF and the Nazi Palestinian terrorists led by Abdel-Qader Al-Husseini and Haajj Amin. However, throughout the Soviet-led camp, the Anglo-American agents, some via the comprador Israeli and Yugoslav secret services, covertly worked to partially sabotage the sponsorship of the Hebrew and Arab freedom struggle. A fifth column in the Soviet Union, even without the knowledge and against the will of such leaders as Joseph Stalin, got the Titoist agents within Czechoslovakia to fund the Ben-Gurion regime during the 1948 War. Some of these agents were later identified and duly purged. See C16S5 for more details.

In People's Democratic Czechoslovakia, the Trotskyist-Titoist intelligence network, which would go on to collaborate with the Mossad, held important ranks in the state apparatus and were led by the trio of Slansky, Geminder, and Koehler:

During the past period of Communist domination of Czechoslovakia it was obvious that the Party, and by it the whole country, was run by the all-powerful trio of the Central Committee: Rudolf Slansky, Bedrich Geminder, and Bruno Koehler. (Deterioration of Economic Conditions, CIA, January 19, 1952, p. 1) (IMG)

Evidence of Slansky's Titoist tendency can be observed in the following quote which states that Slansky did not seem disinterested in being regarded by his interrogators as linked to Zilliacus and Tito's regime. In his book after the 1989 collapse of the Czechoslovak state, Karel Kaplan, a West German intelligence agent, admitted:

This important gap was to be bridged by a general concept of Slansky's and Zilliacus's shared objective of shaping Czechoslovakia in the image of Tito's Yugoslavia. Slansky seemed to like this. (The Report on the Murder of the General Secretary, Karel Kaplan, 1990, p. 186) (IMG)

Amy Knight of the Woodrow Wilson Center, a think tank dominated by the US State Department and the CIA, wrote::

Although arrests of some high-level [officials] had been occurring as far back as 1949, the first sign that this might develop into a widespread purge came on 27 November 1951, with the arrest of Rudolph Slansky, general secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, and his deputy Bedrich Geminder, both ... associated with Beria and the MGB. Indeed, acting with Beria's sanction, they [i.e. Slansky and Geminder] had made Czechoslovakia a center for funneling aid and weapons to Israel in its conflict with the Arabs after the war. (Beria: Stalin's First Lieutenant, Amy Knight, p. 169) (IMG)

In other words, Slansky and Geminder were agents of Beria and the Mossad. Again, more will be mentioned of their relations with the Israeli secret service, in turn a front for the American secret service, in C16S5. However, for the context of this chapter, their role in economic sabotage against Czechoslovakia will be explored.

The tide in Czechoslovakia had been in the favour of the communist faction, but the material bases of reaction had not yet been crippled, allowing the reactionary and comprador classes to catapult into leadership the Slansky ring, as a significant lobbying force impeding the advancement of socialism in Czechoslovakia. These imperialist-fascist agents led by Slansky carried out economic sabotage in Czechoslovakia. They set aside the economic and technical experts in industry, agriculture, and central economic planning, replacing them with incompetent individuals who had little technical qualifications, and often were bureaucrats loyal to Slansky's gang. Demagogical Yugoslav-style 'worker self-management' as well as Party management of industry was highly encouraged and widespread resulting in severe mismanagement by the incompetent 'democratic management'. Excellent it would be for the Party to have a massive army of communist enterprise managers, especially from proletarian backgrounds, in charge of the economic enterprises. The task of a robust Party of the proletariat, furthermore, would be to expand the oversight of the Party over the economic bodies so to ensure proper oversight of the measures undertaken by the non-Party-affiliated non-communist managers, bureau chiefs, and technicians, to hunt down industrial saboteurs, and to maximize the accountability of enterprise officials and economic bodies to the Party of the proletariat and hence to the cause of the proletariat itself. The Party's task was not to put the incompetent Party officials with so little knowledge of the subject matter in charge of the details of the management. Unfortunately, the Slansky faction, saboteurs as they were, ensured to put those incompetent officials in charge. Under the influence of the Slansky faction, the skilled Stakhanovite workers lost their positions and were sent to schools. Progress in scientific research was deliberately impeded. All of these are confirmed by a declassified US intelligence document, which states:

In daily work in state agencies, and practically in all fields of national life, the definite Party directive No 1 was strictly applied "under all circumstances, in all operations, political considerations are to be given first priority". (...). Practically this meant to put in all, even lesser positions, only politically reliable individuals, or, putting it in the Party language, the "faithful sons of the workers' class", the thoroughly disciplined individuals who knew nothing except what they had been told and taught. This policy resulted in catastrophic losses to the highly developed Czech industry and economy. New "workers' cadres" were hurriedly educated in numerous "central workers' schools" and "workers' universities" in the basic economic alphabet. It soon happened that governmental departments, factories, distribution organizations, state and collective farms (JZD's) were run by people who had no qualifications for these jobs whatsoever. These examples show the extremes to which this went. Under the existing Party policy practically all positions were considered "responsible" and had to be occupied by "new cadres". An administrative director of a hospital naturally wanted to prove how responsible the clerical work was in hospital administration; high officials in the Ministry of Health wanted to show the importance of such work also. They decided therefore to put in these positions new "reliable" workers' cadres. This has resulted in a real hunt for the workers' cadres in factories and plants in order to get them into workers' schools. Most capable and skilled workers were thus taken off production and sent to schools, causing great damages to production in all fields of the national economy. After completing a brief education consisting mainly of political indoctrination, it happened, for example, that a ward from hospital for mental diseases became the actual boss of the famous Myslivecek psychiatric clinic. The new boss, in his position of "political secretary", decided that all work with "crazy" people was sheer nonsense and put an end to research work conducted in this scientific institution. Under the same policy

[someone] originally in charge of the heating system in the Student Health Institute, became overnight a high official in the Ministry of Health, Cadre Department, and was put in charge of the assignment of doctors. A garage maintenance man in the Ministry of Foreign Trade became deputy section chief of the Cadre Department and an actual head of all personnel of foreign trade companies. These are but a few examples of the new policy which resulted in a general mismanagement in all fields of the Czechoslovak economy and administration. (Deterioration of Economic Conditions, CIA, January 19, 1952, pp. 1-2) (IMG)

Indeed:

This was at the same time the main cause of the rapid deterioration of the Czech economic situation within some thing more than one year. (Deterioration of Economic Conditions, CIA, January 19, 1952, pp. 1-2) (IMG)

Referring to the above sabotage policies, the CIA document makes it absolutely clear that:

The ill-famed trio: Slansky, Geminder, Koehler were the actual creators of the above policy.... (Deterioration of Economic Conditions, CIA, January 19, 1952, p. 2) (IMG)

Slansky began the strike against the communist faction of the KSC, attacked Gottwald's comrades, and worked to undermine the central planning of the economy by, again, setting aside high quality specialists and replacing them with the incompetent. Referring to Slansky, the CIA document again emphasized:

he destroyed the economy. So in 1949 he abolished the so-called Narodohospodarska Komise (NHK) – Economic Committee of the Central Secretariat, headed by Ludvik Frejks, Dr. Goldman and Dr. Jung-Jancik. This committee was the right hand of Gottwald, and created the Two [Year Plan] and later the Five Year Plan. After the NHK was dissolved Gottwald took Frejka with him to the President's Personal Office; Dr Goldman was appointed Deputy Minister in State Planning Office in charge of statistics, and Dr. Jung-Jancik, who was in charge of all economic cadres with the NHK was given a minor position with the local Slovak Government in Bratislava. Instead of NHK, within the Communist Party a new organization was created, the so-called ... Department Industry, Finance and Commerce, with new people in charge. Many general directors of national corporations put in by the NHK under Frejka and Jancik were dismissed, regardless of their technical qualifications, and given some inferior positions; some even went to jail. New personnel were appointed to such positions through the new General Cadre Department headed by Bruno Koehler, a German Communist who did not even speak fluent Czech. (...). The entire nation was becoming more and more disgusted by State propaganda methods. The national output decreased steadily as a result of the mismanagement of new bosses, deep apathy of the working masses, ever growing shortages of raw materials, and disorganization of the entire economic and administrative life of the country. Since propaganda drives had not brought forward any positive results, the ever-growing and quickening "turn-over" of employees had only added to the rapidly spreading general chaos in the country. (Deterioration of Economic Conditions, CIA, January 19, 1952, p. 2) (IMG)

The correct policy towards the urban Czechoslovak petit bourgeoisie would have been to first encourage them to join cooperatives by generous state loans and technical equipment. When the technical progress of the shops were improved to the adequate level and the small shops became large enterprises, the government could then nationalize the enterprise. However, this was not the policy of the Slansky faction. Instead, they swiftly nationalized the shops and committed even greater economic sabotage by moving away the skilled workers of the shops to the factories as manual laborers. All of these were seriously detrimental to the economy:

The distribution system is very bureaucratic and works rather poorly, especially in the country. The former shop owners are made scapegoats for this failure and are usually blamed and even accused of sabotage. Late in 1950 many former shop owners, employed until that time in their nationalized shops, were transferred to other shops, and at the beginning in 1951 were completely removed from trade business and sent to factories as manual laborers. It was of course much easier for the Slansky' regime to break the resistance of the middle class than the resistance from the peasant class encountered in the collectivization drive. (Deterioration of Economic Conditions, CIA, January 19, 1952, p. 5) (IMG)

The volume of goods distribution rose rather substantially during the last year, but the rise was due solely to the sharp increase in consumer prices. Actually, though, consumption has dropped in most items, since the population cannot afford to buy the goods at the new, high prices. The increased consumption of basic consumer goods per capita promised in 1948 and 1949 was not realized. The reasons for this failure were: the administrative mismanagement, shortages of raw materials, ... and the growth of the Czechoslovak rearmament program. Outside of the State Planning Bureau, the real statistical data of production and consumption are known only to the top Party officials. On the average, the entire consumption is lower per capita than a year ago. (Deterioration of Economic Conditions, CIA, January 19, 1952, p. 5) (IMG)

The Titoist intelligence network in People's Democratic Czechoslovakia actually used more or less the same strategies employed by the Trotskyite bandits of the Gestapo agents Tito and Djilas. If the reader recalls from C12S1, Tito's Trotskyite bandits in Montenegro enforced left-opportunist measures, leaping onto 'socialism' and imposing it through terror on the masses, going so far as to call for the annexation of Montenegro by the USSR. Under the guise of 'friendship' with Soviet power, they were backstabbing it, portraying it as an oppressive and aggressive expansionist power seeking to enslave the Montenegrin people. Such extreme 'pro-Sovietism' and blatant anti-Sovietism were two masks of the same foe. The same strategy was pursued by the Slansky faction to drive a wedge gulf between the Czechoslovak public opinion and Soviet power, so to provoke and agitate anti-Soviet uprisings, and to pave the way for the rise of a Titoist regime in Czechoslovakia hostile to the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies. The CIA stated that Slansky, Koehler, and Geminder were:

Communist ideologists [read: Trotskyites], being practically separated from the daily life of the country.... It was generally believed that Slansky was a Moscow man, placed by the Soviets in charge of the entire country. (Deterioration of Economic Conditions, CIA, January 19, 1952, p. 2) (IMG)

The belief that the Soviets installed Slansky was a false one fostered by Slansky's group itself, the objective being the false portrayal of Soviet power as an 'aggressive' 'expansionist' state 'seeking' to devour Czechoslovakia, just as Tito's Trotskyite bandits advocated the conquest of Montenegro by the USSR.

The communist faction of the KSC, however, successfully raised vigilance against the true colours of the Slansky group. The communists spearheaded a secret service campaign against the Slansky group and exposed their Trotskyite reactionary role in the economic damage and terror sown:

Slansky's popularity among the Czechoslovak population was quite small because of his wholly pro-Soviet political orientation. Zapotocky, in one of his articles published in Prace prior to emphasized that although in building socialism in Czechoslovakia the examples and experiences of the USSR had to be followed, certain experiments could not be transferred blindly. He wrote that, in applying these principles, the specific conditions prevailing in Czechoslovakia had to be taken into consideration. Certain Party members of long standing blamed Slansky for not paying adequate attention to the special economic and political conditions existing in Czechoslovakia when applying Soviet methods, and felt that Czechoslovak production suffered because of this. This criticism was voiced by Dr. Velda Pithart, Deputy Minister of Industry; Eng. Dr. J. Jicinsky, director general of the Czechoslovak United Steel Works; Ing. K. Kabelle, coke industry specialist and director of the coke kilns at Kladno; Dora Smolkova; and several others. (Czechoslovak Communist Party: Background of the Slansky Purge, CIA, July 16, 1952, p. 3) (IMG)

The author of a report for the US intelligence stated:

I have often heard that Dr Jaromir Dolansky, the Minister for State Planning and the best Communist economist in the country, was always in strong opposition to Slansky's methods and [believed] ... that no positive results could be expected in following a strict Communization policy with complete disregard for economic problems. (Deterioration of Economic Conditions, CIA, January 19, 1952, p. 3) (IMG)

Dolansky belonged to the on the faction of:

Gottwald.... (Deterioration of Economic Conditions, CIA, January 19, 1952, p. 3) (IMG)

And:

Gottwald denounced Slansky ... as a Trotskyist.... (Gottwald's Position in the Arrest of Slansky, CIA, February 14, 1952, p. 1) (IMG)

Gottwald's accusation against Slansky was of course accurate, for although Slansky, just like Tito, officially denounced Trotskyism, he hypocritically was one himself.

Ota Sling was one of the prominent:

members of the Slansky group. (Czechoslovak Communist Party: Background of the Slansky Purge, CIA, July 16, 1952, p. 1) (IMG)

Sling was extremely unpopular owing to his Trotskyite measures imposing aggressive 'collectivization', high work norms, and dictatorial behaviour, among others. With the Soviet-backed communist faction of the Party resurging and raising vigilance, the growing popular rage was successfully canalized to raise vigilance against the Titoist faction, resulting in Sling's arrest:

Sling's attempt to build socialism rapidly and his failure to take into consideration the special conditions prevailing in the Brno region greatly contributed to his unpopularity. Sling's unpopularity was greatest among the farmers who were compelled by drastic measures to join the agricultural cooperatives (JZD) Even among factory workers, however, the position of Sling was not much better. He tried to introduce constantly higher labor norms, resulting in a decline of wages. These measures caused increasing unrest among the factory workers which resulted in several strikes in departments of Zbrojovka Brno, where Pliva was employed at that time. In several cases the KSC regional leaders in Brno were compelled to retreat from their position: because the KSC factory organizations and the trade union organizations, under pressure from their members, were opposed to the measures advanced by Sling. For this reason Sling's removal and arrest provoked no unfavorable reaction in the Brno region; on the contrary, the action was well received. (Czechoslovak Communist Party: Background of the Slansky Purge, CIA, July 16, 1952, p. 2) (IMG)

The first step in the decisive attack against Rudolf Slansky and his companions was the liquidation of Marie Svermova, Ota Sling, Viteslav Fuchs and other Party officials who were known to be members of the Slansky group. (Czechoslovak Communist Party: Background of the Slansky Purge, CIA, July 16, 1952, p. 1) (IMG)

Putting his personal interests above that of the Party, the administration, and the people, Slansky created a large bloc of his adherents within the Party, violating the principles of democracy, fostering a duplicate bureaucracy, the natural result of which was inefficiency. The American intelligence service pointed to:

the fact that Slansky and his group had seized most of the key positions both in the economic and political spheres, so that the Government was in a position inferior to that of the Party. This naturally damaged the prestige of the Government in the eyes of the public. Things had progressed so far that general managers of Czechoslovak nationalized enterprises, in order to settle important netters, did not conduct their business with the ministry of the industry to which they were subordinate, but went directly to the Secretariat of the KSC, where the final decisions were made. (...). Kopecky, especially, criticized Slansky in this respect. It was the general opinion that the ruling power within Czechoslovakia was centered in the UV KSC [i.e. General Secretariat of the Party] and not in the Government. (Czechoslovak Communist Party: Background of the Slansky Purge, CIA, July 16, 1952, p. 7) (IMG)

Along with Kopecky,:

Gottwald denounced Slansky ... for his responsibility for the confusion in the Government and Party as a result of the duality of control.... (Gottwald's Position in the Arrest of Slansky, CIA, February 14, 1952, p. 1) (IMG)

Thanks to Slansky's lack of 'popularity among the Czechoslovak population', said the CIA,:

Gottwald dared to make such a direct attack against Slansky.... (Czechoslovak Communist Party: Background of the Slansky Purge, CIA, July 16, 1952, p. 3) (IMG)

Finally, the economy was so heavily damaged by 1951 that the setting for the purge of the Slansky gang had already become ripe and the scientific economically-minded communist faction gained the upper hand:

And then, in the last moment, when the coal output and the agricultural production were getting dangerously low and the general chaos in administration had reached a stage that nobody knew any more what was going on in the country, came the blow, the biggest shakeup in the Communist Party.... Rudolph Slansky was removed to an unimportant position, Geminder and Koehler simply vanished. An economically-minded group of individuals headed by Klement Gottwald came to power. It meant also the reinstatement of his Oxford-

trained economic advisors, Dr. Goldmann and Ludvik Frejka. The new Ministry of State Control was put in charge of Karol Bacilek a Slovak Communist, known as faithful and blind follower of Gottwald. (Deterioration of Economic Conditions, CIA, January 19, 1952, p. 2) (IMG)

Extensive discussions occurred in the Party meetings, a fact which also informed the public regarding the betrayal of Slansky's group:

The psychological preparation of public opinion for Slansky's arrest involved constant discussion at Party meetings of the cases against Svermova, Sling, Fuchs, and other arrested Party members, with emphasis on their connections with the West. (Czechoslovak Communist Party: Background of the Slansky Purge, CIA, July 16, 1952, p. 1) (IMG)

The purpose of these first arrests was to lay the groundwork for the arrest of Slansky and to test the reaction of the Czechoslovak public in the event of his arrest. (Czechoslovak Communist Party: Background of the Slansky Purge, CIA, July 16, 1952, p. 1) (IMG)

Subsequently, other Slansky agents were arrested:

After the arrest of Svermova and Sling, a number of Party officials in various regions were arrested. All of these officials were known as collaborators of Slansky, and it was obvious then that the net around Slansky and his closest collaborators, who held important posts directly in the Central Secretariat of the Party, was being tightened slowly but surely. (Czechoslovak Communist Party: Background of the Slansky Purge, CIA, July 16, 1952, p. 3) (IMG)

The Czechoslovak people, increasingly vigilant of the Trotskyite repressions of the villainous Slansky and his gang, did not view unfavourably the purge of the Slansky network:

People who were not Party members generally felt that with the removal of Slansky the worst "villain" in Czechoslovakia was gone, political persecution of non-Party citizens might decrease, and a partial detachment from the influence of Moscow would take place. (Czechoslovak Communist Party: Background of the Slansky Purge, CIA, July 16, 1952, p. 5) (IMG)

From what has been said above it would follow that the general reaction to Slansky's arrest within the Party and among non-party citizens within Czechoslovakia was not as unfavorable as may have been assumed abroad. A psychological preparation of public opinion for the liquidation of Slansky and his adherents had been made. Thus, Slansky had not been arrested in September 1951, since it was necessary to ascertain first what public reaction should be expected in the event of his arrest. He was arrested only when it became obvious that his followers were a minority and that no grave political consequence would result from his liquidation, and this was followed by the systematic arrest of all those who were suspected, even slightly, of being in his camp. (Czechoslovak Communist Party: Background of the Slansky Purge, CIA, July 16, 1952, p. 5) (IMG)

By the time of the arrest of these Titoist fifth columnists, however, the economy was already damaged. The CIA noted:

the failure of Czechoslovakia to fulfill the Five-Year Plan, especially in the realms of heavy industry and agriculture.... (Czechoslovak Communist Party: Background of the Slansky Purge, CIA, July 16, 1952, p. 3) (IMG)

The economic situation during the first half of 1951 could be characterized as a rapidly deteriorating one. (Deterioration of Economic Conditions, CIA, January 19, 1952, p. 1) (IMG)

The economic problems certainly existed. However, the Czechoslovak people regarded the Slansky gang, not Gottwald, as responsible. In fact:

Gottwald ... today enjoy[s] a certain popularity within Czechoslovakia; [his] removal would do more harm than good. (Czechoslovak Communist Party: Background of the Slansky Purge, CIA, July 16, 1952, p. 8) (IMG)

Thanks to his correct scientific communist stance, Gottwald continued to be viewed favorably by the Czechoslovak proletariat and peasantry. Indeed, along with the purge came a new policy for the economy:

The expected shakeup came and was followed by the most complete, thorough reorganization of the Czech economy since its nationalization under the Communist regime. (Deterioration of Economic Conditions, CIA, January 19, 1952, p. 1) (IMG)

New ministries were created :

First, two independent Ministries for Heavy and Light industry were created. Later on, they were divided into some more specialized ministries. This reorganization does not necessarily result in a larger bureaucratic machinery; (Deterioration of Economic Conditions, CIA, January 19, 1952, pp. 2-3) (IMG)

Note that the Slansky group had created economic agencies within the Party, agencies responsible not as much for oversight and surveillance but more so for acting as ministries themselves. This had created a duplicate bureaucracy. Indeed, as the CIA suggested, the above-mentioned reorganization did not increase bureaucracy. Rather, it reduced bureaucracy by restoring the role and prestige of the government's economic ministries, while ensuring that these individual government ministries were unified, tightly knit, surveilled and oversighted by the KSC. This policy would have eliminated the extra agencies within the Party, while not diminishing the necessary guidance and role of the Party over the individual government bureaus. In other words, it practically merged the duplicate bureaucracies into one. This was reflected also in the emphasis on the expertise, rather than direct Party affiliations, of managers in state enterprises while simultaneously ensuring that the Party authorities maintained oversight over the performance of these managers. Akin to this was the elimination of the demagogical policy of worker self-management as advocated by Slansky's gang which would have made chaos and mismanagement an inevitability. Instead, the scientific Taylorist and Leninist policy of one-person management was introduced. The CIA reported:

in the mean time the collective workers' administration of enterprises were abolished, and the plants and other enterprises were put under the direct administration of a corresponding industrial ministry. It is to be expected that after the removal of Koehler more attention will be paid to actual qualifications in appointment of employees, and not only to political reliability as it was before. (Deterioration of Economic Conditions, CIA, January 19, 1952, p. 3) (IMG)

Another trend has been to give full authority and full responsibility to one individual – the director of the plant – and to eliminate Communist Party and trade union interference in plant management. This does not mean, however, that the Communist Party organization at the plant has no influence. The director is now under the supervision of a higher CP officer, either district or regional, and reports to him. There is no interference by local workers in management affairs while an industrial plan is being fulfilled. In the

past, management was more of a triumvirate: the manager and director, the trade union, and the Communist Party. (Industrialization of Czechoslovakia and Preparations for War, CIA, January 9, 1952, p. 2) (IMG)

The policies of Czechoslovakia under Slansky's clique had emphasized the formation of associations of production. In essence, this policy created very large national corporations that controlled several plants but did not function as ministries. The level of their management was more micro than those of the ministries and more macro than those of the individual state plants. They encompassed a smaller portion of the economy than the ministries typically would. At the same time, they encompassed several plants. Since a great role was given to these large state corporations, the role of the ministries was reduced and as such the economy was decentralized. The smart aspect of this economic sabotage, however, was that the control of a single corporation over several plants made it falsely appear as though the economy was centralized. In reality, given the diminished role of the ministries and the decentralization of their power to the relatively lower-level state corporations, the economy was decentralized, resulting in economic chaos. However, with the purge of Slansky's group, a greater role was given to the ministries and these corporations were broken up into individual plants.

There are constant reorganization changes occurring in Czechoslovak industry, and production of certain products is being transferred from one plant to another. (...). However, a recent trend has been to transfer production from the large national corporation plants to smaller production groups of one to three plants. (Industrialization of Czechoslovakia and Preparations for War, CIA, January 9, 1952, p. 2) (IMG)

Again, the transfer of production to these smaller production groups was not decentralization, for these small production groups were centrally planned by the economic ministries and other central economic bodies. To put it in an oversimplified form, this transfer to smaller groups implied that instead of having several factories be managed by one manager of one multi-factory state 'corporation', there would instead be one manager per each factory. This would render the day-to-day management of the factories more efficient since it meant that there would be a manager dealing directly with his/her factory instead of one manager having to deal with several factories at a time. At the same time, these managers and their factories would be accountable to the central economic bodies and ministries.

In short, the Slansky-era existence of state corporations, more micro than the ministries and more macro than the individual enterprise units, pseudo-centralized the management of several individual enterprises into the hands of a few managers, while decentralizing economic planning away from a central ministry onto the level of a relatively more local corporation. The rise of the Gottwald faction and the reversal of this Slansky-era policy recentralized economic-strategic planning into the hands of the state ministries while handing the task of day-to-day management onto the enterprise managers themselves, the latter in turn being accountable to the central plan.

It is important that the reader self-familiarizes with the concept of the Slansky ring's method of sabotage in management. This technique used by the Slansky ring was a sneaky method of sabotage repeated, under different titles, by the Titoist saboteurs of other countries as a way of decentralizing under the guise of 'centralizing' the economy. Of course, after the formation of these state corporations, the next step that would have been pursued by the Slansky group was to fully decentralize planning onto the individual enterprise level, hence to eliminate all central planning in general. Given the economic sabotage done by the Slansky faction as well as the Anglo-American imperialist economic sanctions against Czechoslovakia, there was a 'critical lack of imports of raw materials', to use the CIA's words:

It is now generally accepted in all government circles in Czechoslovakia that the state of the country's economy is chaotic. The economic events leading up to this state of affairs have all arisen from a critical lack of imports of raw materials for Czechoslovakia's basic engineering and rolling mill industries. This is caused by a current lack of purchasing currency and the curtailment of imports from the west. Holdings of foreign currency are now non-existent.... (General Economic Conditions in Czechoslovakia, CIA, August 17, 1949, p. 1) (IMG)

The fascist dictatorship (see C12S2, C12S3, C12S4, and C12S5) of the Gestapo agent Tito (see C12S1) did its part to damage Czechoslovakia by refusing to fulfill its trade obligations:

Yugoslavia, having recently sold 15 million dollars worth of copper has now abruptly reduced her export of raw copper to Czechoslovakia to 4,000 tons instead of the contracted 15,000 tons for 1949. Because of this, Czechoslovakia is now trying to purchase raw copper to renew her supply which was recently curtailed. (General Economic Conditions in Czechoslovakia, CIA, August 17, 1949, p. 2) (IMG)

On the personal level, the Gestapo agent Tito was extremely rude towards the Czechoslovak communists. As admitted by West German agent Kaplan: Moscow's most important problem was Yugoslavia, and its attacks focused on those who vacillated or might vacillate on this point.

In this respect, Moscow had complete trust in the Czechoslovak leadership. None of its members doubted for one second the correctness of the Soviet attitude toward the Yugoslav CP. Moscow also realized that the formerly professed Czechoslovak-Yugoslav friendship concealed a discordant trait: Czechoslovak politicians felt that the Yugoslavs held them in some disdain. "All we ever heard from them was criticism of our situation" (Slansky). Others complained that the Yugoslavs "systematically treated us with hostility and disloyalty" (Clementis). Moscow was also fully aware of Tito's critical, even condescending attitude toward Gottwald, whom he considered a sycophantic lackey of the Soviets, a politician without a will of his own. Gottwald's insistence ... that Tito be expeditiously removed only strengthened Moscow's confidence that Prague unambiguously supported the Soviet side on the Yugoslav issue.

(The Report on the Murder of the General Secretary, Karel Kaplan, 1990, p. 19) (IMG)

Gottwald went so far as to hope that a democratic majority in the YCP would overthrow Tito, not realizing that Tito had established a dictatorial rule in that Party:

This plan was going to be implemented in stages. The first two stages were described by Stalin on July 14, 1948, in his response to Gottwald's letter suggesting that Tito's leadership be removed:

I feel from your report that you're counting on the defeat of Tito and his group at the Yugoslav CP Congress.

I have to say that we Muscovites have not been and are not counting on so early a defeat of Tito's group. Our objective in the first stage was to isolate it in the eyes of other Communist parties, and to reveal its shady machinations. We have attained this objective.

The second stage will be a matter of gradually detaching Communist-Marxist groups within the Yugoslav Communist Party from

Tito and his group. This takes time and we have to be good at waiting. I see that you lack patience. But I advise you to arm yourself with patience, for there is no doubt that Marxism-Leninism will in time prevail in Yugoslavia.

(The Report on the Murder of the General Secretary, Karel Kaplan, 1990, p. 4) (IMG)

To assist People's Democratic Czechoslovakia against Yugoslav economic sabotage, the fraternal Soviet Union provided emergency economic assistance to Czechoslovakia by 1950:

A form of credit intermediate between short-term commercial credit and investment. is the emergency loan. Such loans have been granted occasionally to Satellite countries by the USSR to tide them over temporary balance of payments' difficulties. The \$25 million loan to Czechoslovakia in 1950 is an example, in this case designed to keep Czechoslovak industries operating by financing raw material imports from Western countries to which the Czechoslovaks were currently unable to make payments. (Institutions and Arrangements in International Trade and Finance Within the Soviet Bloc, Economic Intelligence Report, EIC-SR-3, Prepared Jointly by IAC and Other US Government Agencies, Economic Intelligence Committee, Subcommittee on International Trade and Finance, CIA, June 30, 1955, p. 58) (IMG)

Contrary to the hostile anti-Soviet propaganda of the US-led camp, a CIA report clarifies that the USSR bore no economic control over Czechoslovakia:

With respect to control exercised by Soviets over Czechoslovak production and economy such control does not actually exist. A few Soviet advisors may be found in the Ministry of National Defense and the Ministry of National Security. (Industrialization of Czechoslovakia and Preparations for War, CIA, January 9, 1952, p. 4) (IMG)

The Slansky faction had within it also a sub-network headed by Vladimir Clementis, an agent of the CIA and Mossad. Clementis's intelligence connections and extensive treasonous collaboration with the CIA and Mossad have been documented in C16S5. However, it is worth providing details of his Slovak separatist activities as well. The CIA-Mossad agent Vladimir Clementis was also a leading figure of the Slovak separatist movement headed by Gustav Husak, and sought to partition socialist Czechoslovakia on behalf of Isser Harel's fascist secret service. Indeed, to Slansky's group belonged the Slovak separatists headed by Clementis, Husak, Novemesky, Okali and Smidke. The CIA confirmed:

Separatism in Slovakia has resulted from the opposition of the Slovak Communist leaders Husak, Clementis, Novomesky, Okali, [and] Smidke.... (Crisis in the Czechoslovak Communist Party, CIA, December 10, 1951, p. 2) (IMG)

Unlike Czechia, Slovakia was not very industrialized. The population there was to a large extent agrarian petit-bourgeois. Unlike the proletarians, who have nothing to lose except their 'chains' in the struggle against finance capital, the petit-bourgeoisie have small business which they may lose. At the same time, unlike the national bourgeoisie and the cooperative peasants who have big businesses with which they can take the risk of engaging in a struggle against finance capital, the petit-bourgeoisie do not have such big businesses and therefore cannot afford to take major risks in the struggle against finance capital. The inability of the petit-bourgeoisie to wage a struggle against imperialism results in the areas populated by the petit-bourgeoisie to become easy prey to material domination by finance capital. Such was the reason that Slovakia was a channel through which the Nazi Germans were able to more easily dominate the territory of former Czechoslovakia. Such was the reason that Slovakia became a major hub for fascism. Such was the reason that after the Czechoslovak Revolution of 1948, Slovakia continued to be the major base of the Slovak bourgeois-nationalist agents of the CIA, MI6, UDB, Mossad, BND, etc. The communist faction of the KSC was:

Hindered by the increasing attacks of Slansky and his followers (Geminder, Frank and Koehler), and almost paralyzed in its activities by the dangerously growing Slovak separatism of the Husak group.... (Crisis in the Czechoslovak Communist Party, CIA, December 10, 1951, p. 2) (IMG)

Slansky drew his strength in part from the Slovak bourgeois-nationalist lobby. Undoubtedly, in any socialist or progressive country, the ethnic minorities deserve some level of autonomy, but the Clementis-Husak group went extreme with their demands for 'autonomy'. The network of CIA-Mossad agent Clementis promoted a very radical boost in Slovak 'autonomy', a kind that would have definitely paved the way for the partition of Czechoslovakia:

Clementis and his adherents ... held to the conception of national and political independence of Slovakia, both toward Moscow and toward Prague. (...). Such a political autonomy with nationalist overtones did not conform to the conceptions of either the Moscow or the ... Prague leadership. However, it was not possible to liquidate Clementis and his group before the Communist Party seized absolute power in Czechoslovakia and fortified its position. The first task of the KSC was the liquidation of the so-called bourgeois parties, and to this end the collaboration of the KSS was needed. After that it was only a question of time when the liquidation of the leadership of the KSS, from Clementis down, would be realized. (CZECHOSLOVAK COMMUNIST PARTY: BACKGROUND OF THE CLEMENTIS AND SLANSKY PURGES, CIA, June 24, 1952,p. 3) (IMG)

Clearly, Gustav Husak and the Mossad agent Vladimir Clementis were Slovak separatists aiming to partition Czechoslovakia. However, Gottwald, drawing strength from the communist industrial blue-collar workers' contingent in the Party, was able to defeat this faction:

Gottwald was able ... to take action in the interest of vigilance and caution and of a real purge of all inimical elements in the Party. (Gottwald's Position in the Arrest of Slansky, CIA, February 14, 1952, p. 1) (IMG)

Notably, the Mossad-backed Husak was jailed for bourgeois-nationalist separatist activity. This fact is important and will be very relevant in the later chapters, when the advent of the Titoist seizure of power in Czechoslovakia in the late 1960s would be explained.

Clementis also is documented to have had suspicious ties to the British Labour Party politician Konni Zilliacus. Zilliacus was unofficially an MI6 spymaster and wrote books in support of Tito against the USSR. He was well-known for his extensive contacts with many of the Kautskyite and Titoist elements in Eastern Europe:

Konni Zilliacus was a British member of Parliament and a leader of the Labour Party's left wing. After World War II he maintained contacts with left-wing politicians of the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party, particularly with Zdenek Fierlinger, who worked hand-in-hand with the Communists. Zilliacus also had close ties with various East European Communist leaders. (Report on the Murder of the General Secretary, Karel Kaplan, 1990, p. 183) (IMG)

Zilliacus and Clementis had met before, and then:

met once again; and in June 1948, Clementis received four documents, each several pages long, amounting to position papers of Zilliacus and his political associates on various United Nations issues. (Report on the Murder of the General Secretary, Karel Kaplan, 1990, p. 183) (IMG)

The 'position papers' which showed Zilliacus's ideological positions, were Zilliacus's 'humble opinions'. A liaison officer's 'humble opinion' can sometimes be a cover for actual instructions by MI6 handlers given to their agents. Had Clementis not had a track record of agency for the Mossad and UDB, it would have been unethical to judge him merely by some 'opinion' documents handed over to him by MI6 spymaster Zilliacus. However, given Clementis's track record of treason, one should give oneself the right to suspect that Clementis received those letters for a treasonous purpose. Like Zilliacus, Clementis supported the Ben-Gurion faction in all ways. Also, during the Slansky Trials (the English-language transcript of which is available online in archive.org), Zilliacus was condemned as one of the leaders of the Clementis-Slansky intelligence ring.

In his book against the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies, Karel Kaplan, the agent of the West German Ministry of Interior, made important confessions regarding the vast network controlled by Noel Field in the Peoples' Democracies. The ties of the Beria and Mossad agent Geminder to this American secret service network is thusly further exposed. Some of Kaplan's remarks are as follows:

Cominform's first Yugoslav resolution of mid-1948 inspired the idea of staging a major Central European international political show trial with high Communist officials. Originally it was to have an anti-American orientation, but it soon acquired a strong anti-Yugoslav tinge as well. The American citizen Noel Field, or perhaps "the case of Noel Field," became the starting point—although not more than that—for constructing such a trial.

After graduating from Harvard, Noel H. Field became a left-leaning diplomat in the U.S. Foreign Service. In the early thirties he gravitated toward intellectuals with strong pro-Soviet sympathies, among whom the Soviet secret service sought collaborators. In 1933, Noel Field met the German anti-Nazis Paul and Hede Massing. They had arrived in the United States from Moscow, with the objective of building up a network of Soviet agents among influential left-wing personalities. Field was one of their recruits. In 1936, much to Moscow's dismay, he left the foreign service for the League of Nations in Geneva, where he worked first in the disarmament section and later was in charge of members of the International Brigades in the Spanish Civil War.

Hede Massing set up Noel Field with Ignatz Reiss and General Walter G. Krivitsky, who were in charge of Soviet intelligence in Switzerland. Soon after that, however, Reiss spoke out against Stalin's terror, and Moscow ordered him liquidated for this "betrayal of the USSR." In August 1937 Krivitsky appointed a new controller for Field. However, after the elimination of Reiss, Krivitsky also defected. Reiss's and Krivitsky's "treason" raised questions in Moscow about Noel Field as well: he may have influenced them or even helped turn them around.

These doubts subsided when in 1938, Noel and his wife, Herta, appeared in Moscow. They fulfilled their old desire to see the "promised land." In addition, Noel wanted to restore the broken intelligence link, and to join the CP USA.

He met with the Massings who helped him reestablish contact: he was given a password which his new controller would use in approaching him. Intelligence agencies did not consider his membership in the CP USA appropriate and instead recommended membership in the German CP, which would be secret, known only to two or three officials, and registered in a secret roster of the Comintern.

More than four years passed before Field's controller contacted him. After giving assurances that he was still interested in the work, Field was to review in detail his contacts with Reiss and Krivitsky, as well as his activities over the previous five years. Field complied but still didn't meet his controller face-to-face. He heard nothing more until after the war, and then in a manner which made him so suspicious and doubtful that he simply threw out the messenger. Moscow's misgivings mounted accordingly.

Since 1939, Field had been operating in France and Switzerland as the director of the Unitarian Service Committee (USC) for Europe. His job was to help victims of Nazism. In the process he met dozens of German, Czechoslovak, Polish, Hungarian, and other Communists whom he helped reach exile. He even operated as a courier among underground Communist groups. In Switzerland he contacted officials of anti-Nazi organizations, including Communists. All told, the services he rendered to the Communists and their resistance were very valuable.

One of his duties was to report to the USC headquarters in the United States about the political and economic situation and about resistance movements in Nazi-occupied homes of the exiles. He also supplied this information to Allen Dulles, the Swiss-based head of the American secret service, the OSS. In exchange Dulles helped out leftist resistance groups financially, materially, and logistically. Such cooperation was considered natural at the time, serving a common goal—the defeat of Nazism.

Two years after the war ended, in the fall of 1947, Noel Field lost his job with the USC. He decided to stay in Europe and to work as a journalist specializing in countries of the Soviet sphere of influence, writing for the U.S. press. Two considerations motivated him: on the one hand, he knew a number of Communist officials whom he had helped during the war and who now occupied high positions in Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Hungary; on the other hand there was his "history with intelligence." Additionally, he had no place to stay, and he wanted to get a residence permit in one of the Soviet-bloc countries.

In April 1948, Oskar Kosta and Evzen Klinger, Czechoslovak Communists working in Geneva, invited Field to Czechoslovakia. He intended to meet his wartime friends, collect material for a book on the people's democracies, and settle the residency issue. Suddenly, however, his name started appearing in reports of the Czechoslovak intelligence. Alice Kohnova-Glaserova, who after the war had been sent to recruit agents among American intellectuals, recommended Field. She had known him from wartime, but being ultracautious, she demanded that he be further investigated. The case was taken up by Josef Sindelaf, deputy head of the Czechoslovak intelligence, who was in charge of U.S. recruiting. He turned to Switzerland for information. Max Horngacker, an official of the Swiss Communist party, recommended Field, whom he knew very well. So did Artur London, a Czechoslovak Communist who with Field's help was receiving medical treatment in Switzerland. London also passed on to Sindelaf a letter by Field dated April 13, 1945. It was the French original, addressed to Horngacker. It read as follows: "Dear Sir: Attached please find a copy of the letter for Mr. Dulles which I promised you this morning. Yours sincerely, Noel H. Field."

In August 1948, the Fields left Prague to visit Poland. There they learned that Hede Massing and her husband had left the Communist movement and were testifying before the House Un-American Activities Committee in Washington, D.C. Field wondered whether his

name might be mentioned and whether he'd be able to return to the United States. Right away he raised the issue with Jakub Berman, a high official of the Polish Communist Party, "who promised help in solving his problem."

After returning to Prague in September, Field multiplied his efforts to get a long-term residence permit in Czechoslovakia. The matter became even more acute when on October 16, 1948, the New York Herald Tribune published a report on the extensive testimony that Whittaker Chambers had given to the House Un-American Activities Committee. (...). It was imperative that he get a residence permit in Eastern Europe. He knew that his influential friends would help, as would proofs of his Communist party membership and solving the misunderstanding with Soviet intelligence.

On September 15, Leo Bauer, an old friend and a leading Communist in West Germany, passed on to Field a message from a leader of the East German Communist party (the SED) who said he had no objections to resolving Field's party matter. In October, Czechoslovak officials including Vilem Novy, Rudolf Margolius, Karel Markus, Alice Kohnova, and Gisela Kischova recommended that Field be granted the residence permit he sought. They approached Bedrich Geminder, head of the international department of the CC KSC secretariat. On November 13, Gisela Kischova delivered to the Czechoslovak party leadership a letter from the CC SED, in which Paul Merker and Franz Dahlem, two of its leading officials, requested that Field be allowed to stay in Czechoslovakia for the time being. Soon after that Field complained in a letter to Bauer that he had "used all levers to get a residence permit in Czechoslovakia . . . but in vain."

All these measures did have one effect: they incited the interest of security authorities, particularly of party security. Karel Svab headed the records department of the CC KSC secretariat, which was in charge of party intelligence. He asked Antonin Jandus from the Office for Party Defense to put Field under surveillance. Jandus gave the job to Alice Kohnova and received detailed information about Field's contacts in Czechoslovakia. Svab was suspicious of Field's efforts to get a Czechoslovak residence permit. He therefore asked the State Security (StB), the Czechoslovak secret service, to investigate the matter, to interrogate Field, and to follow Field's contacts. The interrogation took place on November 19, 1948, in Jandus's presence.

On the same day, Venceslav Wehle, the commander of Czechoslovak intelligence, signed a report "On Field's connection with J. F. (should read: Allen) Dulles." Wehle saw proof of this connection in a letter from Field to Dulles, containing data on the resistance strength and political conditions in Nazi-occupied territories. It must have originated from the same source as the earlier letter which Sindelaf received from Artur London. Participants of the interrogation learned about Field's earlier work with the Soviet intelligence and heard out his request to be put in touch with the Moscow security center. The Czechs refused to mediate this but did approve his residence request because "having interrogated N. Field one can state that he is of the socialist persuasion." The residence permit was good until May 1949.

In December 1948, Field and his wife left for France and Switzerland to settle personal matters. Czechoslovak security meanwhile held up their mail, which was being forwarded to Kischova. In France, Field met with Artur London, who was getting ready to return to Prague, and asked him to arrange contact with Soviet intelligence in order to clarify past misunderstandings.

(The Report on the Murder of the General Secretary, Karel Kaplan, 1990, pp. 19-23) (IMG)

Whereas, quite suspiciously, Czechoslovak security chief Vesely refused to arrest Noel Field, Gottwald eventually ordered Field's arrest upon receiving information from his Hungarian and Soviet comrades:

Czechoslovak security advised Budapest about Field's arrival. Szucs immediately went to Prague and requested that Field be arrested; however, Jindfich Vesely, StB Chief, refused for lack of grounds. On May 9, Gottwald received a radiogram from the leader of Hungary: "To Comrade Gottwald. Please comply with our request and detain Field, who has just arrived in Prague. [Matyas] Rakosi." The Soviet General Belkin, masterminding the Field case from behind the scenes, also insisted. Gottwald agreed and explained his acquiescence to Vesely: "If even General Belkin has looked into this and supports it, let them have their way." Field was arrested and handed over to Hungarian security personnel on May 11. (The Report on the Murder of the General Secretary, Karel Kaplan, 1990, p. 24) (IMG)

Gejna Pavlik-Politzer, another member of the KSC named as a Jewish bourgeois-nationalist during the Slansky trials, had maintained contacts of an espionage character with the CIA spymaster Noel Field:

Who was Dr. Gejna Pavlik, fifty-five, and why did he attract the attention of Prague, Budapest, and even perhaps of Soviet security? He was a Slovak intellectual with leftist, pro-Communist leanings since his youth. After World War I he fought in the Red Army and was a member of the Soviet CP. Then he was sent to the battlefields of the short-lived Hungarian Soviet Republic. After its defeat, he settled in Slovakia as a lawyer and worked closely with the Communist party. In 1939 he left with his wife Charlotta for Switzerland, where he met Noel Field who provided some support, and Tibor Szonyi of Hungary. These acquaintances became fateful.

Field appointed him head of the Unitarian Service Committee's Czechoslovak chapter. This charitable organization provided assistance but in return expected information about the social and economic situation in the receiving area. (...). During his short employment with the USC – the job ended in mid-1946 – Pavlik sent the USC four reports. Later he worked as secretary of the Parliamentary Club of the Communist Party of Slovakia (KSS), and in October 1948 was appointed director of Cedok, the state travel agency.

(The Report on the Murder of the General Secretary, Karel Kaplan, 1990, p. 40) (IMG)

In some Eastern European countries, [Noel Field] even managed to get a communist onto the USC board. In Czechoslovakia, for example, the job was held until 1946 by Gejna Pavlik, a veteran communist activist who had taken part in the October Revolution in Russia, and one of his jobs was to provide Field with information as to the country's economic and social situation. (Revelations of Karel Kaplan, Intelligence Memorandum for Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, CIA, May 3, 1977, p. 8) (IMG{GDR})

Another person directly collaborating with the American spy Field was Vilem Novy:

Novy ... in 1939 helped Field organize the transfer of Communists from Poland to Britain.... (The Report on the Murder of the General Secretary, Karel Kaplan, 1990, p. 59) (IMG)

Back in 1939, the American imperialist secret service was still hostile to the USSR, allying with the latter only in 1941.

The American spy Noel Field plotted to go to the Peoples' Democracies to obtain intelligence on those countries. Referring to Noel Field, the revelations of Karel Kaplan, as presented in a CIA memorandum for the director of the FBI, stated:

[Noel Field] hoped to get all this without difficulty in the East. He made the rounds of friends he had made during the war, all of them now holding down important jobs. He considered as beginning, settling down for a while in Prague and writing a book for Western

readers about the people's democracies. he had already begun gathering the necessary data. (Revelations of Karel Kaplan, Intelligence Memorandum for Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, CIA, May 3, 1977, p. 8) (IMG{GDR})

Slansky, Novy, and Margolius – among others – were behind the invitation of the American spy Noel Field to Czechoslovakia:

Among the people Field saw in Prague was Vilem Novy, a member of the Party CC, a member of the parliament, and editor-in-chief of RUDE PRAVO, Rudolf Margolius, who in 1949 was to be named deputy minister for Foreign Trade and in 1952 was to climb the scaffold with Rudolf Slansky, Karel Markus, Alice Kohnova, and Gizela Kischova. All gave him letters of recommendation for a sojourn permit. (Revelations of Karel Kaplan, Intelligence Memorandum for Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, CIA, May 3, 1977, p. 8) (IMG{GDR})

Another person with suspicious ties to Noel Field was Artur London, who was later released during the Titoist New Course:

Furthermore, immediately after the war, and still in contact with the European communist leadership groups, Field was able to meet in Switzerland with several of the foremost figures in the Czech CP, among them Arthur London, the future deputy foreign minister and one of the three acquitted among the 14 on trial in the Slansky case, Evzen Klinger and Otto Kosta, both high ranking officials in the Ministry of Information. (Revelations of Karel Kaplan, Intelligence Memorandum for Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, CIA, May 3, 1977, p. 8) (IMG{GDR})

To survive the purges, Zapotocky jumped on the side of the anti-Slansky team. On the overt level, he supported the communist blue-collar faction of the Party headed by Gottwald in the purges of the Slansky group. Officially,:

Zapotocky supported Gottwald in this action. His reasons, however, were quite different from those of Gottwald. (Czechoslovak Communist Party: Background of the Slansky Purge, CIA, July 16, 1952, p. 3) (IMG)

Behind the scenes, Zapotocky was fighting on the same side as the Slansky group was – fighting for the Mossad, which back then was a CIA front. In fact:

Meanwhile, further arms negotiations had started in March. Czechoslovakia suffered a dire shortage of hard currencies and offered Haganah a considerable additional amount of hardware from its own surplus, valued at about \$18 million. One of the main instigators of this project was Antonin Zapotocky, then a deputy premier. He discussed the possibility of additional weapon sales with Mordechai Oren, an officer of the left-leaning socialist Mapam party. Zapotocky even promised to train Israeli fliers and paratroopers in Czechoslovakia. The government presidium had Reicin negotiate details of the arrangement with Avriel, who represented the Haganah. (The Report on the Murder of the General Secretary, Karel Kaplan, 1990, pp. 239-241) (IMG)

As a matter of fact, the author of the CIA report agreed that it was questionable if Zapotocky himself seriously agreed with the arrest of the Slansky group:

It is open to question if Zapotocky fully agreed with the arrest of Slansky and his followers as agents of the West since in the case of Vladimir Clementis he had suggested that a less drastic measure be taken. The fact remains that it was Zapotocky who signed the warrant for Slansky's arrest. This fact, however, does not constitute sufficient proof that Zapotocky agreed with this measure of Gottwald's.... (Czechoslovak Communist Party: Background of the Slansky Purge, CIA, July 16, 1952, p. 7) (IMG)

Zapotocky was trying to save himself by opportunistically pretending to be 'against' the CIA-MI6-Mossad network, to which he actually had been a covert accomplice.

There was Colonel Jan Bojko who was a close collaborator and accomplice of General Reicin. Reicin, as mentioned above, had assisted the top CIA-Mossad operative Ehud Avriel in the conspiracies against People's Democratic Czechoslovakia and against the Arab states. Bojko, seeking to escape the purges, fostered the myth of his 'death' so to delude his opponents into not searching for him, so that he could buy time to escape to Yugoslavia, the Eastern European country harbouring the CIA and Mossad bases. In this escape operation involving the classic tactic of fake 'death', Bojko was taking with himself several top secret intelligence documents from Czechoslovakia so that they fall into the hands of the CIA-Mossad-UDB authorities. However, he was arrested on his escape route, and the Soviets believed that Bojko had ties to Zapotocky:

Bojko was a close collaborator of Gen. Bredich Reicin, executed during the purge of the Slansky group. Bojko, a Slovak, generally believed dead, had actually been concealed by Slansky's followers and was detected trying to reach Austria on the way to Yugoslavia with important documents.

His capture revealed a conspiracy involving the highest circles of Communist leadership and increased Soviet suspicion with regard to Czechoslovak unwillingness to purge unreliable elements. Soviet authorities have placed the responsibility on Dr. Stefan Reiss, a former Minister of Justice, a Hungarian Jew by birth, but considered a Slovak. He is a protégé of President Zapotocky.

(Investigation of Czechoslovak leaders, CIA, February 15, 1954, p. 1) (IMG)

C15S9. East Germany / The German Proletariat's Support for Communist anti-Nazi Underground / The Removal of German Industries / Soviet Aid / Class Struggles and Economic Development in People's Democratic East Germany / Economic Development / The German Democratic Republic
*** IMG-All-{GDR}

Approximately a thousand Germans participated in communist-led anti-fascist popular front committees for the liberation of Germany. The KPD was the main leader of the extra-regime German anti-fascist struggle. The CIA reported:

Free Germany movements had sprung to life in Britain, Sweden, Switzerland, and France, drawing upon sizeable German émigré communities of anti-Nazi communists, socialists, and social democrats. Comprising nearly one thousand members, the Free Germany committees served as popular front organizations under the more-or-less open leadership of German communists. They supported the Allied war effort ... by calling for Germans to rise up and overthrow Hitler. (The OSS and the London "Free Germans", CIA Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 46, No. 1, Johnathan S. Gould) (IMG)

It is said that the SPD was the most popular 'anti-Nazi' 'opposition' political party in Germany during the Great Patriotic War. The US intelligence, however, believed otherwise:

6. The SP and trade union leaderships are probably the most discredited leaderships of any German democratic organization. The SPD and the trade unions wielded power – the CP not. The SPD ruled Prussia until July 20, 1932; it continually boasted of its strength. (...). The Weimar Republic may even be considered the creation of the SPD. And yet it failed completely to adopt Its policy to the new

requirements. (THE FREE GERMANY MANIFESTO AND THE GERMAN PEOPLE, Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Branch of Research and Analysis (R&A#1033), Europe-Africa Division, Psychological Warfare Subdivision, Central European Section, August 6, 1943, p. 20) (IMG{Soviet Intelligence in Nazi Germany})

By contrast, according to that same OSS document which cited the Psychological Warfare department of the US intelligence, the KPD/CP was the most important opposition organization in Nazi Germany:

Ps/W [i.e. Psychological Warfare department] interrogations indicate:

- a. that the CP underground still is the most important organization;
- b. that the Communist Youth Organization is still the most active youth underground;
- c. that, however, Gestapo agents have found entrance into the CP underground.

While the CP thus is the best organized and strongest underground group in Germany, the appeal of Russian Communism has not increased....

5. The esteem for Communism among the German workers rose considerably during the Spanish Civil War – a crucial period in Europe; it declined sharply during the German-Russian non-aggression pact, and climbed steeply with the decline of Germany's military fortunes on her Eastern Front.

(THE FREE GERMANY MANIFESTO AND THE GERMAN PEOPLE, Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Branch of Research and Analysis (R&A#1033), Europe-Africa Division, Psychological Warfare Subdivision, Central European Section, August 6, 1943, p. 19) (IMG{Soviet Intelligence in Nazi Germany})

As the above document shows, the German workers were not as wholeheartedly on the side of Nazi Germany as the liberal media claims. During the Spanish Civil War, the German workers actually were oriented towards the USSR and communism, whereas during the Nazi-Soviet Pact era when the Soviets and the Nazi Germans appeared to be 'allies', the appeal of communism and the USSR reduced in Germany. The rollback of the Nazi German forces in the USSR reduced the propaganda power of the Third Reich while increasing the leverage of the KPD Underground among the German proletarians, the above document indicates.

Note, furthermore, that the 'Hitlerite majority' in Germany was primarily concentrated in and emanating from the agrarian petit-bourgeois areas, located mainly in southern Germany, unlike in East Germany which was industrialized, proletarianized, and historically a zone of anti-Hitlerite uprisings such as the Stennes rebellion (see C10S7). Hitler's lieutenant, Hermann Rauschning, recalled:

Hitler's nature was incomprehensible to the North German. (Hitler Speaks, Hermann Rauschning, 1939, p. 165) (IMG{Soviet Intelligence in Nazi Germany})

The East Germans, located in Germany's northeast and primarily made up of proletarians, were never really so Hitlerian, unlike the petit-bourgeois majority of the Germans concentrated in the south.

The Potsdam Agreement of August 1945 between the Anglo-American Allies and the USSR provided the latter the right to reparations in kind through the removal of physical capital and production from East Germany, so long as the reparations payment would leave sufficient economic resources for the subsistence of the German population:

The Potsdam Agreement (of August 1945) provided claims that the reparations claims of the USSR should be met by removal of capital equipment and current production from the zone of Germany occupied by the USSR and by seizure of appropriate German external assets. The Potsdam Agreement provided further that payment of reparations should leave enough resources to enable the German people to subsist without external assistance. (PROBABLE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS IN EAST GERMANY THROUGH 1955, CIA, February 1954, p. 9) (IMG)

The Potsdam Agreement provided that Soviet reparations claim should be met by removal from the Soviet Zone of productive capacity in excess of that required to meet approved German peacetime needs. ('Review of the Soviet, British, and French Programs with Respect to Germany', ORE 11/1, CIA, April 8, 1947, pp. 4-5) (IMG)

And the USSR pursued the policy of the removal of German industries:

Substantial progress has been made in the removal of industrial facilities.... (Review of the Soviet, British, and French Programs with Respect to Germany, ORE 11/1, CIA, April 8, 1947, p. 5) (IMG)

In 1945 the Soviet occupation authorities ordered more than 200 of the largest and most important factories in East Germany transferred to Soviet ownership and management as a partial reparations payment. ('Soviet Economic Assistance to the Sino-Soviet Bloc: Loans, Credits, and Grants', Intelligence Memorandum, CIA, August 20, 1956, p. 8) (IMG)

However, upon reaching relative sufficiency in reconstruction, the USSR began to return half of the physical capital by 1950 and much of the rest by 1952 in exchange for compensation to be paid, as a part of the broader strategy of expanding the industrial backbone of the Peoples' Democracies:

In 1947 and 1950, approximately 100 plants were returned to East German ownership. The remaining companies were organized in 30 holding companies called Soviet-Owned Joint Stock Companies (Sowjetische Aktiengesellschaften – SAG's). In 1952, 66 SAG's were returned to East Germany, for which compensation had to be paid. ('Soviet Economic Assistance to the Sino-Soviet Bloc: Loans, Credits, and Grants', Intelligence Memorandum, CIA, August 20, 1956, p. 8) (IMG)

The consequent interruption of production, however, and the deterioration of facilities reserved for removal and in transit have caused the USSR to seek more immediate benefits from the current production of plants retained in the Soviet Zone, despite objections to the principle of taking reparations from current production. ('Review of the Soviet, British, and French Programs with Respect to Germany', ORE 11/1, CIA, April 8, 1947, p. 5) (IMG)

With a view to both immediate benefits ... the USSR has obtained control of some 200 key industrial establishments producing the greater portion of the current industrial output in the Soviet Zone (for example, some 85 percent of current metallurgical production), largely on the basis of their reliability to removal as reparations. To control these industries the USSR has established a gigantic trust, the Sowjetische Industrie A.G. ('Review of the Soviet, British, and French Programs with Respect to Germany', ORE 11/1, CIA, April 8, 1947, p. 5) (IMG)

Thus, the USSR returned East German physical capital to boost the latter's production, while continuing to receive the reparations.

Some hold the mistaken view that as East Germany was already mostly industrialized, it did not have to expand its heavy industry. This view is incorrect, because (1) East Germany needed to rebuild its war-torn economy and heavy-industrial development was necessary to this end, (2) there was still much room for the development of heavy industry especially in light of the covert or direct wars that could occur, (3) the development of heavy industry would have actually given a massive long-run boost to the development of light industry and consumer goods, and (4) even if East German heavy industry was highly developed, it still needed to upgrade its heavy industry, and for that it needed the prioritization of scientific advancement in engineering and technological advancement geared towards heavy industry, for such upgrades to occur. This is why:

the principal Soviet economic objectives for East Germany for the next few years are:

- a. To expand East German industry, particularly those heavy industries equipped to contribute directly or indirectly to armament production or capable of early conversion to armament production. (...).
- b. (...).

(NIE-50: PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN EAST GERMANY THROUGH 1952, CIA, January 28, 1952, p. 11) (IMG)

Obviously in light of the experience of the Great Patriotic War, for some time, East German scientific research in the military sector was firmly controlled or supervised by the Soviets. Nonetheless, scientific research in the field of heavy industry development was particularly emphasized in East Germany:

Scientific research in East Germany since 1945 has been primarily in the applied fields, as distinct from basic or pure research, and has concentrated upon the development of substitute materials and the improvement of processes in heavy industry. Research upon the most important military items, such as the V-2 rocket, was transferred to the USSR in 1947 and 1948. The scientific research upon military items now [in 1952] being conducted in East Germany is under direct Soviet control, while the planning and direction of all other research are the responsibility of the GDR. (NIE-50: PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN EAST GERMANY THROUGH 1952, CIA, January 28, 1952, p. 19) (IMG)

A 1954 CIA document admits that many of its conclusions, predominantly with anti-Soviet bias, are provisional. However, regarding the effects of the Soviet policies in East Germany, the document acknowledges one fact as ‘sufficiently clear’: that the USSR successfully managed to simultaneously boost the East German production to levels higher than that of West Germany, while taking large levels of reparations from East Germany. It states:

The principal Soviet policies were, however, sufficiently clear. During the first 3 years of the occupation, the USSR tried to restore East German industrial production as rapidly as possible at a time when little attention was given to such development in West Germany. At the same time, however, the USSR was quickly removing as much war booty as possible, such as livestock, raw materials, automobiles, tractors, and other valuables, as well as reparations in the form of industrial equipment. The Russians met with considerable success in each of these seemingly contradictory endeavors. (PROBABLE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS IN EAST GERMANY THROUGH 1955, CIA, February 1954, p. 7) (IMG)

Another CIA document, this one definitive and devoid of any ‘provisionality’ to its conclusions, states:

In its desire to obtain immediate benefits from German production, the USSR has pressed vigorously the industrial rehabilitation in the Soviet Zone. The level of production is still well below former standards, but, despite the disruption occasioned by plant removals, significant progress has been made. (‘Review of the Soviet, British, and French Programs with Respect to Germany’, ORE 11/1, CIA, April 8, 1947, p. 5) (IMG)

In accordance with the principles of the Potsdam Agreement, and contrary to Anglo-American propaganda, the reparations paid in kind by Germany focused not as much on the civilian sector of the economy, but rather the war materials. Indeed, as confirmed by the US intelligence:

A significant proportion of the Soviet take from German current production is in the form of war materials. It is well established that war plants and research facilities in the Soviet Zone had been continued in operation, producing such ... items as guided missiles, jet-propelled aircraft, tank treads and armor plate, optical instruments, synthetic fuel, and synthetic rubber. (‘Review of the Soviet, British, and French Programs with Respect to Germany’, ORE 11/1, CIA, April 8, 1947, p. 5) (IMG)

During the early years of the Soviet occupation, the foundations for a democratic government in East Germany were laid. Contrary to the Anglo-American depictions of East Germany, in fact, a multi-party bourgeois-democracy, not a ‘socialist’ ‘single-party’ state was formed in that land. Germany’s legislative assemblies were in fact made up of non-SED bourgeois parties:

In 1946, half of the deputies in the Landtage still belonged to the Liberal and Christian Democrats (LDP and CDU) and various non-party peasant organizations. (SED and East German Communist Views on Unification, CIA, November 12, 1952, p. 2) (IMG)

Upon the establishment of the foundations of democratic statehood in the Eastern Zone, neither the USSR nor the SED could purge all those Germans who served the Nazi regime, because a large minority of the East German population (and a majority of the unified-German population) were ideologically oriented towards Nazism. Only those directly responsible for crimes were purged. Thus, in the immediate post-war period, the ‘old civil servants’ who did not directly involve in committing crimes and instead only served the German government continued to maintain their position for a while, until new cadres of potentially more reliable experts were trained:

The administration was, until recently, still composed of too many of the old civil servants. Thus, in Communist parlance, East Germany was a ... country with a bourgeois administration. Meanwhile, a new Socialist civil service has been trained in the Walter Ulbricht Academy in Forst Zinna, and many new people will take the places of the purged, a process facilitated by the administrative re-organization of the states (Länder) into districts (Bezirk) of which Berlin will become the fifteenth. (SED and East German Communist Views on Unification, CIA, November 12, 1952, p. 2) (IMG)

Many of these ‘old civil servants’, as one may expect were not politically reliable. One such individual was Georg Dertinger, who had a long history of ties to various reactionary Nazi-collaborationist organizations. A former member of the German National People’s Party, a right-wing German bourgeois-nationalist organization not to be confused with the Nazi Party, he had helped Franz von Papen in getting the Vatican to bless Hitler’s Reich. Since 1934, he worked as a ‘journalist’ in Berlin for a newspaper. He had not been openly a full-scale Nazi, but was rather one of the ‘staff’ members or ‘civil servants’ who ‘only’ served the German Empire, be it Nazi or otherwise. Thus, in the initial years, Dertinger was not identified as a Nazi to be purged, and thereby continued to serve in the East German government. Even then, Dertinger did not hide his ties to the US-led bloc:

Dertinger had not expected his arrest. He believed he had high enough protection in Moscow and made little effort to hide from the public his contacts with the West. The arrest of Dertinger is a possible preliminary to action against those Russian delegates who have one too far in their contacts with the West. (The Current Purge, CIA, March 25, 1953, p. 2) (IMG)

He did indeed have the support of a certain faction in Moscow. In particular, Dertinger worked for the MI6 agent Beria:

Dertinger was ... functioning under the authority of Beria.... (The Current Purge, CIA, March 25, 1953, p. 2) (IMG)

Not surprisingly, Dertinger was convicted as a British spy and duly sent to the corrective labour camps.

Dertinger lied outside of the KPD. There were, however, comprador agents within the KPD. One of those Trotskyist-Titoist agents in the German communist movement was Paul Merker, who had belonged to the hostile anti-Soviet faction within the KPD:

Paul Merker, a veteran of the German Communist Party, was, prior to 1933, systematically disposed towards the anti-Moscow wing, and for this reason was eliminated in 1931 for some time from a part of his party functions. He was considered to be a Remmele-Neumann man. Remmele was a Reichstag deputy who disapproved of Stalin's German policy in 1932, went to Moscow as a German Communist refugee, and was executed there in 1937, together with his comrade, Heinz Neumann. In 1941, Merker escaped from occupied France and went to Mexico City where he published a paper, Freies Deutschland, and organized a number of Communist fronts there and in other parts of Latin America. (...). Merker, who has been loudly denounced as a Trotskyite, belongs to a group of ... European Communists, who believed for a time that the European Communist Party and regimes would assure for themselves a greater degree of independence from Moscow. (The Current Purge, CIA, March 25, 1953, pp. 2-3) (IMG)

His departure to Mexico was the beginning of his long relationship with US intelligence. Merker's relationship with the American spymaster Noel Field stretched back to 1942 when Field had helped him move to Mexico:

Field had helped [Merker] to escape to Mexico in 1942.... (Revelations of Karel Kaplan, Intelligence Memorandum for Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, CIA, May 3, 1977, p. 9) (IMG)

The above is a quote from the revelations by Karel Kaplan referred to by the CIA in a memorandum for the FBI. During his tenure in Mexico, Paul Merker collaborated with American-Israeli intelligence:

Paul Merker ... is accused [by Moscow] of having favored cooperation with Zionist organizations during his stay in Mexico City, and especially with J. P. Warburg, who was assistant director of the German department of the United States Information Service in Mexico for some time during Merker's sojourn there. (...). Moscow's statements concerning this cooperation are true, and it is equally correct to say that the Moscow ... authorities were unable, from 1933 on, to supervise all their own branch organizations, nor were they prepared to do so at that time. (The Current Purge, CIA, March 25, 1953, p. 2) (IMG)

In a book published by the Oxford University Press, Rachel McCleary of the CIA front think tank 'Hoover Institute' confirmed also that:

Edward M. Warburg [was] chair of the Jewish Joint Distribution Committee.... ('Global Compassion: Private Voluntary Organizations and U.S. Foreign Policy Since 1939', Oxford University Press, Rachel M. McCleary, 2009) (IMG)

As such, Merker had cooperated with the American-Israeli espionage organization, the Joint Distribution Committee (JDC). For more information about the JDC's intelligence and special operations activities for the American imperialists and the Mossad, see chapter 16. During the post-war years, Merker maintained his connections with the US intelligence through the spymaster Noel Field as well as Czechoslovakia's 'Slansky group' – a clique of agents and saboteurs working for the intelligence services of Yugoslavia, Israel, Britain, and the United States. As confirmed by the CIA,:

Merker [is] linked to Noel H. Field and the Slansky group in Prague.... (The Current Purge, CIA, March 25, 1953, p. 2) (IMG)

A 1977 US intelligence memorandum written for the FBI chief attached open source texts with some background information on the Field case. To provide information on the Peoples' Democracies, Noel Field:

had already begun gathering the necessary data. (Revelations of Karel Kaplan, Intelligence Memorandum for Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, CIA, May 3, 1977, p. 8) (IMG)

He would do this under the guise of:

settling down for a while in Prague and writing a book for Western readers.... (Revelations of Karel Kaplan, Intelligence Memorandum for Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, CIA, May 3, 1977, p. 8) (IMG)

Full quote:

Field ... hoped to get all this without difficulty in the East. He made the rounds of friends he had made during the war, all of them now holding down important jobs. He considered as beginning, settling down for a while in Prague and writing a book for Western readers about the people's democracies. He had already begun gathering the necessary data. (Revelations of Karel Kaplan, Intelligence Memorandum for Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, CIA, May 3, 1977, p. 8) (IMG)

For the purpose of gathering intelligence,:

In September [Field] contacted Leo Bauer, an important official in the German CP, who gave him word from East German leader Paul Merker, whom Field had helped to escape to Mexico in 1942, word that there would be no obstacles to his joining the Party. (Revelations of Karel Kaplan, Intelligence Memorandum for Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, CIA, May 3, 1977, p. 9) (IMG)

In other words, Merker continued his intelligence contacts with Noel Field through Leo Bauer, to the point of even trying to help him to infiltrate the SED for collecting data on the Peoples' Democracies. Not surprisingly:

Merker was also openly tied to Tito.... (The Current Purge, CIA, March 25, 1953, p. 3) (IMG)

Thus, just like the 'Slanskyites' of Czechoslovakia, Merker was an agent of American intelligence, and a willing accomplice of Yugoslavia's fascist dictatorship. Even as late as the 1950s, said a prominent German historian,:

Paul Merker had deviated from Stalin's 'anti-Zionist' policy [which was] directed against the state of Israel.... ('Germany: The Long Road West: Volume 2: 1933-1990', Heinrich August Winkler, p. 142) (IMG)

Some would argue that the fact that Merker had cooperated with the American-Israeli espionage service in 1942, the year in which the American imperialists and their Dayanite henchpeople in Israel were genuine rivals to Nazi Germany, shows that Merker was being 'pragmatic'. Certainly, had Merker's cooperation with American-Israeli intelligence services been limited to the period between 1941-1942, his deeds would have been justified since it would have assisted in the fight against the Axis forces. However, the fact that Merker continued to favor the regime of Israel well after 1942, and continued to foster bonds with the CIA, as well as with the Yugoslav regime shows clearly that his cooperation with the American-Israeli intelligence services was for the purpose of assisting American-Israeli espionage efforts in general, and was not limited to fighting the Axis.

Up until early 1952, the East German government, despite its many merits on other issues of economic policy, pursued a reactionary left-deviationist policy line on wages. There was little wage differentiation in the economy, causing skilled workers dissatisfaction for the little pay they got for their hard work. Stalin, in a comradely manner, criticized the East German policy in his conversation with Walter Ulbricht. The following is an excerpt, from the Soviet archives, of an April 1952 conversation that took place between Joseph Stalin and the East German leaders Wilhelm Pieck, Walter Ulbricht, and Otto Grotewohl:

Comrade Stalin says that he has [some] questions. Last time it was found that in the GDR, the ratio of workers' salary to the salary of engineering and technical personnel was 1:1.7. It is absolutely incorrect. It will doom your entire industry. Maybe you started from the assumption of what Marx and Engels said in the period of the Commune – that an engineer should not be paid more than a well-qualified worker. Maybe it was correct then, but it is absolutely incorrect now. The engineer is engaged in intellectual work. He must have an apartment, decent furniture; he should not be chasing a piece of bread. He should enjoy a standard of living appropriate for a person who is engaged in intellectual work. He has to have a library, comfort, so that he could sit down and read a book undisturbed, or write something. If you do not do it, not only will your old engineers leave, but even the young ones will run away. In our country, an engineer gets two to three times more than a worker and in some spheres even four times more. Academicians get 12 thousand rubles monthly. It is impossible to work and grow without it. Therefore, you should discard your old views on this issue. The technology has become so complex compared to the times of the Commune, that engineers, and even high-level workers, must study a lot to master this technology. An engineer must have an opportunity to constantly grow, read books, write – there can be no engineer without it. (...). Comrade Stalin says that he heard that in the GDR well-qualified workers get only slightly more than the manual workers.

Comrade Ulbricht says that they do get more, but the difference is not sufficient. Therefore, they plan to introduce pay rate charts.

Comrade Stalin says that we [Soviets] went through the same experience in the first years of the Soviet government. Communes were organized on the plants, which brought together engineers and manual workers, who pulled all their money together and then divided it equally. It was stupid. White-collar workers did not have any incentive to raise their qualifications, while blue-collar workers did not have any incentive to grow to the level of white-collar workers. As a result, both categories lost. In the old time, some people were saying that such an approach was a proletarian, socialist one. But there is nothing socialist or proletarian about it. It is a simple peasant leveling of all. Any proletarian will tell you that if he gets more money, he would try to raise his skills, otherwise he will not. A skilled worker should be paid more than an unskilled worker, and an engineer—much more than a skilled worker. It should be done regardless of how much it costs. In our country, we did it 25 years ago, and that is the only reason why it works so well. Skilled workers have their prospects—many of them took exams to become engineers, and became good specialists. The peasant leveling of all should be buried. Comrade Stalin asks if the German leaders agree with this and adds that it is the genuine Marxist approach.

Comrade Pieck says that is correct

(‘Conversation between Joseph V. Stalin and SED leadership’, Wilson Center, April 07, 1952, pp. 3-4. Conversation between Joseph V. Stalin and SED leadership, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Library of Congress, Dmitri Volkogonov Collection; according to Mikhail Narinsky, April 07, 1952. A copy can be found in Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Moscow (AP RF), fond (f.) 45, opis’ (op.) 1, delo (d.) 303, list (l.) 179.) (IMG)

Indeed, the East German leaders accepted Stalin’s criticism. Hence, the conditions in East Germany soon began to change for the better. The living standards rose. For their achievements, the best of the workers, peasants, and intellectuals were rewarded with prizes and privileges forming the East German ‘elites’. The word ‘elite’ in this context refers not to the corrupt bureaucrats, the bourgeoisie or aristocrats, but rather, to the high achievers among the proletariat and peasantry, the German equivalent of the Soviet Stakhanovites. As confirmed by a late 1952 CIA report:

There is much satisfaction with improvement in living standards, the greater range of goods offered, and the somewhat easier work tempo. A great number of special privileges are given to the working intellectuals, to labor heroes and master peasants, and the prizes or orders these persons get are accompanied by material, cultural, and educational privileges. The great number of vacation homes for these elite and their children were mentioned most approvingly, and the division of the population into the followers of the regime, enjoying these privileges, and the others, the loafers and idlers has been very well adapted to German mentality. A point of pride is the new housing projects in East Berlin, especially the Stalinalle. All new apartments will be reserved for the elite, and this is an attractive form of social pressure. (SED and East German Communist Views on Unification, CIA, November 12, 1952, p. 2) (IMG)

The rewarding of East Germany’s hardworking ‘elites’ was a very positive step in that country’s political economy. As the CIA document stated above, the German people were very much satisfied with the rise in living standards, the high amount of production, and the relative ease. Another US intelligence document confirmed:

The regime has gained some support in the last two years as the result of the ... the slow but steady rise in the standard of living.... (NIE-50: PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN EAST GERMANY THROUGH 1952, CIA, January 28, 1952, p. 6) (IMG)

To much of the German youth, especially the ones from the proletarian families of the industrialized zones, Nazism represented the scorched earth policy of the Hitler gang which caused them the tremendous uncalled-for suffering. By contrast, the East German government at that time represented the steadily improved life standards of the population. It also had paid special attention to fighting Nazi propaganda and to educating the youth with progressive democratic ideas. Indeed, as the CIA stated:

The regime has made efforts to win over the youth (age group 6 to 25), who comprise more than a third of the population.... (NIE-50: PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN EAST GERMANY THROUGH 1952, CIA, January 28, 1952, p. 6) (IMG)

Until early 1952, the time in which the above CIA document was written, the government had not yet introduced the wage differentiation policy and as such, the ‘elite’ workers had not been sufficiently rewarded. Nonetheless, even in early 1952 and despite the left-opportunist equalization measures of the East German government, the CIA stated:

The regime has gained some support in the last two years as the result of the Communist education upon the youth.... (NIE-50: PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN EAST GERMANY THROUGH 1952, CIA, January 28, 1952, p. 6) (IMG)

Many changes occurred in Germany in the months subsequent to the date of the CIA report. The scientific policy of wage differentiation and the promotion of the 'elite' workers was likely the factor that led to in an even greater support for the state among the East German youth in the months after the CIA report. This was manifested in the fact that the:

the young people are eagerly volunteering to enter the army, so ... many of the applicants have had to be put on the waiting list. (SED and East German Communist Views on Unification, CIA, November 12, 1952, p. 1) (IMG)

Worth emphasis is that the German youth were eagerly and voluntarily joining the army. As for the older generation of the German working class, the conditions were somewhat complicated. As mentioned prior, the KPD formed the most important underground resistance movement against the Nazi regime and enjoyed a level of popularity among the German workers, as reported by the OSS. Naturally, as a result of years of propaganda by the Nazi Reich, a significantly large minority of the German proletarians certainly harboured anti-communist views.

For the standard of living, the high time had come for Germany to collectivize its agriculture, as means of boosting its food production. Until 1952, the German Democratic Republic had not undergone any agricultural collectivization, as confirmed by the US intelligence as well as the conversation between Stalin and East German leaders:

There has, for all practical purposes, been no collectivization of agriculture. (NIE-50: PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN EAST GERMANY THROUGH 1952, CIA, January 28, 1952, p. 10) (IMG)

He, Stalin, understands that the GDR has no collective farms at all, and the machine-rental stations serve only private peasant farms.

Comrade Ulbricht confirms that and adds that they even prohibited organization of collective farms where the peasants wanted it, trying not to harm the movement for united Germany.

('Conversation between Joseph V. Stalin and SED leadership', Wilson Center, April 07, 1952, p. 4. Conversation between Joseph V. Stalin and SED leadership, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Library of Congress, Dmitri Volkogonov Collection; according to Mikhail Narinsky, April 07, 1952. A copy can be found in Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Moscow (AP RF), fond (f.) 45, opis' (op.) 1, delo (d.) 303, list (l.) 179.) (IMG)

Ronald A. Francisco, an anti-Soviet political economist and a fellow at the CIA front think tank 'Wilson Center', admitted that in Germany, the failure in private farming became a significant impetus for collectivization. (The Political Economy of Collectivized Agriculture: A Comparative Study of Communist and Non-Communist Systems, Pergamon Press, edited by Ronald A. Francisco, Betty A. Laird, Roy D. Laird, pp. 65-66) (IMG)

Furthermore, a drought had hit Germany recently, creating an even greater need for the SED to boost agricultural production. In face of the conditions of drought, Joseph Stalin strongly suggested to the SED leaders that they do not attack the kulaks, and instead, encircle them through the creation of collective farms:

The kulaks should be encircled, and you should create collective farms around them. In our country, organization of collective farms was going on simultaneously with expropriation of the kulaks. You will not need to do it this way. Let your kulaks sit tight, leave them alone. ('Conversation between Joseph V. Stalin and SED leadership', Wilson Center, April 07, 1952, p. 4. Conversation between Joseph V. Stalin and SED leadership, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Library of Congress, Dmitri Volkogonov Collection; according to Mikhail Narinsky, April 07, 1952. A copy can be found in Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Moscow (AP RF), fond (f.) 45, opis' (op.) 1, delo (d.) 303, list (l.) 179.) (IMG)

Indeed, a purpose of the policy of collectivization is to amalgamate the agrarian small businesses into employee-owned bigger businesses capable of competing, undercutting, and besieging the kulak-owned businesses.

The CIA reported:

Ulbricht has stated that no action will be taken against the Grossbauern [i.e. kulaks] as a class but only against individuals who break the law. (Effect of Slansky Trial on Jews in East German Government, CIA, March 1, 1953, p. 3) (IMG)

Anglo-American finance capital has propagated the false narrative that as a result of the collectivization efforts, the East German government's 'terrorism', 'warfare', and 'mass arrests' against the German people 'suddenly' increased. Not true, as evidenced by a late 1952 CIA report:

There are no mass arrests going on as in the early years of the occupation; concentration camps exist, but they represent only a modern form of the forced labor usual for criminals in German jails. (SED and East German Communist Views on Unification, CIA, November 12, 1952, p. 2) (IMG)

Even as late as March 1, 1953, a source for the US intelligence stated that he/she does not believe any direct action against the kulaks will be undertaken in East Germany:

Source does not believe that there will be a concerted campaign against the large farmers (Grossbauern) because any such action would mean that the State would have to take charge of overseeing the farms. (Effect of Slansky Trial on Jews in East German Government, CIA, March 1, 1953, p. 3) (IMG)

In his conversation with the SED leaders, Stalin also advised that Germany should pursue collectivization as means of reducing unemployment, improving the conditions of agriculture by teaming up peasants for larger land, backed by generous aid and benefits from the state:

How many peasant farms join a production cooperative – 5, 10 or 15 – that does not matter. What matters, is that they will be organized. Currently poor peasants do not have any machines, do not have enough seed, and do not have necessary knowledge and experience in the economy. That is why their harvest is so poor. In such a situation, poor peasants will ruin themselves and will join the ranks of the unemployed. However, if you organize small collective farms and show them how to manage their farms, then peasants would start thinking, what is better – to join collective farms or to live separately. (...). You should give production cooperatives some privileges, as it used to be in our country some time ago. You should sell them machines cheaper, help them with seed and advice. If you need instructors for organization of collective farms, we will give them to you. Of course, if the bloc of parties objects to it – that would be a different case. But the bloc will not object if the peasants want to organize production cooperation, and if you help your peasants to do it, what can be bad about it? You will see for yourself that peasants will visit those collective farms and watch how life will unfold in a new way. (...). Do not force anybody to join, if they want to, good. If they do not, do not force them. Peasants will join production cooperatives voluntarily. You could send good people from the city unemployed to organize such cooperatives in the village. Comrade

Stalin says that in the Soviet Union, we were able to get rid of unemployment for two reasons; first of all, because we expanded the production and, secondly, because peasants settled on the land. It used to be that every year between 23 to 25 million hungry peasants would come from villages to Russian cities and undermine the price for labor force. Now we do not experience it any more, because the peasants are interested in working in the villages. Today we do not have unemployment in the USSR, and our problem is that we do not have enough workers. We mobilize young peasants and send them to work in the industry. This is how we defeated unemployment from both ends. Do not economize on assistance to collective farms; it will pay back later. Then gradually you will have a union of workers and peasants, and it is difficult for workers to stand alone without peasants. You need help on the part of the peasants. ('Conversation between Joseph V. Stalin and SED leadership', Wilson Center, April 07, 1952, pp. 4-5. Conversation between Joseph V. Stalin and SED leadership, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Library of Congress, Dmitri Volkogonov Collection; according to Mikhail Narinsky, April 07, 1952. A copy can be found in Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Moscow (AP RF), fond (f.) 45, opis' (op.) 1, delo (d.) 303, list (l.) 179.) (IMG)

Part of the program that Stalin had advised was already in place. As late as January 1952, the government allocated: seed and fertilizers, the Machine Lending Stations, the Farmers' (Mutual Aid Society)... (NIE-50: PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN EAST GERMANY THROUGH 1952, CIA, January 28, 1952, p. 10) (IMG)

The government would use the above as instruments to encourage voluntary collectivization. As confirmed by Ronald Francisco, a former Fellow at the CIA think tank Woodrow Wilson Center, the collectivization:

drive ... was genuinely positive and designed to encourage voluntary membership. Collectives were made to look economically attractive. Heavy state subsidies flowed to them through investment credits; and they were given priority access to machinery, fertilizer, and other farm equipment. Life for individual collective farmer also had economic attractions. Taxes were significantly lower, minimum incomes were guaranteed, and almost all indebtedness from farming for the year preceding membership was cancelled by the state. (Agricultural Collectivization in the German Democratic Republic, author: Ronald A. Francisco. In: 'The Political Economy of Collectivized Agriculture: A Comparative Study of Communist and Non-Communist Systems', Pergamon Press, edited by Ronald A. Francisco, Betty A. Laird, Roy D. Laird, 1979, p. 65) (IMG)

A very scientific step-by-step approach to collectivize agriculture was undertaken. Francisco further wrote:

These incentives were coupled with a tantalizing variety of collective farm structures. This was perhaps the most original plank in the GDR's package, and it disarmed a great deal of resistance. The idea was very simple.... No matter how attractive collective life seemed to be, it remained for the private farmer an uncertain and intangible life. Hence, why should the state insist upon a sudden and full transformation from traditional private farms to collective farms? Why not make the process less unpleasant by making it less abrupt and more gradual? The GDR did precisely this by creating three separate types of collective farms. Type 1, which most preferred, allowed a farmer to retain nominal title to his land when he made it part of the collective. Nothing was required beyond this; each farmer maintained independent ownership and control of all of his machinery, livestock, and buildings. Type 2 differed from Type 1 only in its inclusion of machinery in collective ownership; livestock and buildings remained private property. Type 3 was a collective farm of the Soviet type; all property was transferred, with the exception of a private plot of one-half hectare and a limited number of livestock. This was a carefully thought-out and well-presented program of collectivization, and it achieved immediate results. A large number of farmers enrolled in the first year, most of them voluntarily. The bulk of these consisted of men who had not been able to operate efficiently as independent farmers on the meager parcels of land distributed by the state. Hence, the ulterior motive of the ideologically questionable land reform seemed to pay off.

(Agricultural Collectivization in the German Democratic Republic, author: Ronald A. Francisco. In: 'The Political Economy of Collectivized Agriculture: A Comparative Study of Communist and Non-Communist Systems', Pergamon Press, edited by Ronald A. Francisco, Betty A. Laird, Roy D. Laird, 1979, pp. 65-66) (IMG)

As an inevitable result of this policy, a large portion of the German kulaks would have become refugees to West Germany. Actually, Joseph Stalin already expected and celebrated this fact, as it would free East Germany from its parasitic kulak class, allowing the East German government to take over kulak land:

Comrade Stalin says that we will give you one or two instructors, but you should not engage in expropriation simultaneously with collectivization. You can leave your kulaks alone for the time being.

Comrade Ulbricht responds that we do not need to touch them at the present time, because when production cooperatives are starting to organize, a part of kulaks will immediately escape to the West.

Comrade Stalin asks, what is bad about that? [The state] will take their land.

('Conversation between Joseph V. Stalin and SED leadership', Wilson Center, April 07, 1952, p. 8. Conversation between Joseph V. Stalin and SED leadership, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Library of Congress, Dmitri Volkogonov Collection; according to Mikhail Narinsky, April 07, 1952. A copy can be found in Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Moscow (AP RF), fond (f.) 45, opis' (op.) 1, delo (d.) 303, list (l.) 179.) (IMG)

So long as deprived of their wealth, the kulaks could turn into an excellent weapon of the People's Democracy, for they could be sent off to West Germany as a Weapon of Mass Migration, with which to increase the West German population, and hence to force the West Germans to spend money accommodating those refugees rather than spend money for funding Nazi terror gangs that would attack East Germany. The kulak threat could thereby be converted into the kulak opportunity.

C16S1. The Joint Distribution Committee, an intelligence front for the American Imperialists and Israeli Reactionaries, Collaborates with the Nazis in Holocaust and against Soviet State *** IMG-All-{Israel}

The employment of 'Non-Governmental Organizations' (NGOs) ostensibly devoted to 'humanitarian relief' or 'human rights' remains an infamous technique of American and Israeli espionage services. Among such NGOs was the 'American-Jewish Joint Distribution Committee' – variously also called the 'Joint Distribution Committee', 'American Joint Distribution Committee', 'the Joint', 'AJDC', 'AJJDC', 'JDC', etc. Disguised as a 'Jewish human rights' organization,:

The American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee was formed in 1914 to help Palestinian Jews suffering under the Ottoman Empire during World War I. ('CIA AND NAZI WAR CRIM. AND COL. CHAP. 11-21, DRAFT WORKING PAPER_0001', Chapter Eleven: American Intelligence and the Jewish Brichah, CIA Draft Working Paper, p. 7) (IMG)

A report by the European Union's EHRI noted that the Joint was established upon the initiative of US ambassador Henry Morgenthau:

The AJDC was founded in the autumn of 1914 in New York when Henry Morgenthau, US ambassador to Turkey, approached Louis Marshall and Jacob H. Schiff with a request for \$50,000 in support for the Jews in Palestine, who were suffering from famine. (Guide to the Sources on the Holocaust in Occupied Poland, European Holocaust Research Infrastructure (EHRI), Alina Skibińska, Translator: Jessica Taylor-Kucia, 2014, p. 243) (IMG)

With the assistance of the imperial powers, the 'Jewish Agency' in Palestine was founded, serving as the representative regime of the collectivity of Zionist settler-colonies in Palestine until 1948, the date of Israel's official founding. In this context however, and for the purpose of simplicity, the term 'Israel' will sometimes be used to refer not only to the post-1948 regime, but also to the 'Jewish Agency'. Hence, the terms 'Israel' and the 'Jewish Agency' will be used interchangeably.

Over the years, the American finance capital began to share the British imperialist view that supporting the Zionist movement in the Israel-Palestine region would allow for an Anglo-American base wars against the Arab proletarians and the Arab anti-colonial national bourgeoisie, using the pro-communist Yiddish citizens of Eastern Europe as cannon-fodder. To this end, American finance capital invested greatly in the elevation of the US-backed Zionist settlements. Founded in 1939, Ha-Mossad Le-Aliyah Bet was the intelligence branch of Israel's 'Haganah' ('Defense') forces and acted as a predecessor to the modern Mossad founded in 1949. The Joint played a critical role in financing and operationally assisting the Mossad:

During the Second World War, the Joint, under Dr. Joseph J. Schwartz worked with Shaul Meyerov (later known as Shaul Avigur), the head of the clandestine *ha-Mossad le-Aliyah Bet*, to smuggle Jews from Europe to Palestine. In 1939, ...the *Haganah*, and the *Histadrut*, the General Foundation of Jewish Labor, formed the *Aliyah Bet* (interchangeably called the *Mossad*).... The Joint raised its funds from American Jews to finance the escape movement. The Joint and the *Aliyah Bet* worked with the Jewish Agency to establish their main posts in Lisbon, Marseilles, Istanbul, and later in Paris. As early as 1939, *Aliyah Bet* agents were in contact with Adolf Eichmann, the SS officer in charge of "Jewish Affairs" in an unsuccessful attempt to arrange the release of some 1,000 Jews from Austria. In 1944, Saly Mayer, the Joint's representative in Switzerland, provided funds to "buy" the release of over 1,500 Jews from Bergen-Belsen concentration camp. Other rescue missions, including that of Raoul Wallenberg, were the results of efforts by the Joint and *Aliyah Bet*. ('CIA AND NAZI WAR CRIM. AND COL. CHAP. 11-21, DRAFT WORKING PAPER_0001', Chapter Eleven: American Intelligence and the Jewish Brichah, CIA Draft Working Paper, p. 7) (IMG)

The JDC played a very important role during the Great Patriotic War. The imperialist United States expanded financial support for the JDC via the War Refugee Board (WRB). The pervasive authority of the WRB is corroborated by a post-war report published by the WRB itself:

The functions of the Board ... included without limitation "the development of plans and programs and the inauguration of effective measures for (a) the rescue, transportation, maintenance and relief of the victims of enemy oppression, and (b) the establishment of havens of temporary refuge for such victims" The Board was directed to enlist through appropriate channels the cooperation and participation of foreign governments and to cooperate with existing international refugee, relief and rescue organizations in the execution of such plans and programs.

The State, Treasury, and War Departments were directed to execute at the request of the Board such parts of the Board's plans, programs and measures falling within their respective spheres. All agencies and departments were directed to supply or obtain such information, assistance, and facilities as the Board might require in carrying out the provisions of the Order.

('Final Summary Report of the Executive Director, War Refugee Board', United States War Refugee Board, William O'Dwyer, September 15, 1945, p. 3) (IMG)

It is worth noting also that US President Roosevelt was reluctant to establish an all-powerful War Refugee Board for Zionist organizations. As he opposed the establishment of a "Jewish state," FDR's views regarding Palestine no doubt clashed with Zionist interests. A few months prior to the establishment of the WRB, in "a memorandum by Colonel Harold B. Hoskins of a conversation he had with the President on September 27, 1943," it was stated:

As to a solution of the Palestine problem, the President stated that his own thinking leaned toward a wider use of the idea of trusteeship for Palestine – of making Palestine a real Holy Land for all three religions, with a Jew, a Christian, and a Moslem as the three responsible trustees. He said he realized it might be difficult to get the agreement of the Jews to such a plan but if Moslems and Christians of the world were agreed he hoped the Jews could also be persuaded. This concept to be successful would, he also realized, have to be presented as a solution larger and more inclusive than the establishment of an Arab state or a Jewish state. He realized that this idea of course required further thought and needed to be worked out in greater detail, but at least that was the line along which his mind was running. (867N.01/2068, Palestine Question, Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Merriam), Washington, October 15, 1943. In: "Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers," US State Department, Vol. 4, p. 816.) (IMG)

Although the US President Roosevelt was officially responsible for the establishment of the WRB, the President was basically forced to do so as the result of the lobbying campaign of the Jabotinskyite Irgun, which had roots in the Italian Fascists, and the pro-Irgun officials such as Secretary Morgenthau. Yehuda Bauer, a prominent scholar from the Yad Vashem and a former Mapam activist, remarked:

The president yielded to a combination of public pressure, organized largely by the Emergency Committee of the Irgun and, quite independently, by a small group of non-Jewish Treasury officials exercising constant pressure on Secretary Morgenthau. On January 22, 1944, Presidential Executive Order No. 9417 established a War Refugee Board to deal with attempts to rescue victims of the Nazis. ('American Jewry and the Holocaust: The American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, 1939-1945', Yehuda Bauer, 2017) (IMG)

The US government, through its War Refugee Board (WRB), backed the projects of the American imperialist intelligence organization, JDC, by issuing licenses that permitted the JDC to, on behalf of the US government, transfer funds abroad. According to a document published by the War Refugee Board itself, the Board's

operations were financed and carried out by private American and [Zionist Jewish] Palestinian agencies, under the direction of the Board's representatives in Ankara. By far the largest number were rescued by the Jewish Agency for Palestine working with the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee. ('Final Summary Report of the Executive Director, War Refugee Board', United States War Refugee Board, William O'Dwyer, September 15, 1945, p. 21) (IMG)

From then on, the Joint/JDC was also covertly funded by the US government's WRB via "the Intergovernmental Committee of the Red Cross":

In addition, the Board obtained an allocation of \$2,000,000 from the President's Emergency Fund for payment to the Committee as the United States Government's share of the Committee's 1944 operational budget. The Committee spent the bulk of these funds ... in France, Hungary and Rumania, using the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee as its agent. ('Final Summary Report of the Executive Director, War Refugee Board', United States War Refugee Board, William O'Dwyer, September 15, 1945, p. 21) (IMG)

As with everywhere else, the head of the Joint in Europe worked closely with Israel's regime, known back then as the 'Jewish Agency':

The JDC director [Schwartz] added that he was working in close cooperation with the Jewish Agency. ('Dr. Joseph Schwartz, J.D.C. Director, Reaches Palestine on Relief Mission', Jewish Telegraphic Agency, August 8, 1943, p. 3. In: JTA Daily News Bulletin, Vol. 10, No. 183.) (IMG)

The relationship between the Joint/Mossad and American intelligence is confirmed also by a prominent American intelligence official named:

Capt. Jules Koenig, a member of X-2's small base in Vienna.... ('CIA AND NAZI WAR CRIM. AND COL. CHAP. 11-21, DRAFT WORKING PAPER_0001', Chapter Eleven: American Intelligence and the Jewish Brichah, CIA Draft Working Paper, p. 6) (IMG)

The X-2 was one of the:

Three branches of OSS.... ('CIA AND NAZI WAR CRIM. AND COL. CHAP. 11-21, DRAFT WORKING PAPER_0001', Chapter Eleven: American Intelligence and the Jewish Brichah, CIA Draft Working Paper, p. 8) (IMG)

It served as the OSS's counter-espionage and liaison activities. According to Koenig, the Joint worked for the Western intelligence services as a liaison and as the financier of the intelligence network in Europe:

Funded by outside groups, including the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (commonly called the "Joint" or the JDC), the Hebrew Sheltering and Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS), the Political Section of the Jewish Agency, and the Aliyah Bet, Jewish agents penetrated the Third Reich both to rescue the refugees and to collect intelligence during the war. These personnel later formed the basis for the Brichah in numerous European countries during 1945-46. According to Koenig, "the various British Intelligence Services freely used the emissaries of this section [i.e. the Jewish Agency] for penetration, intelligence and DA [double agent] purposes. The representatives of the AJDC acted as a liaison with the Allied intelligence services and eventually financed this courier-cum-intelligence service." ('CIA AND NAZI WAR CRIM. AND COL. CHAP. 11-21, DRAFT WORKING PAPER_0001', Chapter Eleven: American Intelligence and the Jewish Brichah, CIA Draft Working Paper, pp. 7-8. Square brackets are original. The CIA paper cites: 'SCI/A, Vienna, "Original Project Report: SYMPHONY Project," [April 1946], LVX-216, (S), in DO Records, 1L 3, Box 4, Folder 10, CIA ARC) (IMG)

As confirmed by Uri Bialer, a senior anti-Soviet official in the Israeli Foreign Ministry, this close financial and operational relationship between the Joint and Mossad continued well after the Great Patriotic War:

This method required a great deal of financing and here, too, the experience acquired during the course of aliyah activities in Eastern Europe prior to May 1948 proved to be useful and significant. The organization of aliyah involved numerous other expenses, notably payment for land and sea transportation and maintenance of the refugees from their departure until their disembarkation in Palestine. Despite efforts to finance these activities independently after the Second World War, the Jewish Agency managed to raise only one-quarter of the tremendous costs involved; the bulk came from the American Jewish organization known as "the Joint" (the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee). The Joint's support was clandestine, reflecting its ambivalence to Mossad activities: the organization's leaders were sensitive to the preservation of the Joint's posture of legality and to the absence of direct links with the Zionist movement. They also felt uncomfortable about contributing to illegal activities which were directly harmful to Britain, America's ally. Under these circumstances, the Joint's assistance to the Mossad had to be secret; indeed, it was not defined in any official document. Nevertheless, opponents of aliyah were certainly aware of the Joint's role. When British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin reviewed the Palestinian problem in parliament early in December 1947, he strongly alleged that illegal immigration into Palestine would not be possible were it not financed by the Jews of America through the Joint. Historical evidence now available entirely supports Bevin's claim. (Between East and West: Israel's Foreign Policy Orientation 1948-1956, Cambridge University Press, Uri Bialer, 1990, p. 82) (IMG)

An Israeli journal on military and intelligence affairs confirmed that until long after World War II:

the State of Israel [was] assisted and sometimes funded by the US Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (JDC or 'Joint').... ('Romanian-Styled Capitalism', Israel Defense, Issue 11 of the magazine, February 17, 2013) (IMG)

As confirmed by Ya'akov Kedmi ('Yasha Kedmi') – an important leader of the Israeli intelligence front 'Nativ', and a prominent Mossad operative – the Joint was, until 1967, responsible for almost all of the financing of the Mossad, the Nativ, as well as Israel's nuclear program in Dimona:

"The Romanians set the price, and we said that Jews have no price and that we would pay for everything. The money [for paying for Jewish migration] came from the JDC, like the financing for Dimona [nuclear project]. Until 1967, the Mossad and 'Nativ' were financed by funds provided by the JDC, not by Israeli national funds," says Yasha Kedmi. ('Romanian-Styled Capitalism', Israel Defense, Issue 11 of the magazine, February 17, 2013) (IMG)

In brief, the JDC/Joint was an American-Israeli intelligence and special operations organization. The Mossad was a part of Joint. The subordinate character of the Mossad to the American intelligence is demonstrated in the fact that for instance, in:

August 1944, OSS agreed to accept reports from the Jewish Agency, but refused to exchange American intelligence or even acknowledge the Jewish reporting. ('CIA AND NAZI WAR CRIM. AND COL. CHAP. 11-21, DRAFT WORKING PAPER_0001', Chapter Eleven: American Intelligence and the Jewish Brichah, CIA Draft Working Paper, p. 8) (IMG)

Israel, or the 'Jewish Agency in Palestine', held a subordinate position vis-à-vis the United States, which makes sense because American finance capital obviously had more historical-material factors under its control than Israel.

From December 1941 to December 1942, the Nazi regime pursued a hostile policy towards American imperialism, and hence Israel's regime, the partner of American intelligence in the Middle East. Only for this one year, solely for this very brief period of time can it be said that the Nazis were genuinely opposed to Israel's regime. The shift began with the turn of the tide against the Nazi war machine in Stalingrad and the Caucasus in December 1942. As the Axis forces began to gradually retreat, the Anglo-American imperialists had no other choice than to aid the Axis as a bulwark against the victorious USSR and the Eastern European Peoples' Democratic forces. The result would be a historic alliance between the Axis and the Anglo-American Allied forces documented in all the previous chapters on the Cold War.

Of the covert channels through which American intelligence supplied economic support for the Nazi forces, the most fascinating was the attempt by American intelligence in providing donations and grants to the SS under the cover of supplying 'humanitarian' funds for the Ashkenazim and the Sfaradim. The calls for the rescue of the Yiddish people from Nazi extermination were misused by the American imperialist secret service as a means of materially sponsoring the Nazis in the war against the USSR. In exchange for 'rescuing' a rather small number of 'biologically valuable' Zionist Jews from Nazi-occupied Europe to move to Palestine, the American secret service and its recruited traitors to the Yiddish people would assist the Nazis in using Yiddish slave labour for the anti-Soviet war effort, and would – with the approval of the Mossad – 'calm down' one million Jews so that they do not resist extermination by the Nazis. These facts will be evidenced in this chapter. Noteworthy is that the Soviet media relentlessly exposed the alliance between the dominant US-backed faction of Israel's regime and the Nazis. In a January 1953 article for the Soviet press titled 'Zionist Agents of the American Secret Service', a Soviet intelligence analyst wrote:

In supporting the American imperialists' policy of launching another world war aimed at establishing U.S. world supremacy, the Zionists are in fact supporting everything that goes with it, in particular, the revival of nazism and the implantation of bloodthirsty fascist regimes imbued with the spirit of race hatred, including anti-semitism. By supporting this policy and assisting its implementation, the Zionists expose themselves as enemies not only of peace and democracy, but also of the labouring sections of the Jewish people. (Zionist Agents of the American Secret Service, New Times, Vladislav Minayev, January 21, 1953, p. 6. Re-printed in: CIA archives)

The dawn of this Nazi-Zionist alliance was in December 1942, as documented by Yehuda Bauer. 'Himmler', he said, succeeded in:

obtaining Hitler's agreement in December 1942 to sell Jews for hard currency and, by implication, for real advantages to the Reich. ('Jews for Sale?: Nazi-Jewish Negotiations, 1933-1945', Yale University Press, Yehuda Bauer, 1994, p. 255) (IMG)

Some would accuse Bauer of having too much of a 'pro-Soviet' 'bias'. However, reinforcing the claims of Bauer is Shlomo Aronson, who has been a Brookings Institute scholar, an IDF correspondent, a Ben-Gurion faction loyalist, a henchman of Moshe Dayan in the Telam Party in Israel, and a very prominent historian of the Holocaust. Aronson corroborated:

Hitler himself had authorized ransoming of "rich Jews" in exchange for "large sums of foreign currency" at the end of 1942. ('Hitler, the Allies, and the Jews', Shlomo Aronson, 2004, p. 172) (IMG)

It could be speculated that Himmler saw in such exchange deals an opening toward negotiations with the West on a separate peace, capitalizing on Hitler's limited permission to exchange a few Jews for much money. The requested sum was thus an opening for much more in terms of the very connection thereby created between Himmler and the West using Jews for his genuine political purpose, separate peace, following El Alamein and mainly due to the German defeat at Stalingrad, as argued by several parties involved such as Pomeranz in his postwar memoir and by some scholars ex post facto. ('Hitler, the Allies, and the Jews', Shlomo Aronson, 2004, pp. 172-173) (IMG)

Such negotiations in practice were not limited to saving the Yiddish proletarians from annihilation. Make no mistakes! On the surface, that is surely what they appeared as; in practice, they served as the noble mask to a sinister alliance.

The Moshe Dayan henchman Shlomo Aronson wrote about the financing of the Nazi SS via Slovakia. Dieter Wisliceny, the Nazi SS leader who served as a deputy to Adolf Eichmann, played an instrumental role in the negotiations between the SS and the Jewish bourgeois-nationalist agents of the American intelligence service. The JDC, the Zionist leadership of the Jewish Agency in Palestine, and perhaps even 'more so' the Judaic extremist Rabbi Weissmandel all had a role in providing financial aid to the SS:

The so-called "rescue debate" seemed to have found here a solid ground. This was especially true when Rabbi Weissmandel's view of its chances, **Wisliceny's alleged serious intentions, and Wisliceny's superiors' alleged willingness to negotiate** (if the Slovak Rescue Committee at least had something serious to show in terms of money) were shared by other rescue workers, even if with less bitterness and crusade-like emotions. Some kept repeating that a chance was missed and that rescue in general could have been enhanced if more money had been appropriated by the "conventional" Jewish leadership. **In fact, the Zionist leadership and AJDC representatives in Europe invested much thought and energy in regard to the Plan, and in spite of their grave doubts about its origins and purposes, they invested in it the requested advances....** The Plan and its collapse became a combined religious and emotional case personally for Weissmandel, whose accusations were posthumously published by ultraorthodox leaders in order to explain the Holocaust their way as a result of the secularization process among Jews, which led on the one hand to the catastrophe of the European Jews as divine punishment and on the other to the alleged betrayal of Jews at the hands of secular Jews. ('Hitler, the Allies, and the Jews', Shlomo Aronson, 2004, p. 174. Bold added.) (IMG)

The finances provided to the Nazi military and intelligence bodies were not really 'bribes' to have the Nazis end the systematic extermination of the Ashkenazim and the Sfaradim but rather served as a tool through which the American intelligence, using the Jewish bourgeois-nationalist traitors to the Yiddish people, financially sponsored the mass-killers of the Ashkenazim and the Sfaradim. This was why, contrary to the assertions of the fascist Rabbi Weissmandel, the deportations of the Yiddish continued to happen for several months after the time they were supposed to 'stop' due to the supposed 'bribe' deal:

About 60,000 of the 95,000 Slovak Jews were deported to death camps in Poland until August 1942, when the SD branch (Abschnitt) in Bratislava advised its head office (Leitabschnitt) in Vienna that about 59,000 had been deported, about 8,000 had fled to Hungary, and the lives of the remaining 22,000 had been spared by the Slovak authorities. **In fact, the deportations continued for several months afterward and then were finally stopped.** Indeed, said the report, the number of Jews had shrunk by 67,000, but it should be noted that most of the deported Jews were "small Jews," who had few connections, whereas the rich and influential Jews to a large extent remained

in the country. **This argument entirely refutes Weissmandel's assumption, and his posthumous allegation, that the Germans were successfully bribed to stop the killings.** ('Hitler, the Allies, and the Jews', Shlomo Aronson, 2004, p. 175. Bold added.) (IMG)

The 'secular' Kautskyite leaders such as Kastner, the henchman of David Ben-Gurion, was on board with Rabbi Weissmandel:

Pomeranz in Istanbul, Schwalb in Geneva, and several members of a Zionist "Rescue Committee" in Budapest, among them Joel Brand and Rezsó Kasztner, came to share a similar concept, or at least adopted for various reasons a similar hope, that a deal (or several separate deals) with the Germans was possible. Such deals depended on outside funding or on the delivery of Allied goods. Once Wisliceny appeared in occupied Budapest with a letter of recommendation from Rabbi Weissmandel in Bratislava and was approached by the Hungarian Rescue Committee to renew negotiations he had broken off in August 1943, telling his Slovak counterparts that he might renew them in the future, these rescue advocates sincerely believed or at least argued that such deals should be pursued. Thus, the ensuing Gestapo Deal concerning the ransoming of the Hungarian Jewry might have been born first in their minds, then returned to them by the Germans as a "real" possibility.... ('Hitler, the Allies, and the Jews', Shlomo Aronson, 2004, pp. 173-174) (IMG)

Given that the SS did not fulfill its 'promise' to stop the deportations of the Yiddish detainees to Auschwitz, the Joint had every reason to cease all financial support for the SS. Saving the Yiddish was no longer an excuse for financing the SS, since the SS sent children of Yiddish background to extermination regardless. And yet, the Joint continued to finance the SS, in manners far more treasonous. Herein comes the Kastner case. In Hungary, the American-Israeli intelligence was headed by Rezsó 'Rudolph' Kastner. A US intelligence document listing the members of the Joint. 'In December 1943', the document stated, Kastner became the:

JOINT contact in Budapest. (PERSONS CONNECTED WITH JOINT AGENCY OR AMERICAN JOINT DISTRIBUTION COMMITTEE "JOINT" IN HUNGARY AND AUSTRIA DURING THE WAR AND THROUGH JUNE 1946 AS NOTED IN THE SYMPHONY FILE, CIA, February 1950, p. 5) (IMG)

A report by the SSU – a US intelligence agency and an immediate predecessor of the CIA in the postwar years – confirmed that Kastner was indeed the leader of the Joint in Budapest since November 1943:

Samuel SPRINGMAN was leader of the JOINT in Budapest until November 1943. In December 1944 he, and his wife left for Palestine and transmitted his duties to KASTNER (alias Dr. KRASZNER) who worked together with Joel BRANDT.

('SUBJECT: GENERAL: Project SYMPHONY, SPECIFIC: Dr. KASTNER and Eng BYESZ', SECRET CONTROL, Office of Origin: Vienna, Austria, SCI/A, Field Hq. File No. LVX 230, Report Made At: Vienna, Headquarters of the United States Forces Austria, Made By: DD 110, SSU, May 1, 1946, p. 2. In: SYMPHONY VOL. 1_0023, CIA) (IMG)

Kastner was also one of the:

members of the Jewish Agency.... (Reference to Kastner Before and During Eichmann Trial, Memorandum, CIA, January 25, 1961, p. 1) (IMG)

The top-ranking SS leader in Hungary Kurt Becher listed Rudolf Kastner as one of the:

leading personalities of the Jewish agency and the Joint Distribution Committee.... (Affidavit of SS Standartenfuhrer Kurt Becher, On His and Rank's Attitude Toward Jews, Translation of Document Frank 17, Frank Defense Exhibit 16, June 12, 1947, Trial of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10, Nuremberg Military Tribunals, October 1946 to April 1949, p. 684) (IMG)

Becher also listed Kastner as the representative of the Jewish Agency and the Joint Distribution Committee in Hungary, as well as the President of the Zionist Organization of Hungary:

Shortly after I arrived in Budapest, I began negotiations with ... the President of the Zionist Organization of Hungary, who was at the same time the representative of the Jewish Agency and the Joint D. C., Dr. Rudolf Kasztner.... (Statutory Declaration, Kurt Becher, April 12, 1948, p. 1. Affidavit Recorded by: U.S. War Department, Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes, Benno H. Selcke. US.Civ.AGO-D 433012) (IMG)

Dieter Wisliceny, another high-level Nazi official and friend of Eichmann, confirmed that:

Dr. Rudolph Kastner [belonged to] the Joint Distribution Committee.... (NAZI CONSPIRACY AND AGGRESSION, Vol. 8, United States Office of Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality, 1946, p. 614) (IMG)

Much has been revealed about Kastner by Adolf Eichmann's memoirs. Under Eichmann, the camps in Hungary were set up for the aim of:

deportations to Auschwitz.... (MEMOIRS PART I, Adolf Otto Eichmann, November 1, 1960, PART I, p. 31. Recorded by: CIA) (IMG)

As the official representative of Israel, and as the number one American-Israeli intelligence operative in wartime Hungary, Kastner also served as the kapo-in-chief, helping the Nazis in the pacification of the Jews in deportation camps:

This Dr. Kastner was a young man about my age, an ice-cold lawyer and a fanatical Zionist. **He agreed to help keep the Jews from resisting deportation – and even keep order in the camps – if I ... let a few hundred or a few thousand young Jews emigrate illegally to Palestine. It was a good bargain. For keeping order in the camps, the price of 15,000 to 20,000 Jews – in the end there may have been more – was not too high for me.**

Except perhaps for the first few sessions, Kastner never came to me fearful of the Gestapo strong man. We negotiated entirely as equals. People forget that. We ... trusted each other perfectly. When he was with me, Kastner smoked cigarets as though he were in a coffee house. While we talked he would smoke on earomatic cigaret after another, taking them from a silver case and lighting them with a little silver lighter. With his great polish and reserve he would have made an ideal Gestapo officer himself.

Dr. Kastner's main concern was to make it possible for a select group of Hungarian Jews to emigrate to Israel. (...). As a matter of fact, there was a very strong similarity between our attitudes in the SS and the viewpoint of this immensely idealistic Zionist leader [i.e. Kastner].... As I told Kastner: "We, too, are idealists and we, too, had to sacrifice our own blood before we came to power."

Kastner would sacrifice a thousand or a hundred thousand of his blood to achieve his goal. He was not interested in old Jews who had become assimilated into Hungarian society. But he was incredibly persistent in trying to save biologically valuable Jewish blood, that is, human material that was capable of reproduction and hard work. "You can have the others," he would say, "but let me have this group here." And because Kastner rendered us a great service by helping keep the deportation camps peaceful, I would let his groups escape. After all, I was not connected with small groups of a thousand or so Jews.

(MEMOIRS PART I, Adolf Otto Eichmann, November 1, 1960, PART II, pp. 2-4. Recorded by: CIA. Bold added) (IMG)

In other words, the American-Israeli intelligence official Kastner assisted the Germans in the extermination of approximately one million Ashkenazim and Sfaradim, in exchange for the 'biologically valuable' among them who could become cannon-fodder for the aggressive Zionist anti-Arab wars in the Israel-Palestine region. Years later, the Kastner Case came up and the Mossad operative Kastner was, not at all incorrectly, accused of having helped the Nazis murder one million Jews. A CIA memorandum stated:

Dr. Rudolf KASTNER's wartime activities were rather thoroughly, though not entirely, exposed at a court trial in Tel Aviv. Kastner had initiated a libel case against a fellow Israeli who had accused him of making a deal with Eichmann in Hungary which resulted in the death of a million Jews. (Reference to Kastner Before and During Eichmann Trial, Memorandum, CIA, January 25, 1961, p. 1) (IMG)

People have to understand that many elderly Ashkenazim and Sfaradim were ideologically not favorable towards Zionism, not necessarily because they felt sympathies for the Arab nation, but because they found giving up their homes in Eastern Europe and farming in kibbutzim in Palestine ridiculous. Furthermore, they could not be very useful for the Ben-Gurion regime even if they were sympathizers, since they were old. A significant number of them were not specialists. Had they traveled to Israel, the Ben-Gurion regime would have had to pay heavy costs to provide a pension plan for people who were not even going to work. As such, as migrants to Israel, even if they were true believers in Zionism, they would have de facto operated more like an anti-Zionist weapon of mass migration, creating costs for the Zionist 'welfare' state, and hence undermining Zionism rather than serving it. It follows that the Mossad could not care about their lives, and was willing to sell them for cheap in exchange for more Nazi cooperation with the Mossad against USSR, and in exchange for younger, 'more useful' Jews. Indeed, these relatively few Jews whom Kastner or other Joint officials selected would then be covertly transported to Zionist areas in Palestine:

This is how most of the illegal emigrations were arranged: a group of special Jews was taken into custody and brought together in a place designated by Kastner and his men, where they were put under SS guard to keep them from harm. After the Jewish political organizations arranged transportation out of the country, I instructed the border police to let their transports pass unhindered. They traveled generally by night. That was the "gentleman's agreement" I had with Kastner.

After leaving Hungary, the Jews could then travel through neutral foreign countries or stay hidden, usually in Rumania, until the necessary steamships arrived to take them on board. When they reached Israel, the ships waited off shore until a few courageous Jews helped the passengers land against the orders of the British mandate authorities. (...). All these minor shipments – a matter of 700 here, 2,000 there, and so forth – were made with Himmler's permission. I would never have dared dance to my own waltz. If I demanded rigid obedience from my own subordinates, I had to be just as rigid in carrying out my superiors' orders. Otherwise I would have been a bad SS commander, and I pride myself on having been a good one.

(MEMOIRS PART I, Adolf Otto Eichmann, November 1, 1960, PART II, pp. 5-6. Recorded by: CIA) (IMG)

Kastner also negotiated with Kurt Becher in order to release his own 'biologically useful' family:

At the same time Kastner was bargaining with another SS official, a Lieut. Col. Becher. Becher was bartering Jews for foreign exchange and material on direct orders from Himmler. (...). There were other agencies, German and Hungarian, which tapped Kastner for foreign exchange in return for Jews, but I held aloof from all money affairs and left the material transactions to Becher.

Men under Becher's command guarded a special group of 700 Jews whom Kastner had requested from a list. They were mostly young people, although the group also included Kastner's entire family. I did not care if Kastner took his relatives along; he could take them wherever he wanted to.

(MEMOIRS PART I, Adolf Otto Eichmann, November 1, 1960, PART II, pp. 4-5. Recorded by: CIA) (IMG)

As the Soviet Red Army forces were advancing against the Axis forces, Kastner, the representative of Israeli intelligence and regime, provided Jewish slave labour for the Nazi war effort against the Soviets:

With the Russian advance westwards, conditions in Hungary became more and more chaotic. After the deportations stopped, I was called upon forcibly to deport 10,000 ethnic Germans before the Russians overran their homeland in eastern Hungary. When I returned to Budapest the situation was tense. My old friend and comrade, General Zehender, commander of the 22nd SS Cavalry division which we had hoped to motorize, was defending Budapest as the Russians drew nearer. Then his artillery ran out of shells. Zehender's position was near a street-car station on the east side of the city, but his ammunition depot was several kilometers beyond the last streetcar stop to the west. He told me in despair that the Russians were about to attack his division and he had no ammunition for his hundred guns.

I proposed a living chain of Jews to carry shells from the depot and load them on streetcars at the west end and station. The streetcars could carry them through the center of Budapest to the eastern end of the line where his own units could move them to the front line. My idea worked. I told Kastner the plan and he furnished the necessary number of Jews. We made a living chain of them, six or eight kilometers long to carry the shells from the depot to the station. Then dozens of streetcars, one after the other, sped across Budapest to meet Zehender's men in the east. The guns blazed away.

(MEMOIRS PART I, Adolf Otto Eichmann, November 1, 1960, PART II, pp. 12-13. Recorded by: CIA) (IMG)

In mid-1944, Eichmann began:

following the second basic order of Reichsfuhrer Himmler: to arrange if possible for a million Jews to go free in exchange for 10,000 winterized trucks, with trailers, which we needed to use against the Russians on the Eastern Front. (MEMOIRS PART I, CIA, November 1, 1960, PART I, p. 31) (IMG)

Himmler's gang needed America and Israel to supply the SS with trucks in order to motorize their divisions:

I do remember Himmler's specifically saying to me, "Eichmann, motorize the 8th and 22nd SS Cavalry Divisions."

This indicated the personal concern of Himmler, as head of the "replacement army," in receiving those trucks. They were far more important than the lives of individual Jews. What did he care about a million Jews? His concern was his division. He apparently did not want to motorize these two divisions but rather to equip them as a sort of fast-moving task force.

(MEMOIRS PART I, Adolf Otto Eichmann, November 1, 1960, PART II, pp. 7-8. Recorded by: CIA) (IMG)

Dieter Wisliceny, the top-ranking Nazi SS official and friend of Eichmann, remarked:

While detailed preparations were being made and actions taken to prepare all Hungarian Jews for evacuation, Dr. Rudolph Kastner of the Joint Distribution Committee gave me 3,000,000 pengoe [i.e. Hungarian currency] for Eichmann to induce him to grant a first interview on the Jewish question. This money was carefully counted and taken over by Geschke's treasurer. About 8 or 10 April, a meeting was arranged at the Hotel Majestic in Eichmann's office between Dr. Kastner, Mr. Brand another representative of the Committee, and Eichmann. There followed a series of conversations in which Eichmann was implored to leave Hungarian Jews alone

upon an offer to pay any amount to stop further action. Eichmann reported the situation to Himmler who sent Standartenfuehrer Becher to continue negotiations in Budapest. (NAZI CONSPIRACY AND AGGRESSION, Vol. 8, United States Office of Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality, 1946, p. 614) (IMG)

The Nazis would use the vehicles exclusively for fighting the Soviet Red Army, and not the Anglo-Americans:

Only Heinrich Himmler could turn off the liquidation machine. It was after the July 20th assassination attempt on Hilter, when Reichsfuehrer Himmler had taken over as commander of the Replacement Army and Minister of the Interior, that he authorized me to propose an exchange: one million Jews for 10,000 trucks and trailers, equipped for winter. The world Jewish organization could choose for itself what Jews it wanted to save. We asked only that they get us 10,000 trucks. Thanks to Himmler's directive, I could assure them, on my word of honor, that these trucks would be used only on the Eastern front. As I said at the time, "When the 10,000 trucks with trailers are here, then the liquidation machine in Auschwitz will be stopped." (MEMOIRS PART I, Adolf Otto Eichmann, November 1, 1960, PART II, pp. 1-2. Recorded by: CIA) (IMG)

Indeed, American-Israeli intelligence began the shipment of tractors to the SS. Kastner was not one of the rogue elements in the American-Israeli intelligence. Kastner's ideas were backed by his superiors in the American-Israeli intelligence service in Europe. All of these facts are confirmed by the memoirs and work of Dr. Isaac Lewin – the member and Israeli representative of the Zionist 'Agudath Israel' movement in the United Nations and member of the UN Human Rights Commission – who was involved in the American-Israeli funding of the SS with vehicles during the War. As an official in the Agudas Israel, Isaac Lewin describes the operations by:

Jacob Rosenheim, president of the "Agudas Israel" World Organization. (ATTEMPTS AT RESCUING EUROPEAN JEWS WITH THE HELP OF POLISH DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS DURING WORLD WAR II, PART II, University of Illinois Press, The Polish Review, Vol. 24, No. 1, Isaac Lewin, 1979, p. 46) (IMG)

HIJEFS, Lewin said, was:

a committee established in Montreux, Switzerland, in 1941 for the purpose of helping students of rabbinical academies in Poland and Lithuania who had escaped to Shanghai. The name is an abbreviation of "Hilfsverein fur jtidische Fltichtlinge in Shanghai." Its founders were Isaac and Recha Sternbuch. The committee extended its activities and became the counterpart of the "Vaad Hatzala" in New York. (ATTEMPTS AT RESCUING EUROPEAN JEWS WITH THE HELP OF POLISH DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS DURING WORLD WAR II, PART II, University of Illinois Press, The Polish Review, Vol. 24, No. 1, Isaac Lewin, 1979, p. 56. Citing his own book: Nuch'n Churban, Isaac Lewin, 1950, pp. 87-94.) (IMG)

Thus, 'Isaac Sternbuch', said a report by the executive director of the War Refugee Board, was the:

Swiss representative of the American Vaad Hahatzala Emergency Committee.... ('Final Summary Report of the Executive Director, War Refugee Board', United States War Refugee Board, William O'Dwyer, September 15, 1945, p. 43) (IMG)

Vaad Hahatzala and HIJEFS were therefore practically different wings of the same organization. The latter was located in Europe, whereas the former was in New York.

Lewin noted that a:

convoy [containing the Yiddish] which was to be sent to a neutral country as a sign of the [Nazi] murderers' "good will," after a lengthy journey from Klausenburg via Budapest and Bergen Belsen, eventually (on August 21, 1944) reached ... the Swiss border. Thus 318 persons were saved....

According to information from Sternbuch neither he nor his "Hijefs" organization had initiated this convoy. But the final act should be credited to them. To this very day it has been a mystery why Eichmann and his gang eventually released this convoy. Can it be assumed that this was gratuitous? In Eichmann's first meeting with Brand he distinctly told him: "Ware fur Blut? Blut fur Ware" (Merchandise for blood? blood for merchandise). For the [life] of 318 Jews something had to be given. But what was given and who gave it?

(ATTEMPTS AT RESCUING EUROPEAN JEWS WITH THE HELP OF POLISH DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS DURING WORLD WAR II, PART II, University of Illinois Press, The Polish Review, Vol. 24, No. 1, Isaac Lewin, 1979, p. 56) (IMG)

Based on documents from Sternbuch, Lewin found that indeed vehicles were being sent to the Nazis as part of the effort to assist the motorization of the SS Cavalry, in exchange for the release of the 318 Ashkenazis:

Sternbuch has transmitted to us original documents according to which his committee had sent to Budapest a letter of credit for a certain number of tractors. On July 5, 1944 Intercommerz Aktirngesellschaft in Zurich, Talstrasse 15, notified Simon Ascher in Bex that an order for thirty tractors had come from Budapest with the advice that the letter of credit in free currency was to be delivered by Ascher who collaborated with Sternbuch. Immediately feverish negotiations were started. The price was 519,000 Swiss francs.

The orthodox representative in Budapest, Philip von Freudiger, cabled on July 7 to Sternbuch:

Communicate urgently with Intercommerz Zurich Talstrasse 15 concerning credits for 30 Willy [Wisliceny] tractors exportable 17,300 francs each according to offer of 15 June payable to Buchs Budapest on presenting documents.

Sternbuch of course immediately solicited the money and obtained consent to send the letter of credit in free currency. At that time the convoy was to be sent to Spain. Freudiger cabled Sternbuch on July 20:

Settle immediately in agreement with Rosenheim the ordered tractors for final settlement of the Spanish compensation depends on it. Failure of tractor delivery endanger entire solution. Don't delay to cable start of delivery.

Sternbuch replied on July 23:

Rosenheim's announcement temporarily dispatching 400 kilograms wool (Zell wolle) received. Opening on Monday letter of credit for ten tractors.

The expression "400 kg. Zellwolle" was an agreed-upon sign. It meant that Rosenheim (i.e. America) placed at "Hijefs" disposal 400,000 Swiss francs. The letter of credit in the Zurich firm was effected, although only for the initial ten tractors.

In the light of these telegrams it becomes clear why the group of 318 persons was eventually sent from Bergen-Belsen (not to Spain but to Switzerland). Apparently Freudiger was able to prove that such a letter of credit was in Zurich; therefore Eichmann's devilish principle "Ware fur Blut ? Blut fur Ware" had been satisfied.

(ATTEMPTS AT RESCUING EUROPEAN JEWS WITH THE HELP OF POLISH DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS DURING WORLD WAR II, PART II, University of Illinois Press, The Polish Review, Vol. 24, No. 1, Isaac Lewin, 1979, pp. 56-57) (IMG)

Thus:

On August 26, Sternbuch cabled to Bratislava (because communication with Budapest had been temporarily interrupted):
First dispatch of 320 arrived....

(...). On August 25 Sternbuch cabled us via the Polish Legation in Bern:

320 persons arrived by train to Basel. Among them many personalities and Rabbis. Other transports are said to be on the way, with them probably also Satmarer will come.

On September 26 Sternbuch cabled us via the Polish Legation about an action connected with the second group of this convoy:

Recently we deposited 260,000 Swiss fr. in the Swiss Bank for the Gestapo trustees in Budapest. It's a great pity we were not allowed to do it two months ago for we deposited on our own 170,000, saving in this way 320 persons. The merchandise and the money remained in Switzerland and probably will not be sent.

These cables explain the puzzle connected with the rescue of the first convoy from Bergen-Belsen. The letter of credit in the amount of 170,000 Sw. fr. for the shipment of ten tractors deposited by "Hijefs" at the end of July 1944 saved the first part of the convoy. Sternbuch, thanks to his contact with us via the Polish Legation in Bern and the Embassy in Washington, continued to work. The second much larger part of the convoy was also saved when the sum of 5 million Sw. fr. was deposited by "Joint" or McLelland from the American Legation in Bern as a down payment towards the 20 million Sw. fr. agreed upon. The second train from Bergen-Belsen arrived in Switzerland on December 8, 1944. Among those rescued was Rabbi Joel Teitelbaum of Satmar, one of the greatest "Tzadiks" of the present time, who now lives in Williamsburg, Brooklyn, N.Y.

(ATTEMPTS AT RESCUING EUROPEAN JEWS WITH THE HELP OF POLISH DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS DURING WORLD WAR II, PART II, University of Illinois Press, The Polish Review, Vol. 24, No. 1, Isaac Lewin, 1979, pp. 57-58) (IMG)

After the arrival of those trains, a new series of negotiations began a few days later. In these negotiations, documented by USA's War Refugee Board, the US Treasury Department issued a license to Joint allowing the latter to loan \$1,000,000 to Sternbuch's network which in turn would transfer that money covertly to the SS in early March 1945:

A second series of meetings between high Nazi circles and a Swiss citizen for the release of Jewish deportees came to the attention of the Board in December 1944. The negotiations were conducted in Germany by Jean-Marie Musy, a former Swiss Federal Counselor acting as a private citizen, with Himmler and other high S.S. officers. Whatever his motives, Musy, who claimed to be an old personal friend of Himmler, succeeded in obtaining the release to Switzerland of 1200 Jews from the Theresienstadt concentration camp in early February 1945. Shortly before the arrival of these refugees in Switzerland, Musy had approached Isaac Sternbuch, Swiss representative of the American Vaad Hahatzala Emergency Committee, whom Musy had kept advised of his dealings with the Nazis, for a payment of one million dollars. Sternbuch cabled his organization in the United States urging that this sum be transferred to Switzerland at once stating that the German release of additional convoys of Jews depended upon the receipt of this sum by Musy. The Vaad Hahatzala Emergency Committee, after having arranged to borrow the million dollars from the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, immediately requested the Board to recommend that the United States Treasury issue the necessary license permitting the transfer as specified by Sternbuch. A special meeting of the members of the Board was called to consider the matter. The Board unanimously decided that under no circumstances would it authorize the payment of ransom which might result from payment of the sum to Musy. However, since the mere presence of the money in Switzerland might serve to continue the negotiations, the Board agreed to recommend that the Treasury issue a license permitting the Vaad Hahatzala to transfer the sum to a joint account in the names of Sternbuch and the Board's representative in Bern, Roswell D. McClelland, and providing that no payments be permitted from the account except as authorized by the Board. The Treasury issued such a license and the transfer was made in early March 1945. The fund was kept, intact for the remainder of the war except for a small payment authorized for relief supplies and the maintenance of refugees. The unexpected balance of this fund was returned after hostilities ceased to the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee. ('Final Summary Report of the Executive Director, War Refugee Board', United States War Refugee Board, William O'Dwyer, September 15, 1945, pp. 42-44) (IMG)

Again, these funds to the SS were used exclusively for fighting the Soviets on the Eastern Front. In 1945, just as the Anglo-American forces and the Red Army were marching towards Germany's heartland, Himmler ordered Eichmann's gang not to shoot at the Anglo-Americans:

In the middle of our move an orderly arrived from Kaltenbrunner with a directive from Reichsführer Himmler ordering us not to shoot at Americans or Englishmen. I countersigned it and ... I conveyed this order to the men. (MEMOIRS PART I, Adolf Otto Eichmann, November 1, 1960, PART II, pp. 24-25. Recorded by: CIA) (IMG)

The rescue of the refugees could happen through using funds for financing a network of agents that both sabotage the Nazi war effort and provide illegal channels for allowing the escape of the refugees; funding the Nazi SS as a whole, not some rogue officials of the SS, and assisting it in the anti-Soviet war effort was no positive contribution to the liberation of the Yiddish inmates. Had the US intelligence and the Jewish bourgeois-nationalist agents been serious about rescuing the Yiddish inmates, the US intelligence would not have funded the Nazis and directly assisted the anti-Soviet war effort. As in the case of the funding of the SS via Slovakia, there is very little evidence to suggest that funds provided to the Nazis were agreed upon to be in exchange for the release of more than a thousand Ashkenazi or Sfaradi inmates. Rather, they constituted the use of the Nazis' so-called 'good will' gestures – such as the alleged release of 1,200 refugees – as an excuse to fund the Nazis. And for the record, the Soviets opposed the transfer of such funds to Nazi Germany. Another US diplomatic document, while providing details on the funds to Nazi Germany, admitted that such funds were provided without the authorization of their wartime 'ally' the Soviet Union:

On February 7, 1945, 1,200 refugees arrived in Switzerland from Germany. Their release was arranged by Musy, a former Federal Councilor of Switzerland, who had made a number of trips to Germany at the instigation of Sternbuch, the representative in Switzerland of the Vaad Hahatzala Emergency Committee of the Union of Orthodox Rabbis of the United States and Canada. Musy returned to Switzerland in advance of the refugees announcing that he had secured their release by direct negotiation with Himmler, whom he had seen on his previous trips to Germany. He stated that additional groups of refugees would arrive weekly in Switzerland dependent upon German transportation facilities. He advised Sternbuch that he would require a deposit of 5,000,000 Swiss francs in his (Musy's) name in the Swiss National Bank immediately after the arrival of the 1,200. This money he suggested might later be paid over by the Germans to the International Committee of the Red Cross as a further gesture of good faith.

The Rabbis are now pressing the War Refugee Board and the Treasury Department for a license to transmit 4,000,000 Swiss francs to Switzerland to be paid to Musy. They have on deposit in Switzerland 1,000,000 Swiss francs under a previous license. The Department

has been asked by Brigadier General O'Dwyer, Executive Director of the War Refugee Board, if it will approve the transaction. He has advised the Rabbis that he will issue the license if the Department agrees.

There are two other negotiations of this character in process. One, originating in a ransom proposal last June, has been shifted by Saly Mayer, the Swiss negotiator and a responsible person, to a proposal that in return for a German promise to cease exterminations, relief supplies might be furnished to feed surviving Jews in concentration camps. Mayer has conducted these negotiations with the Germans since August 1944. Early in January 1945 he requested the deposit of 20,000,000 Swiss francs in Switzerland in order to maintain his position in the negotiations. The Board and the Department authorized the transmission of these funds to a joint account in the names of Saly Mayer and McClelland, the representative of the War Refugee Board at Bern, with the stipulation that no commitment or payment be made without express authority from this Government. The transfer of these funds was reported to the British and Soviet Governments. An earlier report on these negotiations brought a reply from the Soviet Government that they were neither feasible nor permissible.

(840.48 Refugees/2-1545, Memorandum by the Adviser on Refugees and Displaced Persons (Warren) to the Acting Secretary of State, Washington, February 15, 1945. In: Foreign Relations of The United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, General: Political and Economic Matters, Vol. 2, pp. 1131-1132.) (IMG)

Describing Himmler in the final days of the Third Reich, Eichmann remarked:

I made my last report to Himmler less than a month before the final surrender of Germany. The Reichsfuhrer had been for some time negotiating with Count Bernadotte about the Jews. He wanted to make sure that at least 100 of the most prominent Jews we could lay our hands on would be held in a safe place. Thus he hoped to strengthen our hand, for almost to the end Himmler was optimistic about making separate peace terms. "We'll get a better treaty than the ones at Hubertusburg," he said to me, slapping his thighs. We'll lose a few feathers, but it will be a better one." It was then mid-April 1945. (MEMOIRS PART I, Adolf Otto Eichmann, November 1, 1960, PART II, pp. 14-15. Recorded by: CIA) (IMG)

Years later, when the Kastner Case came about, Kastner was believed to be about to give confessions regarding the Mossad's sponsorship of the Nazi Germans in Hungary. Just when he was believed to be about to give confessions regarding the Mossad's role in killing the Jews, he was assassinated:

The trial became a cause celebre among the parties in opposition to Ben Gurion. Kastner was faring very badly against the attacks of the defense lawyers and is reported to have been on the verge of divulging sensational revelations when he was cruelly murdered in front of his apartment in Tel Aviv. The opposition accused the government of murdering him to prevent a revelation of the true facts; the government in turn accused the terrorist groups of having slaughtered Kastner for political reasons. (Reference to Kastner Before and During Eichmann Trial, Memorandum, CIA, January 25, 1961, p. 1)

The criminals who murdered Kastner belonged to an infamous terrorist organization known as the 'Kingdom of Israel' (Hebrew: Malchut Yisrael):

In 1957, Kasztner was murdered by a far-right group, Malchut Yisrael.... (Holocaust hero or villain who collaborated with Nazis?, The Jerusalem Post, Colin Shindler, November 19, 2016) (IMG)

Note that the trials were happening in the mid-1950s. A few years prior, in February 1953, the 'Kingdom of Israel' terror group had launched a terrorist attack against the Soviet Embassy in Tel Aviv. Although the Israeli regime paid lip service against the terrorist attack and the 'Kingdom of Israel' terrorists were sentenced to up to 12 years, their sentences were commuted by the Ben-Gurion gang and they were quickly released (see C16S6). As such, they had the support of the Ben-Gurion group. Furthermore, with the knowledge of Shin Bet, Israel's counter-intelligence and internal security service, Kastner was targeted for assassination and the person who murdered Kastner was a Shin Bet operative:

Declassified: Shin Bet knew Israel Kastner was targeted

[Just-released 1956 cabinet minutes on his assassination]...could strengthen the conjecture of some that the Shin Bet security service was involved in the murder of Kastner

The minutes raise difficult questions...[GSS head Isser] Harel told the cabinet that the intelligence services knew of the plan to kill Kastner and had arrested eight people who were "among potential terrorists." One of them, who was convicted of the murder and imprisoned, was Eckstein. Harel told the cabinet that Eckstein had taken part in a 1955 plan to assassinate Kastner that did not go forward.... Kastner was given a bodyguard by the Shin Bet, who "for some reason was pulled off a few days before the murder," Katzir said, adding that this fact encouraged those who believed in a conspiracy theory involving the Shin Bet.

And a related, even more explosive question is whether the organization itself was involved with various conspiracy theories promulgated over the years. To understand them, it must be recalled that Eckstein, the assassin, worked as an informant for the Shin Bet before the murder.

Harel told the cabinet, according to the minutes, that ties with Eckstein were cut off before the murder...[According to Eckstein]...in his recent book "Smichat Tla'im" ("Quilt Blanket") (Carmel Publishing House, 2014). "Little by little, without feeling how the change was taking place in my thoughts, in my opinions – and finally in my desires as well – the understanding grew stronger in me that when I spy and inform for 'ours' against 'them,' I am lying in my soul," Eckstein wrote. He described how he became entranced with the underground against whom he was sent to spy. "They knew they were surrounded by agents and provocateurs, and I understood that if I wanted to be part of them, I had to bring them a suitable 'dowry' and thus – woe is me – I became the servant of two masters."

...Harel told the ministers that the reason Eckstein was not tried was a lack of evidence, and because the justice minister feared people would say he was a provocateur.

...Eckstein, in his book, alludes to another person's involvement in the murder. "Another shot thundered at the very instant of my third shot, followed by agonizing cries. Apparently someone was there, in any event, carried out confirmation of the kill and, as a true professional, did not miss even in the dark."

Kastner's daughter told a similar story...of another person who was involved in the shooting. That person was never arrested.

"My father got out of the car. Eckstein tried to shoot him and it didn't work. My father fled, ran into the building, but somebody prevented him from going in. He ran out again, and took a bullet in the back," Suzi Kastner says, recalling her father's words...Suzi Kastner says she believes the mysterious other man, who confirmed the kill, was a Shin Bet agent, and that a senior Shin Bet official was behind the murder, to take revenge on Kastner for not saving his family in the Holocaust.

...Did [Police Minister Shalom] Sheerit doubt that Eckstein and his accomplices, Dan Shemer and Yosef Menkes, were the actual murderers, and raise the possibility that the Shin Bet had assassinated Kastner?

(‘BTW, where is Avishai Raviv?’, The Jerusalem Post, Yisrael Medad, January 9, 2015. Presenting excerpts of a Haaretz article. The square brackets are original to the Jerusalem Post article.) (IMG)

Through this process, Kastner was duly eliminated and was not able to give confessions regarding the tinier details of the Mossad support for Hitler gang. At the time of his death, Kastner was a government official in the Ben-Gurion cabinet.

The Nazi SS also founded a fake ‘humanitarian’ group ostensibly to ‘save the Jews’ when in fact it was for the purpose of allowing the JDC, the Jewish bourgeois-nationalist arm of the US intelligence, to fund the Nazis in the war effort against the Soviets. The fake ‘humanitarian’ group ostensibly meant to ‘save the Jews’, was headed by a JDC operative and prominent Gestapo-collaborationist Michael Weichert. The operations of this fake humanitarian group were until 1941, when the JDC agents of US intelligence were still allied to the Nazis, and was renewed in 1943, shortly after the Battle of Stalingrad when the American intelligence renewed its alliance with the Nazis. In a letter describing the JUS, Weichert confirmed that its establishment was due to authorization by ‘the Superior SS’ and the ‘Police Chiefs in the General Government’:

The Jewish Relief Agency for the General Government “JUS” renewed, at the end of April, its activities by the authorization of the Superior SS and Police Chiefs in the General Government under the supervision of the General Government’s Administration, main department of Internal Administration, section of Population and Welfare. The authorities assigned to it the building at No 2a Jozefinska where offices, drug distribution service and stores have been.

The main purpose of “JUS” consists in distributing to Jewish labour camps, to districts inhabited by Jews and factories where Jews are employed, drugs, food as well as clothes and linen received as gift packages from abroad or obtained through exchange or by supplementary purchase.

(‘BRIEF REPORT OF THE ACTIVITY OF THE “JUS”: From May 12 to July 31, 1943’, Jewish Relief Agency for the General Government (JUS), Letter by: Dr. Michael Weichert, Krakow, August 1, 1943, p. 1) (IMG)

Lucy S. Dawidowicz, a WWII-era JDC operative, confirmed that Weichert was a JDC agent and had been funded by the JDC well until 1941: All through German-occupied Poland ZSS branches came into being, many already operating spontaneously as skeletons of the prewar service agencies. Within a year, the ZSS had 118 branches, in large cities. By the beginning of 1942, it had 412 branches. ZSS personnel was recruited from the recognized social-service agencies and other communal institutions. **Its founder and head was Michal Weichert (1890-1967), a man of many talents, trained in law, the theater, and literature. A teacher in a Jewish gymnasium in Warsaw, he served as legal adviser to the JDC and ORT, and enjoyed a career as journalist, actor, and director before the war. In mid-1942 the Germans dissolved the ZSS, but later reconstituted it as the Jüdische Unterstützungsstelle (JUS; Jewish Relief Office).** Technically still under the Interior Department's jurisdiction, **JUS in fact fell under SS control.** The Jewish underground thereafter regarded JUS in the same light as the Judenräte. (After the war, Weichert was tried in Poland on charges of collaboration, but was exonerated. He spent the last years of his life in Israel.)

ZSS's basic strategy was to rescue what could be rescued. (...). **ZSS funding came largely from the JDC**, which spent about \$1 million a year in Poland until America's entry into the war, on December 7, 1941, halted the legal transfer of funds. Some moneys were obtained by voluntary donations, fund-raising drives, theater and concert benefits. (...). ZSS funding came also from the Judenräte, some of which subcontracted part or most of their welfare programs to the ZSS.

(‘The War Against the Jews, 1933-1945’, Lucy S. Dawidowicz, p. 244) (IMG)

Concerning the case of the collaborationism of Weichert with the Nazi Germans, Yitzhak Zuckerman, the commander who betrayed the Jewish Fighting Organization and served as an apologist and supporter of Weichert, wrote:

Now the episode of Michael Weichert. He was one of the greatest theatrical talents of Polish Jewry. Professionally he was a lawyer. As I recall, he **cooperated with the Germans during World War I**; but that was a totally different and positive cooperation. In any case, he had close contacts with them. He was a devoté of German culture, the representative of the Jewish Social Self-Help (YISA), and later the Yidisher hilfs komitet (YHK, whose initials were also YSS, but the Germans ordered the name changed because of the "SS"). That was an umbrella organization of welfare operations. I never heard anything good about Weichert, but that's not to censure him. I heard that he wasn't an easy or a friendly person; but that doesn't say anything against Weichert either.

The Weichert incident began after we picked up on the intensive social activity he was carrying out in 1943, after the Uprising. **We realized that just when the Germans were taking the Jews of Warsaw, the Jews of Poland, even the Jews of Krakow, to death, Weichert, following orders from the Germans, formed JUS (Jüdische Unterstützungsstelle) to replace the YHK. At the same time that the Germans were executing Jews, they assigned him to summon the Jewish world abroad to send material aid: medicine, food, and so forth.** And the simple question arose of what was the purpose of these letters of appeal sent by a well-known figure of the prewar era, and during the war as well, a man who led welfare operations and represented the Jews vis-à-vis the German institutions?

His letters abroad, sent in those very months of bloodshed and mass murder, created the impression abroad that this money was needed for the hungry. True, Jews were dying of starvation, in 1941-1942 and in 1943; but in 1944, that was no longer the problem. The difference between him and Ringelblum, and even between him and Kirshenbaum, was that those Jews did everything to alarm the world to the fact that **the Germans were killing us – simple murder! Whereas Weichert requested material aid in his letters; and, if material aid was requested, it was requested for live Jews! So we suspected this activity as a first class deceit. This assessment didn't come only from Jewish sources, we heard it from Polish sources too, for example, the Polish Committee for Welfare in Warsaw (RGO), a few of whose members cooperated with us in ZEGOTA; one of these was Marek Arczyfiski, the democrats' representative. (He was in Israel a few years ago and we entertained him.) Everyone felt that Weichert was a traitor, that he was doing the work of the Germans.**

Weichert was the only Jew who didn't wear the Magen-David armband. He lived in his own house on the Aryan side, when there were no more Jews in Krakow. The remnants of Krakow Jewry were gathered in the Plaszow concentration camp, whereas he lived in Krakow under German protection and ran their errands. He received several shipments of food from abroad. When we learned that, we did two things: we wrote to London condemning the letters published in his name – in order to expose Weichert and proclaim that he was not the representative of the Jews; the second thing was to send Marek Arczyfiski to Weichert to persuade him to give up that disgraceful work and to suggest he go underground. We were willing to accept responsibility for his safety under the circumstances. At that time it didn't occur to us to issue a death sentence against him. We thought we would hide him in Krakow or

someplace else and support him, although I'm sure he didn't need our money. We said we would provide an Aryan document for him; but he rejected our proposals. (We had a branch of self-help in Krakow led by Marianska, who is now head of Yad Vashem in Tel Aviv.) When changes occurred in the status of the Plaszow concentration camp, Weichert announced he was willing to accept our offer; but when he realized that **his position with the Germans was as firm as it had been**, he again avoided accepting our judgment. He had two "forced" assistants, Dr. Eliahu Tish and Dr. Haim Hilfstein, in the Plaszow camp. **Weichert, as I said, was the only person in Krakow who operated freely.** Those two were well-known public figures, honest men, members of Et Livnot (the right-wing faction of the General Zionists). But we couldn't say anything to Tish and Hilfstein since they were both prisoners in the camp. Not Weichert. Ultimately, he disappeared.

There were meetings and discussions that resulted in a death sentence against him. He survived only because of our weakness.

(A Surplus of Memory: Chronicle of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, Yitzhak Zuckerman, 1993, pp. 450-452. Bold added.) (IMG)

After the war, in Poland, the trial of Weichert began. Zuckerman then goes on to explain in his memoirs that since the start, he opposed the trial of Weichert because the trial against that Nazi-collaborationist would have involved the execution of a Jew, whereas the Gestapo agent Weichert tried to promote Zuckerman as a hero. During the days of Weichert's trial in Poland, Zuckerman was living in a luxurious apartment provided to him by the infamous Gestapo spy Spsychalski, who was a close friend of Zuckerman. The judge that was supposed to purge Weichert in Poland was murdered, and Weichert was released and went to Israel. In Israel too, Weichert was judged as 'innocent'. These facts about Weichert are all mentioned in the Zuckerman memoirs. In the memoirs, Zuckerman also provides an excuse for not having killed off the Gestapo spy Weichert; if the story which Zuckerman provided was true, then perhaps the rebels under Zuckerman's influence were unable to kill Weichert, but there are reasons to, in the first place, doubt the story about the difficult conditions which Zuckerman's team faced in killing off that Nazi agent. Zuckerman was a traitor to the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising of 1942-1943, and had been a rival of the Hashomer Hatzair martyr, General Mordechai Anielewicz. Once the Nazis exterminated Anielewicz, Zuckerman was catapulted into leadership but managed to never be hit by the Nazis. More details on the Hashomer Hatzair and Mordechai Anielewicz will be provided later.

Jaroslav Andrzej Piekalkiewicz, a commander affiliated with the London Poles and the Home Army (AK), wrote that Michael Weichert was an agent of the Nazis and that since 1943, by the time of which the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising was continuing, the JDC continued to fund the JUS even in spite of the warnings issued to the JDC by Warsaw's Yiddish rebels. The JDC leaders knew very well that only a small part of the medical and food aid sent by the JDC to the JUS went for the Yiddish inmates, who were already being directly murdered rather than being starved to death, and that anywhere between 80% to 90% of the aid was actually going to the SS:

Another very harmful operation was run by Dr. Michal Weichert, a Jew, in cooperation with the Germans. The Germans permitted a Jewish welfare organization to function in the GG, the Jüdische Unterstützungsstelle (JUS), headed by Weichert, to appeal for help from international Jewry. Weichert first operated from Warsaw, but then transferred his office to Kraków, where he lived in his own house outside the Kraków Ghetto, moved freely around the city, and was not required to wear the Star of David armband. He wrote letters to international Jewish Organizations claiming that Jews were not being exterminated, but only interned in work camps. His efforts led to shipments of food and medicines being sent from Switzerland through the International Red Cross for distribution to Jews in need. It is calculated that only about 10 percent of all these shipments reached their Jewish recipients in the camps – the rest was robbed by Germans, with the full knowledge and collaboration of Weichert. The letters and shipments continued even after most of the Jews, including those in the labor camps, had been exterminated. International Jewish organizations chose to believe Weichert, who had been highly respected before the war, rather than the information provided on the Holocaust by the Underground State, the ZKN (Jewish National Committee), and the Bund through the Polish Government-in-Exile. (Dance with Death: A Holistic View of Saving Polish Jews during the Holocaust, author: Jaroslav Andrzej Piekalkiewicz, edited by Joanna Drzewieniecki, 2020, p. 261) (IMG)

Tragically, the constant stream of information about the murder of Jews provided by the Polish Underground State to the Polish Government-in-Exile, which it then passed it on to the Allied governments and to the Western media was not believed. It was often viewed as exaggerated propaganda stemming from Poles' deep hatred of the Germans. Even the desperate appeals from Polish Jewish underground organizations, which confirmed this information, was ignored not only by the Western governments, but also by many Jews in Western countries (see below). To those who wanted to help, the only open avenue appeared to be through the International Red Cross (IRC) and its affiliate the German Red Cross. The latter was completely controlled by the Nazis and thus making it the guardian of aid to Jews was the same as putting a fox in charge of protecting a chicken coop. JOINT's branch in Lisbon, Portugal, a neutral country, sent food and medicine parcels through the IRC, addressed either to the JUS in Kraków (see chapter 8), or other addresses in Poland. Between February and April 1943, 12,559 parcels were sent. Of this number only 925, or 7.36 percent were received by the addressees. The rest was obviously stolen by Germans. (Dance with Death: A Holistic View of Saving Polish Jews during the Holocaust, author: Jaroslav Andrzej Piekalkiewicz, edited by Joanna Drzewieniecki, 2020, pp. 247) (IMG)

For another case, Piekalkiewicz, citing the Yad Vashem prominent Holocaust researcher Yehuda Bauer, wrote:

Even more disastrous was the shipment of 7,226 parcels late in 1943 when only 42, or a bare 0.58 percent, were delivered to their destinations (Bauer 1981, 331). The other German scam (discussed in chapter 8) was the permission for JOINT and the World Jewish Congress, with the assistance of the German Red Cross, to send whole train cars with food and medicine from Switzerland to the Michal Weichert's JUS operation in Kraków. Despite constant warnings from the Jewish Underground in Poland that Weichert was a German agent and that most of the shipments went to the SS, Jewish leaders in the West felt that even if a small amount reached the camps, it was worth the effort.

Eventually, JOINT did discover its error....

(Dance with Death: A Holistic View of Saving Polish Jews during the Holocaust, author: Jaroslav Andrzej Piekalkiewicz, edited by Joanna Drzewieniecki, 2020, pp. 247-248) (IMG)

Yehuda Bauer, it is worth mentioning, had been affiliated with a pro-communist organization called 'Mapam', which acted as the Israel branch of the Soviet intelligence service. Bauer, as a leading figure in the Yad Vashem and IHRA, has done plenty of research. However, in keeping with the purpose of this book, which is to use confessions by anti-Soviet sources for pro-Soviet truth, Bauer cannot be cited. Nowadays, Bauer does denounce communism and the Soviets, but even his anti-Soviet rhetoric is a very soft 'anti-Sovietism', and contains many pro-Soviet 'confessions', naturally coming from a Mapam-affiliated historian. In any case, if the reader is further interested in JDC-Nazi collaboration, the reader can refer to his works. Piekalkiewicz, a commander affiliated with the anti-Soviet London Poles, acknowledged the correctness of Bauer's claims.

The rhetoric of even the JDC operative Dawidowicz reflects the excuse, promoted by the JDC leaders, that however tiny the amount of aid going to the Yiddish inmates, it was still worth it:

Since the ZSS was accredited to the German civil administration, it had access to supplementary supplies of food, clothing, and medicine that were not available to the Judenräte. Quantities were small, to be sure, but in the economy of scarcity prevailing in the ghettos, even small amounts extracted from the Germans were beyond price. The very fact that the ZSS received supplies from the Germans heightened the contrast in the Jewish public mind between the judenrat and the ZSS. ('The War Against the Jews, 1933-1945', Lucy S. Dawidowicz, p. 244) (IMG)

The JDC leaders refused to mention the fact that when the rest of the aid, the 80% to 90% would go for the Nazi Wehrmacht and the SS, that would actually help the Nazis fight the Soviet Red Army more easily, thus preventing millions of Yiddish inmates from quicker liberation. That was the point after all; the JDC operatives serving the American intelligence, had no reason not to support the Nazis, and what a more useful propaganda cover – from the lens of the JDC – to misuse the call for the liberation of the Yiddish captives for such an agenda.

Lastly, a few things deserved to be mentioned concerning the 'Nazi-Zionist' connection. It is not the case that Nazi-collaborationism came primarily from the Zionist networks alone, nor is it the case that all 'Zionist' activists were affiliated with Nazi-collaborationist organizations. There were 'Zionist Jews' who genuinely opposed the Nazis, 'anti-Zionist Jews' who genuinely opposed the Nazis, and there were 'Zionist Jews' who collaborated with the Nazis and 'anti-Zionist Jews' who collaborated with the Nazis. While it is true that the mainstream of the Zionist movement, the tools of Anglo-American imperialism, were responsible for funding the Nazi SS, so is it also true that the rogue tendency in the Zionist movement, the 'Socialist Zionist' tendency, bravely fought against the Nazi SS. The case in point is the involvement of the 'Stalinist' 'Socialist Zionists' of the Hashomer Hatzair which were greatly involved in the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising against the Nazi occupation. The Hashomer Hatzair combined 'Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism' with Kibbutzism and Zionism, were opposed to the partition of the territory of historic Palestine and the chauvinist terror against the Arabs, instead favouring a bi-ethnic state of the Israelis and Palestinian Arabs, a state socialist-leaning, kibbutzist, and allied to the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies against the Anglo-American imperialists. The Hashomer Hatzair was an entirely different kind of a 'Zionist' movement than most of the rest of the Zionist current. The second thing about the 'Nazi-Zionist' connection is that Nazi-collaborationists were not solely concentrated in the Zionist movement, but could be found among the 'anti-Zionist Jews' as well. The reactionary Menshevik 'Bundists' refused to engage in armed struggle against the Nazis (see C13S4) and instead advocated pacifistic reformist politics in the Nazi regime to stop the Nazi persecution of the Ashkenazim during the Holocaust. Many of the Ultra-Orthodox 'anti-Zionist' Jewish rabbis, Rabbi Weissmandel chief among them (as indicated previously), were very active in funding the Nazi SS and claimed that the Holocaust was the due divine punishment for the irreligiosity of most of the Ashkenazim and Sfaradim. Traitorous was the bulk of the leadership of the Ashkenazim and Sfaradim who lived outside of the USSR; years of Nazi terror against the Yiddish revolutionaries, added to the constant lobbying campaigns and pressures imposed by the Anglo-American intelligence agencies, had resulted in the rise of such traitors to the high ranks of the 'Jewish leadership', just like the traitors in the high ranks of the leadership of most of the rest of the other peoples living outside the USSR. All of those Bundist or Ultra-Orthodox leaders who served as agents of the American intelligence service, were fighting on the same side as the Zionist settler-colonizers in Palestine, even if they 'condemned' Zionism. The pro-Soviet or pro-communist elements in the Bundist, Zionist, etc. organizations were naturally inclined towards cooperation with the communist forces and a sincere struggle against Nazism. Simply put, the question of Nazi-collaborationism vs. anti-Nazism was actually a question not of Bundism vs. Zionism, but of loyal service to American imperialism vs. being friends of the USSR. The question of Jewish supremacism bore the same kind of a character. The Zionist agents of American imperialism wanted to carry out a genocide against the Arabs, whereas the Bundist agents of the Anglo-Americans would have established separate 'Jewish states' in the territories of the USSR and would have carried out a genocide against the citizens of the USSR if given the chance. The 'Socialist Zionist' agents of the USSR, very different than the Zionist mainstream, opposed the genocide against the Arabs of Palestine.

C16S2. The Soviet-Led Bloc and Zionist Migration *** IMG-All-{Israel}

The USSR, prior to and during the Great Patriotic War, became the place of refuge for the Yiddish people fleeing Axis persecution. Already, in the USSR:

the number of synagogues in 1941 was 1,011.... (CA Propaganda Perspectives May 1972, The protestants, CIA, May 1972, p. 5.) (IMG)

The due assistance by the USSR in saving the Ashkenazim and Sfaradim from extermination has been acknowledged by none other than the American-Israeli intelligence agent and head of the American-Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, James Rosenberg:

RUSSIA HELPED 1,750,000 JEWS TO ESCAPE NAZIS, SAYS JAMES N. ROSENBERG

"Russia has saved over ten times as many Jews from Nazi extermination as all the rest of the world put together," James N. Rosenberg, American Jewish leader, declared here today in an address of welcome which he delivered at a reception given at the Astor Hotel to Solomon Mikhoels and Itzik Feffer, the Jewish cultural delegation from Russia. The reception was attended by several hundred representatives of various Jewish organizations.

Emphasizing that he based his estimate of those saved on facts gathered by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Mr. Rosenberg quoted the organization's journal as reporting that "of some 1,750,000 Jews who succeeded in escaping the Axis since the outbreak of hostilities, about 1,600,000 were evacuated by the Soviet Government from Eastern Poland and subsequently occupied Soviet territory and transported far into the Russian interior and beyond the Urals. About 150,000 others managed to reach Palestine, the United States, and other countries beyond the seas."

"We Jews," Mr. Rosenberg said, "rightly give thanks for the innumerable resolutions of sympathy for Jews, adopted by well-meaning men and groups horrified by the hideous tragedy which has befallen our people. Russia has chosen deeds. She has given life, asylum, bread, and shelter to a vast Jewish population. These facts are not sufficiently known. To make them known to every Jew in this country is a task of supreme importance for the Jewish Council for Russian War Relief. Need I ask what would have happened to those Jews had Russia left them where they were?"

('Russia Helped 1,750,000 Jews to Escape Nazis, Says James N. Rosenberg'. In: JTA Daily News Bulletin, Vol. 10, No. 153, Jewish Telegraphic Agency (JTA), July 2, 1943, pp. 3-4.) (IMG)

Approximately two million people Yiddish people were saved by the USSR from Axis reaction.

In this setting, the Mossad agents of the American secret service were working to force the Yiddish people out of Europe into Palestine. The Zionist spy networks attempted to rob the Soviet Union of the Yiddish refugees residing in it in 1943 when the top Israeli military and intelligence official Munya Meir Mardor visited Iran. He recalled:

Naturally, meeting the Russians in Tehran gave us the opportunity to raise the question of Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union. But we ran up against a blank wall every time. We met Russian Jews among the Soviet Army units in Persia; but most of them had lost touch with Jewish traditions and few of them had retained any knowledge even of Yiddish. On the basis of these encounters it seemed to us that Russian Jews were well on the way towards complete assimilation, and that unless there came some radical change in Soviet policy, this process would continue until Russian Jewry had ceased utterly to exist as a distinctive community. The Soviet authorities in Tehran made it clear to us that the Soviet Government was opposed even to our taking homeless Polish Jewish children from the USSR. (Strictly Illegal, Munya Mardor, 1957, p. 105) (IMG)

The inability of American-Israeli intelligence to remove the Yiddish people of the Soviet Union and transfer them to Palestine was the consistent theme for the next decade as well. The USSR, in its agreement with the Polish government-in-exile – and not Israel's regime – permitted thousands of former Polish settler-colonizers who had for long occupied Western USSR ('Eastern Poland') to leave the USSR through the Middle East en route to Europe eventually. Some of these Polish settler-colonizers expelled from the USSR were Yiddish in origin. Nonetheless, the Yiddish among the Polish settler-colonizers expelled were not released particularly for the purpose of assisting Zionism or expelling the Yiddish from the USSR, but rather as a part of a general agreement between the Soviet Union and the Polish government-in-exile for sending the Polish settler-colonizers – be they Yiddish or not – out of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union up until mid-1953, the time of Joseph Stalin's death, strictly banned the migration of the Yiddish people to Israel. Citing various Israeli government sources, Bialer acknowledged:

Between 1948 and mid-1955, only 131 Jews left the U.S.S.R. for Israel, 9 of them before 1953.

(Between East and West: Israel's Foreign Policy Orientation 1948-1956, Cambridge University Press, Uri Bialer, 1990, New Publication: November 2009, p. 63. Citing: Material for a meeting of the Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee of the Knesset on 31.12.1950, ISA 2514/8; Debates of the American Section of the World Jewish Congress on 22.2.1950, ISA 2498/5; a despatch from the Eastern Europe Section of the Israeli Foreign Ministry to Michael Arnon on 10.8.1952, *ibid.*; Bentsur's despatch to Arnon on 13.10.1952, ISA 2498/5; and Bentsur's letter to the Foreign Minister on 12.7.1955, ISA 2502/8.) (IMG)

The Soviet Union did, however, permit the Yiddish people who had taken refuge in the Soviet Union during the War to return to their home countries. While the Yiddish refugees departed the USSR, the number of Jews who remained in the Soviet Union was:

1,700,000

(Between East and West: Israel's Foreign Policy Orientation 1948-1956, Cambridge University Press, Uri Bialer, 1990, New Publication: November 2009, p. 63. Citing: Material for a meeting of the Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee of the Knesset on 31.12.1950, ISA 2514/8; Debates of the American Section of the World Jewish Congress on 22.2.1950, ISA 2498/5; a despatch from the Eastern Europe Section of the Israeli Foreign Ministry to Michael Arnon on 10.8.1952, *ibid.*; Bentsur's despatch to Arnon on 13.10.1952, ISA 2498/5; and Bentsur's letter to the Foreign Minister on 12.7.1955, ISA 2502/8.) (IMG)

The USSR:

permitted a large number of Polish Jews who had reached the U.S.S.R. during the course of the Second World War to return to Poland....

(Between East and West: Israel's Foreign Policy Orientation 1948-1956, Cambridge University Press, Uri Bialer, 1990, p. 68) (IMG)

That these Yiddish people were able to return to their Polish homeland, in-itself would have been a positive event. However, the problem with this was that once they returned to Poland,

their aliyah to Israel was facilitated. Before this process [of Jews in USSR returning to Poland] began, in the summer of 1945, some 50,000 Jews still lived in Poland; a year later some 150,000 left the country, for Germany and Austria. In 1947, 90,000 Jews remained in Poland. Thus, of the 250,000 to 300,000 Polish Jews resident in the U.S.S.R at the end of the Second World War, some 200,000 were permitted to return to their homeland.... (Between East and West: Israel's Foreign Policy Orientation 1948-1956, Cambridge University Press, Uri Bialer, 1990, p. 68) (IMG)

What if the Soviet Union would have banned the Polish Jews from returning to Poland? That may have had some temporary 'benefits' insofar as it would have weakened Zionist migration, but it would have actually benefited the Zionists more in the long-run. Not allowing the Yiddish refugees to return to their Polish homeland would have served as an excellent propaganda weapon with which to portray the USSR as a country that held 'Polish citizens' as 'captives'. This would have given greater leverage for CIA-Mossad agents to deepen the wedge between the USSR and Poland, hence to reduce Soviet intelligence presence in exchange for extended CIA-Mossad presence. All of that was in addition to the legal issues arising concerning the repatriation of citizens.

For some time, I have come to wonder: if the United States cared so much about fulfilling Israel's manpower quotas, why did it not first promote Zionist migration from the United States and its satellites and colonies first, and then, once the Jews and 'Jews' in the USA and most of its satellites and colonies had been 'depleted' in their original countries, focus on getting the Yiddish people of Eastern Europe to migrate to Israel? Why did the CIA prioritize the migration of the Yiddish citizens of the socialist camp over migration from the pro-fascist camp? After all, the CIA-Mossad covert operations for agitating and propagating for migration, for secretly smuggling these Yiddish people of the socialist camp was far more expensive and faced far many more obstacles than the mass migration of the people of Jewish background from North America, Western Europe, and other non-Israeli areas under US domination. True, the Great Purges in Eastern Europe were yet to occur, the CIA-MI6 agents had not yet been fully purged and the period before such purges was the optimum time for such undercover human-smuggling activity. That, however, does not answer the question: if the real deal is fulfilling the manpower quotas, why not send the North American and Western European ones? Why care at all about spending so much money about the Yiddish citizens of territories not under US control? Why such an order of priority, and why the preference of such an expensive migration from Eastern Europe over a much cheaper migration from Western Europe and North America, for the purpose of fulfilling Israel's manpower quotas? I believe that the United States so greatly focused on the Eastern European Yiddish citizens because it aimed to rid the socialist camp of many of its loyal citizens – the supporters of 'Shemesh HaAmim' ('Sun of the Peoples', often translated as 'the Sun of Nations' – Ashkenazi reference to 'Uncle Yossi', Joseph Stalin) – and send them to the Middle East so that they provide mandatory military service as pawns for an army dominated by the Anglo-American intelligence agents David Ben-Gurion, Shimon Peres, Ariel Sharon, Menachem Begin, and Moshe Dayan, in wars against the USSR's Arab allies. By the time these communist-influenced Eastern European Yiddish citizens have been spent as pawns

dead in battle, the non-communistic or less-communistic Mizrahi and North American Jews and 'secular Jews' go and fill up Israel's manpower quotas. In the end, the fascist question 'Which people should get exterminated?' is a question of soft power influence and political culture; the people who were susceptible to the soft power influence of the USSR or Soviet allies were, from a fascist perspective, the main people whose extermination to prioritize. Why did the Nazis focus on the Yiddish people after all? In the Middle East, the Arabs of Palestine were planned to be annihilated because the Arabs of Palestine were going to come under the soft power influence of a Syria allied to the USSR, and the Eastern European Yiddish migrants were to be sent by the Ben-Gurion regime as pawns to die so that the number of Israeli citizens with a pro-communist cultural orientation would decline and the number of the loyal citizens of the socialist-led camp would reduce. Ultimately, the big reason was to reduce pro-communist manpower in the Soviet-led camp and to use these progressive-minded people as 'cannon-fodder' for an Anglo-American agenda. The CIA reported that the state media of People's Democratic Romania pointed to this fact when:

The Bucharest transmission declared that the Israeli Government attempted to persuade Rumanian Jews to emigrate to Israel largely because they needed "cheap labor and cannon fodder." (THE JEWISH QUESTION IN SOVIET AND SATELLITE PROPAGANDA, CIA, February 10, 1953, p. 19) (IMG)

The Zionist regime was set up as a counter-weight to the Soviet Yiddish Autonomous Oblast. Few, except the Soviets and the Mapam in Israel, mentioned the USSR as the 'Homeland of the Jewish People', even though the USSR had the Yiddish Autonomous Oblast that had, as a matter of incontrovertible fact, been the hub and the main place of refuge for those fleeing anti-Semitic persecution.

Had a socialist or progressive anti-fascist state been established in Israel, the migration of Jews and 'secular Jews' to Israel from countries which were (1) geographically more proximate to Israel than to the USSR and Popular-Democratic Eastern Europe, and (2) which were dominated by pro-fascist regimes, could cause those Jews and 'secular Jews' to no longer be subjects of a pro-fascist state and to instead serve in the economy and the military of an anti-fascist Israel. In other words, through migration to Israel, these pro-fascist regimes would be deprived of a significant portion of their potential taxpayers, military pawns, skilled or unskilled laborers, and human shields, whereas the troop count and the labour force of an Israel belonging to the camp of anti-imperialist states would increase. For some of the anti-fascist Jews and 'Jews', anti-fascist resistance would be equally or more effective if they stay in their home countries as stay-behind guerrilla resistance and as members of an anti-fascist intelligence service with members in the pro-fascist regime apparatus. However, for some of them, it would make more sense that they take refuge in an anti-fascist state and to serve in the labour force of this anti-fascist state; a genius of military engineering would be far more fit serving in the upgrading and improvement of the weaponry of an anti-fascist army than to die and be wasted as a stay-behind guerrilla in a fascist-occupied country; or even an anti-fascist musician or singer would be far more useful boosting the morale of anti-fascist troops than to produce music not undermining the fascist regime. There is a reason why military forces set up separate brigades based on the category to which their troops belong – 'All-Women' brigades, 'All-Hungarian' brigades, etc. Armed forces set up separate groupings for different ethnic or gender categories of individuals because they correctly understand that troops can become more effective if they share a common language, psychology, and/or culture, for that facilitates communication between units. In the case of migration to an anti-fascist Israel, the same concept applies, except that service would not be limited to being troops in brigades but would also include service in the rear of the military, in the economic backbone that supports the military, and in the cultural warfare sector.

The Mossad/Joint operation to remove the Yiddish people and ship them to Palestine had tremendous value for American-Israeli intelligence, of course. In fact, in 1946 American intelligence, represented in Vienna by Captain Jules Koenig of the X-2, noted that Israeli intelligence utilized the 'Brichah' (Zionist 'flight') as a means of gaining intelligence on the Eastern European states:

Capt. Koenig ... outlined the structure of the Jewish refugee groups in Austria and the various international organizations that supported the immigrants as they passed through the country. In particular, Koenig commented on the role of a young Austrian-born Jew, Arthur Pier, who represented the Jewish Agency in Vienna, but actually served as the head of the Brichah in Austria. Pier, according to Koenig, claimed to represent several Jewish newspapers, including the [Zionist] Palestinian Telegraphic Agency. "Officially Pier is here to collect items of Jewish interest for his newspaper employer, principally items on atrocities against Jews during the war and after," the American intelligence officer wrote. "Actually he runs a highly efficient intelligence net, through couriers into Romania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. He is also running another net," Koenig reported, "which tracks down Germans either free or in captivity in Allied-occupied zones of Germany or Austria, who are suspected or proven to have been committing atrocities against Jews during the war." Pier ... also collected evidence for the Jewish Agency. ('CIA AND NAZI WAR CRIM. AND COL. CHAP. 11-21, DRAFT WORKING PAPER_0001', Chapter Eleven: American Intelligence and the Jewish Brichah, CIA Draft Working Paper, p. 10) (IMG)

Avinoam Patt, a researcher for the US Holocaust Memorial Museum, wrote of the fact that the Brichah and its Poland branch leader Zuckerman, were sponsored by and worked for the JDC:

As Zuckerman noted later, he took advantage of his position on the Central Committee of Polish Jews to secure funds for the HeHalutz activities." He was also successful in tapping connections in the JDC as a source for Bricha funding. Zuckerman leveraged his close wartime relationship with the JDC representative in Warsaw, David Guzik (who had helped finance the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising and worked with the Jewish National Committee after the revolt), to continue JDC support for his efforts after Guzik reestablished the JDC office in Warsaw after the war. As Zuckerman recalled in his memoirs, his early connections with the Joint were vital not only in securing money for Dror, but in assisting the Joint in establishing connections in Poland. Zuckerman's networking enabled him to obtain funding not only for his own movement (Dror), for Hehalutz in general, but also to make requests on behalf of the Jewish Agency for Palestine as needed—all through his close connections to Guzik and Joe Schwartz, director of European operations for the JDC." (The Jewish Heroes of Warsaw: The Afterlife of the Revolt, Avinoam Patt, 2021) (IMG)

Hence, the migration of the Yiddish people from Eastern Europe served the Mossad and the Joint, two highly-overlapping fronts of the American imperialist secret service. The Zionist weapon of mass migration would serve as a basis for the continuation of the American-Israeli intelligence cooperation against the camp of the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies:

In effect, Koenig saw the project, which he dubbed SYMPHONY, as a continuation of earlier wartime collaboration between the Allies and the [Zionist] Jews, ... facing a new threat – the Soviet Union. ('CIA AND NAZI WAR CRIM. AND COL. CHAP. 11-21, DRAFT WORKING PAPER_0001', Chapter Eleven: American Intelligence and the Jewish Brichah, CIA Draft Working Paper, p. 8) (IMG)

Among the aims of the American intelligence listed by Koenig were:

"to use the influx of Jewish refugees into Austria from Romania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland for sources of CI information, for exact data on the intelligence service of the Jewish Agency in Austria, and for all intelligence activities run by any persons or organizations who use this influx into Austria for such purpose." ('CIA AND NAZI WAR CRIM. AND COL. CHAP. 11-21, DRAFT WORKING PAPER_0001', Chapter Eleven: American Intelligence and the Jewish Brichah, CIA Draft Working Paper, p. 6) (IMG)

- Immediate Aims (overt): To extract information of CI [i.e. counter-intelligence] value from refugees escaping from Russian-occupied countries: composition, trends and activities of the Communist parties in those countries; location and identification of concentration camps in Russia and Russian-dominated countries; identification of NKVD deserters or NKGB deserters; identification of NKVD agents or Communist agents sent among the refugees; (...).
 - Immediate Aims (covert): To ascertain and locate the agents of the Jewish Agency in Austria who run both the emigration of Jews from Russian-dominated countries and a highly-efficient intelligence service into those countries;
- ('CIA AND NAZI WAR CRIM. AND COL. CHAP. 11-21, DRAFT WORKING PAPER_0001', Chapter Eleven: American Intelligence and the Jewish Brichah, CIA Draft Working Paper, pp. 8-9) (IMG)

The US intelligence also aimed:

to ascertain and spot those persons who smuggle Jews out of those countries for high sums of money and who, being in contact with NKVD officials, also smuggle war criminals and agents into the Allied-occupied zones, to work either in Austria or in Palestine. ('CIA AND NAZI WAR CRIM. AND COL. CHAP. 11-21, DRAFT WORKING PAPER_0001', Chapter Eleven: American Intelligence and the Jewish Brichah, CIA Draft Working Paper, p. 9)

Indeed, among the most prominent officials assisting the Joint/Mossad in the smuggling of Jews out of Eastern Europe, were 'former' Nazi spies and Home Army units who had infiltrated the Soviet intelligence-backed communist-led popular fronts and organizations.

The American intelligence also kept an eye for:

Nazi elements, infiltrating amongst the refugees to escape punishment from the authorities of their respective countries. ('CIA AND NAZI WAR CRIM. AND COL. CHAP. 11-21, DRAFT WORKING PAPER_0001', Chapter Eleven: American Intelligence and the Jewish Brichah, CIA Draft Working Paper, p. 9) (IMG)

The Nazi war criminals would surveiled in order to be 'arrested' by the Americans as a cover for protection by the Americans. The Mossad was to assist US intelligence in this regard. The local American-Israeli intelligence spy ring chief also acknowledged Brichah's role in sponsoring terrorist organizations:

the Brichah "has been more and more associated with, if not actually sponsoring, certain terroristic groups in a desperate effort to attain its aims." ('CIA AND NAZI WAR CRIM. AND COL. CHAP. 11-21, DRAFT WORKING PAPER_0001', Chapter Eleven: American Intelligence and the Jewish Brichah, CIA Draft Working Paper, p. 26. Citing: Acting Chief, FBM and DH-136 [believed to be Evelyn M. Williams] to Commanding Officer, War Department SSU Mission to Austria, "SYMPHONY Project," 19 September 1946, (S), enclosing Project Review, in DO Records, IL 2, Box 4, Folder 10, CIA ARC. This same document is found in DO Records, C Box 1, Folder 11, CIA ARC.) (IMG)

The kinds of terrorists the Brichah was supporting is known. The Mossad was supporting the Gestapo spy Spychalski, the Gestapo agent Tito, the Home Army (AK), the Gehlen organization, and all the related networks standing up against Soviet power and the Peoples' Democracies. In his memoirs, the American imperialist secret service operative Yitzhak Zimmerman – a long-time close friend of the Gestapo agent Gomulka since the Great Patriotic War – admitted many things about the subversive and treasonous activities of Polish officials. He said, for instance, that Spychalski, keen on 'calculating' a special relationship between Poland and Britain, promoted the illegal mass migration of the Yiddish to Israel in collaboration with Zuckerman's intelligence network. He further implied that Spychalski did all of this without authorization from many of the other Party and state bodies from which he was supposed to secure authorization. **Spychalski, furthermore, proved to be in fact a spy for Zuckerman, hence a spy for the American intelligence and the Mossad, providing Zuckerman military intelligence on the routes to take and allowing him to be briefed by Spychalski's henchman Czerwinski on the presence and coordinates of a Soviet military base that would have blocked the Zionist mass migration.** Spychalski, after informing Zuckerman of this, warned them against using such a route. Referring to his efforts to secure the illegal Zionist mass migration of the Jews to Israel, the American-Israeli intelligence agent Zuckerman wrote:

But within forty-eight hours, I got a phone call at the Committee of the Jews in Poland ... from one of the senior members of UB, asking to meet with me. We made an appointment at a certain café.

That meeting began with a friendly conversation. I won't mention that man's name because I don't know exactly what his situation and fate are today, and I prefer to be cautious. And I don't know the real names of those who were involved, one of whom was a Jew. The two men I talked with said they had been told what I said on the plane, and they had a few questions about it and a few difficulties with it. First of all, even if they were sympathetic to the departure of the Jews for Palestine, they couldn't give permission for such a departure unless they had government support; and their question was whether I could meet with the foreign minister, since the support should be given by the Foreign Ministry. And if the Foreign Ministry adopted such a policy, they would make sure it was carried out. The foreign minister was Zygmunt Modzelewski.

They didn't deal with foreign relations, but it wasn't hard for me to tell them what Modzelewski had told me, and I knew that despite his sympathy, he would give me the same answer connecting this with Polish interests and relations with Britain. And I knew that even if he knew about the departure of the Jews, he would have to say he didn't. Then they started listing names of other members of the government. Maybe Osobka-Morawski, the prime minister? I told them about my meeting with him on the day of the Kielce pogrom. Then one of them asked how my relations were with [Gestapo spy] **Marian Spychalski, who was then – if I'm not mistaken – deputy minister of defense. He was my friend from the underground when, even if we weren't seeing one another, each one knew what the other was doing. More precisely, I knew more about him than he knew about me** since he and his friend, the engineer Turbyfiski, who was later mayor of Warsaw, were close friends of Wacek Folman, Havka's older brother, an architect. They had known one another before the war; and during the war, Turbyfiski had helped Folman when he came to the Aryan side. After the war, we had several meetings both about restoring the farm in Grochów and about the apartment I got, thanks to him. There were all kinds of things between us of no great importance; at any rate, I was sure of his sympathy and I said we could try that direction.

The second question was which one of us would be in charge of the departure. I had to give an immediate answer. I said I personally would take responsibility. And I added I had reliable people with me. Until the last minute, I didn't know if this was a trap. It wasn't simple, since the UB was in charge of the borders and if I said the He-Halutz organization was responsible (I don't remember if He-Halutz was legitimate then) – even if it was all right legally – if the authorities decided one day that someone on the border wasn't proper, He-Halutz would have to take the responsibility. So I answered that I personally would be responsible.

Two things stood out in their position: first, that they needed support and without it they couldn't help; and the support had to be political, from someone in the government. And in consultation, the lot fell to Marian Szychalski. The second thing was who on the Jewish side would take responsibility. It didn't occur to anyone on the Central Committee of the Jews in Poland that we confronted operations of such a nature and scope. However, I couldn't give He-Halutz that responsibility for fear we would be swallowed up. That was what motivated me to assume the responsibility myself.

They wrote down the summary and I said immediately that as soon as I got an answer from Szychalski, I would get in touch with them. After first and second thoughts, I decided to let Dr. Adolf Berman in on the secret. I already said that toward the end of the war, before the Polish Uprising, in a conversation about what would happen in the future, I realized we had differences of opinion. He was a "legalist," and he declared that. He also believed in some delusions, like the establishment of a Communist State of Israel; and he also believed in the new relationship of world and Polish communism to the Zionist enterprise, if and when everything was done legally. That was his reservation. I didn't believe in those things. I told him that our people and I had already worked illegally on the borders of the Communist zone in 1939 and 1940, but I imagined that wouldn't be simple for us now. And I said that legalism couldn't be the reservation for our acts. When we met after the war, we didn't continue that discussion.

In 1944, that was a theoretical question, because we didn't know if we'd survive. Then there was the Polish Uprising. Nothing practical was to be decided, and the decision wasn't in our hands; the Germans were still in Warsaw. Even though I knew Berman's world, his points of view, I had no reason in January, after the Liberation, to start an argument with him on precisely that Zionist point and to reveal to him what we were or weren't doing. We confronted certain areas of activity where we had to work together, in the issues of Polish Jewry, in things done legally; but now we confronted the illegal departure, which we had started in January and February 1945; and Berman didn't know about those things since I never talked to him about them. I would meet with him at the Committee of the Jews in Poland and would also come to his home. After the Polish parliament was established, he was a member of it, we would meet in all kinds of places, as well as with the family, and we were friends. We talked about everything except Brikha and our illegal work.

Now I decided to talk with him. I saw him as the person closest to us on the Committee of the Jews in Poland. Moreover, to his credit or not, among the gallery of Zionist activists, he was best known among the Polish leaders because of his brother, Jakub Berman, the Communist. Yosef Sak, member of Po'alei Zion-Z.S., was also there; but at that decisive period of the underground, on the Aryan side of Warsaw, for various reasons, he was remote from issues and sat at home while the political representative on the Jewish National Committee was Dr. Berman. **He knew the people I knew, like Gomulka and Szychalski, and had contacts with many others I didn't know.**

Now in that conversation I initiated, I told him of how things had evolved. I also told him what Modzelewski, the foreign minister had told me and about my last conversation with the members of UB. I told him I had concluded, along with them, that **the only one who might be able to consider these things globally and calculate Poland's relations with England and what that required was Marian Szychalski, and we knew him from the underground; he was reliable and imaginative.** "Maybe that will work," I told Berman.

Berman agreed immediately. We got in touch with Szychalski and were accepted without delay. I'll never forget Szychalski's reaction – the meeting with him was warm. Like us, he was shocked by the pogrom in Kielce. As far as I'm concerned, all **Szychalski's later sins in general issues and Jewish matters** cannot obscure **his sympathy toward us** in this case. We didn't tell him about our conversations or the replies we had gotten from the prime minister.

On the spot, he called the general in charge of the borders, a Soviet military man whose name was Czerwinski. I realized immediately that he was a Russian of Polish origin. His Polish was very "Russified." He was commander of the border patrol, the military patrol in charge of all the borders of Poland.

Szychalski said one thing to Czerwinski in our presence: Do not under any circumstances use the northern borders, that is, toward Berlin; use the southern route, across the Czech border. Czerwinski told him, if I'm not mistaken, that the distance between the new Polish border (the Oder- Neisse line) and Berlin was only seventy kilometers and there was a Soviet garrison there, whereas the Polish army was on the southern border. A few of our comrades in Brikha didn't accept that warning and later cost us lives. Some of them behaved irresponsibly at a certain moment when they were under pressure; they thought they should and could "open" the northern border, too. This time, in terms of the army, the arrangement was completely legal. When we received the positive reply, a meeting was arranged with Czerwinski. I assumed a certain pretense and, as someone who dealt with people of ministerial rank, I said I would send my man to meet with Czerwinski. That man was Stefan Grajek. We also wanted to demonstrate that there was no need to negotiate with Czerwinski, but simply to fix border crossings. So Stefan Grajek was selected as the liaison with General Czerwinski. Right after I got Szychalski's positive answer and after he appointed the commander of the border patrol, Czerwinski, to deal with the matter, I gathered our members of Brikha, Isser Ben-Zvi, Zvi Netzer, and Yohanan Cohen, a member of the Labor Zionists, one of the independent liberals, who was also a Shaliah from Eretz Israel. Without going into details, I proposed to them to indicate border crossings we would suggest to Czerwinski. I also suggested we not expose the places we had secretly used thus far; and, if this was a trap, or some day they decided to stop, we would always have the crossings we had used.

(A Surplus of Memory: Chronicle of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, Yitzhak Zuckerman, 1993, pp. 665-668) (IMG)

It is worth mentioning that Czerwinski was under the authority of the Polish military, not the Red Army. He had been 'assigned on loan' to the Polish Government, meaning that he no longer served the Red Army:

General Czerwinski, commander of the Polish border patrol and a Soviet officer of Polish extraction, was assigned on loan to the Polish Government. (The American Joint Distribution Committee and Polish Jewry 1944-1949, Yosef Litvak. In: 'Organizing Rescue: National Jewish Solidarity in the Modern Period', edited by Selwyn Ilan Troen, Benjamin Pinkus, p. 285) (IMG)

Backing up Yehuda Bauer's assessments, and supporting the belief that Szychalski was behaving as a rogue element of the Soviet bloc rather than in total coherence with the general policies of the communists at the time, Zuckerman further wrote:

At a symposium on Yehuda Bauer's book at Efal, Leviteh asked me to take issue with a few things. He claimed that allowing Jews to leave en masse couldn't possibly remain the property of one branch of government and not be known to the general government institutions; and that it couldn't be concealed from the citizens of Poland, because the day after the agreement, the Jews began selling their possessions and moving and all Poland knew about it. No doubt such a thing couldn't have been done underground, vis-a-vis other branches of the administration. But as far as I know, the Foreign Ministry was cautious about giving the issue official public approval, which could have damaged Poland.

I must also say that as far as I know, there wasn't an agreement between various branches of government. I don't know what authority Leviteh had for his remarks. I must say that in that position, **Spychalski didn't ask the Foreign Ministry**. True, those things couldn't be kept secret. In fact, a person in a key position soon responded sharply to the issue. But at first, nothing was known about it. For a few days or weeks, it was kept secret – I don't know.

Leviteh also claimed there couldn't have been such an agreement without the knowledge of the Soviet authorities. Did the Russians know about Brikha, and what was their attitude? I don't know what happened at the cabinet meeting, what Modzelewski said, what they said among themselves, or what Moscow said. There may be all kinds of speculations, but I don't know the facts. What I can do is reconstruct the course of things. And I state here that the decision came at that stage, within a few minutes, in the conversation Dr. Berman and I had with Spychalski. If the Polish government wanted to ruin it, they would have. Jakub Berman knew about it, too. Not at that moment, but a few days later. If he had wanted, he could have ruined it. The same goes for Moscow. Jakub Berman certainly didn't keep quiet without asking Moscow. I reject Leviteh's thesis, at least in regard to the first stage, and I can't say how long it went on—one day or two weeks. I think that there was an historical, fateful decision here, made by Spychalski. If we hadn't gone to him, if we had gone to the minister or to another ministry that would have considered the case from another angle, I don't know if the Jews would have crossed the borders as they did.

Could Spychalski, who was acting Minister of Defense, have decided such a thing on his own? At any rate, the fact is that, when he accepted Berman and me, he didn't know why we had come. And when he gave his positive answer – I'm certain of it – he didn't pick up the telephone to call the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or any other element in the government. He gave the approval of his own, without asking. Before I came to him, I sat with members of the UB, who gave me all kinds of advice: to appeal to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Prime Minister – and I rejected it; and only then did Spychalski's name come up. So, Spychalski didn't know in advance why we came to him. At that time, there was not yet a bureaucracy that obliged Dr. Berman and Yitzhak Zuckerman to inform Spychalski in advance what they wanted to discuss with him. We asked for an audience and he agreed. And, in our presence, he didn't ask anyone for permission; and, on the spot, he called the man in charge of the borders. **He didn't ask the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he didn't ask the Party, nor did he ask the opinion of the Prime Minister.** True, it was impossible to hide it, either from the Polish public or from the circles of Polish leadership. But **the fact is they didn't know.** For example, the "great Berman" (**Jakub Berman**) didn't know. Zvi Netzer could testify to that too.

So, it is conceivable to me that Spychalski did it on his own, perhaps out of naiveté, perhaps because of his attitude toward Jews, perhaps because of the proximity to the Kielce incident, or because of the clash between his Communist theory and the Polish reality. These things and God knows what else might have caused that. At any rate, he accepted it openly and immediately gave permission right then and there. True, nothing was written and no agreement, no document was signed; it was all an oral conversation.

(A Surplus of Memory: Chronicle of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, Yitzhak Zuckerman, 1993, pp. 671-672. Bold added.) (IMG)

Recall that Yitzhak Zuckerman had said: "Spychalski said one thing ... in our presence: Do not under any circumstances use the northern borders, that is, toward Berlin; use the southern route, across the Czech border. Czerwinski told him, if I'm not mistaken, that the distance between the new Polish border (the Oder-Neisse line) and Berlin was only seventy kilometers and there was a Soviet garrison there, whereas the Polish army was on the southern border. A few of our comrades in Brikha didn't accept that warning and later cost us lives. Some of them behaved irresponsibly at a certain moment when they were under pressure; they thought they should and could 'open' the northern border, too." This was important not just because of the fact that it exposes Spychalski espionage for the Mossad – he told them of which routes to take and which routes were unsafe, and allowed Czerwinski to disclose such top secret information about the military base – but also sheds light, in passing, on the clashes that occurred between those Mossad operatives that refused to heed the warnings and the Soviet Red Army. Yehuda Bauer reveals the details of some of these clashes. En route to Berlin, the Red Army captured numerous Zionist emigres, and arrested and imprisoned Joint/Mossad leaders:

In the meantime, the old truck route was renewed and additional sea routes were operated out of Stettin; all these passed Berlin and therefore were affected by what was happening in that city. The major problem of transportation concerned the trucks; these had formerly been Russian or Polish Army vehicles whose drivers had been bribed to take refugees on their empty runs into Berlin (on the way back they would bring equipment and goods that the Russian forces were dismantling and taking out of defeated Germany). This had been proved unsatisfactory because cases had multiplied where the drivers handed over the refugees to the Russian police, and kept the bribe. Brichah therefore bought their own trucks in Poland and used Brichah drivers for them, under a variety of pretexts. This was very expensive, however, and there was of course always the risk that trucks that were caught would be confiscated by the Soviets. In Berlin, trucks were much cheaper, and so Brichah began using Berlin vehicles, for which the Berlin Brichah paid.... (Flight and Rescue: Brichah, Yehuda Bauer, 1970, pp. 236-237) (IMG)

In one case, the Red Army even opened fire on the American-Israeli intelligence operatives, killing one of them:

On a small scale, Brichah attempted a number of other subterfuges to get Jews out of Poland. One of these was the transport by boat. At the end of July a boatload of children was sent to the small port of Ueckermünde, and from there the train took them to Berlin. One more boat was sent in this way, and then increased Russian control over the port made the route impossible. (...). Also, at the end of August, another incident had occurred which was typical of the hazards of the Stettin operations. Yitzhak Ram and Yosef Nissenbaum, both from the Berlin Brichah, decided to try another boat route and entered into negotiations with some Russian sailors on one of the river boats. After reaching an agreement with them, they took the boat ride to Berlin together with ten refugees, mainly teachers, from Stettin. Before they reached German territory, the Russian sailors said they needed fuel and asked the passengers to wait for them on shore because they could not ask for fuel with Jewish refugees on board. Nissenbaum and two other Brichah men stayed on board. As they were moving away from the shore, three armed Russians who had hidden themselves in the engine room came up and forced the three men at gunpoint

into the Oder. When the three hit the water, the Russians opened fire on them and Nissenbaum was killed. (Flight and Rescue: Brichah, Yehuda Bauer, 1970, pp. 237-238) (IMG)

As a result of this large scale mass migration project by the American-Israeli intelligence service, plenty of data on the USSR and the future Peoples' Democracies were collected:

Koenig told Headquarters that Pier was the key link to facilitating the movement of Jews from the Russian-dominated countries, and he gave him the operational codename of CONDUCTOR. After organizing the Jews into small groups, Pier's agents led them surreptitiously across the border into Austria. The groups made their way to Vienna where the Joint initially placed them in the city's Rothschild Hospital. Pier screened the refugees for information desired by the Jewish Agency and then prepared to move them to other DP camps in the American zone. Those refugees intended for Palestine were placed in a camp near Salzburg while those who could not or did not want to go to the Middle East were sent to other camps in Germany. Koenig calculated that Pier was responsible for the smuggling of hundreds, if not thousands, of Jews on a monthly basis into Austria and eventually toward Italy and Palestine.

At first, Koenig posed as a journalist seeking information about the Brichah. As his questions became more of an intelligence nature, Koenig admitted to Pier that he was an American intelligence officer. In the meantime, Koenig also wanted to place American personnel in the Jewish camps in Vienna, principally the Rothschild Hospital and the Jewish Agency's interrogation center on Alserbacherstrasse. These agents, also posing as American journalists, would collect intelligence on Soviet order of battle as well as economic and political information behind the Iron Curtain. US contact with the Jewish Agency, Koenig believed, would expand SSU's understanding of the personalities involved in the illicit smuggling of refugees. This aspect of the project, however, proved the most difficult given the lack of Americans who could speak Yiddish or Hebrew.

(‘CIA AND NAZI WAR CRIM. AND COL. CHAP. 11-21, DRAFT WORKING PAPER_0001’, Chapter Eleven: American Intelligence and the Jewish Brichah, CIA Draft Working Paper, pp. 10-12) (IMG)

At the time, Israel had not grown to become its own imperialist power, and was thus a mere settler-colony serving the United States, and covertly, also the British. As such, the Mossad was correctly regarded by the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies as having been a front for the CIA, as opposed to an independent organization of its own. This was highlighted during the media campaigns of the Doctors' Plot case and the Slansky trials. This is why the Israeli secret service agents were consistently denounced as American agents. Furthermore, in the 1949 resolution of the Cominform, it was explicitly stated:

The Tito clique transformed Belgrade into an American center for espionage and anti-Communist propaganda. (Communist Party of Yugoslavia in the Power of Murderers and Spies, Cominform, November 1949. MIA. The same document can be found in the ‘Revolutionary Democracy Organization of India’ archives section) (IMG{Titoist Yugoslavia})

The accusation was absolutely correct, because there were numerous CIA-Mossad bases in Yugoslavia. Uri Bialer, an official researcher for the Israeli Foreign Ministry, remarked:

Yugoslavia had always been the location of one of the most important Mossad centers in Eastern Europe. This situation was the result of the special relationship which the Yugoslavs had developed in the course of the Second World War and thereafter with representatives of the Yishuv who had operated in the framework of the British war effort. After the war, it seems to have been buttressed by ideological perceptions. As one of the Mossad emissaries in the Balkans phrased it: “The Yugoslavs saw in the [Mossad] an embodiment of the struggle against imperialism. The Yugoslavs ... as former partisans, ... felt an emotional affinity for the small nation struggling against an [Arab] enemy that vastly outnumbered and overpowered it.” (Between East and West: Israel's Foreign Policy Orientation 1948-1956, Cambridge University Press, Uri Bialer, 1990, p. 114) (IMG)

Yugoslavia was the most important center of the Mossad activity in the bloc of the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies. The ties of Tito's group to the Israeli military goes back to World War II, when Tito's group established liaison with Dan Lerner, a commander of and traitor to the ‘Palmach’, which was the military force of the communist-led ‘Socialist Zionist’ popular front party, Mapam. The Palmach had many communist revolutionaries in it but there obviously existed some Titoist elements within it, collaborating with the Mossad official Ehud Avriel. Avriel wrote in his memoirs:

The third and most spectacular assault was on the main radar station on Mount Carmel. The commander of the 1st Battalion of the Palmach, then stationed in the vicinity of Haifa, had received instructions in the beginning of November to prepare for the eventuality of the ‘related struggle’. His name was Dan Lerner, although once it had been Ernest Loehner, the son of the exclusive Vienna shopkeeper, Rudolf Loehner, who at the last moment and by pure chance had been plucked from the doomed at Cladovo to accompany a small, lucky group of youngsters to Palestine. Since then he had served as a parachutist-liaison officer in Tito's headquarters during the Yugoslav partisans' war of liberation, and from a Palmach commander he was to rise to the rank of general in Israel's army. The young man who only a few years earlier had been an ‘illegal immigrant’ himself was now commanding an operation to help secure the arrival of what was left of the victims of Nazi Europe. (‘Open the Gates!: A Personal Story of “Illegal” Immigration to Israel’, Ehud Avriel, 1975, p. 230) (IMG)

No doubt during the period 1941 to late 1942, an alliance with the Zionist agents of the British intelligence service against the Third Reich was necessary. In the early stages of World War II, Israel – as the settler-colony of American imperialism – had to contribute some of its resources to engage in an intelligence war with Nazi Germany. Involving the “Jewish Agency in Palestine” into fighting the Nazis would have certainly been progressive in the first stages of the Great Patriotic War, (1) because it contributed resources to fighting the Nazis, and (2) because for fighting the Nazis, it was forced to reallocate some of its resources away from slaughtering the Arabs and onto helping in the fight against the Nazis. Of course, the Jewish Agency in Palestine contributed so little to the fight against the Nazis, but insofar as it did, it did a correct thing. From late 1942 onwards, the Zionist leadership of the Jewish Agency in Palestine began to sponsor the Nazis as a bulwark against the Soviets, and so from then on, Israel played a reactionary role. Hence, the Mossad began to support Tito's group in 1943. Recall that as stated previously:

Some 240 Palestinian Jews volunteered to parachute into the Balkans in 1943 and the British established training camps in Cairo and Haifa. The following year, 32 men and women were, in fact, dispatched in joint British-Allyah Bet missions into Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Italy, Slovakia, Austria, and Yugoslavia. (...). The most successful of the Palestinian agents, Yesheyahu Trachtenberg, better known as Shaike Dan, had a remarkable wartime and postwar intelligence career and is remembered as the savior of thousands of Romanian Jews. (‘CIA AND NAZI WAR CRIM. AND COL. CHAP. 11-21, DRAFT WORKING PAPER_0001’, Chapter Eleven: American Intelligence and the Jewish Brichah, CIA Draft Working Paper, pp. 7-8) (IMG)

The IsraelDefense magazine – an Israeli magazine, which as the name suggests, is concerned with military and intelligence affairs – stated that Shaike Dan was the founder of the ‘Nativ’, an Israeli espionage organization that also facilitated that process of illegal migration to Israel:

This decades-long enterprise was the responsibility of the people of "Nativ" - the intelligence agency in charge of maintaining connections with and providing assistance and protection to Jews in the USSR and Eastern Europe. At the head of this enterprise stood Shaike Dan, one of the 'Volunteer Paratroopers' and a major operative of the Escape movement, who was among the founders of "Nativ" and who, for many years, served as the most senior representative of that agency in Eastern Europe.

"We reached an agreement with them for a certain quota of Jews each year. We were the primary source of foreign currency for the Romanian intelligence services. We sometimes paid by cheque, other times in cash - all from Swiss banks," recalled Yacov ("Yasha") Kedmi in a recent interview for IsraelDefense. Kedmi served as the head of "Nativ" between 1992 and 1999, immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union.

(‘Romanian-Styled Capitalism’, Israel Defense, Issue 11 of the magazine, February 17, 2013) (IMG{Romania})

The first "Nativ" station was established in Vienna by Mike Harari, a veteran Mossad hand who subsequently became the head of 'Caesarea', the Mossad's field operations division. Harari had established stations in Moscow and in Vienna. In those years, Austria was also divided into four zones controlled by the Soviet Union, US, France and the UK, and served as a playground for overt and covert activities by all of the superpowers. Israel took advantage of this situation, and Shaike Dan decided to set up his forward command post in Vienna. (‘Romanian-Styled Capitalism’, Israel Defense, Issue 11 of the magazine, February 17, 2013) (IMG{Romania})

Indeed, ‘Shaike Dan ... managed to establish a close friendship with the head of the Yugoslav secret police’:

Shaike Dan was born in 1909 in the town of Lipkani, Bessarabia. He immigrated to Palestine in 1935 and settled at Kibbutz Nir-Am. During WWII, he volunteered to serve in the British Army and was dropped by parachute, along with his friend Yitzhak (Mano) Ben-Ephraim, in Romania, to help rescue British pilots whose aircraft had been shot down. Before departing for his parachute jumps, he would take a handful of earth from the Kibbutz to keep in his pocket.

Even during the War, Shaike Dan and Yitzhak Ben-Ephraim were already involved in saving Jews and helping immigration to Palestine. After the War ended, they continued to operate in Romania for a number of years. When Israel was established, Shaike Dan was sent to Yugoslavia to help organize Jewish immigration to Palestine from there. After he was apprehended during his activity, he managed to establish a close friendship with the head of the Yugoslav secret police. Subsequently, this agency helped Israel in connection with various activities, including arms smuggling to Israel and by serving as a transit point for immigrants from Romania.

Yugoslavia was a part of the Eastern bloc, but it had been cut off from the ComInform (Communist Information Bureau), and was fairly isolated, caught between the Soviet threat and the embargo imposed by the West. As it was rich in natural resources, but lacked the appropriate infrastructure, it needed Israeli assistance in order to develop its industry.

(‘Romanian-Styled Capitalism’, Israel Defense, Issue 11 of the magazine, February 17, 2013) (IMG{Romania})

The head of the Yugoslav regime’s fascist secret police was Rankovic, the anti-communist mass murderer who tried to do to Kosovo what Israel did to Palestine. Note also that the above-cited document confirmed that the UDB:

helped Israel in connection with various activities, including arms smuggling to Israel and by serving as a transit point for immigrants from Romania. (‘Romanian-Styled Capitalism’, Israel Defense, Issue 11 of the magazine, February 17, 2013) (IMG{Romania})

Another major channel of liaison between the Mossad and the Yugoslav regime was between the prominent Mossad operative Ehud Avriel and the Tito henchman, Moshe Pijade. Throughout his memoirs, Ehud Avriel several times implied that he was a Mossad operative. His service for the Mossad is explicitly confirmed by Francis Nicosia of the US ‘Peace Corps’ who said:

Ehud Avriel [was] a former Mossad agent in Vienna.... (The Third Reich and the Palestine Question, Francis R. Nicosia, p. 161) (IMG)

Moshe Pijade proudly assisted the Mossad in its operations in Eastern Europe. Top Mossad operative Ehud Avriel wrote in his memoirs:

My 'journalistic' work brought me into contact with the officials of the Yugoslav Government Press Office. Not surprisingly, I met a few who had a sincere respect for our struggle in Palestine, about which they received quite one-sided reports from British sources. But after the war they regarded their former British Allies as having reverted to the stance of imperialist suppressors, and they felt the partisans' affinity for a small people fighting against a superior enemy.

In consultation with Alkalay, I decided to ask for an interview with Moshe Piade, the Speaker of the Federal Parliament and one of the chiefs of the Communist Party. Piade was a Jew, and Alkalay had been in touch with him on matters concerning the revival of Jewish communal life after the war. Alkalay had found him friendly and sympathetic, although he hardly regarded himself as a member of the Jewish community about to be re-established. When I was finally told that Piade was ready to receive me, he asked that I come to see him informally at his home.

A stoutly built man with the face of a scholar and intellectual, Piade opened the door for me himself when I arrived at his villa for our talk. Completely dispensing with formality, he brought me into his drawing-room.

'Here you can speak absolutely freely. I have switched off all the microphones and we are alone,' he said with a sarcastic reference to rumours, then current in Belgrade, that even top leaders of the Communist Party were closely watched by the Secret Service.

As we settled down for a long talk, Piade told me of his curiosity about everything concerning the 'Zionist effort in Palestine'.

'I am, as you may know, of Jewish descent,' he said, 'but I regard myself as a Yugoslav communist and nothing else. This is my country and my people; among them I have grown up and fought my political battles. Till recently I was with them in the mountains fighting against the Nazis. But I want to hear from a primary source about your work, your ideas, your life.'

Moshe Piade's manner made me think he might well be called 'Tito's Berl Katznelson.' He listened with sympathy, interrupting with keen questions as I tried to explain our way of life and our thinking. The organization of the kibbutz — a collective 'from below', as he defined it — interested him most. It was obvious that he pondered the possibilities of a similar movement in the new social reality of the 'People's Democracy'. At the end of the long and stimulating evening I knew we had won a friend.

'You will hear from me again, both directly and indirectly,' Piade said as we parted, and I knew by his tone that I would receive an affirmative reply to my request for permission to organize illegal immigration to Palestine from the shores of the Adriatic.

Leibl returned from his exploration of the Hungarian track full of hopes and more than pleased when he heard that on the diplomatic level things looked good too. But he was not satisfied with one link: he knew, and he had been told once again in Budapest, that many

Jews from Poland had moved to Rumania. So he decided to 'open the border' between Rumania and Yugoslavia too. At the frontier post of Kikinda, again by speaking Russian and showing his Polish refugee card, he received assurances from the Rumanian frontier guard that any Jewish refugees wanting to cross into Yugoslavia would be helped.

A few days after my talk with Piade, Slavko Radej, the head of the emaciated Jewish community of Zagreb, came to meet with me. He had survived the war with his vigour and optimism fully intact and had visions of streams of Jewish refugees from Hungary and Rumania on their way to the Dalmatian coast. Slavko was glad to discover the existence of the Mossad. He had already hoarded food, blankets and boots and had made arrangements for transit quarters on the outskirts of Zagreb. His contacts with the Yugoslav communist administration had been forged while he lived with many of the new leaders as partisans in the mountains, and these friendships facilitated his new task as host to the expected refugees from beyond the Yugoslav borders. As we ate breakfast together in the dining-room of the Majestic, he told me about the arrangements he had made with Leibl for transient refugees from Rumania.

Suddenly the hall-porter came up to me with a telegram. It was from Paris and it read: 'Chief Editor needs you for urgent discussion at once. Ruth'. I turned the telegram over in my hand. There was absolutely no indication of what it was all about, and Slavko shared my curiosity. I explained to him that it could mean that Ben Gurion — who I knew was in Paris — wanted to see me urgently. Or was I imagining things? The quiet atmosphere of our talk suddenly vanished. Slavko suggested that I try to telephone Paris and find out for sure before I made any decisions.

This time the telephone connection worked reasonably fast. I was able to distinguish Ruth's voice faintly over the line, and she confirmed my interpretation of the message. I left with Slavko on the train to Zagreb, after having taken leave of Leibl and of Alkalay.

After a short stop in Zagreb for a visit to Slavko's home and to take up food supplies, I continued on to Vienna. From Zagreb through the snow-covered mountains of Slovenia, as far as I could make out I was the only passenger on the unlit train. It moved with great effort up the steep ascents, and I wondered how long I would be stuck in the bitter cold of the unheated carriage.

(‘Open the Gates!: A Personal Story of “Illegal” Immigration to Israel’, Ehud Avriel, 1975, pp. 245-247) (IMG)

Under Pijade, Yugoslavia became the pathway through which the Jews were transported by Zionist organizations clandestinely to Israel. CIA reports confirmed:

Young Hungarian and Rumanian Jews who have been forbidden by their respective governments to emigrate to Israel, continue to cross into Yugoslavia clandestinely. The Yugoslav authorities incarcerate them but by a tacit agreement with JOINT they are released for emigration as soon as shipping space is available for Israel. Ninety of such emigres were included in a shipment of approximately 5,000 persons to Israel from Fiume during the last week of May.

About three weeks ago Moshe Pijade personally arranged a release from prison of all minor Jewish political prisoners for emigration to Israel.

(Emigration of Hungarian and Rumanian Jews through Yugoslavia to Israel, CIA, June 14, 1949, p. 1) (IMG)

These were done in active collaboration with the United States, the Tito-Pijade Regime in Yugoslavia, as well as the American-Israeli intelligence organization known as the ‘Joint’:

The final exodus of approximately 30,000 Jews in Yugoslavia from Fiume Haifa for on SS RADNIK and PARTIZANKA, will be complete by the end of July 1949.

Passages on vessels will be paid to the Yugoslavia government by the Joint Distribution Committee in dollar credits in the United States and through dummy corporation “American Lloyd” in Paris. Thus far, the Yugoslav Government has received \$200,000 in the United States for passengers shipped to Israel.

(Exodus of Jews from Yugoslavia, CIA, March 21, 1949, p. 1) (IMG)

Against the laws of Romania, Ana Pauker, the Titoist Romanian agent of the Mossad, assisted Israeli agent Mordechai Namir in promoting the clandestine Zionist migration. However, the Romanian government, the laws of which were being violated by the Israeli agent and Titoist lobbyist Pauker, sought to re-enforce such laws. Uri Bialer, the Israeli Foreign Ministry's official historical researcher admitted:

Although virtually no emigration was permitted from Rumania between late 1948 and November 1949, agreement had been reached between Mordechai Namir, representing the Jewish Agency, and the Rumanian Foreign Minister Anna Pauker (herself a Jewess), early in 1948. This allowed for the clandestine emigration and aliyah of some 5,000 Rumanian Jews per month.

Rumanian renunciation of this agreement in mid-1949 was accompanied by the severe imposition of intensive anti-Zionist measures, which included the imprisonment of local Zionist leaders and the destruction of most of the movement's organizational frameworks. In return Israel stepped up her own efforts to bring to fruition the Rumanian promises regarding aliyah.

(Between East and West: Israel's Foreign Policy Orientation 1948-1956, Cambridge University Press, Uri Bialer, 1990, p. 61) (IMG)

Since Zionist migration was banned, the Mossad had to launch these operations illegally, clandestinely, and through its agents in Romania's state apparatus. The Israeli embassy in Bucharest, which was subordinate to the Nativ and in turn subordinate to the Mossad, would provide bribes so to promote migration:

"Over the years, Shaike Dan developed excellent connections with senior officials in the governments and intelligence services of the Eastern European countries, and succeeded in establishing a solid connection with the Romanians as well. In Eastern Europe, it was impossible to do anything without being monitored by the security services. It was therefore logical to go ahead and contact them, instead of waiting, and if they wanted it to happen - it would."

"Shaike would sometimes fetch a suitcase containing two million dollars and head for Bucharest. The entire Israeli embassy in Bucharest was a "Nativ" station. At the beginning of each year, we would go to Bucharest, sit down with them and finalize the quotas and prices - how much a child would go for, how much an adult would go for, how much extra should be paid according to the person's professional qualifications and status and so forth. It ranged between less than one hundred dollars to a few thousands. The price for a doctor could be as high as \$10,000.

"Throughout the year, we would make all kinds of adjustments, and we would hold a summation meeting at the end of the year - compare, balance the budget and make the necessary complementary adjustments. The management of funds was perfect - strictly in accordance with the tariff."

(‘Romanian-Styled Capitalism’, Israel Defense, Issue 11 of the magazine, February 17, 2013) (IMG{Romania})

A paper published by the CIA front think tank 'Wilson Center' admitted that the negotiations between Pauker and the Mossad went back to as early as 1946:

In mid-1946, the agents of the Mossad opened negotiations with the Romanian authorities, in particular with Ana Pauker, unofficial leader of the Romanian Communist Party, in order to gain consent for large-scale Jewish emigration. Bucharest agreed to allow 50,000 Jews to leave, on the condition that the emigrants give up their property and their money. (Moscow's Surprise: The Soviet-Israeli Alliance of 1947-1949, Wilson Center, Laurent Rucker, p. 29) (IMG)

The Wilson Center document stated that Pauker:

was the most fervent advocate of unrestricted Jewish emigration from Romania. (Moscow's Surprise: The Soviet-Israeli Alliance of 1947-1949, Wilson Center, Laurent Rucker, p. 32) (IMG)

Again, lest we forget the Mossad-backed faction's ties to the Yugoslav intelligence. Indeed, Rankovic's UDB:

helped Israel in connection with various activities, including arms smuggling to Israel and by serving as a transit point for immigrants from Romania. ('Romanian-Styled Capitalism', Israel Defense, Issue 11 of the magazine, February 17, 2013) (IMG{Romania})

Hence, Ana Pauker's faction was allied to the Yugoslav regime's fascist secret service. Referring to Ana Pauker, the CIA also reported:

Between 1944 and 1948, she opened a private bank account in Switzerland for her father and brother. This is the principal charge preferred against her. (BACKGROUND OF TOP LEVEL COMMUNIST LEADERS IN RUMANIA, CIA, March 11, 1955, p.3) (IMG{Romania})

The Swiss banks were the banks through which the CIA, MI6, Mossad, and Nazi German secret service operated their financial transactions, and assisted their agents in carrying out financial sabotage and money laundering. Since Pauker was an agent of the Mossad, and since the Mossad was subordinate to the US intelligence back then, it is not improbable that she got CIA-Mossad payments through those bank accounts.

The faction countering the CIA-Mossad influence in Romania was centered around Gheorghiu-Dej, the close friend of Joseph Stalin. In the words of a document published by the Woodrow Wilson Center:

The faction of the general secretary of the Romanian Communist Party, Gheorghiu Dej, stood against the emigration of Jews.... (Moscow's Surprise: The Soviet-Israeli Alliance of 1947-1949, Woodrow Wilson Center, Laurent Rucker, p. 31) (IMG)

In fact thanks to the influence of the communist faction headed by Dej,:

Romanian emigration ceased at the end of 1948.... (Moscow's Surprise: The Soviet-Israeli Alliance of 1947-1949, Woodrow Wilson Center, Laurent Rucker, p. 31) (IMG)

Zionist migration to Israel was banned, the 'Joint' assets were liquidated, and the supposedly 'Communist-led' Jewish Democratic Committee was thoroughly purged. A 1949 CIA document explained:

with the assistance of various international Jewish charitable agencies, thousands were able, after being screened by the Communist-dominated Jewish Democratic Committee, to emigrate to Israel. However, following their attack against "Zionist nationalism" in the Workers Party Resolution of 12 December 1948, the Communists began early in 1949 to restrict the number of Jews permitted to leave the country. This has amounted to virtual cessation of all emigration to Israel. (...). On 4 March 1949, Rumanian Jewry's most valuable tie with the West was severed through the forced liquidation of the American Joint Distribution Committee's assets in Rumania. The Jewish Democratic Committee, thoroughly purged and reorganized under the direction of ... Bercu Feldman, and the Federation of Jewish Communities are now the twin instruments of Communist [the anti-Zionist leadership] of the Rumanian Jewish population. (RUMANIA, CIA, October 5, 1949, pp. 9-10) (IMG)

The document continued:

Strenuous efforts have been made to "integrate" the Jewish population in the framework of a sovietized Rumania. (RUMANIA, CIA, October 5, 1949, p. 9) (IMG)

Note that the migration ceased in 1948, a few months after the expulsion of Tito's gang from the Cominform. This makes much sense since the migration was to happen via Yugoslavia through a joint collaboration of the UDB and Mossad. With the expulsion of Tito's gang from the Cominform came the severing of ties with fascist Yugoslavia and the decline in Yugoslav influence in Romania, hence a decline in CIA-Mossad influence. Subsequent Mossad attempts to lure the Romanian government into collaboration with the Ben-Gurion regime pretty consistently failed. Describing the situation with the Mossad's attempt to promote Zionist migration, Shmuel Friedman, who was:

Director of the Eastern European Section of the [Israeli] Foreign Ministry.... (Between East and West: Israel's Foreign Policy Orientation 1948-1956, Cambridge University Press, Uri Bialer, 2009, p. 86) (IMG)

reported that (as Bialer rightly stated) the anti-Zionist faction of the Romanian government stepped up its resistance against the Zionist conspiracies. According to the Israeli foreign ministry document dated February 22, 1949, Friedman reported that:

In Rumania the situation is deteriorating. The emissaries have not been released and three more have been detained. The directors of the Zionist Funds are still under arrest and awaiting trial. The Rumanians have refused to receive a delegation from the Jewish Agency. (...). The negotiations on Aliya from Rumania have had no results. The Jewish community is on the verge of panic and thousands have been gathering near the Legation in Bucharest demanding to be allowed to emigrate. The Israeli Minister was summoned to the Deputy Foreign Minister and asked to put a halt to the demonstrations.... (...). The Minister in Rumania wishes to contact the Russians in this matter, but Golda Meyerson thinks there is no possibility of holding talks of such sort in Moscow. (S. Friedman (Tel Aviv) to M. Namir (Moscow), February 22, 1949. In: DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL, State of Israel Archives, Vol. 2, October 1948 - April 1949, Edited by Yehoshua Freundlich, Companion Volume, p. 79) (IMG)

In late February of 1949, Rubin, the head of the Israeli legation in Bucharest, Romania, made the following points in his report to Moshe Sharett:

1. For the last four days the entire local press has been attacking with growing intensity the Zionist enterprise in Israel and the aliya.
2. No reply has been received from the authorities on the aliya; on the contrary, pressure has increased on the Jews to take employment and to be absorbed in the Rumanian economy.
3. The pressure to close down the preparatory training farms is continuing and all the children's homes maintained by the Zionist Organization have been taken over by the government.
4. There has been no progress on the release of the directors of the Zionist Funds.
5. There has been no response to Israel's protest over the detention of the emissaries.

6. The leaders of the regime refuse to meeting the Minister and refer him to second or third grade officials.
7. In the Minister's estimate the situation has reached a critical stage and there is a feeling of an impending catastrophe. The impression is that there is no prospect of a solution locally and it is suggested that the Russians be energetically approached in this matter.

(R. Rubin (Bucharest) to M. Sharett, February 27, 1949. In: DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL, State of Israel Archives, Vol. 2, October 1948 – April 1949, Edited by Yehoshua Freundlich, Companion Volume, pp. 80-81) (IMG)

While the Mossad agent Ana Pauker was very kind towards the Mossad, her deputy minister did not appear as favorable to Israel's regime. According to an Israeli legation report to Sharett:

Rubin has been received by the Deputy Foreign Minister from whom he demanded the release of the seven emissaries and requested an answer on the aliya. The Deputy Minister replied that the emissaries were under interrogation on the charge of interfering with internal affairs of the Rumanian state. He also said he had no reply on the aliya. When Rubin asked whether this should be construed as a reply, he said: "As you wish". Rubin replied that he would have to go back to Israel to report. The Deputy Minister responded only by asking when Rubin was planning to leave. (...). In Rubin's opinion further negotiations on the aliya are of no use as an unfavourable decision on this matter has apparently already been taken. The content and tone of the conversation seem to underline this state of affairs. Rubin thinks he should be recalled to Israel for consultations. (R. Rubin (Bucharest) to M. Sharett, March 1, 1949. In: DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL, State of Israel Archives, Vol. 2, October 1948 – April 1949, Edited by Yehoshua Freundlich, Companion Volume, p. 81) (IMG)

Romania's counter-intelligence chief, responsible for many of the anti-Zionist purges, had an even tougher rhetoric against Zionist subversion: Reporting on a meeting between the Minister of the Interior, the Deputy Minister, and 20 Zionist leaders. According to the Minister: the Zionist Organization had to be abolished. The State of Israel was a lackey of the United States. Israeli emissaries in Rumania had engaged in subversive activity, organized demonstrations, and agitated against the government. The [Zionist] agricultural training farms had to be shut down, and the [Zionist] youth movements disbanded. No promise had been given that Zionists would be permitted to emigrate to Israel – this had simply been the Zionists' interpretation. To the extent that aliya would be feasible in the future, it was the government which would determine who would be allowed to leave. All other Jews would have to take their place in the labour force. Thus far, the Minister's statement. (R. Rubin (Bucharest) to M. Sharett, March 3, 1949. In: DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL, State of Israel Archives, Vol. 2, October 1948 – April 1949, Edited by Yehoshua Freundlich, Companion Volume, p. 82) (IMG)

As such, the Mossad operative Avriel reported that:

In Rumania, defeat [of the Zionists] was total. (E. Avriel (Prague) to S. Friedman, March 7, 1949. In: DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL, State of Israel Archives, Vol. 2, October 1948 – April 1949, Edited by Yehoshua Freundlich, Companion Volume, p. 83) (IMG)

Indeed, Avriel rightly believed that:

direct negotiations with the Rumanians will prove fruitless.... (E. Avriel (Prague) to S. Friedman, March 7, 1949. In: DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL, State of Israel Archives, Vol. 2, October 1948 – April 1949, Edited by Yehoshua Freundlich, Companion Volume, p. 83) (IMG)

Ana Pauker tried to release the Israeli agents in Romania. According to a report by the Israeli legation in Romania to Friedman:

Rubin had been granted an interview with Ana Pauker, the Rumanian Foreign minister, and had delivered the letter from Israel's Minister for Foreign Affairs.... They had discussed the problems of aliya, the imprisonment of the emissaries, and trade relations. The emissaries were to be released and sent back to Israel. Rubin asked that all public meetings relating to the emissaries be postponed, and that the press be muted on the matter. With respect to immigration, there was a possibility that negotiations would be resumed; nevertheless, the action agreed upon with Agami should not be deferred at this stage... Israel's purchases in Rumania should certainly be expedited, and a meeting had already been arranged for him with the Minister of Commerce. (R. Rubin (Bucharest) to S. Friedman, March 18., 1949. In: DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL, State of Israel Archives, Vol. 2, October 1948 – April 1949, Edited by Yehoshua Freundlich, Companion Volume, p. 85) (IMG)

According to the Israeli foreign ministry's report on the meeting between Rubin and Pauker:

Ana Pauker received the letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs ... and read it in Rubin's presence.

She said that she had initiated steps to have the imprisoned emissaries released, but the demonstrations outside the Legation had sabotaged her efforts. They had also interfered with further work on the question of immigration. (...).

Ana Pauker raised the question of trade between Rumania and Israel. Rubin replied that he had requested an interview with the Minister of Commerce, but had met with no response. She telephoned the Minister then and there, and the interview was arranged.

In the matter of the directors of the Zionist Funds, she promised to consider a meeting between Rubin and the Rumanian Finance Minister, in order to reach some financial arrangement. Rubin proposed the sum of \$400,000 to resolve the dispute between the Funds and the Rumanian government. He also suggested that a special meeting be called between officials of the Israeli Legation and the Rumanian government commission dealing with immigration to Israel, so that Israel could present her views more clearly. She said that she would study the question.

In Rubin's opinion, the Rumanian government, was divided in its attitude towards Israel, with Ana Pauker, among others, being in favour of permitting emigration to Israel.

(Meeting: R. Rubin – Ana Pauker, Bucharest, March 18, 1949. In: DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL, State of Israel Archives, Vol. 2, October 1948 – April 1949, Edited by Yehoshua Freundlich, Companion Volume, p. 86) (IMG)

Zionist plans in Romania indeed proved quite fruitless as predicted by the Mossad agent Avriel. Later on, Ana Pauker was arrested for her activities for the Mossad:

Ana Pauker was arrested in February 1953 and accused of serving as an agent of international Zionism. (Moscow's Surprise, Wilson Center, Laurent Rucker, p. 32) (IMG)

Anti-corruption purges in Romania also were directed against Zamfir, who had been in charge of passports and hence certain aspects of migration, and who had allowed comprador bourgeois elements among Hungary's Jews/'Jews' to launder money out of Romania:

Colonel Zamfir, Director of Surveillance and Passports ... had obtained huge sums of money by granting passports to people not entitled to them, such as former aliens who had acquired Rumanian citizenship or Jews who had smuggled large amounts of foreign currencies out of the country. Zamfir's wife and mother-in-law were his agents in these transactions. (Political Situation in Rumania from June 1952 to August 1954, CIA, January 27, 1955, p. 2) (IMG)

Colonel Zamfir, Director of Surveillance and Passports, his wife, and his mother-in-law were arrested, and he was sent to work on the Danube-Black Sea Canal.... (Political Situation in Rumania from June 1952 to August 1954, CIA, January 27, 1955, p. 2) (IMG)

In Hungary, parallel events were occurring. Zionist migration was prohibited in Hungary. There was a power struggle between the pro-Zionist faction represented mainly by Zoltan Vas, and the communist anti-Zionist faction led by Rakosi, a comrade of Stalin. A CIA document stated:

Unlike the other Satellites, Hungary had never completely halted the operations of the Jewish welfare organization, the American Joint Distribution Committee (known as Joint). the agreement with Joint was made by Zoltan Vas.... (...). Vas, as chief of the Supreme Economic Council until June 1949 had been associated with a number of shady deals calculated to turn a quick forint to save the financially hard pressed regime. Gero, as chief of the Peoples Economic Council established in 1949 appeared to follow more orthodox methods of industrialization. Vas, an opportunist of many skills and amazing political agility, probably was personally antipathetic to the rigidly puritanical Gero. Vas, moreover, was personally vulnerable: he had been closely related to several high-level defectors and was directly involved in the security police purge through his connection with the Joint agreement. (FACTIONALISM IN THE HUNGARIAN WORKERS (COMMUNIST) PARTY (1945-1956), CIA, January, 28, 1957 pp. 37-38) (IMG)

The gradual decline of Yugoslav influence in Hungary as a result of the Cominform resolution and the firm stand of the communist parties against Titoism, there came about a decline in the power of the Israeli intelligence service as well, by extension. At this point, therefore,:

In Hungary Israeli diplomats failed to negotiate the mass departure of Jews. (Moscow's Surprise, Wilson Center, Laurent Rucker, p. 32) (IMG)

The mass migration from Hungary therefore saw a sharp decline to approximately 555 people per month during the period mid-1948 to the end of 1949:

From mid-1948 to the end of 1949, only about 10,000 Jews emigrated illegally to Israel. (Moscow's Surprise, Wilson Center, Laurent Rucker, p. 32) (IMG)

The anti-Zionist purges by the communist faction though were just beginning, and Zionist migration was to decline even further. As early as February 1949, Israeli intelligence reported that Rakosi had opposed the migration of the Yiddish from Hungary. A Mossad document written by the Mossad operative Avriel provided the following details:

Avriel discussed the problem of aliya with Rakosi, the Secretary-General of the Hungarian Communist Party, stressing the necessity of aliya from Hungary and asking for 50,000 exit permits within six months, promising in exchange to put a stop to the illegal emigration and to use his influence to pacify the Jewish public.

Rakosi refused the request, claiming that the Jews were an integral and useful component of the Hungarian nation. They included many professionals, whose emigration would harm the stability of the state. (...). The Hungarian government is putting pressure on the Zionist Organization to dissolve of itself. Emissaries from Israel are being deported on the charge of Zionist activities. Avriel advised the Zionist leaders not to dissolve the organization but also not indulge in provocative acts. The emissaries will leave Hungary only if forced to do so.

(E. Avriel (Prague) to S. Friedman, February 21, 1949. In: DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL, State of Israel Archives, Vol. 2, October 1948 – April 1949, Edited by Yehoshua Freundlich, Companion Volume, pp. 78-79) (IMG)

The result of such a power struggle was a 'compromise' between the Zionist faction of Zoltan Vas and the anti-Zionist communist faction centered around Rakosi. Indeed, considering the greater pressure by the Mossad lobby in Hungary:

Rakosi ... nevertheless agreed on the need for some sort of compromise and promised to have the problem discussed anew in the Cabinet and to consult the neighbouring countries. (E. Avriel (Prague) to S. Friedman, February 21, 1949. In: DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL, State of Israel Archives, Vol. 2, October 1948 – April 1949, Edited by Yehoshua Freundlich, Companion Volume, pp. 78-79) (IMG)

The 'compromise' actually favored the anti-Zionist faction more than may at first appear. The 'compromise' in the Hungarian Party was that Israel would have to pay for the legal migration (as opposed to kidnapping) of the elderly Yiddish. Note that the older Jews were predominantly unenthusiastic about the Zionist project, nor were they particularly 'biologically useful' for entrenching an Israeli Kautskyite terror state that required energetic young men and women in the labour force or the military. Legal migration of the elderly to Israel would have meant that the migration of the elderly Jews was going to be limited to the Zionist elderly Jews/'Jews', as opposed to any random elderly Jew/'Jew' being captured. Beyond the older Jews for whose legal migration (as opposed to kidnapping) money was to be paid, no Zionist migration would be allowed. For all practical purposes, the legal mass migration of the elderly and the less-literate to Israel would have boosted costs for Israel's regime while contributing little in favor of the Zionist settler-colonial project. Hence the launching of a mass migration of Zionist elderly to Israel would have served as an anti-Zionist weapon of mass migration, forcing the Ben-Gurion regime to spend its funds in accommodating the elderly rather than spend its funds for terrorizing Arabs. This circumstance really dissatisfied Ehud Avriel (whose original name was 'Ueberall', later Hebraicized into Avriel), the top Mossad operative responsible for Zionist migration affairs. These facts have been corroborated in a CIA document, some excerpts of which are as follows:

Ueberall, the Israeli minister in Prague, is currently in Budapest conferring with the Hungarian Government on the release of 20,000 Hungarian Jews for emigration to Israel.

The Hungarian Government is demanding two million U.S. dollars from the Joint Distribution Committee, ostensibly to cover "fees" for processing emigrants. The Government will release only older and, by Israeli standards, unassimilable elements for emigration.

Ueberall, regarding the sum demanded as "hostage money", is opposed to payment and to accepting older people. He has already conferred with Matyas Rakosi, Secretary of the Hungarian Workers Party, who has proved uncooperative and refused to permit young Hungarian Jews, to emigrate on the grounds that they are a "literate element" and are needed by the State.

(HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENT REFUSES TO RELEASE PRO-ZIONIST JEWISH YOUTH, CIA, April 26, 1949, p. 1) (IMG)

Rakosi 'compromised' with the Zionist forces in a manner that undermined the Zionist forces, and led anti-Zionist purges, and actively worked to undermine CIA-Mossad presence in Hungary. Shmuel Friedman, Director of the Eastern European Section of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, reported that:

There is complete stalemate in Hungary, and E. Avriel is continuing his negotiations. (S. Friedman (Tel Aviv) to M. Namir (Moscow), February 22, 1949. In: DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL, State of Israel Archives, Vol. 2, October 1948 – April 1949, Edited by Yehoshua Freundlich, Companion Volume, p. 80) (IMG)

Thus, due to the influence of the Rakosi faction:

The Hungarian government has once again renewed its resistance to the emigration of Hungarian Jews to Israel. Consequently, "clandestine methods" are now being used to remove Hungarian Jews from Hungary. (Exodus of Jews from Yugoslavia, CIA, March 21, 1949, p. 1) (IMG)

After this phase of the 'compromise', which undermined Zionist interests, anti-Zionist purges began; those responsible for assisting the illegal migration were duly prosecuted, and a Hungarian Zionist organization was dismantled. This is corroborated by Karel Kaplan, a West German spy who stole many of the archives of the Czechoslovak government in his defection to the camp of the US-led countries in the mid-1970s. Subsequently, he closely collaborated with the CIA's Radio Free Europe, as well as with the 'Federal Institute for East European and International Studies', the official research wing of the Interior Ministry of the Federal Republic of Germany. Kaplan wrote:

One could, however, observe a note of anti-Zionism.... The official Hungarian attitude toward Jews, particularly toward efforts to emigrate to Israel, had dramatically changed in the course of 1949. Emigration passports were no longer granted as liberally as before, and later were no longer granted at all. February negotiations of Israel's envoy in Prague with leading Hungarian authorities were fruitless in this regard. On March 24, the interior ministry disbanded the Hungarian Zionist Union (with perhaps a hundred thousand members), stating that it had been organized by a foreign power. Those who assisted people in getting abroad illegally, via Czechoslovakia, were prosecuted. (The Report on the Murder of the General Secretary, Karel Kaplan, 1990, p. 29) (IMG)

Rakosi was aware of the extensive lobby of the CIA-Mossad in Czechoslovakia, and as will be revealed later in C15S8, Rakosi would assist Gottwald in the purge of American agents in Czechoslovakia. The Israeli legation in Prague, in its monthly report to Tel Aviv, stated that:

With respect to aliya from Eastern Europe in general, the Legation [in Prague] had learned that the Hungarian Communist Party had lodged a complaint with the Cominform against the Czechoslovak Communist Party concerning the immigration from Czechoslovakia, asking for a uniform decision in this field. The report had not been corroborated by other sources. (Monthly Report of the Israeli Legation in Prague, March 10, 1949. In: DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL, State of Israel Archives, Vol. 2, October 1948 – April 1949, Edited by Yehoshua Freundlich, Companion Volume, p. 85) (IMG)

The report was later corroborated in another Israeli foreign ministry document by Friedman which stated:

The Cominform was to convene at the end of April and, among other issues, would discuss the question of immigration to Israel. (S. Friedman (Tel Aviv) to the Israel Legation in Warsaw, March 30, 1949. In: DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL, State of Israel Archives, Vol. 2, October 1948 – April 1949, Edited by Yehoshua Freundlich, Companion Volume, p. 89) (IMG)

The April 26 CIA document continued:

no matter what the attitude of the Hungarian Government might be, the Hungarian Jewish youth is dominantly pro-Zionist and is determined to emigrate, clandestinely if necessary.*

*Comment: Presumably through Yugoslavia

(HUNGARIAN GOVERNMENT REFUSES TO RELEASE PRO-ZIONIST JEWISH YOUTH, CIA, April 26, 1949, p. 1. Underline original) (IMG)

On the other hand, the Israeli secret service agents were losing ground in Poland as well. Friedman, the Director of the Eastern European Section of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, reported that:

In Poland the situation is also difficult. The Palestine Office, which dealt with immigration to Israel, has been closed down and its functions have been transferred to the Legation, whose staff is consequently under great pressure. The Polish government allows only a small number to emigrate, as it sees fit. Apparently only those are permitted to leave who have relatives in Israel, who are over 50 and who are not in an essential occupation. The report which has been recently appeared in an Israeli newspaper that there would be great concessions in the matter of emigration is apparently groundless. The Israeli Minister in Warsaw finds it difficult to reconcile himself to this state of affairs and transmits continuous reports on "friendly" negotiations, on an unclear situation and on possible developments in either direction. There are good prospects of aliya from Czechoslovakia. (S. Friedman (Tel Aviv) to M. Namir (Moscow), February 22, 1949. In: DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL, State of Israel Archives, Vol. 2, October 1948 – April 1949, Edited by Yehoshua Freundlich, Companion Volume, pp. 79-80) (IMG)

However:

In Bulgaria, on the other hand, emigration is continuing. The Bulgarians have requested to postpone the dispatch of an official representative from Israel till the end of March, when the emigration of the Jews will have been completed. (S. Friedman (Tel Aviv) to M. Namir (Moscow), February 22, 1949. In: DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL, State of Israel Archives, Vol. 2, October 1948 – April 1949, Edited by Yehoshua Freundlich, Companion Volume, pp. 79-80) (IMG)

Also:

The movement of Bulgarian Jews on Israeli ships to Israel was recently completed. (Exodus of Jews from Yugoslavia, CIA, March 21, 1949, p. 1) (IMG)

As a result of the powerful Zionist lobby that existed in the Peoples' Democracies, and despite the communist resistance, these Mossad operations were largely successful.

C16S3. On Britain's fake 'Opposition' to Zionism *** IMG-All-{Israel}

During the 1940s, the British and the Israeli regime pretended to be viciously at war with each other. Surely, there existed Mapamite/Palmachnik who genuinely aimed to combat the British imperial presence in the region (more on this later) but the dominant faction in the Zionist movement held a favorable stance towards the British Empire, despite pretending to 'oppose' it. The dominant faction in Israel and the British ferociously denounced

each other. Hence, on the surface, Britain would appear as ‘opposed’ to the Zionist ‘Jewish Agency’ and Israel, and hence opposed to US projects in Palestine since Israel was actively and openly backed by the United States.

Depending on the balance of power as determined by the extent of the development of the productive forces, two or more imperialist powers can be rivals or can be allies. The Anglo-Americans, however, had strictly convergent finance capital interests at the time. To think that the British were seriously going to oppose the US colony Israel, is to be profoundly mistaken.

The CIA collaborated with the MI6 on virtually every corner of the planet; simultaneously, the CIA also collaborated with the Mossad on virtually every corner of the planet, and since the Mossad was the junior partner in this collaboration, the Mossad was controlled by the CIA back then through the Joint Distribution Committee. The MI6 and Mossad both so extensively collaborated with the CIA, and yet both managed to avoid each other or wage wars against each other? Such a ‘love triangle’ war between the MI6 and Mossad, two partners of the CIA, is totally implausible. It is so obviously a fraud, disproven not only by dialectical logic, but also by empirical evidence of the thorough collaboration of numerous MI6 agents with the Mossad and numerous Mossad agents with the MI6 during this period. Some of the evidence of the services rendered by the British and the Israelis to one another will be mentioned in this chapter.

For start, the whole purpose of promoting the myth of British colonial ‘opposition’ to Zionism goes back to 1910s and 1920s with the alliance of the MI6 with both the Zionists and the Hashemites of Jordan. Since the Palestinians are regarded as ethno-racially more similar to the Jordanians than they are to the other Levantine Arabs of the Levant, it would have been awkward for Jordan’s Hashemites to openly collaborate with the colonial power that promoted the Zionist terror against the Palestinian Arabs. As such, the British decided to, on the covert level, ally with the Jordanian Hashemites and the Zionist settlers, while being ‘hostile’ to Israeli regime on the overt level and supporting Zionist settler-colonialism’s fake ‘enemy’, the Hashemite Jordan. So much for the Anglo-Hashemite ‘hostility’ to Zionist settler-colonialism, the Anglo-Hashemites stabbed the Arab armies in the back during the 1948 War.

The MI6 puppet Hashemite regimes in Iraq and Jordan and the infamous British General Glubb who ran the Hashemite Jordanian army on behalf of the British military, stabbed the Arab armies in the back during the war against Israel. This fact is extensively documented and books have been written about this, but I will present the remarks of the Saudi King Faysal, who years after the 1948 War, in a conversation with Gamal Abdel-Nasser, recalled the Anglo-Hashemite stab in the back:

That Glubb was a pig! At the time, he was preventing the Jordanian army – even if Abdullah wanted to be with him – he would stop them, and he had instructions from the British to not go beyond the boundaries of the division.

The Iraqi army remained in the triangle there and did not move. Its front reached Latania, between Haifa and Tel Aviv, and then they returned to it, like the battle.

(Minutes of the Discussions of President Gamal Abdel-Nasser with King Faysal, Second Session, December 19, 1969) (IMG)

Throughout most of the years of the colonial occupation of Palestine, the British Empire pretended to ‘oppose’ Zionist migration and Zionist settler-colonialism. The Israelis and the British launched ‘wars’ of words against each other. Yet, that same Britain opened up Palestine for Zionist migration even during the years in which it ‘denounced’ Zionist projects. Arnold Toynbee, who worked for the intelligence department of the British Foreign Office, stated that decades of British military rule over Palestine is what led to Zionist migration to that territory, whereas an independent Arab state in Palestine would have prevented the flooding of Palestine with Jews:

Arnold J. Toynbee who, before becoming recognized as an eminent world historian had dealt directly with the Palestine Mandate in the British Foreign Office, wrote in 1968:

“All through those 30 years, Britain (admitted) into Palestine, year by year, a quota of Jewish immigrants that varied according to the strength of the respective pressures of the Arabs and Jews at the time. These immigrants could not have come in if they had not been shielded by a British *chevaux-de-frise*. If Palestine had remained under Ottoman Turkish rule, or if it had become an independent Arab state in 1918, Jewish immigrants would never have been admitted into Palestine in large enough numbers to enable them to overwhelm the Palestinian Arabs in this Arab people’s own country. The reason why the State of Israel exists today and why today 1,500,000 Palestinian Arabs are refugees is that, for 30 years, Jewish immigration was imposed on the Palestinian Arabs by British military power until the immigrants were sufficiently numerous and sufficiently well-armed to be able to fend for themselves with tanks and planes of their own. The tragedy in Palestine is not just a local one; it is a tragedy for the world, because it is an injustice that is a menace to the world’s peace.”

(History of the Question of Palestine, Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem, Part I (1917-1947), United Nations (UN)) (IMG)

In 1939, the British established the ‘White Paper’ supposedly to restrict Zionist migration, but during that same period from 1939 to 1944, when the Ashkenazi and Sfaradi refugees were escaping Nazi persecution, the British relaxed their own ‘White Paper’ restrictions. In other words, the ‘White Paper’ only nominally ‘restricted’ Zionist migration. The UN reported:

The clauses of the 1939 White Paper relating to immigration were also implemented, but at the end of the five-year period in 1944, only 51,000 of the 75,000 immigration certificates provided for had been utilized. In circumstances where Jewish refugees from Europe were fleeing violence and persecution, the White Paper’s limits were relaxed and legal immigration was permitted to continue indefinitely at the rate of 18,000 a year. (History of the Question of Palestine, Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem, Part I (1917-1947), United Nations (UN)) (IMG)

Furthermore, and as a matter of fact, recall that Britain actively collaborated with Israel during World War II:

According to [OSS official] Koenig, "the various British Intelligence Services freely used the emissaries of this section [i.e. the Jewish Agency] for penetration, intelligence and DA [double agent] purposes. The representatives of the AJDC acted as a liaison with the Allied intelligence services and eventually financed this courier-cum-intelligence service." ('CIA AND NAZI WAR CRIM. AND COL. CHAP. 11-21, DRAFT WORKING PAPER_0001', Chapter Eleven: American Intelligence and the Jewish Brichah, CIA Draft Working Paper, pp. 7-8. **Square brackets are original.** The CIA paper cites: 'SCI/A, Vienna, "Original Project Report: SYMPHONY Project," [April 1946], LVX-216, (S), in DO Records, 1L 3, Box 4, Folder 10, CIA ARC.) (IMG)

Although the Mossad and the MI6 pretended to have ceased cooperation since 1945, that claim is completely implausible for so many reasons. It is anti-dialectical to assume that the British imperialists were simultaneously (1) genuinely allied to the American imperialists and (2) genuinely opposed to the regime of Israel, the ally of American imperialism. It goes against another of the dialectical laws of history: the tendency for two states/organizations to form an alliance with each other if there is a state/organization that is allied to these two states/organizations. The alliance of the British with the Americans and the alliance of the Americans with the Israelis would have meant that the British too were allied to Israel, despite

the outwardly pretensions of ‘hostility’ between the British and the Israelis. The outwardly pretensions of ‘hostility’ actually was an excellent propaganda and intelligence weapon of the MI6, the CIA, and the Mossad, because it gave the Anglo-Israeli agents in Eastern Europe the required excuse to support Israel so to assist Israel in ostensibly ‘fighting’ the British imperialists, when in fact Israel was going to fight the Arabs instead of the British.

C16S4. On the 1947 Soviet Vote in the UN regarding Palestine *** IMG-All-{Israel}

In 1946, the USSR signed a secret treaty with Syria calling for the removal of British troops from the region:

The USSR agree to support the Syrian government in all steps which the latter may undertake in order to establish complete independence. The USSR will back Syrian demands for immediate evacuation of all French and British troops. (The Soviet Union and Egypt, 1945-55, Rami Ginat, 1993, p. 70. Citing: From Encroachment to Involvement, a Documentary Study of Soviet Policy in the Middle East, 1945-1973. Israel University Press, Yaacov Ro'i, 1974, pp. 29-30) (IMG)

The same type of deal was made with Lebanon:

A secret treaty between the USSR and the Lebanese government based on these [above] clauses, was signed two days later. (The Soviet Union and Egypt, 1945-55, Rami Ginat, 1993, p. 70) (IMG)

The first significant political dialogue between the Soviet Union and the Arab governments occurred at the beginning of 1946. In an attempt to increase their influence in the Middle East, the USSR approached the President of Lebanon, Bishara al-Khuri, on 10 January 1946 with a proposal to negotiate a secret treaty. After consultations and discussions between the Lebanese and Syrian governments, both agreed to receive the first formal proposal of a treaty from the USSR. (The Soviet Union and Egypt, 1945-1955, Rami Ginat, 1993, pp. 69-70) (IMG)

Therefore, the USSR had an international obligation to strive towards the reduction of British imperial influence in the Levant – and the Soviets stayed true their words. As the world’s superpower, the USSR took the initiative in the UN by starting the discussions on the independence of Palestine, a topic which the Anglo-Americans surely sought to avoid:

The efforts of the United Kingdom and United States to avoid discussion of the substance of the Palestine problem at the special session, and to create a neutral committee without Great Power participation, provided the Soviet Union with an opportunity to gain credit for a certain degree of leadership in the Palestine question. Gromyko exploited this opportunity by (1) appearing to champion the principle of full discussion; (2) generally favoring immediate independence and termination of the Mandate.... The course pursued by the Soviets appears to leave the USSR in an excellent tactical position for the future. (Subject: Position Taken by the USSR on Problems Arising at Special Session of United Nations General Assembly, May 27, 1947. In: ‘Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947: 1947:5’, United States Department of States, p. 1089) (IMG)

In early 1947, thanks to the efforts of Palmachnik Israeli freedom-fighters, the question on the fate of Palestine was brought forth to the United Nations::

in February 1947 ... the British Government, under the pressure of violence in Palestine, requested a special session of the General Assembly to consider the appointment of a special committee “to make recommendations ... concerning the future government of Palestine”. (The Origins and Evolution of Palestine Problem, Part II: 1947-1977, The Palestine Question in the United Nations; underline added) (IMG)

The official goal of the UNSCOP was to:

prepare a report to the General Assembly and shall submit such proposals as it may consider appropriate for the solution of the problem of Palestine. (Official Records of the General Assembly, First Special Session, Plenary, General Series, document A/286, 56th meeting, p. 314. Cited in: The Origins and Evolution of Palestine Problem, Part II: 1947-1977) (IMG)

However, the UNSCOP member states were:

Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, India, Iran, the Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia. (‘UN Partition Plan, 1947: Paving the Way to the Impending Nakba’, Palquest: The Interactive Encyclopedia of the Palestine Question) (IMG)

Australia, Canada, Guatemala, Iran, the Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia were all firmly entrenched in the imperialist camp. The latter in particular is noteworthy as will be seen later in this chapter. In spite of its anti-imperialist pretensions, Yugoslavia was a pro-imperialist spy-state, serving as one of the hubs of CIA, MI6, and most importantly for this case, Mossad activity.

India was openly sympathetic to the USSR.

The situation in Czechoslovakia was mixed. The influence of the communist and anti-communist forces in Czechoslovakia was quasi-equal in 1947. Note that Czechoslovakia’s communist revolution did not happen until 1948. Nor did the Red Army have a strong presence in Czechoslovakia to create the pressure for non-socialist Czechoslovakia to adopt Soviet lines. While the Communist Party (KSC) maintained a strong popular representation in the Czechoslovak government, they still were not yet in power. As a matter of fact, Czechoslovakia was back then led by such openly pro-Western capitalist leaders as President Edvard Benes and the pro-Western ‘Christian Zionist’ Foreign Minister and millionaire Jan Masaryk. Subordinated to Masaryk was his Under Secretary, Vladimir Clementis who was ostensibly a ‘communist’ and officially belonged to the KSC, but, as a member of a ring of Anglo-American agents, was secretly betraying Czechoslovakia by promoting Slovak separatism and anti-state Zionist activity. The communists did have a significant influence over the Czechoslovak state, but still not enough.

Clearly, the majority of the states in UNSCOP were satellites or neo-colonies of the United States. In the UNSCOP, a key:

question in the discussion on the Special Committee was whether the problem of Jewish refugees in Europe should be linked with the Palestine problem. A European delegate stressed the importance of separating the two:

“... the difficulty of finding a just and satisfactory solution to the Palestine question are increased by the linking together of two problems which are not necessarily interdependent.

“The first problem is the question of the future status of Palestine; the second problem is the question of the homeless Jews in Europe. These two problems are usually linked together in every discussion of the Palestine question. It is taken for granted that the only solution of the humanitarian problem of Jewish homelessness is immigration to Palestine and it is thus dependent upon a solution of the political question of the future status of Palestine.

(The Origins and Evolution of Palestine Problem, Part II: 1947-1977, Citing: Official Records of the General Assembly, First Special Session, Plenary, General Series, document A/286, First Committee, vol. III, 48th meeting, pp. 88-91.) (IMG)

In the end, Washington was able to lobby for the imposition of its will, and the issue of Jewish refugees was linked to the future of Palestine: The United States draft (somewhat amended) was approved ... and the mission of the Special Committee was approved in broad terms: "The Special Committee shall prepare a report to the General Assembly and shall submit such proposals as it may consider appropriate for the solution of the problem of Palestine".

While avoiding specific reference to the refugee situation in Europe, the Special Committee was authorized to conduct investigations anywhere it considered necessary, thus assuring an indirect linkage of the Jewish refugee issue to the future of Palestine.

(The Origins and Evolution of Palestine Problem, Part II: 1947-1977, Cited: Official Records of the General Assembly, First Special Session, Plenary, General Series, document A/286, 56th meeting, p. 314.) (IMG)

Throughout the sessions of the United Nations, the USSR consistently supported the establishment of a single state of Palestine, an independent bi-ethnic democratic state in which the rights of the Israelis and Palestinian Arabs were respected. Indeed, as early as April 15, 1947, the Middle East Department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs argued firmly for a single, independent, democratic Palestine. One prominent legal scholar at Harvard University has noted:

With the United Nations moving to take up Britain's request, the government of the Soviet Union moved toward formulating a stance. To many in the Soviet foreign affairs establishment, the logical choice was to oppose Zionism and support the Arabs. On April 15, 1947, an internal document was drafted titled "Memorandum by the Middle East Department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the Palestine Question (for the forthcoming discussion of the Palestine question at the United Nations)." The Memorandum, circulated within the Ministry only, stated: "The United Nations must draw up a constitution for a single, independent and democratic Palestine which will ensure that all the peoples living there will enjoy equal national and democratic rights." Continuing, it recited, "The United Nations must also act as guarantor for the implementation of its own prerequisites for an independent and democratic Palestine state. The independent and democratic State of Palestine shall be included [as a member] in the United Nations." (The International Diplomacy of Israel's Founders, Cambridge University Press, John Quigley, pp. 47-48) (IMG)

Clearly, this position of the Soviets:

was support for the Arab position. The Arabs wanted a Palestine state upon Britain's withdrawal. That was the view of the Arab Higher Committee, which regarded itself as a government-in-waiting for Palestine. The Soviet position, as yet confidential, was moving away from the trusteeship proposed in the earlier Soviet paper, in the direction of outright independence for Palestine. Under this approach, the Arab-Jewish hostility would be resolved through democratic processes. Migration to Palestine would presumably require the consent of the Arabs, so the USSR would oppose the Zionist desire for a Jewish state. (The International Diplomacy of Israel's Founders, Cambridge University Press, John Quigley, p. 48) (IMG)

A US diplomatic document confirmed that the USSR was pursuing a policy in support of the Arab cause and against the creation of Israel's regime: Recent press articles (Embets 1636, April 30 and 1670, May 6) as well as Gromyko's conduct in special GA [General Assembly] meeting provide further indication that Soviet policy toward Palestine is based upon:

1. Opposition to formation in all or part of Palestine of Jewish State, which USSR would regard as Zionist tool of West, inevitably hostile to Soviet Union.

2. Support of ... independence of Palestine with present Arab majority population. Chambrinski in Red Fleet article was undoubtedly speaking for Soviet Union in declaring "progressive circles of entire world consider entirely just [the] demand of Palestinian people for independence and democratic path to development.["]

(867N.01/5-1047: Telegram, The Charge in the Soviet Union (Dubrow) to the Secretary of State, Confidential, Moscow, May 10, 1947.

In: 'Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947: 1947:5', United States Department of States, pp. 1081-1082) (IMG)

During the discussions of the UNSCOP, the USSR and Poland argued for an independent and democratic Palestinian state. Dominated by a pro-Zionist and pro-imperialist bias, the UNSCOP rejected these proposals:

During the discussion in the Committee, the Soviet and Polish representatives proposed amendments to its terms of reference requiring it to submit proposals on the question of establishing "the independent democratic State of Palestine", both amendments being defeated. (The Origins and Evolution of Palestine Problem, Part II: 1947-1977, The Palestine Question in the United Nations) (IMG)

Instead, the UNSCOP had developed a 'majority' plan. The 'majority' who supported this of course belonged to or leaned towards the Western Bloc and thus supported the Zionist project:

The Special Committee, however, had been unable to agree on recommendations. A majority of members (Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, Netherlands, Peru, Sweden and Uruguay) recommended the partition of Palestine into two States that would be politically separate and independent, but would administer a unified economy. Jerusalem would be an international city. The minority (India, Iran and Yugoslavia) proposed an independent Palestine as a federated State with Jerusalem as its capital. Australia did not support either proposal. (The Origins and Evolution of Palestine Problem, Part II: 1947-1977) (IMG)

Notice that Czechoslovakia belonged to this 'majority' faction. It seems unlikely that Czechoslovakia was supporting the 'majority' faction as a result of Soviet influence, because the Soviets were openly on the side of the single independent democratic state instead of the partition. The UNSCOP members did agree on the termination of the British occupation of Palestine, however. This inter-imperialist conflict was manifested in the fact that the:

The only unanimous agreement [in UNSCOP] was on the termination of the Mandate, the principle of independence, and a United Nations role:

"The Mandate for Palestine shall be terminated at the earliest practicable date ...

"Independence shall be granted in Palestine at the earliest practicable date ...

(The Origins and Evolution of Palestine Problem, Part II: 1947-1977) (IMG)

In short, the decision of the UNSCOP was to support the partition and to terminate the British mandate. The UNSCOP majority therefore adopted the line officially held by the Zionists. Note that during this period, the Zionist mainstream was supportive of a strategic partnership with the United States but also pretended to be militantly hostile to the British Empire. Recall also that Britain was the force behind the Zionist mass migration, even though it presented itself as hostile to Zionist mass migration. Recall further that the reason behind this ostensible 'hostility' of the Zionists towards the British Empire was rooted in Britain's strategic alliance with the Hashemite monarchy in Jordan, 'the Arabs', hence resulting in Britain's 'hostility'

the Ben-Gurion network, Zionist migration, etc. No informed observer would have ever seriously doubted the fact that the Ben-Gurion group, fascist agents of American intelligence as they were, would have been – and were – also allies of Britain.

None of that is to imply that the superficiality of the ‘hostility’ of Israel and Britain was insignificant, since after all the UNSCOP majority line officially supported the withdrawal of Britain in favor of the establishment of Israel. This outwardly pretension of hostility was something that the USSR exploited excellently so to undermine British imperial and Zionist settler-colonial interests in Palestine.

Let us analyze the situation. **If Britain was to stay in Palestine, then the Israeli settler-colonies would have expanded gradually but surely, even if Israel would have not been officially established. If the British were to leave Palestine, there was a strong probability that the Israeli settler-colonies would have swiftly expanded through a successful Israeli war against the Arabs, but there was also a good probability that Israel would not have won the war and hence the Zionist settler-colonial project of expelling the Palestinian Arabs would have failed.** If Britain would have officially stayed in Palestine, British presence in Palestine would have been both covert and overt. If, on the other hand, the British would have left Palestine, British imperial presence in Palestine would have been reduced to mere covert presence for the while, thus relatively weakening British imperial presence. In sum, continued official British presence in Palestine would have guaranteed the expansion of Israeli settler colonies against the Arabs living under British rule, and would have maintained covert and overt British presence in Palestine. On the other hand, the official withdrawal of the British would have ended the guarantee on Israel’s settler-colonial expansion and would have reduced British presence to covert presence only. The choice between these two options is a no-brainer: (1) Britain leaving Palestine and ending the guarantee on Israel’s settler-colonial expansion, and (2) Britain staying in Palestine thereby guaranteeing Israel’s settler-colonial expansion. Option 1 was definitely the correct choice, and that was the choice of the USSR. The Arab states should have supported the USSR’s pragmatic line on this matter, because it would have damaged Zionist colonial interests in spite of the appearance of it being a ‘pro-Zionist’ line. However, the Arab states did not do so officially, because they were under the pressure of the Arab masses who, understandably, were not necessarily aware of the strategic situation described above.

One question that may be raised is: if one is to choose between these covert allies Britain and Israel, why choose to side with the Zionists against British colonialism in the UN vote? In other words, why not side with British colonialism against the Zionist delegates in the UN? The reason is that at the time, the British controlled all of Palestine whereas the Ben-Gurion faction of the Jewish Agency controlled only a part of Palestine; the balance of power in this British-Israeli ‘conflict’ was in the favor of the British. The British held much more material factors under their influence than did the Zionist settler-colonizers in Palestine. In order to exploit this superficial ‘conflict’ between Zionists and British imperialists, it was necessary to coopt and ‘support’ the weaker reactionary – those delegates to the UN who voiced support for Zionist settler-colonialism – against the stronger evil, the British Empire. Had Britain stayed in Palestine, nothing would have been left of Arab Gaza and Arab West Bank since those territories would have been fully settler-colonized by the Israeli regime. British withdrawal put those efforts into jeopardy. Even now, the reason why the West Bank is colonized is because of Anglo-Hashemite betrayals. In short, although the decision to ‘favor’ the Zionist settler-colonists at the expense of the British Empire would superficially appear as ‘support’ for Zionist settler-colonialism, the truth was that Zionist settler-colonialism itself fed from and was fueled with the support of British colonialism, and without British colonialism, the Zionist settler-colonial project too would have weakened. The United States would have definitely benefited from both the continued presence of the British in Palestine and the continued expansion of the Israeli settler-colonies. The US therefore covertly supported both Britain and Israel. However, publicly, it had to make a choice between Britain and Israel. Publicly choosing Britain over Israel would have been a ‘strategy’ of utmost foolishness on the part of the American imperialists, since the Americans had spent so many years cultivating soft power influence among a significant percentage of the Israeli population. The tasks were divided between the Americans and the British; Britain would increase influence in Jordan through British colonial ‘anti-Zionism’, whereas America would aim to steal the USSR’s soft power influence among the Ashkenazim by supporting the establishment of a Zionist state as a rival to the Yiddish Autonomous Oblast in the USSR. Furthermore, had the US publicly sided with Britain over Israel, the USSR – already armed with tremendous soft-power influence among the Yiddish population due to its heroic war against the Nazis – could easily use this decision of the United States as a propaganda tool to drive a deep wedge between Israel and USA. In effect, the USSR would have been able to not only dramatically undermine the British, but also to pull Israel away from America so to liberate Israel from American imperialism and to pave the way for Israel to ally with the progressive anti-imperialist Arab organizations and states in the region. The result would have been damage to British, American, and Zionist settler-colonial interests. The US would have been monumentally foolish not to publicly side with Israel against Britain. Hence, as yet another evidence of the success of Soviet maneuvering, the US was compelled to join the USSR in supporting the resolution to expel Britain from Palestine.

The USSR also correctly calculated that despite the reactionary character of the Zionist regime, the Soviet soft power among the Ashkenazim and Sfaradim would greatly pay off. Many individuals harbor the false view that almost all of those who migrated to Palestine migrated wanted to terrorize the Arabs of Palestine. That is not true. Although a large percentage of the Ashkenazi/Sfaradi migrants to Palestine harbored anti-Arab chauvinist views, another large percentage opposed such anti-Arab chauvinism, favoring instead coexistence with the Arabs and alliance with the progressive Arab forces against the British Empire, the American imperialists and the anti-Arab chauvinist mainstream tendency in the ‘Jewish Agency’ led by Ben-Gurion. The Soviets were aware of such a current among the people of Israel. More on this will be mentioned later.

In any case, the Soviet decision regarding Palestine was not a choice between the lesser evils, but was a strong step forward against the imperialist-fascist presence in Palestine. Thus, after the UNSCOP rejected the Soviet and Polish delegations’ call for a single state of Palestine, the Soviets reiterated their support for a single state solution, but toned down their line by describing it as a ‘more noteworthy’ option:

Thus, the solution of the Palestine problem by the establishment of a single Arab-Jewish State with equal rights for the Jews and the Arabs may be considered as one of the possibilities and one of the more noteworthy methods for the solution of this complicated problem ... (Official Records of the General Assembly, First Special Session, Plenary, General Series, document A/286, Plenary Meetings, vol. I, 77th meeting, pp. 132-134. Cited in: *The Origins and Evolution of Palestine Problem, Part II: 1947-1977*) (IMG)

Reflecting the Soviet confrontation with the pro-Zionist majority in the UN and the aforementioned dilemma associated with it, the Soviet representative in the United Nations Andrei Gromyko added:

If this plan proved impossible to implement, ... then it would be necessary to consider the second plan ... which provides for the partition of Palestine into two independent autonomous States, one Jewish and one Arab. (Official Records of the General Assembly, First Special Session, Plenary, General Series, document A/286, Plenary Meetings, vol. I, 77th meeting, pp. 132-134. Cited in: *The Origins and Evolution of Palestine Problem, Part II: 1947-1977*) (IMG)

It is essential to emphasize, as confirmed by US diplomatic and intelligence documents, that the USSR surely preferred the establishment of a single, integral, independent, democratic Palestinian state, hence opposing the establishment of Israel’s regime. A May 27, 1947 US diplomatic report cited a memorandum that was:

Dated May 27, ... [and] drafted by officers of EUR.... (Subject: Position Taken by the USSR on Problems Arising at Special Session of United Nations General Assembly, May 27, 1947. In: 'Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947: 1947:5', United States Department of States, p. 1088) (IMG)

The EUR was and remains the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, a special branch of analysis for the US State Department, focusing, as the name suggests, on Eurasian affairs. The memorandum, the US diplomatic report stated, analyzed the stance of the USSR on the partition of Palestine:

The attached memorandum, prepared at your request, and reviewed in EUR and NEA, analyzes the statements on various aspects of the Palestine problem made by the Soviet Delegation at the special session of the General Assembly. The voting record of the Soviet bloc, the Arab States, and the United States on the principal roll call votes taken at the special session is also appended. (Subject: Position Taken by the USSR on Problems Arising at Special Session of United Nations General Assembly, May 27, 1947. In: 'Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947: 1947:5', United States Department of States, pp. 1088-1089) (IMG)

The US State Department memorandum stated that while on the surface, it appeared as though the Soviet delegation had a shift its stance to a Zionist one, in reality there had been no change in the Soviet stance. This was, the memorandum confirmed, because the USSR supported the establishment of a single, integral, non-partitioned, multi-ethnic, democratic, independent Palestine as its first choice:

The memorandum indicates that, despite an apparent shift in the Soviet position at the final meeting of the Assembly, there is no real inconsistency in the various statements of position made by the Soviet Delegation. Throughout, the statements seem designed to straddle the fundamental issue. The Soviets supported ... independence after partition if a bi-national state proved to be impracticable; and representation for the Great Powers on the special investigating committee. (Subject: Position Taken by the USSR on Problems Arising at Special Session of United Nations General Assembly, May 27, 1947. In: 'Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947: 1947:5', United States Department of States, p. 1089) (IMG)

On September 1947, in a meeting of the US delegation to the UN General Assembly, the Soviet position on Palestine was discussed. Indeed, regarding the specific issue of Palestine, the former Assistant Chief of Staff of the US Army and Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas, General John Hilldring confirmed that the USSR's number one choice for Palestine was a federal state:

General Hilldring said that the Russians had already made their position clear. Their first choice was a federal state. (10 Files: US/A/AC.14/205, Position on Palestine, Excerpts From the Minutes of the Sixth Meeting of the United States Delegation to the Second Session of the General Assembly, New York, September 15, 1947. In: 'Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947: 1947:5', United States Department of States, p. 1148) (IMG)

Another US diplomatic document stated that the:

UNSCOP majority recommendation ... though second-choice, would serve Soviet interest in softening up area by ... [s]ecuring withdrawal of British and ensuring against their replacement by other great-power influence; (...). Soviet offense in Arab eyes would be minimized by prior endorsement [of] partition by UNSCOP majority and USA and by Soviet record in support [for] Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt (already being propagandized, see Embtel [Embassy Telegram] 3205, November 131). (867N.01/11-1447: Telegram, The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State, Confidential, Moscow, November 14, 1947. In: 'Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947: 1947:5', United States Department of States, p. 1264) (IMG)

This reality, along with the consistent Soviet support for Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt 'minimized', in the words of the US diplomatic document, the negative view of the USSR 'in Arab eyes'. In his speech at the founding of the Cominform in September 1947, Zhdanov reaffirmed the Soviet Union's alliance with Egypt and Syria as two countries aligned with 'anti-imperialist and democratic camp' 'and anti-fascist forces':

A new alignment of political forces has arisen. The more the war recedes into the past, the more distinct become two major trends in post-war international policy, corresponding to the division of the political forces operating in the international arena into two major camps: the imperialist and anti-democratic camp, on the one hand, and the anti-imperialist and democratic camp, on the other. The principal driving force of the imperialist camp is the U.S.A. Allied with it are Great Britain and France. ... The imperialist camp is also supported by colony-owning countries, such as Belgium and Holland, by countries with reactionary anti-democratic regimes, such as Turkey and Greece, and by countries politically and economically dependent on the United States, such as Near-Eastern and South American countries and China.

The cardinal purpose of the imperialist camp is to strengthen imperialism, to hatch a new imperialist war, to combat socialism and democracy, and to support reactionary and anti-democratic pro-fascist regimes and movements everywhere.

The anti-imperialist and anti-fascist forces comprise the second camp. This camp is based on the U.S.S.R. and the new democracies. It also includes countries that have broken with imperialism and have firmly set foot on the path of democratic development, such as Rumania, Hungary and Finland. Indonesia and Vietnam are associated with it; it has the sympathy of India, Egypt and Syria.

(Speech by Andrei Zhdanov (member of the Soviet Politburo) at the founding of the Cominform (a Communist International Organization) in September 1947, James Madison University) (IMG)

On November 29, 1947, along with the overwhelming majority of the UN, the Soviets voted for the 'majority' plan. However:

While the Soviet Union also voted for partition ... the original Soviet stand was in favour of a unified state in Palestine, if it was possible. (The Soviet Union and Egypt, 1947-1955, Rami Ginat, 1991, p. 107. Citing: Interpretative Report on Soviet Foreign Policy based on the Press for November 1947, prepared by the American Embassy, Moscow, 23 December, 1947, W.N.R.C., RG 84, Cairo Embassy General Documents, File Subject-1947: 800, box 167.) (IMG)

The Soviet policy on Palestine, opposed to both British and US-backed Zionist settler-colonialism, was correct and just, indeed. The explanation for the Soviet line in the UN was also reflected in the Soviet media at the time:

In an article entitled "The Arab East and the Palestine Question" New Times attempted to indicate the consistency of Soviet policy regarding the solution of the Palestine problem. It asserted that, although Soviet representatives in the U.N. had affirmed the advantages of the minority recommendations for a single state, they considered the proposals for division the only course possible under existing conditions and had only one purpose, namely, to hand Palestine over to the peoples inhabiting it. New Times accused "British propaganda" of working on Arab fears of isolation. It promised the Arabs the support of the antiimperialist camp. (The Soviet Union and Egypt, 1947-1955, Rami Ginat, 1991, p. 108. Citing: Interpretative Report on Soviet Foreign Policy based on the Press for November

1947, prepared by the American Embassy, Moscow, 23 December, 1947, W.N.R.C., RG 84, Cairo Embassy General Documents, File Subject-1947: 800, box 167.) (IMG)

Therefore, as evidenced by the facts enumerated above, while the USSR voted for the resolution that resulted in the partition of Palestine, it did not pursue the partition of Palestine as its real goal. It supported the UN resolution in order to expel the British colonists from Palestinian territories. The Soviet opposition to the British presence in the Levant, however, gave the Soviets no delusion about the American imperialists represented in Palestine by Israel's regime. Given the covert alliance of Britain with Israel, the expulsion of the British from Palestine would have meant a weakening of the Zionist hold over Palestine. The US ambassador to Moscow wrote to his boss in Washington:

Despite lack info GA developments except from Soviet press and fragmentary radio news, we feel obliged register our conviction Soviet policy and tactics toward Palestine question are deliberately calculated to ensure unsettlement, rather than settlement, and to create maximum difficulties for British and Americans in Near East. (867N.01/11-1447: Telegram, The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State, Confidential, Moscow, November 14, 1947. In: 'Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947: 1947:5', United States Department of States, p. 1263) (IMG)

After the 1947 Palestine vote, in the UN, the Soviet Union undertook complex diplomatic manoeuvres aimed at sowing division in the Anglo-American-Zionist camp. Obviously, the UN resolution involved both the expulsion of Britain from Palestine, a positive outcome, along with the partition of Palestine, the negative outcome. The Soviets remained consistent with their support for the former outcome. Regarding the latter, they remained consistent with their official vote only nominally. In practice, they did nothing to implement partition and instead worked to make America's position in Palestine to 'go from bad to worse', to use the CIA's words. The following is an excerpt of a major CIA document on Palestine:

the USSR voted for the UN partition of Palestine. From November to May it consistently supported partition but **took no initiative in urging effective action to implement partition**. Officially the Soviet position was unimpeachable; unofficially, the Kremlin was content to sit back and watch matters go from bad to worse in Palestine. (POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS FROM THE PALESTINE TRUCE, ORE 38-48, CIA, July 27, 1948, p. 7. Bold added.) (IMG)

The American attempts to establish trusteeship over Palestine and the efforts to 'mediate' 'peace' between the Arabs and the Zionist regime would have rendered the US-backed Ben-Gurion faction far stronger in Palestine. The USSR blocked such American efforts. As American intelligence put it:

The Soviet delegation loudly denounced and obstructed the US proposals for a temporary trusteeship over Palestine, the one possibility which might have prevented an Arab-Jewish war after 15 May. Since 15 May the delegation has been lukewarm on truce attempts and has obstructed mediation efforts. On 7 July it abstained in the Security Council from voting on the resolution to extend the four weeks' truce. Although it voted for the resolution on 15 July ordering the belligerents to cease hostilities, it abstained from voting on the proposal to give the UN Mediator authority to negotiate a settlement between Jews and Arabs. (POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS FROM THE PALESTINE TRUCE, ORE 38-48, CIA, July 27, 1948, p. 7) (IMG)

The Soviets also worked against the Bernadotte Plan, which was aimed towards restoring British colonial rule in Palestine. An American diplomatic document noted the:

British emphasis on Bernadotte's recommendation for merging two areas rather than on his statement that disposition Arab Palestine should be left to government of Arab States; (2) recent pressure on Arab States ... against recognition [of] Arab Government Palestine interpreted by most Arab leaders as rising less from reasons advanced than from British desire promote Transjordan and their interests. (501.BB Palestine/10-1348: Telegram, The Ambassador in Egypt (Griffis) to the Acting Secretary of State, Cairo, October 13, 1948. In: 'Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948', Vol. 5, Part 2, US Department of State, 1976, p. 1471) (IMG)

There was also:

British argument that greatly enlarged Transjordan necessary to security of ME. (501.BB Palestine/10-1348: Telegram, The Ambassador in Egypt (Griffis) to the Acting Secretary of State, Cairo, October 13, 1948. In: 'Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948', Vol. 5, Part 2, US Department of State, 1976, pp. 1471-1472) (IMG)

An untitled US intelligence document also stated:

US Ambassador Douglas in London transmits a message sent by the UK Foreign Office to British Representatives in the Arab capitals strongly urging Arab acceptance of UN Mediator Bernadotte's recommendations for Palestine. The Foreign Office endorses the Mediator's proposal that Arab Palestine be incorporated in Transjordan because of the British view that Arab Palestine ... could not maintain itself as a separate state militarily, economically, or politically.... ("(UNTITLED)", CIA, September 23, 1948, p. 1) (IMG)

The 'British Chargé Chapman-Andrews', the US ambassador to Egypt said, was:

inclined [to] believe (1) destruction of AGP [is] of overriding importance and; (2) that British emphasis on Bernadotte proposal re[garding the] disposition of Arab Palestine by Arab States would encourage Arab Government's support AGP with adverse effects. He also maintained enlarged Transjordan would enhance British ability maintain security of ME. (501.BB Palestine/10-1348: Telegram, The Ambassador in Egypt (Griffis) to the Acting Secretary of State, Cairo, October 13, 1948. In: 'Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948', Vol. 5, Part 2, US Department of State, 1976, p. 1471) (IMG)

To summarize, the British plan was to establish a Greater Jordanian state over what little remained of Palestine, so to establish a neo-colony of Britain. This British plan was also endorsed by the United States:

Secretary Marshall had publicly expressed this Government's [i.e. USA's] support of the Bernadotte plan in its entirety, and that the Department was in complete agreement that the most logical disposition of Arab Palestine would be its incorporation in Transjordan. (501.BB Palestine/10-148, Subject: Developments concerning the Bernadotte Report and situation in Palestine. Memorandum. of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Satterthwaite), CONFIDENTIAL, WASHINGTON, October 1, 1948. Participants: Mr. T. E. Bromley, First Secretary of the British Embassy. NEA—Mr. Satterthwaite. UNA—Mr. McClintock NE—Mr. Rockwell. In: 'Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948', Vol. 5, Part 2, US Department of State, 1976, pp. 1445-1446) (IMG)

The increase in the influence of the Anglo-American imperialists, via the Hashemite Jordanians, in the West Bank would have blocked the progressive Arab forces from increasing their influence in the West Bank, thus further weakening the already weak Palestinian Arab revolutionary resistance in the West Bank, while strengthening the fascist forces in the West Bank. In time, MI6-backed Jordanian control over the West Bank could allow for an easy Zionist conquest of the West Bank, as happened in the 1967 War. The 'Arab' face, the Jordanian mask, which the Anglo-American imperialists

were using to take control of the West Bank was a trap in favour of Zionist settler-colonialism. The Egyptians, strategically aligned with the Soviets, disagreed with such plans:

Egyptian opposition to Bernadotte Plan has greatly increased due to widely held belief that British support for plan is based principally on desire secure merger Arab Palestine and Transjordan as step in enlarging their sphere of influence and toward creation Greater Syria. (501.BB Palestine/10-1348: Telegram, The Ambassador ;n Egypt (Griffis) to the Acting Secretary of State, Cairo, October 13, 1948. In: 'Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948', Vol. 5, Part 2, US Department of State, 1976, p. 1471) (IMG)

So did the Syrians, also strategically aligned with the Soviets. Under the influence of the pro-Soviet (see C4S8) Prince Faysal faction, Saudi Arabia ended up denouncing such an agenda too:

Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia also opposed Bernadotte's plan.... (Jerusalem: Some Aspects Of a Complex Problem, RP 78-10212, National Foreign Assessment Center, CIA, May 1947, p. 22) (IMG)

Referring to the Arab states, the US House of Representatives' Committee on Foreign Affairs stated:

In the fall of 1948, at the Paris session of the General Assembly, they rejected the Bernadotte plan which would have turned over the entire Negev, the Palestine desert, to Jordan. (THE MUTUAL SECURITY PROGRAM, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs in House of Representatives, p. 1495) (IMG)

The Palestinian government, headed at the time by the Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin Al-Husseini, was also opposed to Jordanian plots to take over Palestine:

On the 10th August, the Mufti of Palestine made a violent attack on the Hashemites in the Sadat Mosque in Damascus, calling them the slaves of British imperialism, and terming Abdallah the "number one Zionist agent" and the man responsible for the catastrophe in Palestine. (Anti-Hashemite Activity, Source: RLB-606, CIA, Date of Document: August 17, 1948, Cross Filed on: January 2, 1953, p. 1) (IMG)

Palestine has been represented at meetings of the Arab League, first by independent individuals and then by the representatives of the new Arab Higher Committee, formed in 1945. At the conference of the Political Committee of the Arab League in October 1947 it is significant that the Mufti, as Chairman of the Arab Higher Committee, played a leading role. (THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE PARTITION OF PALESTINE, ORE 55, CIA, November 28, 1947, p. 4) (IMG)

Of course, there can be no doubt that the Mufti, himself a Nazi Muslim Brotherhood terrorist agent of the Italian Fascist secret service and the MI6, would have hailed a Hashemite Jordanian conquest of Palestine behind the scenes. Nonetheless, outwardly, because he had to officially represent the Palestinian Arabs, he opposed the Jordanian plots on the overt level. Along with the Arabs, and in line with 1946 Soviet treaties with Lebanon and Syria, the Soviets opposed the Bernadotte Plan on the ground that it was a British attempt to regain control over the Levant through an aggressive expansionist Jordanian Hashemite regime:

the Arab coalition rejected the plan. So did the Soviet bloc. (...). The Soviet bloc was also vehemently opposed to Bernadotte's plan, considering it an attempt to reestablish British control over parts of Palestine. ('The Peace Brokers: Mediators in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1948-1979', Princeton University Press, Saadia Touval, p. 48) (IMG)

In the meantime, the Amir Abdallah of Transjordan, under the stimulus of Iraq's Arab unity plan, had intensified his own campaign for a Greater Syria oriented toward Jordan. This project of Abdallah's -- like that of Iraq -- was motivated by a long-standing resolution to restore the Hashemite rule over Syria which had collapsed when the French drove Abdallah's brother Faysal from Damascus in July 1920. (Disunity Among the Arab States: The Hashemite Controversy and Arab Palestine, Intelligence Report, Office of Intelligence Research, Department of State, November 24, 1954, p. 4) (IMG)

Soviet propaganda against Greater Syria was particularly strong and stressed that it was "foreign circles" which were behind Abdallah. (Disunity Among the Arab States: The Hashemite Controversy and Arab Palestine, Intelligence Report, Office of Intelligence Research, Department of State, November 24, 1954, p. 7) (IMG)

The Ben-Gurion faction, agents of Anglo-American intelligence, inevitably would have supported the Bernadotte Plan behind the scenes, but publicly had no choice but to continue to stick to the ostensibly 'hostility' of the Zionists to the British Empire.

C16S5. The 1948 War and the Soviet Union *** IMG-All-{Israel}

Anti-dialectical is the assumption that the USSR would oppose the Anglo-American imperialists thoroughly but that it would also support an Israeli regime which was aligned with the American imperialists and covertly also with the British imperialists. It would be anti-dialectical to assume so, because such an assumption would contradict a major dialectical-historical-material law of history: the alliance of the proletariat. The USSR was a dictatorship of the proletariat, whereas the anti-imperialist states of the Arab world were the dictatorship of the anti-colonial national bourgeoisie, closely allied with the proletariat of the Arab countries. Such states did have the national bourgeoisie as the main force dominating the state but secondarily also incorporated the proletariat into the state, which was why these Arab states were democratic – Egypt was a constitutional monarchy, Syria was a democratic republic, and Lebanon was a multi-confessional parliamentary democracy. The interests of the Soviet proletariat were the same as the interests of the Egyptian, Lebanese, and Syrian proletariat. **It makes little sense to say that the dictatorship of the proletariat in the USSR would materially contradict the progressive bourgeois-democratic alliance of the proletariat and the anti-colonial national bourgeoisie in the Arab countries because that would mean the contradiction of the class interests of the Soviet proletariat with the class interests of the Arab proletariat.** One can therefore calculate that the Soviets would never betray the anti-colonial Arab forces, even if, at face-value, appearing to betray it. And it unsurprisingly turns out that such a calculation is backed up immensely by historical empirical evidence – namely **the military and economic support of the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies for the Arab anti-colonial war effort during the 1948 War.**

The Soviet media stated that the anti-imperialist bloc would support the just cause of the Arabs; these were by no means empty promises. Throughout the 1948 War, the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies of Eastern Europe covertly furnished the Arabs with military assistance. With respect to military aid to the Arabs, however, another excerpt of the previously mentioned Soviet-Syrian and Soviet-Lebanese secret treaties in 1946 was as follows:

The Soviet Union agrees to send a sufficient number of military personnel to Syria, comprising military instructors and high-ranking officers, in order to help Syria to build up as rapidly as possible a national army of some strength. (The Soviet Union and Egypt, 1945-

55, Rami Ginat, 1993, p. 70. Citing: From Encroachment to Involvement, a Documentary Study of Soviet Policy in the Middle East, 1945-1973. Israel University Press, Yaacov Ro'i, 1974, pp. 29-30) (IMG)

And the same type of deal was made in the secret treaty with Lebanon:

A secret treaty between the USSR and the Lebanese government based on these [above] clauses, was signed two days later. (The Soviet Union and Egypt, 1945-55, Rami Ginat, 1993, p. 70) (IMG)

With regards to Soviet military support for Syria, the well-known Syrian politician Akram Howrani, who would later hold prominent positions in Nasserist and Ba'athist governments in Syria, confirmed that the Soviets were 'offering military equipment in exchange for a pledge that we will not participate in any international agreements against it', and that a female colleague of his received a special telegram regarding the details of a Soviet offer of military and economic aid:

Then, on October 2, 1946, I published the following comment on the possibility of establishing our relations with the Soviet Union.

"When Radio Moscow, quoting the correspondent of the Russian newspaper "Pravda", broadcast the news of the British offer to conclude a military alliance treaty between England and Syria. When this news was broadcast, the Syrian government rushed and issued a statement saying, "This news is not true." It is necessary to clarify all the internal and external circumstances regarding our current situation, but this certainty disappears little by little when other news is published and broadcasted that is closely related to our situation and our situation.

"A female colleague published a few days ago what a Jewish newspaper said in a special telegram she received from Beirut: **'The government of the Soviet Union submitted proposals to Syria and Lebanon in which it presented to the two countries a guarantee of their independence and safety, and that it was ready to support the two countries' international stance and support their respective steps in the United Nations Council. In every other international conference, support for Syria's demands from Turkey on the Alexandretta issue, the provision of tractors, agricultural machinery and building materials, the conclusion of commercial treaties with them, and the provision of military equipment at a fixed price for a long period.'**

"This is what was published last Sunday morning. The official circles met him only with complete silence, as if the matter did not concern them in a little or a lot... But we cannot stand idly by on this issue. Rather, the nation wants to know the facts. The facts are detailed. Because our country has become, by virtue of its geographical location, a field of competition between the major powers with influence. We must take advantage of this dangerous circumstance as much as we can.

"Our independence is guaranteed by the United Nations.

"As for providing military equipment to our army. What we know is British. And before that, French. You did not agree to give us enough weapons for this young army. Then the opposition of these two countries to us was clear in our purchase of arms from America. And here is a Russian offering military equipment in exchange for a pledge that we will not participate in any international agreements against it. What is our position also on this offer?

"That's the logic. And our international position, and our interest. All of this requires us not to be hostile to any country, unless it tries to detract from our independence and sovereignty."

(Akram Al-Howrani Memoirs, 2000, pp. 586-587. Bold original) (IMG)

The support of the USSR for Syria was not limited to the period before the 1948 War but continued well afterwards onto during the 1948 War. Indeed the USSR – along with the Eastern European Peoples' Democracies – militarily and economically backed Syria and Lebanon during the 1948 War. As material support for the Arab fighters, the Soviet Union and the Czechoslovak People's Democracy provided weapons whereas Romania supplied the petroleum:

Some of the Arab League countries have purchased arms from Czechoslovakia; the largest shipments to the Arabs from that country have gone to Syria and Lebanon. Small shipments from the USSR or Balkan ports are also reported to have landed on the Syrian and Lebanese coasts; also, petroleum products are now being shipped to Lebanon by Rumania. (POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS FROM THE PALESTINE TRUCE, ORE 38-48, CIA, July 27, 1948, p. 9) (IMG)

As a result of Soviet military aid, the position of the Arabs improved significantly:

The armament position of the Arabs has been notably improved by ... a \$2,035,000 contract for small arms, ammunitions, and other materiel just negotiated by Syria with the Skoda works of Czechoslovakia ... and ... the reported arrival of Soviet shipments of small arms in Lebanon and Syria. (Book III – Weekly Summary – 3 July 1947 (#55) thru 30 December 1947 (#79), CIA, pp. III-IV) (IMG)

According to the above report, Britain also provided some token arms to the MI6 puppet regime in Iraq, the government which did not really contribute seriously to the fight against the IDF. The fact that the CIA documents used the word 'reported' – referring to reports which the CIA itself received – may make it appear as though the reports of Soviet shipment of weapons were not necessarily true. The reports were indeed true. A study published by the RAND Corporation confirmed that the USSR indeed sent arms to Syria:

The USSR was hedging its bets by sending some Czech arms from a remote air field to ... Syria through Rijeka and Beirut.... ('The Evolution of the Soviet Use of Surrogates in Military Relations with the Third World, with Particular Emphasis on Cuban Participation in Africa', RAND Corporation, Gavriel D. Ra'anana, December 1979, p. 3) (IMG)

Also documenting the Soviet military aid to Syria is the 'American Jewish Committee' (AJC). To show the importance of the AJC as a source on this matter, the following is a description:

Prior to the establishment of the state of Israel and for more than a decade thereafter, the American Jewish Committee (AJC) was the Jewish organization to whose views Israeli leaders were most sensitive. Israeli and Zionist leaders perceived the AJC as the Jewish organization with the best access to U.S. policy-makers and as most representative of wealthy American Jews. Thus, the AJC was an important link in securing political and economic support from the American government and financial assistance from the American Jewish community.

AJC leaders had participated in the expanded Jewish Agency when Zionist leaders had sought the cooperation of leading non-Zionists in the 1920s. Indeed, the agreement between Zionists and non-Zionists whereby the latter joined the expanded Jewish Agency was largely the result of an agreement reached between Chaim Weizmann and Louis Marshall, leader of the AJC.

(DIASPORA INFLUENCE ON ISRAEL: THE BEN-GURION-BLAUSTEIN "EXCHANGE" AND ITS AFTERMATH, American Jewish Committee Archives. Reprinted from: Jewish Social Studies, Vol. 36, No. 3 to No. 4 (July 1974 to October 1974), Charles S. Liebman, pp. 271-272) (IMG)

According to the AJC, Riad Al-Solh, Lebanon's first Prime Minister after independence, stated that the USSR, covertly through Czechoslovakia, was providing arms to the Arabs even though it superficially 'sided' 'with' Israel in the UN in 1947:

On February 25, Riad-es-Solh, the Premier of Lebanon, declared in Cairo: "Russia voted with you [Israel] on the Palestine question, but where do you think we are getting our arms? From Czechoslovakia. And who is Czechoslovakia but Russia herself?" (Jews in the Soviet Satellites, The American Jewish Committee, edited/authored by: Peter Meyer, Bernard Dov Weinryb, Eugene Duschinsky, Nicolas Sylvain, 1953, p. 128) (IMG)

Note again that in 1946, the USSR formed a military alliance with Lebanon. Well into the 1948 War, the progressive Arab forces were continuing to be furnished with arms by the Soviets. Also, as confirmed by Ra'anana, who had written the RAND Corporation paper, the USSR rejected the Israeli call for the purchase of Soviet arms:

at the time, negotiations were proceeding in Moscow regarding the possibility of *Soviet* arms supplies to Israel. This topic led to a meeting, on October 5, 1948, between the Israeli Major-General Yochanan Rattner and General Antonov, representing the Soviet chief of staff, Marshal Vasilevskii. Later in October, Mrs. Meir spoke to Mr. Bakulin of the Middle East Division of the Soviet Foreign Ministry and submitted a detailed list of requests (including T-34 tanks, fighter planes, artillery, and anti-aircraft guns), stressing the urgency of an answer. However, she never received a reply, and the request was never fulfilled. (International Policy Formation in the USSR: Factional "Debates" during the Zhdanovschina, Gavriel Ra'anana, with a foreword by Robert Conquest, 1983, p. 83) (IMG)

An excerpt of a CIA document concerning this matter is as follows:

POSSIBLE OUTSIDE SOURCES OF SUPPLY. (Countries from which Israel is receiving material.)

a. The USSR and its satellites

No reliable evidence exists of purchases of arms from the USSR....

(Probable Effects on Israel and the Arab States of a UN Arms Embargo, ORE-48-48, CIA, August 5, 1948, p. 15) (IMG)

The following is an excerpt of a research paper from the Wilson Center:

No Soviet Arms

As soon as they arrived in Moscow in September 1948, Israeli diplomats opened talks with Soviet authorities about providing direct military aid. On 5 October 1948 Israeli military attaché Yochanan Ratner discussed training questions with General Seraev, asking about Soviet military textbooks and possibilities for Israeli officers to take advanced courses in the Soviet Union. A few days later, during a conversation with Red Army General Aleksei Antonov, Ratner suggested officer-training courses and the supply of German equipment that had fallen into Soviet hands. Antonov replied by asking for a detailed list of the Israeli needs.

On 7 November Ben Gurion sent such a list to Ratner, who submitted it on 11 November to Ivan Bakulin. The Jewish state wanted to purchase 45 T-34 tanks, 50 fighter planes, and anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns. Bakulin stated that he would transmit the Israeli requests but emphasized the difficulties due to the UN embargo: "True, others are violating this resolution," he stated. "But if arms supplies from us are discovered, there will be an uproar." After this meeting, Bakulin sent a memorandum to Zorin suggesting that they officially reject the request because of the UN embargo. (...).

The Israeli request was in fact not sent to Stalin. As Bakulin explained to Gromyko, the requests "had been raised by the Jews during the war in Palestine. At present, since the end of the war and the stabilization of the situation in Palestine, the Jews have not renewed them. Reckoning that the Jews did not make these military requests seriously, we think it advisable to delay replying to them, and to raise with the higher authorities [Stalin] only the matter of credit." In actuality, however, the Soviet Union did not want to be involved in direct military cooperation with Israel.

(Moscow's Surprise: The Soviet-Israeli Alliance of 1947-1949, Wilson Center, Laurant Rucker, pp. 27-28. Bold original.) (IMG)

Along with the USSR, the Peoples' Democracies militarily assisted Syria. The CIA confirmed:

Determined efforts were made to obtain arms and ammunition. Syria signed a contract with Skoda [a Czechoslovak military and automobile company], and a first delivery is known to have been made. (Possible Developments in Palestine. ORE 7-48. Report by the Central Intelligence Agency, CIA Files, Secret, Washington, February 28, 1948. In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1948, THE NEAR EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA, Vol. 5, Part 2, p. 671) (IMG)

The War in Palestine continued till March 1949. Czechoslovakia continued to provide military support for the Arab cause, in particular Egypt. Citing various intelligence and government sources, a research work financially sponsored by the 'Anglo-Jewish Association' – the association which had a long history of promoting Jewish-bourgeois nationalism and British colonialism – stated:

Since the beginning of 1949, there had been many reports of Czech arms going via Poland to the Eastern Mediterranean. According to a senior official in the Egyptian government, the U.S.S.R was pressing offers of tanks, guns, ammunition and agricultural implements on the Egyptian government. On 5 July, the Israeli Minister to Czechoslovakia told his British counterpart that he knew for certain that the Egyptian government was making considerable purchases of arms mostly small arms and automatic weapons in Czechoslovakia for export to Egypt. E.A. Chapman-Andrews of the British Embassy in Egypt, confirmed that according to the Joint Intelligence Board's quarterly report on the arms trade for the period mid-January to mid-April 1949, arms to the value of a few thousand dollars, originating in Czechoslovakia had been delivered to Egypt.

(The Soviet Union and Egypt – 1947-1955, Rami Ginat, 1993, p. 102. Citing: On the Soviet position concerning the arms embargo, see minute by Beith, F.O., 7 July 1949, F0371/75104, E8780/1192/65. On the supply of Czech arms to Egypt see, Telegram No. 278 from P. Dixon, British Embassy, Prague, 12 May 1950, F0371/81958, E1192/84; Letter from H. Gresswell, Ministry of Defence, to F.O. and War Office, 23 March 1949, F0371/73549, J3020/1194/16; On the conversation between the Israeli Minister and P. Dixon, the British Ambassador to Prague, see, Telegram No. 148 from Dixon, 8 July 1949, F0371/73561, J5640/11919/16; Telegram No. 461 from Chapman-Andrews, Alexandria, 31 August 1949, *ibid*, J7094/11919/16.) (IMG)

Referring to the 1948 War in Palestine, the research work corroborated:

The issue of arms sales was not at all new. Arms from Soviet bloc countries had arrived in Egypt and Syria during the Palestine war and soon after. ("The Soviet Union and Egypt, 1945-1955," Rami Ginat, 1993, p. 241) (IMG)

According to the American Jewish Committee – which for a long time served as the main lobbying organization for Israel and hence played a predecessor role to AIPAC in this respect – Czechoslovakia also provided arms to the Palestinian Arab forces combatting Israel:

On March 19 [1948], a shipment of Czechoslovak rifles and machine guns for the Palestinian Arab army arrived at the small Lebanese port of Djounish in a large schooner from Genoa. (Jews in the Soviet Satellites, The American Jewish Committee, edited/authored by: Peter Meyer, Bernard Dov Weinryb, Eugene Duschinsky, Nicolas Sylvain, 1953, p. 128) (IMG)

Again, the evidence, which was previously shown, overwhelmingly indicates that the Czechoslovak supply of such arms was under Soviet military direction. Some people in the Soviet Foreign Ministry found out about such arms shipments to the Arab countries only later. A message by Soviet Foreign Ministry official Zorin to Molotov confirmed that Czechoslovakia indeed sold arms to Syria but not to Israel back in early 1948:

Comrade V.M. Molotov,

According to a report by Comrade Bodrov, the chargé d'affaires of the USSR in Czechoslovakia, the Czechoslovak government has sold weapons to the Syrian government (mortars, mortar shells and cartridges). At the same time, the Czechs have refused to sell weapons to the Jewish Agency in Palestine, which made this request in November 1947.

On this matter Agence France-Presse reported from Cairo on 13 December that the British are trying to foil the supply of Czech weapons to the Arab countries and that the British government has, allegedly, held up the remittance which the Syrian government made through London in payment for weapons bought from Czechoslovakia. This report is confirmed by an appeal to the State Insurance Company of the USSR (Gosstrakh) from the Czechoslovak Insurance Company Slavye which has a contract with Gosstrakh for its cooperation should the British obstruct insurance for the cargo of weapons sent from Czechoslovakia to Beirut for the Arabs.

(‘V.A. Zorin to V.M. Molotov (Moscow)’, COPY: AVP RF, F.0118, OP.2, P.3, D.11, LL.60-1, Moscow, January 22, 1948. In: “Documents on Israeli-Soviet Relations, 1941-1953, Parts 1-2”, Israeli Foreign Ministry, Russian Foreign Ministry, Israel State Archives, Russian Federal Archives, p. 256) (IMG)

A specific faction within Czechoslovakia, the Slansky faction, did use its influence to provide arms to Israel. The shipments were illegal and part of the treasonous activity of the Titoist faction in the Czechoslovak state. However, the communist faction, the Gottwald faction, was responsible for the arms shipments to Syria.

Hence, the USSR and People’s Democratic Czechoslovakia provided arms to Syria, Egypt, and Lebanon to combat the regime of Israel. People’s Democratic Romania also provided the petroleum resources crucial for the war effort. The USSR also increased its economic ties to Egypt during this time. The two states signed two trade agreements, giving each other highly-favored-nation statuses:

Egypt and the Soviet Union signed a barter agreement on March 3, calling for the exchange of 38,000 metric tons of long staple cotton for 216,000 tons of wheat and 19,000 tons of corn cereals. A protocol, signed simultaneously with the agreement, granted both parties most-favored-nation treatment in trade relations with the exceptions of countries adjacent to the Soviet Union and of the Arab countries (telegram 228, March 4, from Cairo). (‘INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE REVISIONIST OF THE ANGLO-EGYPTIAN TREATY OF AUGUST 26, 1936, AND THE FUTURE STATUS OF THE SUDAN; THE SOVIET-EGYPTIAN BARTER AGREEMENT’. In: ‘Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948’, Vol. 5, Part 2, US Department of State, 1976, p. 86) (IMG)

Note that the Anglo-American imperialists had regarded Egypt as a zone from which to bomb the USSR:

During the spring and summer of 1946, prior to the Soviet note on the straits, strategic planners decided that other than Great Britain, the Cairo-Suez area was the most desirable place on the globe from which to launch an air attack against Soviet targets. (Safeguarding Democratic Capitalism: US Foreign Policy and National Security, 1920-1950. Melvyn P. Leffler, 2017, p. 173) (IMG)

From air bases in Turkey, fighter bombers and attack planes could not only aid Turkish ground forces inside Turkey but also interdict Soviet troops moving through Iran and Iraq toward Persian Gulf Oil or sweeping widely toward Cairo-Suez. (Safeguarding Democratic Capitalism: US Foreign Policy and National Security, 1920-1950. Melvyn P. Leffler, 2017, p. 177) (IMG)

The reason that Egypt was chosen was that the Soviet Red Army, the strongest part of the Soviet military, was far away from Egypt and at the same time, the American air force, the strongest part of US military, could be stationed there and get sent to bomb the Caucasus oil fields.

The Zorin report to Molotov, cited above, stated that the Czechoslovak government had armed Syria but had refused to arm Israel. Zorin was not lying when he said that a faction of the Czechoslovak state had refused arms for Israel and had armed the Syrians. Yet, we know that Czechoslovak arms reached Israel. How, then, is this blatant contradiction to be explained, if not by the calculation that this must have been done by rogue elements of the Czechoslovak state, a CIA-MI6 faction in the Czechoslovak state, responsible for such armaments of Israel, in contradiction with and devoid of coordination with the anti-imperialist faction of the Czechoslovak state? And indeed, it was done by the CIA-MI6 faction led by Slansky. The Mossad operative Ehud Avriel and several other Israeli intelligence agents had been deployed to Europe to obtain military assistance for the fight against the Arabs. Alongside Avriel, Mordechai Oren was tasked with the recruitment of European Ashkenazim into the Israeli military. Howard Sachar, the head of the Hiatt Institute funded by the US State Department, wrote:

Mordechai Oren, a member of Israel’s far-left Mapam party [to which Oren was a traitor], and Nahum Shadmi, a senior Haganah training officer based in Paris, traveled through Eastern Europe, seeking to recruit young Jews for military service in Israel. (Israel and Europe:

An Appraisal in History, Howard M. Sachar, 1998, p. 58) (IMG)

Details of such a project have been exposed by Karel Kaplan, an imperialist spy who stole many of the archives of the Czechoslovak government in his defection to the West in the mid-1970s. Subsequently, he closely collaborated with the CIA’s Radio Free Europe, as well as with the ‘Federal Institute for East European and International Studies’ which was and remains an the official research wing of the Interior Ministry of the Federal Republic of Germany. With such a background, he wrote a book titled ‘The Report on the Murder of the General Secretary’, after the 1989 collapse of the Czechoslovak government. Kaplan wrote:

Ehud Avriel (formerly Uberall) was one of Ben Gurion’s people sent to Europe with this mission [of obtaining arms]. Avriel met in Paris with Robert Adam Abramovici who represented the import-export firm of Joseph Nash. Before the war, this firm had operated in Romania representing, among others, Czechoslovakia’s Zbrojovka Arms Works. General Heliodor Pika, at the time Czechoslovakia’s military attache in Bucharest, had met both Nash and Abramovici, who in 1939 funneled financial support to Czechoslovakia’s anti-Nazi resistance through him (Pika). After the war, General Pika, appointed deputy Chief of General Staff, was responsible for Czechoslovakia’s arms industry. He renewed his contacts with Nash and Abramovici, who were now in Paris, again representing the Zbrojovka Arms Works.

Bedrich Reicin, commander of defense intelligence, recommended the sale of arms to Haganah via the Nash firm. The Czechoslovak government approved. General Pika was very instrumental in arranging this. The arms in question were nonmoving inventory: weapons built for the Germans during the war but which were now useless. The Prague government was happy to unload them. On December 1, 1947, the Zbrojovka Arms Works signed a contract to sell more weapons than Haganah's entire arsenal at the time. The next task was to deliver the weapons to Israel. This was the job of Pika, Reicin, Clementis, and Masaryk. The Polish government refused to allow transshipment, and the weapons were therefore sent down the Danube River through Hungary to Yugoslavia, and then clandestinely through Italy to Tel-Aviv. They arrived in April 1948.

(The Report on the Murder of the General Secretary, Karel Kaplan, 1990, pp. 239-241) (IMG)

Back in 1947, Czechoslovakia had not undergone a socialist revolution and that Czechoslovakia was still a bourgeois state. It was headed by a non-communist. The Czechoslovak Communists had gained increased influence throughout the state apparatus via the democratic elections, but the communist revolution had not yet happened. The prominent Mossad official Ehud Avriel remembered in his memoirs that Masaryk told him that Vladimir Clementis supported Israel using the excuse of combating British imperialism. Avriel also noted that Joseph Nash and Robert Adam Abramovici militarily aided the Mossad for free, which would have not only helped the Israelis win their war against the Arab forces for cheap, but also would have sabotaged Czechoslovakia's economy. Avriel wrote:

Robert Adam and Joseph Nash, at that time business partners, never accepted a penny or even the smallest gift in return for the services they rendered to the Haganah. It was their way of expressing their feeling of responsibility for the fate of Jewish Palestine.

The representative of the Czech armworks was at the airport to meet us. So was my friend Felix Doron, the Haganah man in Prague, who came with us in the black, official-looking limousine to the head office of Adam's business friends.

'Have we emerged from the underground?' Doron whispered to me in the car.

'I hope we have,' I replied. 'Otherwise we shall be wiped off the ground altogether.'

Less than an hour after we entered the offices of the Zbrojovka, Brno – permeated with an air of solid authority and reliable politeness we had concluded the deal. Adam was at home in these offices; and the younger of the two Czech directors had been at school with Felix Doron, who was born in Prague and had left for Palestine just before the invasion of Czechoslovakia. The two sides in the negotiation understood each other perfectly.

(...). Doron and I rushed to the Czech Foreign Office with a letter of introduction to Jan Masaryk, the son of the founder of the Czech republic and then Czech Foreign Minister, as well as a warm friend of Zionism. When I telephoned his office from the armworks, he agreed to see me at once. I explained the situation to Masaryk, who was visibly delighted that his country could help us and pleased that we were able to overcome 'technical difficulties'. He was certain that his communist deputy, Vlado Clementis, would likewise favour assisting our war effort. 'For me, it is enough that you defend yourself against your enemies. But Clementis will be happy to know that by fighting for your life you undermine British imperialism in the Middle East.'

('Open the Gates!: A Personal Story of "Illegal" Immigration to Israel', Ehud Avriel, 1975, p. 335) (IMG)

Clementis, an imperialist-fascist agent, was documented in C15S8 to have been a staunch supporter of Slovak separatism and the partition of People's Democratic Czechoslovakia. Clearly, Clementis was not from the mainstream of the Czechoslovak Communist Party (KSC), and rather belonged to the Titoist elements that had infiltrated it. The superficial 'hostility' of Israel and Britain was undoubtedly useful for Clementis and the Yugoslav intelligence service, for it portrayed the military armament of Israel, the sabotage of the Soviet efforts to bring military victory for the Arabs, as a supposed struggle against British colonialism. Anyways, Kaplan continued:

Meanwhile, further arms negotiations had started in March. Czechoslovakia suffered a dire shortage of hard currencies and offered Haganah a considerable additional amount of hardware from its own surplus, valued at about \$18 million. **One of the main instigators of this project was Antonin Zapotocky**, then a deputy premier. He discussed the possibility of **additional weapon sales with Mordechai Oren**, an officer of the left-leaning socialist Mapam party. Zapotocky even promised to train Israeli fliers and paratroopers in Czechoslovakia. The government presidium had Reicin negotiate details of the arrangement with Avriel, who represented the Haganah. The military airport in Zatec was put at Haganah's disposal for moving the weapons. The transport, ostensibly a sale of scrap metal to an Addis Ababa company, was taken care of by a Panamanian air company, under code name Operation Balak. In April and May, the Prague government released eighty-five aircraft to Haganah but refused to sell tanks and cannons. The aircraft were flown via an air-bridge from Czechoslovakia's Zatec to Yugoslavia's Titograd (then called Podgorica) to Ekron in Palestine. Some eighty Haganah fliers were trained in military schools, and another group was undergoing paratroop training at the training center in [the Czechoslovak town of] Straz pod Ralskem.

At this time, too, a Czechoslovak military brigade for Israel was being formed. Its members were being trained in Velka Strelna, in the Libava military area. Its formation was proposed by **Shmuel Mikunis**, general secretary of the Communist Party of Israel. He originally wanted to create an international brigade from Jews of the people's democracies. Moscow approved, and Mikunis, **armed with Malenkov's approval**, visited Communist leaders of the bloc. **In Prague he dealt with Slansky and Geminder** who were, however, not particularly enthused by his requests.

Mikunis calculated that the presence of this brigade would strengthen his party's influence in Israel. He assumed that most members of the brigade would be Communists. However, the entire plan changed after the split with **Yugoslavia, which had been particularly receptive to it**. Only a Czechoslovak brigade was created, which included a few dozen Hungarian and Romanian Jews. Instructors and commanders **were selected by Svab's** records department of the CC KSC secretariat, particularly Osvald Zavodsky. (...). The transport took place in parts, starting in December 1948, with the last contingent of some five hundred people leaving in April 1949. By then the Arab-Israeli war was over, and the brigade was not needed.

(The Report on the Murder of the General Secretary, Karel Kaplan, 1990, pp. 239-241. Bold added) (IMG)

It deserves to be further noted that:

Czechoslovakia was the only member of the Soviet bloc to provide Israel with military assistance.... (The Report on the Murder of the General Secretary, Karel Kaplan, 1990, p. 241) (IMG)

Noteworthy is that, as confirmed also by the Slovak National Newspaper (SNN), the prominent Anglo-Israeli intelligence operative Robert Maxwell was a key negotiator in the matter as well. The SNN, both in its print and online versions, is the organ/media of the "Matica Slovenska", the Slovak

government's official anti-communist institution for promoting bourgeois-nationalism in Slovakia. It receives financial support through the Slovak government budget. Discussing the history of the arms deals with Israel, the newspaper revealed:

the main mediator of this huge supply of weapons from the Czechoslovak Republic for Israel was the Israeli agent Robert Maxwell (real name Ján Ludvík Hoch, a native of Subcarpathian Ukraine), later a well-known media mogul. ("Šesťdesiat rokov po poprave o osudových okolnostiach násilnej smrti V. Clementisa II: Bez diskusie..., jedenásť povrazov a tri doživotia!" ["Sixty years after the execution of the fateful circumstances of the violent death of V. Clementis II: Without Discussion ... eleven ropes and three lifetimes!"], Slovenske Narodne Noviny (SNN), Peter Štelinger, December 15, 2012, p. 10. In: Slovenske Narodne Noviny (SNN), December 15, 2012) (IMG)

So much for the British Empire's supposed 'opposition' to the Zionist regime, the top MI6 operative Maxwell was arming the regime of Israel. The above-mentioned network of Mossad agents in Czechoslovakia were also close to the MI6 spy Lavrenti Beria. In fact, the British agent Beria was a major culprit of the arms sales to the Zionist regime. Without Joseph Stalin's knowledge or approval, the MI6 agent Beria:

succeeded in giving military aid to Israel. Stalin did not know everything and did not necessarily approve of everything that my father [Beria] did in this connection, in a sphere where he [Beria] could act discreetly and without asking for permission, by using his personal network of agents. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 208) (IMG)

Beria's channel for arming Israel's regime involved a vast network of Titoist spies in the top ranks of the Peoples' Democracies. The most important channel for funneling weapons to the Zionist state was Czechoslovakia. In particular, Beria conducted the operation thanks to the active support and involvement of other Anglo-American agents Rudolph Slansky and Bedrich Geminder:

Although arrests of some high-level [officials] had been occurring as far back as 1949, the first sign that this might develop into a widespread purge came on 27 November 1951, with the arrest of Rudolph Slansky, general secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, and his deputy Bedrich Geminder, both ... associated with Beria and the MGB. Indeed, acting with Beria's sanction, they [i.e. Slansky and Geminder] had made Czechoslovakia a center for funneling aid and weapons to Israel in its conflict with the Arabs after the war. (Beria: Stalin's First Lieutenant, Amy Knight, p. 169) (IMG)

In the drive to arm the regime of Israel, added to such big 'chess pieces' as the MI6 spy Beria and MI6 spy Maxwell, there was the MI6 spy Tito. Recall the fact that prominent Mossad operative Shaik Dan:

Shaik Dan ... managed to establish a close friendship with the head of the Yugoslav secret police. ('Romanian-Styled Capitalism', Israel Defense, Issue 11 of the magazine, February 17, 2013) (IMG{Romania})

It is also worth noting that Tito personally approved the activities of the Mossad in Yugoslavia and hailed Zionist migration:

The Joint Distribution Committee was lauded yesterday by Premier Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia for the successful conclusion of its rehabilitation program in that country and for aiding in the emigration of Yugoslav Jews wishing to go to Israel, the New York Times reported today from Belgrade.

Marshal Tito told Frederick C. White, J.D.C. director for Yugoslavia, in his villa on Dedinje Hill that it was only just and proper that special efforts were made to aid Yugoslavia's Jews. The Premier stated he felt the Jews had a right to emigrate to a country for which they had longed for over 2,000 years. Following his visit with Tito, Mr. White was decorated with the Order of the Yugoslav Banner, third degree.

Mr. White, who will leave Belgrade for Israel this week-end after spending more than four years in this country during which time the J.D.C. expended some \$3,500,000 for the relief and rehabilitation of the decimated Jewish community, had high praise for the "generous cooperation and sympathy received from Yugoslav authorities." Some 500 Jews are expected to leave for Israel March 10, it was revealed, leaving some 5,000 Jews in this country who wish to remain. Two hundred Yugoslav Jewish physicians who wish to leave for the Jewish state have not been allowed to do so until additional graduates of medical schools are available to take over their duties.

('Tito Lauds J.D.C. Work in Yugoslavia; Decorates U.S. Jewish Relief Official', The Jewish Telegraphic Agency, February 28, 1950. In: JTA Bulletin, March 1, 1950, p. 4) (IMG)

After the 1948 War, the Yugoslav regime rushed in to finance the Israeli intelligence front organization 'World Jewish Congress':

Yugoslav authorities have turned over to the Israel representative in Belgrade 4,500,000 dinars collected by Yugoslav Jews in a special fund-raising campaign for Israel, it is revealed in a report received here today by the World Jewish Congress from the Federation of Jewish Communities in Yugoslavia.

The Federation, which is affiliated with the World Jewish Congress, emphasized in the report that the Jews of Yugoslavia are ready to re-establish contact with the Jewish communities throughout the world.

(Yugoslav Jewish Communities Seek Contact with Jews Abroad; Inform Jewish Congress, Jewish Telegraphic Agency, December 1, 1949, p. 5) (IMG)

Anyways, during the 1948 War, the UDB, the Tito regime's fascist secret service,:

helped Israel in connection with various activities, including arms smuggling to Israel and by serving as a transit point for immigrants from Romania. ('Romanian-Styled Capitalism', Israel Defense, Issue 11 of the magazine, February 17, 2013) (IMG)

Therefore, Beria, Slansky, Geminder, and the entire network of renegades who assisted Israel were also treasonously allied to the Yugoslav intelligence service. Beria had longed been a collaborator with the Tito-Rankovic faction in Yugoslavia. In addition to facilitating the process of transferring arms from Czechoslovakia to Israel, Yugoslavia itself also provided military support for the Israeli state during the 1948 War, as revealed by the CIA. We know for a fact that the only country from the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies that sold weapons to Israel was Czechoslovakia, and such arms sales were done by Yugoslav agents. Hence, the 'possibility' of the USSR and Poland providing Israel with arms simply did not materialize. On the other hand, the United States provided high-quality military equipment to Israel, while Yugoslavia furnished Israel with arms, as confirmed by the following CIA document:

The efforts of Zionist agents abroad have resulted in the stockpiling of quantities of small arms, automatic weapons, and ammunition in various eastern European countries for eventual shipment to Palestine. Most of these stocks come from Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and possibly from Poland and the USSR. Jewish acquisitions from the US consist mainly of machinery, motor vehicles, and air transport. The Israeli forces are much more concerned with obtaining such heavier equipment than in acquiring small arms. (PROBABLE

EFFECTS ON ISRAEL AND THE ARAB STATES OF A UN ARMS EMBARGO, CIA, ORE 48-48, Washington, August 5, 1948. In: Foreign Relations of the United States, US Department of State, 1948, Vol. 5, p. 1279) (IMG)

That the prominent MI6 agent Beria, the top MI6 operative Maxwell, as well as the intelligence service of the British spy Tito (see C12S5) all supported the arms sales to Israel is further evidence of the fake character of the British imperial 'hostility' to Israel. One could calculate, based on dialectics, that since the interests of the comprador reactionary class dominating Israel converged with the interests of British finance capital, Israel and Britain would be allied despite pretending the contrary. The 1948 War was called the 'War of Independence' because the IDF was allegedly 'liberating' Israel from the British Empire and the Arab 'mercenaries' of the MI6. At the time, British 'anti-Zionism' was a means of facilitating contact with the Hashemite monarcho-fascist Arabs. Recall that even during the 1956 invasion of Egypt, Britain was only unofficially allied to the IDF. Officially, back then, Britain branded itself as a 'peacekeeper' seeking to limit Israeli 'excesses'. All observers called the British Empire's bluff, and it was clear to all that the British military was allied to the IDF despite pretending otherwise. Only a while later, when the Israeli regime stabilized, and when the British imperialist alliance had become far too exposed and well-known, did the British Empire begin to openly support both Jordan and Israel. Hence, even in the 1956 War, the Ben-Gurion, who owed his whole career to the British Empire, and Moshe Dayan, who had lost his eye fighting as a military intelligence officer of the British Army during the Great Patriotic War, pretended to be contradicting the British Empire. Why is the disproof of the 'hostility' of the Ben-Gurion faction to Britain so significant? It is significant firstly because it reaffirms the dialectical thesis that classes with the same interests would have a natural tendency to ally with each other, and when the political actors serving as agents of these classes 'oppose' each other, it is either a deception operation, or out of a temporary small misunderstanding that can be resolved quickly. This is important because it debunks the 'realist' school of International Relations theory, which aims to explain strategic relations on the narrative of separate geopolitical entities competing with each other and behaving directly according to the shape of their borders, rather than according to the class alliances. Secondly, it reaffirms the thesis that the Soviet call for the removal of the British occupation in 1947, even if ostensibly 'at the expense' of the partition of Palestine, was a move that undermined the British Empire and hence the ally of the British Empire, the Ben-Gurion faction in Israel, even though it may have appeared as giving the Ben-Gurion faction a state with which to slaughter Arab civilians.

Recall the excerpt of the report by the Soviet Foreign Ministry official Zorin to Molotov: "the Czechoslovak government has sold weapons to the Syrian government (mortars, mortar shells and cartridges). At the same time, the Czechs have refused to sell weapons to the Jewish Agency in Palestine, which made this request in November 1947." The fact that this report states that the Czechoslovak government had refused to sell weapons to the Israeli regime - the 'Jewish Agency in Palestine' - shows that rogue elements of the Czechoslovak government had been involved in the arming and funding of the regime of Israel. And we know that these were indeed rogue elements, for they were agents of the British and Yugoslav intelligence services.

Once Stalin found out about the secret arms sales, he reported the Czechoslovak arms sales to Czechoslovakia's anti-Zionist leader Klement Gottwald. By all indications, Gottwald had been unaware of such Mossad influence in his own country. Indeed:

Alexej Cepicka discussed Gottwald's anxiety and surprise when he learned about the extent of Czechoslovakia's economic contacts with Israel. (The Report on the Murder of the General Secretary, Karel Kaplan, 1990, p. 244) (IMG)

Gottwald subsequently blocked the arms sales. Stalin agreed that the arms shipments should be stopped in Czechoslovakia. This has been revealed by the Slovak National Newspaper (SNN), the organ/media of the "Matica Slovenska", the Slovak government's official state-budgeted anti-communist institution for promoting bourgeois-nationalism in Slovakia. Discussing the history of the arms deals with Israel, the newspaper revealed:

As Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Clementis also solved the problem of arms transfers to Palestine. The route led by rail through Hungary to Yugoslav ports and from there by ship to Palestine. It is worth mentioning that on May 15, 1949, an employee of the Central Committee of the KSb negotiated with Klement Gottwald and Rudolf Slánský about Mátyás Rákosi's complaint to Stalin about Czechoslovak arms supplies to Yugoslavia, which were in fact intended for Israel. Stalin agreed to their detention in Hungary. ("Šesťdesiat rokov po poprave o osudových okolnostiach násilnej smrti V. Clementisa II: Bez diskusie..., jedenásť povrazov a tri doživotia!") ["Sixty years after the execution of the fateful circumstances of the violent death of V. Clementis II: Without Discussion ... eleven ropes and three lifetimes!"], Slovenske Narodne Noviny (SNN), Peter Štelinger, December 15, 2012, p. 10. In: Slovenske Narodne Noviny (SNN), December 15, 2012) (IMG)

Note again that Stalin initially was unaware of the Czechoslovak military aid to the IDF. Recall that Sergo Beria had said that Lavrenti Beria: succeeded in giving military aid to Israel. Stalin did not know everything and did not necessarily approve of everything that my father [Beria] did in this connection, in a sphere where he [Beria] could act discreetly and without asking for permission, by using his personal network of agents. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 208) (IMG)

In Moscow, Beria was the primary agent assisting Geminder and Slansky in the provision of arms to the Israeli armed forces:

Although arrests of some high-level [officials] had been occurring as far back as 1949, the first sign that this might develop into a widespread purge came on 27 November 1951, with the arrest of Rudolph Slansky, general secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, and his deputy Bedrich Geminder, both ... associated with Beria and the MGB. Indeed, acting with Beria's sanction, they [i.e. Slansky and Geminder] had made Czechoslovakia a center for funneling aid and weapons to Israel in its conflict with the Arabs after the war. (Beria: Stalin's First Lieutenant, Amy Knight, p. 169) (IMG)

By the time of Rákosi's complaint to Stalin, however, the latter had come to know much more about the conspiracy to arm the IDF and supported efforts to purge those responsible for such sales. In its usual anti-Soviet propaganda language, the SNN, itself the Slovak regime's notoriously anti-Semitic media outlet, stated:

Stalin knew very well about Czechoslovak military aid to Israel, and who was responsible for it. Stalin's "papal infallibility" probably played a role here. Czechoslovakia allowed itself to "do business on its own" and, without the Kremlin's knowledge, supported the establishment of a Jewish state. The main culprits had to be found and visibly punished as soon as possible". It was the period of Stalin's sickening anti-Semitism.... ("Šesťdesiat rokov po poprave o osudových okolnostiach násilnej smrti V. Clementisa II: Bez diskusie..., jedenásť povrazov a tri doživotia!") ["Sixty years after the execution of the fateful circumstances of the violent death of V. Clementis II: Without Discussion ... eleven ropes and three lifetimes!"], Slovenske Narodne Noviny (SNN), Peter Štelinger, December 15, 2012, p. 10. In: Slovenske Narodne Noviny (SNN), December 15, 2012) (IMG)

Hence the purges against those responsible for the arms sales began:

The campaign against Zionism ... culminated in the Slansky trial in Czechoslovakia, the country which militarily helped Israel the most. (Report on the Murder of the General Secretary, Karel Kaplan, 1990, p. 242) (IMG)

During the Slansky trials, the accused were accused of being simultaneously agents of Israel and of Yugoslavia. This was true since the Yugoslav and Israeli secret services were allied and the Slansky group had collaborated with both of them in the arms sales. In what became famously known as the 'Prague Trials' and the 'Slansky Purge', Slansky, Geminder, Zavodsky, Reicin, Svab, and Clementis were interrogated, tried for intelligence activities on behalf of the Mossad, and executed. The close associates of these individuals were duly investigated and purged. General Heliodor Pika, who had been responsible for assisting Mossad in the arms sales, was identified as an imperialist spy and he too was executed well before the other Zionist agents were. His collaborators Robert Adam and Joseph Nash were, as far as I am aware, not executed however, because they were in Paris and not in Czechoslovakia. Most of the Slovak separatists were purged as well; among them survived the Mossad-backed Slovak separatist leader Husak, who later became the head of the Czechoslovak state from 1969 onwards, thanks to the assistance of the Yugoslav agent Dubcek. Zapotocky who opportunistically placed himself at the forefront of the anti-Zionist campaign and who pretended to be anti-Israel, was able to survive the purges. Unfortunately, the faction headed by Beria and Malenkov eventually succeeded in the power struggle against the Stalin faction, and thus their Titoist network was able to release Mordechai Oren from jail after Stalin's death.

The purges of the Zionist agents occurred thanks to the assistance provided by Rakosi to Gottwald, as revealed throughout the book by Karel Kaplan (see C15S8). Several Czechoslovak officials serving as agents of American intelligence, were allied to these individuals and the details of their purges are explained in C15S8. In addition, Mossad operative Oren was jailed; Mikunis as the head of the Israeli 'communist' movement was denounced for his bourgeois-nationalist defection. Officially, the purges were due to the mentioned network's large-scale systematic economic sabotage on behalf of the Mossad as well as their Slovak separatist conspiracies. Another reason though, was of course the arms sales to Israel. The Zionist Israeli anti-communist historian Gilboa admits:

One of the aims of the Prague trial was to indicate to the Arab world of the readiness of the Soviet bloc to join it in an anti-Israel campaign. From the accusations against Slansky and his friends the Arabs were to reach the conclusion that they and Czechoslovakia had the same enemy, for these traitors had weakened the defensive power of Czechoslovakia in handing over to the Jews of Palestine important military equipment for waging war against the Arabs. By affording assistance to the emigration of Jews, by aiding Jewish displaced persons reached Palestine, by helping out in the transfer of capital, and by similar acts, they had simultaneously sabotaged Czechoslovakia and increased the power of the Israeli aggressors. Part of the plan of the traitors standing trial was to harm the relations between the Democratic People's Republic [of Czechoslovakia] and the Arab states. They alone are responsible for the support given to Israel several years before, backing which was actually one of their destructive plots. (...). In other words, Prague made a concentrated and spectacular effort in November 1952, to clear herself once and for all of the "stigma" of her position and behavior with respect to Palestine in 1947-1948. It is quite certain that parallel to these overt verbal gestures in the court intensive action was taken at approximately the same time to wing sympathy by generous offers (by Moscow and Prague) of military equipment and weapons to the Arab countries from the famous armaments industries of Czechoslovakia. (The Black years of Soviet Jewry, Yehoshua A. Gilboa, pp. 274-275) (IMG)

It is beyond the scope of this work to explain this particular matter in depth but the Czechoslovak communists and the Soviets did not publicly speak much about the role of the Slansky group in funding and arming of Israel, because the Mapam, the communist-led 'Socialist Zionist' popular front in Israel, used the armament of Israel 'by Czechoslovakia' as a talking point for why Israel should be strategically aligned with the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies. Indeed, the Mapam agents in Israel – from Haganah Commander Moshe Sneh to former Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin to Mapam deputy leader Ya'akov Riftin – spoke of the 'Czechoslovak aid' to Israel during the 'War of Independence' against the Arabs as a talking point to persuade the Israeli audience towards the objective of strategically aligning Israel with the Soviet Union against the Anglo-American imperialists and against the Ben-Gurion faction.

The purges of the Slansky gang were also reflected several times in the Soviet media. One of the articles previously stated explained aspects of the trial. Vladislav Minayev, a top Soviet media figure and pundit, wrote for the New Times, the following:

The Zionist leaders, having sold themselves to American imperialism, have placed their organizations and associations at the disposal of the American secret service. This was clearly brought out at the recent trial of Slansky and his gang of conspirators in Prague. Ornstein, Zionist and American spy, stated at the trial that in 1947 Truman, Acheson and Morgenthau (then Secretary of Treasury) had a secret conference with the Zionist leaders Ben-Gurion and Sharett in Washington, where the so-called "Morgenthau-Acheson plan" was adopted, defining the conditions on which the United States would render support and assistance to Israel. A sequel to this plan was the wide-scale utilization of the Zionist organizations by the American secret service. All these "cultural," "philanthropic" and other societies have been turned into centres of espionage and sabotage activities against the countries of the democratic camp, and of the supply of agents for this purpose. For this criminal work, too, the Zionists have placed at the disposal of the American secret service the members of their organization working in the diplomatic service. It was revealed at the trial of the Slansky gang, for instance, that Avriel (Uberall) and Kubovy, former Israeli Ministers in Prague, worked in close contact with the spies and saboteurs, gave them instructions, protected them from discovery, etc. (Zionist Agents of the American Secret Service, New Times, Vladislav Minayev, January 21, 1953, p. 6. Republished in: CIA)

The antithesis of Slansky's pro-Zionist position was Czechoslovakia's pro-Arab policy and the sale of arms to Wafd-led government in Egypt. Indeed, a declassified Israeli intelligence document referring to the Israeli representative (minister) in Prague, stated:

In the [Israeli] minister's opinion, Slansky had perhaps opposed Czechoslovakia's pro-Arab policy and the sale of weapons to Egypt, and this opposition had led to his indictment as a Zionist, the description of Israel as a "country working against the national movements which are freeing themselves from colonial regimes".... The minister adds that some reaction to these phenomena is necessary. He proposes condemnation of the new line in the press in London and in Paris.... (Coded Tel. P325, Inc.: 130.09/2343/1, Israel Legation in Prague to the East European Division, December 21, 1951. In: DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL, State of Israel Archives, Vol. 6, 1951, Edited by Yemima Rosenthal, Companion Volume, p. 366) (IMG)

For quite a number of times, Czechoslovakia sent arms to the Arabs during the 1948 War. In one of these waves of transfers however, the transfer was sabotaged by the Mossad, 'thanks' to the intelligence provided to the Mossad by the Yugoslav regime. Since Shaike Dan had the support of Yugoslav intelligence in sending arms to Israel, he was residing in a Yugoslav hotel at the time. The person helping them in this affair was a Yugoslav regime officer 'responsible for contacts between [Israeli] procurement personnel and the [Yugoslav] authorities'. The Yugoslav regime officer provided highly critical and sensitive intelligence that Czechoslovakia was sending weapons to Syria, and promised to provide further intelligence

materials on 'the vessel, its crew, the time it would sail, its speed and declared destination'. In a memoir published by the Israel Defense Army Publication, the Mossad operative Amnon Yona (or Amnon Jonah) who was there at the time, recalled:

Procurement and Aliya Bet operative **Shaiké Dan sat in his Yugoslavian hotel** waiting for news about Nora: had the ship managed to bring its cargo of weapons to the Hagana armories, despite the British Army and the UN observers who were trying to prevent it? Late on Friday night, a **Yugoslav officer who was responsible for contacts between procurement personnel and the authorities came into Shaiké's room. His message was brief: "The ship that is to load the weapons from Czechoslovakia has entered Fiume port."** Shaiké, being fully aware of our shipment plans, immediately understood that the weapons and the ship had nothing to do with us. He immediately phoned Ehud Avriel in Prague. Ehud was no less surprised than Shaiké, and he promised to check the story and its implications. Two days later Ehud responded that the Czech armaments plant Zabriovka had sold arms and ammunition to the Arabs: the Fiume shipment included 8,000 rifles and six million rounds of ammunition, intended for Syria. By sheer coincidence, the route from Czechoslovakia to Fiume in Yugoslavia was exactly that used for our shipments. The significance of this secret supply was earthshaking. Clearly, everything possible had to be done to prevent the weapons from reaching the Syrians. Shaiké tried to persuade the Yugoslavs to impound the weapons since the shipment documents listed machine parts not weapons. He promised that we would purchase the shipment immediately at full price. The response was negative. The Yugoslavs contended that such an act would adversely affect their relations with Czechoslovakia. Shaiké's other proposals for action against the ship were also rejected, but the **Yugoslavs did agree to supply information about the vessel, its crew, the time it would sail, its speed and declared destination.** (Missions with No Traces: Sixty Years of Israeli Underground National Security, Israel Defense Army Publication, Amnon Yona, originally published 2001, p. 99. Bold added) (IMG)

In this situation, backed by Yugoslav intelligence, the Mossad plotted to cause the explosion of the Lino ship and to capture those weapons that were destined for the Arabs. Munya Mardor, the prominent Israeli military official in charge of securing military supplies, wrote in his memoirs (and the introduction of the memoirs was written by Ben-Gurion since the book had the Prime Minister's blessing):


The casing of the mine was the inner tube of a motor-cycle, filled with TNT, and resistant to water. The detonators were contained in rubber contraceptive sheaths, again as a water resistance, and had potash powder distributed about them. When the time came, one of the bottles would be fitted to the inner tube, upside down, so that the acid would begin eating through the paper until it reached the potash and could generate sufficient heat to touch off the detonator and **so explode the TNT – and sink the Lino.** (...). There were no incidents on the way. **Amnon Jonah** [i.e. Amnon Yona], with Mrs. Grossman consoling at his side, was at his post. As we came up he gave the signal that all was clear. (Strictly Illegal, Munya Mardor, 1957, p. 208. Bold added.) (IMG)

The operation was successful. Hence, although previously some arms from Czechoslovakia had been successfully transferred to the Arab troops, one of the transfers was successfully sabotaged:

On March 19 [1948], a shipment of Czechoslovak rifles and machine guns for the Palestinian Arab army arrived at the small Lebanese port of Djounish in a large schooner from Genoa. In April, a Syrian government official declared that 8,000 rifles and 6,000,000 rounds of ammunition had been lost en route from Czechoslovakia to Syria in a recent explosion aboard a ship in Bari, Italy; this was said to be the second shipment from Czechoslovakia of arms of a total value of \$2,085,000. Both shipments were consigned to the Syrian army. (Jews in the Soviet Satellites, The American Jewish Committee, edited/authored by: Peter Meyer, Bernard Dov Weinryb, Eugene Duschinsky, Nicolas Sylvain, 1953, p. 128) (IMG)

Munya Mardor provides an image of the Lino ship, which the Mossad destroyed with the assistance of Tito's fascist secret service. It was Yugoslav intelligence that was mainly responsible for transfer of arms to Israel, it was Yugoslavia that provided so much arms to the regime of Israel, and it was Yugoslav intelligence that sabotaged a part of the arms transfers to the Arab forces. Behind the Mossad lied the UDB, and behind the UDB lied the CIA and MI6, the latter being ostensibly an 'enemy' of the Ben-Gurion regime but actually a friend of the Ben-Gurion regime.

Some of the high-ranking leaders in the Arab world advocated a covert military intervention by cross-border infiltration against Israel so that the Arab states would not be condemned as 'aggressors' and so that the Arab states could have plausible deniability. According to this school of thought, it was better to send an army of volunteers from each Arab country to the battlefield and these armies of volunteers would in turn be militarily sponsored by the official armies of the Arab states. A guerrilla war by the Palestinian Arab and non-Palestinian Arab volunteer commandos, backed by the official Arab militaries, would have inflicted higher costs on the IDF at a cheaper price for the Arab armies. The application of this covert war



The sinking of the *Lino*. (Above) Little is visible as she lies sunk beside the quay. In the background is the ship from which the saboteurs swam to fix the mine. (Below) Under tow after she had been raised.

(Strictly Illegal, Munya Mardor, 1957, p. 209) (IMG)

against the Israeli regime was also going to be within the boundaries of international law, a factor which could permit the Soviets and Czechoslovaks to less secretively, and hence at a lower cost and with much less difficulty, provide arms to the Arab militaries destined for the fighters against the Israeli regime. A consequence of such difficulties en route to the Levant was the theft of a significant part of these arms by the Mossad and the UDB en route to the Levant, and the inability of the USSR and Czechoslovakia to hold the Mossad and UDB to account for such an operation because the arms transfer was supposed to be kept a secret. Although the progressive anti-imperialist Arab states launched the military invasion to save the Arabs of Palestine from Zionist terror, it is a fact that back then, the concept of 'Responsibility to Protect' was not so entrenched in international law. The 1948 Arab League military invasion of Israel constituted an 'act of aggression' by the standards of international law. Arab armed struggle against the Israeli regime was necessary no doubt, but there are many indications that an Arab armed struggle in the form of an invasion was a very unwise move. In the eyes of the mainstream of the Arab public, an invasion against Israel was considered necessary and a no-brainer, but among the Arab leaders, it was actually quite controversial. According to Sami Moubayed of the American University of Beirut, Syrian President Shukri Al-Quwatli and Lebanese Prime Minister Riad Al-Solh, both pro-Soviet in strategic orientation, opposed the direct military invasion against Israel by Syria, Lebanon, and the rest of the Arab League countries, on the grounds that the Arab armies were militarily weaker, whereas the Egyptian King Farouk, an MI6 agent, and the Mufti of Jerusalem, pro-Nazi, both supported a direct military invasion of Israel by the Arab League:

Knowing perfectly well the inferiority of the Arab armies, Kuwatly and Lebanese Prime Minister Riad al-Solh summoned the Secretary General of the Arab League Abdul Rahman Azzam and asked him to refrain from advancing into Palestine. Under the impression that a fully organized Arab force could easily defeat a few Jewish fighters, Azzam was shocked to hear what both men were saying. They added that they would be willing to provide the Palestinians with all possible arms and funds, but had reservations on involving their own forces in combat. A head on collision with the Jews would only mean certain defeat for all the Arab forces. Running on popular demand and assurances from King Farouk that the war could easily be won, Azzam ignored their plea and continued in his diplomatic mission to enlist support for the Arab army. The ex-Mufti of Jerusalem, Amin al-Husayni, who had led an uprising against the Jews in 1936, began touring Syria and Lebanon to elevate public support for Palestine. The people needed little encouragement, they were already asking for a full-scale war with the Jews. Both Kuwatly and Solh were now facing a dilemma; refusing to participate would have meant isolation among political circles and alienation within the Arab community. Likewise, sending their troops would most probably mean military defeat, yet an elevated standing among the masses. Both leaders took the second alternative. (Damascus Between Democracy and Dictatorship, Sami M. Moubayed, 2000, p. 2) (IMG)

To Solh and Quwwatli was added Egypt's Wafdist Prime Minister Noqrashi, also aligned with the Soviet-led bloc just like most other Wafdist politicians. Haajj Amin Al-Husseini, the Mufti of Jerusalem and the chief of the Palestinian regime at the time, recalled:

It is fair to mention here that the late King Abdul Aziz Al Saud and the late Noqrashi were not willing to enter the Arab armies into Palestine. Al-Naqrashi was of the opinion that Egypt could not enter the war while the English army was perched on the Suez Canal. But the late King Farouk responded to the heads of the Arab ministries who met him and convinced him that the matter is nothing more than a "military picnic." (The Memoirs of Mohammad Amin Al-Husseini, organized by: Abdel-Karim Al-Omar, 1999, pp. 392-393) (IMG)

That the Arab armies' invasion of Israel was wrong does not negate the irrefutable correctness of Arab armed struggle aimed at overthrowing a CIA-MI6 satellite regime, an anti-Arab settler-colonial terror regime serving as a base for Anglo-American aggression. Armed struggle against the Israeli regime was absolutely necessary, be it done by Arabs or by Israelis themselves. If the Arabs were not to engage in operations against Israel's regime, the Israelis themselves should have done so. If the Arabs were to handle the bulk of the armed struggle, and at the same time not to invade Israel, then the Arab states should have organized armies of volunteers. Armed struggle was a constant, the real question was the form. Arab armed struggle for overthrowing the CIA-MI6 satellite puppet regime of Israel was righteous, but the Arab masses' call for the overthrow of Israel as a country or society was and remains a moral and strategic error resulting from a lack of an understanding of the class struggles in Israel, and a lack of an understanding of a major socialist/anti-imperialist current in that country. The behaviour of Moscow lines up with this, for Moscow denounced the invasion for the abolition of Israel's existence as a country but of course, the Soviets and their Czechoslovak and Romanian allies funded the Arab armies during their war against the Ben-Gurion regime. Yet, it was not just Moscow that opposed this invasion but also Lebanese Prime Minister Riad Al-Solh, Syrian President Shukri Quwwatli, and Egyptian Prime Minister Mahmoud El-Noqrashi.

The defeat of the Arab armies in the war against Israel's regime rolled back the progressive factions in the Arab armies while strengthening the reactionary factions in these armies. In Jordan, this meant the greater entrenchment of the reactionary forces over the military. In Syria, by contrast, this meant the weakening of the progressive forces dominating the Syrian state apparatus and greater leverage for the fascist spies. A CIA coup occurred in Syria a few days after the defeat of the Syrian Arab Army by the IDF. The weakening of the Syrian state, and the rise of the reactionary elements in the command of the means of violence in Syria created the ample opportunity for the CIA to launch a military coup against the Soviet-backed government of Syria. Some time in March or April of 1948, the US intelligence activated the coup plots it had hatched against the multi-partisan parliamentary Syrian bourgeois-democracy:

I had been sent to Damascus in September 1947, with instructions to make unofficial contact with President Quwwatli and other key officials in the Syrian Government, and to probe for means of persuading them, on their own, to liberalise the political system. The first part of the assignment was easy. By the time Keeley reported for duty, some six months later [i.e. March 1948], I had established an easy personal relationship with the President and with most of those around him who were worth persuading. The probe, however, produced only negative results: it was clear to Keeley, upon reading my report, that Quwwatli and his establishment had no intention of liberalising anything, and that they would remain blind to the increasingly apparent fact: that a serious political explosion was looming. 'We have before us only two alternatives', said Keeley, 'both of them undesirable' – by which he meant that either political opportunists, with covert Soviet support, would shortly stage a bloody uprising, or that the Syrian army, with our covert support, would take over the government and maintain order.... (The Game of Nations: The Amoralism of Power Politics, Miles Copeland, 1969, p. 41) (IMG)

Thus, the steps for a military coup against the Syrian democratic republic were taken by the US intelligence:

A 'political action team' under Major Meade systematically developed a friendship with Za'im, then chief of staff of the Syrian Army, suggested to him the idea of a coup d'état, advised him how to go about it, and guided him through the intricate preparations in laying the groundwork for it – a degree of participation which was only suspected by Syria's leading politicians, and which was later written off as 'typical Syrian suspicion' by Western journalists and students who interviewed the principal participants and examined the relevant

documents. So far as the outside world knew, the coup was strictly a Syrian affair, although it was afterwards assumed, fairly generally, that Za'im was 'the Americans' boy'.

Details of the coup itself ... are [as follows] in order:

First, the State Department was informed of the coming coup as soon as it became a serious possibility. If details were not reported it was because the Department made it clear enough that it preferred not to have the details. References to the pre-coup involvement of Meade's political action team were ignored. The tenor of the Department's replies was 'If Za'im seems bent on changing the Government the Department sees no reason to discourage him....' Za'im, it happened... would ... institute much needed [pro-American] social and economic reforms, and ... 'do something constructive' about the Arab-Israel problem – this last being what neutralised any inclination the Department might have had to give us explicit instructions to lay off.

Second, the attitude of the Minister, Jim Keeley, should be recorded. (...). Overestimating our influence on Za'im ... [Keeley] thought that once Za'im ruled the country by sheer 'naked power', as Bertrand Russell calls it, our persuasiveness, sweetened by a little military aid, would result in his introducing democratic [i.e. pro-CIA] processes as rapidly as the society would permit. (...). [Keeley] believed that a short period of dictatorship might quarantine [Syrians] from 'foreign [i.e. Soviet] influences'....

(The Game of Nations: The Amorality of Power Politics, Miles Copeland, 1969, pp. 42-43) (IMG)

Less than three weeks after the end of the 1948 War, with the active backing of the United States, Colonel Za'im launched a military coup against the democratic state:

The operation was the Husni Za'im coup of 30 March 1949. (The Game of Nations: The Amorality of Power Politics, Miles Copeland, 1969, p. 42) (IMG)

A tyrannical military junta was installed into leadership. Copeland provides some details of Za'im's behaviour as the new leader of Syria:

He hadn't learned the modern theory of command – that is, that the commander's principal function is to maintain conditions in which subordinates have no alternative but to accept them. A military man who had lived all his life under such conditions, Za'im took them for granted. He treated his immediate subordinates, his fellow colonels who should have been the shoulders of his 'command structure', as though they had no choice but to carry out his instructions, and without question. (The Game of Nations: The Amorality of Power Politics, Miles Copeland, 1969, p. 44) (IMG)

The new tyrannical regime that the United States installed in Syria was, in Copeland's words:

a stooge of the most powerful government on earth.... (The Game of Nations: The Amorality of Power Politics, Miles Copeland, 1969, p. 44) (IMG)

Za'im had been so 'amenable to suggestion' (as we said in our reports) before the coup.... (...). Outrageous though it may sound, Meade spent the second day of Za'im's era telling the new dictator who should be Ambassador to the Court of St James, which officers should be promoted into diplomatic positions, and what diet should be given deposed President Quwwatli by his jailer so as not to irritate his ulcer. (The Game of Nations: The Amorality of Power Politics, Miles Copeland, 1969, p. 44) (IMG)

As a result, the Syrian-American:

relations remained friendly enough for the rest of [Za'im's] tenure.... (The Game of Nations: The Amorality of Power Politics, Miles Copeland, 1969, p. 44) (IMG)

After an intensive power struggle, there came about a democratic restoration in Syria. In this midst, the USSR began to fund the Syrian progressive bourgeois-democratic forces again. Hence in 1950:

Dwalibi confirmed that the U.S.S.R offered arms to Syria and talks about a treaty of friendship and commerce had been going on between Farid Zain al-Din, the Syrian Minister to Moscow and Vyshinskyii, the Soviet Foreign Minister. Dwalibi was reported as saying that the Syrian Government had not made any decision about Soviet proposals to supply all Syria's requirements from arms manufactured in the Soviet Union or Czechoslovakia; (The Soviet Union and Egypt – 1947-1955, Rami Ginat, 1991, p. 150. Citing: Telegram 206 from F.O. to Damascus, 13 May 1950, F0371/82794, EY10338/2. Khalid al-Azm, the Syrian Prime Minister, said that Syria would obtain its arms from any available sources; see telegram 128 from Damascus, 17 May 1950, F0371/82814, EY11338/2.) (IMG)

The deal did go through. That the USSR furnished Syria with arms in 1950 is confirmed by the interview-memoirs of Dr. Ma'rouf Al-Dwalibi, the prominent Syrian official at the time. Although a staunch anti-communist and anti-Soviet slanderer, he was nonetheless one of the officials of a progressive and Soviet-friendly government in Syria. As a minister of the Hashim Al-Attasi administration, he was tasked with negotiating arms with the USSR. In his interview-memoirs, Al-Dwalibi recalled his 1950 negotiations with the Soviet ambassador as follows:

I also told him: 'You participated in planting the Jews in our country, and this [Israel] is the result. And now I want a weapon from you, because we are threatened.' He said: 'We cannot give you a weapon, because we just got out of the [Great Patriotic] War. All of our arms production should be for our country.' He asked me for a copy of the peace agreement, and I sent it to him; and he sent it to Stalin. And he went crazy, and after four days, he issued an order to give us whatever weapons we wanted. Thus, the door to the weapon was opened. Three months later, I became Speaker of Parliament. (Memoirs of Dr. Ma'rouf Al-Dwalibi, interviewed by: Mohammad Ali Hashemi, interviewee: Dr. Ma'rouf Al-Dwalibi, 2005, p. 146) (IMG)

Dwalibi was someone who tried to portray the USSR as problematic, but he did admit that four days after the Soviet ambassador sent the letter to Stalin, the Soviet state ordered that Syria be given 'whatever weapons [she] wanted' and thus 'the door to the weapon was opened'.

Although the Abdel-Nasser faction managed to complete the process of the Egyptianization ('Tamsir') and nationalization of the Suez Canal, the process for such Egyptianization and nationalization actually began during the era of the Soviet-backed Wafd Party. Recall from C4S7 that the Wafd Party, a progressive bourgeois-democratic party, had established close ties to the Bolshevik intelligence service. The relationship continued well into the 1950s. According to Ya'akov Ro'i – one of the most prominent Israeli researchers working for the Israeli Directorate of Military Intelligence and the Research Department of the Intelligence Corps – the USSR supported the Egyptian Arab struggle for control over the Suez Canal as early as 1946, so unequivocally that some attributed the proposal for British evacuation not to the Egyptian government but to the USSR:

As early as December 1946, when it was suggested that Egypt's demand to abrogate the 1936 Treaty be brought before the Security Council, the Egyptian minister in Moscow announced at a press conference there that Egypt could rely on the USSR's adopting a favorable position. The Soviet media, quoting the minister, said that the Egyptian people was disgusted with its government's hateful policy of confusion and error and that the protection of the Suez Canal should be given to Egypt. Soviet support for the proposal to bring

the matter before the Security Council and for the British evacuation of Egypt was so unequivocal that certain Egyptian sources attributed the very proposal to the USSR government. ('Soviet Decision Making in Practice: The USSR and Israel, 1947-1954', The Shiloah Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Yaacov Ro'i, 1980, p. 78) (IMG)

Again, so much for the 'hostility' of the Ben-Gurion faction to the British Empire, these two 'enemies' sided with each other against Egypt on the Suez Canal. Against Britain and Israel in the UN, the USSR firmly sided with the much-isolated Egypt:

On 26 July 1951, Israel and Britain complained to the Security Council against Egypt's long-term policy of imposing restrictions on Suez Canal traffic to Israel. Egypt found itself almost completely isolated during six weeks of UN debates on this complaint for the Soviet Union was the only power to support Egypt. Soviet officials regarded Egyptian policy as legal. For instance, on 25 July 1951 during a conversation between Gromyko and Eliashiv, the Israeli Minister to Moscow, Gromyko said that Egyptian assertions that Egypt and Israel were in a state of war were in line with international law. ("The Soviet Union and Egypt, 1945-1955," Rami Ginat, 1993, p. 119) (IMG)

During this period, said the CIA, the:

USSR also expressed its sympathy with ... Egypt's demand for the cancellation of its 1936 agreement with England concerning the Suez Canal Zone [which had allowed Britain to military control the Canal], and of the Agreement of 1899, which calls for the two countries' joint exercise of government in the Sudan. (THE SOVIET BLOC (SURVEY 1950 AND 1951), CIA, May 7, 1952, p. 2) (IMG)

The friendly remarks between Egypt, Syria, and the USSR were well-reflected in the media and official statements:

In February 1950 the Egyptian and Soviet governments agreed to accept each other's envoys. Semen P. Kozyrev became the Soviet Minister to Cairo and Anis al-Azr the Egyptian Minister to Moscow." As early as April 1950, statements advocating a neutral policy and calling for improved relations with the Soviet Union were made by senior officials in the Syrian and Egyptian governments. On 8 April, al-Ahram reported that Egypt had informed the Western powers that it was not prepared to commit itself in support of them in the cold war." On 9 April, during the Arab League session in Cairo, the Syrian Minister of National Economy, Ma'ruf al-Dawalibi, proposed the conclusion of a non-aggression pact with the USSR. On 12 April, Dawalibi stressed that such a pact would 'protect the Arab states in case a third world war should break out'. He was opposed to reliance on the policy of the Western powers. Khalid al-'Azm, the Syrian Prime Minister who was also attending the Arab League session, stressed that he knew nothing of Dawalibi's move. He claimed that Dawalibi had co-ordinated his move with Salah al-Din, the Egyptian Foreign Minister, and that the latter had taken part in the formulation of Dawalibi's statement." From the Soviet reaction to Dawalibi's statement it was impossible to conclude whether the statement was approved by the Soviets or if they had been informed of its content. Indeed, before and after Dawalibi made his statement, he had had several talks with Daniil Solod, the Soviet Minister to Damascus, about the conclusion of commercial agreements between their countries. In fact, Dawalibi's move was welcomed by the Soviet Union. Daniil Solod told the Arab News Agency: 'Syria has extended her hand to us so we extended to her both our hands. Later on, a statement made in New Times on Dawalibi's speech said: 'The whole democratic camp has sincere sympathy for the Arab states.' The statement showed 'on whose side the sympathy of the Arab peoples lies in the struggle between the camp of democracy and the camp of imperialism'. In connection with Dawalibi's statement, 'Azzam Pasha, the Arab League's Secretary General, said that he believed that many Arabs had had enough of US pro-Jewish policy and had received al-Dawalibi's remarks with satisfaction'. ("The Soviet Union and Egypt, 1945-1955," Rami Ginat, 1993, p. 109) (IMG)

The Soviet official line of supporting the Wafd government's struggle against Britain continued until the government's collapse on 27 January 1952. The Soviet press expressed its sympathy with the Egyptian government and people for their justified struggle against the 'barbaric British attack' in the Suez Canal zone. Radio Moscow commented that 'the anti-imperialist struggle was merging all sections of the population ... highest spiritual leaders and lecturers of al-Azhar, the Muslim University, and the Egyptian Government'. The Soviet government's notes, said Radio Moscow, 'had been received with satisfaction by the varied classes in Egypt and other Middle Eastern countries'. Now it was clear that the Egyptian people would not be frightened 'by the aggression launched by Great Britain with the assistance of other imperialist powers'. ("The Soviet Union and Egypt, 1945-1955," Rami Ginat, 1993, p. 128) (IMG)

Whereas the Soviets supported Egypt on the Suez issue, Tito personally supported the MI6-backed Ben-Gurion regime which was hostile to the Egyptian intentions concerning the Suez Canal. An Israeli foreign ministry document, referring to a conversation between the Israeli diplomat to Yugoslavia, Ezra Yoran, and Tito, stated:

Yoran reports on a forty-minute meeting with Tito on 18 August. Tito emphasized Yugoslavia's friendship with Israel. He asked about aliyah from Eastern Europe, assured Yoran of Yugoslavia's support on the Suez blockade issue, and promised to speak to his foreign minister about it. He asked Yoran to forward best wishes to the Prime Minister [David Ben-Gurion]. (E. Yoran (Belgrade) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 18, 1951. In: DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL, State of Israel Archives, Vol. 6, 1951, Edited by Yemima Rosenthal, Companion Volume, p. 241) (IMG)

Approximately three years later, Yugoslavia also began to push for the Ben-Gurion regime's inclusion in the anti-Soviet 'Balkan Pact' alliance, a military alliance of Yugoslavia, monarcho-fascist Greece, and Turkey. As a matter of fact, as confirmed by Jacob Abadi, a professor of history at the US Air Force Academy, in 1954,:

In his conversation with Ezra Yoran, Israel's Minister in Yugoslavia, a Yugoslav Foreign Ministry official argued ... that his country was willing to support Israel's candidacy to the Balkan Alliance. (Israel and the Balkan States, Middle Eastern Studies, Jacob Abadi, 1996, p. 298) (IMG)

More important than the Soviet diplomatic gestures were the economic and military relations between Egypt and the Soviet-led camp. Indeed: From 1948, commercial relations between Egypt and the Soviet bloc countries, especially the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, had steadily increased. ("The Soviet Union and Egypt, 1945-1955," Rami Ginat, 1993, p. 241) (IMG)

The expanding relations were also in the military sphere:

During April and May 1950, there were many reports, some considered reliable, indicating Soviet offers of arms to Egypt and Syria. On 27 April, the CIA reported to President Truman that, according to information given by a senior Syrian official, Syria had signed a secret non-aggression and economic agreement with the USSR by which Syria was to receive Soviet arms via the port of Latakia. Reports from Caffery spoke of rumours that the Soviet government was prepared to furnish arms to Arab countries by way of new barter agreements." According to al-Ahram, the Soviet Union offered Egypt arms for cotton on liberal terms including barter. The paper said

that the Egyptian government 'is not unfavourably disposed to purchasing these necessary defensive weapons' from the Soviet Union and stressed that, owing to the American and British refusal to sell arms to Egypt, the Egyptian government would consider positively the Soviet offer; the arms were necessary to help Egypt realize its national aspirations." Later, on 22 May, this information was confirmed by the Department of State, which informed President Truman that the Egyptian government 'have indicated recently that, if necessary, it could secure arms and assistance from the USSR.' ("The Soviet Union and Egypt, 1945-1955," Rami Ginat, 1993, p. 110. Citing: Telegram 821 from American Embassy, Cairo, 20 April 1950, RG 84, Cairo Embassy-General Documents, 1950-1952: 320, box 219. Al-Ahram (Cairo), 3 May 1950. The American Embassy and Service Attaches could not confirm or reject this information; see Dispatch 983 from Caffery, Cairo, 3 May 1950, RG 84, Moscow Embassy-Confidential File, 1950: 320 Egypt, box 143. According to the daily paper Al-Asas, a high ranking Soviet diplomat who was asked, what would be the Soviet Government attitude should Egypt or any other Arab state apply to the Soviet bloc for arms? replied, that his country would welcome any cooperation with the Arab states; see telegram 1150 from Caffery, Cairo, 20 May 1950, Cairo Embassy- General Documents, 1950-1952: 320, box 219. Papers of Harry S. Truman-Naval Aide Files, 22 May 1950, File Subject: State Dept. Briefs, May-July 1950, box 22.) (IMG)

Stalin-era USSR thus laid the foundations to a Soviet alliance with the anti-imperialist Egyptian Arab state:

As we have already seen, Soviet interest in the area had been steadily increasing since the second half of the 1940s. Towards the end of Stalin's period in power, many attempts were made by the Soviets to improve relations with Arab governments which conducted an anti-Western policy or declared neutralism. This was the case with the Wafdist government (1950-52), when Salah al-Din, the Wafdist Foreign Minister, shaped and implemented Egypt's new policy of neutralism. He resolutely rejected Western proposals for establishing a Middle East Command, and was the motive power behind his government's decision to abrogate the treaty of 1936 with Britain. As a result of his policy, the relationship between Egypt and the Soviet Union significantly improved; several commercial agreements were concluded and more understanding and co-operation found expression at the UN. During the second half of 1951 the idea of concluding a non-aggression pact between the two countries had been seriously considered. In fact, the roots of the later Soviet-Egyptian honeymoon originated in this period. ("The Soviet Union and Egypt, 1945-1955," Rami Ginat, 1993, p. 240) (IMG)

As mentioned previously (in C17S3), the Anglo-American imperialists, in their aggression plans against the USSR, were plotting to drop a nuclear bomb on Baku in particular to destroy Soviet oilfields, as part of the World War III scheme. They were seeking to travel via Iran and Turkey for this purpose. Soviet sponsorship of Arab patriots helped contain Anglo-American influence in the Middle East and strengthen the defenses of the anti-imperialist camp against Anglo-American plots. A CIA document stated:

Soviet interest in the Arab states is still directed rather toward ... undermining the British position in the Middle East.... Their principal asset, the oil of Iraq and Saudi Arabia, would be economically inaccessible, although its denial to Britain and the United States in the event of war would be of important consequent. But, by fomenting local demands for the withdrawal of British troops, the Soviet Union can hope to deny effective British support to Turkey and Iran. To this end the Soviet Union will exploit anti-British sentiment among the Arabs, and particularly the vexing Palestine issue. (Soviet Foreign and Military Policy, ORE 1, Central Intelligence Group (CIA Predecessor), July 23, 1946, p. 7) (IMG)

In 1952, at the instigation of the MI6, the Egyptian King Farouq launched a campaign to overthrow the constitutional monarchy and to establish a monarcho-fascist regime. This entailed a systematic purge of the Soviet-backed Wafd Party and other progressive bourgeois-democratic elements allied to the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies. It also entailed a purge of the military. In this midst, when the democratic order was already on the verge of elimination, when the constitutional monarchy was being abolished, Gamal Abdel-Nasser and the Free Officers took action to overthrow the King Farouq. As such, the Free Officers launched not a coup, but a counter-coup against a monarcho-fascist coup. Some of the aspects of the Free Officer counter-coup were suspicious: how is it that Abdel-Nasser was the leader of the Free Officers, but Naguib, the traitor to the Free Officers, ended up as the leader of the new Egyptian government? It is often explained that Abdel-Nasser promoted Naguib as a puppet; but we know that Naguib ended up not being a puppet at all. During the Free Officer coup, Abdel-Nasser himself was briefly detained by the troops affiliated with the Free Officer coup plotter network. These are suspicious aspects of the coup. Anyways, the imperialist-fascist secret service agent General Naguib, who was an enemy of Abdel-Nasser, managed to be installed as the main leader of the Free Officers and hence the leader of the newly-installed regime, with Abdel-Nasser as vice leader. Upon seizing power, General Naguib and his gang dramatically boosted the intelligence influence of the BND and the remaining Nazi officials inside Egypt's intelligence service. Naguib and his gang supported the reactionary fascist elements inside the Muslim Brotherhood. Naguib and his gang launched a campaign of terror against ordinary workers, and brutally suppressed dissent. All of these measures were opposed by Abdel-Nasser either directly or indirectly. Naguib and his gang plotted the assassination of Gamal Abdel-Nasser. Behind the scenes, the Ben-Gurion faction of Israel enthusiastically welcomed General Naguib's rise to power and the establishment of such a fascist state:

The tensions and conflicts inside the UN deprive the community of nations of the ability and authority to decree peace, and the situation in the different countries of the Middle East foreshadows not stability, quiet development, and projects of peace, but the opposites. Apart from two stable and strong countries in the Middle East - Israel and Turkey - all Near Eastern countries are immersed in a whirlpool of disturbances, revolts, political chaos, political assassinations, deposition of monarchs, and constant contests for power between adventurers and dictators.

It is possible that these stormy developments may also contain some positive trends for recovery and progress. Wherever such trends exist, we view them with favour. **No doubt some of the events in Egypt in recent weeks in connection with the seizure of power by Mohammed Naguib may be welcomed. We can accept the testimony of Mohammed Naguib, the head of the military revolution, who declared that he and many of his colleagues in the Army had been opposed to the invasion of our country....**

(Israel welcomes the Egyptian revolution – statement to the Knesset by Prime Minister Ben-Gurion, August 18, 1952. In: Historical Documents, Volumes 1-2: 1947-1974, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Bold added) (IMG)

Gamal Abdel-Nasser did have a favorable view of 'the other Israel' – the progressive faction of Israel led by the Mapam, the Soviet-backed communist-led 'Socialist Zionist' popular front party that operated also as a Soviet intelligence network. The Mapam Party's military force was the Palmach (pronounced Paal-Maakh); the Palmach commanders were often members of the Mapam. As will be explored in greater detail later in C16S6, Abdel-Nasser had befriended the Palmach commanders Yitzhak Rabin, Yigal Allon, and Yeruham Cohen during the 1948 War. In the 1948 War Diaries Abdel-Nasser had made a truly interesting remark: "We ... went to Gat, and we were well-treated. There was a vast difference between

Gat and Iraq al-Manshiyyeh. One feels that one is among civilized people – mechanized agricultural means, hygiene, and the women in bright clothes wearing shorts.” More about Abdel-Nasser’s Mapam connection will be said later in the upcoming chapter. Abdel-Nasser’s ‘pro-American’ views were of a similar nature. He was ‘pro-American’ if the term ‘pro-American’ is to mean that he supported ‘the other America’, the pro-Soviet faction of America. In a letter to his good friend John F. Kennedy, he frankly condemned American imperialism, US policies in the region, and many US presidents including Eisenhower and ‘Democratic Party’ President Woodrow Wilson, but indicated regrets that US President Roosevelt died too early to pursue his anti-colonial program. However, in contrast to Abdel-Nasser, Mohammad Naguib was aligned with the mainstream – the reactionary – factions of America and Israel, which earned him Ben-Gurion’s love.

It is a well-documented fact that the USSR denounced the Israel-backed Naguib gang as ‘fascist’ ‘agents of American imperialism’. Indeed:

Joseph Stalin rejected cooperation with the new Arab leaders such as General Mohammed Naguib, precursor of Colonel Nasser, who headed the Egyptian revolutionary junta in July 1952. (Arab-Israeli Dispute, Howard C. Reese, April 1966. In: United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, Commandant: Major General Harry J. Lemley, Jr. Assistant Commandant: Brigadier General Robert C. Taber, Vol. XLVI, April 1966, No. 4, p. 62.) (IMG)

Somehow, the fact that the USSR was hostile to the Naguib regime – the regime that plotted Abdel-Nasser’s assassination – has been interpreted by some as to mean that the Stalin-era USSR was hostile to Abdel-Nasser and the true Free Officers. That is an absurd claim, to say the least. On the contrary, through such hostility to the Naguib regime, the Stalin-era USSR helped to systematically destabilize the Naguib regime, thus indirectly assisting Abdel-Nasser in overthrowing the Naguib gang. Furthermore, Soviet hostility to the Naguib regime could not possibly be Soviet hostility towards the rise of the secular Arab liberation struggle. As confirmed by the CIA, the Stalin-era USSR promoted secular pan-Arabism (‘Arab Nationalism’) as an ideological trend that could undermine Anglo-American imperialism in the Middle East region:

The Arab nationalism of the Middle and Near East countries exploded in conflicts with the old colonial powers. The Soviet Union, which supported these actions with adroit propaganda, made use of the same tactics it applied in Southeast Asia to create the impression that it is a friend of these countries. Although the Moslem countries are hardly fertile soil for communism, the development of extreme nationalist groups, into various of which the MGB [i.e. Soviet intelligence], well disguised, has apparently succeeded in penetrating, has created a favorable situation for the eastern bloc and a correspondingly unfavorable situation for the western powers. It will take all the skill of Western diplomacy, a broad understanding of the problems of the oriental countries and peoples, to take action, within the confines of neutrality, to prevent the Near East from becoming dominated by the eastern bloc, not just for the moment, but for a long time to come. The significance of this source of danger can hardly be overestimated. (THE SOVIET BLOC (SURVEY 1950 AND 1951), CIA, May 7, 1952, p. 2) (IMG)

By early 1953, thanks to Soviet pressures, the Naguib regime too had been weakened, though not to the point of being ‘ready’ to be overthrown yet. This was correlated with the fact that (as confirmed by the American spy Sa’id Aburish in ‘Nasser; The Last Arab’) in early 1953, Abdel-Nasser was able to convince elements within the military to lobby for a crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood. From 1950 until the ‘Islamic Revolution’ in Iran, the progressive elements inside the Muslim Brotherhood were a small minority, and the reactionary terrorist agents of the CIA and MI6 an overwhelming majority, thus making the organization an Anglo-American intelligence front. The ruthless crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood in early 1953 reduced CIA-MI6 influence and slightly tilted Egypt towards the anti-imperialist camp. This could not have gone unnoticed and unappreciated by the Soviets; indeed, according to Rami Ginat, the Stalin-era USSR slightly toned down its opposition to Egypt’s government and was to some extent satisfied by the maneuvers of Egypt:

The downfall of the Wafd government in January 1952 generated a period of mutual suspicion and distrust in Soviet-Egyptian relations. In his last months, however, Stalin moderated his negative attitude towards the Free Officers’ regime in Egypt. The Soviets now adopted a wait-and-see tactic. Eventually, the Free Officers’ position vis-a-vis the Western powers did, to some extent, satisfy Soviet policy-makers. They believed that Western failure in the region would serve Soviet interests. In the meantime, the Soviet media supported Egypt and the Arabs in their ‘just struggle’ and their ‘right’ to full independence. (The Origins of the Czech-Egyptian Arms Deal: A Reappraisal, Rami Ginat. In: ‘The 1956 War: Collusion and Rivalry in the Middle East’, edited by: David Tal, 2001, p. 148) (IMG)

The USSR should not have fully supported – and indeed did not fully support – the Egyptian regime during this time period, because the Naguib faction was still dominant. However, the elevation of the Abdel-Nasser faction, which was correlated with the suppression of the Muslim Brotherhood terror group, was also correlated with a less unfavorable approach to Egypt by the USSR. After the 1948 War, Abdel-Nasser retained secret contacts with the Soviet-backed Mapam-Palmach faction in Israel. Upon ascending to the position of the President (Al-Ra’is) of Egypt in 1954, Abdel-Nasser retained contacts with the faction of Yigal Allon and Yitzhak Rabin, via the Palmach officer and Allon aide, Yeruham Cohen. This fact is well-documented. The prominent journalist Eric Rouleau for one wrote:

The friendship between Nasser and Cohen lasted well after the war. Having ascended to the presidency of the republic, the Rais invited Cohen more than once to visit him in Cairo, something the Israeli was unable to do because the Israeli government refused permission. The two men corresponded with each other and exchanged gifts for their respective birthdays. Besides Cohen, Yigal Allon, commander of the forces besieging al-Faluja and later a leader of the Labor Party, also had courteous conversations with Nasser and excellent memories of their encounters, according to the statements he made to the Israeli daily Yedioth Ahronoth. (‘Truths and Lies in the Middle East: Memoirs of a Veteran Journalist, 1952-2012’, Eric Rouleau, 2019) (IMG)

C16S6. The Mapam Faction in Israel *** IMG-All-{Mapam}

The history of the Soviet and Czechoslovak support for the Arab armed struggle against the regime of Israel is only the Arabic part of the story of the Soviet stance on Israel. The Hebrew part of the story, studied by few outside of Israel, is one of the most fascinating aspects of the history of the region. The alpha and the omega – or rather, the Alef and the Tav – of the ‘Israeli side’ of the story can be summarized by one word: Mapam. Mapam, in partnership with the Maki, was to rise to dominance in Israel, leading the way to a new a revolutionary socialist Israel.

Due to the discrimination against the Yiddish people of Europe, most of them became proletarians involved in the socialist class struggles. On this point, Engels stated:

In addition, the anti-Semite presents the facts in an entirely false light. He doesn’t even know the Jews he decries, otherwise he would be aware that, thanks to anti-Semitism in eastern Europe, and to the Spanish Inquisition in Turkey, there are here in England and in

America thousands upon thousands of Jewish proletarians; and it is precisely, these Jewish workers who are the worst exploited and the most poverty-stricken. In England during the past twelve months we have had three strikes by Jewish workers. Are we then expected to engage in anti-Semitism in our struggle against capital?

Furthermore, we are far too deeply indebted to the Jews. Leaving aside Heine and Börne, Marx was a full-blooded Jew; Lassalle was a Jew. Many of our best people are Jews. My friend Victor Adler, who is now atoning in a Viennese prison for his devotion to the cause of the proletariat, ... Paul Singer, one of our best men in the Reichstag – people whom I am proud to call my friends, and all of them Jewish! After all, I myself was dubbed a Jew by the Gartenlaube....!

(On Anti-Semitism, Frederick Engels, April 19, 1890)

When using the term 'Jew', he was so obviously speaking not of the religion of Judaism which Engels and Marx greatly disliked and frequently ridiculed, but of the Ashkenazim, Sfaradim, the secular 'Jews', or the Yiddish. When the USSR was established, there came the special relationship between the Yiddish nation and the Soviet state. Time and time again, the Yiddish proletarians, among whom the USSR held a high level of soft power influence, had been strongly influenced by communist ideas, and from among them rose agents who actively pushed for the expansion of Soviet and Comintern influence. Such was the case in the days of the October Revolution, when the Yiddish proletarians formed much of the Bolshevik cadres and sought to expand Bolshevik influence in Byelorussia and the Baltics. Such was the case in Moldova and Bessarabia, when the Yiddish population there supported the efforts to hand that territory back to the USSR. Such was the case when the Yiddish proletarians in Warsaw launched that heroic uprising against the Nazi occupation. Such was the case when the Yiddish proletarians – Rakosi among them – formed many of the cadres of the communist party activists in Hungary and Poland, the agents of the Comintern in the Middle East, the fighters of the Spanish Civil War, etc.

Understandably, the vast majority of the observers incorrectly believed that upon joining Zionist organizations or migrating to Israel, these Yiddish activists no longer had a significant revolutionary potential. The Soviets, on the other hand, had the vision to understand that this was not as true as one may have thought. While Zionism did most certainly diminish tremendously the revolutionary potential of the Ashkenazim, by sending the children of the People's Democratic Eastern Europe to become the subjects of an aggressive pro-fascist Anglo-American satellite state in the Middle East, the potential was not as badly reduced as many assumed. The heroism of the sons and daughters of the USSR and Eastern Europe in the Hashomer Hatzair and the Mapam and very importantly the fact that these socialist anti-fascist saboteurs had a powerful socio-economic base, the kibbutz lobby and the proletariat, all serve to show the incorrectness of this thesis that the rise of Israel was almost the end of the Ashkenazi revolutionary potential.

The population of Israel had a high revolutionary potential, but such a revolutionary potential was suppressed as a result of the intensive Anglo-American investment into preventing the 'fall' of Israel into the hands of the Israeli proletariat. Even in spite of the general upper hand which the Anglo-American agents obtained in Israel, the communist intelligence network in Israel had enough influence over the military, intelligence, and security bodies of the Israeli state, to produce wonders. The USSR supported Arab armed struggle not at all for the Rejectionist-style destruction of the society of Israel but for militarily decimating the CIA-MI6 faction in Israel, the Mapai-Irgun alliance, so that the way could be paved for the establishment of a socialist state in Israel.

As mentioned before, contrary to what is often believed, many of the migrants who went to the territory that is called Israel actually were serious believers in a democratic peace and fraternal coexistence with the Arab inhabitants of Palestine. No doubt Zionism is a reactionary pro-fascist ideology that supports settler-colonial terror against the Arab proletarians, and favours strategic partnership and 'peace' treaties with the fascist Arabs, the bad Arabs. Yet, not everyone who self-described as 'Zionist' defined that term in such a way, at all. For many of them, 'Zionism' was redefined so as to mean life in a socialist-leaning bi-ethnic state in Israel-Palestine-Jordan region in a joint struggle of the Yiddish migrants, Hebrew 'sabras', and the Arabs against Anglo-American imperialism – no ethnic cleansing against Arabs, no settler-colonialism, no Ashkenazi supremacy.

In Israel, there existed three main 'Socialist Zionist' political parties that closely cooperated with the Soviet intelligence, Comintern, the communist parties, or other communist-linked organizations. These parties were: Achdut Ha-Avoda (to which Yitzhak Rabin and Yigal Allon belonged), Hashomer Hatzair (to which Meir Ya'ari, Ya'akov Hazan, and the martyr commander of the 1942 Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, Mordechai Anielewicz, belonged), and Poale Tzion Smol. With the encouragement of **the Soviet intelligence fronts, the consulates of the Peoples' Democracies and the Soviet officials in Moscow** – possibly even Stalin himself personally – the Israeli pro-Soviet 'Socialist Zionist' parties which closely cooperated with Moscow, merged to form the political party, Mapam. The CIA reported:

The 2,000 workers of the Socialist League plus 500 former members of the Hashomer Hatzair Youth Movement brought total adult membership of the Hashomer Hatzair up to 8,500 in 1946. Its newspaper, Mishmar, was the third most widely circulated in Palestine. In 1946 the party came out against terrorism and was reported to be trying to gain strength in the rural areas. In July 1946 there was a reorganization of the political executive. **Sections were designated for cooperation with the USSR, the V-League (Friendship for Soviet Russia), and the Arabs.** (...). During the fall of 1947 negotiations were in progress in Palestine and abroad, particularly in Poland, for a union of all pro-Soviet left-wing groups in the Jewish Agency to counter-balance MAPAI's "dictatorship" and to oppose the "fascism" of the Irgun-Revisionist bloc. Such **pro-Soviet institutions as the Society for Israeli-Soviet Friendship, (the former V-League) the Soviet section of the Pan Slav Union, and the satellite consulates lent encouragement.** By January 1948, Achdut Avoda-Poale Zion Smol's fear of being swallowed up by the better organized communities of Hashomer Hatzair was assuaged, and these three parties united to form MAPAM. In the 1946 elections to the Histadruth the parties combined in MAPAM received 25% of the vote as opposed to 35% received by MAPAI. (POLITICAL PARTIES IN ISRAEL: Intelligence Memorandum No. 108, CIA, December 28, 1948, p. 8) (IMG)

In April 1946, Achdut Avoda merged with Poale Zion Smol to form the Mefleget Achdut Avoda, although (as in the merger of other Jewish parties) it remained its own party organization. (...). **After the visit of two of its members to Moscow in February 1948**, this party merged with the Hashomer Hatzair to form MAPAM. (POLITICAL PARTIES IN ISRAEL: Intelligence Memorandum No. 108, CIA, December 28, 1948, p. 7) (IMG)

The Mapam, a 'Socialist Zionist' party that was created with the support of the Soviets and cooperated closely with the Soviets, was to serve as the vehicle for socialist intelligence service work in Israel. In some ways, the Mapam back then was an equivalent of the Tudeh Party of Iran in the sense that it was so designed to be a communist-led popular front party. In other words, it was designed to be a progressive bourgeois-democratic party led by communists and oriented towards communism, but not exactly a communist party per se. The Mapam was actively sponsored by the Soviet

military intelligence and the Soviet political intelligence via the Soviet Embassy in Tel Aviv well until 1949 and well beyond. In a Soviet Foreign Ministry instructions document sent to the Soviet legation in Tel Aviv, the legation was instructed to gather military and political intelligence in Israel, but also, importantly, instructed the legation to support the Mapam and the Maki in the struggle for bringing about a socialist-leaning state in Israel:

In relations with the opposition parties – the United Party (Mapam) and the Communist Party of Israel [Maki] – the legation must confine itself to acquiring information and, without interfering in these parties' internal affairs or the relations between them, support their actions in their struggle to establish friendly relations between Israel and the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies. (INSTRUCTIONS TO THE MINISTER OF THE USSR IN THE STATE OF ISRAEL, Secret, Ershov. Part of: COPY: AVP RF, F 089, OP.2, P.3, D.8, LL.2-11, I.N. Bakulin to A.A. Gromyko (Moscow), Moscow, 29 September 1949, Secret. In: "Documents on Israeli-Soviet Relations, 1941-1953, Parts 1-2", Israeli Foreign Ministry, Russian Foreign Ministry, Israel State Archives, Russian Federal Archives, pp. 534-538) (IMG)

Supporting the one-state solution, the Mapam opposed the partition of Palestine on the grounds that it would prevent a democratic peace between the Yiddish/Hebrews and the Arabs and would result in both countries – Israel and the Arab part of Palestine – to be economically weak. Along Soviet lines however, since the expulsion of the British was a priority for the Party, the Mapam supported the UN plan on Palestine which entailed the expulsion of the British and at the same time the partition of Palestine. "An article in the 25 January 1948 edition of the Palestine Post," reported the CIA, "contains excerpts from the new party's platform":

"The independent nation is to forge its socialist future by striving for a pact with the toiling Arab masses in the country.... The party sees itself an inseparable part of the revolutionary workers' movement and the work against capitalist reaction.... It will foster contacts with revolutionary movements all over the world and favors agreement between the workers of the world and the USSR which is the first workers' state.... Complete equality and cooperation between the Jewish people returning to its land and the Arab masses living there will be sought.... Regarding the UN decision, the platform has determined the establishment of the Jewish state and its defense under present conditions despite its rejection, in principle, of the partition solution." (POLITICAL PARTIES IN ISRAEL: Intelligence Memorandum No. 108, CIA, December 28, 1948, p. 5) (IMG)

The Mapam had a long history of arguing for a bi-ethnic state in Palestine and opposition to the partition:

From its inception, this movement understood that two peoples are living in the Land of Israel, and they both have the right to national self-determination. At its founding convention in 1929, the Kibbutz 'Artzi Federation resolved: "...the historic Land of Israel is the common homeland of two peoples, the Jewish people returning to it and the Palestinian people living in it."

This kibbutz federation, and its youth movement, strove to create a bi-national state in Israel, in which both peoples would have equal national and political rights while preserving the Zionist principle that the country must be open to all Jews persecuted by anti-Semitic forces and all Jews who choose to manifest their national existence.

(The Independent Socialist Party of Israel – MAPAM, International Department of the MAPAM, January 1986, p. 1) (IMG)

Nonetheless, even after the partition of Palestine, the Mapam made every effort to undo the damage of the partition of Palestine. To undo the economic damage of the partition, the Mapam called for economic cooperation and an eventual economic union between Israel and Arab Palestine. To block settler-colonial terror against the Arab civilians, the Mapam opposed the expulsion of the Arab civilians from Israel and supported the right of return. The Mapam also called for a democratic peace and extensive cooperation with Arab Palestine, as well as a military alliance with the progressive forces in the other Arab states.

In a report to the Soviet intelligence service, top Mapam officials Levite and Ya'akov Riftin reaffirmed the Party line in support of the Palestinian Arab right of return, the support for and pursuit of an alliance with the revolutionary Arabs in the neighbouring states, the establishment of a democratic peace, an Israeli alliance with the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies against Anglo-American imperialism, and strengthening the socialist forces in Israel's state apparatus and mode of production:

Speaking about the forthcoming elections to the Constituent Assembly and the prospects for development of the State of Israel, Riftin told me that their pre-election platform [of the Mapam] had been approved and consisted of the following: in foreign policy, orientation towards the Soviet Union and the new democracies; strengthening links with the Arab democratic movement. On the issue of Arab refugees, Levite said that the party's position included the following: return of refugees after the war, with the exception of 'warmongers'. In the: sphere of domestic policy, a resolute struggle against fascist and terrorist organizations. At present the government was pursuing only the Stern group, while members of other fascist and terrorist groups were still at liberty. Legislation to institute a progressive tax, the burden of which would be borne by the bourgeoisie, and not by the broad masses of the population; a struggle against clericalism, while retaining freedom of conviction; defence of [Mapam] positions in the army, because 'with the support of the army, the party can be a significant force'; officials who served the British to be dismissed from the civil service. (DIARY: AVP RF, F.089, OP.1, P.1, D.3, LL.21-3, Meeting: P.I. Ershov – Y. Riftin and L. Levite, Tel Aviv, September 23, 1948. In: "Documents on Israeli-Soviet Relations, 1941-1953, Parts 1-2", Israeli Foreign Ministry, Russian Foreign Ministry, Israel State Archives, Russian Federal Archives, pp. 363-365) (IMG)

Dr. Moshe Sneh, the prominent Haganah commander who was the leader of the Mapam and was a top Soviet spy in Israel, said in an interview that the Party supported an economic union between Palestine and Israel and the return of the non-revanchist Arab refugees, and an alliance with progressive Arabs:

We have always demanded the right of peaceful Arab refugees to return to the country. We have connected this with our demand that in the Arab part of Palestine there should be created a democratic independent Arab state, which would be linked with Israel by an economic union and a treaty of friendship. In the framework of such a democratic solution the question of refugees could no longer be used as an instrument for foreign intrigues. It is characteristic that, when we proposed a year ago that the right of peaceful Arab refugees to return be proclaimed as part of a democratic entente between Jews and Arabs, the majority parties just about denounced us as traitors. (...). According to our proposal of a year ago, the return of Arab refugees could have been an act of good will on the part of Israel on the path to Jewish-Arab friendship; (INTERVIEW WITH DR. SNEH, Neie Presse (a Paris Yiddish daily), Interviewer: L. Bruck, interviewee: Moshe Sneh, November 1949, p. 1. MIA) (IMG)

In a conversation with the Soviet diplomat in Tel Aviv, Levite, a leader of the Mapam, said:

On the issue of Arab refugees, Levite said that the party's position included the following: return of refugees after the war, with the exception of 'warmongers'. (DIARY: AVP RF, F.089, OP.1, P.1, D.3, LL.21-3, Meeting: P.I. Ershov – Y. Riftin and L. Levite, Tel Aviv, September 23, 1948. In: "Documents on Israeli-Soviet Relations, 1941-1953, Parts 1-2", Israeli Foreign Ministry, Russian Foreign Ministry, Israel State Archives, Russian Federal Archives, pp. 363-365) (IMG)

It should be obvious enough that the Arab right of return, the economic union, and comprehensive cooperation between these states would have undone every 'anti-Palestinian' thing that Israel is known for.

The Mapam also correctly claimed responsibility for promoting the rights of the Arab workers in the Histadrut:

MAPAM did not forego its desire for an accommodation with the Palestinian-Arab people and opened its ranks to Arab members, within the framework of a common political party. MAPAM fought against all restrictions on freedom of movement for the Arab population of Israel imposed by the Military Administration. MAPAM demanded – and achieved – the acceptance of Arab workers into the General Labour Federation of Israel (Histadrut). (The Independent Socialist Party of Israel – MAPAM, International Department of the MAPAM, January 1986, pp. 1-2) (IMG)

The Mapam ideologically held a strongly communistic orientation and almost half, if not more, of its members held communist stances on almost all issues except for 'Socialist Zionism':

According to a press dispatch of 25 April from Tel Aviv, an extremist group advocating stricter compliance with the Cominform line has gained control of MAPAM, a left-wing socialist party which was second only to MAPAI (Prime Minister Ben-Gurion's party) in 1949 general elections. In a countrywide election this week of delegates to next month's MAPAM party conference, the extremist group, which maintains that there is no ideological difference between Communist and MAPAM party aims other than Communist opposition to Zionism, had a 50% voice in the party's rule. MAPAM's moderate groups, which have reportedly elected but 40% of the party delegates, have stressed the importance of Zionism and of ideological independence. (U New York Times, Tel Aviv, 26 April [19]51). (...). Such a development could present Israel with a more serious Communism problem than the present political set-up provides. ('Israel. Reported Leftist Gains in the MAPAM Party'. In: 'Daily Digest', CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), April 26, 1951, p. 5) (IMG)

According to a "Reuters" broadcast from London, Israel's left-wing socialist party, MAPAM, dodged a threatened party split on the issue of how closely the party should follow the Cominform line when the party concluded its political convention at Haifa. A contradictory mixture of Zionist pioneering and pro-Soviet tendencies was revealed by the convention's directive that MAPAM move toward "the socialist revolutionary camp, against Titoism, and for Jewish pioneering". MAPAM ... generally follows along Communist lines. ('Israel. Pro-Soviet MAPAM Avoids Threatened Party Split'. In: 'Daily Digest', CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), June 4, 1951, p. 3) (IMG)

Again, the 'Zionism' of the Mapam was very different than the mainstream Zionist tendencies, in that it had opposed the partition of Palestine, opposed the terror and expulsion of the Palestinian Arabs, and supported an alliance with the progressive Arab forces. They were 'Zionists' in the sense that they supported the migration and regarded 'Eretz Yisrael' as the homeland of the 'Jewish people' (in addition to being the homeland of the Palestinian Arabs). Many anti-Zionists do not even know that a significant minority of the individuals who self-describe as 'Zionist' oppose the reign of terror and expulsion of the Palestinian Arabs, because most anti-Zionists assume that practically all of those self-describing as 'Zionists' would agree that the term 'Zionism' ipso facto and by definition means support for the settlement of the Jews and 'Jews' in replacement of Arabs and not alongside Arabs. Because of the existence of this 'Socialist Zionism' which called for Zionist migration to Palestine under the conditions of a democratic peace and a bi-ethnic state, rather than the partition and the settler-colonization of Palestine, Zionism was seen as an umbrella term that included both the Arab-friendly 'progressive Zionists' and the anti-Arab child-killers and fascist assassins of which many are reminded every time the word 'Zionist' is uttered. This is why in many worker organizations, unions, and parties in Europe, Zionism was in some contexts denounced as a fascist terror ideology and was sometimes denounced as merely 'foolish' or 'erroneous' but not as criminal or colonial. They who denounced this non-fascistic 'Socialist Zionism' as 'foolish' ridiculed it by arguing that it was calling for Ashkenazi lawyers and doctors in Europe to go the Negev desert and farm in an ultra-egalitarian cooperative. This contextual difference emanated from the different connotations of the term 'Zionist' and the recognition that some of those who self-described as 'Zionists' opposed anti-Arab terror and extermination projects.

The HaShomer HaTzair, 'the Young Guards', was one of the most prominent of these 'Socialist Zionist' organizations. Initially affiliated with the Kautskyite and Trotskyite circles slanderously campaigning against the USSR, it came increasingly under the influence of the communistic elements thanks to the soft power influence of the USSR among the Yiddish during the Great Patriotic War and thanks to the contacts established with the communist resistance forces as a result of the popular front policies. The cracks in the Hashomer Hatzair began to widen in the late 1930s, when, increasingly, it was made up of a 'Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist Zionist' majority faction that triumphed over the 'Trotskyist Zionist' minority faction. Whereas the mainstream of the Zionist movement – the tools of Anglo-American intelligence as they were – collaborated with the Axis forces from 1943 as part of the effort to contain Soviet influence, the Hashomer Hatzair opposed the Nazi regime and the latter's Anglo-American backers, and supported Soviet efforts. Naturally, as with all communistic anti-Nazi resistance organizations, there were some suspicious elements – Trotskyite and Titoist agents – in its ranks, much as how there were high-ranking Gestapo agents inside the communist parties. However, just like the Comintern-affiliated parties, the general trend in the Hashomer Hatzair was genuinely anti-Nazi. A top case in point of Hashomer Hatzair heroism in the anti-Nazi struggles is the case of the well-known martyr Mordechai Anielewicz. Anielewicz was the commander in chief of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, the Yiddish uprising against the Nazi German occupation. A HaShomer HaTzair 'Socialist Zionist' activist, he was a true friend of the Soviet Union even though the imperialist media and right-wing Israeli media try to steal and coopt his image for their own reactionary agenda by portraying Anielewicz as anti-Soviet and as best of friends with the MI6-backed anti-Semitic 'Home Army' terrorists. Yitzhak Zuckerman, the second most prominent commander of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, recalled in his memoirs:

For example, Mordechai Anielewicz – he was a brilliant lecturer – said that if the Red Army (this was back in 1940) went into the Middle East and occupied Eretz Israel, we would welcome them with open arms. They would occasionally invite me to attend the sort of conferences we attend today in Israel. I said then that the entrance of the Red Army into Eretz Israel could be the end of Zionism, so I wouldn't welcome them gladly; naturally, I said, we might not have the strength to resist them. That was the big difference in conception. (A Surplus of Memory: Chronicle of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, Yitzhak Zuckerman, 1993, p. 504) (IMG)

Anielewicz was a leftist, so was Braslaw. If they had remained alive in Poland after the war, they would have gone with [the Soviet spy Ya'akov] Riftin. (A Surplus of Memory: Chronicle of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, Yitzhak Zuckerman, 1993, p. 258) (IMG)

Yitzhak Zuckerman's role in the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising is dubious, but it is true that he had a prominent position in it. In other parts of his memoirs, Yitzhak Zuckerman confirmed – in vast contrast to mainstream media accounts – that the anti-Semitic terrorist organization, the MI6-backed Home Army, contributed nothing positive to the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising (see C13S4.1). Note that Zuckerman was admitting this a pro-American, pro-British, anti-Soviet Zionist – not as a Hashomer Hatzair 'Stalinist'. Once again, pay attention to the difference of the Hashomer Hatzair mentality with that of the rest of the Zionist movement, when Zuckerman said "Mordechai Anielewicz ... said that if the Red Army (this was back in 1940) went into the Middle East and occupied Eretz Israel, **we would welcome them with open arms.** (...). I said then that the entrance of **the Red Army into Eretz Israel could be the end of Zionism**, so I wouldn't welcome them gladly;" Hence, the Hashomer Hatzair's 'Socialist Zionism' was a kind of a 'Zionism' that did not match the mainstream anti-Arabist and pro-imperialist faction of the Zionist movement to which Zuckerman belonged.

It is said that the Israeli military conducted research on the crimes that it committed against Arab civilians. This fact about the Israeli military is cited by the right-wing Israeli historiographers as 'evidence' that the Israeli army was a 'moral' army. What such right-wing historiographers deliberately leave out in such excerpts is that such research on the Israeli armed forces' crimes against Arab civilians was done by the Soviet spies and Mapamite opponents of the Israeli regime. The Riftin report, which was written by the Mapam leader and top Soviet spy Ya'akov Riftin, is a very famous case in point. Yes, the criticism of the IDF terror against Arabs did come from the high ranks of the Israeli military and intelligence bodies but these individuals belonged to the dissident tendency, the pro-Soviet tendency, in the Israeli regime and they were exposing the crimes against humanity by the dominant tendency, the pro-American fascist tendency, in the Israeli regime. The IDF as a whole has been a fascist army of terror, but thanks to the existence of class struggles, it has never been a monolith. Thanks to Arab armed struggle and the struggles of the Israeli proletariat, the fascists dominating the IDF have been rolled back at times and moral people have been catapulted to its high ranks. Some of the prominent Israeli leaders who did official government research about the IDF terrorism, typically tended to belong to the Soviet intelligence network in Israel and they owed their positions thanks precisely to such Arab anti-fascist armed struggle and the Israeli proletariat.

Norman Finkelstein, a prominent anti-Zionist Ashkenazi scholar on Arab-Israeli relations and a critic of the Mapam, wrote:

Mapam was unusually well placed to follow the unfolding of events in 1948. **Much of the Haganah/IDF's officer corps was recruited from Mapam — e.g. Galili, Camel, Rabin and Allon. Moreover, committed as it was to achieving a modus vivendi with the Arab world, Mapam enjoyed atypically close relations with the Palestinian Arabs.** Finally, Hashomer Hatzair, which together with Ahdut Ha'avodah formed Mapam in January 1948, managed to accumulate an extensive archive on the Arab flight. (...). In early May, **Aharon Cohen, director of Mapam's Arab Department, wrote that 'a deliberate eviction [of the Arabs] is taking place. ... Others may rejoice — I, as a socialist, am ashamed and afraid'.** A few days later he repeated that the Arabs were being expelled — a "'transfer' of the Arabs from the area of the Jewish state' was being executed — 'out of certain political goals and not only out of military necessity'. And at a Mapam meeting in June, Cohen charged that 'it had depended on us whether the Arabs stayed or fled. [They had fled] and this was [the implementation of] Ben-Gurion's line in which our comrades are [also] active'. At a late May Mapam Political Committee meeting, Eliezer Prai, the editor of the party's daily paper, accused elements of the Yishuv — e.g. Weitz — of carrying out a 'transfer policy' by 'blood and fire', aimed at emptying the Jewish state of its Arab inhabitants. In July, Mapam leader Ya'acov Hazan threatened that 'the robbery, killing, expulsion, and rape of the Arabs could reach such proportions that we would [no longer] be able to stand' belonging to a coalition with Ben-Gurion's Mapai. (In May 1948, Mapam had joined the newly formed government as a junior partner.) (Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict, Norman G. Finkelstein, 2003. Bold added.) (IMG)

In addition to Yigal Allon and Yitzhak Rabin, the two IDF commanders Haim Bar-Lev and David Elazar too were prominent members of a Mapam that identified with Stalin-era USSR:

Mapam members who had stayed in the IDF, like Yitzhak Rabin, Haim Barlev, David Elazar and others, were mostly appointed in the first few years of statehood to staff and training posts, and only slowly obtained commands over fighting units.

Although Mapam's strength inside the army was broken, Ben Gurion's apprehensions did not diminish. Mapam's wholehearted identification with Stalin's Soviet Union and its claim to belong to the Soviet bloc sounded alarms in Mapai Headquarters.

(Between Battle and Ballots: Israeli Military in Politics, Cambridge University Press, Yoram Peri, 1983, p. 62) (IMG)

They who have studied the reasons for the defeat of Israel by the Arab armies during 1973 War would surely find it very telling to be reminded, if not already remembering, that Eleazar and Bar-Lev were both agents of the Mapam, both close comrades of Yitzhak Rabin – and both Chiefs of Staff of the IDF during the 1970s.

Until midway through the 1948 War, different political parties had their own military forces. The Mapai had the Haganah, which was the main military force and the core of the IDC, although the Mapam had a significant influence over the Haganah as well. The Mapam itself had the 'Palmach', the military force arising out of the kibbutzim and headed almost exclusively by Mapam-affiliated commanders. The 'Fighters for the Freedom of Israel' (Lehi), the Nazi Zionist party that had over the years come under the partial influence of the Hashomer Hatzair anti-Nazis, had its own military force. The Herut (later called 'Likud'), the party of the Italian Fascist agent Ze'ev Jabotinsky and his henchman Menachem Begin, had the 'Irgun'.

Ya'akov Riftin and Liova Levite, **Mapam's political secretaries and Soviet spies**, provided an intelligence briefing to the local Soviet intelligence service station in Israel. In this report, they made some critically important remarks which I have bolded below:

Riftin and Levite came to see me at their request. Levite said that the United Workers' Party [Mapam] was playing an important role in the political life of Israel. In the last elections to the Histadrut, it received about 40 per cent of the votes. At least a hundred collective settlements, out of a total of 300 Jewish agricultural colonies, are under its influence. Since many of this party's settlements are located near the frontiers of Israel they bore the main thrust of the Arab forces. Before the formation of the Jewish army, units of the Palmach, which consists mainly of supporters of this party, formed the basis of the Jewish armed forces. **At present a large number of the military commanders, including some generals, belong to Mapam. However this is not true of the general staff or other central military departments, where Mapai members predominate.**

Riftin said that he had recently returned from America, where he had met Comrade A.A. Gromyko. He believes that the United Workers' Party is the most progressive party in Israel, where it is 'following the path laid down by the Great October Revolution'. At present, the party considers its main task to be winning the war, because only when it has defended its territory from the enemy, will it be possible to build a democratic state.

At first the party favoured the establishment of international trusteeship over Palestine (America, Britain, the USSR), but later gave full support to the United Nations' resolution on partition. It is a staunch supporter of cooperation with the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies, since it sees them as the main international support, which will be needed in order to build a democratic

socialist state. **It is therefore trying to arrange practical links with the Soviet Union in the hope of receiving some advice. For their part, they offer comprehensive information about Israel and the Arab countries. In addition, it would be desirable for the Soviet Union to give moral support to the United [Workers'] Party.**

(DIARY: AVP RF, F.089, OP.1, P.1, D.3, LL.21-3, Meeting: P.I. Ershov – Y. Riftin and L. Levite, Tel Aviv, September 23, 1948. In: "Documents on Israeli-Soviet Relations, 1941-1953, Parts 1-2", Israeli Foreign Ministry, Russian Foreign Ministry, Israel State Archives, Russian Federal Archives, pp. 363-365. Bold added.) (IMG)

The Mapam was a strong force because, as stated in Riftin's report, it had a large level of influence over Israel's means of violence. However, the general staff and the central departments of the military were controlled by Ben-Gurion and other Kautskyite agents of the Anglo-American secret services. As a result of the CIA-MI6 Kautskyite control over the Israeli armed forces' topmost ranks, the general strategic orientation of Israel was in favor of the anti-Arab Kautskyites and Anglo-American agents. Nonetheless, the Arab-friendly socialist Mapamite (or 'Mapamnink') intelligence agents in the ranks of the Israeli army had enough strength to sabotage the Israeli regime's anti-Arab wars with the aim of ultimately rising to take control over the central departments and the general staff as well, and hence the Israeli means of violence in general. The class character and the strategic orientation of a government is indeed determined by the question of which class forces control the means of violence. Upon taking decisive control over the means of violence in Israel, the Mapam could transition Israel swiftly into a progressive state strategically aligned with the USSR, the Peoples' Democracies and the progressive Arab states and organizations.

The Mapam could also utilize its influence in the Israeli military in order to provide top secret military intelligence to the USSR. The Mapam did indeed prove to be a Soviet spy front, providing not only political intelligence but also using its position in the armed forces to provide top secret military intelligence to the Soviets. The Mapamite intelligence agents in the Israeli army also sabotaged the anti-Arab policies of the Israeli military. Assisting the Arabs in waging wars against the Israeli regime would inflict financial costs upon the pro-fascist tendency, the dominant tendency, in the staff of the Israeli armed forces, thus reducing the lobbying power of this pro-fascist tendency. Reduced lobbying power for this pro-fascist tendency in turn would increase the leverage of the Mapamite dissidents in the staff of the Israeli armed forces. This would result in the elevation of the Mapamite dissident elements within the Israeli armed forces, so that eventually, a leap from quantity to quality occurs and Israel's means of violence would be firmly under Mapamite control. This would cause Israel to transition into becoming an anti-imperialist socialist-oriented state willing to ally with the progressive Arab states and hostile to the reactionary CIA-backed regimes in the Arab world. And the military alliance of the new Israel with the progressive Arab states would yield a democratic peace with the Arab people of Palestine. Hence, the USSR did provide the Mapam with extensive support; it provided such support by (1) promoting the unification of the 'Socialist Zionist' groupings into the Mapam, (2) promoting the soft power influence of the Mapam among the Israeli population, (3) arming the Arab armies that waged war against the Israeli regime's military, thus severely damaging the Ben-Gurion faction that stood in the way of the Mapam, hence providing greater lobbying power to the Mapamite elements that had infiltrated the Israeli military so to yield this elevation and rise of the Mapam faction in the Israeli armed forces.

While supporting the Mapam through arming the Arabs during the 1948-1949 War, the USSR also sponsored the Mapam morally. As stated in the Riftin-Levite report to Ershov, it was indeed desirable that the USSR would provide moral support to the United Workers' Party, the Mapam, for it would have helped promote the Mapam's positions in the Israeli electoral campaigns. In fact, a CIA report indicated the USSR may have promoted the Mapam over the Israel's communist party, the Palestine Communist Party. The communists had minimal chance for recruitment because the majority of Israelis would have opposed the communist line against the Zionist mass migration, the kind of the migration that benefited settler-colonialism. Hence, according to the CIA:

An unconfirmed report states that the Palestine Communist Party had been ordered by Moscow to recruit Communists among European immigrants for the MAPAM parties, not for the weak and discredited Palestine Communist Party. Moscow has long had ties with the component parties of the MAPAM through such pro-Soviet groups as the League for Soviet Friendship and the Kremlin is aware that MAPAM is the only strong party which favors the formation of an anti-US-UK bloc in Israel. (POLITICAL PARTIES IN ISRAEL: Intelligence Memorandum No. 108, CIA, December 28, 1948, p. 6) (IMG)

In the rise of the Mapam there existed the potential for the rise of the Red Star over Tzion, the establishment of a socialist Israel on the strategic Mediterranean coastline, allied unofficially or officially with the anti-imperialist forces reigning over Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt. This the Soviets sought to achieve – or at least get as close as possible to achieving – through the highly secretive armament of Lebanon, Syria, and Egypt, so that Arab armed struggle may weaken the enemies of the Mapam and elevate the position of the Mapam intelligence agents in the struggle for control over Israel's means of violence. History proved that the Soviet method paid off very well. The positive effects of such policy can be traced as far as the late 1990s.

During the period 1948 to 1949, while arming the Arab foes of the Israeli regime, the USSR officially showered Israel with moral support so to yield an electoral elevation of the Mapam:

The most optimistic estimate of MAPAM strength in the coming elections gives this party 25% of the vote. Most recent estimates from Goldman in London and the Press Club in Tel Aviv, give MAPAM only 18% and predict another MAPAI-led coalition. In that case, MAPAM would probably continue in very much its present role; it would maintain its [socio]-economic power in the Histadruth and seek to gain prestige by taking credit for any Soviet action favorable to Israel. (POLITICAL PARTIES IN ISRAEL: Intelligence Memorandum No. 108, CIA, December 28, 1948, p. 6) (IMG)

The Israeli Constituent Assembly, delegates of which were chosen numerically in the 25 January [1949] election with each delegate representing 2,500 votes, will open 14 February in Jerusalem. MAPAI, the winning party in the election, will control 49 of the 120 seats in the Assembly. MAPAM, the second party, has 19 seats, the United Religious Bloc 16, and Menachem Begin's extremely nationalist Freedom Party 14. (...). MAPAM, the leftist labor party which is closest to MAPAI in views and second to it in strength, will probably also be included in the coalition. Although relatively weak in the country as a whole, its influence in the coalition and the Constituent Assembly may be much greater because of its strong position in Histadruth, the powerful labor organization to which more than 40% of the population belongs. In the last Histadruth election in 1944, MAPAM obtained 43% of the vote to MAPAI's 53%. Should this ratio be maintained in the 13 February Histadruth elections, MAPAM will be in a strong bargaining position vis-à-vis MAPAI and can be expected to demand greater influence in the coalition government and the Constituent Assembly than its 15% vote in the general election would warrant. (INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY FOR WEEK ENDING 9 FEBRUARY 1949, CIA, Near East / Africa Branch, p. 4) (IMG)

The USSR could and should have utilized its soft power influence in order to assist its Mapamite allies to gain as much control over the Israeli government apparatus, so to yield a socialist Israel, an Arab-friendly Israel, on the coast of the Mediterranean, at the intersection of North Africa and the Middle East, as a base for spreading socialist influence throughout the region. Stalin came to unequivocally support this view. Sergo Beria wrote:

At the start Stalin said neither yes [n]or no. But he soon gave preference to the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine – a Socialist state, which, as he saw it, would become an advanced satellite of the USSR in the Middle East and enable Moscow to expand its influence forward in this oil-rich region. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 110) (IMG)

Even at the time of its official vocal support for Israel, the USSR made it clear that it opposed Zionism and hence the concept of a 'Jewish state' in the supremacist sense of the term. The Soviets rather supported a socialist Israeli state, not a 'Jewish state' as in a Judaic-theocratic state, nor a Jewish supremacist state. The British, while supportive of the dominant tendency, the pro-fascist tendency, of the Israeli government, feared that the high level of Soviet soft power influence and the significant strength of the Mapamite intelligence agents at the high ranks of the Israeli military and state apparatus could agitate for movements that would transition Israel towards this agenda of an Arab-friendly progressive Israel, or even a socialist Israel. A US State Department document recording the remarks of the British Foreign Affairs Minister Bevin, states:

Bevin said Pal settlement at the earliest possible date is essential. UK does not intend to "hold out" against recognition PGI and at proper time when UK knows location Israeli frontiers, UK will extend promptly full recognition to Israel. However, UK believes prospects for UK obtaining its strategic requirements from Israel in the foreseeable future are poor and possibility must be faced that "within five years" Israel may be Communist state. Bevin infers this from fact that new Jewish immigrants come largely from countries behind Iron Curtain where they have been exposed to Communist philosophy. There was no great exodus to Israel from the US and UK where democratic philosophy could have been absorbed. To have communist Israel lying athwart vital strategic roads in ME such as Auja-Beersheba, Gaza-Beersheba and El Kuntilla-Aqaba, would be serious blow to UK strategic plans for area. ('Subject: Appeal of British Government for US-UK understanding with regard to forthcoming Arab-Jewish negotiations re frontiers in Palestine', The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Acting Secretary of State, LONDON, December 22, 1949. 501 .BB Palestine/12-2248: Algram) (IMG)

It is said that the majority of the Israelis were vicious anti-Arab chauvinists. For historical circumstances beyond the scope of this work, that claim is very true of the 21st century majority of Israelis, but is not so true of Israeli public opinion during the 20th century, even well until the late 1990s, when socialistic ideas had a worldwide appeal including in an Israel governed by an anti-communist regime. The fact that the Mapai, not the Herut/Irgun, was the most powerful reactionary party in Israel says much about the attitudes of the people of Israel. The Herut/Irgun was very explicit in its fascist, anti-Soviet, anti-Arab chauvinist, and anti-socialist stance. By contrast, the anti-socialist anti-kibbutznik anti-Arabist Mapai presented itself as 'Soviet-friendly', 'socialist', 'pro-kibbutz', and even 'Arab-friendly'. Take a look at the following excerpt of a CIA document:

The formation of Israel's first non-provisional government is notable for the strong control exercised by MAPAI throughout. **When Prime Minister Ben-Gurion invited the other Israeli parties to join MAPAI in the new coalition, he made it clear that those accepting must accept the principle of collective responsibility and MAPAI's major policies – friendship and cooperation with both the US and the USSR, an Israeli-Arab alliance, a majority of constructive labor elements in the government, and complete civic equality for women, Christians, and Moslems.** This point was emphasized when MAPAM, the left socialist party which had played a part second only to MAPAI in the provisional government, demanded as a condition to its joining the new cabinet that Ben-Gurion: (1) to decline any Marshall Plan aid offered Israel; (2) to refuse bases to the Western powers; and (3) to balance trade between Eastern and Western blocs. Although Ben-Gurion is still holding four portfolios open for MAPAM and General Zionists (who wanted more than the single post offered [to] them) he refused to commit itself on MAPAM's demands, and the MAPAM Council has voted 150-33 to remain in opposition. (...). **Although without MAPAM the government will be generally more conservative than it was expected to be, its policy will be comparatively clear cut and predictable, and it will continue to maintain theoretic neutrality while actually leaning towards the West.** (INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY FOR WEEK ENDING 9 MARCH 1949, CIA, Near East / Africa Branch, March 9, 1949, pp. 3-4. Bold and underline added) (IMG)

The top CIA party in Israel was calling for 'friendship and cooperation with ... the USSR', and, almost a year after having carried out a genocide against the Arabs of Palestine, had the audacity to officially call for 'an Israeli-Arab alliance' and 'complete civic equality for ... Christians, and Moslems'. The fact that the CIA-backed pro-fascist reactionary party was disguising itself with such rhetoric to appeal to the Israeli electorate is demonstrative of the progressive attitudes of the Israeli population. The majority of the Israelis harboured pro-communist attitudes.

The fact that the Mapai had to demagogically present itself as 'pro-Arab' and 'pro-Soviet' once again is reflective of the political attitudes of the Israeli population. The argument that the Ashkenazi and Sfaradi proletarians of Europe went to Israel with the objective of stealing Arab lands and helping the IDF burn Arab villages has no basis in facts concerning that time period. The people of Israel were Arab-friendly and sympathetic to the Soviet-led forces. The fact that the Ben-Gurion gang was elected into power by the largest minority of them does not mean they were supporters of the Ben-Gurion group's ethnic cleansing and genocide projects. Does voting for Obama, who ran on a so-called 'anti-war' platform, necessarily mean support for rendering Libya into a hellhole? Not just the Mapai, Mapam, and Maki but also the Lehi preached cooperation with the Arabs and the Soviets (see C16S7). The Mapai was very dishonest, the factionalism-stricken Lehi was semi-dishonest, and Mapam and Maki were honest in calls for international fraternal cooperation with the Arab people and the Soviet-led forces. The Herut-Irgun was the only major Israeli party that, blatantly enough, spread hate against Arabs – the Herut-Irgun represented a minority in Israeli society. The Arab-friendly attitude shown by all the major parties minus Herut is reflective of the attitude of the Israeli electorate

Some harbour the delusion that the awareness of the masses is on its own enough to mobilize them for anti-imperialist action. To begin with, the predominance of a progressive political culture in a society, on its own, is not enough to stop the reactionary projects of the reactionary class forces ruling such a society, for it is not by consciousness (alone) that history is determined but by the control over the means of violence. Even if the majority of a population are anti-imperialist but ruled by pro-imperialist reactionaries, the ruling reactionaries would still be able to pursue their sinister agenda while minimizing the material manifestation of the progressive people's dissent to such reactionary agendas. Minimizing dissent could take the form of suppression or using the media and intelligence bodies to foment dissension in the anti-imperialist movement thus to lead to the implosion of the anti-imperialist movement. Therefore, let there be no doubt that the consciousness of the masses can be a serious force against imperialism only if the progressive forces have enough historical-material factors under their sway to be able to mobilize the conscious masses towards translating their revolutionary mindset into revolutionary action; and since in some societies, the reactionary classes have the vast majority of the historical-material factors under their control, there are not enough historical-material factors under the control of the progressive forces for

the latter to be able to translate such a progressive mass consciousness into a progressive mass action. It follows that even though the majority of the Israeli population was Arab-friendly and pro-Soviet, the fact that Israel's progressive forces did not have enough historical-material factors to overthrow finance capital and the comprador classes in Israel inevitably assisted the comprador and imperialist agents in the drive to sow dissension amongst the progressive forces and to engineer the elections in their own favour.

Details on the methods of sowing dissension among the progressive forces in Israel will be provided later. However, to put the matter briefly, here is some information which will be discussed in greater detail later in this work: the imperialist forces in Israel sowed dissension by (1) having the Mapai, the imperialist party that launched the ethnic cleansing against the Arabs of Palestine, present itself as 'pro-Soviet' and 'Arab-friendly' so that the Kautskyite agents of fascism can steal votes from the Mapam, (2) working tirelessly to engineer the split of the Mapam into Achdut HaAvoda, post-split Mapam, and the 'Left Faction', and (3) promoting the left-opportunist Mikunis faction in the Maki as a counterweight against the communist forces in the Maki and against the Mapam. By contrast, had the socialist forces had enough historical-material factors under their sway, they would have been able to (1) use the Mapam agents in the Shin Bet and the Mossad to finance the electoral engineering campaign to ensure that the Herut-Irgun voters feel no motivation to vote and that Mapai voters are attracted to Mapam, (2) ensure that the proletariat more firmly dominate the Achdut HaAvoda, Mapam, and 'Left Faction' so that the proletariat glues these three groupings more firmly together and re-merges them, and (3) use the Mapam agents in the Mossad and Shin Bet to compromise Mikunis, compel the demotion of his faction in the Maki while elevating his real communist rivals, so that the potential for the Maki's cooperation with the Mapam increases. That type of a situation would have yielded a mass movement for utterly destabilizing the Zionist regime and paving the way for a People's Democratic Israel that would undo the Zionist reign of terror. The Zionist reign of terror occurred not because the people of Israel were "anti-Arab chauvinist savages" who migrated to Israel out of love for stealing land and burning down Palestinian villages but because the Anglo-American imperialists had fortified their material presence in Israel enough to not only sow dissension in the ranks of the opponents of anti-Arab chauvinism but to even use the conscription law to force the socialist activists to become cannon-fodder for the aggressive imperialist war drive. In those years, the opposition to ethnic cleansing did not manifest strongly not because the Israeli population had a love for colonial terror but because historical circumstances blocked the formation of an effective opposition by them.

Some would argue that the strategic reorientation of Israel into an alliance with Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, the USSR, and the Peoples' Democracies would have caused the 'forgetting' of the issue of the Palestinian refugees; such an argument, which keeps getting raised by some left-opportunist commentators, is very stupid. Strategic realignment is not merely a change in the political geography but constitutes a change in the class character of the state. The strategic reorientation of Israel would have come along with the increased influence of the proletariat over the Israeli state apparatus and the dominance of the proletariat and collectivist peasantry over the state. Such dominance of the proletariat over the state would have naturally generated a dominant proletarian internationalist tendency in Israel, causing Israel to (1) strive for the rise of the progressive forces in the Arab countries in which reactionary forces to dominate, and (2) to strive for the military-industrial development of Arab countries in which the progressive forces already dominate. That is, the new revolutionary Israel would have strived to overthrow the reactionary regimes of Saudi Arabia and Hashemite Jordan while assisting the efforts to industrialize the progressive governments of Lebanon, Syria, and Egypt. An Israel dominated by the Mapai-Irgun alliance pursued and continues to pursue more and more terror against the Arabs of Palestine as an endless trajectory; an Israel dominated by the Mapam, the socialistic forces, would have pursued, as an endless trajectory, the further and further elevation of the proletariat and hence the further and further political and economic advancement of the peoples of the region including the Arabs of Palestine and the Palestinian refugees, thus paying far more than just reparations to the Palestinian refugees. And such an advancement of the peoples of the region would have benefited the new revolutionary Israel strategically as well. The overthrow of Anglo-American-backed reactionary Arab regimes was a matter of national security for a socialist-oriented Israel, whereas strategic cooperation with the progressive Arab states would have yielded a stronger regional security network for blocking Anglo-American assaults aimed at destroying the socialist-oriented Israel.

Some would argue that the population of Israel, ideologically influenced deeply by Zionism, even if 'Socialist Zionism', would not have been willing to give up on the call for Zionist mass migration. First of all, let it be clarified that the primary reason that Zionist migration was reactionary was that those Jews and 'Jews' would become the labour force and troops serving, willingly or unwillingly, a reactionary aggressive warmonger state allied with Anglo-American-German finance capital. The migration to Israel, if a socialist state had been established in Israel, would not have been reactionary because then that would have increased the labour force and troop count of a socialist anti-imperialist state. The persecuted Jews and 'Jews' proximate to the mainland of the USSR and the Eastern European and East Asian Peoples' Democracies could take refuge in the mainland of the Soviet-led camp, whereas the persecuted Jews and 'Jews' proximate to socialistic Israel could take refuge in People's Democratic Israel. Asylum-seeking is really the core aspect of the 'Zionism' part of 'Socialist Zionism'. The peripheral problem of the 'Zionism' part of 'Socialist Zionism' is that it calls for an ultra-liberal migration policy in favour of the 'Jewish people', and just like the other kinds of Zionisms, advocates allowing any Jew/'Jew' who travels to Israel to very quickly, almost immediately, become a citizen. It is one thing to argue that people with a culture similar to that of Israel should have some advantage when applying for citizenship to socialist Israel; it is another thing to say that this person should be able to immediately become a citizen of Israel just because of belief that this person's ancestors thousands of years ago lived in that land. Although 'Socialist Zionism' had this problem, the relatively positive thing about it was that it did not obsess over Ancient Israel or ultra-liberal migration, and the core argument behind its call for ultra-liberal migration was that Israel and the USSR should be places of refuge from anti-Semitic persecution. Therefore persecution, not obsession with the presence of one's ancestors in that land in the ancient times, was the core reason behind such an argument. Had this hypothetical socialistic Israel been established, the 'Socialist Zionist' culture among the masses would have in time evolved to Israeli socialist patriotism, the devotion to socialist fatherland Israel.

Unlike Rejectionist anti-Zionism, the more common and less mature version of 'anti-Zionism', the Soviet anti-Zionism had doses of Post-Zionism to it, in that the USSR supported the right of existence of Israel as a country while opposing the Zionism. The Soviet stance was not full-on 'Post-Zionist', but it did contain aspects of it. Such incorrect assertions as 'Stalin supported Zionism' rest on the fact of the existence of the Post-Zionist element to Soviet behaviour regarding Israel. When the partition did happen, the USSR recognized Israel – for the better. Any regime that is allied with the United States cannot be and was not recognized as a legitimate state; however, diplomatic recognition of a state is different than the recognition of a state as morally legitimate. No doubt Israel's regime should not have been recognized as legitimate in the moral sense because of its pro-American and pro-fascist character; however, the refusal to recognize Israel diplomatically has always been an infantile move. The Arab states fight against Israel's regime, but then when making truces, they would use a Zionist non-Israeli intermediary for indirect truce negotiations; in other

words, according to this mentality, it is bad to negotiate with the Zionist Israeli representatives but it is fine to negotiate via the Zionist non-Israeli representatives; such a mentality only creates additional bureaucracy and is actually ridiculous. Some of the secular pan-Arab anti-Zionist leaders themselves wished to negotiate truces with Israel directly, but the petit-bourgeois emotions of some people has always put an obstacle to such a process, and made truces inefficient. In the case of the USSR, a Soviet failure to diplomatically recognize Israel would have caused the USSR to lose access to Mapam-Maki progressive elements in Israel, thus benefiting the dominant pro-fascist tendency backed by the Anglo-American intelligence in Israel. For Soviet intelligence activities against Israel to take place, the recognition of the Zionist regime would have facilitated the process. Noting the reactionary character of Zionism and the pro-imperialist and anti-Soviet character of the Israeli regime, the Soviet Foreign Ministry directive to the Soviet legation in Tel Aviv called for espionage against Israeli officials and Anglo-American military presence in Palestine:

1. Since the government of Israel relies on the US in its foreign policy, the Soviet legation must show a reserved attitude to the **government and its representatives and must keep a close watch on its foreign and domestic policy** and promptly inform the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
2. While showing due respect to the sovereignty of the state, the legation must at the same time explain and emphasize that the decisive factor in the creation and establishment of the State of Israel was the Soviet Union's attitude to the Palestinian question at the UN and subsequently to Israel.
3. Since **reactionary Zionism tries to smooth over class contradictions among the Jewish population and is a direct agent of Anglo-American imperialism**, the legation must refrain from taking part in purely Zionist functions arranged by the government and political parties.
4. On the question of immigration to Israel of Jews from the USSR, we should bear in mind that this involves the renunciation of Soviet citizenship and is decided in each individual case by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet in light of citizens' personal applications. As for the departure of Jews from the People's Democracies, that is their business and the legation cannot discuss it.
5. **In relations with the opposition parties – the United Party (Mapam) and the Communist Party of Israel – the legation must confine itself to acquiring information and, without interfering in these parties' internal affairs or the relations between them, support their actions in their struggle to establish friendly relations between Israel and the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies. (...).**
9. The legation must help the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission in strengthening and spreading the influence of the **Russian Orthodox Church in Palestine and in its struggle. conducted jointly with the Jerusalem Patriarchate, against the increased activity of the Vatican.**
10. The legation must follow closely policies and **practices of the US and Britain, especially of a military nature, and must keep the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed.**

(INSTRUCTIONS TO THE MINISTER OF THE USSR IN THE STATE OF ISRAEL, Secret, Ershov. Part of: COPY: AVP RF, F 089, OP.2, P.3, D.8, LL.2-11, I.N. Bakulin to A.A. Gromyko (Moscow), Moscow, 29 September 1949, Secret. In: "Documents on Israeli-Soviet Relations, 1941-1953, Parts 1-2", Israeli Foreign Ministry, Russian Foreign Ministry, Israel State Archives, Russian Federal Archives, pp. 534-538. Bold added.) (IMG)

The idea that Israel should not be recognized as a country takes root from the Palestinian chauvinist and revanchist ideological tendencies. It also arises from the Third-Worldist belief that Israel does not really have a proletariat, that Israel has had no revolutionary potential whatsoever, and that the entire Israeli population, including the proletarians and the kibbutzniks, constituted a 'bourgeoisie' to be violently overthrown by the allegedly 'proletarian' Palestinian revanchist terrorists who massacred civilians instead of fighting against the IDF. It is good to support armed struggle against the IDF and to impose certain kinds of economic sanctions that decimate the pro-fascist tendency in Israel while elevating the progressive elements among the Hebrews. However, the Third-Worldists went farther. The Third-Worldist call for the violent elimination of the 'bourgeois' Israeli proletarians and kibbutzniks was used to 'justify' military operations that constituted terror attacks against civilian targets. They 'justified' the economic-terroristic boycott of almost everything Israeli, and the absolute rejection of any, even indirect, recognition of Israel. Third-Worldism in turn fed Palestinian Rejectionism and the 'logic' that 'justifies' Palestinian chauvinist terror. Fortunately, the Soviets did not harbour such reactionary Rejectionist views.

The USSR, as shown in the above excerpt, supported establishing closer relations with the Mapam and the Maki for bringing about their rise to dominance in Israel, while obtaining intelligence to undermine Anglo-American imperialists in Israel and spying on the influence of the Anglo-American intelligence agents there. Without a Soviet Embassy, without a Soviet intelligence station in Tel Aviv, these kinds of measures would have undoubtedly become much more difficult. While the Soviet Union instructed its legation in Israel to engage in anti-regime espionage, the Soviet government had worked to limited the possibility of Israeli intelligence activities in Soviet territory. This is corroborated in an Israeli intelligence document written by Israeli Foreign Ministry official Friedman, in his report to the top Mossad operative Ehud Avriel. Dated February 23, 1949, the document's remarks are as follows:

There have been discouraging developments in the Soviet Union. The Israeli representatives have been forbidden to have any contact with Soviet citizens, whom they have been accused of encouraging to renounce their nationality and to emigrate to Israel. The Legation has been forbidden to distribute its Bulletin to institutions, to kolkhozes, and to Jewish communities, and have been ordered to transmit messages to Soviet citizens solely through the intermediacy of the Foreign Ministry, while the Bulletin may be distributed only to members of the diplomatic corps and to the Foreign Ministry.

The Legation has moved from its temporary quarters in the hotel to a permanent residence, which has probably put an end to the visits by local Jews who used to come to the hotel.

(S. Friedman (Tel Aviv) to E. Avriel (Prague), February 23, 1949. In: DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL, State of Israel Archives, Vol. 2, October 1948 – April 1949, Edited by Yehoshua Freundlich, Companion Volume, p. 80) (IMG)

Thus, the Soviet recognition of Israel could not be out of any sympathy for the Zionist settler-colonization of Palestine. Hence, as stated by the journal of the US Army:

Although the Soviets recognized Israel in 1948, the move was neither out of sympathy for [the regime of] Israel nor hostility for the Arabs. Before liquidation of the British mandate, the Soviets advocated British withdrawal from Palestine.... (Arab-Israeli Dispute, Howard C. Reese, April 1966. In: "Military Review: Professional Journal of the US Army", United States Army Command and General

Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, Commandant: Major General Harry J. Lemley, Jr. Assistant Commandant: Brigadier General Robert C. Taber, Vol. XLVI, April 1966, No. 4, p. 62.) (IMG)

The USSR sympathized with the struggles of the Israeli people and the Arab nation. Its recognition of Israel, however, as the above excerpt confirms, did not mean sympathy with the regime of Israel nor hostility to the Arab nation.

The Mapam was an intelligence front of the Soviet Union. Note that the Soviet intelligence station in Tel Aviv had reported to Moscow, in reference to the Mapam, that:

they [i.e. Mapam] offer comprehensive information about Israel and the Arab countries.

(DIARY: AVP RF, F.089, OP.1, P.1, D.3, LL.21-3, Meeting: P.I. Ershov – Y. Riftin and L. Levite, Tel Aviv, September 23, 1948. In: "Documents on Israeli-Soviet Relations, 1941-1953, Parts 1-2", Israeli Foreign Ministry, Russian Foreign Ministry, Israel State Archives, Russian Federal Archives, pp. 363-365) (IMG)

To be a high-ranking loyalist agent of the Mapam amounted to service to international communism spearheaded and led by the Soviet Union. Not every Muslim Brotherhood operative was directly connected to the MI6 but the Muslim Brotherhood was an MI6 front and a Muslim Brotherhood loyalist officer was serving the British intelligence service; analogously, not every Mapamite general had a direct link with Moscow, but every Mapam loyalist agent in the high ranks of the Israeli regime apparatus was working for a Soviet espionage network and was knowingly allied to the Soviet state. The Mapam had a pervasive intelligence network in Israel. Isser Harel, the Shin Bet chief and a Mossad founder, warned:

"Mapam had set up an underground network which was operating out of the very bosom of the Defense Ministry, the army, and the Foreign Ministry." (Spies in the Promised Land: Iser Harel and the Israeli Secret Service, Michael Bar-Zohar, 1972, pp. 130-131) (IMG)

The Mapam's intelligence penetration into the different areas of Israel's state apparatus was truly remarkable. That many of the politicians, diplomats, and generals were agents of the Mapam is well-known. The Mapam also had agents in of the ranks of the right-wing parties. Ze'ev Tzahor was a high ranking IDF official, a Ben-Gurion aide and research assistant, and a researcher of the Mapam who interviewed many Mapam affiliates. Tzahor wrote:

In 1950, Mapam's secret cells operated in the security service, the military administration, the Ministry of Defense and the army. (...). Some of the cell members later made an impressive security career. Of those, there were generals, ambassadors and Members of the Knesset who were not necessarily [officially affiliated with the] Mapam. One of them was a minister in a right-wing party. This is based on several sources. (Hazan: Movement of Life, Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi Institute, Ze'ev Tzahor, 1997, p. 197) (IMG)

Now that the general characteristics of the Mapam, the general party line and relations of the Mapam, have been explained, it is high time to delve into the many operations of the Mapam. The most fascinating military operation by the Mapamite intelligence agents at the high ranks of the Israeli regime apparatus was in the Altalena bombing.

The Mapam-affiliated generals of whom the Palmach was composed were regarded as dangerous subversives by the Ben-Gurion clique. Forget not that the agenda of the Ben-Gurion group was to transition Israel from a Kautskyite 'social democracy' of the settler-colonial type to a Pinochet-style fascist dictatorship backed by the MI6 and the CIA, a regime politically authoritarian and theocratic, and economically neoliberal, not just exterminating the local Arabs but overtly and blatantly terrorizing the Israelis themselves. Such a regime was the long-term goal. To this end, the Kautskyite Ben-Gurion gang aimed to covertly sponsor the Irgun fascists. The sponsoring of the Irgun fascists also had a short-term benefit for the Ben-Gurion faction for it would have created a powerful bloc rivaling the Palmach freedom-fighters. Totally unlike the Palmach freedom-fighters, the Irgun terrorists were very serious about fighting against the Arab people and Arab anti-fascist forces. Thus, funding the Irgun terrorists would have tremendously assisted the anti-Arab war of terror. In an intelligence report to the Soviet secret service, the Moshe Sneh, Soviet spy and former high-ranking Haganah commander, confirmed that the Irgun Zvi Leumi (IZL – pronounced in Hebrew as 'Etzel') was secretly backed by Prime Minister Ben-Gurion:

the extreme nationalists, revisionists and the IZL [are] secretly supported by Prime Minister Ben-Gurion, who ... are trying to reach an agreement with the US to obtain the annexation of part of the Arab territories of Palestine in order to hand them over later as concessions to American [finance] capital. Ben-Gurion's view is expressed in the press by the journalist Liebenstein [Livneh] in the newspaper Davar. 'What Liebenstein writes, Ben-Gurion thinks, or the other way round' said Sneh; [T]he United Workers' Party and the Communist Party of Israel are against any sort of concessions to, or compromises with, the US and Britain, but in favour of 'a just compromise' with the Arabs, and of the closest possible relations with the USSR and the People's Democracies. (DIARY: AVP RF, F.089, OP.1, P.1, D.3, LL.5-6, Secret, Meeting: P.I. Ershov – M. Sneh, Tel Aviv, October 9, 1948. In: "Documents on Israeli-Soviet Relations, 1941-1953, Parts 1-2", Israeli Foreign Ministry, Russian Foreign Ministry, Israel State Archives, Russian Federal Archives, p. 381) (IMG)

Uri Milstein was an IDF commander who was later designated by former IDF Chief of Staff Rafael Eitan of the Ariel Sharon faction to write a history of the 1948 War. Milstein was a Jabotinskyite right-wing Zionist enemy of the Mapam, and a viciously violent foe of Yitzhak Rabin. Milstein wrote that the Mapai-controlled Haganah and the Irgun/Etzel were to form an alliance, but that the Mapam, its military force the Palmach, and Mapam's top representative in the Haganah, Yisrael Galili, aimed to sabotage such an agreement between the Irgun and the Haganah. The Ben-Gurion faction Kautskyites also aimed to form a coalition cabinet with Menachem Begin and his Herutniks/Likudniks, but this agreement was indeed sabotaged by the Mapam:

According to the agreement, the Irgun was supposed to coordinate its activities with the Haganah, until the declaration of independence, and to join the IDF after the establishment of the state, as a cohesive military framework, in a position that the Palmach had in the Haganah and at the beginning of the IDF. Most of the senior commanders in the Palmach, including Yitzhak Rabin, were under the influence of the Marxist Mapam. Through the fame of the commanders, Mapam leaders sought to shape the IDF in their spirit, and to become the dominant political factor in Israel. The plot of Deir Yassin was also intended to thwart, after the declaration of independence, the establishment of a national unity government, one of whose members was supposed to be Begin. Most of all, Galili and Mapam, his party, feared that a coalition between Ben-Gurion and Begin would push them to the margins of the political system, completely nullify their influence on the future state, and harm their economic and social interests. (...). Galili and his comrades' first goal was not achieved: the Zionist General Council approved the agreement between Etzel [i.e. IZL] and Haganah – by a majority of 39 to 32 – at five in the morning on April 13, 1948. The agreement was approved after bitter struggles, heated debates and attempts by Mapam representatives

to postpone the vote in order to cancel it, since after a few hours most of the delegates from abroad were supposed to take off back to their countries. Their other goal was fully achieved - Begin and his friends remained out of the political system until after the War of Independence until the first elections in 1949. (Through Rabin and His Legacy, Uri Milstein, Chapter 22) (IMG)

Menachem Begin himself confirmed years later that David Ben-Gurion harbored a positive opinion of the Irgun and that Ben-Gurion, rather than ban those terrorists as the agents of the former Fascist Italy, harbored them and assisted them in operating in the ranks of the armed forces of Israel:

When independence was declared on the 14th May, 1948, there was no immediate formation of a unified army. Haganah continued to exist; and the Irgun, whose soldiers were stationed on various fronts and in some sectors were fighting together with Haganah men, also continued to exist. The well-known journalist, Dr. Azriel Karlibach, at that time published an open letter to me, brimming with enthusiasm and demanding that ... we should work for establishment of a unified Israel Army. I replied on our radio that several days earlier we had publicly called for the establishment of a unified Army to replace the military organisations. But it depended on the Government, not on us.

When the creation of the Army was announced we continued as a recognised military organisation until the integration of our forces into the Army was completed. In the operational orders of the Front Line and Brigade Commanders, Irgun units appeared as an inseparable part of the Army forces. In liberated Jaffa which, at our request, had been divided into two sectors, one sector was garrisoned by the Irgun. The Prime Minister, Mr. David Ben Gurion, one day visited Jaffa and also inspected Irgun units, who presented arms. I was told that Mr. Ben Gurion, moved at the incident, said to the escort: "I didn't know they had such boys."

Afterwards the Prime Minister sent the following letter to Sergeant Haim, the officer in command of our occupying force in Jaffa:

State of Israel
Provisional Government
22 May, 1948

To the Commander of the Irgun soldiers in Jaffa. Until further instructions you and your men are at the sole orders of the Military Governor of Jaffa, I Chizik.

(signed) David Ben Gurion

Head of the Provisional Government and Minister of Security.

We pointed out to Mr. Ben Gurion's aide-de-camp that it was not customary for a Prime Minister to communicate directly with a local officer. We were gratified at the official recognition of "the Irgun Zvai Leumi soldiers in Jaffa," but out of concern for the tender growth of our State we wished to uphold the status of the Prime Minister as such.

With his aide and his colleagues we continued to discuss the creation of a unified army. The details of the discussion are related elsewhere. Here it is sufficient to mention that we agreed that the Irgun should bring into the Army complete battalions with their officers. But as the organisation of battalions required time, it was agreed between us that we would set up a temporary Staff of the Irgun Zvai Leumi, approved by the Prime Minister and Minister of Security. By the time the "Altalena" arrived we had organized and integrated several battalions into the Army. Other regiments were still in process of organisation, their men being still dispersed in smaller units on various fronts. Our Staff was thus an official and recognised body, when it was called to discuss with the representatives of the Ministry of Security the unloading of the "Altalena" arms.

(The Revolt, Menachem Begin, 1978, pp. 217-219) (IMG)

With the full support of the Ben-Gurion faction, the Irgun terrorists were to be funded militarily by the US-led bloc. The Irgun was to be handed a ship filled with all the arms which Israel needed for a decisive victory early on in the War. Menachem Begin, the commander of the Irgun terrorists, recalled that the amounts of arms to be provided were so numerous that in fact Israel would have won control of pretty much all of Palestine, not to mention inflicting a far more crushing defeat on all of the Arab armies. 900 Irgun soldiers were to guard it. General Begin wrote:

The "Altalena" with her nine hundred soldiers, five thousand rifles, four million rounds of ammunition, three hundred Bren guns, 150 spandaus, five caterpillar-track armoured vehicles, thousands of air-combat bombs, and the rest of her war equipment, was ready to sail not in the middle of May but only in the second week of June. (The Revolt, Menachem Begin, 1978, p. 215) (IMG)

The tragic fact was that the "Altalena" was late in coming. Had this landing-craft arrived off the shores of Eretz Israel immediately on the liquidation of British rule, that is, in the middle of May, 1948, the whole condition of the nation would have been radically changed. We should then have placed at the disposal of the Government and the Army eight or ten battalions, fully equipped with arms and ammunition — instead of their customary equipment, unlimited readiness for self-sacrifice and short-ranged Sten-guns. At our first attack we should have captured Ramleh. This Arab town, besieged by the Irgun Zvai Leumi at the request of the Haganah in order to draw away enemy forces from the Latrun front, was on the point of falling when we had to withdraw. The morale of the inhabitants had been lowered, mainly by the shelling of our 3 inch mortars. Our boys stormed the approaches to the town and in the opening stages captured large parts of it. But lack of arms and ammunition proved fatal. They needed only a few hundred rifles and additional ammunition, but on the Ramleh front that quantity was not available either to us or to the Haganah Command. Three hundred rifles, or six per cent of the number loaded in the hold of the "Altalena"....

Had we been able to capture Ramleh at that time — and its conquest depended solely on these additional arms — the united Jewish forces would have broken the Arab front at Latrun and our strategic situation would have been changed fundamentally, its effects being felt as far as Jerusalem, as far as the Old City. With the fall of Ramleh, the fate of Lydda would have been sealed. Thus we should have smashed the enemy on the central front in the first stage of his invasion, instead of only after the first "truce." And the Jewish forces would have been free in the second stage for a full-scale attack on the "Triangle." In a word, we should today have held the Western bank of the Jordan — at least.

(The Revolt, Menachem Begin, 1978, pp. 214-215) (IMG)

The war materiel ship was sent during the truce, when the pace of the Arab armies in defeating Israel was forcibly slowed down. BBC radio, which was the media outlet of the MI6, informed the Irgun terror command with a coded message in its broadcast, telling the Irgun that the Altalena war ship was moving from the coasts of France to Israel. As often, Menachem Begin nonsensically implied that the British, who provided the codes, were opposed to arming the Irgun and that they sought to alert the UN observers. Nonetheless, it was clear that BBC was signalling to the Irgun that the war ship had started travel. Begin wrote:

The "Altalena" with her nine hundred soldiers, five thousand rifles, four million rounds of ammunition, three hundred Bren guns, 150 spandaus, five caterpillar-track armoured vehicles, thousands of air-combat bombs, and the rest of her war equipment, was ready to sail ... only in the second week of June. We received first news of her departure from a French port on the London radio. (...). That very day the "truce" had come into force. Whatever our attitude to the truce might be, I explained to my comrades, we were not entitled to bear the responsibility for the possible consequences of a breach. All the Jewish forces were very tired; the enemy had superior armament. This was no longer an underground partisan-political fight. This was a fight in the open field and the consequences of defeat might be destruction for our people. (...). We did not, of course, place absolute credence in the B.B.C. report. Perhaps the boat had not yet sailed and the British Government only wanted to alert the UNO observers? (...). [Then], late at night, we communicated with the Israel Department of Security and gave them detailed information about the boat and its cargo of munitions. Now – we said to the representatives of the Security Ministry – it is for you to decide whether to permit the boat to come, or divert her. (The Revolt, Menachem Begin, 1978, pp. 215-216) (IMG)

Not a shred of reason exists to believe that the BBC ever seriously opposed the Irgun. Begin's track record was full of MI6 connections. In the 1930s, Menachem Begin emerged as a member of the Betar movement, headquartered in MI6-backed Fascist Italy. Arrested by the Soviet NKVD on charges of being an MI6 agent, Begin was released only during Soviet negotiations with the British Empire against Nazi Germany with the onset of the Great Patriotic War. Then, Begin emerged as a corporal cadet officer of the MI6-run Anders Army, the Polish military force created by the MI6 agent Beria (see C13S4) and loyal to the London-based Polish government-in-exile. When the Anders Army was deployed into British-colonized Palestine, Menachem was allowed to ostensibly 'leave' the Anders Army to form the Irgun. In a speech to the Menachem Begin Heritage Centre, Polish President Andrzej Duda said:

I am particularly pleased to be able to meet you in this very centre, named after Menachem Begin, born in Brest on the Bug River as Mieczyslaw Biegun; then in the rank of officer cadet of the Polish Army he came to Israel in 1943 as one of Polish army soldiers under command of general Wladyslaw Anders. And it was here, on this soil at his own request he was dismissed from the service in order to be able to join the struggle for a Jewish state of Israel, whose member of Knesset he was for next ten terms in office, from 1949, the state that he ruled then for six years as prime minister. (Poles and Jews stood shoulder to shoulder in defence of the Republic of Poland, President.PL January 18, 2017) (IMG)

Anyways, The Ministry of Security, of which David Ben-Gurion was the Minister, conveyed the message to the Irgun terrorists that they shall proceed smoothly with the arrival of the war materiel for arming the Irgun fascists:

The decision of the Government – or the Security Ministry – was that the arms-ship of the Irgun must be brought in, and as quickly as possible. The decision was conveyed to me by Israel Galili the day after our late-night conversation at Irgun Headquarters. Anxiety gave way to joy. We were all delighted. The burden of responsibility had been taken off our shoulders. The Government, after all, knew the situation and its requirements. There was apparently no choice. Arms were lacking. In particular, there was a shortage of rifles – yes, ordinary rifles, the basic weapons in the Eretz Israel battles – and there was a shortage of British .303 ammunition, for lack of which a large part of the Haganah arms was out of action. All these urgent requirements would be brought in the "Altalena." (The Revolt, Menachem Begin, 1978, pp. 216-217) (IMG)

Mr. Galili writes: "I reported to the Prime Minister and Defence Minister, at every stage, both orally and in writing, fully, on the meetings with the heads of the Irgun Zvai Leumi, including the night meeting, the conversation on the morrow, and subsequent meetings."

"The night meeting" is the discussion at Irgun headquarters, on June 14, 1948, in which we relayed to the representatives of the Provisional Government, Mr. Galili and Mr. Eshkol, all the details of the ship, its means, and its arms. That night, four days before the Altalena approached the shores of Eretz Israel, we announced that the arrival of the ship depended on the decision of the government. The next morning, at ten o'clock, Mr. Galili, the authorized representative of the Defence Minister, relayed to me the following announcement:

"We have decided that the Altalena is to come, and with all possible speed." Thus was it confirmed for the first time that the Irgun, which had been accused for an entire generation of bringing the Altalena, in order to seize control of the government, had prepared its rebellion with the knowledge, consent, and even the command, of the Provisional Government....

(The Revolt, Menachem Begin, 1978, pp. 22-24) (IMG)

Mr. Ben Gurion ... was then Prime Minister and Defence Minister.... (The Revolt, Menachem Begin, 1978, pp. 23-24) (IMG)

As for the UNO prohibitions [of arms shipments during truce], we would manage somehow. After all, the Government knew. In the circumstances this was no question of morals. Nobody was helping our attacked people; the situation was one of life and death; and we thanked God that the Government understood the situation, weighed what had to be weighed and disregarded what in the circumstances it was forbidden to take into account. At once a code message went out to the "Altalena" where, as we later learnt, it aroused even greater joy. Instead of "Keep Away" it was now "Full steam ahead." (The Revolt, Menachem Begin, 1978, p. 217) (IMG)

That Eshkol relayed the message that the Altalena ship must be brought in leaves no doubt that the Ben-Gurion faction, if not Ben-Gurion himself, definitely approved of bringing the war materiel ship, for Eshkol, the Kautskyite Mapai terrorist, was the well-known agent, protegee, and successor of David Ben-Gurion. It was Eshkol who continued Ben-Gurion's hostility to the Mapam at home and the Abdel-Nasser faction abroad. True, Eshkol was a weak personality whom the Mapam had an easier time pressuring. However, in this context, Eshkol truly represented the Defense Minister, Security Minister, and Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion. As a matter of fact, the Irgun high command and the Security Ministry had conferences in which the distribution of the arms and their allocations were decided with the Irgun:

I must therefore repeat: the Provisional Government knew about the arms ship sailing towards our shores.... And it was the Government that decided to bring the "Altalena" in during the truce period. Otherwise she would not have come.

After the Government had ordered the boat to be landed without delay, a conference began between the Security Ministry and our Staff concerning the unloading of the arms and their distribution. The Irgun Zvai Leumi was then an open military force recognised by the official institutions. Before the declaration of the State, the Greater Council of the Zionist Organisation had confirmed the agreement for military co-operation between us and the Haganah. (The Revolt, Menachem Begin, 1978, pp. 217-219) (IMG)

We [the Irgun and the Ben-Gurion faction of the government] decided jointly on the point on the coast at which the boat should be brought in. This involved a change in the instruction we had given the captain in April. The "Altalena" as she waited for her men, her arms and her instructions, had been plying for some months between European ports and the north coast of Africa. She had been acquired

by the Hebrew Committee of National Liberation and the American League for a Free Palestine, and we had intended bringing her in while the British forces were still ruling – with men or arms or both.

At that time we had decided that she should anchor off Tel Aviv, because by then (the end of 1947) the British forces had left the Tel Aviv-Petah Tikvah area as the first instalment of evacuation. The precise spot we had fixed for landing was Frishman Street. This detail too must be remembered well if the smokescreen of subsequent distortion is to be dissipated.

A Ministry of Security expert proposed that the boat should not come in at Tel Aviv but at Givat Olga or Kfar Vitkin near Nathanya, and so avoid the attention of U.N.O. observers. Our experts agreed; to them it made no difference at what point on the coast the boat arrived. The essential thing was the unloading of the arms. We, who suspected nothing because we plotted nothing, never imagined there were other motives than those affecting the unloading. So that day a further message went out to the "Altalena": to alter course and proceed to Kfar Vitkin.

The discussion then proceeded on the distribution of the arms. We proposed that one-fifth of the arms should be sent to Jerusalem to the Irgun Zvai Leumi units there, while the rest should be distributed throughout the unified army, among battalions consisting of Irgun men as well as among other battalions. Our proposal was just and justified. There were most serious reasons for it.

(The Revolt, Menachem Begin, 1978, pp. 219-220) (IMG)

Yisrael Galili transmitted to the Irgun terror chief Menachem Begin, the Ben-Gurion regime's approval of the transfer of the arms to the Jerusalem front:

Israel Galili, previously Commander of the Haganah, and at that time Deputy to the Minister of Security, informed me on the telephone that the Ministry had agreed to our proposal about Jerusalem. Twenty per cent of the arms from the "Altalena" were to be allotted to that front. We were overjoyed.... (The Revolt, Menachem Begin, 1978, p. 231) (IMG)

The arms were to go to a military force that would mark the merger of the Irgun with the Haganah. As is well-known, the predecessor of the IDF was the Haganah. The Haganah was the military organization whose general staff oversaw not just the Haganah itself but also the militaries affiliated with the non-Mapai parties – the Palmach, the Lehi, and the Irgun. The Haganah staff were the staff of the Israeli armed forces in general. The Haganah was to be the unified Israeli Army and did emerge such. Menachem Begin admitted that the arms and the Irgun terrorists on board were to join the unified Israeli Army and to fight for it most loyally:

And what would have happened if ... we had unloaded all the arms and all the ammunition from the boat? The evilly-disposed whispered that we intended then to convey the arms to our underground armouries. But the truth is that by that time we had no more secret armouries. We had given the army all our arms and equipment, and they had full knowledge of where all our concentration points had been. (...). No less enlightening is the fact that in all our conversations we emphasised that the full supervision of the arms, after they were unloaded, would be handed over to the Army. All this was apparently part of the "secret preparations" for a "revolt against the Government!" Had we unloaded all the arms from the "Altalena" all of them would have gone into the hands of the unified army whose establishment we had called for from the moment the State was set up. Twenty per cent of the arms would have been despatched with the Government's consent, to Jerusalem—to Jerusalem as such and not to any particular force there—and the Old City might still, in spite of Shaltiel's "dilatoriness" have been regained from the enemy.

(...). And not only her arms. "Altalena" brought over a battalion fighters. These young people were overwhelmed with joy when they reached the shores of their Homeland. I saw many of them kneeling and kissing the salty, damp sand on the shore. In my ears I still hear the echo of their joyful cries as their boats ran on to the beach.

How their joy was silenced, how they were welcomed is known. Nevertheless they came, and they entered the Army. And in the Army they served faithfully and fought courageously. The boys of the "Altalena" served on many fronts, participated in many victories, from Tarshiha to Eylat. Many of them distinguished themselves by their outstanding gallantry. Not a few fell in battle. Subjected to the most terrible and most trying of tribulations, they yet knew how to pass the supreme test of love for their country.

(The Revolt, Menachem Begin, 1978, pp. 234-235. Bold added.) (IMG)

In his diaries, Ben-Gurion admitted that he knew that the Altalena ship was to arrive in Israel, that he knew that the Altalena ship contained plenty of arms and units for Israel, that he believed that the Altalena should be welcomed rather than be sent back, and that it should be disembarked in a secret shore rather than a zone so highly populated as Tel Aviv. In the June 16, 1948 entry of the War Diaries, Ben-Gurion wrote:

Yisrael Galili and Skolnik [i.e. Levi Eshkol] met yesterday with Begin. Tomorrow or the next day their ship is due to arrive: 4,500 tons, bringing 800–900 men, 5,000 rifles, 250 Bren guns, 5 million bullets, 50 bazookas, 10 Bren carriers. Ze'evstein [the director of the Tel Aviv port] assumes that at night it will be possible to unload it all. I believe we should not endanger the Tel Aviv port. They should not be sent back. They should be disembarked at an unknown shore. ('War Diaries, 1947-1949', David Ben-Gurion, 1947-1949, p. 411.

Edited by Gershon Rivlin & Elhanan Orren, Translated to Arabic by: Samir Jabbour) (IMG)

In other words, far from opposing the transfer of arms and soldiers to Israel's side of the war, Ben-Gurion supported such efforts. It also disproves the ridiculous narrative, promoted by Ben-Gurion in his 'Memoirs' book (not to be confused with the War Diaries cited here) years later, that he opposed the arrival of Altalena on the grounds that Israel should adhere to international law which called for the arms embargo.

The above quote from the Ben-Gurion diaries also eliminates possible doubts over Yisrael Galili's role in transmitting the message of the Ben-Gurion faction to the Irgun terrorists. General Yisrael Galili was a prominent Mapam member with long-standing ties to the Soviet spy Moshe Sneh. Along with Levi Eshkol, who was a Mapai general from the Ben-Gurion faction, he was tasked with transmitting the orders and messages of the Ben-Gurion faction to the Irgun terror command. In this midst, some may raise suspicion that Yisrael Galili was totally deceiving the Irgun, that Ben-Gurion's faction did not approve of the arrival of arms at all and that Galili was trolling Begin and conspiring to get the ship disembarked on a coast so that the Palmach would be able to hunt down the ship. Such an assertion, however, is unfounded, for Galili, while in the staff of the Haganah, and while having the decimation of Irgun as his agenda, was in one of the negotiation phases being surveiled by the Ben-Gurion faction agent Levi Eshkol; note that he carried out some of his missions of transmitting Ben-Gurion faction messages along with Levi Eshkol, who was able to spy on Yisrael Galili on Ben-Gurion's behalf, so to ensure that Galili gets the job done properly enough. Furthermore, again, the quote from Ben-Gurion shows that Ben-Gurion was aware of the arrival of the ship full of arms and that he approved of its arrival and unloading. Therefore, no, Galili's official approval of the unloading and arrival of Altalena really did represent the government and did not represent the Mapam.

Ben-Gurion definitely approved of the arrival of arms. Having said that, it is true, however, that Galili used his position to skillfully mislead Ben-Gurion's gang and Begin's terror group on some critical matters in the Altalena Affair. Yisrael Galili, it must be noted, was an intelligence agent of

the Mapam faction at the high ranks of the Israeli military apparatus. Naturally, Ben-Gurion had for long been viciously hostile to him and had spared no chance to demote him. Nonetheless, thanks to the lobbying power of the Mapam in the Israeli government, Ben-Gurion was not able to totally dismiss him:

Galili – Mapam's senior security man – was the head of the Haganah's national headquarters from mid-1947 until he was fired by Ben-Gurion, creating a serious crisis, shortly before the declaration of independence. In order to resolve the "Galili Crisis," Ben-Gurion agreed to return Galili to his senior position in the defense establishment, but not to his previous position. (Through Rabin and His Legacy, Uri Milstein, Chapter 22) (IMG)

As such, Galili gained the lobbying power to influence some of the major tactical decisions in warfare in Israel. Yigal Yadin, the IDF's Acting Chief of Staff, had been promoted by Ben-Gurion as a means of reducing the influence of the Mapam generals, but the influence of the Mapam agents in the Israeli military had been enough to encircle and coopt Yadin into 'getting into line' and cooperating with the Mapam. As such,:

Yigal Yadin, head of the IDF's Operations Division and acting chief of staff, ... was then under the dominant influence of Yisrael Galili.... (Through Rabin and His Legacy, Uri Milstein, Chapter 22) (IMG)

As planned by Ben-Gurion, Altalena was originally intended to disembark in Kfar Vitkin, a zone farther away from the UN observers, but the General Yisrael Galili, through his then-coopted yes-man Yigal Yadin, was able to lobby for the deployment of IDF troops to attack the Altalena and force it to move away from the Kfar Vitkin shores. Shimon Peres, back then Ben-Gurion's third most important henchman in the military, recalled:

Altalena anchored off Kfar Vitkin, a moshav between Tel Aviv and Haifa, and hopefully far from the prying eyes of UN observers, and began off-loading the weapons with the help of hundreds of supporters who had gathered at the site. Galili and Yadin deployed troops to surround the beach and ordered Begin to surrender. Some of the troops with Etzel [i.e. IZL] sympathies crossed the lines and joined the Altalena crew and its enthusiastic sympathizers. The ship, with Begin and other Revisionist leaders now on board, weighed anchor and put out to sea, chased by IDF craft. ('Ben-Gurion : A Political Life', Shimon Peres, 2011, p. 123) (IMG)

In any case, the Altalena war materiel ship ended up in Tel Aviv:

At midnight, on Tuesday, June 22, the guard noticed at the Palmach headquarters that an unidentified ship was approaching the shore. Nathaniel Hitron, the Palmach training officer, who was the officer on duty, immediately reported to the General Staff in Ramat Gan. Yigal Yadin, head of the IDF's Operations Division and acting chief of staff, who was then under the dominant influence of Yisrael Galili, consulted with him. Galili – Mapam's senior security man – was ... a contractor for special missions in the defense establishment, including everything related to the Irgun and the Lehi. (Through Rabin and His Legacy, Uri Milstein, Chapter 22) (IMG)

Ehud Sprinzak, the advisor to Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin on right-wing violence, the topic about which he was a professor and a scholar, wrote extensively on the Altalena affair. Sprinzak wrote that Begin got the ship as close to the Tel Aviv beach, convinced that Ben-Gurion would not approve of any shooting:

Altalena's last day started with the midnight arrival of the ship at Tel Aviv beach. Irgun supreme commander Menachem Begin and a few of his officers were aboard, as well as the ship's crew, several overseas volunteers, and about forty Irgun fighters. Convinced that Ben-Gurion would not order the army to attack Altalena ... Begin ordered the former World War II ship to get as close to the beach as possible.... (Brother against Brother: Violence and Extremism in Israeli Politics from Altalena to the Rabin Assassination, Ehud Sprinzak, 1999, p. 25) (IMG)

In this midst, the Palmach fighters went towards the Altalena in order to 'help' the Irgun terrorists. Actually, such 'help' was aimed towards Mapam-Palmach espionage against the Irgun fascists with the objective of eventually demolishing the Altalena and killing its terrorists on board. For the purpose of espionage and maintaining the cover of 'helping' the Irgun, the Palmach did not vigorously oppose the travel of the first boat from the ship:

Altalena's command [decided] to begin unloading the cargo. A boat carrying arms and a dozen armed men was sent to the beach with the additional purpose of starting negotiations with the government. While announcing their intention to unload and asking their supporters in the area for help, Altalena's loudspeakers called upon the soldiers to hold their fire. The announcement was accompanied by a warning that if fired at, Altalena men would respond in kind. The first boat made its way to the beach safely. and the men quickly took combat positions the army. Palmach and Irgun soldiers spoke to one another and even agreed on informal boundaries that would hold as long as there was no firing from the other side. (Brother against Brother: Violence and Extremism in Israeli Politics from Altalena to the Rabin Assassination, Ehud Sprinzak, 1999, p. 28) (IMG)

Menachem Begin himself confirmed that the Palmach fighters that were there to 'help' the Irgun were actually anti-Irgun spies:

On the spot we were helped by a number of Palmach men in a boat. Today I have no doubt that they were sent not so much to help as to spy on us. At the time we accepted their help ... without a shadow of suspicion. (The Revolt, Menachem Begin, 1978, p. 233) (IMG)

After the first Irgun boat was unloaded,:

The situation changed dramatically with the arrival of the second boat, however. (Brother against Brother: Violence and Extremism in Israeli Politics from Altalena to the Rabin Assassination, Ehud Sprinzak, 1999, p. 28) (IMG)

According to Milstein,:

At 1:15 AM, "Altalena" sent a boat to shore. Hitron, who saw himself as the last protector of Israeli democracy, warned the ship's commanders to return the boat. When left unanswered, the Palmach fired several shots. (Through Rabin and His Legacy, Uri Milstein, Chapter 22) (IMG)

In this scenario,:

Palmach commanders ordered the second boat to return to the ship. When the Irgun sailors refused, gunfire broke out for the first time and both sides suffered casualties. Fire was also directed at the ship. Short cease-fires were negotiated by the local commanders to evacuate the wounded. (Brother against Brother: Violence and Extremism in Israeli Politics from Altalena to the Rabin Assassination, Ehud Sprinzak, 1999, p. 28) (IMG)

These Palmach strikes at the Irgun terrorists in Tel Aviv too were at the behest of Galili:

Galili advised to respond very firmly – to the point of opening fire. At 12:30 AM, Yadin ordered to Hitron on the phone: "In case of an attempt to break out of the ship, open fire. In case of people going ashore, warn not to go ashore. If they continue to descend, open fire on them." Yadin will inform Hitron that the command for the operation against Altalena has been assigned to the Kiryati Brigade, and that the members of the Palmach headquarters will be subordinate to it. In other words, they ordered Palmach members to open fire, at

their discretion, without Yadin himself, without another senior commander directly commanding IDF forces on the line of contact, without Ben-Gurion, and without a senior official representative on his behalf, being present. This is how they determined the nature of the events that day on the shores of Tel Aviv, which reached the brink of civil war, and determined the nature of the political system in Israel from then until now. To give security into the hands of the Palmach training officer is to give permission to detonate all explosives immediately.

After passing the order to the Palmach men, Yadin imposed the command of the "Akhdut" ['Unity'] operation against the "Altalena" on the Kiryat Mishmar Battalion of the Kiryati Brigade. Zvi Orbach, the battalion commander, established his headquarters on the second floor balcony of the Kata Dan Hotel at 101 Hayarkon Street. The battalion lacked operational capability because its men refused to act against Etzel members.

(Through Rabin and His Legacy, Uri Milstein, Chapter 22) (IMG)

The clashes with the Irgun were not seen by the public as clashes between the Mapam and the Likudniks, but were rather seen as a conflict between the Provisional Government of Israel headed by Ben-Gurion/Mapai and the Irgun forces. Haganah clashes with the Irgun would have agitated the Jabotinskyite elements of the public into mob action against Ben-Gurion's headquarters, not knowing that Ben-Gurion was an ally of the Jabotinskyites. At that time, recalled Shimon Peres, Ben-Gurion's team in the headquarters compound were bogged down to ensuring that Ben-Gurion's office would not be stormed by the demonstrators. This forced the Ben-Gurion faction to reduce attention to the Altalena Affair and to pay more attention to saving themselves from potential mob storming. Through one chess move, Galili had sabotaged Ben-Gurion's plan for armaments for the Irgun while also bogging down Ben-Gurion's terror gang into worrying about clashes with demonstrators:

It sailed south toward Tel Aviv and eventually ran aground close to the shore. At army headquarters in Ramat Gan, I spent that night with a rifle in my hand in Ben-Gurion's office, in case the headquarters compound was stormed by demonstrators. ('Ben-Gurion : A Political Life', Shimon Peres, 2011, p. 123) (IMG)

Bogged down in his own office, Ben-Gurion clearly did not have enough access to information to be able to lead Israel's military in this crisis. Utilizing this opportunity, Galili assured Ben-Gurion that the ship had surrendered after a brief naval battle:

At 2:00 AM, the naval headquarters reported to Ben-Gurion that the ship had surrendered in the middle of the sea, after a naval battle.

This was almost the only detail from the events of that day that Ben-Gurion mentioned in his diary. This ... false report reassured Ben-Gurion, leaving Galili more than an hour and a half free to 'cook the stew' - until Ben-Gurion took over the management of the crisis.

(Through Rabin and His Legacy, Uri Milstein, Chapter 22) (IMG)

Ben-Gurion was misled and 'carried away' by the reality of having to deal with potential mob storming. Hence,:

About twenty years after the tragedy, one of the people closest to Mr. Ben Gurion came to me and told me, on his own initiative, the following words: "We have arrived at the conclusion that in the Altalena matter Ben Gurion was misled." (The Revolt, Menachem Begin, 1978, pp. 22-23) (IMG)

The person who stated so to Begin was Shimon Peres:

In May 1967, in the midst of discussions on the formation of a national unity government, MK Shimon Peres - then Rafi's secretary and Ben-Gurion's associate - visited Begin's home in Tel Aviv several times. At one of these meetings, Peres said: "We investigated the Altalena case, and came to the conclusion that they misled Ben-Gurion." (Through Rabin and His Legacy, Uri Milstein, Chapter 22) (IMG)

Menachem Begin further specified that a particular person had misled Ben-Gurion:

Immediately after the Likud 1977 election victory, Begin attended the remembrance ceremony for the 16 comrades who died on board the ill-fated Altalena. [Among the dead was Abraham Stavsky]. In his address to the gathering he stated: "Ben-Gurion was misled [sic; meant 'misled'] concerning the matter of the Altalena. Someone misled him and told him that the ship arrived to help Etzel [i.e. IZL, or Irgun Zvi Leumi] take control of the State. On this information, an order was given to shell the ship." He said that he heard this from a member of the Labour Party who had stated: "We investigated the Altalena incident and came to the conclusion ... [ellipsis original] that Ben-Gurion was misled." (The Politics of Memory: The Israeli Underground's Struggle for Inclusion in the National and Military Commemorialization, Routledge, Udi Lebel, 2012 p. 236) (IMG)

In fact, it was Galili who misled Ben-Gurion by providing minimal intelligence, and where having to provide intelligence, he provided false intelligence to Ben-Gurion and the cabinet ministers from the Ben-Gurion faction:

In the Altalena affair, too, Galili played the role of the false-information provider. (Through Rabin and His Legacy, Uri Milstein, Chapter 22) (IMG)

Yitzhak Greenbaum, a member of the General Zionists, Minister of the Interior in the Ben-Gurion government, was already suspicious on June 22, 1948 of Galili's manipulative game. Greenbaum said that a report by Galili to the government was inaccurate, and after hearing the Irgun's version from Haim Landau, he thought "one should always synthesize from two sides, and only then get a little closer to the truth." (Through Rabin and His Legacy, Uri Milstein, Chapter 22) (IMG)

To project confidence, Ben-Gurion pretended to have known nothing about the Altalena at all, and to have opposed the violation of international law by the Israeli regime! Begin recalled:

In the summer of 1971, the internal debate on dissidence, the "season" and Altalena, broke out, or was renewed. It has, of course, not yet ended. It demonstrated beyond all doubt that there is a contradiction which cannot be bridged between the public statements of Mr. Ben Gurion and Mr. Galili. (...). Counter to Mr. Galili, Mr. Ben Gurion, who was then Prime Minister and Defence Minister, reasserts that he knew nothing of the Altalena's arrival until June 19, 1948. What happened then during those four fateful days? In whose name did the authorized representative of the Defence Minister make the positive statement following that night meeting? But if he had been empowered by the Prime Minister to relay to me this decision, for the Altalena to come with all possible speed, how can Mr. Ben Gurion claim that he heard of the arms ship only four whole days later? (The Revolt, Menachem Begin, 1978, pp. 22-24) (IMG)

The diaries of David Ben-Gurion leave no doubt that he was well aware of the Altalena as early as June 16th. Thus, Ben-Gurion was blatantly lying when he said that he did not know about the ship's arrival until the 19th. Furthermore, note that Menachem Begin had expressed sympathies with Ben-Gurion by reiterating Shimon Peres's claim that Ben-Gurion was misled in the Altalena Affair. It follows that if having to lay the blame upon either of Ben-Gurion or Galili, Begin would have blamed Galili. Such was Begin's insinuation/implication from the above excerpts from his memoirs. Menachem Begin also wrote:

The Palmach commander then offered to "cease fire" provided we unloaded no more arms. To this we agreed. The fire ceased and the unloading ceased. We informed the commander that we had a number of wounded on board. Our small boat had been damaged and could not be used to land them. We asked for a boat to take them off, as there was now no doctor on board and many of them were in a very serious condition.

The Palmach officer promised to send a boat immediately from Tel Aviv port. We waited. One hour, two hours. But no boat came. The condition of the wounded grew worse.

Suddenly . . . something whistled over our heads. Munroe Fine exclaimed: "That's a shell! They'll set the ship on fire!" We called to the Palmach commander, reminding him that he had promised a complete cessation of fire. He did not reply. A second shell, a third, a fourth. They had bracketed the ship and were creeping up to their target. Munroe was in despair. I proposed that he and his American colleagues who were engaged as navigators and not as soldiers, should leave the ship and that the rest of us should remain. He would not hear of it. He pointed out that the ship would inevitably blow up if the shelling continued, in view of her cargo of explosives and that the only way to save her was to hoist a white flag. This he did. But that symbol of surrender amongst civilized combatants did not help. The shells kept on coming. We called again to the Palmach commander. "You undertook to stop firing. Why are you shelling us?" His answer came after a pause. His actual words deserve to go on record:

"There is a general 'cease fire' but the order has not yet reached all the units of the Army."

A few minutes later a shell penetrated the belly of the ship. Fire broke out and smoke poured forth.

(The Revolt, Menachem Begin, 1978, p. 239-240) (IMG)

The sentence "There is a general 'cease fire' but the order has not yet reached all the units of the Army" deserves attention, for it could imply that the Palmach commander – either Yitzhak Rabin or Yigal Allon – had refused to obey the ceasefire directive sent from above. Anyways, shortly after the first series of clashes with the Irgun terrorists, the Palmach forces commanded by the Mapam-affiliated commanders, Yigal Allon and his protégé Yitzhak Rabin, launched a military operation sinking the Altalena ship, destroying the plentiful war materiel – the thousands of units of arms – that existed in it, and killing Irgun terrorists, including the infamous Irgun terrorist leader Abraham Stavsky, even when the Irgun terrorists wanted to stop the fighting with the Palmach:

Palmach's command post was manned by auxiliary and support units with only a few fit combatants. One of these was Palmach operations chief, Colonel Yitzhak Rabin. Rabin came to Tel Aviv for a meeting and made an early detour to meet his girlfriend, Lea, who was serving in the Palmach communications center. Instantly the senior officer in the building, Rabin understood the potential danger of Irgun men storming the Palmach headquarters. Rabin reacted quickly, throwing hand grenades at Irgun men who approached the building and ordering several Palmach off-duty combat units to report immediately to the scene. Rabin's superior, Palmach commander Yigal Alon, soon took over. Replacing the incompetent Kiriyati commander, Alon ordered full mobilization. The situation was getting out of hand and casualties were mounting. The men aboard Altalena, who showed no intention of surrendering, were not allowed to carry their wounded to the beach for fear they would bring in more guns and ammunition.

The ensuing explosion on Altalena, which forced its people to evacuate the ship, was not the only ordeal. Some Palmach and army units continued to shoot at the swimming survivors despite a number of white flags flown on the ship's deck to indicate surrender. Not all the fire was meant to kill, but there were egregious exceptions.

(Brother against Brother: Violence and Extremism in Israeli Politics from Altalena to the Rabin Assassination, Ehud Sprinzak, 1999, pp. 28-29) (IMG)

In this midst, the Palmach freedom-fighters' bombing of Altalena placed David Ben-Gurion and his Kautskyite gang at a difficult position. Ben-Gurion no doubt covertly and secretly sympathized with the Irgun terrorists. The bombing of Altalena was done by the Palmach, the military force of the Soviet spy front Mapam, the party which held many ministers in the Provisional Government of Israel. At a time in which Israel had been defeated in its battles with the Arabs in the first phase of the 1948 War, the Ben-Gurion faction held much reduced leverage whereas the Arab-friendly Mapam/Palmach had gained greater leverage in the Israeli regime thanks to Arab successes in the first phase of the War. Ben-Gurion could not so vigorously oppose the Mapam. Furthermore, the shipment of arms to Israel and the violation of international embargo was to be a top secret, not something which Ben-Gurion could do openly. Although Ben-Gurion and the Israeli regime leaders have repeatedly violated internal law rather blatantly, certainly international law did reinforce the Mapam lobby in Israel. Furthermore, the unloading of the arms was being done in Tel Aviv and the bombing of:

Altalena [was] in front of thousands of Tel Avivans.... (Brother against Brother: Violence and Extremism in Israeli Politics from Altalena to the Rabin Assassination, Ehud Sprinzak, 1999, p. 28) (IMG)

Ben-Gurion could condemn Arabs very easily but he could not condemn Israeli generals and Israeli fighters for observing international law and destroying an arms shipment that violated the international arms embargo. For these reasons, Ben-Gurion had no choice but to pretend to be fully in line with the Palmach freedom-fighters that destroyed the Irgun terror ship. Moshe Dayan wrote in his memoirs:

When the first U.N. cease-fire went into effect on June 11, 1948, Israel and the Arab states agreed not to introduce new arms into their territories. Both sides, of course, violated this agreement, but covertly. However, the Irgun resolved to bring in an arms shipment openly on the Altalena. This act could only be viewed as an irresponsible and wanton defiance of government authority, and it had to be vigorously and speedily dealt with. (The Story of My Life, Moshe Dayan, 1976, p. 95) (IMG)

Moshe Dayan violated international law many times throughout his life. He therefore could not have cared about international law banning arms shipments, and he was correct to say that the Arabs too violated the international law on this matter, which was why Czechoslovak and Soviet arms shipments to the Arabs were done in secret. Nonetheless, reading in between the lines of the above statements by Moshe, one can see a reason behind Dayan's and Ben-Gurion's feeling of compulsion to publicly voice 'support' for the Palmach freedom-fighters' operation against Altalena: 'the Irgun resolved to bring in an arms shipment **openly** on the Altalena'. The Irgun had no intention of bringing the arms shipment openly but the scheduling difficulties, created by General Yisrael Galili, caused the secret to be revealed, and the Palmach used this opportunity.

No, Ben-Gurion did not mind that there would be a moral backlash against Israel for the violation of international law. Throughout its existence, the Ben-Gurion faction got 'the job' done without regard for international law. The diplomatic isolation of Israel mattered so little for the Ben-Gurion faction because the Ben-Gurion faction was fighting for its self-entrenchment and fuller establishment in Israel against the Arab armies. Surely, the diplomatic isolation of Israel was going to force the American armament of Israel to be even more secretive and more covert. Covert/secretive operations are generally far costlier. However, the strategic and tactical benefits to be gained through such massive arms supply to Israel far

outweighed any considerations of such petty costs as the increased cost of keeping the armament of Israel secret, and such even pettier issues as 'diplomatic isolation'. Diplomatic isolation and the cost of armaments were to be won through battles. An Israeli military conquest of Arab territory would have delivered Israel's regime so much leverage as to render it a voice so loud in the international matters that it could no longer be ignored and hence no longer feasible to diplomatically isolate. An Israeli military conquest of Arab territory would have brought so much economic benefit as to outweigh the costs of increasing the secretiveness of the secret arms sales to Israel. Hence, the real matter for the Ben-Gurion faction was neither the question of the diplomatic isolation nor the increased cost of the armament of Israel. Rather, the real issue at stake, which led Ben-Gurion to publicly endorse the Palmach's heroic operation against Altalena, was that such a heroic operation was a fait accompli. After the operation was launched and the secrets were revealed, Ben-Gurion had no better choice than to pretend to be in line with international law and hence to support the crackdown on the Israeli terrorist materiel ship. In a similar spirit as with Moshe Dayan's words, Begin wrote:

This fact must be re-emphasized, for it is from this point onwards in this sad history that the black smokescreen has been thrown up. The Provisional Government later published sanctimonious statements that while the Irgun had tried to disregard the UNO truce orders, the Government, in observance of international law, was compelled to destroy the arms brought to Eretz Israel in contravention of the truce. (The Revolt, Menachem Begin, 1978, pp. 217-219) (IMG)

Ben-Gurion could not publicly reveal the real force behind the operation against Altalena, which was the Mapam/Palmach:

To avoid bloody civil war at all costs – this principle, tempered in the sufferings of the "season," we observed years later in the test of blood and fire of the "Altalena."

It is no longer a secret that this famous arms-ship served as the instrument of a sinister plot. When Mr. Ben Gurion, on the rostrum of the first Israel parliament, modestly boasted "I have some part in that ship lying not far away from here," he was interrupted by a question from a member of Mapai: "But who was it who urged you to do it?"

Mr. Ben Gurion was silent. His silence was perhaps even more eloquent than any words.

(The Revolt, Menachem Begin, 1978, p. 214) (IMG)

For the bombing of Altalena however, it was not the Palmach that was blamed. Rather, the Irgun was blamed and accused by the Mapam of seeking to overthrow the State of Israel through a military coup:

Official propaganda, hiding behind the smokescreen, pretended that the Irgun had brought over the "Altalena" in order to prepare an armed revolt against the Government of Israel. (The Revolt, Menachem Begin, 1978, p. 216) (IMG)

The "Altalena" affair took place about a month after the declaration of independence, during the first truce, and was intended to empty the agreement of its contents, dismantle Etzel [i.e. IZL, or Irgun] units in the IDF, remove Etzel commanders from command positions, and further damage the reputation of Begin and his comrades. According to the provocation, the Irgun planned to carry out a "putsch" against the Ben-Gurion government. (Through Rabin and His Legacy, Uri Milstein, Chapter 22) (IMG)

Palmach General Yigal Allon, the master of cover-up operations, propagated a highly sensationalized myth that the Irgun was taking over the Tel Aviv and street clashes would have soon occurred, as a part of a supposed Irgun 'coup plot':

Allon ... described an entirely different situation, one where the Irgun fighters had taken control of key points in and around Tel Aviv, stirred up the local people and captured positions along the shore. He also witnessed exchanges of fire between IDF soldiers and Irgun cells from the beach and from the ship.

"It quickly became clear to me that without reinforcements for the IDF in Tel Aviv, we would not be able to quell the rebellion," Allon wrote, adding that he had two alternatives: fire on the ship "and cause heavy losses to its people," or let them come ashore with their arms, "something that would have led to bitter street battles."

(‘The Man Who Jumped Off the Altalena, the Ship That Nearly Caused an Israeli Civil War’, Ha’aretz, Ofer Aderet, June 17, 2018) (IMG)

When the news was leaked to the press that Ben-Gurion was misled in the Altalena Affair, Allon was among the first to react quickly and to assert that the strike on the ship carrying arms for Israel was totally at the behest of Ben-Gurion, and that no, Ben-Gurion was not misled in the matter. Yigal Allon and Yitzhak Rabin had divided their tasks. Allon would be the tactful Israeli official who would always appear to be in line with the will of the Israeli regime apparatus, all the while covertly and behind-the-scenes operating against the Israeli regime. Under the radar, he operated. Diplomatic, reserved, meticulously measured, mysterious in aura, he carefully hid his intents and feelings. Unsurprisingly, Allon emerged as the most prominent anti-regime dissident within the regime. The 2nd most prominent anti-regime dissident inside the regime was designated to support the 1st most prominent anti-regime dissident by blurting out the truth and speaking out loud. Allon's closest protégé, Yitzhak Rabin, did go along with the Israeli regime propaganda in many cases, but relative to Allon, he was far less tactful and far less diplomatic – deliberately so. He had a reputation for it. It is no surprise that the Israeli right-wing historiographers, Uri Milstein most infamous among them, always attack Rabin more than Allon even though Allon was always the more important person for them to target insofar as the 'War of Independence' is concerned. They do not have many Yigal Allon quotes to attack Allon for. Later on, by the mid-1960s, Yitzhak Rabin emerged as the 1st most prominent dissident insider of the regime, and Allon the 2nd.

In some ways, the Mapam/Palmach lobby in the Israeli regime was correct to say that an Irgun power group was in the making, because the Irgun sought to transition Israel from a Kautskyite 'social democracy' of the settler-colonial type to a blatantly Mussolinite, Pinochet-style, theocratic, authoritarian, neoliberal, anti-kibbutznik, overtly misogynistic, settler-colonial fascist regime under which the progressive elements in the Israeli regime's armed forces would be purged, pretty much all the Arab citizens would be in slave camps or extermination camps, and the progressive or democratic elements that existed in the Israeli state apparatus would be cleansed away as much as possible by the Irgun fascists. Thus, by maximizing its weapons arsenal, the Irgun was going to gain enough lobbying power to render Israel into such a totalitarian fascist regime; it did seek to overthrow the democratic and progressive elements in the government of Israel. Nonetheless, it should be obvious for any observer that the narrative of full-scale 'military coup' at that specific phase was a sensationalist distortion and exaggeration, far from the full truth – the dominant tendency in the government of Israel was the Ben-Gurion faction, the ally of the Irgun. The Irgun had no reason to overthrow the Ben-Gurion faction, but rather was arming itself and the Haganah to come to the aid of the Ben-Gurion faction in purging the Mapam/Palmach elements – the agents of the Israeli proletariat and the kibbutzim, reinforced in leverage by the anti-imperialist Arab armies armed by the USSR – and rendering Israel into the Mussolinite state envisioned by the Irgun.

That sacred-most of the Palmach artillery produced the glorious moment of the Epic of Altalena, and will be remembered in history as a counter-example to the view that the Israeli population was hopelessly reactionary, quasi-monolithically fascist, devoid of class contradictions and united behind the aggressive warmonger agenda of the Anglo-American colonizers. The Altalena Epic, a key moment in the history of Israelite revolutionary class warfare against Israeli fascism, marked a Cold War confrontation between the Soviet-backed Mapam generals and the CIA-MI6 terrorists, Irgun. The Altalena masterpiece was not a fratricidal war between the Israelis, but a case of proletarian and kibbutznik class warfare aimed at rolling back the influence of the agents of Anglo-American finance capital over the Israeli state apparatus, increasing the leverage power of the Mapamite agents of the Israeli proletariat and the kibbutzniks over Israel's means of violence – the armed forces – and to utilize this leverage over the armed forces to transition Israel into a workers' state allied to the USSR, the Peoples' Democracies, and the progressive Arab forces, against the CIA-MI6 fascist agents in the region.



The Altalena Ship, the masterpiece of the Mapam and the Palmach.
Image source: 'Forward' magazine.

The arrival of arms to Israel would have strengthened the Mapai-dominated Israeli armed forces, thus further strengthening the Ben-Gurion faction's leverage in their power struggle against the Mapamite generals. Thanks to the Altalena Epic, the pace at which the leverage of the Ben-Gurion faction was to increase, slowed down, and Ben-Gurion did not succeed in purging as many Mapam-affiliated generals as he desired. Nonetheless, arms to Israel came from other sources, such as from Yugoslavia, the United States, and the Slansky faction in Czechoslovakia. Such a large flow of arms strengthened the leverage of the Ben-Gurion faction, reducing costs for it, and allowing it to free up some funds away from the war effort and onto the secret service conflict against the Mapam faction. Hence, Ben-Gurion did succeed in provoking a crisis that led to the demotion of Galili. With the loss of Galili from his key position in the high command, the mantle for leading the Mapamite generals passed onto the brilliant Yigal Allon. Although Allon was an excellent Mapamite general and a struggler against the Ben-Gurion faction, the replacement of Yisrael Galili with Yigal Allon was a setback for the Mapam's intelligence network including for Allon himself, because Galili, a well-connected and highly experienced fighter for the cause of the Mapam, was losing his key position in the Israeli high command. The demotion of Yigal Allon's key ally and comrade, Yisrael Galili, marked a demotion of Yigal Allon as well. Ben-Gurion was one step closer to installing more MI6 generals in the high ranks of the Israeli armed forces. Shimon Peres – the anti-Mapam commander who belonged to the faction of David Ben-Gurion, Moshe Dayan, and Ariel Sharon – recalled:

Less than a week [after the Altalena bombing] Ben-Gurion was again facing down what he angrily termed "a political mutiny in the army".... He was determined to bring more ex-British Army/ Jewish Brigade officers into key posts. And he was determined too to reduce the influence of Mapam (since January, an amalgam of the Hashomer Hatzair and Ahdut HaAvoda parties) in the army, which was exercised primarily through the Palmach commanders, most of them Ahdut HaAvoda adherents. The two aims dovetailed and succeeded in raising the ire of Yigael Yadin, the (non-political) chief of operations (Chief of Staff Yaakov Dori was ill for most of the war), and of the Mapam-affiliated generals, who now tendered their collective resignation. Ben-Gurion accused Yadin of mutiny. Yadin said he was prepared to serve as a simple soldier but not to take responsibility for decisions that he found unjustifiable. At a cabinet meeting, Ben-Gurion threatened to resign. And he again demanded Galili's dismissal as the sine qua non for any new arrangement.

A five-man ministerial committee was set up to investigate the charges and countercharges. Yadin testified before it, excoriating Ben-Gurion's incessant interference in operational matters. He restated his profound disagreements with the prime minister and defense minister over the battle for Jerusalem. Galili testified too, also criticizing Ben-Gurion's performance of his duties as defense minister. The ministers recommended the creation of a formal war cabinet. They recommended too that Galili be restored to his old role as head of the national command – effectively interposing him between Defense Minister Ben-Gurion and the general staff. Ben-Gurion promptly resigned, just days before the truce was due to end. With the prime minister demonstratively at home, and the generals no longer at their posts either, the entire political and military establishment went into a paroxysm of negotiations to find some saving formula. (...). Yadin went around to Ben-Gurion's home, braved Paula, and put before the Old Man a compromise scheme designed to get on with the war (once the truce ended) without making an immediate string of controversial appointments. Yigal Allon, the Palmachnik accepted by all, was given command of the key Jerusalem front.

(‘Ben-Gurion : A Political Life’, Shimon Peres, 2011, pp. 124-125) (IMG)

As a part of the compromise, Galili lost his job:

Galili altruistically offered his own head. (‘Ben-Gurion : A Political Life’, Shimon Peres, 2011, p. 125) (IMG)

The affair, to which historians refer as the Generals' Revolt, is demonstrative of the relative weakness of the position of David Ben-Gurion's faction. No doubt the Ben-Gurion faction dominated the majority stake in the Israeli armed forces, but it was not so decisively dominant over it. It should therefore come as no surprise that the Mapam generals were able to launch that Altalena bombing operation, blame it on Irgun, and get Ben-Gurion to take responsibility for it.

Naturally, the Ben-Gurion faction's attempt to weaken the Palmach and Mapamite influence over the military while strengthening the MI6-trained officers angered people such as Rabin:

I could not help objecting to [Ben-Gurion's] attitude toward the Palmach. Between 1942 and 1947 he showed little regard for the idea of fostering an independent Jewish force and placed an exaggerated stress on enlistment in the British army. Then, upon assuming the defense portfolio, he gave preference to British army veterans.... (The Rabin Memoirs, Yitzhak Rabin, p. 19) (IMG)

Operation DANI was the operation in which General Allon had gotten to deploy his forces to Latrun-Jerusalem front. The Operation DANI was midway through, when the Egyptian Arab Army began a large-scale assault, penetrating the territory to the south of Israel and making a deep headway northwards. With the Israeli regime rolled back on the military front, the leverage of the Ben-Gurion faction once again reduced, whereas the Mapamite elements at the high command of the IDF gained greater leverage. Whereas David Ben-Gurion called for transferring the troops under the command of Yigal Allon to the south for combatting the Egyptian forces, Yigal Allon and his team in the Palmach brought up excuses to disobey. The Mapam faction headed by Yigal Allon argued that the Israeli forces should remain in the Latrun-Jerusalem front at the expense of the south. Thanks to the Egyptian advances in the south and the consequent increase in the leverage of Mapam faction in the IDF, the Mapamite elements in the IDF forced Ben-Gurion to back down. Ben-Gurion accepted the notion that Allon's forces should not be redeployed to the south, but compensated for this retreat by getting other Israeli troops to be deployed to the south. David Tal, an Israeli military research fellow for the NATO command, wrote:

The second point to reckon with was the intensive Egyptian offensive, which was at its height when the first stage of Operation Dani ended.

By 8 July, the Egyptians had launched an attack on the Israeli forces. The whole matter is discussed elsewhere, but it should be recalled here that despite their taking the first initiative, the Egyptians' intention was defensive, as they intended only to strengthen the positions they were holding and to prevent a Jewish intrusion along their lines. **The Jews were unaware of the Egyptians' intentions, and anyway, the 5th Brigade was put under heavy pressure, which could further affect their chances of regaining the Negev. Another disturbing development was the reports that an Egyptian company and heavy artillery force—the artillery unit was the one that took part in the occupation of Yad Mordechai – had joined the Egyptian and Jordanian forces positioned in 'Artuf. This joint force constituted a formidable company that, along with the Jordanian soldiers from the 12th company in Hebron, could threaten the Israeli Burma Road, and could even try to join the Jordanian forces to the north of the Jerusalem–Bab al-Wad road, which were tightening the siege on Jerusalem.**

Thus, fearing, on the one hand, that the IDF's ability to act was restricted by limits on time, and worried, on the other hand, about the prospect of an Egyptian offensive, Ben-Gurion and his aides pondered whether to let the Operation Dani forces to proceed with the original plan, adjusted to meet the new time limit, or to send them to the south, where the 5th Brigade was asking for help. Yadin put forward three options. The first was adhering to the original plan and going to Ramallah and Jerusalem. The other two options signified a departure from the Operation Dani logic, shifting the focus to what seemed to be the grave situation in the south. The first option would involve sending forces to Bayt Jibrin, and from there breaking through the eastern arm of the Egyptian force to the south. The advantage of this move was that it would prevent an Egyptian advance northward, thus removing the danger of the Egyptian forces joining the Legion forces along the Bab al-Wad–Qastal line. At the same time, the Israeli progress through Bayt Jibrin would open a new path to the besieged Negev while inserting a wedge between the Egyptian forces in the Hebron–Bethlehem area and the main Egyptian body in the Negev. The other alternative was sending reinforcements to the major combat area which revolved around Negba and the Iraq Suwaydan junction.

The first option was the most disturbing. Going directly to Ramallah meant bypassing Latrun and accomplishing the operational logic of the Operation Dani plan. However, it also meant disregarding the time factor. [The Mapam-coopted General] Yadin was probably ready to ignore the time factor, assuming that even if the truce did come into effect, it would be possible to proceed with their plans in the next cycle of fighting that would surely come. However, Ben-Gurion was much more sensitive to the time factor, and he made his decision on the basis of the assumptions that only a few days of fighting remained, and it was not at all certain that it would be possible to resume the war. (...). Fearing the Legion's counterattack, but more significantly, being aware of the short time remaining, Ben-Gurion shifted the original operational focus of the second stage of Operation Dani from Ramallah to Latrun. He decided that the IDF would occupy Latrun and 'Imwas; while in Jerusalem an effort would be made to conquer the Old City and al-Shaykh Jarrah, with the latter to be razed to the ground. In the south, the Israeli forces would strike at the Egyptian forces at the Iraq Suwaydan junction to secure a free passage between the southern Negev and the north, and to remove any possible Egyptian claim to the Negev. **To make that possible, at least two armored battalions would need to be sent to the south, while some of the remaining forces would be directed against the Egyptian and the Jordanian forces around Jerusalem. If this plan could be carried out successfully, it would be considered as 'a significant improvement in our military situation, and a great political victory', although in Ben-Gurion's eyes it would be less than a total victory.** A total victory would be achieved, so he believed, only if, in addition, Nablus was occupied, and a powerful aerial bombardment was carried out against Cairo, Alexandria, Damascus and Beirut. In the Prime Minister's view, it was important to end the war in a situation where the other side had completely lost its will to fight— and this would be achieved only if the enemy were dealt a crippling blow, with victory to be achieved by means of annihilation. For Ben-Gurion, then, a decisive victory and the destruction of the enemy's armed forces were not only a means to terminate the Arab presence in Israel, but also an essential instrument to avert the renewal of war at a later stage. This was what Ben-Gurion meant when he made reference to 'total victory'.

Yigal Alon, the commander of Operation Dani, was against the transfer of a significant part of his forces to the south. He argued that his men were tired, and that while they continued to fight in their current positions, they would be unable to function in a new place. The more convincing argument, however, was the one heard from the commander of the armored brigade, who said that his tanks were broken down, and that fixing them would take at least a week. The alternative was to send the 11th Brigade, but in that case, the struggle to open the road to Jerusalem would be significantly impaired. A decision had to be postponed until the situation in the south became clearer. By 13 July the Egyptian attack had reached its peak, and the 5th Brigade met the attack successfully. With that Ben-Gurion met Yadin and the General Staff on the following day to discuss the next steps. Most of the IDF generals thought that priority should be given to the fighting along the Latrun-Jerusalem Front. **Yigal Alon reiterated his conviction that Operation Dani should continue according to the original plan, even at the expense of the Southern Front.** Another general,

Fritz Eshet, agreed with him, suggesting that the forces in the south be assisted by reinforcing their fire-power with combat planes and artillery. Zvi Ayalon, the Chief of Staff's deputy, concurred. Moshe Sadok disagreed and recommended giving high priority to the Southern Front, even at Jerusalem's expense. **Ben-Gurion accepted the majority opinion**, claiming that although reinforcements must be sent to the south, it must not be at the expense of the fighting on the central front. He claimed that 'the occupation of Latrun and the liberation of Jerusalem should not be compromised', but at the same time, the **Egyptians should not be allowed to cut off the Negev. Additional forces should be sent to the south, and his solution was to not send in forces that had participated in Operation Dani, but (as mentioned in Chapter 8) to send in troops from other units.** The only exception was Dayan's 89th Raiders Battalion, which belonged to the 8th Brigade. It had taken part in Operation Dani but was now inoperative.

(War in Palestine 1948: Strategy and Diplomacy, David Tal, 2004, pp. 314-317. Bold added.) (IMG)

Ben-Gurion was not wrong to say that the southern front should be reinforced. As much as some IDF generals like to pretend otherwise, the truth is that the 'strategic depth' which the conquest of the Jerusalem front has given to Israel has never been as important as securing the 'Southern Front' against the mighty army of Egypt. In the Jerusalem front, the 'central front', the Israeli armed forces had to face primarily the Hashemite Jordanian forces, which were under the influence of the MI6 and thus could not be as serious a threat to the Ben-Gurion regime as the Wafdist Egyptian military, which was under the influence of the Czechoslovak People's Democracy. By implying that a lesser threat, the MI6-run Jordanian army, was a priority over the greater threat, the Egyptian army, Yigal Allon and the many Mapam-affiliated generals in the IDF were stabbing Israel's anti-Arab war in the back. Naturally, Ben-Gurion was utterly outraged yet again at the treasonous activity of the Yigal Allon faction. Yigal Allon and his team had been a factor in slowing down Operation DANI. By the time the Egyptians began striking from the south, Allon was bringing up excuses to not end Operation DANI so that the Israeli troops would not need to go southwards for fighting the Egyptian Arab forces.

By late 1948, Israel's regime was able to rearm thanks to the weapons sales of the Anglo-American imperialists and their agents. This episode spelled the defeat for the Arab armed forces, the Palmach and the Mapam faction for the 1948 War. In October 1948, Ben-Gurion issued the orders to gradually dismantle the Palmach. The Mapam resisted, but so in vain:

The sequel came in October [1948], on the eve of a third round of hostilities against the Egyptians in the Negev. Ben-Gurion issued orders to dismantle the Palmach's separate command structure, explaining that it was anomalous in an integrated army. Mapam appealed the decision before the executive of the Histadrut, and there the arguments raged for two days. Ben-Gurion accused Mapam of endangering "the integrity of the state." A Mapam leader warned that the right was plotting to seize power undemocratically, and that by eliminating the Palmach, Ben-Gurion was heightening the risk that this might succeed. This time Ben-Gurion enjoyed his own party's solid support, and the Mapam appeal was voted down. ('Ben-Gurion : A Political Life', Shimon Peres, 2011, p. 125) (IMG)

For the while, however, the Palmach was not fully dissolved. Rather it experienced a decline in influence from that time onwards. Allon, Rabin, and other Palmach generals were forced by the Ben-Gurion faction to head southwards and to engage in a fratricidal war with the Egyptian forces. Yet even in the southern front, they spared no chance to assist their Arab comrades.

In November 1948, there were a series of secret meetings between Gamal Abdel-Nasser and Mapam-Palmach generals from Israel, three of whom were Yigal Allon, Yitzhak Rabin, and Yeruham Cohen. Sa'id Aburish, the CIA spy affiliated with the 'Radio Free Europe' (RFE), wrote:

The second truce, in August 1948, left Nasser and his brigade surrounded by Israeli forces. But Nasser refused to surrender. When the Israelis and Egyptians negotiated for the Egyptians to withdraw and cede to Israel the areas they still occupied, Faluga and Iraq al-Manshia, Nasser had his one chance to directly assess the enemy. He met with two Israeli officers, future chief of staff Yigal Allon and a junior officer by the name of [Yeruham] Cohen. Years later both men were to praise the young Egyptian officer they had met and to speak of his curiosity about their organization and the methods they used. Both spoke of Nasser's bravery and dignity. (Nasser: The Last Arab, Sa'id Aburish) (IMG)

A CIA document leaked by the students who captured the US Embassy in Tehran in 1979, noted the meeting of Rabin and Abdel-Nasser:

During the Arab-Israeli war of 1948, Rabin commanded the brigade that secured the road to Jerusalem. He was also executive staff officer to Alon, then head of Palmach. At one point during the war in the Negev, Rabin and the late Egyptian President Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir, then an army officer, met, discussed the military situation and shared a bowl of fruit. ('BIOGRAPHIC REPORT: Yitzhak RABIN, Prime Minister of Israel', CIA, June 1974, p. 4) (IMG)

In his 1948 War Diaries, which were published by Abdel-Nasser's daughter Hoda bint Gamal, Gamal Abdel-Nasser recorded the events: November 11, 1948

I met with the Jewish officer at hour 10:00 and was informed that the [Egyptian] commander agreed to meet with the Jewish leader between hours 15:00 and 16:00. He said that he regrets that we did not agree on the place, and that this place between the lines in the sun is not suitable. His commander would like us to have a cup of tea together. He asked us to pick between Gat and Beit Jibrin for the place of meeting. We agreed to meet at Gat. He will meet us at hour 15:15.

We – Al-Sayyid Bey Taha, Rizqallah El-Fasakhani, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Ibrahim Baghdadi and Khalil Ibrahim – went to Gat, and we were well-treated. There was a vast difference between Gat and Iraq al-Manshiyyeh. One feels that one is among civilized people – mechanized agricultural means, hygiene, and the women in bright clothes wearing shorts.

And we met with the Jews. And the Jewish commander [probably Allon] spoke and said that he desires to prevent bloodshed, and that our position is hopeless. He asked us to surrender. The Egyptian commander objected and requested the withdrawal to Gaza or Rafah. The Jews objected and said: They agree, on the condition that the Egyptian army out of all of Palestine. We demanded that the wounded be evacuated to Gaza, but they refused that and said that they are ready to give us whatever medicine we want. Finally, we went out, and they offered us orange juice, oranges, sandwiches, chocolate, canapes, petit fours and biscuits.

The head told us that a convoy would attend. The password is HSAN [Arabic for HORSE]. At hour 11:00, I learned that His Majesty the King sent a telegram in which he thanked and encouraged everyone. Mr. Taha was promoted to Amiralay with his Bey rank.

(Gamal Abdel-Nasser Special Papers: Vol. 1: Gamal Abdel-Nasser as a Student and as an Officer, Collected by: Hoda Gamal Abdel-Nasser, 2015, p. 178) (IMG)


In one meeting, Rabin argued that the Arabs and the Israelis should be fighting not each other but rather the British Empire. Without naming Rabin, Abdel-Nasser wrote in his memoirs:

November 14, 1948

The enemy continued firing its artillery and mortars throughout the night. At hour 11:00, a chariot with a white flag arrived. We were informed by the Jewish officer that he was ready to give us medicine and take the wounded to their hospitals, to be prisoners of war. The commander agreed to take the medicines, but he said that he is determined to evacuate the wounded, by means of the Red Cross, to our lines, and we have agreed to communicate at hour 16:00 by radio with the Jews, to receive their response after they received the list of medicines.

The rain is continuous. I met the Jewish officer in the rain. We talked about general topics. He said that he hopes that we will not be tired in the rain. He asked: does it rain like this in Egypt right now? And he said that he wished that peace would prevail, and that we [Egyptian forces] would be able to return safe and sound. And he spoke and said: 'It was Britain that forced us to achieve its goals.' He added that they might be able to expel the British from Palestine, and they hope that we will expel them as well, and that we would cooperate together.

(Gamal Abdel-Nasser Special Papers: Vol. 1: Gamal Abdel-Nasser as a Student and as an Officer, Collected by: Hoda Gamal Abdel-Nasser, 2015, p. 181) (IMG)



Above is an image of Gamal Abdel-Nasser's notebook, recording the November 11th meeting.

The more clearly visible version of the text can be found in the 'Screenshots' section, recording a screenshot of the 1948 War Diaries.

Gamal Abdel-Nasser agreed with Yitzhak Rabin regarding the Arab alliance with the Mapamite/Palmachnik Israelis against the Anglo-American imperialist forces in the Middle East. Years later, Yitzhak Rabin recalled his conversation with Abdel-Nasser:

The details emerge in a 1994 interview with Rabin, then prime minister, that is the centerpiece of "Shalom Rabin," director Amos Gitai's new film about Rabin's bid for peace with the Palestinians. (...) Rabin says Israeli officers invited their Egyptian counterparts after surrounding their brigade at the Faluja enclave. Rabin was a leader of the elite Palmach fighting force.

"He (Nasser) was a major. I was a lieutenant-colonel," Rabin says. "We offered them to come and have lunch at (Israel's) Kibbutz Gat and they came."

The Israelis gave their word the Egyptians would return to their brigade safely.

"Nasser was sitting next to me. He looked at the emblem of the Palmach and asked me what it meant and I explained. Then he told me the war we are fighting is the wrong war against the wrong enemy at the wrong time. And I remembered that, because he didn't say it in private."

"And I believe at that time that we were very close to peace," Rabin says.

"And what happened, and he went the opposite direction. I guess the road is much longer than we would have wished," Rabin says.

('When Towering Rivals Rabin and Nasser Met for Lunch - in Rabin's Own Words', Ha'aretz. Original article from: Reuters, February 2, 2017) (IMG)

Michael Oren, an Israeli government official with ties to Yitzhak Rabin, wrote:

Rabin was aware of the situation's delicacy, and exceedingly wary of Nasser. He had actually met the man once, at the end of the 1948 war when Rabin helped negotiate the withdrawal of besieged Egyptian soldiers from the Negev. The future Egyptian president had told him, "Our main enemy is the British... We should be fighting the colonial power rather than you," and had impressed the young Israeli officer. (Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East, Michael Oren, p. 62) (IMG)

In his 1955 book 'The Philosophy of the Revolution', Abdel-Nasser recalled that while he was fighting in Palestine, he desired to fight in Egypt against the British agents that dominated his homeland, and that while the bullets of the Egyptian troops were being directed against the Israeli forces, his thoughts were for the expulsion of the British from Egypt:

May 16, 1944 ... marked the start of my life in the Palestine War. As I trace the details of our experience in Palestine I feel a strange sensation. We were fighting in Palestine but our dreams were in Egypt. Our bullets were aimed at the enemy lurking in the trenches in front of us, but our hearts were hovering round our distant Mother Country, which was then a prey to the wolves that ravaged it. In Palestine [Free] Officers' cells were meeting in trenches and posts, studying and searching. (...). As I reached that stage in my thinking my feelings would suddenly jump across the battlefield, across frontiers, to Egypt. I found myself saying, "there is our Mother Country, a far, far bigger Falouga. What is happening in Palestine is but a miniature picture of what is happening in Egypt. (...)." (The Philosophy of the Revolution, Book I, Gamal Abdel-Nasser, 1955, pp. 12-13) (IMG)

the enemy also played his part in reminding us of our homeland and its difficulties. A few months ago I read some articles written about me by a Jewish officer named Yerdan Cohen. These were published in the Jewish Observer. In those articles he related how he met me during the contacts and discussions of the Armistice. "The subject that Gamal Abdel Nasser discussed with me," he stated, "was Israel's struggle against the English, how we succeeded in mobilizing world public opinion against them." (The Philosophy of the Revolution, Book I, Gamal Abdel-Nasser, 1955, pp. 13-14) (IMG)

Cohen, a Yemenite Israeli 'Jew', was another of the Mapamite Palmach commanders with whom Abdel-Nasser spoke. Abdel-Nasser was not implying that he did not wish to struggle against the Israeli regime. Rather, Abdel-Nasser was implying his desire for strategic cooperation with Palmach freedom-fighters against the CIA-MI6 comprador regime of Israel, against the MI6 presence in Egypt, against the British colonial forces throughout the entire region. The Palmach freedom-fighters had been forced against their will by the MI6-backed fascists of the Israeli regime into a fratricidal war against the Arab freedom-fighters. After the 1948 War, Abdel-Nasser retained secret contacts with the Soviet-backed Mapam-Palmach faction in Israel. Upon ascending to the position of the President (Al-Ra'is) of Egypt in 1954, Abdel-Nasser retained contacts with the faction of Yigal Allon and Yitzhak Rabin, via the Palmach officer and Allon aide, Yeruham Cohen. This fact is well-documented. The prominent journalist Eric Rouleau for one wrote:

The friendship between Nasser and Cohen lasted well after the war. Having ascended to the presidency of the republic, the Rais invited Cohen more than once to visit him in Cairo, something the Israeli was unable to do because the Israeli government refused permission. The two men corresponded with each other and exchanged gifts for their respective birthdays. Besides Cohen, Yigal Allon, commander of the forces besieging al-Faluja and later a leader of the Labor Party, also had courteous conversations with Nasser and excellent memories of their encounters, according to the statements he made to the Israeli daily Yedioth Ahronoth. ('Truths and Lies in the Middle East: Memoirs of a Veteran Journalist, 1952-2012', Eric Rouleau, 2019) (IMG)

The anti-Arab terrorism of the Israeli regime emanates from Israel's strategic alliance with Anglo-American imperialism. An Israel opposed to Anglo-American imperialism and allied with the USSR (or nowadays, with Russia) against the Anglo-American imperialists would cease its anti-Arab terror activities. Armed struggle against the Israeli regime must have been directed not towards the overthrow of Israel as a country but rather towards the strategic realignment of Israel with the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies against the Anglo-American imperialists. Most people do not understand this very important point. The Soviets, the Peoples' Democracies, and the Mapamites understood this point. Long before adopting the UNSCR242 as his official program, Gamal Abdel-Nasser demonstrated an understanding of this important point. The other category of people to recognize this point was Hafez Al-Assad and his team. This is why Hafez Al-Assad called for a lasting democratic peace with Israel while also waging bloody wars against the Israeli military. There is neither hypocrisy nor a self-contradiction here. Waging wars against the Israeli regime would inflict financial costs upon the fascist tendency, the dominant tendency, in the staff of the Israeli armed forces, thus reducing the lobbying power of this fascist tendency, while increasing the leverage of the Mapamite dissidents in the staff of the Israeli armed forces. This would result in the elevation of the Mapamite dissident elements within the Israeli armed forces, so that eventually, a leap from quantity to quality occurs and Israel's means of violence would be firmly under Mapamite control. This would cause Israel to transition into becoming an anti-imperialist socialist-oriented state willing to ally with the progressive Arab states and hostile to the reactionary CIA-backed regimes in the Arab world. And the military alliance of the new Israel with the progressive Arab states would yield a democratic peace with the Arab people of Palestine.

By contrast, the Israel that has historically allied with the Anglo-American imperialists has established peace with some Arab states – but what type of peace with which kinds of Arab states? It established a peace and an alliance with the reactionary Arab regimes, such as the murderous regime of the Nazi agent Anwar Sadat, with the Hashemite Jordan, and with the PLO terrorists, etc. The Mapam faction in Israel - headed by Rabin and Allon - spared no chance to sabotage the fascist 'peace' with the Sadatist faction in Egypt, the Hashemite monarcho-fascists in Jordan, and the PLO terrorists. Throughout their lifetimes, they strived to overthrow the Hashemite monarchy and install a pro-Nasserist state in Jordan, and maximized efforts towards undermining the murderous Saudi regime. The issue of Rabin's role in the Oslo Accords and the deal with the Arafat faction is more complicated than what the mainstream media presents it as.

Anyways, as can be seen with the evidence presented above, even in the case of being forced against their will into the fratricidal campaign against the Egyptian Arab freedom-fighters, the Mapamite Palmach freedom-fighters led by Allon and Rabin ensured that the Egyptian Arab forces would be provided with proper medicine and food. Obviously the campaign against the Arab forces was not for freedom, but the many of the generals and special forces who had been forced to participate in this campaign tried to at least minimize the damage on the Arab freedom forces, while seeking to divert the struggle away from the anti-Arab struggle onto fighting the British Empire. Indeed, insofar as the Egyptians were to be fought, it was necessary to fight the MI6 elements among the Egyptians. One must note that at the superficial level, Israel and Britain continued to be 'enemies' even though behind the scenes, Israel's regime and the MI6 regime were allied. Nonetheless, the superficial contradiction between Britain and Israel's regime could and should have been exploited. In the 1947 UN voting, the balance was in favor of Britain and 'against' Israel's regime and so the Israelis were to be supported against the British in this superficial conflict. By the latter stages of the war, the regime of Israel had established much of control over Palestine. By the time of the latter stages of the war, the balance had shifted in favor of Israel and 'against' Britain. In that case, it was necessary to 'support' British imperialists against Israel in this superficial conflict in order to maximize damage both to Israel's regime and the British imperialists. To this end, Yigal Allon and Yitzhak Rabin decided to get the British involved in the war and get the British to come to fight Israel's regime. Therefore, Allon and Rabin and the Palmach warriors, without informing the IDF high command entered Egyptian territory, knowing that Britain had threatened to interfere if Israelis get into Egyptian territory. They got into Egyptian territory apparently with minimal casualties on

Egyptians. Ben-Gurion, an MI6 agent, strictly ordered Allon and Rabin to return from Egypt but Allon disagreed. Nonetheless, Allon and Rabin were forced by IDF high command to retreat;

The head of the column encountered an Egyptian position about seven miles before Abu Ageila, where our lead armored car was hit and burst into flames. All that night the burning vehicle served to mark the location of the enemy positions, and the strongpoint was taken in a night attack by an infantry unit. Resuming our advance at dawn, we found that the Egyptians had abandoned Abu Ageila, and we took it almost without encountering resistance.

That morning, **without consulting the general staff**, we decided to push on to El Arish. It was probably because of this lack coordination that we found ourselves under attack by Israeli planes, losing several soldiers and jeeps in the raids. When we reached the eastern airfield at El Arish, we were strafed again — this time by Egyptian planes. Just as we were getting over that our own planes appeared once more. **The troops opened up at them with every available weapon. I halted one of our jeeps whose occupants were blazing away at a furious rate. "You never fired like that at the Egyptian planes," I commented to one of the soldiers. "Can't you see that they're ours?"**

"Sure I can see," he replied. "Our planes are a hundred times more dangerous!" As the force proceeded westward, we received a message from the general staff: "Our planes report you are advancing on El Arish. What's going on? Halt your advance!" We asked one more night, and moved on to the second airfield, two miles from the town. But the general staff was adamant. Allon flew to Tel Aviv to get the orders rescinded, but at midnight a radioed message from him shattered our last hope: "No go. Withdraw from El Arish." We carried out our withdrawal in stages as Allon Ben-Gurion to his vacation spot in Tiberias, dredging up every possible argument for completing the mission. But Ben-Gurion wouldn't budge.

(The Rabin Memoirs, Yitzhak Rabin, p. 40. Bold added.) (IMG)

While being forced to leave Sinai, Yigal Allon did ensure that at least yet another provocative measure against the British Empire's military would happen. The Palmach forces under Yigal Allon's command shot down five British warplanes:

This first Jewish penetration into Sinai was doomed to failure, however. The British, who were still in Suez, forced the Jews to retire behind the old Mandate border by threatening to enter the war on the side of Egypt. It should be noted, however, that Allon's forces shot down five British Spitfires which were sent to observe their withdrawal. ('Sir Basil Liddell Hart's Disciples in Israel, Jac Weller, p. 13.

In: MILITARY REVIEW: The Professional Journal of the United States Army, US Army Command and General Staff College, Vol. LIV, January 1974, No. 1, p. 18) (IMG)

And as stated by Rabin, the Palmach fighters vigorously attacked the Israeli warplanes but not so much the Egyptian warplanes, for they regarded the Israeli air force as 'a hundred times more dangerous'.

While establishing friendly ties with the revolutionary forces amongst the Arabs, such as Gamal Abdel-Nasser and others, and while waging the war against the reactionary fascist current in Israel during the 1948 War, the Palmach also struck the reactionary fascist currents amongst the Arabs. An example to this is the killing of Abdel-Qader Al-Husseini, which was not by the mainstream pro-fascist tendency in the Israeli armed forces but by the Palmach freedom-fighters. Philip Mattar, a prominent Palestine Studies fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center, wrote:

Abd Al-Qadir ... entered Palestine in late 1947 to lead the Army of the Holy Struggle (Jaysh Al-Jihad Al-Muqaddis) of Al-Hajj Amin Al-Husayni against [the] Zionist forces. He was killed fighting with Palmach forces during the Battle of al-Qastal, near Jerusalem. (Encyclopedia of the Palestinians, Philip Mattar, revised edition: 2005, 213) (IMG)

An ally and family relative of the Mufti of Yerushalayim Amin Al-Husseini, Abdel-Qader was a reactionary terrorist who participated in the 1941 Nazi coup in Iraq led by Rashid Al-Gaylani. The Nazis aimed to take over the Soviet Caucasus oil fields in order to render the Soviet war effort ineffective in the face of Operation BARBAROSSA. Turkey, Iran and Iraq served as the major avenues that could facilitate Nazi access to the Soviet Caucasus. Even though Iraq did not share a border with the Soviet Union, it was geographically very close to it nevertheless. In 1941, in order to render Iraq into a base via which the Nazis would proceed through Iran onto the Soviet Caucasus oil fields, Rashid Al-Gaylani and Abdel-Qader Al-Husseini launched a military coup ostensibly against the British Empire, which by the way back then was emerging as a Soviet ally. The new Gaylani regime directly, openly, and without shame, allied with the Nazis, and increased the influence of the Mufti Haajj Amin. Later on, the fascist Gaylani regime was overthrown, and Abdel-Qader Al-Husseini was jailed by the USSR's British imperial allies. Back then, as British finance capital had become allied with the Soviet dictatorship of the proletariat and hence with the world proletariat, British finance capital played a very progressive role throughout the world. Back then, hostile action against the British Empire was anti-Soviet action. By the time of the Battle of Stalingrad, when the tide had turned in favour of the Soviets, the British Empire began to favour the Nazis. Such an alliance with the Nazis was manifested in the British imperial policy in all regions of the globe, including in Iraq. As Abdel-Qader was by then useful to the British imperial cause, he was released from jail in 1943, just like most other Nazis who were also released by the British in 1943. Officially, the Saudi agents of the American secret service requested his release by the MI6-aligned comprador monarchy in Iraq. Upon his release, Abdel-Qader travelled to Nazi Germany setting up his base there in 1944 and receiving from the host country support for his military and intelligence efforts. Al-Mayadeen, a Hezbollah-backed pro-Hamas media outlet, reported:

Abdel-Qader Al-Husseini ... was a supporter of the Rashid Ali Al-Gaylani revolution in Iraq in 1941, and he was participating in the fight against British forces, which led to his arrest for three years. He was released in 1943, with the intervention of King Abdel-Aziz Al-Saud [the independent-minded Saudi king that faced the pressure of the American imperialists], and he resided in Saudi Arabia for two years.

With the beginning of 1944, Abdel-Qader Al-Husseini left Saudi Arabia secretly for Germany to receive a military course "on the manufacture and installation of explosives." His specialization in his university studies in the Department of Chemistry gave him experience in dealing with explosives. **Then he returned to Saudi Arabia**, and moved from it in 1946 to Egypt.... The specter of harassment and deportation continued to haunt him until 1947, when the Palestinian cause entered a critical and dangerous juncture. He prepared a plan for the Palestinian resistance against the Israeli occupation. He organized training operations and armed the resistance. He also established a secret camp with Egyptian and Libyan national forces. He trained Egyptian elements who participated in the volunteer campaign in the Palestine War and the Canal War against the British occupation.

With the help of sheikhs and leaders in Palestine **and with funding from the Mufti of Palestine, Amin al-Husseini, he established a wireless station at the headquarters in Birzeit...**

(‘He said to the leaders: You have lost Palestine... Who is Abdul Qadir Al-Husseini?’ Al-Mayadeen, Muhammad Ali Faqih, April 18, 2018) (IMG)

Some would naively argue that although Abdel-Qader had the problem of collaborating with the Nazis, killing an Arab during the 1948 War was ‘counter-productive’. Yet, so implausible is the narrative that killing a fascist Arab was ‘counter-productive’ during the 1948 War, as there is no reason to believe that an agent of fascism would not tactically sabotage the Arab war effort against Zionist settler-colonialism. If in 1948 a Palmachnik had killed Anwar Sadat, the Nazi German agent who sabotaged the Arab war effort against IDF, would that have been ‘counter-productive’? By 1944, when Abdel-Qader had been training in Nazi Germany and preparing his armed forces there, Nazi Germany had already become a strategic partner of the JDC, the very American Zionist espionage body that promoted the Ben-Gurion faction in Israel. Collaboration with Nazi Germany was collaboration with the Zionist intelligence agents of the United States. And what surprise is there that the Saudis demanded Abdel-Qader’s release in 1943? And again, what reason is there to trust a Saudi-backed Nazi German agent to perform well for the Arab cause? Wasting military funds to launch a terror attack against media offices instead of attacking military targets is a form of tactical sabotage against the Arab war effort. It is also obviously a war crime against Israeli civilian targets. Abdel-Qader Al-Husseini and his personal army, the so-called ‘Sacred Struggle Army’ or ‘Holy Jihad Army’, engaged in terror operations. As confirmed by Haajj Amin Al-Husseini, the ‘Sacred Struggle Army’ ‘responded’ to Zionist terrorism by responding the ‘same way’ as how the Zionists had behaved. The ‘Sacred Struggle Army’ engaged in a disproportionate bombing campaign against ‘most of Jewish neighborhood in the Old City’ in Jerusalem:

And when the Jews deliberately carried out acts of bombing and destruction in order to terrorize the Arabs, the destruction battallions of the Holy Jihad Army met them in the same way. Rather, they increased them by blowing up Ben Yehuda Street, the Jewish Agency House, the Montefiore neighborhood, the Palestine Post building and its environs, in addition to most of the Jewish neighborhood in the Old City, which forced the Jews to stop acts of destruction because they inflicted great pain and suffering upon them. (The Memoirs of Mohammad Amin Al-Husseini, organized by: Abdel-Karim Al-Omar, 1999, p. 452) (IMG)

According to the PLO, Abdel-Qader Al-Husseini and his forces blew up the Atlantic Hotel in the Ben-Yehuda Street in Jerusalem which led to the deaths of ‘49 Zionists’:

2/22/1948: The Arab Mujahideen blew up the Atlantic Hotel on Ben Yehuda Street in Jerusalem. This explosion was planned by the Palestinian Mujahid Abdel-Qader al-Husseini, the commander of the Army of Holy Jihad. This explosion led (according to the enemy’s account) to the death of 49 Zionists and wounded 132 others. (State of Palestine website, PLO, February 22, 2017) (IMG)

Whenever Palestinian terrorists kill civilians, in order to ‘justify’ their non-combat against Israeli combatants and combat against Israeli non-combatants, they refer to the latter category as ‘Zionists’ so that those civilian targets would appear to ‘deserve’ being blown up. The overwhelming majority of the casualties reportedly were not Israeli soldiers but civilians (‘Zionists’). In addition to the Atlantic Hotel, the so-called ‘Sacred Struggle Army’ also blew up the ‘environs’ of the ‘Palestine Post building,’ ‘the Montefiore neighborhood,’ and ‘most of the Jewish neighborhood in the Old City’ in Jerusalem. Abdel-Qader Al-Husseini’s army wasted the military funds of the Arab armed forces by engaging in terror attacks rather than expanding the fight against the Israeli military targets.

The terror operations of Abdel-Qader Al-Husseini, Amin Al-Husseini, Hasan Salameh, and other ‘Sacred Struggle Army’ terrorists had the support of the British intelligence service agents. Efraim Karsh, a prominent Israeli military history scholar and a high-ranking IDF intelligence official, wrote:

But the story doesn’t end there. British security personnel were also implicated in a series of anti-Jewish outrages in Jerusalem, from the distribution of weapons to Arab rioters in early December, to the bombing of the building of the moderate English-language newspaper the Palestine Post on February 1, ... to the February 22 bombing of Ben Yehuda Street in central Jerusalem, in which fifty-two people were killed and another 123 wounded, to shootings on civilian Jewish targets in the Old City, to armed provocations aimed at inflaming Arab-Jewish relations. (Palestine Betrayed, Yale University Press, Efraim Karsh, 2010) (IMG)

There is no reason to doubt MI6 involvement since Abdel-Qader had been released by the British in 1943 when the British allied with the Nazis, and was trained in military and intelligence matters by MI6-backed Nazi Germany during 1944. Such Nazi Palestinian terrorist “resistance” of the ‘Sacred Struggle Army’ was undoubtedly a British colonial conspiracy aimed at destroying the Palmach freedom-fighters, and massacring Israeli civilians so to give the Israeli fascists the excuse for ethnic cleansing against the Arabs of Palestine. At the same time, by allocating military funds away from combat against the Israeli fascist armed forces and onto massacring Israeli civilians, Abdel-Qader’s army of terror was sabotaging the Arab anti-fascist war effort.

The Soviets and the Arab communists accused the Mufti of paving the way towards the partition of Palestine via anti-Semitic terrorism:

Gromyko cautioned the Arabs that by their uncompromising stand they might bring about a very undesirable solution: partition. The Arab communists, who oppose partition no less than the mufti, are directing their full wrath at the extremism and fanaticism of the official Palestinian leadership, which [they say] is helping [bring about] partition by its racist hatred of the Jews and its refusal to recognize the existing Jewish community in Palestine. (Circular of the Mapai Central Committee to its Emissaries Abroad, COPY: CZA S53/12C, Tel Aviv, May 29, 1947. In: “Documents on Israeli-Soviet Relations, 1941-1953, Parts 1-2”, Israeli Foreign Ministry, Russian Foreign Ministry, Israel State Archives, Russian Federal Archives, p. 202) (IMG)

Unwilling to risk their small businesses by confronting finance capital, the petit-bourgeoisie instead choose to submit to imperial rule and refuse to resist it, both materially and ideologically. Insofar as the Palestinian petit-bourgeoisie ‘resisted’ imperialism, they did so through provocative terror attacks that provided the Zionist agents of Anglo-American imperialism the excuse and pretext for further colonial subjugation. Back then, the vast majority of the Palestinians were petit-bourgeois. Behind the Palestinian fascist leadership stood the majority of the Palestinian people. Undoubtedly, the Palestinians, through their Rejectionist intransigence and with their sickeningly chauvinistic urge to treat Israeli proletarians and kibbutzniks as ‘colonial’ ‘profiteers’ and ‘legitimate’ military targets, provided the colonizers the excuses sought for and invited Zionist suppressive terror against the revolutionary forces in the Arab world.

The hateful chauvinistic attitudes of many among the Palestinian people towards their Yiddish and Hebrew neighbours, strongly forged with enforcement of such hate through the anti-Semitic terror attacks, all weakened the argument for a single bi-ethnic (Israeli and Arab) Palestinian state. Thus, the Soviet delegation in the UN promoted the partition of Palestine as Plan B, if Plan A – a territorially integral bi-ethnic Palestine – would fail:

The fact that no Western European State has been able to ensure the defence of the elementary rights of the Jewish people, and to safeguard it against the violence of the fascist executioners, explains the aspirations of the Jews to establish their own State. It would be

unjust not to take this into consideration and to deny the right of the Jewish people to realize this aspiration.... Thus, the solution of the Palestine problem by the establishment of a single Arab-Jewish State with equal rights for the Jews and the Arabs may be considered as one of the possibilities and one of the more noteworthy methods for the solution of this complicated problem.... If this plan proved impossible to implement, in view of the deterioration in the relations between the Jews and the Arabs ... then it would be necessary to consider the second plan which, like the first, has its supporters in Palestine, and which provides for the partition of Palestine into two independent autonomous States, one Jewish and one Arab. I repeat that such a solution of the Palestine problem would be justifiable only if relations between the Jewish and Arab populations of Palestine indeed proved to be so bad that it would be impossible to reconcile them and to ensure the peaceful co-existence of the Arabs and the Jews.... (The Origins and Evolution of Palestine Problem, Part II: 1947-1977, The Palestine Question in the United Nations) (IMG{Israel})

Both Israel and Palestine were dominated by the comprador classes allied to finance capital – in Israel, the bureaucrats of the Ben-Gurion faction increased the presence of American finance capital, and in Palestine, the Hashemite Jordanian monarcho-fascist reactionaries brought Anglo-American dominance over the Jordanian-occupied areas. However, the revolutionary potential in Israel was incomparably higher than the ‘revolutionary’ ‘potential’ in Palestine. Both in terms of societal class composition and culture, Israelis were far more advanced. Whereas the majority of the Israelis were proletarians and cooperative farmers sympathetic to socialism and the USSR, the majority of the Palestinians were petit-bourgeois individuals upon whose gullibility and unwisdom thrived the Nazi pogromism of Haajj Amin, Abdel-Qader, and Rashid Al-Gaylani. The Soviets harboured no delusions about the pro-fascist class character of the Zionist terror regime, the outpost of Anglo-American imperialism. However, the Soviets also made neither moral nor strategic mistakes when they appreciated a proletarian and kibbutznik people, whose beloved heroes were Lenin and Stalin, much more than unreliable adventurer petit-bourgeois masses whose beloved ‘heroes’ were the Nazi German agents and fascist mass-murderers Abdel-Qader Al-Husseini and Rashid Al-Gaylani.

In 1948, the Palmachniks killed that fascist general Abdel-Qader Al-Husseini along with several of the other terrorists who served him and his Gaylani Nazi agenda. The Palmach generals were militantly opposed to the Israeli regime, and were allied with the good Arabs, but that does not mean that they were to be soft on the fascist Arabs. On the contrary, they had a moral obligation - which they fulfilled - to wage wars against every reactionary fascist Arab they could find, just as how they were to - and did - wage war against the pro-fascist Zionist regime.

Nor was the Palmach alone in the struggle against the fascist gang of Abdel-Qader Al-Husseini. In fact, as confirmed by the Mufti of Yerushalayim, the Wafdist Egyptians led by Nuqrashi confiscated massive loads of weapons belonging to the Arab Higher Committee, the official name of the Mufti’s Palestinian terror regime. Abdel-Qader Al-Husseini’s terror squads were affiliated as the army of the Arab Higher Committee. The Mufti wrote:

Several Arab League countries confiscated weapons depots that were in the possession of the Palestinians, weapons repair laboratories, and ammunition fillings. The Cairo-based “Akhir Sa’ah” [‘The Last Hour’] magazine published pictures of a large number of large transport vehicles, more than thirty cars, full of weapons and equipment that were confiscated [by Egypt] from the Arab Higher Committee warehouses, and that was during the era of the Nuqrashi Administration. Abundant quantities were also confiscated in some other Arab countries. (...). Arab League States wrested the political cause of Palestine from the people of Palestine and removed from it the men who were in charge of its political leadership and conducting its war battles. (The Memoirs of Mohammad Amin Al-Husseini, organized by: Abdel-Karim Al-Omar, 1999, pp. 392-393) (IMG)

As the reader may recall, Nuqrashi, Egypt’s Wafdist Prime Minister aligned with the Soviet-led camp, had opposed direct military invasion by the Arab armies into Israel, whereas the MI6 agent King Farouk, keen on decimating the Arab armies through a Trotskyite ‘Permanent Revolutionary’ military adventure, hailed an invasion and claimed that triumph over Israel was as easy as a “military picnic.” Nuqrashi, who confronted MI6 policies in the region, was assassinated in December 1948 by the pro-MI6 faction in the Muslim Brotherhood. Despite the Muslim Brotherhood’s direct involvement in the terror attack, Hasan Al-Banna did not have a role in the assassination, but was wrongly blamed and assassinated by the Farouk gang, ostensibly to combat Muslim Brotherhood terrorism but actually to eliminate a top obstacle to the MI6 current in the Brotherhood. It is worth mentioning that although Abdel-Nasser was rightly vehemently hostile to the Brotherhood, he had fairly positive relations with Hasan Al-Banna, a fact which shows the paradoxical contradiction between the fascist character of the Brotherhood and the personality of its founder. Hasan Salameh, the co-leader of ‘Sacred Struggle Army’, also knew that the Syrian-created Arab Liberation Army (ALA) pursued the agenda of having the ‘Sacred Struggle Army’ killed in the battle with the Palmach. After Abdel-Qader died,:

I was in the office of the Higher Arab Commission in Damascus when [Arab Liberation Army commander] Taha Pasha [i.e. Taha Al-Hashemi, not to be confused with Egyptian commander Taha Bey] and Major General Ismail Safwah came with the late Shukri al-Quwatli to pay their respects to Abdel-Qader. The late Sheikh Hasan Salama reprimanded Taha for his shortcomings with Abdel-Qader, so Taha patted his back politely. Hasan Salama said to him: “You pat us on our backs and prepare to kill us!!” (The Memoirs of Mohammad Amin Al-Husseini, organized by: Abdel-Karim Al-Omar, 1999, p. 392) (IMG)

Abdel-Qader too had made the same kind of a remark:

Taha Pasha understood that many of the leaders of the Sacred Struggle [Army], at the forefront of them Abdel-Qader and Hasan Salameh had spent several military courses in Iraq and [Nazi] Germany, but Taha did not agree to give them anything, and so [the ever-fanatical] Abdel-Qader rose and threw the maps in his hands onto the face of Taha, and said to him: “Truly, you [Syrians and Syrian-backed forces] desire to kill us and pave the way for our inexpensive defeat.” (The Memoirs of Mohammad Amin Al-Husseini, organized by: Abdel-Karim Al-Omar, 1999, p. 391) (IMG)

Note that Taha Al-Hashimi was close to President Quwatli, and his words basically represented the rhetoric of the Syrian military. The prominent scholar on Syria, Joshua Landis, wrote:

Taha al-Hashimi ... was an Iraqi pan-Arab nationalist and long-time intimate of Quwatli, whom the Syrian president wanted to head the Liberation Army rather than General Safwat, Egypt’s candidate. Hashimi was ultimately appointed Inspector General of the ALA and placed in charge of recruitment and training of the troops at the Qatana headquarters. His office was in the Syrian Ministry of Defense and he met daily with Syria’s political and military leaders. (SYRIA AND THE 1948 WAR IN PALESTINE, Joshua Landis) (IMG)

The progressive Arab armies – from the Egyptian army, to the Lebanese army, to the Syrian army – were all opposed to the Palestinian terror regime of Haajj Amin and the Palestinian terror army of Abdel-Qader. The progressive Arab armies were backed by the USSR and the Peoples’ Democracies, which also were very antagonistic to the Mufti, as indicated previously. Later on, during the Doctors’ Plot case, throughout the imperialist media was

spread the anti-Soviet libel that the Soviet Union had welcomed the Nazi Mufti. Yet, in a document slanderously denouncing Stalin as an enemy of the 'Jews' and the people of Israel, Ben-Gurion admitted that the rumours of the Mufti being welcomed in the socialist camp were not credible:

Soviet Russia is not antisemitic. (...). Hajj Amin al-Husayni ... was one of Hitler's friends and assistants. I do not believe the reports in the press that Stalin has now invited the mufti, but it is clear that Stalin is not antisemitic. (D. Ben-Gurion to the Members of the Israeli Government, COPY: ISA 130.02/2157/14, Tel Aviv, January 20, 1953. In: "Documents on Israeli-Soviet Relations, 1941-1953, Parts 1-2", Israeli Foreign Ministry, Russian Foreign Ministry, Israel State Archives, Russian Federal Archives, p. 858) (IMG)

By waging the heroic war against the death squads of Abdel-Qader, Hasan Salameh, and other fascist Palestinian terrorists, the Palmach freedom-fighters were not waging a war against the Arab people but were rather siding with the Arab people and the progressive Arab armies and with the people of Israel against fascist reaction. Anti-Arabism is not hostility to all Arabs. Anti-Arabism, rather, is the hostility to the advancement of the progressive classes among the Arabs and support for the elevation of the reactionary classes among the Arabs. An Israeli revolutionary soldier's killing of a Palestinian fascist is not "Zionist settler-colonialism" and "anti-Arab chauvinism."

It is said that Yitzhak Rabin ordered the ethnic cleansing to be carried out against the Arabs of certain cities in Palestine. It is true that 'Rabin' ordered it – but more accurately, he was ordered by Ben-Gurion to order it. He was a Mapam faction intelligence agent who, in order to infiltrate the Israeli regime so to combat the pro-fascist forces dominating it, had to partially blend with the policies of the Israeli pro-fascist forces. They who cite the fact of Rabin's order for mass expulsion, tend to sweep under the rug the incontrovertible fact that Rabin did all of this reluctantly. Rabin said that psychologically, this was the toughest thing that he had gone through, and implied that great psychological suffering inflicted on him and his comrades in the Palmach, and that such a move was against the values of international brotherhood and humanness. The same Rabin who 'confessed' to participation in such ethnic cleansing also stated that his participation and 'agreement' with such a genocidal program by Ben-Gurion gang was reluctant:

"Driving out" is a term with a harsh ring. Psychologically, this was one of the most difficult actions we undertook. The population of Lod did not leave willingly. There was no way of avoiding the use of force and warning shots in order to make the inhabitants march the ten to fifteen miles to the point where they met up with the legion. The inhabitants of Rami watched and learned the lesson. Their leaders agreed to evacuate voluntarily, on condition that the evacuation was carried out by vehicles. Buses took them to Latrun, and from there they were evacuated by the legion. (...). Great suffering was inflicted upon the men taking part in the eviction action [and I, Rabin, was one of the men who took part in the eviction action]. Soldiers of the Yiftach Brigade [which was a Brigade of the Palmach] included youth-movement graduates, who had been inculcated with values such as international brotherhood and humanness. The eviction action went beyond the concepts they were used to. There were some fellows who refused to take part in the expulsion action. Prolonged propaganda activities were required after the action to remove the bitterness of these youth-movement groups and to explain why we were obliged to undertake such a harsh and cruel action. (The Rabin Memoirs, Yitzhak Rabin, pp. 383-384) (IMG)

There is no reason to doubt the honesty of Rabin insofar as he implied that these crimes were committed by 'him' unwillingly, for the entire legacy of Rabin was filled with socialist and anti-fascist heroism subtly and skillfully disguised as the pursuit of the Zionist fascist agenda.

Throughout this book, there has been an immense effort to not cite the pro-Soviet 'confessions' of those Anglo-American, Israeli, German, etc. security officials who held crypto-pro-Soviet sympathies, unless such pro-Soviet 'confessions' would be backed up by the confessions of the genuinely anti-Soviet security officials. The reader will find throughout this book that the pro-Soviet remarks of US officials affiliated with the Kennedy faction, for example, were either avoided or backed up by the intelligence sources that were genuinely anti-communist. Many of those who cited Yitzhak Rabin's 'confessions' believed that Rabin was a genuine believer in Zionist settler-colonialism, when in fact he was not. His 'confession' that he 'agreed' with the ethnic cleansing against the Palestinian Arabs, along with his condemnation of such ethnic cleansing, was a part of his game. Rabin simply could not stop 'confessing' the truth. He 'confessed' that the Arabs of Palestine left their homeland unwillingly, that Abdel-Nasser had no aggressive intents in 1967, that the Shah was anti-Kurd and an unreliable partner of the people of Israel, that Israel should not ally with the Sadat gang, that the IDF terrorists created a 'Red Line' to protect the PLO terrorists against the Syrian Arab Army peacekeeping efforts in Lebanon in the 1970s and the 1980s, that the 1982 IDF invasion of Lebanon was very wrong (and Nasrallah cited his confession on this one), that the US presence in the Gulf during the Iran-Iraq War was reactionary, etc. He 'confessed' all such truth because he was never truly loyal to imperialism-fascism in the first place.

After the abolition of the Palmach, the David Ben-Gurion faction took on the next step and further demoted Yigal Allon, replacing him with the Pirate of the Mediterranean Moshe Dayan:

While Allon was still in France, Ben-Gurion, in his capacity as defense minister, announced a series of new appointments, including Yigael Yadin as chief of staff and Moshe Dayan as the head of Southern Command. There could be no doubt that Ben-Gurion's move was a deliberate slap in the face to the former commander of the Palmach, leaving Allon with no choice but to resign from the army. As acting commander of the front, I was in charge of transferring the command to Dayan. Everyone was silent and expressionless when he arrived, and Dayan may have felt ill at ease in the company of all those Palmach men. I transferred the command without any ceremony, and the feeling that Dayan would prefer to be rid of me as well was strengthened by our first talk. He was cold, reserved, and laconic. Moreover, he was frank. "Thank you," he said, "I don't need you any longer." (The Rabin Memoirs, Yitzhak Rabin, p. 46) (IMG)

Moshe Dayan, Ben-Gurion's favourite general, had led a reconnaissance squad for the British military, thus assisting in the collection of military intelligence for the British in the Middle East. It was during his official service for the British military that Moshe Dayan had lost an eye, forcing him to wear the piratical eyepatch. Ben-Gurion, keen on promoting the MI6 officers as the generals of the IDF, promoted the Pirate of the Mediterranean as much as he could. By contrast, Yigal Allon had long been despised by Ben-Gurion. Rabin recalled in one case during the 1948 War:

Ben-Gurion's anger did not subside. "Why didn't Allon tell me that he doesn't intend to attack Latrun?" His rage reached its peak as he shouted, "Yigal Allon should be shot!"

I was astounded, barely able to mumble, "Ben-Gurion, what are you saying?" But he did not withdraw his remark. "Yes, you heard me correctly!" This exchange is depicted in Ben-Gurion's book *The State of Israel Restæed*. I have carefully read every word of it, and shooting Yigal Allon is not mentioned. In retrospect, Ben-Gurion must have grasped that he had let his tongue run away with itself.

(The Rabin Memoirs, Yitzhak Rabin, pp. 33-34) (IMG)

The defeat of the Arabs in the 1948 War had already reduced the costs for the Ben-Gurion faction thus giving him greater leverage and lobbying power in the factional conflict against the Mapamite generals. The ouster of General Yigal Allon from the leadership of the IDF's Southern Command was a step in this direction. Despite this setback, however, the 'game' was far from over, as the cliché goes. In correlation with the anti-imperialist Arab recoveries and anti-imperialist Arab comebacks against the Ben-Gurion faction dominating the IDF, the Mapam was to also see elevations in its position. Rabin, the protégé of Allon since the 1930s, had a long way to go with his comrade:

[in the 1930s] Being the youngest pupils, at first we served as messengers between the defense positions. Then we were trained in the use of arms. Our instructor was Yigal Allon, one of Kadouri's first graduates and by then the highly respected "King of Galilee." (In time, he and I would go a long way together as soldiers and as politicians.) (The Rabin Memoirs, Yitzhak Rabin, p. 8) (IMG)

As a result of the victory of the Israeli regime over the Arab forces in the 1948 War, the Ben-Gurion faction strengthened in leverage, whereas the Mapamite faction had reduced leverage vis-à-vis the Ben-Gurion faction. As such,:

After the war Ben-Gurion achieved his goal of a fully integrated army by disbanding the separate Palmach brigades. ('Ben-Gurion : A Political Life', Shimon Peres, 2011, p. 125) (IMG)

The costs inflicted upon the Arab armies had led an IDF dominated by the Ben-Gurion faction to triumph. Reduced military costs allowed the Ben-Gurion faction to spend its funds for the secret service conflict to oust the Mapam generals in the IDF. With such increased leverage, the Ben-Gurion faction reduced the presence of the Mapam-Palmach agents in the IDF, increased its influence in the security bodies and hence over the Israeli 'non-state' media. The Israeli media then stepped up its propaganda campaign against the USSR, and the USSR retaliated by stepping up its media campaign against the Israeli regime. In a conversation with the US ambassador to Israel, Ben-Gurion made it absolutely clear that the faction he headed regarded the USSR as the gravest threat and the greatest enemy of Israel's regime:

I was in Jerusalem July 28-30. Being info Prime Minister was in Elath, Mrs. McDonald and I had tea his denec with Mrs. Ben-Gurion where to my complete surprise Prime Minister joined us.

He talked to me privately an hour substantially as follows:

Eban is returning Washington with instructions sound out desirability of visit of Prime Minister to US this fall to discuss "on highest level" possibility of USG sponsoring three years program to increase Israeli population through intensified refugee immigration to millions and build with American arms effective Israeli army of 250,000 men "capable and anxious aid US and UK and Turkey to resist Russian aggression".

Prime Minister hopes he "can convince President Truman, Secretary Acheson and US military that America's vital interest would be served by proposed strengthening of Israel as only country other than Turkey in [western] Asia willing to fight Russian aggression to limit of strength". Prime Minister feels American Jews would give or lend money required beyond USG possible loans only if USG first sponsors intensified Israel efforts speed up immigration.

Prime Minister praised President Truman's Korean decision as "bold and vital step to block Communist expansion and hence may prove turning point in history." Russia, he added, is regime "based on fear, deceit, force and repression". It "must be stopped if freedom is to live in world".

In answer my question re Israel left-wing labor, Prime Minister said confidently. "Israeli people would support crushing any form Communist collaboration in event world conflict. Only few Mapam could possibly cause embarrassment and this locally". Re-equipped and enlarged Israeli army "would guarantee Israeli unity in support of West". If Russia attacked Israel's strategic air fields "Israel's new army could and would hold until US and UK forces could arrive".

(...). Prime Minister could not have been more explicit in willingness commit Israel unreservedly to West. His statement is doubly significant because it follows and doubtless represents con[s]ensus opinion Foreign Office and diplomats whose fortnight conference Tel Aviv and Jerusalem he attended. Although Israel's attitude strengthened by increasing difficulties internal economy, I believe it basically represents culmination of realization by Israeli leaders that Israel can survive only in world freed from menace of Communist aggression. To defend itself Israel would fight against Russian invaders as desperately as against Arabs.

(784A.13/7-3150: Telegram, The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State, Top Secret, Priority, Tel Aviv, July 31, 1950. In: Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol. 5, United States Department of State, pp. 960-961. Note: many US diplomatic documents are written deliberately in an abbreviated or note form as means of making the document brief.) (IMG)

One of Ben-Gurion's close friends and ministers described Ben-Gurion as such:

He is unwilling to be neutral; he regards the Soviet Union as the number one enemy of Zionism and the entire world. He is prepared to accept only one thing - that there be no anti-neutrality expressions. (Between East and West: Israel's Foreign Policy Orientation 1948-1956, Cambridge University Press, Uri Bialer, 2009, p. 225. Citing: FRUS, 5, 1950, pp. 960-1. See also M. Gazit, "Ben Gurion's Efforts to Create Military Ties with the U.S.A.," Geshet, 32, 1986/7, pp. 57-63 (Hebrew).)

As part of the Morgenthau Plan to strengthen Israel, in January 1950, the US also provided a 100 million Dollar loan for Israel:

\$100,000,000 credit made available by the Export-Import Bank. (Developments Affecting Israel, Memorandum of Conversation, Participants: The Secretary Mr. Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Mr. Rockwell, January 9, 1950, p. 2)

The Soviet support military operations against the Israeli regime not for the destruction of Israel as a country but for using military conflict as a means of giving greater lobbying power, leverage, and operational room for the Mapamite officials. The military conflict was used to achieve victory in the secret service conflict. Soviet use of warfare was for political change in Israel - the establishment of a socialist-oriented state - rather than for the destruction of Israel as a country and a society. How would the anti-imperialist Arab forces have reacted if the Mapam faction had won the power struggle during and as a result of the 1948 War? Would these Arab anti-imperialist forces have continued to wage war for the 'destruction' of the 'Zionist Entity'? Cowardly academics condemn these kinds of 'what if' questions as anti-historicist. They who hold a scientific view of history, on the other hand, use the laws of historical materialism and dialectics to determine the changes in dependent variables resultant from the changes in independent variables in history.

The laws of history dictate that if two forces both belong to the same class alliance and are thus strategically aligned with the same camp, and if these two forces are being pressured to fight each other, these two forces would seek to tokenize the struggles against one another so to minimize fratricidal

damage against one another. The Saudi regime and Hashemite Jordan were both regimes aligned with the camp of Anglo-American imperialism, just like Israel. It is no surprise that the struggles of these regimes against Israel has been consistently tokenized and insofar as the struggle has been serious, it has emanated from rogue/anti-imperialist infiltrators in these regimes. The Soviet-backed forces in the Arab world - the Syrians, the Lebanese, and the Egyptians - contributed to the bulk of the fighting against the CIA-backed regime of Israel. While the USSR supported armed struggle to overthrow the Ben-Gurion regime, the USSR rightly denounced armed struggle in the form of an invasion against Israel. That the invasion against Israel was wrong, however, does not negate the general correctness of support for such Arab armed struggle against the CIA-MI6 puppet regime of Israel. The USSR supported the Arab armed struggle against the Ben-Gurion regime in order to give greater leverage in Mapam's factional conflict against the Mapai and Irgun. **Had the Mapam faction emerged victorious in the power struggle against the Ben-Gurion faction during the 1948 War, the Soviet-backed elements in the Arab forces – predominantly concentrated among the Syrians, the Lebanese, and the Egyptians – would have tokenized and de facto ceased military operations against the new socialist-oriented and Arab-friendly Israel. Why? It was because the new socialist-oriented Israel was allied to the same Soviet state to which these Arab states were allied. These Soviet-aligned Arab states would have launched token military operations with no serious results and would have sworn at the 'Zionist Entity', but would have focused the bulk of their forces towards covertly backstabbing the CIA-MI6 puppet regime forces such as the gang of General Glubb from Jordanian regime, the regime which by then was actually going to engage in real serious fighting against the new Israel in order to re-install the Anglo-American-backed faction there. In that scenario, the new Soviet-aligned Israeli People's Democracy would have concentrated its forces onto combatting the Jordanian monarcho-fascists in order to overthrow the regime there and to establish a Soviet-aligned Arab state in Jordan. And the very Soviet-aligned Arab forces that had waged war against the ancient regime in Israel, the Ben-Gurion regime, would have covertly assisted People's Democratic Israel in this war against Jordan.** Later on, if the plots to undermine the Jordanian regime efforts against the new Israel would have succeeded, the new Mapamite state in Israel would have been stabilized in its position. A while later, these Soviet-aligned Arab states would have signed a friendship treaty with the new Israel. Such calculations based on dialectics and historical materialism are reinforced by the empirical evidence of the behaviour of the Syrian, Egyptian, and Lebanese leaders – all Soviet-aligned, violently opposed by the CIA, rightly supporting Arab armed struggle against the Israeli regime, and rightly opposed to an invasion against Israel. The Syrian leadership – and the Lebanese counterparts probably agreed – was favourable to a democratic peace with the Israelis but oppose to an Israeli supremacist or Zionist terror state:

Both Jamil Mardam Bey and Shukri al-Kuwatly had been closely following up on the Zionist affair since the Palestinian uprising of 1936. Back then, during a state visit to Paris, **Mardam Bey had met Chaim Weizman, head of the Zionist agency, in hopes of working out a peaceful solution to the crisis.** In discussing the Jewish affair Mardam Bey had conveyed a Syrian desire of achieving a solution that would please both parties. **To assure Weizman that war was not what the Syrian government wanted, he called for a Syrian-Jewish Conference in Damascus later that year.** Heading a delegation of the Zionist agency's most active figures, Weizman traveled to Syria to meet Shukri al-Kuwatly, Jamil Mardam Bey, and other politicians from the national movement. In Damascus, the Zionists made it clear that they would not cease their activities until the state of Israel was created. **Kuwatly declared that if the Zionist objective was to establish a home for themselves in Palestine, then they were welcome to live in harmony and peace with the local Arabs. However, if they were thinking of making of Palestine a Jewish home, then they would face immense Arab wrath and start a bitter hostility that would never end. (...).** Knowing perfectly well the inferiority of the Arab armies, **Kuwatly and Lebanese Prime Minister Riad al-Solh** summoned the Secretary General of the Arab League Abdul Rahman Azzam and asked him to refrain from advancing into Palestine. Under the impression that a fully organized Arab force could easily defeat a few Jewish fighters, Azzam was shocked to hear what both men were saying. **They added that they would be willing to provide the Palestinians with all possible arms and funds, but had reservations on involving their own forces in combat.** A head on collision with the Jews would only mean certain defeat for all the Arab forces. Running on popular demand and **assurances from King Farouk that the war could easily be won,** Azzam ignored their plea and continued in his diplomatic mission to enlist support for the Arab army. The ex-Mufti of Jerusalem, Amin al-Husayni, who had led an uprising against the Jews in 1936, began touring Syria and Lebanon to elevate public support for Palestine. The people needed little encouragement, they were already asking for a full-scale war with the Jews. Both Kuwatly and Solh were now facing a dilemma; refusing to participate would have meant isolation among political circles and alienation within the Arab community. Likewise, sending their troops would most probably mean military defeat, yet an elevated standing among the masses. Both leaders took the second alternative. (Damascus Between Democracy and Dictatorship, Sami M. Moubayed, 2000, pp. 1-2) (IMG)

The Egyptian Wafdist leader Noqrashi, a strategic ally of the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies, held similar opinions:

It is fair to mention here that the late King Abdul Aziz Al Saud and the late Noqrashi were not willing to enter the Arab armies into Palestine. Al-Naqrashi was of the opinion that Egypt could not enter the war while the English army was perched on the Suez Canal. But the late King Farouk responded to the heads of the Arab ministries who met him and convinced him that the matter is nothing more than a "military picnic." (The Memoirs of Mohammad Amin Al-Husseini, organized by: Abdel-Karim Al-Omar, 1999, pp. 392-393) (IMG)

Had a People's Democratic Israel been established, it was the failure to sign a friendship treaty with Israel that was going to be a stab in the back of the Arab nation because the new Israel was going to be friendly and favorable to the Arab people of Palestine. This is the reverse analogy of how the reactionary CIA-aligned Arab regimes established an official friendship with the CIA-aligned regime of Israel. On the other hand, the same Mapamite Palmach officials who sought to wreck the Israeli regime's military would have, upon assuming decisive control over the means of violence, sought to render the new Israel into a military superpower and rightly so. By contrast, the remnants of the Ben-Gurion faction in Israel, the agents of Ariel Sharon and Moshe Dayan, would have done everything they could to sabotage the military of the socialist-oriented Israel, so that the Anglo-American-backed faction would be re-installed back to power. Basically, the strategic realignment of Israel out of US orbit and onto an alliance with the USSR, would have completely reversed the situation.

Whereas the Arab war to overthrow of Israel's Kautskyite regime was progressive, a war to overthrow Israel as a country and society would have been reactionary. The Yiddish and Hebrew people who lived in Israel held a highly favorable towards the Soviet Union. They also had the collectively-owned agricultural enterprises that constituted important socialistic businesses competing against Anglo-American finance capital in Palestine; agricultural cooperatives are not just socialist cosmetics but materially entrench the anti-imperialist forces. The petit-bourgeoisie, concerned that they may lost their small business through confronting finance capital, do not risk revolutionary struggles; by contrast, when the petit-bourgeoisie unite into cooperatives, they come to have a socialistic version of a big business that can take risks and to compete with finance capital. Hence, the existence

of kibbutzim, however flawed and idealistic the kibbutz model was, contributed to the entrenchment of the socialist anti-imperialist tendency, one manifestation of which was the Palmach. There also existed a powerful revolutionary socialist movement in Israel, with pervasive influence over the military and intelligence bodies, a movement so powerful that it never missed a chance to cause serious trouble for the Zionist fascist aggression plots. Among the Arabs of Palestine, by contrast, there were not as many cooperatives, the USSR did not hold as high a soft power, and the socialist movement was not very strong. In this light, it is not difficult to see why the establishment of a socialistic Arab-friendly Israel assisting the Arabs of Palestine would have been a far better option than the Rejectionist concept of ending Israel not just as a regime but also as a country. The United States and Britain wanted the regime of Israel to survive, but if the regime of Israel was to be doomed to be destroyed, the Anglo-Americans would have undoubtedly preferred that the Glubb-commanded Hashemite Jordanian monarcho-fascists would conquer Israel and destroyed Israel as a country – including the pro-Soviet Yiddish and Hebrews, the Kibbutzim, not to mention the Palmach – so that the socialist forces would not establish a powerful base in the Mediterranean coastlines. Volumes of historical evidence prove this fact about Anglo-American objectives. The Soviets wanted the exact opposite of this, which was why their stance was described as 'pro-Israel but anti-Zionist'.

The kibbutzim were cooperatives, albeit a very idealistic left-deviationist version of the cooperatives. Nonetheless, the key positive aspect of the kibbutzim was that it amalgamated the individual farms into larger businesses that were communally-controlled and thus, unlike small businesses that cannot take much the risk of competing against imperialist finance capital, these collectively-owned bigger businesses were more capable of taking risks to compete against the presence of American finance capital in Israel. As a result, many of the kibbutzim emerged as social bases for assisting the proletariat in the combat against Israel's regime. To be sure, there were exceptions in this respect; just like in any kind of a farm, there existed anti-socialist elements in the kibbutzim. Some members of the kibbutzim stole Arab property, other kibbutzim began to function more so like corporations and less so like cooperatives, and still others were multiple private farms that were cooperatives in the name only. However, the point is that the general trend of collectively-controlled business reduced the influence of finance capital thus elevating the Mapam agents of the proletariat. The Palmach was an Israelite military force originating from the many pro-Soviet elements in the kibbutzim and was dominated by the Mapam officials. The Israeli victory in the 1948 War boosted Ben-Gurion's leverage, thereby allowing him to eliminate the Palmach and to reduce – but by no means wipe out – Mapam influence in the Israeli military. The Soviet objective with regards to Israel in the initial phase was the establishment of a Mapamite state in Israel, a government hostile to the Hashemite regime Jordan, friendly to the Arab population, and friendly to the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies.

In an intelligence report to the Soviet secret service, the Soviet spy Moshe Sneh confirmed that the Irgun Zvi Leumi (IZL) was secretly backed by Prime Minister Ben-Gurion:

When I asked which parties or political groups were showing an inclination to give ground, Sneh answered that at present there were three currents of thought in political circles: 1) the right wing of the Mapai Party and the representatives of the grande bourgeoisie, whose views were expressed in the government Rosenblueth, by Finance Minister Kaplan and the Minister of Justice and in the press by the newspaper Haaretz: These were all inclined to make territorial concessions in order to gain the agreement and support of the US and Britain; 2) **the extreme nationalists, revisionists and the IZL, secretly supported by Prime Minister Ben-Gurion**, who oppose concessions and are trying to reach an agreement with the US to obtain the annexation of part of the Arab territories of Palestine in order to hand them over later as concessions to American capital. Ben-Gurion's view is expressed in the press by the journalist Liebenstein [Livneh] in the newspaper Davar. 'What Liebenstein writes, Ben-Gurion thinks, or the other way round' said Sneh; 3) the United Workers' Party and the Communist Party of Israel are against any sort of concessions to, or compromises with, the US and Britain, but in favour of 'a just compromise' with the Arabs, and of the closest possible relations with the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies. (DIARY: AVP RF. F.089, OP.1, P.1. D3, LL.5-6, Secret, Meeting: P.I. Ershov – M. Sneh, Tel Aviv, October 9, 1948. In: "Documents on Israeli-Soviet Relations, 1941-1953, Parts 1-2", Israeli Foreign Ministry, Russian Foreign Ministry, Israel State Archives, Russian Federal Archives, p. 381) (IMG)

According to the laws of dialectics and historical materialism, it makes sense to state that Ben-Gurion would secretly support IZL. The Irgun or IZL was a terrorist army founded by Ze'ev Jabotinsky from the Italian Fascists' Betar Naval Academy. As the Jerusalem Post, itself a Jabotinskyite media, stated:

Mussolini even took part in the establishment of the future Jewish state's defense force, helping Zionist leader Ze'ev Jabotinsky establish the Betar Naval Academy officer training camp in Civitavecchia for Mandatory Palestine Jews – which would eventually become the Israel Navy more than a decade later.... ("Catholic Italy's 'Promised Land'", The Jerusalem Post, Benjamin Glatt, January 23, 2017) (IMG)

The Italian Fascists were in turn led by a gang of MI6 spies headed by the British intelligence agent Mussolini (see C5S1). Jabotinsky was well-known for his collaboration with the Polish regime and the Petlura gang, both of which were MI6 satellites. It is completely natural that David Ben-Gurion, an agent of the British and American intelligence services, would support the Irgun, an MI6-funded terror army, all the while pretending to be hostile to them. The opposition of Ben-Gurion to Menachem Begin was like the opposition of Obama to McCain.

The influence of the Mapamites and the Palmach, which drew from the Israelite working class and the economically powerful kibbutzim, as well as the generally high soft power influence of the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies among the Jews, all meant that it was possible for the progressive and socialist forces, the Arab-friendly Israelis, to take over the Israeli state some day and transition Israel towards a progressive Arab-friendly state, if not a socialist state. David Ben-Gurion's selection as the top candidate for Prime Minister by the Anglo-American intelligence services was obviously a part of the agenda of strengthening the Kautskyite forces as a means of undercutting the support base of the Mapamite socialist forces in Israel. The promotion of Ben-Gurion by the Anglo-Americans, therefore, was a part of the agenda of forming a Kautskyite dam against the tide in favor of socialism in Israel and an Israeli democratic peace with the Arabs. However, the agenda of the Anglo-Americans – secretly supported by Ben-Gurion as well – was to transition Israel towards a Pinochet-style politically totalitarian and economically neoliberal state, rather than a Kautskyite-type pro-fascist settler-colonial 'social democracy'. Such was why Ben-Gurion supported the Irgun. The job of the Kautskyite stay-behind agents is to take leadership of the cooperativists and the proletarians so to ensure the slow-down of these movements, giving time and room for breath to the fascists; the Ben-Gurion team was the Kautskyite team whereas the Jabotinskyite 'Revisionist Zionists' constituted the fascist movement.

Almost all of the other CIA-backed regimes outside of Western Europe and North America have been totalitarian regimes of the Pinochet type. Why has Israel been a top exception? Israel's regime, on behalf of finance capital, established an open terrorist dictatorship of the settler-colonial type over the Arabs such as in the West Bank, but Israel is not a fascist state the way that the Pinochet junta, the Pahlavi regime in Iran, the Hitler regime in

Germany were. Inside Israel proper, Israel has some of the standard bourgeois-democratic procedures and it is possible for one to be openly a dissident and condemn the regime. Why the Israeli exception?

Some hold the view that because Israel had many European (particularly, Ashkenazi) faces, the United States and Britain decided to allow for elections to happen in Israel so that Israel would be propagandistically hailed as 'the only democracy in the Middle East'. This perspective is incorrect. For start, the Anglo-Americans did not care much about playing the 'Israel is the only democracy in the Middle East' card because historically, the Anglo-American propaganda for painting fascist states as 'freedom states' has almost always sufficed. Furthermore, for an 'only democracy in the Middle East' propaganda card, they would have naturally leaned towards promoting Turkey, rather than Israel, as the best choice. Unlike Israel, Turkey had a Latinized de-Semitized alphabet. Unlike Israel, Turkey had a reputation for laicism. Unlike Israel, the Turkish population had not been educated with the communist opinions in the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies. Unlike in Israel, the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies did not have as much soft power influence among the Turks. Unlike Israel, Turkey could lay territorial claims to all of the Arab world and not just 'all of historic Palestine', and not just 'From the Nile to the Euphrates'. Hence, promoting Turkey would have been a better choice than Israel for the Anglo-Americans, insofar as the 'only democracy in the Middle East' card is concerned. Why then did the Anglo-Americans opt for 'allowing' parliamentary elections and some democratic procedures to exist in Israel but consistently established Pinochet-style fascist military dictatorships in Turkey? Why not elevate Turkey as the big propaganda card? The fact of Turkey being a predominantly Muslim country vs. Israel as a Jewish population cannot be a reason for this, for Turkey had a reputation for Europeanization, Westernization, de-Islamization, and laicism, whereas the European people and the North American people, with the long history of anti-Semitism in their countries, could just as easily be persuaded to continue to ethn-racially hate the Israeli Jewish civilian population all the while being also persuaded to hail Israel as the bastion of anti-Arabism.

Some would argue that the migration issue made it necessary for Israel to become democratic, for Israel needed it as a propaganda weapon through which to promote Zionist migration to a 'free society'. Incorrect. Actually, it has never been difficult for the CIA to portray the countries under its influence as free, democratic, and worthy of living in. Fascist Yugoslavia, which was presented as democratic, was migrated to by many of the dissidents of the Peoples' Democracies and these migrants themselves were placed in slave camps by the Yugoslav regime and tortured there. And certainly many of the Mizrahim moved to Israel not out of passion for democracy per se but rather for being ghettoized away from the CIA-MI6-sponsored terror operations and pogroms in the Arab countries. Propaganda about the Jewishness and safety from (CIA-MI6-sponsored) pogroms – rather than propaganda about democracy – was enough to get the Mizrahim there. The CIA could have dressed (and did dress) its agents as 'Communist-backed Arabs' and launched pogroms to encourage Ashkenazi migration to Israel. Through such terror operations, the socialist sympathies among the Ashkenazim could further decline and the 'de-Nazified' Europe would have been portrayed as no safer from Palestinian revanchism than Israel. In sum, terror operations against Jews as a propaganda weapon for migration sufficed and there was no fundamental need for having democracy as a propaganda card, although of course democracy would have been a bonus for the propaganda.

One argument is that the migrations to Israel required a high freedom of travel for the Jews which in turn necessitated a free flow of information. The free flow of information, the argument goes, yielded a more informed citizenry that opposed democracy. The argument is wrong because knowledge about Jews and 'Jews' of other cultures and countries has little intellectual connection to fascism vs. democracy and cannot make a significant impact as to make the citizenry so much more informed that they would become a mighty force to oppose fascism.

Rather, the reason why the Anglo-Americans 'allowed' Israel to have some real democratic procedures was that the Anglo-Americans were forced to accept these democratic procedures. Anti-imperialist Arab armed struggle against the Israeli regime's military and intelligence apparatus – not to be confused with the Arab revanchist terror attacks targeting the civilians – rolled back the pro-fascist faction, the dominant faction, in the Israeli armed forces, thereby reducing the lobbying power of such a faction, while increasing the relative lobbying power and the operational room of the Mapam infiltrators in the ranks of the Israeli armed forces. The Mapam intelligence agents of the socialist forces and the representatives of the Israeli proletariat and the kibbutzim, blocked the agents of the Anglo-American finance capital from being able to transition Israel towards becoming a typical CIA-MI6 puppet dictatorship, and strengthened the political influence of the proletariat and the kibbutzim through entrenching the democratic procedures. Had the persistent anti-imperialist Arab armed struggle against the Israeli regime and in favor of the Mapam agents of the Israeli proletariat and kibbutzim not happened, Israel would have become Jewish version of the Saudi regime or later on, a Jewish version of the Pinochet junta. That is what a Kautskyite democratic state is, after all – a kind of a dictatorship of the fascist financial bourgeoisie that has been forced to accept the incorporation of elements of the dictatorship of the proletariat through the forced acceptance of democratic procedures. In addition, the role of the kibbutzim which were largely affiliated with the Hashomer Hatzair or the Mapam should not be underestimated. Israel initially did not have a large proletariat; the collectively-controlled agricultural big businesses, the kibbutzim, competed against the presence of the front companies of Anglo-American finance capital in Israel, and thus reduced the strength of the parasitic class forces dominating that area, while increasing the leverage of the Mapam-Palmachnik agents of the proletariat in the state apparatus of Israel. This is to be contrasted with the agriculture of the countries devoid of a strong predominance of the cooperative mode of agriculture; in those countries, the peasants had small farms, and thus could not risk losing their small farms through such risky action as competing against the businesses controlled by American finance capital; this facilitated the installation of CIA-backed comprador tyrannical regimes. To summarize, the keys to the exception in Israel were the Arab armed struggle and the kibbutzim, both of which reinforced the influence of the proletariat over the Israeli state. There existed a correlation between how authoritarian an Israeli politician was, how hostile to the kibbutzim he/she was, and how anti-Arab he/she was. The limited space here does not provide room for an in-depth explanation of this but let it be known that the history of Israel proves that there existed a strong positive correlation between (1) Arab anti-imperialist military successes and (2) the political strength of the kibbutzim. By contrast, the reason why America and Britain, two countries that never faced a direct anti-imperialist armed struggle inside their mainland/heartland territories, became democracies was that unlike Israel, America and Britain had a very large proletarian class. The working class in these countries was so large that it could impose democracy in them. Germany's proletariat was mostly concentrated in Prussia whereas the rest of Germany was mostly agrarian, and thus the proletariat was not so populous as to impose democracy upon the rising totalitarian state.

The Mapam leaders analyzed that the Ben-Gurion regime was plotting an alliance with the Irgun terrorists in order to transition Israel from a Kautskyite terrorist state to a fascist state more in line with Anglo-American interests and engaged in combat against the Soviet Union and the Peoples' Democracies. Ze'ev Tzahor – a prominent aide to Ben-Gurion, researcher on Mapam and the biographer of Ya'akov Hazan – wrote:

The explanation for the role of the underground is derived from the assumption that Ben-Gurion promised the Western powers military assistance during the impending World War. To confirm this assumption, they analyze Ben-Gurion's leadership and ideological past, in order to determine its future trends. Thus, for example, it was determined that Ben-Gurion decided on the dissolution of the Palmach

even before the establishment of the state. Ben-Gurion was compared to Jabotinsky – both only pretended to be fighters against the British while they were really 'Anglophiles'. Ben-Gurion, who had always admired the British, formed a conspiracy with them, based off of which he gave up the conquest of the land [and handed Israel to the Anglo-Americans]. Its goal is to allow Britain to control Jordan and get through it and through Iraq to the soft underbelly of the Soviet Union. It was further determined that there is a written promise by Ben-Gurion to establish British and American military bases, which will turn the State of Israel into a logistical base of attack against the Soviet Union. The discussion included tenure, that Ben-Gurion wants to harm the kibbutz movement and strike a wedge inside the Mapam. A man devoid of such moral inhibitions could forge an alliance with the fascist Right led by Begin and turn the country into an arm of the West in the Middle East. (Hazan: Movement of Life, Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi Institute, Ze'ev Tzahor, 1997, p. 198) (IMG)

The Mapam, which already had a powerful intelligence network in the command of the Israeli armed forces, began to prepare for a 'stay-behind' network that would wage armed resistance against the fascist regime of Israel should Israel transition from a Kautskyite state to a fascist state. The armed resistance was to take the form probably of a democratic restorationist counter-coup by the communist generals against the fascist coup, or Israel-wide guerrilla resistance against the regime:

In 1950, Mapam's secret cells operated in the security service, the military administration, the Ministry of Defense and the army. It must be said in advance that the matter of the Mapam Underground in the security system is extremely sensitive. Documentation about it is limited, and most of it is not available to the researcher. (...). Despite the caution and destruction of the evidence, records remain that deal with explaining the need to establish secret cells within the military. They mention two completely different missions: one, which was apparently outlined by Hazan, assumes the possibility that the Right, led by Menachem Begin, will take over the country by force and establish a fascist regime. In such a case, the cells are meant to gather early information to thwart the takeover, or to prepare for an underground struggle, if what has been defined as a 'fascist right-wing plot' succeeds. A completely different task is the one outlined apparently by Sneh, according to which, the cells must prepare for the possibility of war between the 'War-Mongering' West and the socialist 'World of Tomorrow'. An unsigned summary of a discussion in one of the cells indicates a revolutionary underground that will operate in the IDF and actively participate in the "imminent World War." (Hazan: Movement of Life, Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi Institute, Ze'ev Tzahor, 1997, pp. 197-198) (IMG)

It is of interest to compare the main theme of the Mapam's internal discussions with Yitzhak Rabin's last speech in 1995. The Mapam harbored the thesis that a CIA-backed coup would transition Israel from a bourgeois-democracy into a Jabotinskyite fascist state. Comparably, Rabin, in his last speech, warned that right-wing extremist violence was posing a serious threat to the democratic tendency in Israel. Rabin said: "Violence is undermining the very foundations of Israeli democracy. It must be condemned, denounced and isolated. This is not the way of the State of Israel [ideally]. Controversies may arise in a democracy but the decision must be reached through democratic elections as happened in 1992 when we were given the mandate to do what we are doing and to continue to do so." Rabin could see what was coming. Within 24 hours, as Rabin predicted, the CIA and its Shin Bet mercenaries initiated the hybrid coup in Israel, first killing Israel's elected Prime Minister and then going on a hunt to purge off the Mapam agents in the high ranks of the security apparatus of Israel. A fascist state, in the sense of a Pinochet-type junta, was not established, but the fascist forces did gain strength. The Kautskyite group of Shimon Peres then intentionally lost the election and handed the government over to Netanyahu, back then a Jabotinskyite puppet of the CIA's most favored man in Israel at the time, Ariel Sharon.

Anyways, let us return to the 1950s. The plan outlined by Moshe Sneh was that the Mapam operatives in the high ranks of the IDF would utilize their positions to stab the fascist efforts in the back and to sabotage the Israeli regime's war efforts against the USSR and its allies. It is worth reminding that the Mapam-affiliated generals in the IDF had already engaged in such activities, the most remarkable of which was the Altalena Affair during Israel's war against Soviet allies Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon.

Yet, not only was the Mapam to have such cadres in the IDF for the purpose of backstabbing the IDF's war on the Soviet Union, the Mapam leaders called on their comrades to prepare for the stay-behind guerrilla warfare against the Ben-Gurion regime on the side of the Red Army and its allies in the Middle East:

In 1949, Aharon Cohen, one of the prominent ideologues of the Kibbutz HaArtzi, demanded that they prepare in advance and prepare tools to help the Red Army, which was preparing to occupy the Middle East. The feature leading up to the Great War, which would also be the fulfillment of the 'Class War', spread in various and broad directions, including military preparations in advance against the possibility that Ben-Gurion, in alliance with the Right, would help the enemies of the Soviet Union. Against this background, Hazan dramatically announced from the Knesset podium: 'Here in Eretz Yisrael there lives - as long as we live - a force that will in its lifetime not allow our country to serve as a launching pad for war against the Soviet Union.' (Hazan: Movement of Life, Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi Institute, Ze'ev Tzahor, 1997, p. 199) (IMG)

One of the major IDF figures and Mapam agents to lead the Soviet Union's shadow war for the liberation of Israel from Anglo-American imperialism and the Mapai-Irgun alliance was Yisrael Bar, alternatively known as 'Israel Bar', 'Yisrael Beer', or 'Israel Beer'. Whereas mainstream historiography aims to credit the recruitment of Yisrael Bar to Khrushchev-era KGB in 1956, in actuality the recruitment of Yisrael Bar by the Soviet intelligence went back to long before 1956. Yisrael Bar was an intelligence agent of the USSR since during the Stalin era. Michael Bar-Zohar – an advisor to Moshe Dayan, a Ben-Gurion faction agent, a former Israeli Defense Ministry spokesman – admitted that Yisrael Bar had been a spy for the Soviet intelligence service in fact since long before the Great Patriotic War:

Beer's arrest was not made public. On the bulletin board of the University of Tel Aviv was merely a notice that "Dr. Israel Beer's courses will not meet until further notice." His interrogation began in absolute secrecy.

Iser Harel was now convinced that Beer was a Soviet agent who had been installed in Israel over twenty years ago. Iser's case rested on the fact that Beer had fought in the International Brigade during the Spanish Civil War. Only a few officers of that brigade were still alive, the majority having either died during the war or been liquidated in Moscow or elsewhere on Stalin's orders. The few survivors had become faithful servants of the U.S.S.R., and before World War II several had been sent as spies into the West or, like Beer, into Palestine.

(Spies in the Promised Land: Iser Harel and the Israeli Secret Service, Michael Bar-Zohar, 1972, p. 205) (IMG)

Some may question the credibility of the allegation of intelligence activity for the USSR by Yisrael Bar; but is there a point in questioning such a matter? That Yisrael Bar was a top Mapam military man and a Mapam intelligence agent is no secret, nor is it controvertible that the Mapam was not

just a Party but also an intelligence organization in Israel, providing top secret intelligence materials to the USSR on all the different aspects of the region. I see very little reason to question the Shin Bet's and Mossad's allegation that Yisrael Bar was a Soviet spy.

The Soviet spy Yisrael Bar was promoted to the high ranks of the Israeli state apparatus by the Mapam:

it was the leaders of Mapam who had "discovered" Beer, linked him to their party, and opened the way for him to the top. (Spies in the Promised Land: Iser Harel and the Israeli Secret Service, Michael Bar-Zohar, 1972, p. 209) (IMG)

The emergence of an Israeli working class base gave rise to the intelligence penetration of the progressive forces in the Israeli military, the foremost among them the organizational predecessors of the Mapam – Moshe Sneh's network among the General Zionists, the Hashomer Hatzair, the forces that made up the Achudt Haavoda, etc. Since the Mapam had a significantly high level of influence in the IDF, with Galili in the top ranks of the Haganah and Palmach as a top Israeli military, Yisrael Bar found it easy to rise upwards in the ranks of the Haganah. The Shin Bet, Israel's FBI equivalent reported:

Bar's publication of articles on military subjects led to his acceptance in 1940 as a permanent member of the "Hagana". There, he took part in training and in planning until the outbreak of the War of Independence. With the establishment of the IDF he was appointed as one of the two assistants to the head of the Operations Division and the Deputy Chief of the General Staff as well as serving as head of the Planning Division for the Operations Division, at the rank of lieutenant colonel. ('Yisrael Bar (1961)', Shabak/Shin-Bet) (IMG)

Again, as mentioned previously, the military victory of Israel's terror regime over the Arabs in the 1948 War gave greater leverage to the Ben-Gurion faction in Israel thus reducing the leverage of the Mapam. This factor was key in causing the demotion of the communist Mapamite generals in the Israeli military. Naturally, Yisrael Bar was among the demoted. His demotion, however, did not stop his intelligence activities. The Shin Bet stated:

He requested discharge from the IDF in 1949, because of his failure to be promoted to a new position in the Operations Division in direct subordination to the Chief of the General Staff of the Israel Defense Forces. He bitterly claimed that he was not promoted because his credibility was in question because of his connection with an opposition party, "Mapam". Bar was formally discharged after a leave of absence in July 1950. ('Yisrael Bar (1961)', Shabak/Shin-Bet) (IMG)

Since the ouster of Yisrael Bar from the IDF, the Mapamite general continued his active role in the Mapam's intelligence service. The Mapam had a Military Committee which in turn had an internal committee led by Baruch Rabinov, the Mapam's security chief:

Mapam's official Military Committee was composed of impressive names: Yitzhak Sadeh, Yisrael Bar, Eliyahu Cohen Ben-Hur, Yigal Allon, Moshe Carmel, Shimon Avidan. The Committee was concentrated on Baruch Rabinov. His choice stemmed from his being less known to the public, and mainly due to his absolute loyalty to the movement and its leaders. It was agreed by the recognized security personnel that most of the Committee's action would be done without them, and perhaps even without their knowledge. The lists in our possession show that the plenum of the Committee was seldom convened. The place of the official Security Committee was taken by an internal committee. We know that it had five members, headed by Rabinov, and that among the official Committee only Yisrael Bar was included. (Hazan: Movement of Life, Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi Institute, Ze'ev Tzahor, 1997, p. 201) (IMG)

Indeed, so critical was Yisrael Bar's role that he was both in the Military Committee – which included Yigal Allon (and his protégé Yitzhak Rabin, not mentioned above) – and the internal committee of the Military Committee. The Shin Bet too stated:

Bar was politically active in "Mapam" during his service in the IDF. After his resignation from the IDF he began work in Mapam, as head of its security department. In this position he obtained military intelligence information about the IDF in order to keep party officials, who were in the opposition, informed, and was closely connected with the party's information department which was gathering political non-military intelligence.

During his "Mapam" activity Yisrael Bar was closely associated with [Soviet spy] Moshe Sneh, the leader of the "Left Socialists", a group that identified completely with the USSR, and supported them blindly, even during the Prague Trials and the Moscow Doctors' Plot during the years 1952-1953.

('Yisrael Bar (1961)', Shabak/Shin-Bet) (IMG)

Yigal Allon was an intelligence agent of Yisrael Bar, and Yisrael Bar was a spy for the Soviet Union. According to the Shin Bet, Yisrael Bar also had close ties to Moshe Sneh and belonged to his faction. Yisrael Bar was led in turn by Baruch Rabinov, the Mapam's security chief:

Some of the heroes of the War of Independence, who felt that they had fallen into disgrace from the Army, turned to the [Mapam] Party's leadership and offered their services. It was all for the purpose of making the move to prepare a revolutionary alternative, relying upon on the senior IDF officers who were forced to retire from the very body they had set up and headed to war. Their previous status in the military allowed them to expand the base and secretly, of course, actively serve as officers.

(...). Another source that indicates the activity of the secret cells is a document file by Baruch Rabinov, who was then head of the Security Committee of the Kibbutz Haartzi.

Baruch Rabinov, a member of Beit Alfa, one of the leaders of the Haganah and one of the senior members of the Ministry of Defense at the time of its establishment, is the one who links the issue to Hazan. Rabinov was in the first circle of Hazan's associates, and in matters of security he was his secret man. The relationship between them went beyond the loyalty of the movement's activist to its leader, and developed into a personal and family friendship. In the vicinity of the Palmach Convention [against Ben-Gurion faction's dismantlement of the Palmach], Rabinov was also "fired" from the defense establishment. After many years of activity in senior positions in the security fields in the locality, Beit Alfa expected him to return home. Hazan turned to his kibbutz and asked Rabinov to approve the continuation of the activity. He was called to coordinate the Party's Security Committee. Hazan did not have to ask for much; the members hinted that there were compelling reasons forcing them to give up the principle of rotation [of positions] in this case. The position assigned to Rabinov was not an ordinary movement activity and it [was] advisable not to [expose it to too many members or] talk about it much.

(Hazan: Movement of Life, Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi Institute, Ze'ev Tzahor, 1997, p. 197) (IMG)

Another noteworthy member of the Mapam's Military Committee, noted by Tzahor, was Shimon Avidan. Avidan was a Yiddish-German and Israeli socialist fighter whose name is not so widely known, despite his major contributions to the proletariat's struggle. Like Yisrael Bar, he had been a veteran of the Spanish Civil War and thus inevitably came into contact with NKVD intelligence agents. After the Spanish Civil War, he came to Israel and, as mentioned in C16S7, led the Palmach troops in the war to liquidate the Irgun, during 'the Season'. Subsequent to the campaign of semi-liquidating the Irgun, Shimon Avidan became the commander of the famous Givati Brigade. As a result of the Ben-Gurion faction's military victories in the war against the Syrian and Egyptian armed forces, the Ben-Gurion faction was able to expand its share of power at home, at the expense of the Mapam-Palmach faction. Avidan lost his position due to 'his extreme left-wing philosophy ... irreconcilable with Ben-Gurion's policies', recalled

Chaim Herzog, the Kautskyite IDF commander who later became the President of Israel and who fathered Israel's current Kautskyite President Yitzhak Herzog. In his memoirs, Chaim Herzog recalled:

The second Israeli brigade was the 'Givati' Brigade, which was unusually large by Israeli standards and consisted of five battalions, totalling over 3,000 men. This had no heavy equipment at its disposal and was responsible for the defence of the southern part of the country immediately north of the Negev Desert (in other words, the area immediately north of the road from Majdal or Ashkelon to Beit Jibrin). It was commanded by one of the more impressive Jewish commanders in the War of Independence, Colonel Shimon Avidan. A native of Germany who had moved to Kibbutz Ein Hashofet in Palestine, he had volunteered for, and served in, the International Brigade during the Spanish Civil War. A slight, fair-haired, determined man, with a toothbrush-like moustache, he was a natural leader. After the war, in which he distinguished himself as an outstanding commander, he was to resign from the Army because his extreme left-wing philosophy proved to be irreconcilable with Ben-Gurion's policies. (The Arab-Israeli Wars: War and Peace in the Middle East, Chaim Herzog, Shlomo Gazit, 1982, pp. 69-70) (IMG)

His role in the Spanish Civil War and his association with Yisrael Bar and the Mapam Military Committee were indications of his possible direct ties to Soviet intelligence. By the mid-1970s, when Yitzhak Rabin and Yigal Allon became the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Israel respectively, Avidan saw a rise in his political influence and gained a high-ranking position in the Ministry of Defense.

As mentioned before, the Mapam utilized its pervasive intelligence presence in Israel as a Soviet intelligence network as well. Note that the Soviet intelligence station in Tel Aviv had reported to Moscow, in reference to the Mapam, that:

they [i.e. Mapam] offer comprehensive information [to us] about Israel and the Arab countries.

(DIARY: AVP RF, F.089, OP.1, P.1, D.3, LL.21-3, Meeting: P.I. Ershov – Y. Riftin and L. Levite, Tel Aviv, September 23, 1948. In: "Documents on Israeli-Soviet Relations, 1941-1953, Parts 1-2", Israeli Foreign Ministry, Russian Foreign Ministry, Israel State Archives, Russian Federal Archives, pp. 363-365) (IMG)

The activities of the Mapam's Military Committee were pervasive and were concerned with all aspects of military operations. **Underground weapons caches were to be set up by the Mapam for the purpose of an Israeli revolutionary war against the Mapai-Irgun regime for tackling the scenario of a World War or a transition to fascist statehood.** At least one large transmitter was also set up. Tens of high-ranking IDF officials worked for the Mapam and plans were made regarding the promotions of the generals, the lobbying and the deployment of agents into key positions in the command. Referring to the activities of the Mapam's Military Committee and the latter's internal committee, Tzahor wrote:

It is also possible to learn from the remaining records that the political authority with which they consulted was Hazan. Ran Golan, from Mishmar HaEmek, who compiled lists that upload a kind of group photo of the kibbutz veterans, to explain how from time to time, in the late hours of the night, a senior officer is seen climbing the path leading to Hazan's room. In the secret room in the kibbutz, Ran Golan describes, they talk about issues that are not sensitive to them, that can not be talked about in the Knesset, certainly not over the phone. From time to time, wider meetings were held, two or three officers, Baruch Rabinov and Hazan. Some of the meetings of the internal, limited Committee were held in Mishmar HaEmek. The official, expanding Committee was not involved in the operative issues. It set out the principles of operation, although sometimes operational issues were brought before it. Thus, for example, at its meeting on May 9, 1950, it approved a comprehensive emergency preparedness. A torn page, which is part of the summary, remains in our hands. It can be read as follows:

1. Each farm must carefully separate the weapon that was invented for it by the Haganah and the IDF, and it is in the registration of the IDF armament service, and the weapon that was purchased by the farm directly and is not in the above [IDF/Haganah] registration.
2. The second type of weapon, which is not in the IDF records, must be stored in a special hiding place in accordance with the cache arrangements, with all the provisions of the secrets contained therein.... The subject matter and the location of the hiding place cannot be known to more than three people.

A 'large transmitter' was hidden in one of the kibbutzim.

At other meetings, information was provided on the activities of the 'party cells in each unit', on a plan to return one hundred officers to the regular army at the party's initiative, and on 'pushing young recruits into positions'. No less than ninety officers in the regular army worked in the secret activities of Mapam cells in the IDF. The lists were marked as top secret. Most were destroyed of course. The information passed on to the members was general, usually without names. The information passed on to the members was general, usually without names. Baruch Rabinov allowed himself to be praised in an anonymous description of the roles held by the secret partners:

1 Commander-in-Chief, 2 Chiefs of Staff, 2 Command Operation Officers, 3 Brigades, 2 Lieutenants, 1 District Commander, 5 Deputy District Commanders, 1 Corps Commander, 2 senior Navy officers, 6 in the Air Force, 7-10 in the General Staff, 6 instructors in the battalion commander course, 20 trainees [in a battalion commander course?] [previous square brackets by Tzahor].

Of the names mentioned in the various lists, 11 are expected to reach the rank of Alufs and above.

(Hazan: Movement of Life, Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi Institute, Ze'ev Tzahor, 1997, pp. 199-200) (IMG)

Note that the term 'Aluf' literally means 'Hero', is rooted in the word 'Thousand', and can be regarded as an Israeli equivalent of Major-General. The IDF Chiefs of Staff as well as some Mossad Directors were ranked as 'Aluf'. And there were indeed two Mossad Directors – Yitzhak Hofi and Nahum Admoni – and several IDF Chiefs of Staff all operating as agents of the Mapam. The Mapam also had agents in of the ranks of the right-wing parties:

In 1950, Mapam's secret cells operated in the security service, the military administration, the Ministry of Defense and the army. (...). Some of the cell members later made an impressive security career. Of those, there were generals, ambassadors and Members of the Knesset who were not necessarily [officially affiliated with the] Mapam. One of them was a minister in a right-wing party. This is based on several sources. (Hazan: Movement of Life, Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi Institute, Ze'ev Tzahor, 1997, p. 197) (IMG)

The secret weapons caches for an armed revolt were to be stored in at least 50 kibbutzim:

The latter include testimonies from members of kibbutzim, who were asked to prepare a weapons depot parallel to the official warehouse, recognized and registered by the authorities. According to them, a secret weapons depot has been prepared in at least fifty kibbutzim. (Hazan: Movement of Life, Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi Institute, Ze'ev Tzahor, 1997, p. 197) (IMG)

So securely hidden were some of these weapons caches that they are still in the process of being discovered. An example is a weapons cache that was discovered in 2014. In the Kibbutz Mesilot, affiliated with the Hashomer Hatzair, there existed a hiding place for the weapons that was believed to have been established after the 1948 War – that is after March 1949, most likely in 1950. The Ha'aretz reported:

An old weapons cache containing dozens of rifles was uncovered at Kibbutz Mesilot in the Beit She'an Valley Monday, during excavation for the construction of a new classroom in the local school.

The rifles were found wrapped up in wax paper, outside the kibbutz fence. Kibbutz members said the police had been informed and a police sapper would be dealing with the find.

The man who hid the rifles, Ephraim Neubart, passed away and no one knows when he hid them. Neubart's son, Gadi, told Haaretz that no one knew about the cache except two other members, who used to be the kibbutz metal workers.

"We knew more or less where the 'slik' was, Neubart said, using the slang word for such weapons caches, best known for the role they played in the 1948 War of Independence. But Neubart's assumption about the date of the cache is surprising – he believes his father and his confidants hid the weapons after the state was established, and not during the war.

"My father took his secret to the grave with him and was never willing to reveal where the 'slik' was," he said.

(‘British Mandate-era Arms Cache Found Under Israeli Kibbutz’, Ha'aretz, Eli Ashkenazi, January 28, 2014) (IMG)

Some of these weapons may have been stolen from the IDF itself:

It is possible that in rare cases, weapons were taken from IDF warehouses and stored in hiding places; it is conceivable that maps and information were collected, and that the early stages of the practical preparations for the outbreak of world war also began. The only operative plans dealt with a response to the possibility that the Revisionist [i.e. Jabotinskyite] Right would take power by force over the state. (Hazan: Movement of Life, Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi Institute, Ze'ev Tzahor, 1997, pp. 199-201) (IMG)

The cells established by the Mapam Military Committee propagated among the army officers, educating them about communist ideas and/or Hashomer Hatzair 'Socialist Zionist' ideas, and instructed them on methods of sabotage:

Little is known about cell activity. From the remaining descriptions one can learn about the influence of the literature of the Russian Revolution on the way the cells were constructed and the method of their operation. The cells were secluded, gathering in secret places outside the base, usually in a nearby kibbutz or in the private home of one of their friends. The cell was egalitarian, with no regard for ranks, and meetings were held without uniforms. They were attended by soldiers in regular service and permanent officers. The management of the cell was entrusted to a secretary, elected by the cell. Sometimes the military rank of the cell secretary was lower than that of the other members. The main function of the cell was to secretly infuse the spirit of the revolution into the tents of the army, and to wait for the day of command. In the cell the unit problems were also discussed, including promotions and roles.

Recruitment to the cell is done in the best underground tradition. A man who was then a cadet in an officers' course says that one day he was secretly approached by a cadet from his friends and invited him to a secret meeting of cadets from his course in a private apartment in Netanya. Yisrael Bar attended the meeting, which convinced them to participate in the cell. The meetings were held once every two weeks, on an evening assigned to After Duty. There were guest lectures, and mostly internal discussions. Thus, for example, the question was discussed, what should the soldier do if he is required to unload a weapon ship intended for the army in the port of Haifa - to attach the weapon to the sea, or whether the needs of the army require him to receive weapons from any source, even American. Apparently, the activity in the cells did not deviate from their social formation, and the ideological and theoretical discussion was emphasized in it. (Hazan: Movement of Life, Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi Institute, Ze'ev Tzahor, 1997, pp. 199-201) (IMG)

In the Shin Bet and the Mossad, Mapamite intelligence networks were woven:

The expansion of the secret cell network could have led to their exposure. Indeed, the bustling activity did not go unnoticed by Isser Harel, especially the one that was woven in his immediate environment. He himself [unintentionally/unwillingly] added to the security service a concentrated group of about thirty Palmach men, led by Gershon Rabinowitz of Ruhama. In the television program "Such a Life" dedicated to the cantor, Isser Harel told about "Mapam's underground, an underground within government ministries, within my organization, within the security service." (Hazan: Movement of Life, Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi Institute, Ze'ev Tzahor, 1997, pp. 199-201) (IMG)

Ben-Gurion himself had expressed serious concern about this matter. In a conversation with US intelligence representative in Israel, Prime Minister Ben-Gurion remarked:

"... in [the] event world conflict ... Mapam could possibly cause embarrassment...". (784A.13/7-3150: Telegram, The Ambassador in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State, Top Secret, Priority, Tel Aviv, July 31, 1950. In: Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol. 5, United States Department of State, pp. 960-961. Note: many US diplomatic documents are written deliberately in an abbreviated or note form as means of making the document brief.) (IMG)



A photo of one of the Mapam arms caches in Israel. The communist loyalist members of the Mapam decided to take the secret of such arms caches with them to the grave and only six decades later were these arms caches discovered. Source of Image: ('British Mandate-era Arms Cache Found Under Israeli Kibbutz', Ha'aretz, Eli Ashkenazi, January 28, 2014. Credit for photos: Israel Police Spokesperson). (IMG)

According to Tzahor, citing the testimonies of people he contacted, Moshe Sneh had established a network of cells made up of handpicked communist and progressive loyalists that would have taken secrets with them to the grave rather than reveal their weapons caches:

Later testimonies relate to the activity that took place in the cells of another leader, Moshe Sneh. Hazan treated with suspicion the brilliant Doctor, who had just replaced stormy Zionist activism with equally stormy revolutionary activism. Sneh's attempt to bypass the 'historical leadership' and build a direct channel of dialogue with the young people of the 'national kibbutz' by virtue of his charisma provoked unrest. Sneh, who wanted to cultivate his relations with the young people of the 'Kibbutz HaArtzi' without provoking the anger of the leadership, preferred that his connection to the cells not be known to Hazan. Sneh's connection to the cells was thus limited to a small and determined part of them, and kept a secret within a secret. In the distance of time it is not possible to determine with certainty the method of activity of the two in the cells and their personal part in their management. There is room for speculation, whose role was limited to shaping the ideological framework of the organization. (Hazan: Movement of Life, Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi Institute, Ze'ev Tzahor, 1997, p. 198) (IMG)

As can be seen, there existed a powerful communist resistance network in Israel. Such a communist resistance intelligence network was able to grow and become a force to be reckoned with, lest we forget, thanks first and foremost to the strong presence of the kibbutzim in the Israeli economy in the alliance with the proletariat as well as the high soft power influence of socialism among the Ashkenazim. The Palmach arose out of the kibbutzim although it was commanded by the Achdut Haavoda operatives based in the urban proletarians. The kibbutzim and the proletarians frequently fought for expelling the United States from Israel.

There were other Mapam-affiliated Soviet spies in the high ranks of the Israeli state apparatus. One of them allegedly was 'Wolf Goldstein'. Since the Yiddish migrants to Israel often changed their names to Hebrew names, his name changed to 'Ze'ev Avni'. Avni's case is covered by a fog of Mossad-sponsored sensationalism. Nonetheless, it was said that Ze'ev Avni had been a communist spy of the Soviet intelligence service since 1943, that he had migrated to Israel and linked up with the Mapam, and that he had thereupon been catapulted to the high ranks of the Mossad while actually continuing his service to the Soviet secret service. Christopher Andrew, the official historian of the MI5, wrote:

Potentially the most important KGB agent during Israel's first decade was Ze'ev Avni, born Wolf Goldstein, a multilingual economist and ardent Communist who had spent the Second World War in Switzerland where in 1943 he had been recruited by the GRU. Avni was a committed ideological agent. 'There was no doubt in my mind', he wrote later, 'that I belonged not only to the vanguard of the revolution, but to its very élite.' In 1948 he emigrated to Israel, joined a kibbutz and contacted the Soviet embassy to try to renew his links with the GRU. He was disappointed to receive a lukewarm, non-committal welcome - possibly because of his lack of security at the kibbutz, where he had made no secret of his Communist convictions and told a senior Mapam member that he would be happy to help the Party establish 'a direct link to Moscow'. In 1950 Avni entered the Israeli Foreign Ministry, where he behaved with much greater discretion. A later security enquiry 'had no difficulty finding people who had known Avni as a militant Communist' at his kibbutz but found 'practically universal admiration' for him among his fellow diplomats, who were entirely unaware that his real loyalty was to the Soviet Union.

In 1952 Avni had his first foreign posting as Israeli commercial attaché in Brussels, where he was also appointed security officer and given the keys to the legation's only safe, in which classified documents were kept. Having successfully renewed contact with the GRU, he began photographing the contents of the safe. After his arrest four years later, he admitted to his interrogator, 'I gave them everything I had.' Remarkably, Avni's enthusiasm for the Soviet Union survived even the paranoia of the 'Jewish doctors' plot'. He later told his interrogator that Stalin had been a 'genius' and initially refused to believe that Khrushchev's 'Secret Speech' of 1956 denouncing Stalin was genuine.

(The Mitrokhin Archive II: The KGB in the World, Christopher Andrew, 2005, p. 193) (IMG)

On behalf of the Mossad, Avni was to establish contacts with the West German Nazis (i.e. Gehlen agents) and the regime of the Gestapo agent Tito:

While in Brussels, Avni also began to be employed by Mossad, using his fluent German to pose as a German businessman and make contact with former Nazis. Late in 1953, Avni was offered both a full-time position in Mossad and the post of commercial attaché in Belgrade and Athens. It was agreed that during his next posting he would combine espionage for Mossad with work as commercial attaché, based chiefly in Belgrade, and thereafter move to a permanent position in Mossad. Once in Belgrade, Avni was assigned a new controller operating under diplomatic cover as first secretary at the Soviet embassy. (The Mitrokhin Archive II: The KGB in the World, Christopher Andrew, 2005, p. 193) (IMG)

According to Christopher Andrew,:

In 1955-56 Avni supplied the KGB residency in Belgrade with the ciphers used by Mossad for communications with its Belgrade and Athens stations (probably enabling them to be decrypted), as well as details of Mossad personnel (probably both officers and agents) in France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Switzerland and Yugoslavia. As in Brussels, he gave his controller 'everything I had'. Avni was caught early in 1956 and sentenced to fourteen years' imprisonment. (The Mitrokhin Archive II: The KGB in the World, Christopher Andrew, 2005, p. 194) (IMG)

However,:

Avni was caught early in 1956 and sentenced to fourteen years' imprisonment. (The Mitrokhin Archive II: The KGB in the World, Christopher Andrew, 2005, p. 194) (IMG)

The precise date of Avni's arrest was in April, only one month after the 20th CPSU Congress. The 20th CPSU Congress was the Party Congress in which the Great Purge was denounced as 'criminal' and the Soviet intelligence service was condemned as the 'Stalinist' body responsible for such 'crimes'. A course of 'de-Stalinizing' the Soviet intelligence service began. 'De-Stalinizing' the Soviet intelligence service really meant destroying the Soviet intelligence service, elevating MI6 operatives at its high ranks, and most importantly for Avni's case, eliminating the agents of the Stalin faction in the Soviet intelligence. One of those Stalin faction loyalists reportedly was Avni:

Avni ... told his interrogator that Stalin had been a 'genius' and initially refused to believe that Khrushchev's 'Secret Speech' of 1956 denouncing Stalin was genuine. (The Mitrokhin Archive II: The KGB in the World, Christopher Andrew, 2005, p. 193) (IMG)

The 'De-Stalinization' of the Israel branch of the Soviet intelligence service seems to have come about in the form of the betrayal of Avni to the Shin-Bet chief, Isser Harel. 1956 was also the year in which the 'Cambridge Five', who were described as the Stalin-era Soviet spies in the high ranks of the MI6, were publicly exposed.

Levi Levi, an alleged Soviet spy in Israel, was captured in 1957:

Zeev Avni, who worked in the Foreign Ministry and carried out special missions for the Mossad, was caught, convicted and sentenced to a lengthy prison term in 1956. Levi (Lucian) Levi worked for the Operations Unit (today the Operations Branch), of the Shin Bet, which as part of its mission, according to foreign reports from Poland, broke into the embassies of the communist countries, in order to photograph documents and install listening devices. He was arrested and sentenced to prison in 1957. (In Depth: The KGB's long history of running agents in Israel, The Jerusalem Post, Yossi Melman, October 27, 2016) (IMG)

It is interesting to note that Yisrael Bar was hunted down by the Shin-Bet in 1961, the year in which the Khrushchev group launched what Western historians refer to as the 'Second Wave of De-Stalinization'. Paul Lendvai, a Zionist Hungarian defector to Austria and a journalist for the CIA-sponsored Die Presse, wrote

At the Central Committee plenum in November-December 1961, Gheorghiu-Dej coped easily with the repercussions of Khrushchev's second de-Stalinization campaign. The Party leader, who since March 1961 had also been President of the republic, asserted that he had been a helpless prisoner of the Pauker group and, by purging them, had restored "collective leadership." (Anti-Semitism without Jews: Communist Eastern Europe, Paul Lendvai, January 1, 1971, p. 337) (IMG{Romania})

1961 was the year in which the concept of the 'Dictatorship of the Proletariat' was denounced by the Khrushchev group and the CPSU officially described the Eurasian state as an 'All People's State'. An official split with China and Albania happened and there was an effort to rehabilitate Yugoslavia's role in the 1956 affairs in Hungary. The year 1961 was also the last year of the Syro-Egyptian unity in the United Arab Republic. That was the year in which the leverage of the progressive forces throughout the Middle East went on the decline, and the arrest of Yisrael Bar was undoubtedly influenced by such factors.

The question of boycott, divestment, and sanctions against any reactionary regime in any part of the world is a question of factional conflict, in turn based directly on class conflict. The crippling sanctions and the campaign of economic warfare shall be directed against the pro-fascist faction, the dominant faction, of the pro-fascist regime. By contrast, economic warfare should be used to sponsor and economically elevate the faction of the progressive infiltrators in the reactionary regime. What does this mean in the context of Israel? It means that economic warfare was to be directed towards sabotaging the Israeli regime's trade ties to the Anglo-American imperialists and their allies while increasing Israel's trade ties to the Soviet Union. The minimum gain that the reorientation of Israeli trade away from Anglo-American imperialists towards the USSR would have yielded was to make Israel less dependent on Anglo-American finance capital and thereby less susceptible to accepting the presence of the CIA-MI6 front companies in Israel; this would have reduced the CIA presence in Israel thus weakening the Ben-Gurion faction. The medium-level gain would be that the Soviets use this trade for purchasing products from the Mapam-affiliated kibbutzim so to increase financial support for the Mapam. The maximum gain would have been that the Soviets would utilize the trade ties to establish their 'Joint-Stock Companies' with Israel for investing there – and for using their front company presence in Israel to furnish the Mapam with all kinds of covert military and financial aid for preparing for the eventual conquest of Israel by Israel's proletariat. The extensive influence of the Israeli proletariat over Israel would have thereupon caused Israel's alliance with the Palestinian Arab proletariat.

For sabotaging Israel's trade ties to the Anglo-American imperialists and economically isolating the Ben-Gurion regime, the Israeli proletariat led by the Mapam took major steps in this direction. In an interview, Mapam leader General Moshe Sneh had said:

Today we are an independent state and we are in a position to reject all American demands. It is evident that our resistance can only succeed if it is supported by help from sincere friends of our independence, that is, in the first place by the help of the Soviet Union and the people's democracies. We do not have the least confidence that the present government of Israel will put up effective resistance to the demands of American imperialism. The composition of the government – right-wing social democrats (Mapai), religious front, small bourgeois parties – determines in advance its political line of submission to the policy of the United States. That is why we are conducting a fight of unswerving opposition to the policies of the government inside and outside of the Knesset. (...). Our economic program aims at the following objectives: nationalization of the land, of water sources, of natural resources (the Dead Sea), of electricity, of oil refineries and of foreign trade; radical recasting of the fiscal system by increase of direct taxation and suppression of indirect taxation and creation of the tax on capital; increase in the volume of trade with the USSR and with all European countries which would replace imports solely from Anglo-Saxon countries, which inevitably lead to the increase in the deficit of our trade balance; democratization in general of the whole economic system, as closely as possible in accordance with the example of the popular democracies and in the spirit of the pioneers of our renaissance. (INTERVIEW WITH DR. SNEH, Neie Presse (a Paris Yiddish daily), Interviewer: L. Bruck, interviewee: Moshe Sneh, pp. 1-2. MIA) (IMG)

To this end, the Mapam launched one of the biggest labour strikes in Israel's history. An excerpt of the 'World Communist Movement' document, which was the major document for the McCarthyite US Congressional Committee on Un-American Activities, was as follows:

November 16 – Israeli Sailors Union stages strike

In the ports of Haifa and Jaffa 800 seamen of the Israeli Sailors Union staged a "resignation strike against the role of Histadrut. the Israeli trade union federation, in the affairs of the union. The Sailors Union was controlled by the "pro-Soviet" Mapam Party.

('The World Communist Movement: Selective Chronology, 1818-1957', Vol. 3: 1951-1953, the Legislative Reference Services of the US Library of Congress, 1954, p. 562. Printed for the use of the: Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC), US Congress.) (IMG)

The Mapam-led strike was prolonged and strong in participant count. It economically isolated the Ben-Gurion regime, nullified Israel's navy, and slowed down the pace of Zionist migration for the while. Howard Sachar, the notorious Ben-Gurion apologist and prominent American-Israeli historian who spoke to the Ben-Gurion agent and Kautskyite trade-unionist Joseph Almogi, wrote:

One fact seemed certain: Almogi would never enter an alliance with the Communists. His reaction to the seamen's strike of 1951 was reassurance enough. That year Israel's Zim Steamship Company listed eight hundred sailors and officers on its rosters. All of them belonged to the seamen's union – and thus to the Histadrut. At the same time, a few Communists and fellow travelers had penetrated their ranks. Most of these extreme leftists had fallen under the influence of the pro-Communist Mapam party and of its leader, Dr. Moshe Sneh. Sneh detested the socialist gradualism of the Mapai party, and of the Mapai-controlled Histadrut. Sparing no effort to embarrass

the Ben-Gurion administration, he and his followers resorted to such tactics as wildcat strikes and artificial "hunger" demonstrations. These were old Stalinist tricks, of course, but from time to time they seemed likely to produce results within the Israel merchant marine. Sneh's principal lieutenant in the seamen's union was Nimrod Eshel, a twenty-five-year-old bosun and native-born Israeli who had been deeply influenced by the Communist-controlled seamen's unions of France and Italy.

Gathering a few picked sailors around him, most of them skilled agitators, Eshel concentrated his fire on working conditions in the Zim company. He was on strong ground here, for in those days many of the ships were quite old, and crew facilities on board were far from satisfactory. Instead of bringing his grievances before the local workers' council, however, Eshel initiated a series of wildcat strikes on every one of Zim's freighters in Haifa harbor. Hardly a week went by without a walkout on one vessel or another – and this at the most critical period of Israel's economic development. Eventually, by sheer persistence, Eshel induced most of his fellow seamen to go out on a general strike. And still he refused to meet with the Zim representatives.

Almogi tried to reason with the bosun. "Look here," he said, "we've got a workers' council precisely for the purpose of negotiating with the owners. Give us a chance at least to bargain with them."

"Nothing doing," Eshel insisted, "we want no interference from the Histadrut. We're handling this affair entirely on our own."

As later events made clear, Eshel's ultimate goal was the paralysis of the Israel maritime industry. Almogi suspected this at the time, but could not prove it. He knew only that the fiery young agitator parroted Sneh's line down to the last syllable, that he stubbornly avoided recourse to the very machinery of collective bargaining which was capable of redressing the workers' grievances. Almogi recognized, too, that if the Histadrut surrendered to Eshel's demands for autonomy, Mapam would be in a position to encourage other unions to break away – and thus disrupt altogether the painfully created solidarity of the labor movement. Finally, Zim itself might well fall into the hands of the Communists, and that would mean the end of maritime connections with the most important shippers in the free world.

(Aliyah: The Peoples of Israel, Howard Morley Sachar, 1961, pp. 275-276) (IMG)

Further evidence of attempts to sabotage Israel's trade with the US-led camp lies in the fact that the Israeli workers in New York and Baltimore joined the Mapam-led strike as well, with a Histadrut official in USA warning those workers that such worker action was economically isolating Israel from its Western anti-Arab allies:

The 59 striking Israel seamen who tied up two Israeli ships in New York and Baltimore and were interned on Ellis Island were deported today from the United States to Israel on the Greek vessel Nea Hellas. Their ships – the Yafo and the Haifa – sailed from the ports of New York and Baltimore, respectively, manned by other crews.

Dr. Joseph Burstin, representative of the Histadrut in the United States, told a press conference here today that the Federation of Labor in Israel is opposed to the demands by the striking Israel seamen who are seeking the right to declare strikes in foreign ports and request autonomy for their employment bureaus. Dr. Burstin emphasized that Israel cannot permit the seamen to strike while in foreign ports since this might paralyze normal traffic between the Jewish state and the outside world.

The representative of the Histadrut pointed out that Israel is surrounded by enemies on land and that its only contact with the outside world is by sea. Israel's entire import and export trade would be exposed to sabotage by irresponsible elements if Israeli seamen were permitted to strike in foreign ports, he emphasized.

(Striking Israeli Seamen Deported from U.S. to Israel on Greek Ship, The Jewish Telegraphic Agency, December 21, 1951, p. 2) (IMG)

Ehud Sprinzak, an advisor to the former Palmach commander Yitzhak Rabin and a potentially pro-Mapam scholar, wrote:

The shutdown of Israel's entire shipping industry was not regarded by the government as a legitimate labor dispute but as a treacherous attempt to paralyze the state fomented by "enemies of the nation and communists." Referring to the conflict in the Knesset, Ben-Gurion asserted, "There was and there is no strike. What is at stake is an effort by the enemies of the state to paralyze the Hebrew navy, an effort strongly supported by several factions for whom the desire to sabotage the state takes first priority.... It is for the working public to decide whether it is a strike, not for the Yevsektzia [a Jewish communist organization in the Soviet Union that always represented the party line] and their collaborators in other factions." (Brother against Brother: Violence and Extremism in Israeli Politics from Altalena to the Rabin Assassination, Ehud Sprinzak, 1999, p. 81) (IMG)

Meanwhile, as Israel's commercial ties to the US-led camp were being sabotaged, the Soviet Union and Israel continued to foster trade relations with each other. The Israeli long-time career diplomat Yosef Gavrin wrote in the timeline section of book:

9 December 1951

Israeli-Soviet trade negotiations were concluded concerning the exportation of 5,000 tons of citrus fruit from Israel to the USSR.

(Israeli-Soviet Relations, 1953-67: From Confrontation to Disruption, Yosef Govrin, 1990, p. 33) (IMG)

This measure by the Soviet Union was interpreted by Israel's Foreign Ministry as a means of strategically reorienting Israel further away from American imperialism:

at the end of 1951, Russia and Israel signed an agreement for the supply of 125,000 crates of citrus fruit worth \$100,000. In the Foreign Ministry this Soviet step was interpreted as a Soviet regional tactic, prompted by rumors of the establishment of a Mideast Command at American initiative; purchases from Israel were perhaps intended to "reinforce neutrality in the Middle East." (Between East and West: Israel's Foreign Policy Orientation 1948-1956, Cambridge University Press, Uri Bialer, 1990, p. 127) (IMG)

Almost from the moment the request for [American] credit was submitted Israeli economic activity in Russia did indeed cease until 1950. In his sharp criticism of this policy in February of that year Mordechai Namir, then Israel's Minister in Moscow, pointed out that since the end of 1949 "not a single proposal has come [from Israel] for us to attempt any economic operation an absolute zero in the USSR. paragraph of our trade balance will not keep us going." The figures substantiate Namir's claim: in 1949 Israeli imports from the Soviet Union totaled some \$400,000 and exports some \$26,000; the next year imports were reduced to \$20,000 worth of goods and Israeli exports to Russia were about one-third of that sum. (Between East and West: Israel's Foreign Policy Orientation 1948-1956, Cambridge University Press, Uri Bialer, 1990, p. 126) (IMG)

As the Israeli Foreign Ministry staff rightly implied, the expansion of the Israeli-Soviet trade that took place during the Sailors' Strike definitely served as a means of reducing the influence of American finance capital in Israel while increasing the influence of the Soviets there. In the context of Israel, that is what so-called 'neutralism' meant: moving away from Israel's ally, USA, and moving towards the Soviets. It is even possible that the Soviet purchase of citric fruits was targeted; it may have been an indirect means of economically supporting the Mapam-affiliated kibbutzim by purchasing their goods via Israel's fruits board.

The Mapam tried to maximize popular front and united front cooperation with the Maki in the struggle against the Ben-Gurion regime. As the Soviet Embassy in Israel reported in 1949:

Mapam and the Communist Party have recently begun to make joint statements on certain questions. (The Situation in Israel, P. I. Ershov. In: I.N. Bakulin to A.A. Gromyko (Moscow) COPY: AVP RF, F 089, OP.2, P.3, D.8, LL.2-11, Moscow, September 29, 1949, Secret. In: "Documents on Israeli-Soviet Relations, 1941-1953, Parts 1-2", Israeli Foreign Ministry, Russian Foreign Ministry, Israel State Archives, Russian Federal Archives, p. 536) (IMG)

In early December of 1951, the Mapam and the Maki actively lobbied for the regime to receive the strikers' delegation in the Knesset. The JTA reported:

The Mapam-Communist demand was turned down by Deputy Speaker M. Shefer who insisted that the Parliament hear an announcement by Police Minister Shitreet on the case of detained religious dissidents involved in the bombing of the Knesset earlier this year. The Mapam and Communist deputies inside Parliament jumped to their feet and began shouting at the Speaker. At the same time, a demonstration of striking seamen and Mapam and Communist representatives outside the building demanded that a strikers' delegation be received by the praesidium of the Parliament.

The disorder lasted for half-an-hour until Speaker Shefer announced that the Police Minister would read his announcement and then the Knesset would adjourn to permit its House Committee to work on the agenda. The deputies calmed down and Minister Shitreet announced that the government had instructed the Inspector General of Police to indict any policeman who broke the regulations. Also, the announcement said that there are no grounds for acting against any of the policemen involved in detaining the religious underground members, who had charged police cruelty during their incarceration. Later, when the Knesset praesidium promised to receive a delegation of striking seamen, the demonstrators dispersed.

(Leftists Provoke Disorder in Knesset over Seamen's Strike, The Jewish Telegraphic Agency, December 6, 1951, p. 1) (IMG)

While the cooperation between the Maki and the Mapam was a positive event, there existed major problems. Back then, the Soviets and the communist forces in Israel had invested more in the Mapam than in the Maki, because unfortunately there was no way that Israel's working class was going to so pervasively be attracted to the Maki, a Party with a long track record of self-describing officially as 'non-Zionist'. Yet, not surprisingly, the lesser investment into improving the situation in the Maki had made it more susceptible to Ben-Gurion faction infiltration than the Mapam. Recall that Shmuel Mikunis, the Maki leader, had with the approval of the Malenkov group in Moscow and with the support of the Yugoslav regime, aimed to mislead some of the progressive-minded Yiddish individuals into serving in the armed forces of the Ben-Gurion regime (see C16S5). The Mikunis group did not represent all of the Israeli Communist Party, and in that Party, there existed what would later become known as the 'Rakah' contingent that formed the Brezhnev-era Moscow-approved Party. However, back then, the Mikunis group dominated the Maki, which was why the Soviets had problems with the dominant faction in the Maki. In the Soviet Embassy in Israel too it was stated that the Maki was making serious errors:

The Communist Party of Israel is insignificant in numbers and in influence in the country. It makes mistakes both in tactics and in matters of organization. It badly needs help. (The Situation in Israel, P. I. Ershov. In: I.N. Bakulin to A.A. Gromyko (Moscow) COPY: AVP RF, F 089, OP.2, P.3, D.8, LL.2-11, Moscow, September 29, 1949, Secret. In: "Documents on Israeli-Soviet Relations, 1941-1953, Parts 1-2", Israeli Foreign Ministry, Russian Foreign Ministry, Israel State Archives, Russian Federal Archives, p. 536) (IMG)

Many commentators incorrectly put Sneh and Mikunis into the same category. Sneh and Mikunis did appear to have similar ideologies – eclectic mixtures of Zionism and communism – and they did work in the same Party since the mid-1950s. However, in spite of the appearance of similarity between these two, the differences were fundamental. Sneh was the top face of the trend of communist infiltration into the Zionist movement whereas Mikunis was the top face of the Zionist infiltration into Israel's communist movement. On the surface however, since in their rhetoric, one could observe eclectic mixtures of Zionism and communism, many were led to the confusion that Mikunis and Sneh belonged to the same category. By December 16, 1951, the Mapam had mobilized a large segment of the proletarian masses as well as some of the revolutionary elements in the intelligentsia into a protest of 3,000 people in support of the sailors' strike. The Maki, the Israeli Communist Party, assisted the Mapam in this effort but Mikunis, the Zionist agent who had risen to the position of the leadership of the Maki, pursued a left-sectarian agenda and tried to cut off Moshe Sneh. A December 17, 1951 document from Israel's high command stated:

On December 16, 1951 at 5:30 PM ... a truck arrived ... at the Maki club.... They mounted a loudspeaker and several dozen teenagers boarded the truck to the Magen David Square, a place crowded with an audience of about 3,000 people. At that time a truck arrived.... It began with the speech of Dr. Moshe Sneh, who attacks the government in connection with its attack on the sailors.

Maki members arrived at the Magen David Square ... and Shmuel Mikunis gave his speech on the loudspeaker, and the Maki and the Mapam began to compete to have their voices heard louder.

After Moshe Sneh's speech, Pinchas Tobin delivered a speech that would agitate the audience to support the sailors' strike. His speech was occasionally interrupted by shouts of contempt against the government from the assembled crowd.

(SUBJECT: Protest Demonstration by the Committee for the Defense of the Seamen's Association, Tel Aviv Headquarters, General Department, National Headquarters, Memo Tel Aviv, December 17, 1951, p. 1) (IMG)

An intelligence document from the Israel police stated:

During the first period of the conflict, the sailors' representatives organized organizing meetings themselves, but later the "Public Committee for Sailors' Aid" convened meetings and organized demonstrations in support of the seafarers' struggle. The organizational origin of the public committee is not clear, but most of the activists who appeared in it all belonged to Mapam. At one point, Maki tried to join the operations, but this joining was apparently undesirable. In one case (a demonstration in Tel Aviv, about December 16, 1951), Mikunis tried to participate over the car with a speaker and was interrupted by the Mapam speaker. Up to 3,000 people took part in the demonstrations. (Report on the Strike of the Sailors, Israel Police, January 9, 1952, p. 3) (IMG)

Here was Mikunis again in December 1951 entering a Mapam-led protest, trying to cut off the speaker, Dr. Moshe Sneh, and behaving in a left-sectarian manner that benefited the Ben-Gurion regime. How typical of Mikunis and his left-and-right-opportunist group. In any case, large-scale Mapam-led protests throughout Israel erupted. Ehud Sprinzak, an advisor to the former Palmach commander Yitzhak Rabin, wrote:

The seamen's organization had the support of the entire Israeli radical left of the time, including Mapam activists, former Palmach commander Yigal Alon, and the movement's writers and artists. (...) Massive pro-seamen demonstrations involving former Palmach members and supporters of Mapam erupted all over the country. (Brother against Brother: Violence and Extremism in Israeli Politics from Altalena to the Rabin Assassination, Ehud Sprinzak, 1999, pp. 81-82) (IMG)

The Ben-Gurion apologist Howard Sachar wrote:

Almogi returned to Haifa and publicly announced the Histadrut's opposition to the seamen's strike. He called for volunteers to man the ships; and within a few days nearly 40 per cent of the men responded to his request and returned to work. But many of the other sailors staged sit-down strikes on the vessels and had to be carried ashore bodily by the police. Even as Almogi had predicted, furious outcries were immediately raised in all parts of the country. Mapam mobilized supporters for the striking seamen from among both union and nonunion members. Thus, in Tel Aviv, doctors, writers, and school teachers paraded through the streets, carrying placards demanding the overthrow of Almogi and Ben-Gurion. Many of the kibbutzim sent Elaganah veterans to remonstrate with Almogi. (Aliyah: The Peoples of Israel, Howard Morley Sachar, 1961, pp. 275-276) (IMG)

The regime imposed mandatory military draft on the sailors:

One of the government's methods of dealing with the seamen was a mandatory military draft. Many of the striking seamen, who were earlier urged to serve in the nation's commercial navy instead of serving in the army, were ordered to report immediately to their army bases. The pretext was that since they were no longer seamen, they were legally obliged to complete their army mandatory service. (...). They had to serve in the army like all other Israelis. (Brother against Brother: Violence and Extremism in Israeli Politics from Altalena to the Rabin Assassination, Ehud Sprinzak, 1999, pp. 81-82) (IMG)

The police resort to physical force and the drafting of many strikers into the army led to the spread of the strike to all Israeli ships docking in foreign ports. Israel's entire commercial navy was nearly paralyzed. (Brother against Brother: Violence and Extremism in Israeli Politics from Altalena to the Rabin Assassination, Ehud Sprinzak, 1999, p. 82) (IMG)

The murderous Ben-Gurion regime was determined to crack down on the sailors' strike through terror against Israel's proletarians:

Mordechai Namir, the Histadrut's secretary general; Joseph Almogi, Histadrut's Haifa chief; and Ben-Gurion were all determined to use any means necessary to impose the Histadrut's authority on the sailors. Substitute seamen were brought to Haifa to replace the striking sailors, creating violent confrontations. Thousands of former Palmach members also came to show their support. (Brother against Brother: Violence and Extremism in Israeli Politics from Altalena to the Rabin Assassination, Ehud Sprinzak, 1999, pp. 81-82) (IMG)

The seamen who were considered exemplary Zionist pioneers before the strike were now called "communist agents and black market dealers" by Joseph Almogi. (...). Violence erupted almost from the beginning. As soon as the first ship, the Galila, docked at the Haifa port on October 22, 1951, and declared a strike, substitute seamen tried to board her. A fist fight involving the use of knives ensued and was quickly joined by a large number of policemen. All the company's other ships arrived in Haifa after the Galila strike. (Brother against Brother: Violence and Extremism in Israeli Politics from Altalena to the Rabin Assassination, Ehud Sprinzak, 1999, pp. 81-82) (IMG)

The Ben-Gurion apologist Sachar who interviewed Joseph Almogi, corroborated the claims of the Rabin advisor:

"I met with Ben-Gurion," Almogi recalled. "He agreed with me; we had no choice but to break the strike. It was a terribly difficult decision, and we expected it to arouse the protests of many honest laboring men in other unions. But under the circumstances we had no alternative."

"Don't forget that this was the austerity period," Almogi reminded me. "The standard of living of the entire country had fallen drastically – because of the huge immigration, of course. Many well-meaning people viewed this 'betrayal' by Ben-Gurion and myself as the last straw."

Although the strike was the most acrimonious Israel had thus far experienced, within Haifa, at least, Almogi managed to keep a firm grip on his labor followers.

(Aliyah: The Peoples of Israel, Howard Morley Sachar, 1961, pp. 275-276) (IMG)

The Mapam/Palmach could not stand by and watch as the Ben-Gurion regime was terrorizing the people of Israel. Hence a series of special military operations were launched. An intelligence document by the Israel police stated:

In the assembly and demonstration system and especially in the attempt of the masses to storm the port of Haifa, a planning and organizing hand was evident. The port gates were attacked deceptively and the masses were occasionally directed.... The equipment was prepared retrospectively (piles of stones, rubble, fragments of logs, etc.) and command nuclei were evident. In all the demonstrations, calls were made against the government, the Histadrut and especially derogatory calls against the police. The most serious cases were in Haifa during the operation against the ships "Negba" and then "Tel Aviv" in which the protesters roamed for hours, controlled the streets near the port and conducted mass assaults on the port gates. The sailors themselves were a tiny and fragile minority. The composition of the participants in these disturbances can be discussed from the fact that all six injured in Haifa on December 28, 1951 were members of agricultural farms and that 16 of the 29 detainees in Haifa on December 14, 1951 were also from the farms. (Report on the Strike of the Sailors, Israel Police, January 9, 1952, p. 3) (IMG)

The party affiliations of these kibbutznik farmers and their squad leaders, while easy to identify, is difficult to prove. However, everyone can infer whom the revolutionary usual suspects were. Meanwhile, the sailors themselves engaged in battles against the terrorist police, thus forcing the police to launch a naval operation in response:

It was known that the "Tel Aviv" team in particular, under the guidance and help of the leaders of the strikes on the coast, valued active resistance against the police's attempt to board the ship, while continuing to continue the battle with all the means at their disposal. Indeed, the sailors on the ship "Tel Aviv" held a planned and organized battle of resistance in a cohesive planned and organized manner when their means of tackling the police were firing water jets, throwing axes, knives, iron bars, tools, planks, etc. at the chiefs of policemen approaching the ship. These measures resulted in the injury of 13 policemen and by chance no casualties were caused to the police.

Police were forced to conduct a rather complex naval operation. For this purpose, the boats of the port administration (including the fire boat) were recruited as an addition to the police vessels. (...). The advantage of the sailors was that they were fortified and under cover and above all that they were in a high position about 7 meters above the heads of the policemen in the boats, [and] the policemen maintained substandard and inefficient equipment. The sailors overturned the ladders, damaged them, and hit every policeman who tried to get on them. The strikers did not refrain from knocking down a ladder that had police officers on it, one of whom fell into the sea and others were dropped into a boat. The number of wounded among the policemen has been growing....

(Report on the Strike of the Sailors, Israel Police, January 9, 1952, p. 2) (IMG)

Israel's terrorist police, in its naval operations against the sailors, required the cooperation of the other workers, a cooperation it was largely denied by the workers of Israel:

Knowing these practices, the police were forced to take precautionary measures and stop the service of "anchor" boats, to flee to the concentration of all boats near the dock and to prohibit their voyage to the port area without permission. These restrictions were also imposed on the fishing castles. Customs workers also did not tend to cooperate with the police. A uniformed customs officer was arrested by police for refusing to comply with a police officer's request to render assistance in stopping a storming crowd at the port.

Another example of non-cooperation that could have thwarted the police operation in the "Tel Aviv" ship was discovered among the employees of the port administration who serve its boats. The port manager made available to the police three of his most appropriate dedications for this operation (two tugs and one fire engine equipped with pumps of water) and without which it was difficult to withstand the operation.

(Report on the Strike of the Sailors, Israel Police, January 9, 1952, p. 4) (IMG)

3. The Position of the Workers of the Haifa Port

In the case of the Haifa Workers' Council, the workers' positive attitude towards the government's position as a seafarers' conflict did not match.

There were many cases in which the Histadrut encountered the refusal of some of the workers to fill positions that the Histadrut had given them, usually involving indifference and unwillingness to cooperate on the part of the workers.

The dismay between the port workers, which was marked by open sympathy for the strikers, apparently had a considerable effect on the entire public.

(Report on the Strike of the Sailors, Israel Police, January 9, 1952, p. 3) (IMG)

The Sailors' Strike had done its damage to the pro-fascist Ben-Gurion faction through undermining the anti-Palmach elements in the Israeli navy. It had sabotaged Israel's trade ties to the West, had sabotaged Israel's naval fleet, and inflicted damage on the fascist police. The Mapam thereafter launched the successor campaign to the Seamen's Strike. Major protests of thousands of Israeli workers erupted against the Ben-Gurion regime's subservience to Anglo-American imperialism in the region:

About 3,000 Mapam sympathizers this week-end demonstrated against the Israel Government's new economic policy and assailed Israel's alleged subservience to the United States. The demonstration was preceded by a three-hour "warning strike."

The strike and demonstration, called by the Mapam Party and Communists, was denounced by the Histadrut, the Israel labor federation, as sabotage of the labor movement and misuse of the strike weapon. The Histadrut threatened participants in the strike with dismissal from their jobs.

The strikers marched in a two-mile procession through the streets of Tel Aviv bearing placards denouncing the government and critical of the United States. Women waving empty shopping bags, in protest against the food situation, were prominent in the line of march.

(MAPAM SUPPORTERS DEMONSTRATE AGAINST GOVT'S ECONOMIC POLICY. In: 'JEWISH TELEGRAPHIC AGENCY, INC.: Daily News Bulletin, Vol. 19, No. 82, 34th year, April 28, 1952, p. 2) (IMG)

Workers committees in a number of industries here under domination of the left-wing Mapam Party, decided today to call a strike on Thursday in a demonstration of protest against the Government's new economic policy.

Spokesmen for the Mapai, considering counter-measures, warned that every striking worker would be subject to dismissal.

(MAPAM WORKERS TO STRIKE AGAINST GOVERNMENT ECONOMIC POLICY. In: 'JEWISH TELEGRAPHIC AGENCY, INC.: Daily News Bulletin, Vol. 19, No. 79, 34th year, April 28, 1952, p. 1) (IMG)

Even before the official establishment of Medinat Yisrael, the Soviets had invested in boosting their soft power influence in Israel. Since great masses of the Yiddish and Hebrew citizens of Israel already were influenced by communism and Soviet ideas, the Soviets already had a presence in Israel in terms of soft power. To lose such soft power would have been a grave error for the Soviets. Hence, in cooperation with the Mapam, the Soviets established, the VOKS – the Soviet-Israeli friendship association, whose task was boosting Soviet cultural influence among the Israelis. The Soviet legation in Israel took on this task. Whereas the Mapai aimed to utilize its 'Friendship' association with the USSR as a channel for intelligence penetration into the USSR for anti-Soviet subversion, the Soviets used their Friendship association as a channel for fomenting pro-communist subversion against the Mapai-Irgun forces. In the list of instructions to the Soviet intelligence base in Israel, the following were stated:

6. The legation must work through the leaders of the League for Friendly Relations with the USSR who are loyal to us, and who are under the guidance of Mapam and the Communist Party, in order to guide the league towards activities which will popularize the Soviet Union among the people of Israel. As for the public Israel-USSR Friendship Society, which was formed by the ruling Mapai Party to counterbalance the League for Friendly Relations, the legation must define its attitude to this committee according to the latter's activity, keeping in mind that Mapai organized the committee in order to make contact with the Jews in the USSR rather than to promote friendship with the Soviet Union.

7. The legation must expand the activity in Israel of VOKS, Mezhdunarodnaia Kniga, Soveksportfilm and Sovinformburo, by organizing exhibitions, opening a Soviet bookshop, publishing a popular periodical on behalf of the League for Friendly Relations and increasing the screenings of Soviet films.

(INSTRUCTIONS TO THE MINISTER OF THE USSR IN THE STATE OF ISRAEL, Secret, Ershov. Part of: COPY: AVP RF, F 089, OP.2, P.3, D.8, LL.2-11, I.N. Bakulin to A.A. Gromyko (Moscow), Moscow, 29 September 1949, Secret. In: "Documents on Israeli-Soviet Relations, 1941-1953, Parts 1-2", Israeli Foreign Ministry, Russian Foreign Ministry, Israel State Archives, Russian Federal Archives, pp. 534-538) (IMG)

In an interview with the Paris-based Yiddish daily Neie Presse, Mapam leader General Moshe Sneh stated:

The fight for the independence of Israel is tied to the fight for peace just as the act of dragging Israel into a regional pact under American control would be tied to the preparation for a new war by American imperialists against the Soviet Union, against the people's democracies and against the independence of all peoples. We have just established in Israel a Committee for Peace which has affiliated with the World Congress of the Partisans for Peace. We are also in the process of enlarging the scope and strengthening the activity of the League for Friendship with the USSR. The popular masses have warmly – even enthusiastically – responded to the call of these two organizations. We hope to be able to create a mass movement in support of the fight to promote peace and friendship with the Soviet

Union. Mapai recently attempted to split the League for Friendship with the USSR, but the result has been just the opposite. The League has been strengthened and the number of members doubled. Our view is that friendship with the USSR is a touchstone for every individual on the question of world peace; for every Jew who wishes to remain true to the real interests of his people and his country; and for every worker who wishes to remain faithful to the banner of genuine socialism. It is necessary to add that not only the Movement for Peace but also the League for Friendship with the USSR take part in and collaborate harmoniously with all progressive forces in Israel, both Jewish and Arab. (INTERVIEW WITH DR. SNEH, Neie Presse (a Paris Yiddish daily), Interviewer: L. Bruck, interviewee: Moshe Sneh, pp. 1-2. MIA) (IMG)

Describing the level of the success of the Soviet soft power program in Israel, a report from the Soviet legation stated:

Thus, on 1 January 1949, an exposition opened in Tel Aviv, 'Upbringing and Education in the USSR', organized jointly by the VOKS representative and the League for Friendly Relations with the USSR. At the exposition, representatives of the Israeli intelligentsia delivered five lectures: 'Lenin, Teacher of Generations', 'Upbringing and Education in the USSR', 'Modern Soviet Literature', 'Soviet Theatre', and 'Soviet Cinema'. Four Soviet films were shown and four musical-literary evenings were organized with the participation of local performers. The exposition and related cultural events attracted the attention of the entire Israeli press. Several newspapers (Kol haam. Al hamishmar, Davar, Haaretz, and Haolam hazeh) published positive reviews of the exposition and articles about education and upbringing in the Soviet Union.

An exhibition, 'The Military Art of the Red Army', was opened in Haifa on 8 January 1949. It was organized by the VOKS representatives together with the Haifa committee of the League for Friendly Relations with the USSR.

About 5,000 people visited the exhibition in 15 days, more than half of whom were soldiers or officers in the Israeli army. A lecture, 'The Soviet Army in Soviet Literature', was read, and books and journals on the exhibition topic were displayed. Lecturers from the league, chiefly from the ranks of the Israeli army, gave explanations at the exhibition. Large articles with detailed descriptions of the exhibition appeared in several Israeli newspapers (Al hamishmar, Davar, and others). They noted the heroic struggle of the Soviet army against fascist occupation and expressed gratitude to the Soviet Union for defeating Hitler's Germany

On 2 April 1949, this same exhibition was organized in Tel Aviv jointly with the Tel Aviv committee of the league. (...). On the first day about 1,500 visited the exposition. In this connection, Soviet films were shown, lectures were delivered about the Soviet army and concerts of Soviet music were held. All the exhibitions enjoyed great success in Israel.

(The League for Friendly Relations with the USSR: Memorandum, Iu. Kosiakina. In: L. Kislova to Ia.M. Lomakin (Moscow) COPY: GARF, F.5283, OP.22, D.194, LL.39-42 Moscow, July 4, 1949. In: "Documents on Israeli-Soviet Relations, 1941-1953, Parts 1-2", Israeli Foreign Ministry, Russian Foreign Ministry, Israel State Archives, Russian Federal Archives, pp. 509-510. No Screenshot.)

However, as is well-known, the CIA had launched Operation MOCKINGBIRD for the purpose of anti-Soviet agitation and American soft power influence in various countries. In Israel too, as the influence of the Palmach and the Mapam over the regime apparatus reduced, the agents of the United States were able to gradually raise their voice and agitated libelous content against the Soviets. One of the major targets was the Soviet film industry. The Ben-Gurion faction, having emerged militarily triumphant over the Arab armies in the 1948 War, was able to free up some of its funds to the secret service conflict against the Mapam in the Israeli military bodies, and then the Israeli security and intelligence bodies. Since Israel's 'non-state' media was controlled by the Shin Bet and the Mossad, increased influence by the Ben-Gurion faction over the 'non-state' media allowed him to agitate and propagate heavily against the USSR. A Soviet intelligence report from the legation in Tel Aviv stated:

The leading role in the anti-Soviet propaganda campaign is played by the newspaper Hador, the organ of the main government party Mapai. Hador is joined by Henil (the organ of the fascist party Herut [note: Herut was Menachem Begin's Party and the Likud predecessor]), Haboker, and other bourgeois papers.

Anti-Soviet propaganda in Israel is inspired by the reactionary American press, the American-Jewish bourgeoisie, which has a great deal of influence on life in Israel, and reactionary circles in Israel itself, beginning with Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, who, in fact, directs all anti-Soviet propaganda in the country, although formally he 'does not interfere' in the affairs of the press, referring to 'freedom of the press' in Israel.

The main methods for implementing anti-Soviet propaganda are the following:

(...). 4) Printing libellous anti-Soviet reviews, mainly of Soviet films;

The reactionary Israeli press gives a slanderous picture of life within the Soviet Union. In particular, it paints an anti-Soviet and Zionist picture of the 'situation of the Jews' in the USSR. Defending the capitalist system, it gives a slanderous impression of the living conditions of the workers in the USSR; it tries to detract from the achievements of Soviet culture, in an effort to paralyze Soviet influence on the workers of Israel.

1. In a review of the film The Tale of a Real Alan, Hador (1 June 1949) wrote that 'this is the weakest of films... everything in it is done almost in bureaucratic form... tears and joys are measured out with mathematical precision'.

(Anti-Soviet Propaganda in the Israeli Press: Memorandum, Excerpts from a Memorandum by M. Popov, COPY: AVP RF, F.089, OP.2, P.3, D.13, LL.8-20, Tel Aviv, December 7, 1949. In: "Documents on Israeli-Soviet Relations, 1941-1953, Parts 1-2", Israeli Foreign Ministry, Russian Foreign Ministry, Israel State Archives, Russian Federal Archives, pp. 562-566. No Screenshot.)

In replacement, Israel's ruling Kautskyites promoted the Yugoslav regime films:

At present the Histadrut has taken upon itself the considerable task of distributing Yugoslav films, and under the Histadrut's 'patronage' films from Yugoslavia are to be shown in workers' and agricultural settlements.

All this takes on a certain hue in light of fact that the events organized by the League for Friendly Relations with the USSR not only evoke no sympathy from the Histadrut, but even encounter opposition in such matters as making premises and funds available.

(REPORT OF THE USSR MISSION IN THE STATE OF ISRAEL FOR THE PERIOD FROM THE FORMATION OF THE STATE IN MAY 1948 TO DECEMBER 1949, Excerpts from the Political Report of the USSR Legation in Israel, COPY: AVP RF, F.089, OP.3, P.6, D.8, LL.211-26; 262-4 Tel Aviv, March 10, 1950, In: "Documents on Israeli-Soviet Relations, 1941-1953, Parts 1-2", Israeli Foreign Ministry, Russian Foreign Ministry, Israel State Archives, Russian Federal Archives, p. 612. No Screenshot)

The regime that promoted settler-colonialism against the Albanians of Kosovo was befriended even in the film industry by the regime that promoted settler-colonialism against the Arabs of Palestine. No surprise. The friendly attitude of the Yugoslav regime towards the Ben-Gurion regime does not

mean friendship with the people of Israel. Forget not that well into the 1970s, the Tito regime, the stance of which in support of Zionist fascist reaction never changed, funded the PLO terrorist "freedom-fighters" who carried out the numerous terror attacks against civilians in Israel.

By late 1952, the Zionist agents of the Anglo-American secret services had greatly stepped up their media campaign against the USSR via the ostensibly 'private' 'non-state' media outlets. The USSR responded in kind in its media campaign against the regime of Israel culminating in the Soviet media coverage of the Prague Trials and the Doctors' Plot. At the height of the Stalin-era Soviet media campaigns against Israel in 1953, the Israeli regime launched a campaign of vicious colour revolutionary propaganda, agitating among the 'Jews' and Jews. the Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett, Ben-Gurion's henchman, instructed his subordinates in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to launch a vicious anti-Soviet slander campaign, explicitly stating that Israel "should not rely on the facts" and instead should "incite" "public tension" for "arousing public opinion constantly and repeatedly" against Moscow. Israel and its agents based in Washington launched a campaign to denounce the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies as hostile to the Israelites. While acknowledging that the doctors' plot case in the USSR is a prelude for a purge of "unreliable elements," the Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett remarked:

Here are my instructions in the matter of Moscow's calumnies

(a) This is not a major line of policy but the result of a general trend to strengthen the regime whether for its own sake or in preparation for war, by means of blood-letting, tightening internal espionage, targeting a scapegoat and laying the groundwork for the mass liquidation of unreliable elements.

(b) Even if for Moscow the libel is of secondary importance, for us it is the crux of the matter.

(c) The libel is the outcome of a deliberate decision, and we should expect more such manifestations and prepare for a prolonged campaign.

(d) We have very few weapons in hand and we should not underestimate the [importance of] arousing public opinion constantly and repeatedly, on the assumption that Moscow is not entirely indifferent to the repercussions of its policy in international public opinion and its influence on people and circles sympathetic to it.

(e) **We should not rely on the facts themselves to maintain the level of public tension; we must constantly incite it.**

Therefore, I favoured from the beginning the initiative for a world Jewish conference to react to the calumnies. This is now the government's stance. The conference should be convened in Paris for greater resonance in Europe. The government of Israel will not participate in either the initiative or the debates but will send an observer. The conference of the organizations for reparations can serve as a precedent for the composition which should be as broad as possible. The aims of the conference: (1) condemnation and refutation of the calumny in a well-considered, dignified and forceful manner; (2) unification of Jewish public opinion and isolation of the enemies of the Jewish people's (3) an appeal to world public opinion; (4) Let My People Go.

The conference will not go beyond the bounds of demanding rectification of the slander of the Jewish people and its organizations, (voicing) its concern for the safety of the Jewish masses, their protection and the demand for their aliya, the denunciation of hatred of the Jewish people and an appeal to the world to rise up against it. It will not condemn communism as a regime and will not overtly join the political war against the Soviet Union.

(CODED TEE ISA 130.09/2309/12, M. Sharett to the Israeli Embassy in Washington, Tel Aviv, February 2, 1953. In: "Documents on Israeli-Soviet Relations, 1941-1953, Parts 1-2", p. 873. Bold added) (IMG)

Through such a massive incitement campaign, Sharett provoked a Zionist terror attack and bombing campaign against the Soviet legation in Israel: February 9 1953

The Soviet Union's diplomatic outpost in Tel Aviv is bombed, leading the Soviets to break off diplomatic relations a few days later. One Soviet diplomat and the wives of two others are injured by the blast of 70 pounds of explosives in the garden, and the building is damaged. (...). The bombing is blamed on an Israeli terrorist group that calls itself the Kingdom of Israel and is known to the public as the Tzrifin Underground. The leader of the group, former Lehi member Yaakov Heruti, denies involvement in the explosion, and the government lacks proof. But Heruti and other Kingdom of Israel members are sentenced to prison sentences of one to 12 years for other attacks and plots and for the danger they pose to state security. Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion commutes the sentences after two years.

(Soviet Embassy Bombed in Tel Aviv, Center for Israel Education) (IMG)

Ben-Gurion freed the 'Kingdom of Israel' terrorists from 'prison' because the latter's activities were godsend for the Israeli secret service. The notorious 'Kingdom of Israel' is known to have had the tacit – if not active – support of the Shin Bet and was later held responsible for assassinating the Mossad operative Rudolf Kastner, just when the latter was believed to be going to reveal secrets of the Mossad support for the Nazis against USSR (see C16S1). Only two weeks prior to the military operation against the Soviet Embassy, Ben-Gurion had asked the rhetorical question 'we permit the enemies of Israel in Moscow to maintain here, overtly and legitimately, agents...?'

What has [Stalin] to do with the Semites? His present political aims require that he attack and accuse the Jews and their state. He is arousing worldwide hatred of Israel. And perhaps we can do nothing against him, but shall we permit the enemies of Israel in Moscow to maintain here, overtly and legitimately, agents of and collaborators with the enemies of Israel? (D. Ben-Gurion to the Members of the Israeli Government, COPY: ISA 130.02/2157/14, Tel Aviv, January 20, 1953. In: "Documents on Israeli-Soviet Relations, 1941-1953, Parts 1-2", Israeli Foreign Ministry, Russian Foreign Ministry, Israel State Archives, Russian Federal Archives, p. 858) (IMG)

Anyways on February 12, 1953, the Soviet-Israeli:

diplomatic relations [were] broken off 12 February [1953] after the bombing of the Soviet legation in Tel Aviv... (The Beria Purge and Subsequent Soviet Policy, Central Intelligence Agency, July 24, 1953, p. 8) (IMG)

Certainly, in their attacks on Soviet intelligence presence under 'diplomatic' cover in Israel, the left-deviationist critics of the USSR on this matter are – most of them unintentionally – standing with the Ben-Gurion faction and the Zionist terror organizations against the Arabs. Plus, such an intelligence base could continue to serve as a base for supporting the progressive elements of the Hebrew society, which contrary to left-opportunist propaganda, were not actually so few. The Soviet intelligence base in Tel Aviv would have allowed the USSR to more easily maintain contact with the people of Israel and could pave the way for the establishment of a socialist state in Israel. It was certainly unfortunate to see that such a base was lost and contact with the people of Israel was reduced.

One of the co-founders and leaders of the Mapam was Meir Ya'ari. Ya'ari was an interesting Mapam activist, for his views were generally communistic but also contained doses of Judaism. As Shimon Peres recalled,:

Meir Ya'ari, the Mapam – Hashomer Hatzair leader, sat in his kibbutz, Merhavia, and spoke of the dictatorship of the proletariat. He insisted on "ideological collectivism." He had a rabbinical air about him, and his followers were like disciples. He quoted from Lenin but still managed to sound like a rabbi! ('Ben-Gurion : A Political Life', Shimon Peres, 2011, p. 134) (IMG)

To support his arguments, the late Meir Ya'ari used to cite the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin - as well as the Hebrew Bible. Ya'ari pretended to oppose the communist faction of the Mapam but in reality, he himself belonged to the communist faction that dominated the Mapam back then. He opposed the conspiracy of Isser Harel's fascist secret service in causing a split in the Mapam and was famously wiretapped by the Shin Bet:

"A group of extreme Leftists had been set up in heart of Mapam," Iser says, "and ... [t]he Mapam leaders did not know of this group, whose leader was Moshe Sneh, the former chief of Haganah. Apparently the Soviet Embassy was directing by remote control a subversive plan which the ... communist groups inside Mapam were putting into execution.... To me, Mapam was first and foremost a Zionist party, and I made up my mind to stop its drift toward communism. Through a friend I informed Meir Ya'ari about the conspiracy that was going on behind his back."

Meir Ya'ari, however, violently objected to Iser Harel's interference. Shin-Bet, therefore, decided to keep a close watch on the activities of the communist faction inside Mapam, and that was why the mike had been installed in Ya'ari's office [to surveil Ya'ari and his comrades].

(Spies in the Promised Land: Iser Harel and the Israeli Secret Service, Michael Bar-Zohar, 1972, pp. 128-129) (IMG)

Then, in 1952 and 1953, a new series of problems arose in the Mapam. The Prague Trials of 1952 and the Doctors' Plot case in 1952-1953 were absolutely necessary for purging off the Zionist agents of the Anglo-American secret services in Eastern Europe, but such purges, while increasing communist soft power influence in the Arab countries, were also utilized as pretexts by the Ben-Gurion faction for condemning the socialist forces. A vicious propaganda campaign by Israel's regime began, with the partial objective of driving a wedge between the people of Israel and the USSR, and engineering a split within the Mapam. The Mapam leader Dr. Moshe Sneh, the Haganah commander who sided with the USSR against Anglo-American imperialism, supported the anti-Titoist purges of Prague Trials. In an article titled 'Israel is in Danger', Moshe Sneh wrote:

And the Soviet Union, and together with it the people's democracies, and the Czechoslovak People's Democracy among them—they were the ones who extended to the Jewish people full assistance to set up its own state in Israel. In the two most violent and most fateful occurrences in Jewish history—in the attempt to destroy the Jewish people and in the struggle for its establishment—it was the Communist world, and the Soviet Union at its head, which showed and proved that it and only it was a true friend of the Jewish people, as of all the nations of the world. And every "explanation" that the Prague trial shows, so to speak, that "Communism is the enemy of the Jewish people" or of the state of Israel or of the liberation movement of our people, is no more than a malevolent libel and a lying slander.

The fact that the government of Israel has harnessed itself to the chariot of American imperialism, the speeches of Sharett and Eban and Ben Gurion, which are laden with hate, and spread enmity to the Soviet Union and to Communism – could produce no other effect. Therefore, we cannot react to the Prague trial in partnership with the enemies of socialism in Israel. And their attempts by word and deed, to turn those in Israel who are loyal to socialism against the strongholds of socialism in the world and to cut us off from the world revolutionary camp, of which we are an inseparable part, will not succeed.

If you want to know what is the true psychical cause of the anti-Communist outburst in the Knesset, on the "Voice of Israel," and in the bourgeois Mapai press, you have only to listen to the outpouring of love and to the glorification which Ben Gurion, and Namir and Labun and Livneh and Begin pour out to the betrayers of communism: to Trotsky and Bukharin, to Kamenyev and Zinovyev, to Tito, Rykov and Kostov, to Slansky and Clementis. What hymns of praise did the ministers and spokesmen of Mapai sing about each one of these whose liquidation saved a socialist state from destruction!

('ISRAEL IS IN DANGER: The hysteria in Israel about socialist "anti-Semitism" is being fed by bourgeois Israeli leaders to cover up the critical situation there', Dr. Moshe Sneh, March 1953, p. 2) (IMG)

The Mapam had been waging a revolutionary class struggle on the side of the USSR and the progressive revolutionary forces in the Arab world against the CIA-MI6 puppet regime headed by Ben-Gurion. The Soviets and the Czechoslovaks were hunting down the agents of the Ben-Gurion faction. Was this strike against the Mossad in Eastern Europe not a step towards the liberation of Israel from the Anglo-American puppet regime and the elevation of the socialist forces in Israel? Was this not what the Mapam too would have desired? Alas, the relentless propaganda campaign of the Ben-Gurion faction partially worked, the Prague Trials were denounced as 'anti-Semitic' by Mapam's party organs, the philosophy of Zionism was placed above scientific socialism, and a reactionary tide against the Moshe Sneh faction began. To this anti-Soviet grouping joined Ya'ari and Ya'akov Hazan, neither of whom, to the best of my knowledge, were genuinely anti-Soviet. They joined this grouping as 'stay-behind' forces: if you cannot beat the reactionary tide, join the reactionary tide, and take leadership of the reactionary tide, so that you may sabotage and slow down the reactionary tide. Since Sneh was going to be ousted anyways, it was better that people with views similar to those of Sneh take leadership (or mis-leadership) of the movement against Sneh. Ya'ari and Hazan chose to be those individuals. They were to pretend to side with Zionist reaction against the socialist forces. In reality, behind the scenes, Hazan and Ya'ari seem to have been loyal to the socialist forces. Hazan himself had shown the degree of his strategic affiliation with the anti-imperialist forces:

At a concentrated seminar held in the late 1950s, attended by security personnel from Kibbutz HaArtzi and Hakibbutz Hameuchad, Hazan said that Mapam sees itself as committed to the Soviet Union. He gave an interesting example: if the Soviet Union requests Israel to refrain, for strategic reasons, from building a deep-water port in Haifa, Mapam must grant the request, even if Israel's economic interest requires the construction of such a port. (Hazan: Movement of Life, Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi Institute, Ze'ev Tzahor, 1997, p. 199) (IMG)

Although Hazan was speaking of the Khrushchev-era 'Soviet Union', the above quote was in line with the Mapam's previous behaviour of blocking the strategic objectives of the Ben-Gurion regime and promoting the cause of the socialist-oriented forces in the region. In response to Khrushchev's 1956 Titoization speech denouncing Stalin, Meir Ya'ari defended the legacy of the Stalin-era purges, stating that some 'mistakes' by Stalin do not tarnish the entire legacy of Stalin. Ya'ari expressed these points in his usual rabbinical way. The Israeli Likudnik media outlet 'Mida' stated:

The interesting thing is that the shock waves from Khrushchev's speech began operating in Israel within a week or so of the incident; Long before the spies did their thing. Discussions at the top of Mapam, the buzz around the 20th conference, began in the first days of March, and there were also some discussions led by Mapam (Hashomer Hatzair) at the end of March. The shock waves did not wait for the full content of the speech to be published in the New York Times in June.

A strategy of [psychological] containing, denial, and holding the stick at both ends was activated, mainly by Mapam leader Meir Yaari, who refused to draw conclusions [against Stalin and the USSR]. "We have not cultivated ... a blind admiration for Stalin," he claimed. "In any case, do not let [Stalin] be forgotten as one of the fathers of socialism." He reminded ordinary members, especially in the kibbutzim, that "the guillotine also operated in the French Revolution." "An entire generation died in the wilderness to save the tablets of the covenant," he said. (...). "Without the severity of the dictatorship [of the proletariat], it would not have been possible to carry out the revolution and establish it at home and abroad," he continued to justify Stalin's work. And most importantly: "Do not pour the baby with the bath water!"

(The Secret Speech that Shook the Israeli Left, Mida, Amnon Lord, February 24, 2016) (IMG)

In spite of the relentless propaganda campaign, the Mapam members and leaders continued to honor the USSR and expressed hope that the IDF would become an Israeli Red Army in the tradition of the Palmach:

On the anniversary of the October Revolution, November 7, 1952, Mapam's central committee said in a greeting address to the Israeli soldiers: "Let us remember the Red Army of liberation and fight for the transformation of our own forces into a People's Red Army in the noble tradition of the Palmach." Neither the Prague trials, nor the wave of [supposed/alleged] anti-Semitism that followed them in November 1952, nor the trial of the doctors in Moscow in January 1953 could shatter the mystical faith of Mapam. On the day Stalin died, one of Mapam's leaders delivered a public oration in Tel Aviv, in which he said: "If there is one grave in the world to which the Jewish people ought to make grateful pilgrimage, it is Joseph Stalin's." (Spies in the Promised Land: Iser Harel and the Israeli Secret Service, Michael Bar-Zohar, 1972, pp. 127-128) (IMG)

Nonetheless, the Mapam ceased to be effective as a political party since late 1952 onwards. Indeed, from that time onwards, the Mapam as a party became a small party. Instead, it began to operate more so as a powerful intelligence network with agents in the highest ranks of the Israeli regime apparatus. Yisrael Bar, Shimon Avidan, Moshe Sneh, Yisrael Galili, Shlomo Argov, Haim Bar-Lev, David Eleazar, Yigal Allon, Nahum Admoni, Yitzhak Hofi, and Yitzhak Rabin were among the major Mapam-Palmach agents in Israel's security, intelligence, and military bodies. These individuals had been chiefs of the IDF, Mossad, Israeli embassies, government ministries, Prime Ministry, etc. As indicated elsewhere, their leader was Rabin, who, as Israel's 'Last Stalinist', died in the 1990s, when the communist forces were at their weakest and American imperialism at its strongest.

C16S7. The Lehi-Soviet-Mapam Connection and the Palmach's Armed Struggle against the Irgun

As is well-known, the Lehi, or 'Fighters for the Freedom of Israel', was initially a Nazi Zionist terror gang led by Avram Stern, an Israelite who sought cooperation with Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. In those years, the Lehi, an eclectic organization, admired Hitler and Gandhi for their 'struggle' 'against' the British colonizers. Yet, during the Second World War, Avram Stern was eliminated and the Lehi cadres were decimated. Such a decimation of the fascist faction allowed the pro-Soviet operatives to penetrate the Lehi and to give the Soviet-backed progressive tendency a significant voice in that fascist terror organization. Nonetheless, a powerful fascist faction remained, capable of carrying out massacres such as the Deir Yassin massacre.

Having come under the partial influence of the pro-Soviet elements, the Lehi denounced the partition of Palestine, to which it referred as the colonial partition of Eretz Yisrael, called for an Israeli alliance with the USSR against the British Empire, played down the hostility with the Arabs, and called for respect for the Arab nation as a friend and ally against British colonialism. Uri Milstein – the prominent Jabotinskyite historian, a genocidally anti-Arab and anti-Soviet author, and an IDF official affiliated with the faction of Ariel Sharon and Rafael Eitan – did some interesting research on the history of the Lehi. Below are excerpts of his research:

The ideological component was represented by a former member of the center, Dr. Israel Shaiv (Eldad), the chief ideologue and publicist in the HaMaas newspaper. The next day, November 29, Eldad wrote openly: "**The division of the Land of Israel by the UN resolution** – in addition to the first division by Britain in 1922 – is a crime against the geographical and economic truth of the land and a robbery against the Hebrew people." **The sympathy for the "World of Tomorrow"** [i.e. Hebrew euphemism for the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies] was represented by **Natan Friedman-Yellin (Yellin-Mor), who saw the Soviet Union as an ally in the fight against Great Britain.** After all, an excerpt from a booklet published by Lehi, "A Reply to Esther Vilenska" (Vilenska wrote an article condemning Lehi in the communist newspaper "Kol Ha'am"), in Elul 5777 (August – September 1947) was as follows: "Our interests are against war in the world. And therefore the Soviet Union is our ally. **Where does the Soviet Union meet us? In the need to take the entire Middle East, or part of it, out of the hands of imperialism and its feudal servants. The Soviet Union is interested in a free population in a country with developed industrial development, with a free working class, that will not allow the country to be turned into an anti-Soviet imperialist base.** Of all the factors in the Middle East, the Hebrew people are the strongest and most reliable factor for such a guarantee. The Hebrew nation concentrated in the Land of Israel is an objective and necessary ally for Soviet Russia, for its peace and security from the south. It is a strong force against all Arab Quislings. Soviet Russia is interested in world peace and the freedom of nations. It is an objective ally of the Hebrew people." (...). **The heads of the Lehi believed that the Arabs of the Middle East were their potential allies in the anti-imperialist struggle. Even though the rulers of the Arab countries still do not understand the identity of the interests, they will.**

"We do not recognize any Arab-Palestinian people. There is one great Arab nation, which is in the process of awakening and self-recognition. The Arabs of Israel are part of the same nation, just as the Hungarians living in Romania are part of the Hungarian people and not a separate people.... **We recognize the Arabs who live in this land, who are part of the great Arab nation, which resides in the Middle East, in Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Syria....** Admittedly, between us and the Arab leadership, which still dominates the opinion of the Arab public in the overwhelming majority, there is a fight. The quarrel is over the right of political sovereignty over the land.... The Arabs of the land are our rival, for the time being. **But the British in Israel are an enemy to all of us. With the Arabs of the country, we must and are entitled to reach an agreement, a political discussion. With the British in Israel, any agreement, any**

law, any negotiation, any contact, except contact with arms, are invalid. This position of ours is in complete contrast to the position of the Haganah, which sees England as a rival and the Arabs as an enemy.... Just an Arab is a resident of this country and should not be harmed. There is no [desire on the part of Lehi for] war against him. Only the Brit is the representative of the enemy. He himself is an enemy, a stranger here. He is not innocent. His very being here is an international crime, a political crime, a moral crime, in addition to the long list of practical crimes committed by him day in and day out. He is an enemy, his sentence is death. This is the difference, and these are the conclusions."

(The Truth About the War of Independence, Chapter 31: Was the leader of Lehi a Soviet agent?, Uri Milstein, October 28, 2016. News1. Bold and underline added.) (IMG)

The Lehi, an eclectic organization made up of communist agents, pro-communist progressives, and fascists, was constantly facing internal struggles. On the one hand, shortly prior to the start of the War of Independence, under the influence of the pro-communist contingent led by Yellin-Mor, the Lehi denounced war with the Arabs:

In October 1947, a month before the outbreak of the War of Independence, Yisrael Eldad wrote in "Ha-Maas" that the Land of Israel should be saved from "the fate of India", that is, from a war between Jews and Arabs: The choice is: British bloodshed today, or Jewish and Arab bloodshed tomorrow".

Nonetheless, Yisrael Eldad later recounted that after the assassination in Hawaii, in August 1947, he demanded that the Lehi Secretariat expand the organization's news and operations department toward the Arab front. **But Yellin-Moore objected, saying, "There will be no Arab front."** After years, Eldad hit on a sin: "The idea of neutralizing the Middle East interfered with the realistic vision of our organization's members. It blinded Friedman's eyes. All preparations for the Arab front were not made."

(The Truth About the War of Independence, Chapter 31: Was the leader of Lehi a Soviet agent?, Uri Milstein, October 28, 2016. News1. Bold and underline added.) (IMG)

Nonetheless, by the time of the War of Independence, the Lehi was factionalized into the pro-Irgun elements and the Lehi soldiers who fought in the Palmach. In April 1948, the fascist faction of the Lehi, to which Yitzhak Shamir and secretly also Yisrael Eldad belonged, committed a major massacre in Deir Yassin in collaboration with Irgun. The US intelligence station in Jerusalem reported:

431. Early morning April 9 combined force Irgun and Stern Gang numbering over 100 attacked Arab village, Deir Yasin, several miles west Jerusalem. Attackers killed 250 persons of whom half, by their own admission to American correspondents, were women and children. Attack carried out in connection battle now still in progress between Arabs Jews on roads leading to Jerusalem from Tel Aviv. Arab reaction to attack has been violent and emotions, already at high pitch following death April 8 of Abdul Kader Hussein (Arab Jerusalem commander) during Arab attempt retake village captured by Haganah, now at bursting point. Officer ConGen visiting Hussein Khalidi, secretary Arab Higher Executive, April 11, found him still trembling with rage and emotion and referring to attack as "worst Nazi tactic". (867N.01/4-1348: Telegram, The Consul at Jerusalem (Wasson) to the Secretary of State, Confidential, Jerusalem, April 13, 1948, 5 PM. In: 'Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Near East, South Asia, and Africa: Part 2', US State Department, p. 817) (IMG)

Such a major crime by the Lehi's fascists was condemned by Natan Yellin-Mor, the leader of the pro-communist, pro-Soviet, and Arab-friendly contingent in the Lehi:

Even more significant are his views on the Arab question. Indeed, during the course of his address Friedman-Yellin for the first time revealed his differences with Eldad and Zetler over Deir Yasin. The path to a new age in the Middle East, he implied, was not to be sought by such actions, but by giving encouragement to the establishment of socialist and neutral states in Arab lands. ('The Stern Gang: Ideology, Politics and Terror, 1940-1949', Joseph Heller, 1995, p. 276) (IMG)

The voice of Yellin-Mor represented the majority in the Lehi. Indeed, in a party meeting, the majority voted for Yellin-Mor's program, which envisioned closer ties to the Mapam-Palmach, opposition to the Anglo-American imperialist presence in the Middle East, and the call for an anti-colonial struggle for the eventual establishment of a socialist state in Israel and other Middle Eastern countries. In contradiction to the fascist faction of the Lehi, it did not call for 'population transfers', the chauvinist program by which the Arabs of Palestine would be expelled to the Arab countries in 'exchange' for the Mizrahim of the Arab world. Set within the context of the post-1948-war period, when the progressive factions in Syria and Lebanon had been decimated, the majority program in the Lehi called for the revolutionary overthrow of the reactionary regimes of the Arab countries surrounding Israel. Anyways, Heller, the prominent scholar on the Lehi, wrote:

On the organisational question, too, Friedman-Yellin expressed definite views. Convinced that a 'club' was not enough ('we also need an instrument'), Friedman-Yellin was far more optimistic than Eldad. Although he did not, on this occasion, speak of the impending disintegration of the large parties, he did speak of the possibility of an association with Mapam ('the camp containing the Palmach'). Altogether, 'even though few in number, we must strive for expansion ... it will bring closer the day of the entire homeland's liberation'. Although the speakers seem to have been divided more by organisational issues than by those of ideology, the 'political committee' of the conference presented two separate resolutions. The first, tabled by Friedman-Yellin, voiced the views of the majority and received 14 votes; the second, tabled by Eldad, received only six votes.

It is interesting to compare these two resolutions with Lehi's previous programme. The majority decision, for instance, certainly leaned far more to the left wing of the party than had the earlier document. Thus it made no reference to 'historical natural' borders, instead it employed the new phrase 'the entire homeland' (but did retain the reference to Uri Zvi Greenberg's call for Hebrew 'mastery' (adnut)). On the other hand, the resolution was far more specific in its call for the establishment of a 'socialist' regime (whereas the July programme had spoken of 'national ownership of the country's resources and means of production'). Similarly, the new resolution spoke of the 'identity' between the workers' struggle for their true interests and the national fight for political liberation. Some of these changes might have been generated by a wish to draw somewhat closer to Mapam, as may have been also the explicit reference to the Histadrut as 'the sole unit of professional organisation'. Whatever the case, it is also noteworthy that the new resolution had some significant omissions: no mention was made of the pronounced right-wing call for population exchanges; the code-word 'neutralisation' was absent and the notion was only alluded to; similarly dropped (perhaps under Shamir's influence) was the original programme's reference to an alliance with 'the eastern bloc'. (...). In the plenum, too, Eldad was defeated. The majority resolution was passed by 49 votes to 13 (with 25 abstentions); the minority resolution was defeated by 41 to 19 (with 27 abstentions). Eldad took his defeat badly. (...). The remainder of

the conference was devoted to the passage of largely ceremonial resolutions. These spoke of the dangers inherent in the spread of British imperialism and of the American economic monopoly; deplored the UN armistice commission as an imperialist tool and the plan to form regional blocs under NATO influence as a threat which could involve Israel in war; rejected the armistice agreements signed with the neighbouring Arab countries, since they had forfeited portions of the homeland to 'backward' regimes which were tools in the enemy's hands; called on the Arab masses to bring down their 'enslaving' governments; expressed horror at the anti-Jewish persecutions in Arab lands (but did not call for population transfers, only for the free immigration of Jews to Israel); expressed sorrow at the 'impediments' which in the 'People's democracies' lands had been placed on the free immigration of Jews to Israel; supported the settlement of barren land; and protested at the continued retention of the emergency decrees.

(‘The Stern Gang: Ideology, Politics and Terror, 1940-1949’, Joseph Heller, 1995, p. 276-278) (IMG)

Milstein, who claimed to have contacts with Yellin-Mor, wrote:

In the perspective of 68 years, Natan Yellin-Mor functioned in the style of a Soviet agent of influence, his attitudes and behavior were almost identical to the attitudes and behavior of the Soviet agent, Moshe Sneh. No documents in this direction were revealed about Yellin-Mor, neither in the archives of the Soviet Union after its fall, nor in the Israel Defense Forces. Neither did the Shai members testify about suspicions against him, as they testified about suspicions against Sneh. But not only his positions, but also the way in which the Soviets allowed him to reach Israel strengthens these assumptions about him. For the record, I was friends with Yellin-Mor, and in the 1960s I published lists under the pen name "Uri Sa'ar" in the biweekly Etgar that he edited. I was also in contact with Moshe Sneh, and I had a long conversation with both of them. In light of their intense activity to remove Britain not only from the Land of Israel but also from the Middle East, and in light of their desire for Israel to belong to the Soviet bloc and not the American bloc, at the beginning of the Cold War, the possibility that one of the leaders of the Jewish People served Soviet interests should not be ruled out. The claim in his book that the alternative he proposed had a chance is totally unfounded, if not cynical, because not only would most Israeli Arabs have rejected it, but so would most Jews. And without these two publics it is baseless and delusional speculation. (The Truth About the War of Independence, Chapter 31: Was the leader of Lehi a Soviet agent?, Uri Milstein, October 28, 2016. News1. Bold and underline added.) (IMG)

There has indeed been much speculation and suspicion about ‘the way in which the Soviets allowed [Yellin-Mor] to reach Israel’. The circumstances of his arrival in Israel are unclear. Nonetheless, the CIA and the US State Department regarded the movement which Yellin-Mor as a Soviet-backed cause. According to the US intelligence, the Lehi was funded by the Soviets. In November 1947, the CIA reported:

Recent reports confirm the fact that the Stern gang has connections with the USSR, which is furnishing it with money. The organization has stated that it considers a turn towards Soviet Russia necessary because of the present world situation. It explains that the USSR and the Stern Ganga both desire the creation of a “strong and independent Palestine” which would constitute a rampart against British “imperialist designs” but would “not be hostile” to the Soviet Union. (THE CONSEQUENCE OF THE PARTITION OF PALESTINE, ORE 55, CIA, November 28, 1947, p. 14) (IMG)

In June 1948, the US intelligence station in Jerusalem reported:

Various sources indicate that guidance, money and arms were being provided to Stern gang by Russia through Satellites particularly Poland. Polish Consulates in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv are believed to be in close touch with Stern gang and its commanders Nathan Friedman Yellin and deputy Dr. Israel Scheib. It is also believed Russia will make every effort widen this support as effective means of gaining subversive foothold in Israel. While reports have been received that Menachem Beigin, Commander of IZL, has ordered his followers to orient themselves toward Russian recognition of [and Russian support of Jewish State, no concrete evidence is available to substantiate report. (867N.01/6-2448: Telegram, The Vice Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State, Secret, Jerusalem, June 24, 1948. In: ‘Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Near East, South Asia, and Africa: Part 2’, US State Department, p. 1142) (IMG)

That Begin was funded by the Soviets was a lie, about which Begin himself joked in his memoirs. It is difficult to confirm how accurate the reports of Soviet funding for the Lehi are. Nonetheless, they have been provided here for reference. Undoubtedly, the Soviets would have liked to support the pro-communist faction of the Lehi, officially headed by Natan Yellin-Mor. Almost a decade later, Yellin-Mor founded the party ‘Ha-Peulah Ha-Shemit’ or ‘Semitic Action’, a post-Zionist, pro-Nasserist, communist-inspired organization that called for the unification of the Arab, Hebrew, and Abyssinian peoples into a pan-Semitic federation in ‘clash’ with the colonial powers. The movement publicly declared support for the FLN and established the ‘Israeli Committee for a Free Algeria’. Exotic and sexy though Ha-Peulah Ha-Shemit may sound, one must exercise caution about it, not just because it promoted eclectic and idealistic rhetoric but also for its membership. The movement also had such co-leaders as the Irgun operative Uri Avnery, a rather questionable ‘progressive’ close to the Palestinian terror godfather Yasser Arafat Abu Ammar and close to the Nazi agent Anwar Sadat. Avnery opposed Hafez Al-Assad’s policy of ruthlessly suppressing the Palestinian terrorists and advocated an IDF strike against Syria as assistance to the Palestinian ‘freedom-fighter’ death squads. These facts of course do not discredit the entirety of the Ha-Peulah Ha-Shemit; Avnery could not, on his own, spoil an entire movement and Yellin-Mor reportedly had conflicts with Uri Avnery. Nonetheless, Avnery’s role in this movement is alarming and calls for vigilance.

Back to Lehi in the 1940s. Lord Moyne, a sworn enemy of the Israeli proletariat and kibbutzniks, aimed to establish an ostensibly ‘independent’ State of Israel which would then be subjugated to a Hashemite monarcho-fascist ‘Greater Syrian Federation’:

Moyne’s reputation amongst the Jews was that he was generally hostile to the Zionist cause. In a debate in the House of Lords in June 1942, Moyne had made a speech which was, indeed, highly antagonistic. He stated that neither the Mandate nor the Balfour Declaration had intended Palestine ‘to be converted into a Jewish State against the will of the Arab population’. He opposed ‘the racial domination by the newcomers over the original inhabitants’, and turned the ‘Nazi’ epithet back on the Zionists – ‘If a comparison is to be made with the Nazis, it is surely those who wish to force an imported regime upon the Arab population who are guilty of aggression and domination.’ What is more, Moyne’s interest in anthropology seemingly led him to make racist observations, such as when he remarked that the Arabs were the real Semites and referred to the ‘Armenoid features’ of Sephardi Jews and the ‘Slav blood’ of the Ashkenazim. Yet privately, Moyne had advocated the establishment of a partitioned Jewish state attached to a Greater Syrian Federation. Several historians have argued that, ironically, if Moyne had lived, the State of Israel may well have come into existence in 1945.

The Labour Zionist leadership were aghast at the assassination, not simply because it marked a different set of mores, but because of the political implications, since Moyne was a minister of state and a close friend of Churchill.

(The Land Beyond Promise: Israel, Likud and the Zionist Dream, Colin Schindler, 2002, p. 178) (IMG)

Note that the 'Greater Syrian Federation' did not mean mainland-Syrian leadership of the Levant region but rather was aimed at ensuring an MI6-backed Hashemite Jordanian monarcho-fascist domination of the Levant. Hashemite pan-Syrianism had the support of the British Empire:

Egyptian opposition to Bernadotte Plan has greatly increased due to widely held belief that British support for plan is based principally on desire secure merger Arab Palestine and Transjordan as step in enlarging their sphere of influence and toward creation Greater Syria. (501.BB Palestine/10-1348: Telegram, The Ambassador ;n Egypt (Griffis) to the Acting Secretary of State, Cairo, October 13, 1948. In: 'Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948', Vol. 5, Part 2, US Department of State, 1976, p. 1471) (IMG)

In the meantime, the Amir Abdallah of Transjordan, under the stimulus of Iraq's Arab unity plan, had intensified his own campaign for a Greater Syria oriented toward Jordan. This project of Abdallah's -- like that of Iraq -- was motivated by a long-standing resolution to restore the Hashimite rule over Syria which had collapsed when the French drove Abdallah's brother Faysal from Damascus in July 1920. (Disunity Among the Arab States: The Hashemite Controversy and Arab Palestine, Intelligence Report, Office of Intelligence Research, Department of State, November 24, 1954, p. 4) (IMG)

The 'independent' State of Israel, which could have come to existence in 1945 through the Churchill-Moyne plan, would have been colonially dependent on Jordan, and thus not bearing real independence. Openly supporting the establishment of even a pseudo-independent Israel, however, would have antagonized Moyne in the Arab public, rendering his contacts with the Hashemite monarchy in Jordan more difficult. As such and as mentioned above, publicly, Moyne pretended to be on the side of 'the Arabs' -- the reactionaries among the Arabs -- and 'against' the idea of a pseudo-independent Israel.

The Moyne plan, which was also the Churchill Plan later renamed as the Bernadotte Plan, was an MI6 conspiracy against the region. Nonetheless, the assassination of Lord Moyne was a reckless adventure out of the trouble of which the progressive forces in the Lehi got out solely by fortune. The Mapai, the party of Ben-Gurion and Moshe Dayan, would have liked to crack down on the perpetrators of the assassination. Had the progressive forces in the Lehi not been so fortunate to receive the Palmach's protection, they would have been quickly crushed. Yet, the Palmach agents protected the Lehi and instead canalized the crackdown away from targeting the Lehi and onto combat against the Jabotinskyite fascist terror group, Irgun, led by Menachem Begin. Thus began 'La saison', 'The Season', the Mapam-Palmach military campaign against the Jabotinskyites. A thesis paper by a scholar affiliated with and writing for the US Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), drawing from Israel's experience of disbanding such independent militant groups, aimed to present the US military with options for unifying the militia forces in Iraq and 'stabilizing' the Iraqi military. On the campaign against the Irgun, the paper stated, with reference to the period immediately after the Moyne assassination,:

In September 1944, Moshe Sneh, the commander of Haganah along with another Haganah leader, Eliyahu Golomb, participated in two meetings with Menachem Begin, the leader of the Irgun. The Haganah commanders told Begin that the actions of the Irgun and Stern Gang were not sanctioned by the Jewish community, Haganah or the Jewish Agency, and ordered him to cease the attacks immediately or face civil war and military elimination. Begin attempted to dissuade the Haganah leaders for two months from attacking a fellow Jewish militia, but the assassination of Lord Moyne by members of the Stern Gang resulted in immediate offensive actions by Haganah against both the Stern Gang and the Irgun.

Moyne's assassination in Cairo on November 6, 1944 dealt a major blow to ongoing negotiations between British and the Haganah over their possible integration as a legitimate security force in conjunction with the British occupation. Soon after the assassination, Winston Churchill proclaimed: "If our dreams for Zionism are to end in the smoke of assassins' pistols and our labours for its future are to produce a new set of gangsters...many like myself will have to reconsider the position we have maintained so consistently and so long in the past." The Haganah also immediately condemned the assassination and produced a plan, which involved the collaboration with British police and military, to capture members of the Irgun and Stern Gang. The Haganah's intelligence branch, the Shai, amassed over 250 names, and the Palmach was employed to kidnap suspects and turn them over to British authorities. The Jewish Agency also established a Department of Special Assignments designed to cooperate with the British Intelligence in collecting information on suspected Irgun members. The Season drew to a close in March 1945, when the Haganah abandoned the kidnapping of Irgun and Stern Gang members in response to condemnation by the Jewish community. Joint British-Haganah operations of the Hunting Season resulted in the detention of over 1,000 suspected members with hundreds deported to detention camps in Africa, while severely limiting offensive operations of the Irgun and Stern Gang. This resulted in seven months of increased security and stability. However they did not eliminate the more radical militias.

('U.S. Post-Conflict Integration Policy of Militias in Iraq', Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) - Monterey, California. Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive, James J. Smith, March 2008, pp. 81-82) (IMG)

Actually, the military campaign of the Haganah was launched almost exclusively against the Irgun, and not the Lehi. This was thanks to the lobby of Haganah General Eliyahu Golomb, a leader of the Achdut Ha-Avoda which would later merge with other parties to constitute the Mapam. The Lehi's commander-in-chief Nathan Friedman, known more commonly as Natan Yellin-Mor, headed a pro-Soviet, Arab-friendly, and pro-communist current in the Lehi. He met Eliyahu Golomb and ostensibly 'threatened' the latter that the Lehi would take action against the Haganah if harmed. Supposedly, Golomb was 'scared' off by this threat and thus was ostensibly 'forced' to lobby for the Haganah campaign to be directed merely against the Irgun and not against the actual planners of the Moyne assassination. A prominent scholar on the Lehi wrote:

On the day of the assassination, the leadership of the Yishuv met in special session, where a decision was taken to co-operate fully with the authorities against the 'dissidents' in what was to be termed the 'saison'. The prime target was the larger organisation, which - after their meeting with Begin - Sneh and Golomb considered to be the greater danger to the 'organised Yishuv'. In fact, the Haganah kidnapped dozens of IZL members and only one Lehi member; moreover, while 700 IZL names were handed over to the authorities, no Lehi name is known to have been communicated. Eldad, who was then in prison, thought (as did the IZL internees) that Friedman Yellin and Shamir had managed to frighten the Haganah. What he did not then know was that Lehi and the Haganah had in fact reached some form of agreement, formulated when Friedman-Yellin met Golomb in the wake of the kidnapping of 'Todi' Pelion 16 December 1944. The meeting had not been an easy one (as is illustrated by the fact that Friedman-Yellin placed a gun on the table); as he was later to recall, Friedman-Yellin considered himself to be caught in 'an awful dilemma'. He wanted at all costs to avoid a civil war, but nevertheless felt duty-bound to warn Golomb that Lehi would fight to the bitter end if it had to. Ultimately, and contrary to Eldad's later charges, Friedman-

Yellin did not mean to implement a full 'union' with the Haganah, and any assurance that he might have given to that effect was merely tactical. He did, however, promise to refrain from further actions while Hakim and Bet Tsouri were still awaiting trial and (in response to a direct question from Golomb) not to make any attempts on Churchill's life. However, there was to be no relaxation in Lehi's ideological struggle. Lehi was even more insistent than the IZL in denouncing the 'saison' and in castigating its perpetrators as 'Quislings', 'collaborators' and 'informers'. ('The Stern Gang: Ideology, Politics and Terror, 1940-1949', Joseph Heller, 1995, p. 138) (IMG)

In reality, contrary to the Lehi narrative, there likely was no real 'threat' against Golomb. Golomb and Yellin-Mor had a 'personal relationship' and 'a common line'. In an interview years later, Natan Yellin-Mor recalled:

Q. Regarding the relationship with the Haganah, the beginning of 1942, from the small video, the persecution of your people and the hunt for them, and then during the great season, the Haganah did not persecute the people of Lehi. In general, we hear and read with great interest about the ... Golomb affair and it seems to us that there is a unique relationship between Lehi and the Haganah.

A. First of all, there were personal relationships between Eliyahu Golomb and me. We both had a common line in that neither of us got into a fight, even the most difficult things we said quietly and anyway we didn't come to a dead end soon. Apart from that, I told in the first book that ... I met with Eliyahu Golomb, it was a rather difficult conversation, but I think this conversation was important. I wasn't interested in the war over existence, on the contrary, it was something that haunted me like a nightmare because I knew that even if we managed to hit the Haganah hard, they would hurt us more, and our damage to the Haganah would weaken the main force that eventually join the war, to fight the British.

Q. You saw in Haganah the military arm of the Jewish Agency's organized settlement of the collaborators with the British.

A. On the other hand, I was very careful not to create in Eliyahu Golomb's heart the impression that if they hurt us, we will pass in silence so that there will not be a fratricidal war. We said the opposite, I said and emphasized and conveyed by message to the defense headquarters in Latrun, that this time and in the future we will not pass by in silence for harming us, that we will fight against the foreign government and whoever stands in our way, we will also fight him because it is our duty to defend ourselves.

('Natan Yellin-Mor Tells about His Background', Interviewer: Yehuda Kaveh (from 'Kol Yisrael'), Interviewee: Natan Friedman Yellin-Mor, lehi.org.il) (IMG)

Haganah General Eliyahu Golomb was a leader of Achdut Ha-Avoda, which would later merge with the Poale Tzion Smol and Hashomer Hatzair to form the Mapam. Golomb has been described as a leader who drew inspiration both from right-wing circles and from the Soviet Union, making him the Lehi's preferred eclectic candidate to negotiate with. The Lehi itself received financial support from the Soviet secret service, according to the CIA. The pro-communist current in the Lehi, officially headed by Yellin-Mor, called for cooperation with the Palmach and the Mapam. The Mapam and the pro-Soviet faction of the Lehi were de facto allies. In light of such parallels and connections, it is highly unlikely that Yellin-Mor would have ever seriously threatened Golomb. More likely, the case was rather a collusion between the pro-Soviet commanders in the Haganah and the pro-Soviet commanders of the Lehi with the objective of jointly undermining the Irgun. The Irgun command's assessment of the situation as no significantly different. "Lehi's true colours," reported Heller describing the Irgun command's views, "had been shown during the 'saison', when its leadership – unlike the IZL – had bowed to the Haganah's ultimatum and agreed ... effectively maintaining a cease-fire for an entire year" (p. 159). Thus was unleashed the campaign against the Irgun. The Palmach warriors went ahead for the 'Hunting Season' against the Jabotinskyite terror network. They hunted 'Irgun people, removed Irgun wall posters, protected people who had been threatened by the Irgun, and beat, kidnapped, and arrested Irgun personnel, hiding them in prearranged sites, including kibbutzim':

In the fall of 1944 young men wearing khaki and high boots began appearing in the cities. This marked the beginning of the "hunting season," the saison. They trailed Irgun people, removed Irgun wall posters, protected people who had been threatened by the Irgun, and beat, kidnapped, and arrested Irgun personnel, hiding them in prearranged sites, including kibbutzim. These operations were conducted by the Palmach and the Haganah's security service. More than 200, perhaps 300, Palmach members were recruited for the operation. All the commanders were from the Palmach. In short order the Irgun's archives and arms caches were uncovered. Its apparatus was broken and its ability to raise money dried up.

Palmach members who were involved took pride in their operational ability and military prowess. Allon, the Palmach commander, said that in all the reports from the field there was not a single case in which an operation against the Irgun ended in failure. The Palmach seemed intent on taking the opportunity to demonstrate at long last its military skills.

(The Making of Israeli Militarism, Indiana University Press, Uri Ben-Eliezer, 1998, p. 120) (IMG)

Subsequently, the Mapai, the party of the Kautskyite agents of the Anglo-American secret services, lobbied to ensure that the Irgun terrorists would be handed over to the British police. This measure was outrageous since Menachem Begin, a member of the Betar, had been commander of the MI6-run Anders Army in the 1940s, and had become the commander of the Irgun only upon allowance by the Anders Army hence by the MI6. Seeking to ensure a real prosecution of the Irgun terrorists, the Palmach was opposed to this measure advocated by the Mapai:

The Palmach at first objected to the idea of turning over Irgun members to the British. Allon, the Palmach commander, proposed a one-time operation to arrest 300 Irgun activists. (...). The Palmach's opposition to handing over Irgun people put to the test the leadership's power and authority. At the heart of the conflict between the Palmach and the leadership were two conflicting principles. (The Making of Israeli Militarism, Indiana University Press, Uri Ben-Eliezer, 1998, pp. 121-122) (IMG)

Although, due to the Mapai lobby, the efforts of the Palmach against the Irgun were being undermined, the Palmach nonetheless successfully continued its campaign of capturing the weapons caches of the Irgun and decimating the latter's capability to propagate their fascist views:

The saison afforded the Palmach an opportunity to show its stuff. Some Palmach personnel were cited for their fine work, and a report of the Haganah's intelligence service enumerated the Palmach's achievements: most Irgun branches were eliminated, its arms caches were depleted, its operational ability was paralyzed, its influence on the young generation declined, its members' arrogance was tempered, and many were turned over to the British police.⁵⁴ The effective blow to the breakaways gave the Palmach a stamp of approval for its military way. So when the order came from above to end the saison, bitter complaints were voiced in the organization: Why? After all, the Irgun has not been totally liquidated. The frustration was palpable in a song aimed at the leadership: "Listen, liquidation is a pipe dream, / Don't believe what you might hear. / This is it, the end of the saison, / You know you have a grand illusion." A controversy developed, pointing to the fact that the right to command and the duty to obey did not yet fully characterize the relations between the young fighters and the political leadership. (The Making of Israeli Militarism, Indiana University Press, Uri Ben-Eliezer, 1998, p. 123) (IMG)

Subsequently, the Mapai successfully lobbied for the end of the 'Season':

To clarify the controversy and to put an end to the season, representatives from the national institutions and the Haganah attended a meeting of season activists called by its commander, Shimon Avidan. Palmach members objected to the termination of the season. The Irgun is not totally liquidated, they claimed, and we should not stop the job before it is completely done. The leadership's answer was surprising. It hinted at the need to stop the operations in order to unify all forces against the British. The activists were not convinced. One of those present later recalled that thirty of them spoke and not one favored calling off the operation. Finally, Sneh's patience ran out. "I have spoken!" he exclaimed, repeating the words four times. This event was supposed to show the young people who really had the power to decide in the Yishuv, but Sneh's pathetic repetition later became a means of derision, part of Palmach folklore that symbolized the problems that accompanied the leadership's attempts to constitute its authority over the armed forces. (The Making of Israeli Militarism, Indiana University Press, Uri Ben-Eliezer, 1998, pp. 123-124) (IMG)

Chapter 17

C17S1. Via Iran and Turkey, the Anglo-American Plan for the Nuclear Annihilation of the Soviet Union *** IMG-All-{Iran}

The nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was regarded as not only an anti-Soviet menace, but also as a prelude for war against the Soviet Union. Approximately a month after the US nuclear destruction of Nagasaki and Hiroshima, the US Air Force produced a strategic plan for the nuclear annihilation of the Soviet Union. Written on September 15, 1945, a copy of the document was submitted by US Airforce General Lauris Norstad to Major General Leslie Groves. "It is ... obvious," stated the US Airforce's report,:

that during this period Russia and the United States will be the outstanding military powers. (Atomic Bomb Production, Memorandum for Major General, War Department, Headquarters of the Army Air Forces, September 15, 1945. p. 2) (IMG)

Thus:

For the purpose of this study the destruction of the Russian capability to wage war has therefore been used as a basis upon which to predicate the United States' atomic bomb requirements. (Atomic Bomb Production, Memorandum for Major General, War Department, Headquarters of the Army Air Forces, September 15, 1945. p. 2) (IMG)

Of the Soviet cities, 66 were designated as most strategic:

As a foundation, a list was compiled of all Russian cities having any major strategic importance. These 66 cities were plotted on the map shown as Appendix "A" to TAB "A". This list is quite comprehensive. - The following percentages of total Russian production are accomplished in these cities: Aircraft 95%, tanks 97%, guns 73%, trucks 88%, steel 45%, oil refining 95%, aluminum 100%, lead 48%, nickel 60%, zinc 44%. in addition, the majority of all ball-bearing, synthetic rubber, and machine tools are manufactured in these areas. It is to be noted that the above statistics mainly include basic and heavy industry which is normally more remotely located than those industries engaged in the manufacture of the end products. It is therefore logical to assume that an even greater proportion of Russian total manufacturing is concentrated in these 66 cities, which include all of Russia's large population and industrial concentrations. (Atomic Bomb Production, Memorandum for Major General, War Department, Headquarters of the Army Air Forces, September 15, 1945. p. 3. Retrieved from: Alex Wellerstein's 'Nuclear Secrecy') (IMG)

The US army designated:

a group of 15 first priority cities and a group of 25 first and second priority cities.... (...). [T]he bulk of all major industries upon which statistics are available is concentrated in the fifteen first priority targets. Only in aluminum and oil refining is there any significant increase in percentage produced between the first priority cities and the total list of cities. (Atomic Bomb Production, Memorandum for Major General, War Department, Headquarters of the Army Air Forces, September 15, 1945. p. 3. Retrieved from: Alex Wellerstein's 'Nuclear Secrecy') (IMG)


The above-shown map and table, retrieved from the US Airforce document, summarizes the number of atomic bombs for each number of priority-category of cities.

Why is this point about nuclear weapons being mentioned within the context of the Middle East conflict? It is because the USSR's South Caucasus flank was the only area in which there did not exist a geostrategic buffer against Anglo-American aggression. At the same time, it was a very oil-rich area which the Anglo-American imperialists prioritized as the target for the nuclear bombing. After Moscow, Baku was the topmost target for a nuclear strike in the Pentagon planning. Hence, on the one hand, the Soviet Caucasus was essentially critical for the Soviet war effort and on the other hand, it was geostrategically vulnerable to an Anglo-American invasion, in the spirit of Operation PIKE (see C9S7), against the Soviet Caucasus oilfields. That is why the Middle East theatre gained an additional importance for during the Cold War. More will be mentioned about this.

18. In summary, it is computed that the United States requirements for stocks of atomic bombs are as follows:

<u>Minimum</u>		<u>Optimum</u>	
For incapacitation of 15 first priority targets -	39	For destruction of 66 cities of strategic importance -	204
For neutralization of possible enemy bases in the Western Hemisphere -	10	For neutralization of possible enemy bases in the Western Hemisphere -	10
For Strategic isolation of the battlefield -	<u>10</u>	For Strategic isolation of the battlefield -	<u>10</u>
Total	59	Total	224
Probable effectiveness factor -	48%	Probable effectiveness factor -	48%
Minimum requirement = $59 \div .48$ or		Optimum requirement = $224 \div .48$ or	
<u>123</u> bombs		<u>466</u> bombs	

Minimum 15 priority cities and optimum 66 strategic cities for a US nuclear strike on the USSR



September 15, 1945 – US Airforce lays the plan for a US nuclear attack on the USSR
 Source: (Alex Wellerstein's 'Nuclear Secrecy')

Oil Concessions from Iran's Regime * IMG-All-[Iran]**

Even Stephen L. McFarland – who was a Visiting Professor of Military History at the United States Air Force Air War College, during 1992-1993 – acknowledged that Iran's regime was aiming to hand over Iran's northern petroleum to the Americans. In McFarland's words, the 'Iranian government in April included the northern provinces in the prospective American concession':

In early 1943 the Iranian commercial attaché in Washington approached Standard Vacuum to seek an agreement for an oil concession. The American government and firms jumped on the invitation once it was made, in spite of warnings from the U.S. minister in Tehran and from the head of the American economic advisory mission that oil negotiations in Iran might jeopardize Allied unity. In December

the Iranian government sent official invitations to Standard Vacuum and Standard Oil of New Jersey. Constant delays in the negotiations over the next year caused the Iranian prime minister to encourage American companies to forestall any Soviet or British interference. In February 1944 the Soviets reminded Iran of their "prior rights" to northern Oil. Disregarding the warning, the Iranian government in April included the northern provinces in the prospective American concession. British oil interests joined the competition in late 1943, but the Soviets did not join until September 1944. (Peripheral View of the Origins of the Cold War: The Crises in Iran, 1941-47, Stephen L. McFarland, American Diplomacy in the Second World War, Vol. 8 of: The American Experience in World War II, Edited with introductions by: Walter L. Hixson, University of Akron, Ohio, p. 253) (IMG)

Once again, the regime in Iran was violating the 1921 treaty with the USSR, which stated that the USSR would renounce all Tsarist-era claims over Iranian resources, including oil, provided that Iran does not grant oil concessions to any other foreign power. The Article 13 of the 1921 Soviet-Iranian Friendship Treaty had stated:

The Persian Government, for its part, promises not to cede to a third Power, or to its subjects, the concessions and property restored to Persia by virtue of the present Treaty, and to maintain those rights for the Persian nation. (Persia and the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic - Treaty of Friendship, signed at Moscow, February 26, 1921 [1922] LNTSer 69; 9 LNTS 383, p. 5) (IMG)

In other words, the treaty had given Iran's oil exclusively to Iran, while prohibiting it from granting oil concessions to any other foreign country. Since the 1920s, Iran had consistently violated the treaty, and had variously granted Iran's oil to the Americans, the British, and the Nazi Germans. Iran once again was violating the treaty by aiming to grant the northern oil to the American companies. This time around, the Soviet Union could not afford to allow Iran's regime to get away with its violations of international treaties. The Soviets took firm steps and tough measures to prevent Iran's regime from granting the oil to the Americans:

Actual Soviet aggression and interference in Iranian affairs was limited until October 1944, when Iran announced its decision to postpone all negotiations for an oil concession until after the war. The oil crisis of that month became a catalyst for the Soviet-American confrontation over Iran. The apparent anti-Soviet nature of the postponement encouraged the Soviet Union to see an American attempt to seize Iranian oil for itself. (Peripheral View of the Origins of the Cold War: The Crises in Iran, 1941-47, Stephen L. McFarland, American Diplomacy in the Second World War, Vol. 8 of: The American Experience in World War II, Edited with introductions by: Walter L. Hixson, University of Akron, Ohio, p. 252) (IMG)

Thus, in accordance with international law, the Soviets demanded a petroleum concession from Iran:

On 2 October 1944 the Soviets made an official offer, followed shortly by demand for an oil concession. (Peripheral View of the Origins of the Cold War: The Crises in Iran, 1941-47, Stephen L. McFarland, American Diplomacy in the Second World War, Vol. 8 of: The American Experience in World War II, Edited with introductions by: Walter L. Hixson, University of Akron, Ohio, p. 253) (IMG)

The purpose of this demand for an oil concession was not Soviet 'imperialist' 'ambition' to 'steal' 'Iranian' resources. Rather, in the words of the staunch anti-Soviet Cold Warrior George Kennan, the Soviets undertook this measure in order to force the Persian regime to not grant oil to foreign countries:

The basic motive of recent Soviet action in northern Iran is probably not need for the oil itself but apprehension of potential foreign penetration in that area coupled with the concern for prestige which marks all Soviet policy these days. The oil of northern Iran is important not as something Russia needs but as something it might be dangerous to permit anyone else to exploit. The territory lies near the vital Caucasian oil centers which so closely escaped complete conquest in the present war. The Kremlin deems it essential to Russian security that no other great power should have even the chance of gaining a footing there. It probably sees no other way to assure this than by seeking greater political and economic control for itself and finds this aim consistent with contemporary Soviet conceptions of prestige. (891.6363/11-744: Telegram, The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State, November 7, 1944; Received: November 8, 1944. 4266. In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: DIPLOMATIC PAPERS, 1944, THE NEAR EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA, THE FAR EAST. Vol 5.) (IMG)

As a result of this Soviet move,:

Iran's *movazaneh* strategy had backfired. Instead of attracting the United States as a buffer against Anglo-Soviet participation in oil matters, Iran was left with all three countries simultaneously demanding concessions. (Peripheral View of the Origins of the Cold War: The Crises in Iran, 1941-47, Stephen L. McFarland, American Diplomacy in the Second World War, Vol. 8 of: The American Experience in World War II, Edited with introductions by: Walter L. Hixson, University of Akron, Ohio, p. 253) (IMG)

'Movazaneh' in Farsi means 'balancing'; in the context of Iranian strategy, it implies striking a 'balance' between foreign superpowers, much like what the 'non-aligned movement' officially claimed to represent. By demanding an oil concession from Iran, the Iranian government had no other option than to prohibit any further oil concessions to any country – not just the Soviets, but also to the British and the Americans. For the Iranian leaders, as McFarland put it:

The only way out was to deny concessions to all, which Iran did on 8 October. (Peripheral View of the Origins of the Cold War: The Crises in Iran, 1941-47, Stephen L. McFarland, American Diplomacy in the Second World War, Vol. 8 of: The American Experience in World War II, Edited with introductions by: Walter L. Hixson, University of Akron, Ohio, p. 253) (IMG)

The Soviets had reached their objective of preventing US infiltration into northern Iran. While preventing Iran's regime from handing over Iranian people's oil resources to the Anglo-Americans was necessary, the fact remains that Iran's regime itself was an Anglo-American puppet state. This meant that the revenue generated by Iran's extraction of the northern oil was not going to go to the Iranian people but rather to the Anglo-American imperialists and their fascist anti-Soviet mercenaries. In this midst therefore, it was necessary to deprive the Anglo-American puppet state from its access to the natural oil resources. The Soviet Union on the other hand represented the interests of the people of Iran's north, people who were opposed to the Anglo-Americans' covert control of their oil through the puppet state. The presence of a Soviet front company, under the cover of oil exploration, in Iran could facilitate the process of funding and arming anti-regime rebels that would bring about a Tudeh-led Iranian People's Democracy.

As such, a large-scale popular unrest took place against the government's decision to not grant oil concessions to the USSR. In Tabriz, the major Turkic and industrial city in Iran, massive demonstrations led by the Tudeh Party erupted against the Persian government over the oil concessions:

About 8 o'clock on October 30 a serious demonstration took place in Tabriz following upon demands made by the Tudeh (Communist) Party on the Iranian Government to reverse its policy on the petroleum concession demanded by the Russians. (891.00/11-144: Telegram, The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State, Tehran, November 1, 1944; Received: November 1, 1944. In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: DIPLOMATIC PAPERS, 1944, THE NEAR EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA, THE FAR EAST, Vol. 5, p. 464) (IMG)

Similar events occurred in Rasht, the capital city of Iran's Gilan province:

The shops at Resht have been closed in so-called protest against the Iranian Government's decision not to grant the Russian petroleum concession. Rumors of disorder are trickling in from other points north. (891.00/11-144: Telegram, The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State, Tehran, November 1, 1944; Received: November 1, 1944. In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: DIPLOMATIC PAPERS, 1944, THE NEAR EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA, THE FAR EAST, Vol. 5, p. 464) (IMG)

Finally, the Iranian Prime Minister Sa'ed feared a similar event in Tehran:

The [Iranian] Prime Minister apprehends the possibility of further trouble in Tehran next Friday. (891.00/11-144: Telegram, The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State, Tehran, November 1, 1944; Received: November 1, 1944. In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: DIPLOMATIC PAPERS, 1944, THE NEAR EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA, THE FAR EAST, Vol. 5, p. 464) (IMG)

All of these facts about the protests in Tabriz, Rasht and potentially Tehran were confirmed by the top ranks of the Persian government and the British Consul General in Tabriz:

The facts about the demonstration cited above are reported to me personally by Prime Minister Saed and by Court Minister Ala and are confirmed by a telegram from the British Acting Consul General at Tabriz to his Ambassador here. (891.00/11-144: Telegram, The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State, Tehran, November 1, 1944; Received: November 1, 1944. In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: DIPLOMATIC PAPERS, 1944, THE NEAR EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA, THE FAR EAST, Vol. 5, pp. 464-465) (IMG)

The Prime Minister has just told me and the British Ambassador that he plans to offer his resignation this afternoon. He believes that this will relieve the tension, at least temporarily. The Shah will accept the resignation reluctantly unless he is given encouragement by the British and American Governments to resist Russian interference. (891.00/11-144: Telegram, The Ambassador in Iran (Morris) to the Secretary of State, Tehran, November 1, 1944; Received: November 1, 1944. In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: DIPLOMATIC PAPERS, 1944, THE NEAR EAST, SOUTH ASIA, AND AFRICA, THE FAR EAST, Vol. 5, pp. 464-465) (IMG)

Unable to suppress the unrest, Prime Minister Sa'ed resigned shortly after.

C17S2. Introduction to the Tudeh Party *** IMG-All-{Iran}

Iran was still in the phase of bourgeois-democratic revolution against feudal vestiges and imperialism-fascism. As such, the Tudeh Party of Iran, which was formed by the communists, was officially a bourgeois-democratic party. It was a progressive anti-imperialist popular front party led by the communist agents of the Iranian proletariat. This is why, instead of calling itself the 'communist party', the Party named itself 'Tudeh' because the term meant 'mass'. Analyzing the stances of the Tudeh Party of Iran, the CIA corroborated:

The party machinery, organized along Communist lines of "democratic centralism," has been dominated from the outset by a combination of veteran Soviet-trained agitators and Marxist intellectuals, most of whom have been comrades in arms ever since they were thrown together in the prisons of Iran during the Reza Shah regime. (THE TUDEH PARTY: VEHICLE OF COMMUNISM IN IRAN (ORE 23-49), CIA, July 18, 1949, p. 1) (IMG)

Furthermore, the CIA stated:

the party has also advocated such objectives as the eight-hour [work] day, recognition of the rights of unions, social insurance, protection of mothers and children, and legal and social equality for women. Although most of its platform relates to the laboring classes, it has asserted that it is not merely a party of the workers but the spokesman for 90 percent of the nation. It has repeatedly stated that it works to uphold the Constitution, is in no way opposed to "constitutional laws," and "has no quarrel with the principles of private ownership." Apparently nothing has angered the leaders of the Tudeh Party so much as the accusation that the party is Communist and has ties with the USSR. Statements in Tudeh newspapers and books stress the democratic, anti-fascist, and anti-reactionary character of the party. The official line is that the party is a native organization, working for the good of the Iranian nation, which is not and will not become Communist; "if our party publishes pro-Soviet articles, it is because the Soviets fight well against the fascists."

(THE TUDEH PARTY: VEHICLE OF COMMUNISM IN IRAN (ORE 23-49), CIA, July 18, 1949, p. 6) (IMG)

As a matter of fact, during the Great Patriotic War, the Tudeh Party officially and rightly favored a system similar to the bourgeois-democratic model existing in the United States and Britain, but by the end of the war, denounced the Anglo-American imperialists once the alliance between the Axis and the Anglo-Americans became increasingly clear:

The official attitude of the party toward the US and UK was at first mild; in 1944 it spoke of establishing a government "on the type of the English and American democracies," while the party leaders then appeared to view the US with a certain amount of good will. However, the party line soon thereafter began to harden first against the UK and then against the US. Against the British, the Tudeh leaders developed the theme of the "one-sided policy" arguing that the British had maintained dominance over Iranian foreign affairs and Iranian politicians, particularly of the reactionary elements.... (THE TUDEH PARTY: VEHICLE OF COMMUNISM IN IRAN (ORE 23-49), CIA, July 18, 1949, p. 6) (IMG)

Over time, the Tudeh Party stepped up its media campaign against Anglo-American imperial presence in Iran:

insisting that Iran receive a much return from the operations of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company; alleging that the British-owned Imperial Bank of Iran LS operated entirely for the benefit of the UK; stating that the Shah's visit to the UK in the summer of 1948 was for the purpose of instructions from the British; and repeating the common charge that many of present "reactionary" leaders of Iran are in the pay of the British. (THE TUDEH PARTY: VEHICLE OF COMMUNISM IN IRAN (ORE 23-49), CIA, July 18, 1949, p. 7) (IMG)

The party is most vehement, as might be expected, about US activities in Iran. vigorously opposed the US arms credit bill which was finally passed by the Majlis in February 1948 and has consistently dismissal of the US military missions to the Iranian Army and to the gendarmerie, alleging that US activities in Iran are part of a plan for creating military bases in various parts of the world and charging that airports are being constructed in Iran under US supervision. (THE TUDEH PARTY: VEHICLE OF COMMUNISM IN IRAN (ORE 23-49), CIA, July 18, 1949, p. 7) (IMG)

Note that during that time period, the religious population of Iran were unwilling to 'convert' to communism. They instead preferred progressive politics. That is why the Tudeh Party was rightly presenting itself as a secular progressive non-communist party favouring close strategic relations with the Soviet Union, just like the Mapam in Israel. And just like how the communists in the Mapam had adopted the 'Socialist Zionist' culture as the political culture of their popular front party in order to blend more easily amongst the Israeli proletarians, the secular Tudeh Party did adopt some of the Shia Islamist 'values' as its political culture and "initially ... organized Moharram processions, and designated a special prayer room in its main clubhouse" (See: 'Tortured Confessions', written by Ervand Abrahamian, page 77) as a popular front tactic of including as many the progressive-minded proletarians and intellectuals, who nonetheless held religious views, in the struggle against Anglo-American imperialism in Iran. The Tudeh Party is of course well-known for having advanced women's rights and secular politics, but it did adopt a Shia Islamic image to some extent. For a while, the left-deviationist current resurged in influence in the Tudeh Party, but was later put down. The left-deviationist tendency in the party sought to weaken communist influence by eliminating the popular front and ending the proletarian alliance with the bourgeoisie. In so doing, the left-deviation would have undermined communist influence in Iran which had taken the form of the communist-led popular front. In response, the:

Tudeh leadership felt compelled ("since the party is neither communistic nor revolutionary") to denounce the "Marxist Trotskyites" within its ranks as representing a "left deviation." (THE TUDEH PARTY: VEHICLE OF COMMUNISM IN IRAN (ORE 23-49), CIA, July 18, 1949, p. 6) (IMG)

Since the anti-Trotskyite purge, however,:

the Tudeh Party has devoted energy to denying any ties with the Soviet Union and more energy to attacking the "enemies" of the USSR. (THE TUDEH PARTY: VEHICLE OF COMMUNISM IN IRAN (ORE 23-49), CIA, July 18, 1949, p. 6) (IMG)

In itself, popular front activity was the most correct policy line for the situation in Iran. However, the challenge faced by popular fronts is that it can allow infiltration by opportunists. The Tudeh Party made note of this serious problem and self-criticized:

On 1 January 1947 ... the Tudeh leadership confessed that the party, by encouraging quantity rather than quality, had granted membership to corrupt opportunists and adventurers who had ignored the instructions of the Central Committee and injured the feelings of many of their fellow countrymen. (THE TUDEH PARTY: VEHICLE OF COMMUNISM IN IRAN (ORE 23-49), CIA, July 18, 1949, pp. 4-5) (IMG)

Again, the main source of opportunism during that time period emanated from the left-opportunists who aimed to sabotage the Tudeh Party's popular front tactics. In spite of the challenges it faced, the Tudeh Party of Iran, as confirmed by the CIA in the 1949 document and US Army Captain James Muhl, grew to become the only genuinely popularly-supported party and movement in Iran:

The Tudeh Party is significant not only because of its Soviet connections, which make it the logical nucleus for a quisling government should the USSR accelerate its efforts to interfere in Iran, but also because of the head start it has obtained in rousing certain important elements of the Iranian people from their political apathy. **The other parties which have sprung up in Iran since the fall of the Reza Shah dictatorship are at present chiefly loose associations of notables, leaving the Tudeh Party as the only political group which has achieved any degree of genuine popular support.** Although the Tudeh organization has scarcely begun to organize Iran's vast peasantry, it has made **notable strides in the towns**, which constitute the principal centers of power and control in Iran. Utilizing the **Tudeh-created Central United Council of Trade Unions, the party at one time had more than 70,000 members** — about one-third of Iran's industrial population — and has been particularly active in such key installations as the Iranian State Railway, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, and government-owned factories. (THE TUDEH PARTY: VEHICLE OF COMMUNISM IN IRAN (ORE 23-49), CIA, July 18, 1949, p. 1) (IMG)

The Tudeh had become the largest political organization in the country after a spurt of rapid growth. By August 1946, it had a core membership of 50,000 and a total roster of 100,000 active members. Together with the Democratic Party of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan and through its several trade unions, the Tudeh could mobilize about 335,000 political supporters — a formidable force. (Iran and the Big Powers, 1900-1953. DTIC, Captain James Howard Muhl, Jr. April 26, 1985, p. 61) (IMG)

The CIA further reported:

sixty percent of this membership consists of factory and railroad workers, with the remainder scattered rather evenly through Iran's other social classes. The country's predominant peasant population accounts for only about eight percent of the membership total. (THE TUDEH PARTY: VEHICLE OF COMMUNISM IN IRAN (ORE 23-49), CIA, July 18, 1949, p. 13) (IMG)

Due to its widespread influence among the urban proletarians,:

the Tudeh organization is well fitted to further Soviet policy by undertaking sabotage, work stoppages, and disturbances at critical points within Iran or by setting up a new group of regional autonomist movements. (THE TUDEH PARTY: VEHICLE OF COMMUNISM IN IRAN (ORE 23-49), CIA, July 18, 1949, pp. 1-2) (IMG)

Iran's regime banned the Tudeh Party of Iran in early 1949. As confirmed by the CIA:

In February 1949, the Tudeh organization was outlawed by the Iranian Government, and a number of its leaders were arrested (and later convicted) on charges of treasonable activity. (THE TUDEH PARTY: VEHICLE OF COMMUNISM IN IRAN (ORE 23-49), CIA, July 18, 1949, p. 1) (IMG)

However even as late as July of that same year, the CIA remarked:

Despite these reverses, the Tudeh Party will continue to be an important factor in Iran's future so long as the lagging of social and economic reform creates a reservoir of popular unrest upon which to draw. (THE TUDEH PARTY: VEHICLE OF COMMUNISM IN IRAN (ORE 23-49), CIA, July 18, 1949, p. 1) (IMG)

While the party has been temporarily driven underground, it will undoubtedly proceed with its announced intentions of carrying on the struggle.... (THE TUDEH PARTY: VEHICLE OF COMMUNISM IN IRAN (ORE 23-49), CIA, July 18, 1949, p. 1) (IMG)

The undemocratic and anti-popular system in Iran, having banned the Tudeh Party in 1949, made revolutionary uprising the only option for the Tudeh party:

It is hardly likely that the Tudeh leadership has any real hope of gaining power through peaceful means, especially in view of the tight control over electoral processes exercised by Iran's present ruling class. (THE TUDEH PARTY: VEHICLE OF COMMUNISM IN IRAN (ORE 23-49), CIA, July 18, 1949, pp. 1-2) (IMG)

Hence, to this popular communist-led bourgeois-democratic movement in Iran, the camp of the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies provided covert military, financial, intelligence, and transportation support. The US intelligence reported:

practical types of Soviet support are provided through appropriate Soviet commercial and cultural organizations in Iran. The assistance provided by such organizations is considerable. the Soviet Hospital at Tehran has supplied the party with newsprint; Iransovtrans has supplied weapons and vehicles, has transported individuals, and has maintained courier services; Iranian-Soviet Fisheries Company has used its boats to smuggle individuals and weapons into Iran; and VOKS and Tass have supplied propaganda material. A number of Soviet organizations have supplied the party with financial assistance, and there is even a report as yet unconfirmed, that the party receives (via the Czechoslovakian Legation) a monthly subsidy of 2,225,000 rials (\$69,000) in cash or easily disposable merchandise. In Tehran, *mohajirs* [emigrants from the Soviet Union] have been supplied with second-hand clothing to hawk in the street and have received free meals at the Hotel Gilan-i-No against ration cards issued by the Soviet Embassy. agents have been supplied for Tudeh organizational work; for example, a Czechoslovakian Communist named Franz Jingar has been active with the party at Isfahan, while a Russian-born agent named Hushangi was at one time the leader of organizational activity at Nowshahr, on the Caspian Sea. (THE TUDEH PARTY: VEHICLE OF COMMUNISM IN IRAN (ORE 23-49), CIA, July 18, 1949, p. 12) (IMG)

In 1945, the Tudeh Party of Iran participated in the Majlis (Parliament) election, but its key representative Ja'far Pishevari, who was elected from Tabriz, was discriminated against and not allowed into the Parliament:

(Ja'far Pishevari, later head of the free Azerbaijan regime, was elected from Tabriz but the Majlis refused to seat him), while an additional seven deputies are believed to have been covert members of the party. This small Tudeh "fraction" in the alert, more skilled in debate, and more sure of purpose than the other deputies – was very outspoken in the chamber and did much to obstruct the legislative process. (THE TUDEH PARTY: VEHICLE OF COMMUNISM IN IRAN (ORE 23-49), CIA, July 18, 1949, p. 4) (IMG)

In response to the undemocratic character of the regime, the:

Tudeh organization in the field worked to strengthen its hand in preparation for the Soviet-directed attempt to shatter the Tehran government's authority which was made at the end of the war. (THE TUDEH PARTY: VEHICLE OF COMMUNISM IN IRAN (ORE 23-49), CIA, July 18, 1949, p. 4) (IMG)

Thus:

At the end of September 1945 a group of Tudeh-backed army officers began a premature revolt in the Khorasan area east of the Caspian Sea. Meanwhile, however, the very active Tabriz section of the party had set itself up as a new and nominally distinct organization, the Democratic Party of Azerbaijan, and had begun its agitation for autonomy. By the spring of 1946 the Iranian Government was confronted Soviet-backed autonomous regimes in both Azerbaijan and Kurdistan, new Tudeh agitation in Khorasan and along the Caspian coast, Soviet demands for an oil concession, and strong opposition from the right-wing politicians. The term of the XIV Majlis was ending in confusion, its final sessions left quorumless because of the Tudeh demonstrators massed before its meeting place. (THE TUDEH PARTY: VEHICLE OF COMMUNISM IN IRAN (ORE 23-49), CIA, July 18, 1949, p. 4) (IMG)

C17S3. The Rise and Struggles of People's Democratic Azerbaijan in Iran / Use of Turkey and Iran as a Route for a Nuclear Holocaust in Baku / The Assassination of Ja'far Pishevari *** IMG-All-{Iran}

By the end of the Great Patriotic War, the Azeri population in Iran no longer identified itself with the latter. As mentioned in C4S2, this trend had started since the end of the First World War. Referring to the Azeri population in his 1979 book, Richard W. Cottam – the infamous American spy who served in the covert operations division of the CIA between 1953 and 1958 and as a diplomat and Political Officer in the US Embassy in Tehran between 1956 and 1958 – admitted:

nothing that happened prior to 1946 indicates positively that the majority of the population identified themselves with Iran. These were lean years for Azerbaijan. Reza Shah's policy of centralizing commerce in Tehran hit Tabriz particularly hard. The city lost its commercial pre-eminence, and the most active and vital of its citizenry moved to Tehran. Their departure emasculated Azerbaijan as a political center. (Nationalism in Iran: Updated Through 1978, Richard W. Cottam, 1979, p. 124) (IMG)

Under such circumstances, the Azeris of Iran grew increasingly sympathetic towards a communist-led sovereigntist popular-democratic movement:

the strong dissatisfaction plus whatever separatist sentiment existed helped create the impression that influenced Soviet policy makers in the latter days of World War II. In Tabriz and in every other Azerbaijan city of any size, a communist coterie existed, ready and willing to assume the leadership of a separatist movement. Support could be expected from much of the Christian element; the Iranian army could easily be neutralized by the Soviet occupation forces; land and social reforms should produce acquiescence, if not sympathy, from the huge peasant and illiterate worker population; and because of general dissatisfaction, little opposition could be expected from the small layer of Iranian nationalists. (Nationalism in Iran: Updated Through 1978, Richard W. Cottam, 1979, p. 125) (IMG)

The leader of the new communist-led Azeri sovereigntist partisan resistance movement was:

Ja'far Pishevari, a life-long communist with official credentials: the first Secretary of the Adalat Committee in Baku, one of three Secretaries of its successor Communist Party of Iran, a participant in the Jangali movement and a member of the nine-man executive committee heading the Soviet Socialist Republic of Gilan. When Reza Shah imprisoned Pishevari from 1925 to 1941, he made contact with Dr. Erani's communist group. (Iran and the Big Powers, 1900-1953. DTIC, Captain James Howard Muhl, Jr. April 26, 1985, p. 58) (IMG)

On September 1945, Pishevari founded the 'Firqeh ye Demokrat', or the Democratic Party of Azerbaijan, a communist-led partisan sovereigntist movement:

Pishevari announced the formation of the Firqah-i Dimokrat in September 1945. Immediately, he was able to absorb the local Tudeh Party and convene the first party congress that October. (Iran and the Big Powers, 1900-1953. DTIC, Captain James Howard Muhl, Jr. April 26, 1985, p. 58) (IMG)

The Azerbaijan Democratic Party enjoyed the overwhelming popular support of the peasant and proletarian masses. Referring to the population of Azerbaijan, Cottam admitted:

the elements of the population that gave support were the very groups that understood politics the least – the peasants and illiterate laborers. Large numbers of these people willingly served in the Democratic army and accepted Russian uniforms and Russian equipment. (Nationalism in Iran: Updated Through 1978, Richard W. Cottam, 1979, pp. 126-127) (IMG)

On September 16th, the Democratic Party:

launched their revolution in Azerbaijan. ('Iran and the Big Powers, 1900-1953'. DTIC, Captain James Howard Muhl, Jr. April 26, 1985, p. 58)

The Soviets aimed to assist the Azeri proletariat and peasantry in Iran to emancipate themselves and create a People's Democratic state:

The Soviets were willing to work with the Azerbaijani communists, despite differing party orthodoxy and allegiances. The Democratic Party of Azerbaijan, or the Firqah-i Dimokrat, was a communal organization appealing exclusively to the people of Azerbaijan. ('Iran and the Big Powers, 1900-1953'. DTIC, Captain James Howard Muhl, Jr. April 26, 1985, p. 58) (IMG)

As always, the strategic interests of the Soviet state of the proletariat converged with those of the proletariat and peasantry in other countries – in this case, the Azerbaijani proletariat and peasantry in Iran. The position of the Soviet Union in its southern Caucasian flank was rather weak. The Soviet Caucasus region had been encircled by a hostile treacherous Turkey and a royalist Persia, both neo-colonies of the Anglo-American imperialists. Via this route, the Anglo-American imperialists could launch their nuclear strike on Baku. Note that after Moscow, Baku was the priority for the Anglo-American imperialists because of its tremendous oil resources, the most strategic commodity for resisting the Anglo-American imperialist aggressors during the potential Third World War. The Soviet state's support for the Azerbaijani uprising in Iran helped strengthen the defenses of the southern Caucasian flank of the USSR against the Anglo-American imperialist bombardment plots. In the words of CIA and State Department consultant Melvyn Leffler:

one suspects that Soviet military planners were eager to capitalize upon the presence of Soviet troops in Iran to safeguard their strategic interests, especially to help protect their petroleum fields and refining industry. They certainly must have known, as did American planners, that in 1940 the British and French contemplated bombing Soviet oil fields in the Caucasus in order to deny petroleum to the Nazis. Soviet planners, having observed the functioning of the Persian Corridor during World War II, must also have been wary of its future use in wartime if it should be controlled by an adversary. (Safeguarding Democratic Capitalism: US Foreign Policy and National Security, 1920-1950. Melvyn P. Leffler, 2017, p. 211) (IMG)

According to the professional journal of the US Army,:

In Moscow, only a week after the formation of the Azerbaijan Republic, the American Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes, queried Stalin about the Soviet troops in northern Iran. Stalin replied that they were necessary to prevent Iran from sabotaging Russian oil fields in Baku. (The Azerbaijan Incident, US Major William R. Andrews. In: 'Military Review: The Professional Journal of the US Army', Vol. 54, No. 8, August 1974, p. 79) (IMG)


The vulnerability of the Soviets in Caucasus was real, as the Anglo-Americans seriously planned to use Turkey as a launching pad for a nuclear and conventional strike on the Soviet Caucasus oilfields. It was in September 1945 that the United States military hatched the plots for 204 nuclear bombs to be dropped on 66 Soviet cities (more details in C17S1). The US military designated 15 Soviet cities in particular as the priority cities for a nuclear strike; in that list of 15, the second greatest priority for the United States was Baku due to its industrialization as well as the rich petroleum resources it contained. A CIA document corroborating the significance of the Middle East frontier, pointed to the strategic importance of Baku's oil fields for the USSR:

It is, moreover, an area of Soviet strategic interest, even greater than that of eastern Europe, in view of the general shift of Soviet industry away from the European Frontier, but still within range of air attack from the south, and of the vital importance of Baku oil in the Soviet economy. It is in the Middle East, however, that Soviet interest comes into collision with the established interest of Great Britain and that there is consequently the greatest danger of precipitating a major conflict. Soviet policy in the area must therefore be pursued with due caution and flexibility. (Soviet Foreign and Military Policy, ORE 1, Central Intelligence Group (CIA Predecessor), July 23, 1946, p. 7) (IMG)

The threat of an American nuclear attack on Soviet Caucasus oilfields was very real. Leffler noted:

It was this very vulnerability that United States strategic planners hoped to capitalize on. In fact, United States interest in Turkey accelerated as war planners began to develop a strategic concept for the postwar era and as overall United States-Soviet relations deteriorated sharply in early 1946. In September 1945 strategic planners emphasized "the necessity of keeping a prospective enemy at the maximum possible distance, and conversely of projecting our advance bases into areas well removed from the United States, so as to project our operations with new weapons [i.e. nuclear weapons] or otherwise nearer the enemy." (Safeguarding Democratic Capitalism: US Foreign Policy and National Security, 1920-1950. Melvyn P. Leffler, 2017, p. 172) (IMG)

the Joint War Plans Committee (JWPC) launched a series of studies code-named PINCHER late in 1945 to explore the problems of waging a war against the Soviet Union. The first fruit of this exercise appeared on March 2, 1946, when the JWPC forwarded a broad concept of operations to the Joint Staff Planners. With refinement, this became the basic concept of operations around which strategic planning revolved for the next several years. Dealing only with the opening stages of a conflict, PINCHER envisioned war breaking out in the eastern Mediterranean or Near East and spreading rapidly across Europe. (Council of War: A History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1942-1991. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Published for the Joint History Office of the Director, Joint Staff, Steven L. Rearden, 2012, p. 71) (IMG)



The 15 priority target cities for a nuclear strike. Source: (Alex Wellerstein's 'Nuclear Secrecy')

Thanks to the presence of People's Democratic Azerbaijan in Iran's north, the Anglo-American imperialists had been forced to rely, in the military planning, for the while, on the Turkish route to Baku and less so the Iranian route. To the Anglo-Americans, Continental Europe was no longer as strategically significant, especially when compared to the Middle East:

Turkey's special role emerged in March 1946 when ... State Department officials pressed military planners to define more clearly the importance of Turkey and when strategic analysts were forced to come to terms with the effects of Western Europe's military weakness and the United States's rapid demobilization. Assuming that Soviet troops would easily overrun all of Western Europe and that United States forces would be evacuated from the continent, the utilization of air power took on more significance than ever before. Turkey was seen as a key to the effective application of air power. (Safeguarding Democratic Capitalism: US Foreign Policy and National Security, 1920-1950. Melvyn P. Leffler, 2017, p. 173. Citing: Byrnes to JCS, March 6, 1946, sec. 5, CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45), *ibid.*; memo for the Joint Staff Planners, March 8, 1946, *ibid.*; JCS 1641/1, "U.S. Security Interests in the Eastern Mediterranean," March 10, 1946, sec. 6, *ibid.*; JPS 789, "Concept of Operations for Pincher," enclosure sec. 1, CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46), *ibid.*; JWPC 453, "Disposition Of Occupation Forces in Europe and the Far East in the Event Of Hostilities in Europe, and the Importance of Certain Areas Of Eurasia," March 27, 1946, sec. 5, CCS 092 USSR (3-2745), *ibid.*; Operations Division, "Adequate Governmental Machinery to Handle Foreign Affairs," March 13, 1946, P&O 092 TS, Records of the United States Army Staff; meeting of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, March 6, 1946, box 3, safe file, Patterson Papers.) (IMG)

Obviously, the geostrategic conditions dictated that after Turkey, Iran would be the most important geostrategic avenue for an Anglo-American military strike on Soviet Caucasus:

the initial (and tentative) plans of the United States for waging war against the Soviet Union envisioned, among other things, an air assault from the south (from bases at Cairo-Suez). These war plans also denoted a route through the Balkans or through Iran as one of the few likely avenues for a land invasion of the Soviet Union, should it ever become necessary." (Safeguarding Democratic Capitalism: US Foreign Policy and National Security, 1920-1950. Melvyn P. Leffler, 2017, p. 211. Citing: JPS 789, "Concept of Operations for Pincher," March 1946, RG 218, CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46), Sec. 1; "Air Plan for Makefast," [Autumn 1946], NA, RG 165, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, American-British Conversations (ABC) 381 SSR (March 2, 1946), Sec. 3; "Presentation to the President," January 14, 1947, Forrest P. Sherman Papers (Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C.), box 2.) (IMG)

Note also that the Anglo-American imperialists had aimed to base their warplanes in Egypt, as stated above. That was because Egypt was far away from the USSR, and thus harder for the Red Army to hit. The Air Force of the United States was the strength of the US military, and was capable of travelling to the Soviet Caucasus while landing back in Egypt. Ironically, in contradiction to the Anglo-American imperialist intents, Wafdist Egypt was one of the Arab countries closest in strategic relations to the USSR during this period.

The creation of a People's Democratic Azerbaijan would have helped prevent the Anglo-American warplanes from reaching the Soviet Caucasus oilfields. The people's revolution would have emancipated the Azeri peasantry and proletarians from Anglo-American-backed royalist oppression while also helping the Soviet Azeri people from a nuclear holocaust. The Soviet Red Army aimed to prevent direct involvement in the conflict in Azerbaijan; instead, it maximized efforts to logistically back the Democratic Army partisans:

The Soviets wished to remain as much as possible in the background, probably to avoid antagonizing the local population....

(Nationalism in Iran: Updated Through 1978, Richard W. Cottam, 1979, p. 126) (IMG)

On November 15, 1945 the Soviets began to distribute arms to the Firqah-i Dimokrat. (Iran and the Big Powers, 1900-1953. DTIC, Captain James Howard Muhl, Jr. April 26, 1985, p. 58) (IMG)

Beside logistical support, however, the Soviet Red Army also tried to prevent bloody repression by Iran's royalist forces:

Soviet intervention in support of the rebellion limited the amount of bloodshed since their overwhelming forces discouraged any official resistance. Whenever the rebels challenged a military or police station, Soviet troops would appear and inform the Iranian commander to submit to the rebels. This pattern of Soviet interference was demonstrated when a relief column sent by the central government on

November 20 was halted near Qazvin by a Soviet military force and 86 turned back. This Soviet signal to the central government ended any military opposition to the rebellion. (Iran and the Big Powers, 1900-1953. DTIC, Captain James Howard Muhl, Jr. April 26, 1985, pp. 58-59) (IMG)

This pattern of Soviet interference against Iranian regime repression happened in a number of cases:

In two instances they were compelled to reveal their hand, but in neither case because of the resistance of Iranian nationalists. Russian troops had to give open support to the Democrats in Ardebil when the Shahsevan tribe joined the local gendarmery in resisting the communist take-over. (Nationalism in Iran: Updated Through 1978, Richard W. Cottam, 1979, p. 126) (IMG)

As one of the first steps of the revolt, the Democratic Army's partisans took over the agricultural center in Mianeh, as the Soviet armed forces prevented Persian regime repression:

A communist-dominated group seized control of the Azerbaijan agricultural center of Mianeh. Simultaneously, the Iranian army garrison in that city was confined to its barracks by Soviet occupation forces and then disarmed. This pattern was repeated in the next few weeks throughout Azerbaijan. (Nationalism in Iran: Updated Through 1978, Richard W. Cottam, 1979, p. 126) (IMG)

Over time, a People's Democratic state was established throughout the whole of the Azerbaijan region in Iran. Once the People's Democratic government in the Azerbaijan region in Iran was established, scientific socialist measures towards improving the conditions of the proletariat and peasantry were undertaken:

The Pishvari government immediately inaugurated social and economic reforms and promised to begin a land distribution program. Even strongly anti-Pishvari residents of Tabriz admitted that more improvements were made in the city of Tabriz in one year of Democratic rule than in the twenty years under Reza Shah. Because of these accomplishments, the regime attracted significant support from the populace. (Nationalism in Iran: Updated Through 1978, Richard W. Cottam, 1979, p. 126) (IMG)

The General-Secretary of the CPSU, Joseph Stalin, assessed that the Qavam group, while fascist agents of the MI6, could nonetheless be coopted by the Tudeh Party and progressive bourgeois-democratic politicians in Iran's regime, so to drive a wedge between Iran and the Anglo-American imperialists. The Qavam group were preferred over the gang of former Prime Minister Sa'ed. In his letter to Pishvari, Stalin remarked:

We see a conflict between the Qavam government and the pro-British circles in Iran, which represent the most reactionary elements in Iran. Today, Qavam, no matter how reactionary he was in the past, must make some democratic reforms to protect himself and his Administration [from democratic backlash] and to gain the support of Iran's democratic forces. What should be our tactics in such a situation? In my opinion, we should use this conflict to take advantage of Qavam, to [coopt and] support him, to isolate the pro-British forces, and to prepare the ground for further democratization of Iran. All our advice to you is based on this diagnosis. Of course, another tactic was possible: spitting on everything, severing ties, and thus ensuring the victory of the pro-British reactionaries. But this is not really a tactic but is rather stupidity. This is in fact a betrayal of the people of Azerbaijan and Iranian democracy. (...). Here we have used a technique that every revolutionary is familiar with. In any situation that is similar to today's situation in Iran, if someone wants to obtain a certain minimum of demands from the government, then the movement must continue on its way, go beyond the minimum demands and pose a danger to the government until concessions are provided by the government. If you did not advance much in the current conditions of Iran, you would not be able to achieve objectives that the Qavam government is forced to concede today. This is the law of the revolutionary movement. (...). On the contrary, if you behave wisely and with our spiritual support, demand the legalization of the real and current situation in Azerbaijan, then both Azeris and Iran will respect you as a pioneer of the progressive and democratic movement in the Middle East. (Stalin's Letter to Pishvari, May 8, 1946. The full text of this document has been released by the Russian history magazine, Novaya I Noveishaya Istoriya, Nr. 3, May-June 1994. The text of this letter can be found in the Islamic Republic of Iran's 'Political Studies and Research Institute' (PSRI) as well as USA's 'Wilson Center'.) (IMG)

Stalin's policy line concerning the Qavam group in Iran was one of bribe-and-blackmail or carrots-and-stick. Stalin aimed to utilize the Tudeh-led revolt along with the Azeri and Kurdish rebellions as a means of posing so severe a pressure on Iran's regime so as to obtain concessions from Iran's pro-British regime. These concessions would enable the Soviets to force the Qavam group into the hands of the Tudeh forces, to coopt the reactionary Qavam group in the struggle against the Anglo-American imperialists, and to increase the influence of the proletariat over Iran's regime so as to advance the interests of the progressive and democratic forces in Iran and the Middle East. Indeed, as Stalin had implied in his letter to Pishvari, the armed revolt of the Democrats in Azerbaijan-Iran, the Democrats in Kurdistan-Iran, and the Tudeh Party in the rest of Iran inflicted so great a material cost on the CIA-MI6 satellite regime that the Anglo-American intelligence agencies were bogged down towards countering the uprising, leaving the communist and progressive agents in Iran's regime apparatus the operational freedom to penetrate and to turn the tide in the favour of the communist and democratic forces. The material undermining of comprador reaction reduced the material possessions, and hence the leverage, of the comprador agents, thus, in relative though not absolute terms, increasing the material strength and leverage power of the revolutionary agents within the Iranian regime apparatus. This increased communist and progressive intelligence penetration had encircled, compelled, and coopted the Qavam group into accepting the Tudeh Party, taking action against the MI6 spies, and undermining the reactionary forces in Iran while fighting for the democratic forces:

Prime Minister Qavam, enabled to act freely by the adjournment of the Majlis on 16 March, turned first against the so-called reactionary element in the opposition, arresting Sayyid Zia ad-din Tabatabai and General Hasan Arfa and ending the activities of Sayyid Zia's allegedly anti-Soviet National Will Party. Toward the USSR and its supporters, Qavam adopted a conciliatory policy, with an immediate view to obtaining the evacuation of Soviet occupation troops from Iran. In Mazandaran the Tudeh Party proceeded to arm the workers, to take over the government-owned factories, and to police communications. The Tudeh-backed Central United Council of Trade Unions sponsored a rash of unauthorized strikes, Tudeh members seized factories at Isfahan, and party speakers at Abadan heaped abuse on the government and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, all without governmental opposition. In June a preliminary agreement was reached between Qavam and the "Azerbaijan Democratic Government," while Abbas Eskandari, brother of the Tudeh Party leader, was named mayor of Tehran; in August, Qavam named three prominent Tudeh leaders to his cabinet, thus enabling them to place loyal followers in important government posts, even in such former right-wing strongholds as Yazd and Kerman. (THE TUDEH PARTY: VEHICLE OF COMMUNISM IN IRAN (ORE 23-49), CIA, July 18, 1949, p. 4) (IMG)

In the letter to Stalin, Pishvari had stated:

Secondly, now that Qavam has started the war and spilled the blood of our brothers, let us also put pressure upon him from all sides, so that in this way the freedom-fighters may rise up all over Iran, and a great movement throughout Iran shall emerge to overthrow the reactionary government of Tehran and to establish a democratic government instead.

If this is not good, let us cut ties with Tehran completely and establish our own national government. Whichever policy the Soviet state will choose, we can execute it honorably and succeed.

(Pishevari's Letter to Stalin, December 8, 1946) (IMG)

Note that People's Democratic Azerbaijan had still not officially separated from Iran, and had instead argued that it was fighting for sovereignty and autonomy – not separation. Upon the suggestion of the Soviet officials, the Azeri Democrats had argued so, but the point of non-separation had not been understood. Pishevari's assessment was that, preferably, all of Iran should be conquered by the progressive and democratic forces, with Azerbaijan serving as a major base for this move. Should this Plan A not succeed, Pishevari held, then the Azeri Democrats should pursue Plan B which is the establishment of a Azerbaijan's 'own national government' completely separate from Tehran. Pishevari was not incorrect to say that Plan A should be the revolutionary takeover of the whole of the country and that separation should be pursued only if Plan A fails. Where Pishevari was mistaken, however, was in his assessment of the revolutionary situation in Iran, which clearly did not exist. Such was why Stalin replied:

There is no strong revolutionary situation in Iran. In Iran, the number of workers is small and they are not well organized. Iran's peasants still do not show serious activity. [Unlike Tsarist Russia in 1905 and 1917] Iran is not in a war against a foreign enemy that will weaken the [reactionary regime] circles through a military defeat. As a result, the conditions in Iran are unlike the effective tactics of 1905 and 1917. (Stalin's Letter to Pishevari, May 8, 1946. The full text of this document has been released by the Russian history magazine, *Novaya I Noveishaya Istoriya*, Nr. 3, May-June 1994. The text of this letter can be found in the Islamic Republic of Iran's 'Political Studies and Research Institute' (PSRI) as well as USA's 'Wilson Center'.) (IMG)

The content of Stalin's letter to Pishevari, as mentioned previously, shows that the Soviets wanted Azerbaijan to be a part of Iran, so that this sovereign People's Democratic Azerbaijan would conquer many of the resources in its territory and would operate as a base which shall destabilize the central government of Iran, allowing communist and progressive intelligence penetration to its higher ranks – such was why the Tudeh Party was able to obtain positions in the cabinet – driving a wedge between Iran and its patron, the British Empire. Had Azerbaijan officially separated from Iran, it would have been difficult for it to launch a military assault on the central government at the opportune time because such a military assault would have been denounced as an "Azeri invasion of Iran," whereas Azerbaijan staying in Iran would have been regarded as an "Azeri people's uprising against the central regime" – huge differences in international law implications and propaganda effects. In time, a militarily sovereign Mahabad plus a militarily sovereign Azerbaijan could help in launching a major rebellion to overthrow the central regime of Iran and then establish a territorially integral Peoples' Democratic Iran in which the democratic freedoms and cultures of all ethnicities are respected, while territorially integrity is pursued along with military and economic recentralization as basis for the rise of a powerful socialist Iran. This Soviet policy was class-wise diametrically opposite, but strategically analogous, to the present-day policy of Israel and the United States concerning Iraqi Kurdistan; contrary to Arab bourgeois-nationalist assumptions, and contrary to what Israel itself pretends, the CIA and Mossad do not support the full separation of Kurdistan from Iraq; the CIA and Mossad both support the full military autonomy of a reactionary Iraqi Kurdistan region strictly without the full separation of Iraqi Kurdistan from Iraq – that is so, because the continued existence of reactionary militarily autonomous regime in Iraqi Kurdistan yields a powerful American-Israeli base inside Iraq, allowing them to use that base and Kurdish bourgeois-nationalist 'fifth column' to launch rebellions against the central government of Iraq, rather than have a separate Kurdistan invade Arab Iraq. The CIA and Mossad support such a militarily autonomous Kurdistan region against the Iran-backed central government of Iraq from inside Iraq, as a step towards destabilizing the central government, and then bringing about in the Arab parts of Iraq the ISIS terrorists that then 'ethnically recentralize' Iraq, by savagely terrorizing and suppressing the Kurdish people, and then the CIA and Mossad strengthen this ISIS terror regime as a bulwark against Iran. The same goes for why the Anglo-American and German imperialists in the 1990s and 2000s fought for the military autonomy of Kosovo but not the full separation of Kosovo from Serbia – a NATO-backed so-called "Kosovar people's heroic rebellion against the Russian-backed chauvinist central government of Serbia" would have sounded very differently than a NATO-backed "separate Kosovar state's invasion against poor Serbia" both in terms of the international law implications and in terms of propaganda effects. The Soviet policy concerning the support for People's Democratic Azerbaijan and People's Democratic Mahabad was the socialist pro-democratic anti-fascist anti-imperialist version of the Anglo-American-German and Israeli strategy concerning Iraqi Kurdistan and Kosovo. Military federalization as a step towards the installation of a new government that then recentralizes the military – such a strategy is sometimes more effective than full partition.

As always, MI6 agent Beria had a radically different vision of the situation. Luckily for Beria, Mir Ja'far Bagirov, the First Secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party in the Azerbaijan SSR, was on his side. Sergo Beria wrote:

My father's relations were excellent with the First Secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party, Jafar Bagirov. The two men had no secrets from each other. (...). This man spoke Turkish and Iranian perfectly, had a lively mind, was able to find his bearings quickly in the most diverse situations, and had shown himself to be a competent administrator, well informed about the oil industry. He ... believed in neither God nor the devil, and still less in communism. His first wife died giving birth to a son. He remarried, to an animated German woman who brought with her three sisters and their mother.

'It's a real harem,' said my mother, laughing at all these women, of whom she was nonetheless very fond. In order to house his tribe Bagirov had to have a house built, and this brought down on him a shower of criticisms. Bagirov was reviving the Turkish way of life, he was organising a brothel, and so on ... whereas the persons involved were perfectly civilised German ladies.

(Beria, *My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin*, Sergo Beria, p. 300) (IMG)

Forget not that Bagirov had been responsible for recruiting the Menshevik/Musavat spy for the MI6, Lavrenti Beria, into the Bolshevik Cheka. Long before the Great Patriotic War,:

Being a Georgian, Beria could not be given the command of the Cheka in Azerbaijan; therefore, Bagirov, who was a Turk Azerbaijani, headed it. In reality, however, the Baku Cheka was run by Beria. ('Bagirov, M D/Beria, L P', CIA, August 19, 1953, p. 1) (IMG)

Beria wanted the Azerbaijan Socialist Soviet Republic to cease to become a socialist state, to separate from the USSR, and most importantly, to join Royalist Iran. Some time in late 1945 or 1946, in a conversation with his loyal supporter Bagirov, Beria suggested:

You would do better to think of attaching your Azerbaijan to Iran! ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 202) (IMG)

In other words, Beria was aiming to help the Iranian regime, comprador terror regime allied to Anglo-American finance capital, to steal the Soviet Union's oil resources by taking over the Azerbaijan SSR. The drive to destroy socialism and liquidate the dictatorship of the proletariat in the Azerbaijan SSR required extensive levels of sabotage at every level. Bagirov's project to corrupt the Azerbaijan SSR would have served precisely that end. The First Secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party, indeed a staunch anti-communist, lived the decadent life of a corrupt official, engaging in nepotism, providing a special privilege for his own clan, and controlling a brothel and a harem made up of German women.

The corruption of the Bagirov gang on the one hand created a network of privileged elites in the Azerbaijan Communist Party, a corrupt bureaucratic class hostile to Soviet power, workers' statehood, and scientific socialism. On the other hand, it would have served to drive a wedge between the state and the masses, foster resentment among some towards the USSR, and thereby pave the way for the collapse of the Azerbaijan SSR and its subsequent separation from the Union.

The Soviets had tried to stay in Azerbaijan. However, the pressure of international law caused the Soviet Union to withdraw. In the letter to Ja'far Pishevari, Stalin had stated that the Soviet Red Army withdrew from Iran because it aimed to take up the issue of international law to expose Anglo-American imperialist hypocrisy concerning the military occupation of the many colonies of the British Empire:

Certainly, if the Soviet forces remained in Iran, you could count on success in the revolutionary demands of the people of Azerbaijan. However, we could no longer keep the Soviet troops in Iran, primarily because their continued presence in Iran would disrupt the foundation of our liberationist policies in Europe and Asia. The British and Americans told us that if the Soviet forces can stay in Iran, then why cannot the British forces stay in Egypt, Syria, Indonesia, Greece, and similarly why cannot the American forces stay in China, Iceland and Denmark? For this reason, we decided to withdraw the troops from Iran and China in order to take this excuse from the hands of the British and Americans, to fuel the liberation movement in the colonies and thus make our liberation policy more legitimate and effective. (Stalin's Letter to Pishevari, May 8, 1946. The full text of this document has been released by the Russian history magazine, Novaya I Noveishaya Istoriya, Nr. 3, May-June 1994. The text of this letter can be found in the Islamic Republic of Iran's 'Political Studies and Research Institute' (PSRI) as well as USA's 'Wilson Center'.) (IMG)

The withdrawal of the Soviet Red Army forces, however, allowed the comprador military of Iran's central government to fight against the Democratic forces in Mahabad/Kurdistan and Azerbaijan, paving the way for the restoration of Iranian regime rule. The Iranian regime then launched its fascist war to "liberate" Azerbaijan and to restore feudalism and corruption. The CIA operative Richard Cottam wrote:

After the liberation of Azerbaijan, the Status quo ante returned. Turkish books and the Turkish press were destroyed, and the Persian language was once again taught; the Army and feudal landowners again controlled the Azerbaijan Majlis delegation; and the general policy of sloth, corruption, and neglect returned. (Nationalism in Iran: Updated Through 1978, Richard W. Cottam, 1979, p. 129) (IMG)

The military defeat of these Democratic forces reduced the lobbying power of the Tudeh Party, allowing Qavam to quickly oust the Tudeh Party agents encircling him in the cabinet:

The mushrooming of Tudeh influence was soon checked, however. Qavam was already becoming annoyed with the Tudeh Party because of its pressure for ratification of the Soviet oil concession agreement and for specific concessions in the forthcoming elections, and when the powerful Qashqai tribes openly rebelled against the ascendancy of Tudeh leaders in the government, he moved effectively. Quickly making an agreement with the Qashqais, he dismissed the Tudeh mayor of Tehran, forced the Tudeh members out of his cabinet, and stressed the rapid expansion of his own newly formed political party, the Democrats of Iran.

(THE TUDEH PARTY: VEHICLE OF COMMUNISM IN IRAN (ORE 23-49), CIA, July 18, 1949, p. 4) (IMG)

When the royalist regime of Iran fully crushed People's Democratic Azerbaijan, many of the Democratic Army militants sought refuge in the Azerbaijan SSR. Many including Pishevari himself were accepted. However, in the midst of this process, Bagirov made sure to filter out as many Democratic Army refugees as he could:

Although some of the leaders were given refuge, Bagirov relayed that all others should stay put, surrender to the Iranian authorities and play the final act of the tragedy. Many of the democrats were killed in the early months of 1947, while most of the leaders managed to survive the worst phase of repression in December 1946 in the safe haven of Baku, and many others continued fighting in the hills until early summer 1947. (Origins of the Cold War: An International History, Melvyn Leffler, David S. Painter, p. 107) (IMG)

According to Jamil Hasanli – an Azerbaijani government official and a scholar of the CIA-backed Wilson Center – a prominent Soviet intelligence official stated, during the trials of Bagirov, that there was a 'coordinated' attempt 'to kill Pishevari' through a 'car accident':

In the meanwhile, former chief of the Yevlakh regional KGB department Salayev Latif Samed oglu declared as follows: "I believe that the car accident was coordinated to kill Pishevari." Salayev's evidence made it clear that attempts had been made to seek the instigators of the car accident abroad. The blame for this crime was laid on Karnik Melikhyan, driver of Pishevari's car. ('Khrushchev's Thaw and National Identity in Soviet Azerbaijan, 1954-1959'. Jamil Hasanli, 2014, p. 71) (IMG)

The testimony of the Soviet intelligence official was occurring during a time in which Beria's agents throughout the USSR were being purged in 1953, and Bagirov was among them. The Soviet intelligence official added:

after Pishevari's death, chief of the Shamkhor regional KGB department Sarkisov Ruben Mirzayevich told me that before the accident he had been aware of the fact that driver Melikhyan was a son of Dashaks' leader.... ('Khrushchev's Thaw and National Identity in Soviet Azerbaijan, 1954-1959'. Jamil Hasanli, p. 71) (IMG)

Another close relative of Melikhiyan was described by Salayev as having:

worked in the British Embassy to Iran. ('Khrushchev's Thaw and National Identity in Soviet Azerbaijan, 1954-1959'. Jamil Hasanli, p. 71) (IMG)

A 2006 work by Teyyub Qurban was a prominent Azerbaijani intellectual. A graduate of journalism studies, he was a researcher defending the legacy of the Beria agent Bagirov, and was linked to the MI6-run Musavat Party, the Party which Beria served in the early days of the October Revolution

and the Civil War. Qurban's work serves to corroborate the remarks by the Soviet intelligence official, and provides additional details. Qurban started by saying:

The guests were welcomed by General Qulam Yahya in whose 'Hudson' car they began driving towards Shaki, in the calm of night. Who was the driver of the 'Hudson' car? Karnik Melikhiyan. (Strong Personalities from the Enemies. Original Azerbaijani title: Düşmənlərindən güclü şəxsiyyət. Teyyub Qurban, Baku, 2006, p. 34) (IMG)

Referring to Melikhiyan, the author confirmed:

His dad was a leader of the Dashnak partisans in Iran. His wife at the time worked in the British Embassy in Iran. The local MGB branch of the Azerbaijan SSR provided him with a personal card after the car accident. (Strong Personalities from the Enemies. Original Azerbaijani title: Düşmənlərindən güclü şəxsiyyət. Teyyub Qurban, Baku, 2006, p. 34) (IMG)

The Dashnaks in the USSR, as the local assistants of the British intelligence service, had invited the British Empire to invade the Soviet Union. With his wife working in the British Embassy, and his father for the British-backed guerrillas, the perpetrators of the crime should become increasingly clear. Moreover, Melikhiyan apparently possessed an amount of money worth a thousand Manats as well as a gun:

During a search [of his pockets], an amount of money worth 1,000 Manats as well as a 'Walther' gun were found. (Strong Personalities from the Enemies. Original Azerbaijani title: Düşmənlərindən güclü şəxsiyyət. Teyyub Qurban, Baku, 2006, p. 34) (IMG)

Qurban continued:

The driver insincerely claimed that the accident was not his fault. He claimed that while driving, he fell asleep. (Strong Personalities from the Enemies. Original Azerbaijani title: Düşmənlərindən güclü şəxsiyyət. Teyyub Qurban, Baku, 2006, p. 34) (IMG)

Melikhiyan's claim is by no means convincing; after all, the rhetorical question to be asked is why Melikhiyan saw virtually no harm during the car accident, whereas Pischevari was horrifically injured:

No one [seems to have] asked the driver as to why, in spite of the fact that the steering wheel in front of you [i.e. the driver] was split in half, you were not hurt at all, whereas sitting beside you, Pischevari had his rib crushed, his leg broken, and his head injured? (Strong Personalities from the Enemies. Original Azerbaijani title: Düşmənlərindən güclü şəxsiyyət. Teyyub Qurban, Baku, 2006, p. 34) (IMG)

Even Jamil Hasanli, the official advisor to the Anglo-American puppet despot in Azerbaijan, admitted Melikhiyan's role in the matter. In enforcing the will of those whom Hasanli called the 'the true perpetrators of the crime' of murdering Pischevari, Hasanli agreed that 'Melikhiyan was directly involved':

Beyond any doubts, Melikyan was directly involved in this provocation. ('Khrushchev's Thaw and National Identity in Soviet Azerbaijan, 1954-1959'. Jamil Hasanli, p. 71) (IMG)

Though injured during the car 'accident', Pischevari did not yet die. However, adequate medical care and aid for him was deliberately withheld by the killer-doctors around him. After briefly 'recovering consciousness' in the hospital on the 11th of that month, Qurban noted, Pischevari:

demanded from the doctors that they bring his brother from Baku; his brother was a doctor and a surgeon. (Strong Personalities from the Enemies. Original Azerbaijani title: Düşmənlərindən güclü şəxsiyyət. Teyyub Qurban, Baku, 2006, p. 34) (IMG)

However, this demand was completely ignored and:

Instead they brought Dr. Asriyan from the Stepankert City. Pischevari asked to see his twenty-year-old son from Ganja next to him. Who could be closer to the father than his son at the most difficult moment of his life. His son was not informed. Had he been informed, he would have surely discovered the criminal plot and would have rushed to his father's help. (Strong Personalities from the Enemies. Original Azerbaijani title: Düşmənlərindən güclü şəxsiyyət. Teyyub Qurban, Baku, 2006, p. 34) (IMG)

That day, on the 11th of June 1947, Pischevari passed away. However, when did the actual team of surgeons come to perform the surgery on Pischevari? They did not arrive until one day after Pischevari died:

Only one day after, on the 12th [of June] the team of doctors and nurses arrived with the plane to Baku. But it was too late. Pischevari did not recover during the surgery. (Strong Personalities from the Enemies. Original Azerbaijani title: Düşmənlərindən güclü şəxsiyyət. Teyyub Qurban, Baku, 2006, p. 34) (IMG)

The Soviet intelligence official Latif Samad-Oglu, a witness during the trials of Mir Ja'far Bagirov years later, said:

I was in the USSR's domestic intelligence service from 1930 to 1950, and from 1944 to 1949 I was in charge of the Soviet intelligence service's branch in Yolakh. In June 1947, 14 kilometers from Yolakh, Pischevari's car had an accident. As soon as I was informed of this incident, I went there and found the 'Hudson' car there which had been torn apart. The car had hit the fence near the bridge. There had been four people inside the car, but in the site of the incident, only the car driver Karnik Melikhiyan was there alive. He had the documents related to the other people in the car and was standing there. When I searched him, I found 10,000 manat [note: 'manat' is how Azeris referred to the Soviet currency] and a 'Walther' gun. I drew the croquis [i.e. visual sketch] of the incident and returned to Yolakh. I went to the hospital, Pischevari was still conscious. His leg and part of his spine were broken and his head was damaged. Qoliyev was also conscious. General Gholam-Yahya was mildly injured but since his face was wounded, he could not speak. I asked Pischevari to speak of the car accident. He told me that during the night, he was a guest of Nazar Heydarov, the head of the Kirov-Abad Oil Exploration Department. 'We ate dinner there and were resting', Pischevari said, adding 'At 4 AM in the morning Qoliyev suggested that we go to Nukha because Nukha was his birthplace...'

In the end, Pischevari used the word 'treason' several times and said: 'I endured 11 years of solitary confinement in Iran, Reza Shah and his Qavam did not succeed in eliminating me, but now, with such a stab in the back, they reached their goal.'

I asked Pischevari why he thought such and told him that after all, the car and the driver are your own. Pischevari responded: 'The car and the driver are both Gholam-Yahya's'.

Pischevari told me that he would never sit in the front of the car and beside the driver, but this time they had made him sit beside the driver. In the midst of our chat, Pischevari started feeling not good, and asked for help. I immediately contacted Yemiliyanov in Baku and let him know about it. Approximately 5 to 6 hours later, the airplane came. Karimov, the deputy minister, Soleiman, the deputy minister of health, and Dr. Zolfaqar Mohammadev, Major-General Sarjialinski, and the nurses all came with this airplane.

Professor Zolfaqar Mohammadev personally took charge of the surgery of Pischevari. Upon my request, specialist doctor Qasim-khan Talishinski from Ganja City and the surgeon Asriyan from Karabakh reached there as well.

The driver Melikhiyan said that during the night he had fell asleep and this caused the accident but in order for him to not die, he used all his might and his two hands to steer the wheel [so to turn such that he would not die] thereby causing the wheel to break. This [self-

contradictory story from Melikhiyan] shows that he actually was not sleeping and was conscious prior to the incident [hence why he was able to steer before the collision]. I feel that this incident was not at all a real ‘accident’, but rather was a deliberate premeditated attempt at murdering Pischevari. I have reached this conclusion based on the following reasons:

- 1) There was no need to take the craft to Nukha at night. It was not necessary to drive a car at a speed of 90 km.
- 2) [Pischevari] was not riding in his own car, and the driver was not his own driver. Rather, he went with Gholam-Yahya's car. And these could not be coincidence.

After this incident, Sarkisov Reuben Mirzayevich, the head of the Soviet intelligence in the Shamkhor District told me that the driver Melikhiyan was a son of the leader of Iranian Dashnak forces and his mother Pliyak Gala was working in the British Embassy. For this reason, Sarkisov Reuben Mirzayevich found Melikhiyan to be suspicious. He starts working on his case, and demands information from the Azerbaijan intelligence, and finds out that Melikhiyan had recently been licensed [as an agent] by the Alpha branch of Azerbaijan's intelligence.

Colonel Fursov, who was in charge of the security in the Nakhichevan region, told me after this car ‘accident’ that long before the ‘accident’, he had reported via a telegram to Yemiliyanov, the head of the intelligence service in the Azeri SSR, that Melikhiyan is a foreign intelligence operative. However, the Azeri branch of Soviet intelligence did not heed to such warnings, and Melikhiyan continued to be the driver for Gholam-Yahya and trusted him so much that he even took Pischevari for travelling.

But what is [even more] significant is that all of the people linked to the death of Pischevari were later subjected to harassment by Bagirov and Yemiliyanov. Sarkisov Reuben Mirzayevic, the head of the Soviet intelligence in the Shamkhor zone lost his job in the intelligence, and is now the manager of a public bath. They also purged me from the Soviet intelligence service's ranks and I am now a manager of a school. Farajov was a minister in Nakhichevan, but was demoted to the head of a local branch. By contrast, Nuri Qoiyev was the head of a secretariat but after this event got the position of a deputy minister.

(...). It is also worth mentioning other facts, such as the fact that Pischevari, after being severely wounded, insisted on having his son near him. And his 20 years old son was in Kirov-Abad. It would have taken merely an hour at most, for his son to come and meet him. However, they [the people responsible] did not pay attention. They feared that Pischevari might tell his son about the deliberate nature of the car ‘accident’.

(The Case of Mir Ja'afar Bagirov: Transcript, 1993, p. 97. In: ‘The Circumstances of the Death of Seyyed Ja'far Pischevari: Naturally Dead or Murdered?’, Asre-Nou, Ali Moradi Maragheh-i, March 3, 2016) (IMG)

C17S4. The Mahabad Republic *** IMG-All-{Iran}

Simultaneous with the Azeri uprising, there came the Kurdish People's Democratic uprising in Mahabad, a more developed district of the Kurdistan province of Iran. The Kurdish revolutionary Qazi Mohammad and the communists and progressives in his team had the support of the people in Mahabad. The British military commander Edgar O'Ballance admitted that Qazi Mohammad was highly popular in Mahabad, the territory of the people's republic. O'Ballance wrote:

While extremely popular in Mahabad, Qazi Mohammad was distrusted by many Kurds because of his seeming friendship with the godless Soviets, and the fact that during the First World War the [Tsarist] Russians had sacked the city. (‘The Kurdish Struggle, 1920-94’, Edgar O'Ballance, 1995 p. 29) (IMG)

Mahabad was a more economically developed area of Kurdistan, and was the dream place of many Kurds in Iran. The progressive classes were stronger in that area, a factor explaining in the popularity of Qazi Mohamad among the Mahabadi people as in contrast with his lack of popularity in the rest of Kurdistan. While Azerbaijani Democrats were leading the struggle against imperialism at the time,:

In Mahabad in November 1945 Qazi Mohammed announced that the Komola would become the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI), and although he held no formal office in this new political party he continued to dominate it. Its aims were autonomy for the Kurds, not complete independence. (‘The Kurdish Struggle, 1920-94’, Edgar O'Ballance, 1995 p. 28) (IMG)

Note that:

The KDPI was distinct and separate from Barzani's KDP. (‘The Kurdish Struggle, 1920-94’, Edgar O'Ballance, 1995 p. 28) (IMG)

The letter ‘I’ in KDPI makes it clear that the leadership of this organization at least officially regarded the Kurdish people as belonging to Iran, and as confirmed by the British commander O'Ballance, the aim of the KDPI was not separation from Iran, but rather autonomy. The autonomy would be socio-cultural, political, and economic:

A Provisional Council of Kurdistan was to be formed. The party's manifesto was a nationalist one, including the use of the Kurdish language. [Most] officials were ... Kurdish, there would be self-government in local affairs and Kurdish revenues would be spent in Kurdish areas. (‘The Kurdish Struggle, 1920-94’, Edgar O'Ballance, 1995 p. 28) (IMG)

The Soviets – Stalin himself included – did not support the full separation of Kurdistan from Iran, because as mentioned before, Mahabad and Azerbaijan were important bases through which regime change in the rest of Iran could be pursued; in time, a militarily sovereign Mahabad plus a militarily sovereign Azerbaijan could help in launching a major rebellion to overthrow the central regime of Iran and then establish a centralized Peoples' Democratic order in all of Iran in which the democratic freedoms and cultures of all ethnicities are respected.

However, in light of the fact that Iran's regime was chauvinistic towards the Kurdish population, and was furthering its collaboration with the Anglo-American imperialists, the fighters for the Kurdish autonomy needed to raise their defenses. The Soviets provided provide military assistance so that the Kurds could defend their newly-gained sovereignty. The war-torn USSR, which did not have nuclear arms yet, was facing a nuclear-armed USA. As such, the Soviets were not able to guarantee the defense of the People's Republic of Mahabad. Nonetheless the Soviets provided as much military assistance as possible in the face of Anglo-American-backed central government:

Qazi Mohammed had two major problems, the first being that the Soviets refused to guarantee the defence of his new republic. The second was that his only means of defence were small groups of armed followers of various sheikhs who had promised allegiance, but these were mercurial, undisciplined and of doubtful reliability. Work was in progress to organise government services and it was also decided to raise a standing army. A Soviet officer was sent to form and train it. (‘The Kurdish Struggle, 1920-94’, Edgar O'Ballance, 1995 pp. 29-30) (IMG)

The USSR also provided aid to this newly established government in the media sphere. Shortly after the establishment of the republic:

A Soviet printing press arrived [in Mahabad].... ('The Kurdish Struggle, 1920-94', Edgar O'Ballance, 1995 p. 28) (IMG)
Because of the chauvinist attitude of the CIA-MI6-backed regime in Iran, the circumstances were polarized such that pro-independence rhetoric was growing. Thus, in Mahabad:

a Kurdish newspaper, *Kurdistan*, was published, which began openly to advocate independence. ('The Kurdish Struggle, 1920-94', Edgar O'Ballance, 1995 p. 28) (IMG)

The central government of Iran no doubt benefited from such pro-independence rhetoric in the newspaper because it would have helped it in depicting Qazi Mohammad and other Kurdish freedom-fighters who sought autonomy – as opposed to fully separation – as 'separatists' or as people who sought to partition Iran, hence weakening the image of the KDPI. Having said that, and regardless, the chauvinism of the central government nonetheless made the call for mere 'autonomy' superficially appear less and less reasonable, and thus the call for independence began to make more sense. In this situation, there came:

a small consignment of Soviet arms, believed to be about 1200 rifles and pistols, as well as bundles of Soviet military uniforms. The euphoria generated by the Kurds in Mahabad was such that on 11 December 1945 the new Kurdish national flag was hoisted in the town. On to this scene arrived Mullah Mustafa Barzani and his '9000 followers' in November. At first he was treated with suspicious reserve as he was thought to be in the pay of the British. However Qazi Mohammed, whose defence forces were negligible, cautiously welcomed Barzani and agreed that he and his allies could stay in areas just to the north-east of the town, and that a number could actually live in Mahabad. In view of Barzani's military strength and his own weakness, Qazi Mohammed could do no other. ('The Kurdish Struggle, 1920-94', Edgar O'Ballance, 1995 p. 28) (IMG)

By early 1946, the USSR increased its military aid to the Mahabad forces:

The Mahabad army received two more small consignments of arms in February 1946, believed to consist of about 5000 rifles, a few machine guns, ammunition and some petrol bombs (Eagleton, 1963). At a later date it also received a few Soviet and American military vehicles. These were by no means free gifts as the Soviets took the whole of the republic's tobacco crop in exchange.

At its maximum, in theory at least, the Mahabad army consisted of '70 officers, 40 non-commissioned officers and 1200 soldiers' (Chaliand, 1993). Most of the officers had formerly served in the Iranian or Iraqi armies, or auxiliary services, but many were at once seconded to undertake essential jobs in the administration, so the army was always under-officered.

The Mahabad army remained in or near Mahabad and never achieved any degree of effectiveness, becoming a sort of presidential guard. The real defence of the republic continued to rest in the hands of those tribal sheikhs who were able to muster groups of armed fighting men. Soon the army, as well as members of the government and officials, were clad in Soviet-style uniforms.

On 31 March the Mahabad government appointed four generals, one of whom was Mullah Mustafa Barzani. He proudly retained his rank and used it for the rest of his life. Barzani's personal armed following remained intact and apart, distrusting the Mahabad government. In fact Barzani was secretly lobbying the Soviet authorities to appoint him president in place of Qazi Mohammed, who seemed at times to lose control of events. However the Soviets refused as they did not trust Barzani, and in any case they no longer cared as they were in the process of withdrawing.

On 9 May 1946 the last Soviet troops pulled out from Iran.... The Iranian army, which had mustered about 13000 troops, had been marching towards Mahabad since early April. Probably about 12 000 armed Kurdish tribesmen were available for defence (Eagleton, 1963), all still under the control of their own sheikhs, and a large proportion of them set off to defend their vague frontiers. For example contingents from the Shikaki and the Herki tribes moved to an area just north of Baneh.

('The Kurdish Struggle, 1920-94', Edgar O'Ballance, 1995 pp. 29-30) (IMG)

The Soviets and Qazi Mohammad, as noted previously, rightly distrusted the Titoist renegade Mustafa Barzani, but Barzani, ever the opportunist, had launched some military strikes against the British imperialist forces in Iraq. Despite being led by a renegade, Barzani's troops nonetheless had anti-British sentiments and had been well-trained. As such, Qazi Mohammad and the Soviets had to coopt the Barzani forces, even though behind the scenes, they regarded him as an enemy. As a result, the troops under the command of Mustafa Barzani were armed by the Soviets as well:

Mustafa Barzani had managed to obtain a share of the Soviet-provided arms, said to be some 1200 rifles, which would bring his armed element up to the 3000 mark (Eagleton, 1963). Barzani marched south towards Saqqiz to counter a small Iranian force that had left that town on 24 April and was moving towards Mahabad. The Iranians were ambushed and the prisoners were sent to Mahabad. This boosted the Barzanis' military reputation to such an extent that the government began to plan for a Kurdish, meaning Barzani, advance southwards to occupy as much Kurdish territory as possible. ('The Kurdish Struggle, 1920-94', Edgar O'Ballance, 1995 p. 31) (IMG)

Indeed, the Soviet arming of Barzani's troops paid off because his troops really did combat the imperialists. Nonetheless, when the Soviets further retreated from Mahabad due to the previous agreement for Soviet troops to leave northern Iran, the intelligence presence of the USSR and the People's Democratic forces declined in that territory, meaning that Mustafa Barzani was less under pressure to perform well. This gave Barzani the opportunity to reveal a part of his covert face, which was that of a traitor. At this critical time, the diversionary group of Barzani opened the way for the fascist occupation forces of the Iranian regime to cross through, and hence to undermine the Mahabad republic:

The Barzanis had taken up positions in mountains overlooking roads leading from Saqqiz to both Baneh and Sardasht (to the south-west), and so were able to block the Iranian advance. On 3 May, under an impromptu agreement between Mullah Mustafa Barzani and Iranian commanders, the Barzanis withdrew a little way to allow the Iranians road access to their beleaguered garrisons. This did not go down very well in Mahabad, where the government was planning to concentrate its forces at Saqqiz, preparatory to an offensive southwards to Sanandaj. ('The Kurdish Struggle, 1920-94', Edgar O'Ballance, 1995 p. 31) (IMG)

Increased Iranian military pressure caused differences to arise between Kurds, especially tribal Kurds and urban ones in Mahabad. ('The Kurdish Struggle, 1920-94', Edgar O'Ballance, 1995 p. 31) (IMG)

Eventually, the Mahabad Republic was overthrown and Qazi Mohammad and his comrades were executed. Barzani was able to escape the scene.

C17S5. MI6 Satellite Turkey's Collaboration with the Nazi Germans during the Great Patriotic War / Turkey as an Avenue for an Anglo-American Assault on the Soviet Union / USSR Defending itself by Demanding Turkish Territory *** IMG-All-{Turkey}

Well until the summer of 1941, Turkey's regime had collaborated with the Nazi Germans against the Soviets. In the words of a US military intelligence document:

both Turkey and Germany were hostile toward the Soviet Union.... (WARTIME ACTIVITIES OF THE GERMAN DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY SERVICES DURING WORLD WAR II, U.S. Army, European Command. Intelligence Division, published online by CIA, p. 116) (IMG)

Thus, the Abwehr, the German intelligence service, closely cooperated with the Turkish intelligence against the USSR. The US intelligence reported that in the summer of 1941:

with passive and active assistance by Turkish intelligence, information was obtained [by the Abwehr] on Russian troops and their movements. At the same time the Turkish intelligence and the Abwehr employed their operatives interchangeably in assigning additional missions for more Russian information. Although the Turks assisted the Germans in regard to espionage against Soviet Russia, they were strictly neutral in matters concerning the Western Powers. (WARTIME ACTIVITIES OF THE GERMAN DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY SERVICES DURING WORLD WAR II, U.S. Army, European Command. Intelligence Division, published online by CIA, p. 115) (IMG)

Note that the Abwehr, the intelligence agency of Nazi Germany, was heavily dominated by the MI6. Turkish intelligence cooperation with the Abwehr against the Soviet Union also marked the collaboration of Turkey with the MI6. By the time of the onset of Operation BARBAROSSA, however, the Turkish intelligence service, on behalf of the MI6, temporarily ceased cooperation with the Nazi Germans. The victory of the Soviets in the Battle of Stalingrad meant that the Anglo-American imperialists and their henchmen in Israel were to support Nazi Germany and the Axis forces as a bulwark against Soviet power. Hence, the Anglo-American intelligence services re-established their covert alliance with the Nazis some time in between late December 1942 or early January 1943. The alliance was reflected in Turkey and Iran as well. Indeed, the Anglo-German alliance was reflected in Turkey's increasingly friendly policy towards Germany. Firstly, note again that:

Throughout the war, Turkey, ... has remained a non-belligerent ally of Great Britain. (Great Britain and the Problem of the Turkish Straits, T-517, US Intelligence, H. N. Howard, January 24, 1945, p. 13) (IMG)

As a British satellite, Turkey permitted the entry of Axis warships through the Straits. In 1943, the Anglo-Americans overtly 'warned' Turkey against allowing Axis vessels through the Straits. Turkey officially accepted the Anglo-American call:

As the result of representations by the British Embassy and ourselves the Turkish Government has decided to hereafter prohibit the transit thru the Straits of so-called barges of which the Germans have thus far transited light.

The representations made by the British and ourselves were based on information to the effect that these so-called barges altho giving the outward appearance of being commercial vessels were built solely for military purposes and that on their arrival at Greek ports they discharge military supplies and the crews immediately don German naval uniforms.

The Turkish Government anticipates a vigorous protest from the German Embassy as soon as the prohibition is made effective, particularly as a considerable number of these barges have been constructed by the Germans during the past year in Bulgarian and Rumanian ports.

(767.68119/1044: Telegram, The Ambassador in Turkey (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State, Ankara, September 8, 1943, FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: DIPLOMATIC PAPERS, 1943. THE NEAR EAST AND AFRICA, Vol. 4, pp. 1086-1087) (IMG)

However, just a few months later, MI6 satellite Turkey once again permitted the entry of Axis naval units through the Straits:

The vessels which were passing through the Straits were of two types. The first were known as K.T. vessels, of about 800 tons, with a normal armament of two 3.7 inch guns and machine guns. The second were E.M.S. craft of about 40 or 50 tons, with a normal armament of one three pounder, machine guns and depth charges. The former could be used for transport of troops and supplies, the latter for various purpose, including submarine chasing. To obtain passage, the Germans dismantled their armaments, which was reinstalled on reaching the Aegean Sea. (Great Britain and the Problem of the Turkish Straits, T-517, US Intelligence, H. N. Howard, January 24, 1945, pp. 16) (IMG)

In response:

Moscow press and radio grew more and more hostile to the Turks and began ... criticizing the Turkish Government for having allowed Axis vessels passage through the Straits.... ('Turkey', SR-1/1, For: the Deputy Director, Joint Intelligence Group, & Joint Staff. CIA, December 22, 1948, p. 33) (IMG)

Again, in order to keep its alliance with the Axis covert, the British Empire overtly joined the Soviet Union in condemning Turkey's policy regarding German warships. As reported by a January 1945 US intelligence document,:

Early in June 1944 Great Britain officially protested against the use of the Straits by German warships which had been employed in the Black Sea. When Mr. Eden announced in the House of Commons on June 14, that Great Britain was profoundly disrupted by the fact that the Turkish Government, by allowing German vessel to pass through the Straits from the Black Sea into the Aegean, had helped to increase German naval strength in that region, Numan Menemencioglu, the Turkish Foreign Minister, who was responsible for the policy, was forced to resign. (Great Britain and the Problem of the Turkish Straits, T-517, US Intelligence, H. N. Howard, January 24, 1945, pp. 15-16) (IMG)

Foreign Minister Eden announced in the House of Commons that the British Government was "profoundly disturbed" by the fact that the Turkish Government, by allowing German vessels to pass through the Straits from the Black Sea into the Aegean, had helped to increase German naval strength in that region. As a result, Foreign Minister Menemencioglu was forced to resign. ('Turkey', SR-1/1, For: the Deputy Director, Joint Intelligence Group, & Joint Staff. CIA, December 22, 1948, p. 52) (IMG)

Behind the scenes, Britain could only thank its Middle Eastern satellite for allowing Germany to gain strength in the War as a bulwark against the Soviets. In this context, the best way for Turkey and Britain to continue to appear 'anti-Nazi' was for Turkey to declare war on Nazi Germany:

The resignation of Numan Menecioglu accelerated the development of Turkish policy toward a break with Germany, which took place on August 2, 1944. (Great Britain and the Problem of the Turkish Straits, T-517, US Intelligence, H. N. Howard, January 24, 1945, p. 16) (IMG)

The Soviets did not trust the Turkish declaration of war, whereas the British were satisfied as it covered up the collaboration of its satellite with the Third Reich:

Although the Soviet Government was distinctly reserved in its attitude toward the Turkish break with Germany, British Prime Minister Churchill announced the break in relations with Germany, with apparent satisfaction in his address to the House of Commons on August 2. (Great Britain and the Problem of the Turkish Straits, T-517, US Intelligence, H. N. Howard, January 24, 1945, p. 16) (IMG)

As a result of consistent Turkish regime treachery.:

On 19 March 1945, less than one month after Turkey's entry into the war, the USSR denounced the 1925 Soviet-Turkish pact of friendship, stating that it no longer conformed to current conditions and would therefore be allowed to lapse after its expiration on 7 November 1945. ('Turkey', SR-1/1, For: the Deputy Director, Joint Intelligence Group, & Joint Staff. CIA, December 22, 1948, p. 33) (IMG)

As shown in greater detail in C17S3, the Pentagon high command had developed Operation PINCHER, an American military contingency plan for invasion against the USSR, through a nuclear strike on Baku and the Caucasus oil fields and the march onto the Soviet heartland via the Soviet Caucasus. In March 1946, the US military finalized PINCHER, its studies on the plans for a potential Third World War against the USSR launched from the Middle East. At that same time, the leaders of treacherous Turkey pretended to be still on friendly terms with the Soviet Union even though the Soviet-Turkish Friendship Treaty of 1921 had expired in November 1945:

The Turkish Government officially accepted the Soviet statements at their face value and indicated its willingness to negotiate a new pact. ('Turkey', SR-1/1, For: the Deputy Director, Joint Intelligence Group, & Joint Staff. CIA, December 22, 1948, p. 33) (IMG)

The Soviets were not very interested in maintaining this relationship with Turkey. The history of betrayals by Turkey's government had sown distrust. Furthermore, the Soviets did not expect Turkey to accept the USSR's new terms and conditions for a new friendship treaty:

In conversation with the Turkish Ambassador in Moscow, however, Foreign Commissar Molotov showed how remote the possibility of agreement was, for he is reported to have demanded that any substitute agreement must provide special privileges for the USSR in the Straits and also territorial concessions in northeastern Turkey (in the Kars-Ardahan region). Moreover, later in the same year, the semi-official Moscow press commented favorably upon a claim made by two Georgian professors and published in a Tbilisi (Tiflis) periodical to an area of northeastern Turkey which, it was said, should be annexed by historical right to the Georgian SSR. ('Turkey', SR-1/1, For: the Deputy Director, Joint Intelligence Group, & Joint Staff. CIA, December 22, 1948, p. 33) (IMG)

Thus, in late:

1946 the USSR demanded a share in the control of the Straits and the right to station Soviet troops there. (SUBJECT: NIE-9: TURKEY'S POSITION IN THE EAST-WEST STRUGGLE, Office of National Estimates, CIA, February 20, 1951, p. 4) (IMG)

and:

unofficially claimed the Kars plateau area in northeastern Turkey. (SUBJECT: NIE-9: TURKEY'S POSITION IN THE EAST-WEST STRUGGLE, Office of National Estimates, CIA, February 20, 1951, pp. 3-4) (IMG)

This foreign policy maneuver of the USSR was by no means aggressive. For one, Turkey had stabbed the Soviet Union in the back numerous times. From 1941 onwards, Turkish intelligence closely collaborated with the Nazi Germany's intelligence service in spying on the USSR. Between 1943 and 1944, Turkey, as a British satellite, had actively collaborated with the Third Reich by allowing German vessels through the Straits. For another, the Soviet demands were not forced on Turkey and therefore did not violate international law. Turkish stabs in the back of the Soviet Union and the consequent end of the Friendship Treaty created a reasonable pretext for getting those Turkish-occupied territories back. Geo-strategically, the Soviet Union, by liberating the oppressed ethnic groups such as the Georgians and Armenians in eastern Turkey, was also creating a buffer zone against an Anglo-American-Turkish aggression against the Soviet Caucasus. In Leffler's words:

In fact, despite the rhetoric about the Soviet expansionist thrust southward, military analysts and civilian officials acknowledged that Soviet demands on Turkey had a substantial defensive component. "Soviet pressure in the Middle East," concluded the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in March 1946, "has for its primary objective the protection of the vital Ploesti, Kharkov and Baku areas." Three months later, in a comprehensive assessment of Soviet intentions in the Middle East, British intelligence emphasized Soviet efforts to move the center of Soviet industry eastward, to safeguard the Caucasian oil fields, and to protect the development of Soviet resources from prospective attack. In their report to the president, Clifford and Elsey also noted that "the Near East is an area of great strategic interest to the Soviet Union because of the shift of Soviet industry to southeastern Russia, within range of air attack from much of the Near East." And in November 1946, in a still more detailed assessment of the region, United States war planners stressed that the Soviet Union wanted to control the eastern Mediterranean and Persian Gulf areas in order "to deny them as possible enemy air, sea, and ground offensive bases. By this increase in the depth of her southerly territorial border, the Soviets would greatly increase the security of their vital areas from air attack and from seizure by ground forces." (Safeguarding Democratic Capitalism: US Foreign Policy and National Security, 1920-1950. Melvyn P. Leffler, 2017, p. 172. Citing: Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) 1641/1, "U.S. Security Interests in the Eastern Mediterranean," March 10, 1946, sec. 6, CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45), Records Of the Joint Chiefs Of Staff; JWPC 475/1, "Strategic Study of the Area between the Alps and the Himalayas," Nov. 2, 1946, sec. 3, pt. 1, CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46), *ibid.*; Joint Intelligence Committee [Of the British Staff Mission], Memorandum for Information No. 223, "Russia's Strategic Interests and Intentions in the Middle East," June 28, 1946, sec. I-C, ABC 336 Russia (22 August 1943), Records of the War Department General and Special Staff; Krock, *Memoirs*, 434.) (IMG)

Turkish leaders of course refused to accept Soviet demands. From the West of the Caucasus, the USSR remained vulnerable to an American nuclear and conventional strike. Throughout all of those years, the United States invested heavily into building up the Turkish air force, which could assist the United States in bombing the oil fields of not only Soviet Caucasus but also Romania:

Accordingly, next to the army, the Turkish air force was the largest recipient of United States assistance. During 1948, for example, the United States transferred over one hundred eighty F-47s, thirty B-26s, and eighty-six C-47s. Smaller numbers of jet fighters began arriving in 1950 and 1951. At the same time, the United States placed a great deal of stress on reconstructing and resurfacing Turkish airfields at places such as Bandirma and Diyarbakir. As a result, Turkey began to develop the capability to attack vital Soviet petroleum resources in Rumania and in the Caucasus; Ploesti and Baku, for example, came within range of the F-47s and the B-26s. Even more important, the rehabilitation of Turkish airfields and the construction of new ones, at Adana for example, meant that if war erupted the United States would be able to bring in its own B-29s to bomb the Soviet Union. Secretary of the Air Force W. Stuart Symington and

Secretary of Defense Forrestal were contemplating that contingency in early 1948. A more systematic effort to achieve such bombing capability was inaugurated in late 1949; significant progress toward that goal was expected during 1952. (Safeguarding Democratic Capitalism: US Foreign Policy and National Security, 1920-1950. Melvyn P. Leffler, 2017, p. 177. Citing: Ambassador's Report on Aid to Turkey, July 15, 1947, Annex D, Part Three, P&O 091 Turkey, Records of the United States Army Staff; Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, memorandum, "Turkish and Iranian Military Effort in War," Feb. 25, 1950, 381 Middle East TS, *ibid.*; "Proposal for Continuing Aid to the Turkish Air Force," appended to Wilds to Robert A. Lovett, Jan. 23, 1948, file 867.20/1—2348, Records of the Department of State; John H. Ohly to Llewellyn E. Thompson.) (IMG)

C17S6. Soviets Strengthen Defenses *** IMG-All-{Iran}

After the military defeat of the People's Democratic movements in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan in Iran, the Soviets, knowing that the Anglo-Americans plotted an invasion of the USSR via Iran, laid plans to fortify their borders. A CIA document on this matter is as follows:

The following was contained in a speech given in March 1947 by Colonel Hladko, member of the Soviet Army General Staff and of the All-Union Communist Party.

Theory Concerning US/British Plan of Attack

1. Soviet leaders believe that US and British political and operational plans for attack on the USSR include the following military operations:

(a) Action on several fronts, with the main attack through Turkey and Iran, where troop concentrations will cut off Soviet access to oil and Ukrainian food and industrial resources. Every effort will be made to hold the territories guaranteeing free movement along the Mediterranean.

(b) Simultaneous ... launching of a complementary attack from the north. The latter's aim will be to cut the USSR off from the Baltic, take Leningrad and drive to Moscow to meet the southern prong. The Soviet Army consequently will be put in a pocket.

2. The US will strike hard and fast, using all-out tactics to secure a quick break in the Soviet defense. The Americans and British are counting on a short war because they realize the expenditure of time, men and materiel necessary to cover the vast distances in the USSR. Upon successful accomplishment of this plan – and the US and British General Staffs do not doubt this eventuality – the Communist Party will be liquidated....

3. (...).

4. Another US/British plan is based on exhaustion of the USSR through a long-drawn-out civil war in China, prolonged by extensive US aid to Chiang Kai-shek in the form of equipment and instructors.

Soviet Military Defense Plans

5. Preparing [the] defense of the USSR necessitates securing these two main invasion routes:

(a) The southern route through Baku, Batum and the Don Basin, and

(b) the Scandinavian and Arctic Route threatened by the US. Strong bases for ice-breakers and specially prepared ship and aircraft are being built. Docks and shops are being constructed at Novy Port on the Ob River, Igarka on the Yenesei, and Tiksi on the Lena. To protect this strategic line further, the USSR desires greater access and facilities in Spitsbergen.

6. Fortifications are being built under the guise of industrial enterprises; the local populations are being deported to the Soviet interior. ('1. THEORY CONCERNING US/BRITISH PLAN OF ATTACK 2. SOVIET MILITARY DEFENSE PLANS', CIA, September 12, 1947, pp. 1-2) (IMG)

C17S7. Iran's Titoist Movement, a CIA Creation / The Razmara Administration / Stalin-era Soviet Aid to Mosaddeq Administration / Khrushchev-Malenkov-Beria Betrayals of Iran Cause 1953 CIA Coup / Yugoslav-linked Titoists help 1953 Iran Coup *** IMG-All-{Iran}

The CIA was interested in establishing a Titoist movement in Iran. The Chief of the Plans Staff of the Near East and Africa Division of the US intelligence reported to the Acting Chief of the Policy, the following:

We are even investigating the feasibility of establishing a local or "Titoist" Communist Party as a possible means of splitting and therefore weakening the Soviet Communist movement in Iran. This is obviously a dangerous undertaking which, if not very skillfully handled, could turn out to be a boomerang. Its potentialities as an anti-Soviet weapon, however, demand that we give it careful consideration.

("SUBJECT: Comments on your memorandum, 'The Limitations of Diplomacy,' dated 13 March 1951" "Memorandum From the Chief of the Plans Staff, Near East and Africa Division, Directorate of Plans ([name not declassified]) to the Acting Chief of the Policy, Plans and Review Section, Office of Policy Coordination, Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency ([name not declassified])", Washington, April 12, 1951. In: "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954", Iran 1951-1954, p. 65) (IMG)

The new Titoist party would be formed by Khalil Maleki and Mozaffar Baqai. As admitted by Homa Katouzian – a pro-Maleki researcher who worked as an economic consultant with the CIA front 'Organization of American States', the International Labor Organization, and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) – when Maleki was a member of the Tudeh Party of Iran, he was the contact of the Yugoslav Embassy in Tehran. In an interview with US liberal news agency PBS, Katouzian admitted:

Maleki had been the official Tudeh Party contact with the Yugoslav embassy in Tehran. ("Homa Katouzian on Khalil Maleki | Part 1: Nonalignment and the 'Third Force'", PBS, Eskandar Sadeghi-Borujerdi, April 12, 2012) (IMG)

The CIA operative Richard Cottam too confirmed that:

Khalil Maleki [was] the leader of the Titoist Third Force... (Nationalism in Iran: Updated Through 1978, Richard W. Cottam, 1979, pp. 294-295) (IMG)

Maleki, who had been a contact of the Yugoslav embassy in Tehran, had a favorable view towards the Yugoslav regime because of its anti-Sovietism:

Maleki's regard for Yugoslavia was both because of its break with Stalin and (as part of that) because of its own independent approach.... (Khalil Maleki: The Human Face of Iranian Socialism, Homa Katouzian, 2018) (IMG)

The notorious American spy and CIA coup perpetrator Mozaffar Baqai too regarded:

Maleki as a Titoist communist element and symbol. (“SUBJECT: Conversation with a Prominent Leader of the National Front”, Despatch From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, Tehran, October 27, 1952. In: “Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954”, Iran 1951-1954, p. 383) (IMG)

Homa Katouzian continued (note: the square brackets in the following quote were by Katouzian):

as early as 1949, Maleki wrote:

I am not concerned with the details of Tito's policies, nor even his major policies which may well be open to criticism and about which I know very little. [I am only concerned with the view] that having regard to one's national self-interest is not in conflict with healthy and proper international relations.

The special reference to the Balkan countries in the above quotation was not accidental, for, surprisingly, Maleki also predicted a rift between Russia and China, despite the apparently solid bond that existed between them at the time, and for many years to come:

The movement that ... Mao Tse-tung now continues, will not in the end remain a satellite of the Soviet Union. Indeed it can be confidently predicted that similar developments to those of Yugoslavia will also take place in China. The forms which these developments will take will doubtless be different from what happened in Yugoslavia. But their substance would be similar resistance against [Soviet] pressures and expansionist behaviour.

(Khalil Maleki: *The Human Face of Iranian Socialism*, Homa Katouzian, 2018) (IMG)

Among most intelligence circles both in the imperialist camp and in the anti-imperialist camp, it was a well-known fact that Mao's group would eventually follow the path of Tito's group although the forms by which Mao's group presented themselves was going to be different and was going to be in a fake 'anti-revisionist' clothing. The imperialist agent Khalil Maleki was aware of this. Contrary to what is too often stated, Khalil Maleki was actually not a founder of the Tudeh Party. In fact, he:

refused to become a founding member of the Tudeh Party in 1941, when Reza Shah abdicated in the wake of the Allied occupation of the country. (“Homa Katouzian on Khalil Maleki | Part 1: Nonalignment and the 'Third Force'”, PBS, Eskandar Sadeghi-Borujerdi, April 12, 2012) (IMG)

However,:

within a year or so, some of the party's leading young intellectuals persuaded him to join the party with the express purpose of helping them to reform its leadership and program. (“Homa Katouzian on Khalil Maleki | Part 1: Nonalignment and the 'Third Force'”, PBS, Eskandar Sadeghi-Borujerdi, April 12, 2012) (IMG)

Maleki's goal was to form a party that would serve as:

a social democratic alternative in the context of the Cold War against ... Soviet totalitarianism. (“Homa Katouzian on Khalil Maleki | Part 1: Nonalignment and the 'Third Force'”, PBS, Eskandar Sadeghi-Borujerdi, April 12, 2012) (IMG)

After the 1948 split, Maleki made overt his opposition to communism:

The time for reflection enabled Maleki to discover the roots of the problem in Soviet Stalinism, on the one hand, and Marxist-Leninist ideology, on the other. He openly denounced the former and grew out of the latter by making it clear that he was no longer a Leninist nor did he subscribe to the Marxist ideology, although he still used Marxian concepts wherever suitable. (“Homa Katouzian on Khalil Maleki | Part 1: Nonalignment and the 'Third Force'”, PBS, Eskandar Sadeghi-Borujerdi, April 12, 2012) (IMG)

In fact, as far as his background can be traced, Maleki was never a communist. Well prior to the split, he had opposed Ja'far Pishevari and Soviet power. Among the scholars of Iranian history, it is a well-known fact that Khalil Maleki

had broken with the Tudeh and the Soviets over ... the ethnic rebellions in Kurdistan and Azerbaijan. (The Coup, Ervand Abrahamian, p. 41)

Well prior to his split, he had problems with the Tudeh Party and wanted to 'reform' it. After failing to 'reform' the Party, he decided to lead a split, thus breaking away from the Party in 1948. Katouzian remarked:

The young reformist intellectuals – led by Jalal Al-e Ahamad – were in contact both with the young and fiery theorist Eprime Eshag [Keynesian] and the "elder" statesman of the party opposition, Khalil Maleki. It was they who persuaded Maleki to lead the famous split of January 1948. (“Homa Katouzian on Khalil Maleki | Part 1: Nonalignment and the 'Third Force'”, PBS, Eskandar Sadeghi-Borujerdi, April 12, 2012) (IMG)

Together with Maleki, the CIA spy Baqai formed the 'Hezb e Zahmatkeshan e Iran' (Translated as "Toilers' Party of Iran" and sometimes as "Workers' Party of Iran"). Explaining the origins of the Titoist party, the US intelligence reported:

The break-up of the Iranian Workers' Party is based on issues long buried, but early recognized by Bagai. The beginning was in 1948 when Bagai believed that he could make a strong labor party, based on socialist convictions, if he could unite with him in a middle-of-the-road policy the anti-communist socialists led by Maleki and the largely leaderless religious elements. He found the Maleki-men to be hard and efficient workers but not good socialists and too ambitious to attempt to dominate the party through their own faction. (“SUBJECT: Conversation with a Prominent Leader of the National Front”, Despatch From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, Tehran, October 27, 1952. In: “Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954”, Iran 1951-1954, p. 382) (IMG)

Furthermore, Baqai admitted to the CIA that Maleki and his gang were in fact disloyal to Mosaddeq. Referring to Maleki's group in third person plural, the US intelligence reported:

When Dr. Bagai left on his trip to Europe and to the United States (and more lately) when he was ill, he left the power of the party in their hands. On his return to active participation in party affairs he found that although they paid lip service to socialist principles, they were in fact ... not loyal to Dr. Mosaddeq. (“SUBJECT: Conversation with a Prominent Leader of the National Front”, Despatch From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, Tehran, October 27, 1952. In: “Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954”, Iran 1951-1954, p. 382) (IMG)

Another CIA document reveals that the Titoist agent Khalil Maleki was supported by the CIA for combatting the communists:

Any attempt to build American directed organizations, no matter how indirect the direction, within state institutions and outside, is bound to be discovered and consequently suspected. Roger, for example, can give you the details as to the difficulties we ran into with the Shah through our support of the Workers' Party and then of Maleki's Third Force because they were publicly anti-communist. It became known to the Shah that we were giving the support, even at a time when these organizations were critical of him. This served to encourage

his suspicions that the United States was supporting Mosadeq as against him, thus reenforcing his innate irresolution. This is an example of how one of our worthy objectives may help stymie another. There is also a potential future complication in that Baqai and Maleki may never believe, if we are not going along with them, that we are not covertly supporting others. (Letter From the First Secretary of Embassy in Iran (Melbourne) to the Officer in Charge of Iranian Affairs, Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs (Stutesman), Tehran, November 30, 1953. Source: US National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1950–1954, 788.00/11–3053. Top Secret; Security Information. In: “Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954”, Iran 1951-1954, pp. 858-859) (IMG)

It became increasingly necessary for Maleki and Baqai to pretend to be enemies. Baqai was assigned the task of actively working against Mosaddeq whereas Maleki was going to be a disloyal 'friend' of Mosaddeq seeking to undermine his Tudeh allies. As such, Maleki's group formed the Third Force, which as the CIA admitted, was supported (and directed) by American intelligence. The 'Third Force' as the name of the Party was a slogan in itself. The 'First Force' (i.e. 'First World') was the capitalist-imperialist and pro-fascist camp, to which Maleki, as would later be revealed, had favourable opinions. The Second Force ('Second World') referred to the anti-imperialist camp led by the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies. The 'Third Force' was named after the Yugoslav-inspired 'non-aligned' approach – promoting 'non-alignment' in the camp of the US-led forces is a pro-Soviet measure, for the slogan 'neutrality' promoted among the pro-American elements shifts the pro-American movement away from the United States and onto the direction of strategic partnership with the Soviet Union. In the context of socialist labour movement politics, however, calls for 'non-alignment' meant shifts away from socialism and onto the camp of American imperialism. This Third Force tendency was actively subsidized by the British spy, CIA agent, and Gestapo agent (see C12S1, C12S2, C12S3, and C12S4) Tito. Recall the following excerpt of a CIA document which stated:

the Yugoslav dictator backs up the so called “Third Force” and the neutral block; his activities are very intense in this field, and especially so among the Asiatic peoples. He holds up the bream (backs up) the labourist [i.e. Labour Party] dissident Bevan ... while his diplomatic mission to Tehran numbers not less than thirty persons. (“SUBJECT: Tito’s True Face”, Political Information (Analysis of Tito’s Relationship with Stalin and the West), CIA, November 28, 1952, p. 13)

The Third Force was a reflection of such reactionary ideologies as 'Third-Worldism' or 'Third World Socialism'. The Third-Worldists ignored the fact that the war-torn USSR had experienced a famine due to the war, not to mention the extermination of at least 27 million of its people by the Nazis, as well as the US plans to carry out a nuclear holocaust against it as early as September 1945. Similar was the case of the peoples of the Peoples' Democracies who had suffered under the savage persecution of fascists and the newly arising Anglo-American imperialist nuclear threats. Portraying the victimized USSR and the Peoples' Democracies as the victimizers mirroring the US-led camp, the Third-Worldists (or the Third Force, or the 'non-aligned socialists') advocated a pseudo-neutral camp when in fact they were objectively on the side of Anglo-American secret services and were actively working to turn the peoples of the colonized world against the peoples of the liberated socialist or popular-democratic camp. This is why, contrary to the popular perception, Gamal Abdel-Nasser regarded the concept of 'non-alignment' as basically junk (C1S3) as well. Tito's sponsorship of the Third-Worldist tendency, by the way, was dictated by the Trotskyite Fourth International, not surprisingly. As the reader may recall from C12S4, the Fourth International instructed Tito the following in 1948:

you would have to become the champion ... of all colonial peoples revolting against their imperialist masters; (An Open Letter to Congress, Central Committee and Members of the Yugoslav Communist Party, International Secretariat of the Fourth International, July 13, 1948. From Marxists Internet Archive) (IMG{Titoist Yugoslavia})

Through his 'Third Force', the Titoist agent Maleki represented the:

social democratic [read: Kautskyite] alternative in the context of the Cold War against and between Soviet totalitarianism and Western imperial machinations. (“Homa Katouzian on Khalil Maleki | Part 1: Nonalignment and the 'Third Force'”, PBS, Eskandar Sadeghi-Borujerdi, April 12, 2012) (IMG)

Reporting to the CIA, Baqai pointed out:

that his split with Maleki will go on indefinitely, with Maleki gradually losing the intellectuals' support he now has; that no worker does, or will, support Maleki. He pictures a withering away of Maleki.... (“SUBJECT: Conversation with a Prominent Leader of the National Front”, Despatch From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, Tehran, October 27, 1952. In: “Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954”, Iran 1951-1954, p. 383) (IMG)

Another US intelligence report, describing the Titoist agents of the CIA, the Third Force, admitted:

This political group is headed by Khalil Maleki, once a leader of the Tudeh Party and more recently party organizer and theoretician for Baghai. Maleki claims 10,000 members, certainly an exaggeration as the party publications appeal to intellectual socialists. (FACTORS INVOLVED IN THE OVERTHROW OF MOSSADEQ, “SUBJECT: Transmittal of Branch 4 Estimate Entitled ‘Factors Involved in the Overthrow of Mossadeq’”, Memorandum From the Chief of the Iran Branch, Near East and Africa Division (Waller) to the Chief of the Near East and Africa Division, Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Roosevelt), Washington, April 16, 1953. Estimate Prepared in the Iran Branch, Near East and Africa Division, Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, John H. Waller. According to Waller, the Branch 4 Estimate entitled ‘Factors Involved in the Overthrow of Mossadeq’ was drafted by Mr. Wilber and represents Branch thinking. Waller referred to the Estimate as a useful as a guide for the CIA’s PP planning, and as a reference source of background information. In: “Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954”, Iran 1951-1954, p. 538) (IMG)

Baqai's own 'new' party was by no means popular either:

Earlier a lieutenant of Mossadeq, Baghai has openly opposed him over the allegedly undemocratic and unconstitutional methods of Mossadeq. Should a show down between Mossadeq and the Shah be diverted to a vote on the continuation of Mossadeq’s plenary powers, Baghai would probably oppose Mossadeq. Baghai has not more than three faithful followers among the Majlis deputies. The Party claims 10,000 members but—given the defection of Maleki, probably has less than 2,000 active members.

(FACTORS INVOLVED IN THE OVERTHROW OF MOSSADEQ, “SUBJECT: Transmittal of Branch 4 Estimate Entitled ‘Factors Involved in the Overthrow of Mossadeq’”, Memorandum From the Chief of the Iran Branch, Near East and Africa Division (Waller) to the Chief of the Near East and Africa Division, Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Roosevelt), Washington, April 16,

1953. Estimate Prepared in the Iran Branch, Near East and Africa Division, Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, John H. Waller. According to Waller, the Branch 4 Estimate entitled 'Factors Involved in the Overthrow of Mossadeq' was drafted by Mr. Wilber and represents Branch thinking. Waller referred to the Estimate as a useful as a guide for the CIA's PP planning, and as a reference source of background information. In: "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954", Iran 1951-1954, pp. 538-539) (IMG)

Contrary to how he is often depicted, Razmara was actually Soviet-friendly:

Razmara was called pro-West, but he did far more to accommodate Iranian policy to the USSR than did Dr. Mossadeq. (Nationalism in Iran: Updated Through 1978, Richard W. Cottam, 1979, p. 210) (IMG)

Officially, Razmara had been among the generals who were ordered to suppress the Democratic force in Azerbaijan, but the fact that others ordered him to participate in these operations does not necessarily mean that he genuinely sympathized with such measures. Razmara was elected as Prime Minister by the same parliament that later elected Mosaddeq as Prime Minister. On the other hand, the Soviets sought to strengthen the Razmara government's hand:

The Iranian Government is finding it increasingly difficult to adhere firmly to its pro-Western policy. In aligning itself with the West, Iran had hoped to receive aid comparable to that given Greece and Turkey. Having failed to receive such aid, the Iranians are skeptical of Western intentions and question the wisdom of maintaining their pro-Western alignment. They are, instead, inclined to listen to the "friendly" Soviet protestations which characterize the current attitude of the USSR toward Iran. This attitude is manifest in the Soviet release of captured Iranian soldiers and in the wish to negotiate such important matters as trade agreement, frontier disputes, and the return of Iranian gold and dollars held in Moscow. The USSR thus appease eager to make arrangements which would sharply point up Soviet willingness to help Iran, and the Iranians feel that a suitable response to the Soviet approach may lessen the likelihood of direct intervention by the USSR. (SUBJECT: Current Iranian Problems, CIA, September 20, 1950, p. 1) (IMG)

This was why the imperialist-fascist secret services decided that Razmara must be ousted. The Shah's faction eliminated him. Regarding the role of the Shah in the Razmara assassination, a US intelligence document stated:

In 1956, the then minister of court in a conversation with a US Embassy officer "clearly implied" that former prime minister Razmara had been murdered "with the full knowledge of the Shah, if not on his direct order." The minister of court also stated that he had acted as intermediary between "the court" and the murderers of Mossadeq's police chief, General Afshartus. In general, however, the Shah continued in a passive position apparently attempting the role of a constitutional monarch, reigning but not ruling. (Centers of Power in Iran, Directorate of Intelligence, CIA, May 1972, p. 10) (IMG)

In mid-1951, therefore, Razmara was assassinated. Mansur Rafizadeh, who was the SAVAK director for US affairs and was the SAVAK's link with the CIA and US State Department, recalled:

During Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's reign, thousands of people were killed and the blame was always laid on "Muslim fanatics."

In Answer to History, the shah sings his familiar tune over and over. "On March 7, 1951, Prime Minister Haj Ali Razmara was by a member of the Fedayeen Islam, a terrorist group of the extreme right, while attending a religious ceremony in the Great Mosque." And again, "On January 21, 1965, Moslem fanatics shot and killed another one of my Prime Ministers, Hassan Ali Mansur. Later several guards were killed and in the early seventies [MEK] terrorists murdered three American Colonels in the streets of Tehran." In reality, these people, including the three American advisers to the Iranian Army, were all killed by the shah's directive.

(Witness: From the Shah to the Secret Arms Deal : An Insider's Account of U.S. Involvement in Iran, Mansur Rafizadeh, April 1, 1987, p. 134) (IMG)

After the elimination of Razmara however, the Shah's Persian bourgeois-nationalist faction maintained control over the Iranian government for a brief period:

Happily, the meaning of the Razmara regime and of its alleged American support is clear with respect to Iranian nationalism. Nationalism reigned supreme after Razmara's assassination, and the overwhelming sentiment among the victorious Nationalists was that Razmara's removal, even by assassination, was fully justified. In fact, the Mossadeq government was condemned for jailing Razmara's assassin.... (Nationalism in Iran: Updated Through 1978, Richard W. Cottam, 1979, p. 210) (IMG)

The pro-Shah elements, however, lasted for only less than a month in power. Quickly, in April 1951, Mosaddeq became the Prime Minister of Iran. The progressive character of his politics quickly won him the support of the people of Azerbaijan:

in 1951, when Dr. Mossadeq became prime minister, the entire political complexion of Azerbaijan changed. No other province joined more completely in the Mossadeq movement. There was a bitter election conflict in Tabriz in 1952, but not between Mossadeq Nationalists and royalist conservatives; the contest was between competing elements of the Mossadeqist National Front. Even some of the smaller Azerbaijan cities fell under Nationalist domination, and Ayatollah Kashani was able to swing several rural districts over to the Nationalist side. (Nationalism in Iran: Updated Through 1978, Richard W. Cottam, 1979, p. 129) (IMG)

Azerbaijan had been the territory from which Shia Islam was spread to the rest of Iran. It was a hotbed of 'Bolshevism' during the days of the October Revolution and 'Stalinism' by the 1940s. It had also been a zone whose socio-economic conditions at the time generated pro-Mosaddeq, or pro-Soviet tendencies. A commonly held myth is that Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq was pro-American or anti-Soviet. Yes, Iran's liberals and Shia Islamists really do claim that Mosaddeq was 'pro-American' and was overthrown due to his 'excess trust in the United States'. Such claims against Mosaddeq are not true; though the Iranian government was officially pro-American, and as the official head of the Iranian state, Mosaddeq had to make pro-American gestures, behind the scenes he was pushing for an alliance with the USSR and the Peoples' Republics. A CIA document corroborated;

Although Mossadeq will probably continue to seek US aid to enable him to meet his budgetary deficit—which would make it easier for him to stand firm on his own terms for an oil settlement and would temporarily strengthen his political position — it is increasingly clear that he opposes the development of closer military and political ties with the West. He has vacillated on giving formal approval to the continuance of the US military missions and the military aid program. He also has strong objections to becoming subject to the US economic advice. Although he was recently prevailed upon to sign a Point IV agreement, he has thus far refused to provide the assurances that would enable Iran to obtain military assistance under the Mutual Security Program. If he fails to receive US aid to relieve his growing budgetary difficulties, he may terminate the contracts of the US military missions and eventually curtail US technical and economic

assistance activities in Iran. However, it is also possible that internal pressures may force him to go further in giving commitments to the US than he would personally favor. Meanwhile, he will almost certainly make greater efforts to expand Iran's economic relations with other countries including the Soviet bloc, providing they do not appear to involve foreign interference in Iran's domestic affairs. (PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAN IN 1952 IN THE ABSENCE OF AN OIL SETTLEMENT, National Intelligence Estimate (NIE-46), CIA, February 4, 1952, p. 3) (IMG)

The document further acknowledged:

As an alternative to US aid, Mossadeq almost certainly would press forward with negotiations now under way with Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary for the sale of some two million tons of Iranian oil, and will probably also seek oil deals with other members of the Soviet bloc or with the USSR itself. However, it is unlikely that the Soviet bloc could provide enough tankers to move financially significant quantities of oil from Iran, and thus the sale of oil to the Soviet bloc would probably not provide Mossadeq with a lasting solution of his financial problems. (PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAN IN 1952 IN THE ABSENCE OF AN OIL SETTLEMENT, National Intelligence Estimate (NIE-46), CIA, February 4, 1952, p. 3) (IMG)

Lastly, the document predicted:

The USSR might attempt to gain political advantages in Iran by providing Mossadeq with limited advances against future oil deliveries or by satisfying Iran's dollar and gold claims against the USSR. (PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAN IN 1952 IN THE ABSENCE OF AN OIL SETTLEMENT, National Intelligence Estimate (NIE-46), CIA, February 4, 1952, p. 3) (IMG)

When the government of Iran took steps towards nationalizing its oil:

The USSR also expressed its sympathy with Persia's action against the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.... (The Soviet Bloc (Survey 1950 and 1951), CIA, May 7, 1952, p. 2) (IMG)

The Mosaddeq team was a road-paver team planted elevated to the top ranks of the Iranian regime. The Mosaddeq Administration, by pushing against the Anglo-American imperialist agents in Iran, was increasing the operational freedom for the Tudeh Party, thus paving the road to increased Tudeh influence in the Iranian state apparatus.

Some historians state that the US coup against Mosaddeq was due to the oil, as opposed to Soviet influence. Such a distinction between the 'oil issue' and the 'Soviet influence issue' is, in practice, a false distinction since Iran's oil nationalization would have antagonized the Anglo-American imperialists and moved it closer to a sympathetic USSR. Mosaddeq's oil nationalization project denied the Anglo-Americans the access to Iranian oil, while Mosaddeq's overtures to the USSR brought Iran closer to the socialist anti-imperialist camp. The Mosaddeq faction was a progressive bourgeois-democratic faction. The progressive bourgeois-democratic factions around the world represent the alliance of the anti-colonial national bourgeoisie with the proletariat and the cooperativists. The expansion of the influence of the progressive bourgeois-democrats of Iran over Iran's oil industry was the expansion of the influence of the Iranian proletariat, the ally of the Soviet dictatorship of the proletariat, over Iran's oil industry at the expense of Anglo-American finance capital. The increased influence of Iran's proletariat over the Iranian petroleum resources meant the increased influence of the Soviet proletariat, and hence the Soviet state, over Iran's petroleum resources. The petroleum resources were a key economic resource over which Iran's proletariat, backed by the Soviet proletariat, was fighting against Anglo-American finance capital. Yes, the Anglo-American imperialists went after Iran 'because of the oil' in the sense that they sought to reduce the influence of Iran's proletariat, and hence Soviet proletariat, over Iran's oil resources.

After the oil nationalization, Britain sanctioned Iran and withdrew its technicians so that the Iranian economy collapses. The West followed Britain in the anti-Iran sanctions:

No major Western European or US oil company has offered to provide Iran with technicians for her oil industry. (Daily Digest July 21, 1951, CIA, Section 2 (Eastern), p. 1) (IMG)

The USSR, on the other hand, was reported to have offered its economic support for Iran:

The Soviet Oil Administration of Austria, however, has reportedly offered Iran 150 technicians and two Soviet-controlled Austrian distributors are reported to be exploring opportunities for selling Iranian oil. (Daily Digest July 21, 1951, CIA, Section 2 (Eastern), p. 1) (IMG)

It is a fact that indeed the USSR began to send its oil technicians. According to another US intelligence report,:

The SMV (Soviet Oil Administration) has sent 15 oil technicians to Iran to instruct the Iranians. The group consists of engineers and drillers, and is known as the Austrian Drilling Delegation. (SMV Technicians in Iran, CIA, November 14, 1951, p. 1) (IMG)

In *relative* terms, the USSR was providing enormous economic infrastructure support for the government Mosaddeq. In absolute terms, the USSR could not possibly provide as much economic aid, because the terrain of Iran made it brutally difficult for the USSR to provide much economic support:

Transporting the oil from Iran would present formidable problems to the Soviet Union because the Soviet bloc owns only about 1% of the world's tanker tonnage; more than 10% of the world's tanker capacity is necessary to handle Abadan's production. Without some tanker facilities from non-Communist countries, the USSR would operate the Abadan refinery, for some time at least, at the cost of a large loss in production. The Iranian railroads at present can carry about 250,000 metric tons of oil per year. This amount is a small fraction of the USSR's yearly domestic output, but it would represent most of Abadan's annual capacity for the production of alkylate, the key component in the manufacture of high-octane aviation gasoline. An operating staff unfamiliar with the plant would require at least a year to achieve substantial production of alkylate. Supply of an additional 250,000 tons of alkylate would more than double the USSR's estimated annual production of this commodity, which is vital to the conduct of a long-range strategic air offensive. Overland transport could in time be increased with new tank cars and possibly with air transport.

The Iranian terrain would make construction of a pipeline to the USSR a most difficult and expensive proposition, though it is not an impossible engineering feat. Such a pipeline could conceivably be constructed in two to three years and would presumably be used for refined products. While the USSR might be unwilling to lay so costly a pipeline in view of Iran's vulnerability to Western interdiction efforts in the event of war, there is a strong possibility that such a pipeline would be built if the Soviet Union were to commence integrating Iran into the Soviet bloc in time of peace. There is every likelihood that if the USSR gains control of the oil resources, Iran would be exploited in the familiar pattern.

(Effects of Closing Down the Iranian Oil Industry, Intelligence Memorandum, Assistant Director, Office of Current Intelligence, CIA, July 11, 1951, pp. 4-5) (IMG)

Khalil Maleki, who did not hold a favourable view of the USSR, the Peoples' Democracies, and the Tudeh Party, was a prominent Iranian Titoist activist backed by and directed by the CIA, as revealed previously. At the time, Maleki was trying in vain to sabotage the Mosaddeq Administration's efforts to lift and shift Iran out of the Anglo-American imperialist camp. While portraying the Tudeh Party of Iran as enemies of Mosaddeq as opposed to allies, Khalil Maleki supported the CIA's World Bank 'mediations' which called on Mosaddeq to back down in the face of 'international' (i.e. Anglo-American) pressures. This fact was admitted by Homa Katouzian, the economic consultant to the Organization of American States and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, and a leading Iranian reformist intellectual known for his extensive research on and support for Khalil Maleki. Katouzian wrote:

On solving the issue concerning oil, the logic of Khalil Maleki was on the same track as the view of Mosaddeq in the [National] Movement. The nationalization of oil, before all else, was a strategy for gaining the independence of the nation and establishing a democratic system. Considering the apathy of the Soviets and the US support for the British, Iran was too weak at the time to be able to carry the struggle forward to the end, especially when there was an enemy in the form of the ruling regime [pro-Shah deep state] and the Tudeh Party, weakening the country from within. Maleki supported the mediation efforts of the World Bank (Chapter 12), and in the end, was the only major voice in the National Movement to dare to emphasize the necessity of resolving the oil issue for the purpose of the survival of the entire [National] Movement. A decent resolution (lower than the ideal goal), could have reduced international pressures, normalized the economic conditions of the country, increased the financial power of the government, so that it could execute the economic and social development projects. (Mosaddeq and the Struggle for Power in Iran, [Mosaddeq w Nabard Qodrat], Homa Katouzian, 1993, pp. 204) (IMG)

Thus, the CIA and MI6 jointly plotted Operation AJAX. The main figure on the ground responsible for launching this fascist coup d'états was, quite famously, General Fazlollah Zahedi, a member of the Nazi intelligence underground:

During World War II several generals were involved in German-sponsored clandestine political activity; one – Fazlollah Zahedi – later became Prime Minister. (Iran After the Shah: An Intelligence Assessment, CIA, August 1978, p. 10. In: CONTROL RECORD FOR SUPPLEMENTAL DISTRIBUTION) (IMG)

On March 1953, MI6 agent Beria and his Titoist circle of British intelligence agents at the top ranks of the Soviet successfully eliminated Joseph Stalin and some of his comrades in the Red Army command (see chapter 19). Upon gaining power in Moscow, the ruling Titoist agents of the MI6 did not follow the Stalin-era policy of supporting anti-imperialist and Soviet-friendly governments abroad, and on the contrary embarked upon a program of sabotage against the anti-imperialist and socialist forces. It was during this time period that drastic de-funding of the Peoples' Democracies occurred, and most violently of all, the June 1953 East Berlin riots occurred. It was also at this time that Moscow drastically cut support for the government of Mosaddeq. According to a document published by the American intelligence front, the Woodrow Wilson Center, the Soviet intelligence had knowledge of the Anglo-American coup plans, but the ruling circles in the Kremlin did not provide assistance to Mosaddeq in the face of Anglo-Americana plots:

The KI received data from the MGB and GRU stations in Teheran, much of it quite accurate. The analysts knew that the Americans wanted to topple Mossadeq because he refused to join an anti-Soviet "aggression pact." They learned that US ambassador Loy Henderson, the Shah, and various generals had been conspiring against the Iranian Prinr Minister since 1952. General Fazlollah Zahedi was identified as a likely candidate to succeed Mossadeq. Why, then, did the Soviets not leak this to him? One cannot tell from KI documents.

There is plenty of evidence, however, that the Soviets neither trusted nor supported Mossadeq. (...). But it was not now ready to ally with the "bourgeois nationalist" Mossadeq in Iran.

("Soviet Intelligence and the Cold War: The "Small" Committee of Information, 1952-1953", Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Vladislav Martinovich Zubok, December 1992, pp. 20-21) (IMG)

Owing to his anti-Stalin bias, the author from the Woodrow Wilson Center falsely claims that Joseph Stalin did not support Mosaddeq, but the earliest Soviet intelligence document which he cites for the context is dated July 7, 1953, three months after the death of Stalin, when the Titoists were in charge of the Kremlin. The ruling Titoist elites, not Stalin, were the ones to have to assist Mosaddeq against the coup. The elimination of Stalin and the subsequent reign of the Titoist agents of the MI6 in the Kremlin paved the way for Operation AJAX. As Mohammad Mosaddeq rightly reflected in his memoirs:

The death of Stalin on March 5 created the suitable conditions for the overthrow of my government (The Memoirs and Pains of Mohammad Mosaddeq, Mohammad Mosaddeq, p. 189) (IMG)

And the other one was [Anthony] Eden, the Foreign Minister of Britain's Conservative Government, who after a while of waiting, as soon as Stalin died and thus the setting for the oppressive behavior of the colonial regimes was created, made a trip to America and convinced the President Eisenhower to trade the freedom of a nation with 40% stock [from Iran's oil].... (The Memoirs and Pains of Mohammad Mosaddeq, Mohammad Mosaddeq, pp. 395-396) (IMG)

The facts mentioned here are also corroborated by the prominent Titoist Third Force officials. Masoud Hejazi, a founder of the Titoist Third Force, recalled that Mohammad-Ali Khonji, another founder of the Titoist 'Third Force', had analyzed that the elimination of Joseph Stalin and the rise of the Titoist circle meant that Mosaddeq could no longer rely on Soviet assistance against the coup. In his memoirs, referring to Mosaddeq's view that Stalin's death led to the coup, Hejazi recalled:

The interesting thing is that Dr. Mohammad-Ali Khonji, as stated before, had reached the same conclusion [as Mosaddeq on the role of Stalin's elimination on the AJAX coup]. In one of the meetings of the Joint Executive Committee and the Central Committee of the Toilers' Party of the Iranian Nation (Third Force), he spent a number of hours to analyze the international political situation concerning Iran, and concluded that due to the death of Joseph Stalin, the Soviet government has moved away from its aggressive [confrontational] approach in the Cold War and is now busy caring about its own domestic affairs, and Dr. Mosaddeq can no longer utilize the existing contradictions between the Eastern Bloc on the one side and the Western Bloc on the other, and as such, Western colonial policy, through England and America having reached common understanding, will pursue the necessary measures for bringing about the collapse of Dr. Mosaddeq's government. ("Events and Judgements, 1950-1960: The Memoirs of Masoud Hejazi", Masoud Hejazi, p. 316) (IMG)

Dr. Khonji's analysis served as warning of an impending coup. Khalil Maleki strictly prevented such a correct analysis to be handed to Mosaddeq: Dr. Khonji, based on this theory, was trying to show that the plot to overthrow the government of Dr. Mosaddeq is near, and I, who identified his remarks as completely logical and corresponding to reality, rose to defend him [Khonji], and called for forming extraordinary meetings of the Executive Committee and Central Committee of the Third Force Party's Youth Organization to equip the Third Force Party and the other National forces and for coordination of these [forces].

However, unfortunately, due to the silence and later the resistance of Khalil Maleki, as well as the slanders against Dr. Khonji, including the slander of him being Melancholic, such clear vision of Dr. Khonji did not bring any results....

("Events and Judgements, 1950-1960: The Memoirs of Masoud Hejazi", Masoud Hejazi, p. 317) (IMG)

The Titoist Third Force pursued the Anglo-American intelligence services' policy of divide-and-conquer against the anti-imperialist forces in Iran. One such case has been noted by Mr. Sadiqi, who, in the words of Iran's official modern historical research center, was:

the Minister of Interior of the late Mossadegh government.... (Factors for the Defeat of the National Movement of Iran in the Coup d'Etat of August 19, Political Studies and Research Institute, Pahlaviha.) (IMG)

In an interview Sadiqi corroborated:

In my opinion, the dough for the August 19 [1953] coup was prepared on July 21 [1953], because all the people and all the classes were in favor of Dr. Mossadegh and praised him wholeheartedly. But the late Khalil Maleki and others insisted that elements affiliated with the Tudeh Party participate in a separate demonstration, and millions at another time. As a result, on that day, a half of the day was a leftist demonstration with a special order and great organizational power and the other half of the day was a National [Front] demonstration with organizational weakness demonstrated, and such division of strength signalled to the Western governments assessing Dr. Mosaddeq's strength that the [socio-political] base of the government had weakened.... The Tudeh Party demonstrations that day had apparently been several times the number of the supporters of the [Mosaddeq's] National Movement of Iran. (Factors for the Defeat of the National Movement of Iran in the Coup d'Etat of August 19, Political Studies and Research Institute, Pahlaviha. Source cited: Source: The "Ettela'at" Daily Information 1388/05/28 (August 19, 2009)) (IMG)

The same excerpt of the interview was also presented in the memoirs of Masoud Hejazi, a co-founder of Maleki's Titoist 'Third Force'. Defending Maleki's decision, Hejazi remarked:

What must be added to this text is that when Khalil Maleki and Co. insisted that Tudeh Party affiliates must participate in a separate rally and at a separate time than the National [Front elements], they were, for several reasons, rightful in their plea and insistence. ("Events and Judgements, 1950-1960: The Memoirs of Masoud Hejazi", Masoud Hejazi, p. 362) (IMG)

The evidence makes it absolutely clear that the Third Force pursued the Titoist policy of dividing the anti-imperialist forces, and driving a wedge between Mosaddeq and his Tudeh Party allies, thus, as Mosaddeq's Minister of Interior stated, leading to the 1953 coup in Iran. Upon their release, the Titoist agents of the American secret service and Yugoslav regime continued their collaboration with the regime of the Shah, and extended their ties to the Mossad. The CIA-backed Titoist leader Maleki began to blatantly and unashamedly collaborate with the newly-installed regime of the Nazi spy Zahedi and the Shah:

In addition, there was one significant dissent by a loyal Mossadeghist from the policy of total opposition. After his release from prison, Khalil Maleki, the leader of the Titoist Third Force, argued publicly for a policy of accepting political realities. Maleki said that Mossaddeq's overthrow, whatever the immediate causes, would not have been possible had the base of social support for nationalism been larger. Therefore, the Nationalists should drop their intransigent opposition and instead seek to cooperate with the liberal wing of the "ruling class" until social evolution had progressed further. Maleki stressed that this "ruling class" should not be viewed as a monolith—all of one color and traitorous—but rather as a group of men whose views range from the reactionary to the liberal. Were the Nationalists to throw their strength to the liberal wing, an evolutionary trend could be set into motion which might bring the Nationalists back into positions of influence.

Maleki's arguments were published in his magazine Elm o Zendegi and were read widely. But instead of convincing his colleagues, Maleki was charged with having sold out to the Court and the imperialist powers. For a man who had lost most of his worldly possessions after the coup and had spent many months in prison because of his unwavering devotion to the Nationalist cause, the realization that many of his supporters now questioned his loyalty was surely a heavy blow. Yet in a day when censorship was increasingly strict, Elm o Zendegi had appeared without repercussions; and Maleki had called for collaboration with the men who had overthrown the greatest of Iranian leaders, Dr. Mossadegh. To many Nationalists the case against Maleki was a clear one. The Third Force split into pro- and anti-Maleki factions. The pro-Maleki wing atrophied; Elm o Zendegi ceased regular publication, and Maleki joined Maki and Baqai in obscurity.

(Nationalism in Iran: Updated Through 1978, Richard W. Cottam, 1979, pp. 294-295) (IMG)

Against communist science, CIA's Titoist agent Maleki and his Titoist friend Jalal Aal-e Ahmad had the audacity to openly argue for an Israel under the influence of the Ben-Gurion faction as their model of a 'socialist' society. It is good to support the communist-led 'Socialist Zionist' popular front party Mapam, or to support the agricultural cooperatives and state ownership in Israel, but to hail Kautskyite Israel in general, and the Israel under the influence of Moshe Sharett in particular, as the model for a 'socialist' alternative in 'contrast' to the Soviet Union was characteristic of Titoist renegades. For their service, Moshe Sharett invited them to Israel. Jalal Ahmad subsequently wrote an infamous travelogue hailing Israel's 'socialism'. Referring to Maleki's travel to Europe, Katouzian remarked:

While in Europe, Maleki was invited to visit Israel by Moshe Sharett, an Israeli socialist leader, ex-prime minister and ex-foreign minister.... Maleki, like all European socialists in the 1950s, regarded Israel as a model socialist country and a viable alternative to the Soviet model, and Elm o Zendegi and Nabard-e Zendegi wrote favourable comments on its kibbutz farms while discussing possible programmes for an Iranian land reform. (...). Jalal Al-e Ahmad and his wife Simin Daneshvar also visited Israel as guests shortly afterwards. He wrote a favourable travelogue.... (Khalil Maleki: The Human Face of Iranian Socialism, Homa Katouzian, March 31, 2018) (IMG)

Chapter 18

C18S1. Soviet Military Aid for the Communists in China *** IMG-All-{China}

The Soviet Red Army sacrificed so much in order to liberate Manchuria from Japanese fascist yoke. Upon liberating Manchuria, the USSR established a base for Chinese communist activity against the KMT, covertly funding the communist rebels against the CIA-backed KMT regime. A “Nationalist informant from Chiamussu area” reported to the CIA:

300 Soviet-trained Chinese pilots have arrived in Chiamusu....

The Soviets are giving the Communists 100 planes which will be delivered to Harbin this month.

(‘MILITARY INFORMATION: SOVIET AID TO COMMUNISTS, MANCHURIA; KOREAN AND MONGOLIAN TROOPS, MANCHURIA’, CIA, October 3, 1947, p. 1) (IMG)

Another CIA report stated:

A group of 150 Chinese students is attending the Soviet military academy at Inokentevskaya ... near Irkutsk. (...). The academy regularly trains Chinese Communist army officers. (MILITARY INFORMATION: TRAINING AND SUPPLY OF FAR EASTERN MILITARY FORCES BY THE USSR, CIA, May 18, 1948, p. 1) (IMG)

Another CIA report on the Soviet training of Chinese and Korean units stated the following:

Chinese and Korean Communist Units

8. The only Korean Communist unit in Hunchun is a small liaison detachment called the Hunchun Branch of the China Liaison Group, Korean Volunteer Army. The Chinese Communist units, listed below, are small groups of picked troops.

9. One Chinese Communist infantry battalion is stationed in the city. It was trained in Vladivostok and Khabarovsk by Soviet officers from “sniper” and cavalry units for a period of about one year. Comprising approximately 500 officers and men, the battalion is divided into companies, each consisting of three rifle and one machine gun platoon. Each (rifle) platoon has four sections, each of which is armed with:

One Jakov grenade launcher, requiring a loader and a gunner

Three Fedorov automatic rifles

One rang finder with periscope

Three to five Soviet infantry rifles, M-1930, with telescopic sights

Hand grenades and smoke candles

10. A signal company, also Soviet-trained, is housed in the building formerly used by the Japanese signal unit in Hunchun. It includes about 250 technicians and soldiers, equipped with Soviet M-1930 rifles and sub-machine guns. The company’s equipment consists of five radio transmitters and twenty wireless telephones. It maintains contact with Chinese Communist headquarters in Harbin and Chiamussu and is used by the Soviets for contacting Soviet units in North Korea and the USSR.

(MILITARY INFORMATION: SOVIET AND CHINESE COMMUNIST UNITS AND INSTALLATIONS IN HUNCHUN, CIA, March 30, 1948, p. 2) (IMG)

A report by the CIA’s Office of Report and Estimates (ORE) stated:

Partial evacuations from certain areas had taken place earlier, with little or no prior notification to the Chinese National Government. The latter did obtain, on 22 March 1946, a Soviet note giving the target date for complete withdrawal, but that note contained no area-by-area schedule for evacuation. Chinese Communist forces were thus placed in a highly favorable position to replace the departing Soviet occupation forces, thereby gaining physical control over most of Manchuria.

Intelligence reports correctly emphasize the importance of the "capture" of great supplies of Japanese arms and equipment by the Chinese Communist forces after they replaced the Soviet troops in Manchuria. Somewhat less well known is the fact that at least part of such Japanese supplies fell into Chinese Communist hands even during the Soviet occupation. A trained US observer personally saw unarmed Communist troops enter the Japanese arsenal in Mukden while it was completely under Soviet control and Soviet guard, and subsequently saw those troops emerge fully armed. (Other sources, including a Japanese, a Manchurian ex-puppet officer, and a Czech refugee in Dairen, cite similar episodes in Soviet-controlled areas containing Japanese Army materiel.) (IMPLEMENTATION OF SOVIET OBJECTIVES IN CHINA, CIA, Office of Reports and Estimates, ORE 45, September 15, 1947, p. 7) (IMG)

The US intelligence staff under diplomatic cover also confirmed the Soviet training of the Chinese forces:

In June 46 the US Consul General Dairen reported that the morale and efficiency of the Chinese police in Dairen had visibly increased and that “it is obvious that they are carefully and systematically trained”. Again in September 1946, he reported that the Soviet military in Dairen were training the Chinese police in the use of the rifle and bayonet. (IMPLEMENTATION OF SOVIET OBJECTIVES IN CHINA, CIA, Office of Reports and Estimates, ORE 45, September 15, 1947, p. 11) (IMG)

Furthermore:

Chinese Nationalist sources have indicated that these trainees in groups of several hundreds have been sent to Chefoo and Antung for service under the Chinese Communists. A US oil company official, who left Dairen in July 1948, reports that the transfer of trainees to Chinese Communist forces is “generally known.” (IMPLEMENTATION OF SOVIET OBJECTIVES IN CHINA, CIA, Office of Reports and Estimates, ORE 45, September 15, 1947, p. 11) (IMG)

C18S2. Sino-Soviet Economic Relations *** IMG-All-{China}

Upon defeating the Japanese forces in Manchuria, the Soviets began to remove military-industrial materials from Manchuria as war booty. International law on war booty, established by the Hague Convention, unambiguously states that forces occupying former enemy territories

have the right to take as war booty those assets which were used by their enemies for making war. In the words of the document of the Hague Convention:

An army of occupation can only take possession of cash, funds, and realizable securities which are strictly the property of the State, depots of arms, means of transport, stores and supplies, and, generally, all movable property belonging to the State which may be used for military operations.

All appliances, whether on land, at sea, or in the air, adapted for the transmission of news, or for the transport of persons or things, exclusive of cases governed by naval law, depots of arms, and, generally, all kinds of munitions of war, may be seized, even if they belong to private individuals, but must be restored and compensation fixed when peace is made.

(“Enemy Material”, MEMO: For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, Judge Advocate’s Office, General Headquarters, A. E. F., February 1, 1919. In: “United States Army in the World War, 1917-1919: 1917-1919”, United States Department of the Army, Office of Military History, p. 610) (IMG)

Referring to this rule of the Hague Convention, the US Army Department's Office of Military History stated:

This language is not ambiguous. It means that an art" of occupation is entitled to take possession of the materials of war and supplies belonging to the enemy state if such property is susceptible of use for military operations. either by the occupying Army o[r] the enemy; and property so appropriated may either be used by the occupying Army in its own operations or held to prevent its falling into hands of, and being used by, the enemy. It is equally clear, however, that property, not susceptible of a military use by either belligerent, though belonging to the enemy and at one forming a part of the supplies of his Army, cannot lawfully be appropriated much less destroyed or sold and the proceeds pocketed by the occupying state. In plainer words we are entitled to take only what we can use or what the enemy could use; (“Enemy Material”, MEMO: For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, Judge Advocate’s Office, General Headquarters, A. E. F., February 1, 1919. In: “United States Army in the World War, 1917-1919: 1917-1919”, United States Department of the Army, Office of Military History, p. 610) (IMG)

Regarding the Soviet removal of Japanese assets in Manchuria, American ambassador Edwin Pauley, the personal representative of US President Truman on the subject of reparations, wrote a fairly famous document fiercely condemning Soviet removals of industrial assets in Manchuria. Nonetheless, he admitted that virtually all of the industrial machinery in Manchuria were built by the militarist Japan:

Since all of Manchuria’s major industrial plants are former Japanese assets, as such they are subject to Allied reparations claims. (Report on Japanese Assets in Manchuria to the President of the United States, Edwin Wendell Pauley (Ambassador of the United States and Personal Representative of the President on Reparations), July 1946, p. 15) (IMG)

This fact shows that the industrial materials removed from Manchuria by the Soviets were militarist Japanese industrial assets, thus liable to removal by the occupying force. As admitted by Pauley in his viciously anti-Soviet report, the Soviets did not remove everything from Manchuria, but rather focused on the industrial assets, which as Pauley had admitted previously, belong to the Japanese military occupation. Pauley wrote:

The term “stripping” as it has been used in the press in connection with removals from Manchuria may be confusing. The Soviets did not take everything. They concentrated on certain categories of supplies, machinery and equipment. In addition to taking stockpiles and certain complete industrial installations, the Soviets took by far the larger part of all function power generating and transforming equipment, electric motors, experimental plants, laboratories, and hospitals. In machine tools, they took only the newest and best.... (Report on Japanese Assets in Manchuria to the President of the United States, Edwin Wendell Pauley(Ambassador of the United States and Personal Representative of the President on Reparations), July 1946, p. 9) (IMG)

The Soviet forces also confiscated approximately three million U.S. dollars worth of gold bullion stocks and over a half billion Manchurian yuan from Manchukuo banks. They also circulated nearly ten billion yuan in occupational currency, almost doubling the total Manchurian note issue. In addition to removals, mentioned above, occupational currency was used to purchase factories and properties and some privately-owned merchandise and materials. (Report on Japanese Assets in Manchuria to the President of the United States, Edwin Wendell Pauley (Ambassador of the United States and Personal Representative of the President on Reparations), July 1946, pp. 10-11) (IMG)

The Soviets soon consolidated their hold on Manchuria and shortly after 1 September 1945 began a systematic and selective removal of industrial machinery. Principal attention was centered on power-generating and transforming equipment, electric motors, experimental installations in the fields of heavy industry, mining, chemicals and cement. As the Soviets made a progressive take-over from the Japanese, production stopped.... (Report on Japanese Assets in Manchuria to the President of the United States, Edwin Wendell Pauley (Ambassador of the United States and Personal Representative of the President on Reparations), July 1946, p. 15) (IMG)

It is also worth noting, by the way, that the Soviets did not pursue the policy of removals from Korea:

Soviet actions in Manchuria are high-lighted by the entirely different policy followed in Korea where there were practically no capital removals or destruction of industry. In Manchuria the confiscation and removal of food stocks, the destruction attendant upon and following the removals of machinery, the almost complete halting of productive effort.... (Report on Japanese Assets in Manchuria to the President of the United States, Edwin Wendell Pauley (Ambassador of the United States and Personal Representative of the President on Reparations), July 1946, p. 12) (IMG)

This non-removal from Korea was because the northern region of Korea was run by a communist-led bourgeois republic, friendly to the USSR, whereas Manchuria was susceptible to capture by the US-backed KMT.

For the same kind of reason, once China was liberated by the CCP-led popular front, an agreement was signed with the USSR through which the Soviets would return Manchuria's industrial assets to the liberated China, without China paying any compensation. In a document submitted to the US Congress, Leo A. Orleans, the China Research Specialist in the Research Services of the Library of Congress, remarked:

In 1950, less than 5 years after the Soviet Union drastically reduced Manchuria's industrial capacity by dismantling and carrying off most of the more modern equipment from that region's industrial installations, a series of agreements were signed between the new Communist regime in China and the U.S.S.R. which laid the foundation for Sino-Soviet economic cooperation. An agreement signed in

February 1950 committed the Soviet Union to return to China, without any compensation, all the properties and buildings appropriated by the Russians in Manchuria after the defeat of Japan and to help rehabilitate, reconstruct, and build anew 50 enterprises. In some instances, therefore, this involved not only the delivery of whole plants, but also in research and design work, in developing the production of new types industrial goods, and in assembling and adjusting the equipment. The equipment and materials involved in this agreement were later calculated to be worth \$300 million.... (SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF CHINA'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, Leo A. Orleans. In: "Chinese Economy Post-Mao: A Compendium of Papers", submitted to: the Joint Economic Committee of Congress of the United States, Vol. 1: Policy and Performance, Printed for the use of the Joint Economic Committee, US Government Printing Office, Washington, 1975, pp. 126-127. "Leo A. Orleans is a China Research Specialist in Research Services of the Library of Congress" (p. 115 of the same document).) (IMG)

The CIA's Office of Research and Reports (ORR) stated:

Two investment credits have also been extended to Communist China by the USSR. The first of these, covering 141 large industrial installations, was granted on 14 February 1950. It provided a credit of \$300 million for the purchase of equipment and other materials for restored or newly built industrial enterprises. Among the projects for which this aid was scheduled were electric power plants, metal and machine manufacturing plants, coal mining installations, and equipment for transportation. ('SOVIET ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC: LOANS, CREDITS, AND GRANTS', Intelligence Memorandum, CIA, Office of Research and Reports (ORR), August 20, 1956, p. 11) (IMG)

Other Soviet-owned assets in Manchuria were generously given to China according to the 1950 treaty:

Under the 1950 Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, the Soviet government also pledged to restore and handover to China, free of charge, and before the end of 1952, all its rights to the Changchun Railway and all its property; a commitment they honored. The two Governments agreed on Soviet troop withdrawal from Port Arthur and Dairen and on relinquishing to the Chinese all the facilities, including the naval base, at this strategic location. Three Sino-Soviet joint-stock companies were established: Sovsinmetal—to prospect for, extract and process nonferrous and rare metals in Sinkiang Province; Sovsinoil—to prospect for and extract oil and gas; and the SKOGA company to operate China's air services. Both sides were to share equally in the capital and management of the companies, but in 1954 all three companies were turned over to the Chinese. (SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF CHINA'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, Leo A. Orleans. In: "Chinese Economy Post-Mao: A Compendium of Papers", submitted to: the Joint Economic Committee of Congress of the United States, Vol. 1: Policy and Performance, Printed for the use of the Joint Economic Committee, US Government Printing Office, Washington, 1975, p. 127) (IMG)

Orleans continued:

A trade agreement- signed in Moscow in April 1950 was to provide China with gasoline, paraffin and lubricants, machines and tools, transportation equipment, cotton, raw materials, fuel and other materials that were indispensable for China's economic rehabilitation. By 1952, the Soviet Union accounted for more than 53 percent of China's overall foreign trade turnover. Numerous other agreements signed in 1950-51 ranged from postal, telegraph, and telephone communication to the navigation of rivers bordering the two countries. During these early years, the Soviet Union claims to have supplied with 943,000 tons of ferrous metals (equivalent to about 40 percent of China's total output) and 1.5 million tons of petroleum products, including over 500,000 tons of gasoline and 477,000 tons of kerosene. Although in 1952 there were nearly 1,000 Soviet specialists in China, the U.S.S.R. never sought to use Its specialists to gain any kind of control over the Chinese economy. While Soviet specialists participated in design work and construction, assembly and commissioning of enterprises, they also were involved in training large numbers of Chinese personnel. Furthermore, large groups of engineers and technicians, as well as tens of thousands of Chinese workers, came to the U.S.S.R. for training during those years.

Even though the Soviets may overstate their claim, it is difficult to quarrel with the importance of their support and experience (and "the aid of the Soviet people") in enabling China to overcome her economic difficulties and in laying the groundwork for a successful transition to planned Socialist construction.

(SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF CHINA'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, Leo A. Orleans. In: "Chinese Economy Post-Mao: A Compendium of Papers", submitted to: the Joint Economic Committee of Congress of the United States, Vol. 1: Policy and Performance, Printed for the use of the Joint Economic Committee, US Government Printing Office, Washington, 1975, pp. 127-128) (IMG)

The interest rate was very low:

The repayment was to be made at an annual interest rate of only 1 percent and was to be made in the form of Chinese raw materials to be delivered to the Union in equal parts over a period of 10 years. Parenthetically, however, it should be pointed out that this represents but a fraction of the support Mao asked for. (SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF CHINA'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, Leo A. Orleans. In: "Chinese Economy Post-Mao: A Compendium of Papers", submitted to: the Joint Economic Committee of Congress of the United States, Vol. 1: Policy and Performance, Printed for the use of the Joint Economic Committee, US Government Printing Office, Washington, 1975, pp. 126-127) (IMG)

C18S3. The War against Fascist Japan / The Nuclear Strikes on Japan *** IMG-All-{Japan }

Imperial Japan was the ally of Nazi Germany. When Nazi Germany would ally with the Anglo-Americans against the Soviets, so too would Japan. Much like Nazi Germany, Japan' imperialist interests actually were in an alliance with the Anglo-American imperialists since 1943. From a Japanese imperialist point of view, the defeat of the Nazi Germans in the Battle of Stalingrad meant a mightier USSR, a Soviet Union with much more productive forces. Such a USSR could then turn eastwards and take out the Japanese Empire. Such a mighty USSR only be defeated through the joint struggle of the Japanese imperialists and the Anglo-American imperialists. Hence began the Japanese alliance with the American imperialists. In their negotiations with the Americans in Europe, which began as early as May 1943 and probably earlier, the Japanese sought to convince the OSS representatives that securing the US interest necessitated a US-Japan alliance against the Soviet Union. According to the declassified files, the Japanese repeatedly asked the OSS representatives:

on [the] status [of] Soviet-American relations with evident desire to impress us that a reasonably strong Japan [can serve] as buffer to protect America from Soviet expansion in [the] Far East.

(From Caserta, Italy. Office of Strategic Services, Field Section, X-2, May 1943, p. 1. in: 'OSS - CONTACT WITH JAPANESE OFFICIALS IN EUROPE/JAPANESE PRE-SURRENDER APPROACH TO ALLIED AUTHORITIES THROUGH OSS/MEMORANDUM ON ALLEGED JAPANESE PEACE FEELERS', OSS, 1943-1945) (IMG)

Thus, Japan's leaders aimed to convince the OSS that the United States should help retain a strong Imperial Japan as a base for anti-Soviet action. This explains the Japanese desire to 'surrender' to the United States. Japanese 'surrender' was a code word for an Imperial Japanese alliance with the United States to counter the Soviet threat. This time, of course, the difference was that the United States had the upper hand in this alliance. Soon enough, the United States would deploy its troops to Japan ostensibly to defeat imperialist Japan but actually to help suppress the rise of the communist forces in Japan and to retain Japan as the imperialist base against the socialist camp. Note that since 1943, the interests of the Japanese imperialists were one and the same with those of the American imperialists. The only major imperialist power whose interests was not the same as those of the Anglo-Americans, the Nazi Germans, and the Japanese, was France. French imperialism was the rival of those powers, and an ally of the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies.

In their contact with '673' – the OSS code for one of its agents in Europe – the Japanese stated their condition for surrender: the Emperor must remain in power. 'Otherwise', the Japanese told the 673, 'communism ... will ensue'. Below is an excerpt of the OSS report:

Our 673 is in touch here with Fujimura understood to be one of chief representatives in Europe of Japanese Navy and formerly Assistant Naval Attaché Berlin. Fujimura is supposed to be in direct and secret cable contact with Jap minister of Marine and believed to have [the] confidence of Jap Government. He indicated to 673 that he believed Navy circles who now control present Jap Government would be willing to surrender but desire to save some face out of wreckage if possible. In particular they stress necessity [to] save [the] Emperor as otherwise communism and chaos will ensue.

(From Bern, Switzerland. Office of Strategic Services, June 2, 1945, p. 1. In: 'OSS - CONTACT WITH JAPANESE OFFICIALS IN EUROPE/JAPANESE PRE-SURRENDER APPROACH TO ALLIED AUTHORITIES THROUGH OSS/MEMORANDUM ON ALLEGED JAPANESE PEACE FEELERS', 1945) (IMG)

In his 1966 memoirs, Allen Dulles confirmed the OSS reports:

On July 20, 1945, under instructions from Washington, I went to the Potsdam Conference and reported there to Secretary Stimson on what I had learned from Tokyo – they desired to surrender if they could retain the Emperor and the constitution as a basis for maintaining discipline and order in Japan after the devastating news of surrender became known to the Japanese people. (The Secret Surrender : The Classic Insider's Account of the Secret Plot to Surrender Northern Italy during WWII, Guilford, Conn. : Lyons Press, Allen Dulles, 2006, p. 219) (IMG)

In his memoirs, the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill also confirmed:

We knew of course that the Japanese were ready to give up ... in the war. (The Second World War Triumph and Tragedy, Volume 6, Winston Churchill, p. 556) (IMG)

All of this explains why the Anglo-Americans were so keen on preventing the USSR from engaging in a combat against the Japanese Empire, with which they were secretly seeking an alliance. Churchill confirmed to his deputy Anthony Eden that:

the United States do not at the present time desire Russian participation in the war against Japan. (The Second World War Triumph and Tragedy, Volume 6, Winston Churchill, p. 553) (IMG)

By engaging in a war against Imperial Japan, Churchill admitted in his memoirs, Generalissimo Stalin was fulfilling:

His word at Teheran and Yalta that Soviet Russia would attack Japan as soon as the German Army was defeated, and [that] in fulfilment of this a continuous movement of Russian troops to the Far East had been in progress over the Siberian Railway since the beginning of May. (The Second World War Triumph and Tragedy, Volume 6, Winston Churchill, p. 554) (IMG)

Nevertheless, and by no means surpassingly, Churchill was disappointed to see that the Generalissimo was staying true to his word, adding that the British did:

not need the Russians. The end of the Japanese war no longer depended upon ... their armies.... We had no need to ask favours of them. (The Second World War Triumph and Tragedy, Volume 6, Winston Churchill, p. 553) (IMG)

A more intricate question was what to tell Stalin. The President and I no longer felt that we needed his aid to conquer Japan. (...). In our opinion they were not likely to be needed.... (The Second World War Triumph and Tragedy, Volume 6, Winston Churchill, p. 554) (IMG)

A means to dissuade the USSR from engaging against fascist Japan was through the use of nuclear weapons as a bargaining chip and a warning. Churchill recalled:

On July 17 [a] world-shaking news ... arrived. In the afternoon Stimson called at my abode and ... said, "that the experiment in the Mexican desert has come off. The atomic bomb is a reality." (The Second World War Triumph and Tragedy, Volume 6, Winston Churchill, p. 552) (IMG)

As an indirect means of threatening the Soviets, Truman and Churchill:

both felt that [Stalin] must be informed of the great New Fact which now dominated the scene.... (The Second World War Triumph and Tragedy, Volume 6, Winston Churchill, p. 554) (IMG)

However, they also wanted to provide:

not ... any particulars. (The Second World War Triumph and Tragedy, Volume 6, Winston Churchill, p. 554) (IMG)

about the bomb. However, Churchill wondered,:

How should this news be imparted to [Stalin]? Should it be in writing or by word of mouth? Should it be at a formal and special meeting, or in the course of our daily conferences, or after one of them? The conclusion which the President came to was the last of these alternatives. "I think," he said, "I had best just tell him after one of our meetings that we have an entirely novel form of bomb, something quite out of the ordinary, which we think will have decisive effects upon the Japanese will to continue the war." I agreed to this procedure. (The Second World War Triumph and Tragedy, Volume 6, Winston Churchill, p. 554) (IMG)

In fact, as confirmed by many sources, among them British military historian and Colonel Hughes Wilson,:

Stalin knew all about the 'Manhattan Project' from the start, thanks to a group of committed Communist spies who kept the Soviet leader well informed. (On Intelligence: The History of Espionage and the Secret World, John Hughes-Wilson) (IMG)

Warning Stalin about the bomb, therefore, did not serve as an effective means of discouraging the Soviet leaders from fighting Japanese fascism.

The Soviets defeated the Nazi Germans in Europe. The European theatre was finished and the Soviets were preparing for combat against fascist Japan. According to international law, and particularly according to the so-called 'Neutrality' Pact between fascist Japan and the Soviets, the Red Army could not immediately begin its military operations against fascist Japan after the defeat of Nazi Germany, as some months had to pass. It is also not at all the case that the USSR badly needed to directly declare war on Japan. No, the USSR could respond proportionately to the Japanese fascist pseudo-neutrality by sending advisors, intelligence officers, and all kinds of light and heavy arms to the East Asian freedom fighters in the war against Japan. This would have created some slight inefficiency in work since it required a strong degree of emphasis on covert operations. Nonetheless, the USSR could still do that. Therefore, for expanding its influence in East Asia, no, the USSR did not desperately need a declaration of war or a direct war against Japan.

Nonetheless, the time for a direct war against fascist Japan came in the April 1945. According to the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact, the USSR had the legal right to cease the 'neutrality' and 'peace', and to wage war on fascist Japan. The article 2 of the Pact stated:

ARTICLE TWO

Should one of the Contracting Parties become the object of hostilities on the part of one or several third powers, the other Contracting Party will observe neutrality throughout the duration of the conflict.

ARTICLE THREE

The present Pact comes into force from the day of its ratification by both Contracting Parties and remains valid for five years. In case neither of the Contracting Parties denounces the Pact one year before the expiration of the term, it will be considered automatically prolonged for the next five years.

(Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact, April 13, 1941 Avalon Project) (IMG)

Naturally, the dialectical laws of history have left no room for a real neutrality in any international conflict; Japan could either promote a pro-Soviet 'neutrality' or a pro-German 'neutrality'. Within the context of international law, a pro-German 'neutrality' would have been legally acceptable enough, had fascist Japan not so vigorously and actively pushed for the interests of the German aggressors. However, Japan was very active in its favorable stance towards Nazi Germany; Japan and Germany were straight up allies. Japan was bogging down the Anglo-American allies of the Soviet Union in the beginning of the Great Patriotic War and later in the Great Patriotic War, Japan pursued an alliance with the Anglo-Americans against the USSR. All of this could hardly be an observance of article 2 of the pact. Furthermore, according to article 3 of the April 1941 deal, the USSR could denounce the 'neutrality' pact with fascist Japan by April 1945. Hence, the USSR indeed denounced the pact in April 1945:

"The neutrality pact between the Soviet Union and Japan was concluded on April 13, 1941, that is, before the attack of Germany on the USSR and before the outbreak of war between Japan on the one hand and England and the United States on the other. Since that time the situation has been basically altered. Germany has attacked the USSR, and Japan, ally of Germany, is aiding the latter in its war against the USSR. Furthermore Japan is waging a war with the USA and England, which are allies of the Soviet Union.

"In these circumstances the neutrality pact between Japan and the USSR has lost its sense, and the prolongation of that pact has become impossible.

"On the strength of the above and in accordance with Article Three of the above mentioned pact, which envisaged the right of denunciation one year before the lapse of the five year period of operation of the pact, the Soviet Government hereby makes know to the Government of Japan its wish to denounce the pact of April 13, 1941."

(Soviet Denunciation of the Pact with Japan, 1945, The Avalon Project) (IMG)

On August 6, 1945, Hiroshima fell victim to Washington's nuclear bombing. After having murdered tens of thousands of civilians, the US President Truman declared on radio:

Sixteen hours ago an American airplane dropped one bomb on Hiroshima, an important Japanese Army base. (Statement by the President Announcing the Use of the A-Bomb at Hiroshima, Harry S. Truman Presidential Library & Museum, originally published: August 6, 1945, Courtesy: The American Presidency Project, John Woolley and Gerhard Peters, University of California, Santa Barbara. underline added. For more information on USA's 'crazy' nuclear policy, check the works of Professor Michel Chossudovsky on the matter.) (IMG)

The 'fanatical Japs' would not have surrendered unless nuclear-struck, so say the proponents of the nuclear strikes. Such a narrative was obviously false, since the US intelligence had confirmed that the Japanese wanted to 'surrender' since as early as 1943 – 'surrender' as in ally with the United States. Even after World War II, a Truman Administration report stated:

Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey's opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945, and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated. (Japan's Struggle to End the War, United States Strategic Bombing Survey, July 1, 1946, p. 50) (IMG)

The nuclear strike on Japan was in part a psychological warfare move against the Soviet Red Army which had just recently entered the conflict against fascist Japan. One thing is for sure: there was no need for the nuclear strike to yield the Japanese surrender, as the surrender had already been negotiated long before 1943, and was to take effect by 1945, without the nuclear strike anyways.

C18S4. The Arrest of Yoshio Kodama *** IMG-All-{Japan}

Yoshio Kodama was a top mercantile bourgeois leader in fascist Japan, leading a large percentage of the East Asian narco-terrorist network. Describing his background, the CIA reported:

One of the causes to which Kodama has devoted much of his time and money is the right-wing, ultranationalist movement. He joined the movement in his teens, and his name was associated with terrorist incidents and rightist arrests that marked the upsurge of Japanese militarism in the early 1930's. After the outbreak of war with China, Kodama organized an underground agency based in Shanghai to procure strategic material for the Imperial Navy. The Kodama Agency was also involved in smuggling, narcotics trafficking and

paramilitary operations. (KODAMA, YOSHIO VOL. 1_0004, Yoshio Kodama – Rightist Leader – Japan, CIA Central Reference Service, p. 1) (IMG)

In October 1937 Kodama began a series of trips to northern China as a special staff official of the Foreign Ministry's Information Bureau. After his return from the first of these trips, he organized the ... China Problems Settlement National League ... aimed at promoting Japanese activity in China. (With unofficial backing from the Foreign Ministry, Kodama spent the next few years working with ... [Japanese] nationalist groups on China, making frequent trips to Shanghai.) In December 1941 he set up a purchasing agency in Shanghai for the Japanese Naval Air Force. This agency, later named the Kodama Kikan (Kodama Organ), involved considerable black market procurement as well as alleged intelligence responsibilities, and reportedly enabled Kodama to amass a huge personal fortune through wartime trade.... His wartime activities also included ... management of the right-wing newspaper Yamato Shimbun in 1943, and the assumption of the presidency of the ... Japan Southern Mining Company, Ltd. ... as well as several other mines, in 1944. In August 1945 he was appointed a member of the Cabinet Advisory Council in the Higashikuni cabinet.... (KODAMA, YOSHIO VOL. 1_0002, Yoshio Kodama – Rightist Leader – Japan, CIA, p. 2) (IMG)

During World War II, Kodama's:

activities also included ... management of the right-wing newspaper Yamato Shimbun in 1943, and the assumption of the presidency of the ... Japan Southern Mining Company, Ltd. ... as well as several other mines, in 1944. In August 1945 he was appointed a member of the Cabinet Advisory Council in the Higashikuni cabinet.... (KODAMA, YOSHIO VOL. 1_0002, Yoshio Kodama – Rightist Leader – Japan, CIA, p. 2) (IMG)

When Japan established its alliance with the United States in the form of 'surrender', as a manifestation of to the demagoguery of the Allen Dulles network, many of Japan's fascist war criminals were briefly arrested so that the American imperialist occupation forces could maintain a facade of 'concern' for 'justice'. This included Kodama who:

was arrested the following December [1945] and detained in Sugamo Prison as a Class A war criminal suspect. (KODAMA, YOSHIO VOL. 1_0002, Yoshio Kodama – Rightist Leader – Japan, CIA, p. 2) (IMG)

Kodama's arrest was by no means the end of his narco-terrorist career. Rather, history would prove that it was a new beginning. Prior to his arrest, Kodama had utilized the wealth he had amassed from his narco-terrorist activity in order to finance the creation of the fascist 'Japanese Liberal Party'. The CIA cited a report stating that:

Kodama gave Hatoyama [head of the Liberal Party (LP)] 10 million yen when the LP was formed in late 1945.... He ... was able to exploit his access to top government officials and his inside information on government policy in various profitable financial transactions. (KODAMA, YOSHIO VOL. 1_0001, Yoshio Kodama, CIA, p. 2) (IMG)

According to the New York Times:

Yoshio Kodama, a political fixer and later a major C.I.A. contact in Japan ... worked behind the scenes to finance the conservatives. (C.I.A. Spent Millions to Support Japanese Right in 50's and 60's, The New York Times, Tim Weiner, October 9, 1994) (IMG)

In order to finance the Japanese 'conservatives', really the Japanese fascists, the US intelligence:

smuggled tons of tungsten from Japanese military officers' caches into the United States and sold it to the Pentagon for \$10 million. The smugglers included Mr. Kodama and Kay Sugahara, a Japanese-American recruited by the O.S.S. from a internment camp in California during World War II.

The files of the late Mr. Sugahara – researched by the late Howard Schonberger, a University of Maine professor writing a book nearly completed when he died in 1991 – described the operation in detail. They say the C.I.A. provided \$2.8 million in financing for the tungsten operation, which reaped more than \$2 million in profits....

The group pumped the proceeds into the campaigns of conservatives during Japan's ... elections in 1953....

(C.I.A. Spent Millions to Support Japanese Right in 50's and 60's, The New York Times, Tim Weiner, October 9, 1994) (IMG)

Chalmers Johnson, the consultant for the CIA and author of books studied closely by CIA staff, confirmed these reports. He said:

There is no doubt today that Kodama returned to Japan in 1945 from China as the former head of the Navy's *Kodama Kikan* (Kodama Agency) [as] a fabulously rich war profiteer. He transferred stolen diamonds and platinum before he went to prison to Hatoyama Ichiro and Kono Ichiro, and the funds these materials produced when sold by Kono, about \$175 million, financed the creation of the Liberal Party. The go-between in this famous operation was the *kuromaku* Tsuji Karoku, whom the Diet questioned in 1947 about the alleged use of former military and black market funds to influence politics. (The 1955 System and the American Connection: A Bibliographic Introduction, JPRI Working Paper: No. 11, Chalmers Johnson, July 1995) (IMG)

Already, Kodama's role as the dominant figure of the post-War Japanese politics was flourishing. For their intelligence work against the Realm of the Proletariat, the US authorities needed the expertise of their Imperial Japanese allies. In Japan, the US intelligence service relied on 'scattered' fascist 'groups and individuals'. The CIA stated:

organized Japanese intelligence work as was carried on between 1945 and 1952 was done by scattered groups or individuals, mostly under the direction and control of occupation authorities. (Intelligence in the New Japan, Center for the Study of Intelligence, Studies Archive Indexes, Vol 7, No. 3, APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1994, CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM, CIA, September 18, 1995) (IMG)

In the meantime, having spent three years in jail, the Japanese narco-terrorist chief Yoshio Kodama was:

Released in December 1948.... (KODAMA, YOSHIO VOL. 1_0002, Yoshio Kodama – Rightist Leader – Japan, CIA, p. 2) (IMG)

Kodama's 'service' to the CIA was a mere manifestation of the alliance of Japan's fascist finance capital with American imperialism. The US intelligence consultant Chalmers Johnson wrote:

There is also little doubt that when Kodama was released from Sugamo on the day after the convicted war criminals were executed, he had been recruited by and was working for U.S. intelligence. On that matter [New York Times journalist] Tad Szulc has written, "Intelligence sources say that Kodama had a working relationship with the CIA from the time he was released from a Japanese prison in 1948"; and another seasoned observer who was also a former SCAP [Supreme Commander for Allied Powers] official, Hans Baerwald,

comments, "[Kodama's] release from imprisonment allegedly was tied to his becoming an agent of the American intelligence services in general, and ultimately the Central Intelligence Agency in particular." (Szulc, *New Republic*, April 10, 1976, p. 11; Baerwald, *Asian Survey*, September 1976, pp. 817-18.) (The 1955 System and the American Connection: A Bibliographic Introduction, JPRI Working Paper: No. 11, Chalmers Johnson, July 1995) (IMG)

Another CIA file reported:

Since his release in Dec 48 from Sugamo Prison to which he was sentenced as a Class "A" war criminal, Kodama has been forced to conduct his possibly illegal and dangerous activities covertly. Reports of his influential leadership in the revival of nationalist organizations and in shady black-market transactions are both insistent and widespread. (KODAMA, YOSHIO VOL. 1_0024, CIA, April 15, 1952, p. 1) (IMG)

With the backing of the United States, Kodama re-established the military of Japan – an underground army of gangsters and guerrillas was established.

A Washington Post article that was archived by the CIA reported:

After ... World War II, the Yakuza gangs were in almost total disarray. One development that helped them survive was [the] recruitment of gang members by US intelligence officers. The American authorities used Yakuza members to spy on and disrupt the supposedly leftist labor movement in Japan. Several incidents traced to Yakuza thugs in the pay of the US government were aimed at union members in Japan in the late 1940s and 1950s. (U.S. Blamed in Rise of Japanese Gangs, Washington Post, Jack Anderson and Dale Van Atta, June 11, 1986, p. 1. Document archived by the CIA) (IMG)

By March 1953, with the death of Stalin, the new Kremlin Titoist rulers reduced pressure on the Japanese fascists. This resulted in the elevation of the Kodama faction in Japan. The CIA reported

By March 1953 Kodama was described as having regained the ground lost after the war and to be once again the undisputed leader of the Japanese right, a position which he still holds, according to various sources. (KODAMA, YOSHIO VOL. 1_0001, Yoshio Kodama, CIA, p. 2) (IMG{East Asia})

By the time the Washington Post article was written:

The Yakuza number[ed] about 110,000, and the 2,500 individual gangs are organized into 83 groupings. (Narcotics Review, Directorate of Intelligence, CIA, June 1984, p. 2) (IMG)

The Yakuza was the Japanese fascist army of terror performing the function similar to the Gladio networks in Europe and the Schnez Truppe in Germany. As an example of their barbarity, they cut their members' fingers for slight deviation from the line of the Yakuza godfather. Many were pressured to belong to this network of crime syndicates.

The United States, honoring its alliance with Imperial Japan, fostered the narco-terrorist networks upon which the Co-Prosperity Sphere had thrived. Finally, in 1952, and once again with the backing of US intelligence, the Japanese war criminals banded together to form the Japanese intelligence service, known as the 'Public Safety Investigation Agency' (PSIA):

The only investigative service, as such, which evolved within the Japanese Government during this period was the Special Investigation Board created under SCAP directive and influence within the Attorney General's Office. The main cadre of this organization came, not from trained military or foreign intelligence ranks, but from among the procurators of the prewar Justice Ministry. In this context of judicial investigation the Special Investigation Board was able to don a mantle of respectability which permitted its survival and indeed growth as a security agency with some intelligence and gray propaganda functions. A few of the mainland operatives of the tokumu kikan [Japanese intelligence service during WWII], mostly from the China theater, joined this service, which emerged in a sovereign Japan in 1952 as the Public Safety (chian) Investigation Agency, taking on as well some senior military intelligence analysts who at last were no longer proscribed from such duty by the purge. (Intelligence in the New Japan, Center for the Study of Intelligence, Studies Archive Indexes, Vol 7, No. 3, APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1994, CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM, CIA, September 18, 1995) (IMG)

C18S5. The Korean Resistance During the Great Patriotic War / Roosevelt's Plans for Korea / Soviet Industrial Aid to North Korea / The North Korea System / South Korea Invasion of North Korea / US Bombs Soviet Air Bases in the Far East *** IMG-All-{Korea}

A document by the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) of the US Army stated:

The origins of the KPA are a fusion of Koreans fighting in China for the Chinese Revolution and against Japanese aggression (Yanan faction); the Koreans fighting the Japanese in Manchuria under the control of the Soviets (Kaspan faction); and the Koreans fighting Japanese colonialism on the Korean peninsula as well as each other for control in Korea after the Korean War.

The birth of the KPA can be established probably in 1936 when the Korean Fatherland Restoration Association (KFRA) was established to create a united front organization of anti-Japanese Koreans operating in Manchuria. On June 4, 1937, Kim Il Sung led a small group of partisans subordinate to the KFRA on a raid against a small border village in Korea and defeated a small Japanese police detachment. This much celebrated victory subsequently became the source of the Kaspan faction's name and the beginning of Kim Il Sung's legendary military career.

In 1939, the Korean Volunteer Army (KVA) was formed in Yanan, China, to support Mao Zedong and fought with the Chinese Communist forces in World War II and the Chinese Revolution.⁶⁸ In April 1946, the KVA was absorbed by various area commands which ultimately evolved into the newly forming Korean Peace Preservation Corps moving into northern Korea. Eventually, even this Corps was diluted by further officer transfers and reorganizations and eventually passed out of existence. However, the legacy and history of the KVA continued to be used probably for security and morale reasons.

In 1942, Kim Il Sung commanded a company of the Soviet Far East Command's Reconnaissance Bureau's 88th Special Independent Sniper Brigade and received a significant amount of training and experience in his future development of special purpose forces for the KPA.

(“North Korea’s Military Threat: Pyongyang’s Conventional Forces, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Ballistic Missiles”, Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, Andrew Scobell, John M. Sanford, April 2007, pp. 17-18) (IMG)

The Yanan fraction actually did not contribute much to the revolutionary struggles of the Korean people but nonetheless aimed to steal the credit at the expense of the Kim faction.

The SSI document also stated:

But more important are the distinctly Korean Partisan characteristics that emerged from the guerrilla origins of the armed band led by Kim Il Sung in Manchuria in the 1930s and 1940s (see “Origins and Evolution” in the Conventional Forces section). Indeed, psychologically, the KPA is very much an indigenous force that considers itself to be heir to the tradition of Kim Il Sung’s Partisans. Officially, the KPA traces its roots back to the band of communist fighters founded by Kim on April 25, 1932. (“North Korea’s Military Threat: Pyongyang’s Conventional Forces, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Ballistic Missiles”, Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, Andrew Scobell, John M. Sanford, April 2007, p. 7) (IMG)

In Korea, Imperial Japan had installed collaborationist structures, as part of its ‘Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere’. The advance of proletarian power in East Asia yielded the decline of the Co-Prosperity Sphere, forcing the Japanese Imperial heartland and its helpers into a unique alliance with the United States, in which of course the latter held the upper hand.

During the Great Patriotic War, President Roosevelt wanted a multilateral trusteeship over the Korean Peninsula and to pave the way for democratic development there. A book written with the support of the US Library of Congress's Federal Research Division reported:

The United States took the initiative in big power deliberations on Korea during World War II, suggesting a multilateral trusteeship for postwar Korea to the British in March 1943, and to the Soviet leaders at the end of the same year. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, concerned about the disposition of enemy-held colonial territories and aware of colonial demands for independence, sought a gradualist, tutelary policy of preparing former colonials--such as the Koreans--for self-government and independence. At the Cairo Conference in December 1943, the Allies, under United States urging, declared that after Japan was defeated Korea would become independent "in due course," a phrase consistent with Roosevelt's ideas. At about the same time, planners in the United States Department of State reversed the traditional United States policy of noninvolvement in Korea by defining the security of the peninsula as important to the security of the postwar Pacific, which was, in turn, very important to American security. (‘North Korea: A Country Study’, edited by and written with the help of: the Federal Research Division of the US Library of Congress staff, author: Andrea Matles Savada, Washington, GPO for the Library of Congress, 1993) (IMG)

However, the pro-Axis Truman Administration completely reversed such a decision. Disbanding the idea of a joint trusteeship,:

At a midnight meeting in Washington on August 10 and 11, 1945, War Department officials, including John J. McCloy and Dean Rusk, decided to make the thirty-eighth parallel the dividing line between the Soviet and United States zones in Korea. Neither the Soviet forces nor the Koreans were consulted. As a result, when 25,000 American soldiers occupied southern Korea in early September 1945, they found themselves up against a strong Korean impulse for independence and for thorough reform of colonial legacies. By and large, Koreans wished to solve their problems themselves and resented any inference that they were not ready for self-government. (‘North Korea: A Country Study’, edited by and written with the help of: the Federal Research Division of the US Library of Congress staff, author: Andrea Matles Savada, Washington, GPO for the Library of Congress, 1993) (IMG)

Nonetheless, respecting the Soviet agreement with Roosevelt era USA, the Soviets tacitly supported the rise of a non-communist anti-fascist leader in North Korea for the first few months:

From August 1945 until January 1946, Soviet forces worked with a coalition of communists and nationalists led by a Christian educator named Cho Man-sik. (...). The Soviets did not set up a central administration, nor did they establish an army. In retrospect their policy was more tentative and reactive than American policy in South Korea, which moved forward with plans for a separate administration and army. In general, Soviet power in the Asia-Pacific region was flexible and resulted in the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Manchuria in early 1946. (‘North Korea: A Country Study’, edited by and written with the help of: the Federal Research Division of the US Library of Congress staff, author: Andrea Matles Savada, Washington, GPO for the Library of Congress, 1993) (IMG)

However, the US regime went further in betraying the agreements made by its former, Soviet-friendly President Roosevelt. The US also renounced Roosevelt's line which had supported democratic development. Instead, the Americans went for a fascist military dictatorship in the South. This was clearly reflected in the attitudes of the US and USSR with regards to the Korean people's committees. A US intelligence report stated:

The contradiction between the US and Soviet political ideologies has again been illustrated in Korea where the application of opposing policies to similar situations at the beginning of the occupation had added significance because forty years of Japanese rule had done nothing to prepare the Korean people for self-government. On their arrival in Korea, the US and Soviet forces both found that local politically conscious Koreans ... had formed People's Committees during the interim between the surrender of Japan and the beginning of the occupation. The Soviet forces, which arrived first, at once recognized the People 's Committees north of the 38th parallel as the legitimate interim representatives of the Korean people. The US forces on the other hand refused to commit themselves to support in advance the claims of any one group to rule Korea. General Hodge accordingly refused to recognize the so-called People's Republic, which had been elected by the People's Committees on 6 September 1945, except as another political party. (KOREA, CIA, Central Intelligence Group (CIG), January 2, 1948, p. I-4) (IMG)

Regarding the Korean people in general (and not necessarily just South Koreans), the US intelligence's Office of Review and Evaluation (ORE) admitted:

a socialistic program is favored by the large majority of Koreans..... (THE SITUATION IN KOREA, CIA, Central Intelligence Group (CIG), Office of Review and Evaluation (ORE), January 3, 1947, p. 2) (IMG)

A socialistic program - the will of the Korean people - was implemented in North Korea. The US intelligence's Office of Review and Evaluation (ORE) reported:

revolutionary changes have in fact taken place under Soviet rule. Korean and Japanese landowners have been liquidated as a class, and the traditional system of land tenure, which the Japanese exploited, has been abolished. The Soviets boast that one million hectares (12,471,000 acres) of land have been distributed free of charge to the tenants. Banking, communications, and transportation, as well as heavy industry, are all controlled by the people's committees. In other words, all enterprises susceptible of immediate socialization have been taken over by the state. Private enterprise survives only among small producers, such as artisans and farmers. (...). Child labor has been prohibited, and equal rights, both political and economic, have been given to women. (THE SITUATION IN KOREA, CIA, Central Intelligence Group (CIG), Office of Review and Evaluation (ORE), January 3, 1947, p. 4) (IMG)

And:

The economy of North Korea has also been reorganized on the principles of regimentation and indirect control. With approximately one-third of the total population of Korea and 35% of the total food production, the Soviet Zone is agriculturally self-supporting. Korean mining, electric power, and heavy industry are, moreover, concentrated north of the 38th parallel. (THE SITUATION IN KOREA, CIA, Central Intelligence Group (CIG), Office of Review and Evaluation (ORE), January 3, 1947, p. 4) (IMG)

By 1947, the economy of North Korea was reconstructed:

The economy of North Korea has also been reconstructed on the principle of state control. Banking, heavy industry and communications have all been nationalized. The land has been redistributed, and private enterprise survives chiefly in agriculture and handicrafts. (THE SITUATION IN KOREA, CIA, Central Intelligence Group (CIG), Office of Review and Evaluation (ORE), January 3, 1947, p. 2) (IMG)

Against the myth that the USSR sought to keep North Korea backwards so to easily 'colonize' it, the US intelligence admitted:

Soviet policy in Korea is directed toward the establishment of a friendly state which will never serve as a base of attack upon the In order to attain this objective at a minimum cost, to its scanty resources in the Far East, the USSR has attempted to make North Korea economically self-sufficient.... (THE SITUATION IN KOREA, CIA, Central Intelligence Group (CIG), Office of Review and Evaluation (ORE), January 3, 1947, p. 1) (IMG)

The Pauley report, which was the official report of the US government on the Soviet treatment of industrial infrastructure in areas formerly occupied by Japan, backed up the above fact. The US intelligence's Office of Review and Evaluation (ORE) reported:

After inspecting of the industrial areas of the Soviet Zone, Ambassador Pauley concluded that only minor items of equipment had been removed from North Korea. It seems therefore that the USSR intends to preserve the industrial potential and build up the economic self-sufficiency of its zone.(THE SITUATION IN KOREA, CIA, Central Intelligence Group (CIG), Office of Review and Evaluation (ORE), January 3, 1947, pp. 4-5) (IMG)

Contrast North Korea with South Korea. Commenting on the political attitudes of the South Koreans toward the policies of the Soviet zone, the document further admitted:

There is no doubt of the propaganda value of the Soviet program, especially in the US Zone. Almost all Koreans are leftists by current US standards.... The socialization of basic industries and the redistribution of land figure in the political platform of every party in South Korea. Soviet policies might therefore be expected to have great popular appeal in Korea. (THE SITUATION IN KOREA, CIA, Central Intelligence Group (CIG), Office of Review and Evaluation (ORE), January 3, 1947, p. 5) (IMG)

And:

Communism and Soviet ascendancy are in fact the main issues between the parties of the left and the right in South Korea, where freedom of expression prevails in spite of occasional and temporary restrictions on the press. The leftist parties in South Korea are in general sympathetic, while the rightist parties are opposed to the Soviet regime. (THE SITUATION IN KOREA, CIA, Central Intelligence Group (CIG), Office of Review and Evaluation (ORE), January 3, 1947, p. 5) (IMG)

The Korean people were ideologically socialist or socialist-leaning and the socialist or socialist-leaning parties in Korea were sympathetic to the USSR. The system in North Korea was also highly attractive to the people of South Korea, a 'socialistic program' was favored by the majority of Koreans in general, and the communist party in South Korea drew much support from workers, peasants and students. The US intelligence, while continuing to show disbelief in the popularity of communism in Korea, nonetheless acknowledged the:

lack of evidence ... that the Soviet program [in North Korea] has not won the support of the people. (THE SITUATION IN KOREA, CIA, Central Intelligence Group (CIG), Office of Review and Evaluation (ORE), January 3, 1947, p. 5) (IMG)

Regarding South Korea, as confirmed by a document by the Headquarters of the US Department of the Army,:

The Korean Communist Party, resuscitated in October [1945], ... quickly built a substantial following among the workers, farmers, and students. ('South Korea, a Country Study', Headquarters of the US Department of the Army, Frederica M. Bunge, 1982, p. 23) (IMG)

South Korea's communist party, as the leading anti-fascist resistance force, established popular committees throughout Korea, that led to the establishment of the Central People's Committee and the Korean People's Republic. The people's committees, which were - as admitted by the document by the US Library of Congress's Federal Research Division - rose and grew as a homegrown indigenous movement were regarded as a threat by the American occupiers:

The Korean Communist Party ... had been a major force behind the Central People's Committee.... ('South Korea, a Country Study', Headquarters of the US Department of the Army, Frederica M. Bunge, 1982, p. 23) (IMG)

Before United States forces had landed in Korea in September 1945, the Koreans had established self-governing bodies, or people's committees. The leaders of these committees had organized the Central People's Committee, which proclaimed the establishment of the "Korean People's Republic" on September 6, 1945. ('South Korea, a Country Study', Federal Research Division of the US Library of Congress, Headquarters of the US Department of the Army, edited by Andrea Matles Savada and William Shaw, 1992, p. 27) (IMG)

The United States military command, along with emissaries dispatched from Washington, tended to interpret resistance to United States desires in the south as radical and pro-Soviet. When Korean resistance leaders set up an interim "people's republic" and people's committees throughout southern Korea in September 1945, the United States saw this fundamentally indigenous movement as part of a Soviet master plan to dominate all of Korea. ('North Korea: A Country Study', edited by and written with the help of: the Federal

Research Division of the US Library of Congress staff, author: Andrea Matles Savada, Washington, GPO for the Library of Congress, 1993) (IMG)

In response to the homegrown formation of the people's committees, the US – betraying the goals and promises of former President Roosevelt – decided to destroy such democratic institutions, institutions which would have no doubt benefited the communists since the Korean people were sympathetic to communism. Instead, the US callously imposed military rule over the southern zone of Korea:

The military government that administered the American-occupied zone proceeded to disband the local people's committees and impose direct rule, assigning military personnel who lacked language skills and knowledge of Korea as governors at various levels. ('South Korea, a Country Study', Federal Research Division of the US Library of Congress, Headquarters of the US Department of the Army, edited by Andrea Matles Savada and William Shaw, 1992, p. 27) (IMG)

Instead:

By early 1946 the military government had come to rely heavily on the advice and counsel of ideologically conservative elements, including landlords and other propertied persons. ('South Korea, a Country Study', Headquarters of the US Department of the Army, Frederica M. Bunge, 1982, p. 23) (IMG)

the initially warm welcome to United States troops as liberators cooled. By early 1946, the United States Army military government had come to rely heavily on the advice and counsel of ideologically conservative elements, including landlords and other propertied persons. ('South Korea, a Country Study', Federal Research Division of the US Library of Congress, Headquarters of the US Department of the Army, edited by Andrea Matles Savada and William Shaw, 1992, p. 28) (IMG)

In addition:

the US Military Government furthermore made ... use of the Japanese officials at the beginning of the occupation, [hence] the various Korean factions convinced themselves that they had a legitimate grievance against the US. (KOREA, CIA, Central Intelligence Group (CIG), January 2, 1948, p. I-5) (IMG)

As such:

Once the United States occupation force chose to bolster the status quo and resist radical reform of colonial legacies, it immediately ran into monumental opposition to its policies from the majority of South Koreans. The United States Army Military Government in Korea (1945-48) spent most of its first year suppressing the many people's committees that had emerged in the provinces. This action provoked a massive rebellion in the fall of 1946; after the rebellion was suppressed, radical activists developed a significant guerrilla movement in 1948 and 1949. Activists also touched off a major rebellion at the port of Ysu in South Korea in October 1948. Much of this disorder resulted from unresolved land problem caused by conservative landed factions who used their bureaucratic power to block redistribution of land to peasant tenants. ('North Korea: A Country Study', edited by and written with the help of: the Federal Research Division of the US Library of Congress staff, author: Andrea Matles Savada, Washington, GPO for the Library of Congress, 1993) (IMG)

These circumstances had thrown South Korea's economy into complete chaos. ('South Korea, a Country Study', Headquarters of the US Department of the Army, Frederica M. Bunge, 1982, p. 24) (IMG)

The social unrest created by these developments can be easily surmised. By 1947 only about half the labor force of 10 million was engaged in gainful employment. Labor strikes and work stoppages were a recurrent phenomena, and demonstrations the United States and the policies of its military government drew large crowds. Temporary stoppages of electricity supply from the northern areas in the early part of 1946 and late 1947 plunged the southern region into on each occasion, deepening the gloom among the populace. A vast majority of the disillusioned and disconcerted people paid keen attention to political leaders of various persuasions who offered alternative ways of solving the Korean problem. ('South Korea, a Country Study', Headquarters of the US Department of the Army, Frederica M. Bunge, 1982, pp. 24-25) (IMG)

The phony "democratic" institutions set up by the USA's fascist military occupation in South Korea were ignored by the communist-led popular front of progressive parties:

In December 1946 the military government established the South Korean Interim Legislative Assembly to formulate draft laws to be used as "the basis for political, economic and social reforms." South Korea's problems, however, required solutions at a much higher plane. The left-wing political groups, consolidated under the rubric of the South Korean Workers' Party, ignored the assembly. ('South Korea, a Country Study', Headquarters of the US Department of the Army, Frederica M. Bunge, 1982, p. 23) (IMG)

Surely, due to the conditions of war, the economic conditions of South Korea were originally poorer than those of North Korea in some respects. However, the problems in South Korea had solutions, and part of the solution was the abolition of feudalism, recognition of indigenous institutions, the purge of the Japanese fascists and Korean collaborationist officials that were corrupting South Korea, the elimination of the fascist police and its replacement with an anti-fascist police, the establishment of scientific central planning with heavy industry development, etc. None of such institutions were established in South Korea, unlike in the North, a critically important fact which contributed to the widespread unrest in the South, unlike in the North.

Around four months after Japanese surrender, noted William J. Webb of the US Army Center for Military History, Washington initiated the expansion of the South Korean fascist army military capabilities:

Attempts to build a ... defense force in South Korea began shortly after the end of World War II. In January 1946 the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized General MacArthur to form a Korean police force and, despite problems with equipment and training, the Korean Constabulary grew to 20,000 men by the close of 1947. ('The Korean War: The Outbreak, 27 June – 15 September 1950', US Army Center for Military History, William J. Webb, September 20, 2012, p. 6) (IMG)

Describing the reign of terror by which the South Korean people were suffering and against which the South Korean people supported the communist movement, the US intelligence reported:

The apparent failure of the South Korean Communists to produce a political crisis is hardly surprising and should not be taken as a South Korean “vote of confidence” in US Military Government. On the contrary, the results thus far achieved appear quite remarkable when it is considered that the Communist organization in the US Zone, since August, 1947, has been subject to all the repressive forces that could be mobilized against the rightist police and fanatically rightist youth groups. That it has been able to achieve even the present dislocation of economic and political life in South Korea on the basis of completely clandestine organization, is not so much due to the skill of the Communist organizers as to the fact that they were sowing fertile soil. The Communists have been able to appeal to the traditional Korean hatred of the rightist police force – a hatred which is unfortunately largely justified. Moreover they have been able to call attention to the inequities in the South Korean economy, namely: the failure to enact a land reform law and the galloping cost of living index. While it is true that both of these latter situations are partially attributable to the lack of certainty concerning South Korea’s political future, the fact remains that as long as this situation continues, the South Korean Communists will have the capability of provoking public disorders whenever the need arises. (Intelligence Highlights – Week of 3 February – 9 February 1948, Office of Reports and Estimates, CIA, p. 4) (IMG)

Struck in fear, and determined to wipe out the Korean people’s revolutionary threat, the leaders in Washington:

asked MacArthur about the advisability of creating a South Korean army. MacArthur proposed instead in February 1948 an increase of the Constabulary to 50,000 men. (‘The Korean War: The Outbreak, 27 June – 15 September 1950’, US Army Center for Military History, William J. Webb, September 20, 2012, p. 6, underline added) (IMG)

The Americans helped South Korea to expand its repressive police force against to the popular revolutionary aspirations of the Korean people.

The South Korean Regime fostered ‘March North for Unification’ (Korean: ‘Pukchin Tongil’ or ‘Pukjin Tongil’) as its official slogan; it called for a Southern invasion of the North:

[T]he Rhee regime insisted on its northward marching policy of unification (Pukchin Tongil).... (Korean Studies Information Service System, Sun Won Park, 2017) (IMG)

A July 1949 CIA report stated that several high-ranking South Korean officers were fanatically pushing for war against North Korea:

In a recent discussion concerning the defense of the Republic of Korea. CH’AE Pyung-tuk, Chief of Staff, Korean Army, stated that his interest in defensive plans is only secondary; his primary interest is in attacking North Korea as soon as possible. CH’AE and several staff officers spoke at length of the necessity of obtaining additional arms for the defense of South Korea, but admitted frankly that their personal intent is to establish an army sufficiently strong to invade North Korea before reinforcements from Manchuria and China bolster the North Korean People’s Army and security forces. (DESIRE OF HIGH-RANKING KOREAN ARMY OFFICERS FOR AN INVASION OF NORTH KOREA, CIA, July 7, 1949, p. 1) (IMG)

As another example, Shin Sung-Mo was:

the 2nd Defense Minister of the Syngman Rhee government in 1949. During a July 17, 1949 speech, Shin stated that the ROK Army could occupy Pyongyang or Wonsan in North Korea in one day if were President Rhee to give the order. (Origins of the North Korean Garrison State: The People’s Army and the Korean War, Routledge, Youngjun Kim, 2018) (IMG)

As such, the United States deployed the KMAG to South Korea in order provide more training and logistics for the South Korean military:

[T]he Provisional Military Advisory Group established by MacArthur in August 1948 was redesignated in July 1949 the United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea (KMAG) and authorized 472 soldiers (‘The Korean War: The Outbreak, 27 June – 15 September 1950’, US Army Center for Military History, William J. Webb, September 20, 2012, p. 6, underline added) (IMG)

As early as November 1948:

South Korea [had] passed the Armed Forces Organization Act, which created a department of national defense. By March 1949 the South had converted its Constabulary brigades into an Army of 65,000 men assigned to eight tactical divisions – the 1st, 2d, 3d, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, and Capital Divisions. In June 1950 the ROK armed forces consisted of the following: Army, 94,808; Coast Guard, 6,145; Air Force, 1,865; and National Police, 48,273. (‘The Korean War: The Outbreak, 27 June – 15 September 1950’, US Army Center for Military History, William J. Webb, September 20, 2012, p. 6, underline added) (IMG)

Up in the North, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea developed its military as well:

The North Korean People’s Army was officially activated in February 1948. (‘The Korean War: The Outbreak, 27 June – 15 September 1950’, US Army Center for Military History, William J. Webb, September 20, 2012, p. 7) (IMG)

Immediately, the USSR began supplying extensive military support for the Democratic People’s Republic in the North:

150 Soviets [advisors] were assigned to each division; the number dropped to 20 per division in 1949 and to a lesser number [of Soviet advisors] by 1950 as trusted North Korean officers were developed. By June 1950 the NKPA and the Border Constabulary numbered about 135,000. The primary tactical units consisted of eight full-strength infantry divisions of 11,000 men each, two more infantry divisions at half strength, a separate infantry regiment, a motorcycle-reconnaissance regiment, and an armored brigade. The NKPA benefited from some 20,000 North Koreans who were veterans of the Chinese civil war of the late 1940s, which gave its units a combat-hardened quality and efficiency. The Soviet Union supplied much of the materiel for the NKPA. Of primary importance was the T-34 medium tank, a mainstay of the Soviet armored force in World War II that weighed 32 tons and mounted an 85- mm. gun. The Soviets also supplied artillery support that resembled the weaponry of the older Soviet division of World War II: 76-mm. and 122-mm. howitzers, 45-mm. antitank guns, and 82-mm. and 120-mm. mortars. At the outset of the war North Korea had about 180 Soviet aircraft-60 YAK trainers, 40 YAK fighters, 70 attack bombers, and 10 reconnaissance planes. Like the ROK Navy, the North Korean naval forces had only a few small vessels – sixteen patrol craft and several coastal steamers. (‘The Korean War: The Outbreak, 27 June – 15 September 1950’, US Army Center for Military History, William J. Webb, September 20, 2012, p. 7) (IMG)

The Democratic People’s Republic’s military expansion was for **defensive** purposes only. The Democratic People’s Republic had no intent on aggressing the fascist South. On July 27, 1949, the CIA reported:

North Korean military forces are at present deployed in depth in defense against a possible invasion by forces from South Korea. The 38th parallel itself is lightly held, with regimental reserves of the North Korean People's Army held in an area twenty to thirty kilometers north of the border.

The reserves of two divisions of the People's Army charged with the defense of the 38th parallel are stationed from thirty to sixty miles north of the border. National reserves are being retained in the Hamhung (127-32, 39-54) and Nanam (129-41, 41-42) areas.

This defense plan has been prescribed by Soviet military advisers to the North Korean government.

(NORTH KOREAN DEFENSES AGAINST AN INVASION FROM SOUTH KOREA, CIA, July 27, 1949, p. 1) (IMG)

By contrast, the South Korean leaders found it increasingly difficult to control their lust for invading the North. For instance:

[T]he old nationalist [Syngman Rhee] also promoted a counterproductive approach during 1949. He openly promoted a plan for unification by invading North Korea. (American Diplomacy and Strategy toward Korea and Northeast Asia, 1882-1950, Kim Seung-Young, p. 188) (IMG)

The Rhee gang's lust for an invasion against the North should not be regarded as being in contradiction in the slightest to the American finance capital's lust for an invasion. The Americans merely pretended to be more moderate than the South Korean fascists. The South Korean President: assertively raised this option of invading North Korea when the US Secretary of the Army, Royal, visited Seoul on February 8, 1949.

Royal had to restrain him by clarifying that no invasion would be allowed as long as US combat forces remained in Korea. (American Diplomacy and Strategy toward Korea and Northeast Asia, 1882-1950, Kim Seung-Young, p. 188) (IMG)

Indeed, only when the Americans would *officially* 'leave' the South was the South allowed invade the North. The Soviets and North Koreans made note of this:

I report the results of the investigation I have organized of the information about the preparation for the withdrawal of American troops and the preparations of the South Korean army for an attack on North Korea.... (Telegram from Shtykov on Preparations for an Attack on North Korea, Wilson Center, May 2, 1949) (IMG)

Then:

In September 1949, [General Shin] argued that the ROK Army was ready for war and had been waiting for a war. (Origins of the North Korean Garrison State: The People's Army and the Korean War, Routledge, Youngjun Kim, 2018) (IMG)

Only two months later, the South Korean press published an article – which was reprinted by the CIA – titled 'Hypothetical Invasion of North Korea', describing South Korea's plan for invading the north:

Many attempts have been made to effect the unification of North and South Korea, but all have failed miserably. The only way to erase the division at the 38th Parallel is the use of force. We, therefore, propose to discuss a hypothetical invasion of North Korea as follows:

First Stage – Occupation of Pyongyang in Three Days

Our crack troops can occupy Haeju the first day and then advance on Sariwon. Guarding the border in the Kangwondo area presents no problem because of the characteristic terrain of that territory.

(Hypothetical Invasion of North Korea, original source: Ibuk Tongsin, reprinted in CIA, date of information: December 1949, date of distribution: January 26, 1950, p. 1. Underline original. Bold added.) (IMG)

Wary of this fact, the North ramped up its **defenses** against what a January 1950 CIA report rightly called the '**offensively minded South**':

The continuing southward movement of the expanding Korean People's Army toward the thirty-eighth parallel probably constitutes a defensive measure to offset the growing strength of the offensively minded South Korean Army. (Korea: Troop Build Up, CIA, January 13, 1950, p. 11) (IMG)

Two months later, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea received even more military equipment from the Soviet Union. In a letter to Kim, Stalin said:

I have also received your proposal of 9 March about the delivery to you of arms, ammunition and technical equipment for the people's army of Korea. The Soviet government has decided also to satisfy fully this request of yours. (Message, Stalin to Kim Il Sung (Via Shtykov), March 18, 1950, Wilson Center) (IMG)

On June 19th, 1950, John Foster Dulles traveled to South Korea and gave a historic speech, excerpts of which are as follows:

Already, the United States has twice intervened with armed might in defense of freedom.... (...). Today, the Korean people are in the front line of freedom, under conditions that are both dangerous and exciting. (...). The American people give you their support, both moral and material.... (Department of State Bulletin, The Korean Experiment in Representative Government Statement, John Foster Dulles Consultant to the Secretary, June 19, 1950, published in Department of State Bulletin, pp. 12-13. Underline added.) (IMG)

The significance of the speech is that it was timed to be approximately when the South Korean Regime, waiting for war, had placed its troops on the North Korean border. According to Webb:

In the early summer [i.e. the latter half of June] of 1950 four ROK divisions held positions along the 38th Parallel: the 1st, 6th, 7th, and 8th. ('The Korean War: The Outbreak, 27 June – 15 September 1950', US Army Center for Military History, William J. Webb, September 20, 2012, p. 6) (IMG)

The speech by Dulles was a 'moral support' for the South Korean troops that 'with armed might' were 'in the frontline' of the coming offensive war for the 'defense of freedom'.

On June 25, 1950, the Korean War broke out.

John Gunther was the biographer of General McArthur, the American Commander who would lead the Anglo-American forces during the Korean War. In his biography of McArthur, Gunther recalled:

Getting into the station and aboard the coaches hitched on to the regular north-bound train was a picturesque experience, because we used the special entrance reserved for the Emperor. A long, tattered, literally red carpet covered the underground passageway, and a covey of little Japanese officials in shabby uniforms bowed and scraped and squirmed as we climbed in. Two important members of the [US military] occupation [of Japan] were with us. Just before lunch at Nikko, and after we had visited a temple which is one of the

most ornately spectacular sights in the world, one of these [important members of the US military occupation] was called unexpectedly to the telephone. He came back and whispered, 'A big story has just broken. The South Koreans have attacked North Korea!' (The Riddle of McArthur, 1951, John Gunther, p. 150. Bold added) (IMG)

The UN – which the imperialist press depicts as a 'neutral' 'impartial' body even though at the time, it was largely boycotted by the USSR and its allies, and overwhelmingly represented by countries and neo-colonies of the Western camp – was quick to blame North Korea as the aggressor. When the 'news' of the 'North Korean invasion of the South' emerged, even the US Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson doubted the accuracy of the report, believing that a North Korean invasion of the South was not imminent:

Returning to Washington, DC, on June 24, Johnson believed that things were going well in the Pacific [for the South Koreans who were going to invade the North]. At 10:00 p.m., a reporter asked Johnson if he had heard that forces of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) had attacked the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea). Johnson received a report about the invasion from a Pentagon duty officer but **was unsure of its accuracy because Far East briefings had not suggested that such an attack was imminent.** (The Encyclopedia of the Korean War, Spencer Tucker, Paul Pierpaoli, p. 383. Bold added) (IMG)

I shall remind that the South Korean press article titled 'Hypothetical [South Korean] **Invasion** of North Korea' called, first, for a takeover of the city of **Haeju** the first day and then advance' forward. On June 26, 1950, as planned, that is precisely what occurred. The South Korean Regime itself confessed that Haeju had been taken over by the South Korean Army. The US Far East Command agreed with this report. Despite believing that the South Korean and American report on the seizure of Haeju was incorrect, the military scholar Kim Jungsoo of the US Naval Postgraduate School nevertheless points out:

On 26 June 1950, the Defense Ministry of South Korea made a wrong announcement that Haeju was occupied by the South Korean Army and the United States Far East Command believed that the South Korean Army had taken Haeju on 28 June 1950. (THE PROACTIVE GRAND STRATEGY FOR CONSENSUAL AND PEACEFUL KOREAN UNIFICATION, Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California Thesis, published in: DTIC, Kim Jungsoo, March 2007, p. 12) (IMG)

In addition to the great volumes of aid which the Soviets provided for the Korean troops, the USSR also provided military and economic aid to the Chinese forces in the War:

In the Far East, the Soviet Union ... extended economic and military aid to the Chinese "volunteers" in the Korean War, but avoided direct involvement in the conflict. (The Soviet Bloc (Survey 1950 and 1951), CIA, pp. 1-2) (IMG)

The Soviets also launched a peace offensive so to expose the Anglo-American unwillingness to pursue peace:

The impetus for the initiation of armistice negotiations came from the Soviet camp. At this time it is not clear whether the USSR really wants to bring about an armistice, or whether it merely wants to gain time to supply Communist China with weapons, ammunitions, military equipment, and economic goods; or to exert pressure toward the achievement of its political aims. (The Soviet Bloc (Survey 1950 and 1951), CIA, p. 2) (IMG)

In the year 1950, the United States military launched a major assault on the Soviet air bases in the Far East, severely devastating the Soviet aerial combat forces in that area. Subsequently, the United States denounced its own military operation by claiming that it was conducted by a rogue officer, rather than on the orders of someone in US high command. Having denounced the military operation, the US government faked a 'trial' of the supposedly-'rogue' officers involved, made sure that the 'rogue' officers would be counted 'not guilty' on the charges against them, promoted them to other prominent military positions, while pretending to have punished them all. Alton Quanbeck described the story of the attack in the 1990 article for the Washington Post. In 1990, the Washington Post published an article by:

Alton Quanbeck, [who] after 22 years in the Air Force, worked for the Brookings Institution, the Senate Intelligence Committee and the CIA. (My Brief War with Russia, Washington Post, Alton H. Quanbeck, March 4, 1990) (IMG)

Quanbeck wrote:

WE WERE skimming the tops of clouds at 37,000 feet when I decided to start our letdown into the target, 10 minutes earlier than planned. We armed our .50-caliber machine guns in preparation for action.

It was Oct. 8, 1950, early in the Korean War, and two of us -- myself and my wingman, Al Diefendorf -- were on a mission over North Korea. Only later did we learn that we had strayed and were, in fact, a few miles inside the Soviet Union.

At 10,000 feet I spotted a small hole through the clouds. We dropped our F-80s in tight circles through the opening and found ourselves above a broad river valley with mountains on each side. Following the river, I proceeded southeast, a heading which I thought would bring us directly to the coastline and well away from the Chinese and Soviet borders.

In the days preceding this mission, signs of the enemy had been scarce, so I was surprised when I saw flashes of anti-aircraft fire from the top of a two-story building in a small town about 500 yards off our right wing. I alerted Diefendorf.

About 20 seconds later I spotted a truck heading west on a dirt road. "Let's go in and get it," Dief said. An instant later, he shouted, "Look at the airfield, it's loaded!"

It was the kind of target that fighter pilots dream about. Parked in two rows were about 20 aircraft of the P-39 or P-63 type. Thousands of them were built and flown by Americans in World War II, and some were sent to our Soviet ally. Those below us had large red stars surrounded by a narrow white border painted on the side of their dark brown fuselages.

I had only seconds to make a decision. At our speed, the airfield would soon pass beneath us unless I positioned us for an attack. We were also nearing minimum fuel. Our low altitude and the low hanging clouds prevented me from seeing more than a mile or two in any direction. Even if I could have identified distinctive terrain features, it was unlikely I could have related them to the crude maps I carried on the mission.

What made me decide to attack? First, we had had intelligence reports of an expected movement of aircraft down the northeast coast of Korea; second, the planes' markings were nearly identical to those used by the North Koreans; third, I had used caution in my dead-reckoning navigation so as to hit the coast well south of Soviet borders. More important, they had shot at us first.

Two uncertainties bothered me. First, P-39 type aircraft had never been seen before in North Korea, and secondly, I was not certain where we were. Our target was an airfield at Chongjin on the far northeast coast of the Korean Peninsula, some 430 miles north-northeast of our base at Taegu Air Field in South Korea and only 40 miles south of the Chinese border and 60 miles southwest of the Soviet border. The airfield below didn't match the description of the one at Chongjin, which was reported to have a hard surface.

But I did not hesitate. We went in for the attack.

In our intelligence debriefing later, we claimed one aircraft destroyed and two damaged. We were conservative. Several months later an intelligence officer assigned to Far East Air Force Headquarters told me "the airfield burned for a week." The aircraft we saw burn must have triggered a series of secondary explosions which reached the other planes. The attack quickly had international repercussions. The Soviet government protested in the United Nations and the United States admitted responsibility. The story was front-page news but it soon became clear that both governments preferred to forget the matter, each for its own reasons. Nonetheless, some historians believe the mission profoundly affected the behavior of the Soviet leaders toward their Korean allies at a critical time.

(My Brief War with Russia, Washington Post, Alton H. Quanbeck, March 4, 1990. Bold added.) (IMG)

According to Mikhail Poltoranin, the former head of the KGB Archives during the Yeltsin Administration:

F-80 group attacked our Naval bases. (...). They bombed 5 of our bases... (Churchill Had Stalin Killed, US Bombed Russian Far East in 50s - Top Russian Official (Video - Mikhail Poltoranin), Russia Insider, May 17, 2018) (IMG)

They destroyed:

a hundred and three aircraft. (Churchill Had Stalin Killed, US Bombed Russian Far East in 50s - Top Russian Official (Video - Mikhail Poltoranin), Russia Insider, May 17, 2018) (IMG)

Four fighter jets. (Churchill Had Stalin Killed, US Bombed Russian Far East in 50s - Top Russian Official (Video - Mikhail Poltoranin), Russia Insider, May 17, 2018) (IMG)

Quanbeck continued:

By early October 1950, MacArthur had enveloped the North Koreans with his amphibious landings at Inchon and the breakout from the Pusan perimeter to the south and was driving north across the 38th Parallel dividing the two Koreas. The People's Republic of China reacted by mobilizing its Manchurian army and committing it to attack across the Yalu River into North Korea as the U.N. forces approached.

Stalin was concerned not only with the possible defeat of his North Korean surrogates but also with the prospect that U.N. forces could soon be located near the Soviets' 15-mile-long border with North Korea. Stalin had to decide whether to intervene actively.

As I sat in the briefing tent of the 49th Fighter Group at Taegu, I was little concerned with these questions. I was being briefed for an armed reconnaissance flight over Chongjin. Our group had flown a mission there the previous day but couldn't find the airfield. Another flight had reconnoitered Chongjin that morning but found no activity. Chongjin received all this attention because our intelligence reported 200 North Korean pilots training in the northeast part of Korea, close to the border.

We were briefed about an hour before takeoff. The briefing officer didn't have much to show us, only a target folder and messages reporting the negative results of the earlier flights. During that stage of the Korean War, photographs or detailed maps of the target areas were not available.

Since we had to fly practically the entire mission without reference to the ground, and since there were no radio navigational aids along the entire flight path, our heading after takeoff and the time of flight would determine our letdown into the target area. A dominant factor was the forecast winds, especially at high altitudes where they were usually strongest. Unfortunately, the Soviets since mid-September had encoded all their weather reports, preventing us from knowing the weather over Siberia, north and west of Korea. The tops of the clouds rose along our path, so we climbed to 35,000 feet and later to 37,000 feet to stay above them. This caused our first deviation from the pre-flight plan.

Then, about 40 minutes after takeoff, flight leader Bud Evans called me on the radio and said his engine had thrown a blade from its exhaust turbine, forcing him to return to base. That was how Dief and I happened to be dropping through the clouds and going after those 20 planes sitting so invitingly on an airstrip somewhere near the Soviet-North Korean border.

I positioned our aircraft for a strafing pass on the northern line of aircraft, then made a sharp, banking turn to the left and fired on the southern line. I could see tracers carving through the aircraft and knew we were getting lots of hits, but there were no explosions. On my last pass, I decided to make sure of one clear kill. I concentrated my fire at one plane and saw it start to burn. Dief followed me closely in each pass. We exhausted our ammunition and were down to minimum fuel -- 400 gallons. Time to go home.

As I pulled off the target, turning right to our homeward course, I saw an island off the coast. "Oh, oh," I thought, "there's no island near Chongjin." After four minutes heading south, I could see a coastal point that matched the coastline at Chongjin. Now I was worried. Dief and I checked our maps and concluded we had struck an unimproved airfield shown at Rashin (now called Najin), 40 miles north of Chongjin and only 20 miles from the Russian border. I felt better.

That evening, after an initial debriefing and dinner, we were summoned to headquarters by Maj. Gen. Earl E. Partridge. I went over the mission completely. Then Partridge laid out a large map, pointed to an area inside the Soviet Union southwest of Vladivostok and asked if we could have attacked there. There were marked similarities to the terrain features we had described at Rashin. It was possible, but certainly not probable. I thought to myself, "My God, the wind would have to be much stronger than we expected to blow us way up there."

(I later figured the winds must have blown from 240 (from the southwest) at 200 miles per hour, twice as strong as predicted and 90 off the direction predicted by our weather forecasters. At that time, such high speeds of winds aloft were poorly understood. Only two months later I flew an F-80 westward over southern Japan with a ground speed of over 600 mph, which translates as a 200-mph tail wind.)

As we were leaving, Partridge said gently, and with some affection, "You'll get either a Distinguished Service Cross or a court martial out of this mission."

Dief met me when I returned from a mission the next day. His succinct words were: "It's hit the fan."

Soon the game was to be played at high levels. Dief and I became pawns as the big boys took over. The headline of the San Francisco Chronicle for Oct. 10, 1950 read: "Moscow Says U.S Jets Strafing Russian Airfield." From The Washington Post: "U.S. Raid on Soviet Plane Base Charged . . ."

Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko delivered the Soviet protest on Oct. 9:

"On October 8 at 16 hours 17 minutes local time two fighter planes of the U.S.A. Air Force of the type Shooting Star F-80 grossly violated the state frontier of the U.S.S.R. and, approaching in a hedge-hopping flight the Soviet aerodrome situated on the seacoast in the Sukhaya Rechka area, 100 kilometers from the Soviet-Korean frontier, fired at the aerodrome with machine guns. As a result of the firing, damage was caused to property of the aerodrome."

To the Soviets, the mission was a surprising and confusing violation of their territory and frustrating evidence of their vulnerability. Soviet radar probably picked up our F-80's about 100 miles from the Soviet border, then tracked us through the descent and lost us in ground clutter when we dropped into the river valley. A general alarm went out, but the Soviets had no aircraft, guns or missiles to meet the attack. Besides, it was Sunday afternoon; no one was around to do anything. To them, it was like Pearl Harbor, a dastardly sneak attack.

The Oct. 8 incident forced Soviet leaders to recognize the vulnerability of their forces, especially in the east, and their inability to defend against the more modern, experienced U.S. Air Force. (. . .). On Oct. 19, Truman had Warren Austin, the chief American delegate to the U.N., admit the attack. His letter to U.N. Secretary Trygve Lie added: "The commander of the Air Force group has been relieved and appropriate steps have been taken with a view toward disciplinary actions against the two pilots concerned." Austin identified the pilots as 1st Lt. Alton H. Quanbeck and 1st Lt. Allen J. Diefendorf. In the meantime, Dief and I were in limbo. The Air Force's investigating officer, Maj. Harry W. Christian, discovered no physical evidence of a crime, and there were no gun-camera records because our base had run out of film. "There is no real evidence in this case," Christian concluded.

But because of the political pressures from Washington, the Air Force ignored his recommendations and scheduled our general court-martial for Nov. 18 in Nagoya, Japan. We were accused of violating an order to stay clear of the Manchurian (Chinese) border, of strafing Soviet territory (a "country at peace with the United States") and of violating an order to make no attack without positive identification. Our attorney, Maj. Bernard Katz, argued that the government was trying to locate us "in Manchuria on one count and in Russia on another count" and added: "They did positively identify a target, and they strafed a target that they positively identified. They identified it as a North Korean airfield, on which was contained certain aircraft, bearing the mark of a star. They had been briefed that any aircraft marked with a star found in North Korea was good game . . ."

Both of us were found not guilty of all charges. But the court martial was closed to the public, and the results were never released. Air Force leaders wanted the Russians, and probably President Truman, to believe we had been properly punished.

The Air Force would not permit Dief or me to fly any more combat missions, reasoning that we would be in jeopardy if we were shot down and captured. Instead, Dief was assigned to a fighter squadron in the Philippines, where his new bride could join him. **I was reassigned to a fighter-interceptor squadron in Japan, and then became aide-de-camp to Brig. Gen. Delmar T. Spivey, who had been present at our initial debriefing.** I finished up my tour as a combat crew instructor with F-84's back with the 49th Fighter Group. (My Brief War with Russia, Washington Post, Alton H. Quanbeck, March 4, 1990. Bold added.) (IMG)

C18S6. Soviet Relations with India *** IMG-All-{Soviet-India}

The hostility towards the Nehru faction in India is one of the many things that unites Maoists with the Anglo-American imperial enemies of the USSR. One of the myths promoted by the CIA-owned mainstream media, the Maoists, and the Khrushchev supporters is that the Soviet alliance with India was initiated by Nikita Khrushchev and the Moscow-based Titoists. Actually, positive relations between the USSR and the Indian progressive bourgeois-democracy began during the Stalin era.

In his 1947 speech, Andrei Zhdanov famously listed India as one of the countries sympathetic to the USSR:

The anti-imperialist and anti-fascist forces comprise the second camp. This camp is based on the U.S.S.R. and the new democracies. It also includes countries that have broken with imperialism and have firmly set foot on the path of democratic development, such as Rumania, Hungary and Finland. Indonesia and Vietnam are associated with it; it has the sympathy of India, Egypt and Syria. (Speech by Andrei Zhdanov (member of the Soviet Politburo) at the founding of the Cominform (a Communist International Organization) in September 1947, James Madison University) (IMG{Israel})

The following report by the CIA explains a large part of the matter:

Stalin welcomes Nehru's proposals

The Stalin-Nehru exchange of messages underscores the present Soviet tactic of promoting friendly official relations with India in an attempt to encourage Indian "neutrality" and to promote a rift between Indian and Western leaders. Since 14 January when Stalin, contrary to his usual custom, personally received the new Indian Ambassador, Soviet and Satellite diplomats have displayed especial cordiality to Indian officials both in Europe and in New Delhi.

An additional reason for Stalin's ready acceptance of Nehru's proposals is that Nehru advocated seating the Chinese Communists in the UN, a major Soviet objective, while avoiding any mention of the Security Council resolution on Korea. It has been alleged that Moscow requested Nehru to make his offer of mediation and suggested some points to be included. It is not surprising, therefore, that Nehru's appeal was warmly received by Stalin and hailed by Soviet propagandists as "backing the Soviet point of view without reservations."

Another development which may be calculated, at least in part, to conciliate Nehru is the recent change in Indian Communist Party policy. Abandoning its tactics of violence and sabotage, which have been roundly condemned by Nehru in India and on his tour of Southeast Asia, the Indian Communist Party announced on 19 July that it would concentrate on a united front "agrarian reform" movement. (SECRET)

(SUMMARIES OF TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS, CIA, July 20, 1950, p. 6) (IMG)

Another CIA report states:

Prime Minister Nehru's conduct of India's affairs is encountering strong opposition from both within and without the government. Deputy Prime Minister Patel, supported by a majority of the Cabinet, has become sharply critical of several major aspects of current Indian

policy, reportedly charging that Nehru has: (1) tossed away the potential benefits of closer ties with the US and UK in the unrealistic hope that India might achieve lasting friendship with Communist China and the USSR as well; (2) ... frightened away foreign and domestic investors with the spectre of socialism at a time when India has urgent need of private investments above and beyond the funds the government itself can obtain. Meanwhile, Nehru is being pressed to take a more belligerent attitude toward by extremist anti-Moslem elements, notably in West Bengal and among the Sikh and Punjabi refugees. (WEEKLY SUMMARY #94, CIA, March 17, 1950, p. 7) (IMG)

When Stalin died, Nehru stated the following:

Sir, I crave your indulgence at the commencement of the proceedings to refer to an event of which the House is no doubt aware. In the early hours of this morning Marshal Stalin passed away. Only two days ago, we had heard of this serious illness; only a fortnight or three weeks ago, our Ambassador in Moscow had met him and it so happened that just a few hours before the news of Marshal Stalin's serious illness came to us, I was reading a long report from our Ambassador about his interview with him. When we think of Marshal Stalin, all kinds of thoughts come to our minds, at least to my mind, and the panorama of history for the last 35 years passes before our eyes. All of us here are children of this age and have been affected by it in many ways. We have grown up not only participating in our struggles in this country but participating in another way with the mighty struggles that have taken place in this world, and been affected by them. And so looking back at these 35 years or so, many figures stand out, but perhaps no single figure has moulded and affected and influenced the history of these years more than Marshal Stalin. He became gradually almost a legendary figure, sometimes a man of mystery, at other times a person who had an intimate bond not with a few but with vast numbers of persons. He proved himself great in peace and in war. He showed an indomitable will and courage which few possess, but perhaps when history comes to be written many things will be said about him and I do not know what opinions, what varying opinions, subsequent generations may record, but every one will agree that here was a man of giant stature, a man such as few who had moulded the destinies of his age, a man – although he succeeded greatly in war – who ultimately would be remembered by the way he built up his great country. Again, people may agree or disagree with many things that he did or said, but the fact remains of his building up that great country, which was a tremendous achievement, and in addition to that the remarkable fact, which can be said about very, very few persons, is that he was not only famous in his generation but as I referred to, he was in a sense 'intimate', if I may say so, with vast numbers of human beings, not only the vast numbers in the Soviet Union with whom he moved in an intimate way, in a friendly way, in an almost family way, if I may say so, but many others too outside who felt that way. I have known people who were associated with Marshal Stalin, who disagreed with him subsequently or who associated themselves with the work that Marshal Stalin did and then who subsequently disagreed with him and came and told me that while they disagreed with him, they felt a personal wrench because of a personal bond that has arisen between him and them, even though they had not come near him or had only seen him from a distance. So here was this man who created in his life-time this bond of affection and admiration among vast numbers of human beings, a man who has gone through this troubled period of history. He may in the opinion of some have made mistakes or succeeded – it is immaterial. But every one must necessarily agree about his giant stature and about his mighty achievements. So it is right that we should pay our tribute to him on this occasion because the occasion is not merely the passing away of a great figure but perhaps in a sense also a greater change, I mean in the sense of the ending of a certain era in history. Of course, history is continuous and it is rather absurd perhaps to divide it up in periods like this as historians and others seek to do; it goes on and on. Nevertheless there are periods which seem to end and take a fresh lease of life and undoubtedly when a very great man passes away who has embodied his age to a great extent, in a certain measure, there is the end of that particular period. I do not know what the future will hold, but undoubtedly even though Marshal Stalin has passed away, because of the great hold he had on peoples' minds and even hearts, his influence and memory will continue to exercise peoples' minds and inspire them. He has been described by many persons, including some who have been his great opponents in the world stage, and those descriptions vary and sometimes are contradictory. Some of them describe him as frank and even gentle person. Others describe him as hard and ruthless, and maybe he had all these feature in him. Anyhow a very great figure has passed away. He was, I believe, technically not the head of the Soviet State – we make reference to the passing of high dignitaries and especially heads of State – but Marshal Stalin was something much more than the head of a State. He was great in his own right way, whether he occupied the office or not. I believe that his influence was exercised generally in favour of peace. When war come he proved himself a very great warrior, but from all the information that we have had his influence had been in favour of peace. Even in these present days of trouble and conflict. I earnestly hope that his passing away will not mean that influence which was exercised in favour of peace is no longer to be availed of. Perhaps, if I may express the hope, this event may loosen all our minds a little from their rigidity in all countries, and that we may view the present problems of the world, not in that rigid way which develops, when people are continually in conflict and argument with each other, but in a somewhat more responsive and understanding way, so that his death may serve to bring us more to think of this troubled world, and to endeavour even more than before to secure peace in this world and to prevent any further disasters and catastrophes from occurring.

In fact, when our Ambassador saw Marshal Stalin three weeks ago or so he expressed himself to him in favour of peace and his desire that peace might not be broken in the world. He expressed then also his goodwill for India and sent his good wishes to our country and to some of us. And it was interesting how he discussed with our Ambassador some of our cultural problems, showing a certain knowledge, which was slightly surprising. He discussed – and it may interest the House – the languages of India, their relationships, their parentage, their extent, and our Ambassador gave him such replies as he could on the subject.

So, I hope, Sir, while expressing our tribute on this occasion, we may also hope that the world will be excited by this event into thinking more in terms of peace. If I may suggest it to you, Sir, perhaps this tribute and our message of condolence might be conveyed by you, Sir, on behalf of the House to the Government of the Soviet Union. May I also suggest, Sir, that the House might adjourn in memory of Marshal Stalin?

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: I am sure the House will fully associate itself with all the sentiments so ably expressed by the hon. Leader of the House, in connection with the passing away of Marshal Stalin. I shall convey, on behalf of the House, to the Government of U.S.S.R. the deep feelings of regret, and the message of condolence that has been passed in this House.

I would request hon. Members to stand in their seats for a couple of minutes.

In token of the memory of Marshal Stalin. I would adjourn this House for the day. The House will meet again on Monday, the 9th of March, 1953, at 2 P.M.

The House then adjourned till Two of the Clock on Monday, the 9th of March, 1953. ('Parliamentary Debates, House of the People', Official Report – Volume 1, No. 18, Friday, 6th March 1953, Parliamentary Secretariat, New Delhi [Cols. 1567-1570]). In: Revolutionary Democracy Organization of India (IMG)

Chapter 19

*** IMG-All-{Titoist Coup}

C19S1. Class Warfare and the Secret Service Conflict to Hijack the CPSU and the Soviet State Apparatus

The following concept outlined by Walter Schellenberg is very important for people to understand:

Heydrich's own theory, which Himmler and Hitler shared, was that military defeat would so weaken the Soviet system that a subsequent infiltration of political agents would completely shatter it. (Hitler's Secret Service, Original title: The Labyrinth, Walther Schellenberg, Introduction by Alan Bullock, Translation by Louis Hagen, first published: 1956, p. 197) (IMG{Canaris})

Via inflicting severe damage upon the Soviet Red Army, the Soviet state would be bogged down in compensating for such damage and would deploy plenty of resources to this end. This would result in the allocation of fewer resources for counter-intelligence, thus allowing anti-Soviet intelligence agents more room for infiltrating the ranks of the Soviet state apparatus. A more powerful intelligence network would arise systematically undermining the Soviet state. At the time, the severe military defeat inflicted upon the German imperialist aggressors blocked the Hitlerian regime from decisively achieving such objectives. Damages were inflicted upon the Soviet Red Army but even greater damages were inflicted upon the Nazis; the anti-Soviet damages by the Nazis did temporarily elevate pro-Nazi intelligence agents in the Soviet system but anti-Nazi damages by the Soviets were greater, allowing the Soviets to infiltrate the Nazis more than the Nazis infiltrated the Soviets. In other words, due to the fact that tide of the military conflict was in the favour of the Soviet Union, the tide of the secret service conflict ended up being in the favour of the communist faction of the USSR as well, preventing Trotskyite and Titoist infiltration from being so mighty.

Nonetheless, it is true that BARBAROSSA caused great damages to the Soviet Red Army and even more so to the CPSU. Indeed, prior to Great Patriotic War, the Party was dominated by the industrial proletariat. The US ambassador Davies reported:

The party heretofore has been dominated by the industrial working class, constituting about 20% of the entire electorate. (THE RUSSIAN BEAR WADDLES THROUGH, NO. 455, Moscow, July 28, 1937, Strictly Confidential. TO THE HONOURABLE THE SECRETARY OF STATE ALLEGED BREAKDOWN OF SOVIET INDUSTRIAL PLAN, In: Mission to Moscow, Joseph E. Davies, pp. 125-126) (IMG{Democratization})

The conditions of the CPSU were to radically change as a result of the Nazi German invasion. During the Great Patriotic War, the bulk of the CPSU membership participated in leading the Red Army. Countless CPSU members participated in or near the frontlines. In an intelligence report to London, Archibald Clark, the British diplomat to Moscow, cited Red Army Major-General Fomichenko for stating that the CPSU sent two-thirds of its membership to the Red Army during the Great Patriotic War:

WITH reference to my despatch No. 798 of the 27th November 1944, regarding the relations between the Communist party and the Red army, I have the honour to invite your attention to a remark made by Major-General G. Fomichenko in Red Star on the 23rd March last to the effect that "the party (has) sent two-thirds of its members, including its best forces, into the ranks of the Red Army." (N 4815/1407/38, Sir A. Clark Kerr to Mr. Eden, No. 250, Moscow, April 11, 1945, Received: May 2, 1945, British Foreign Office (April to June 1945), p. 74. In: British Foreign Office (USSR and Finland, 1945), p. 110) (IMG)

The best of the communists of the CPSU died in the war, paving the way for opportunists and careerists to infiltrate the membership and the ranks of the CPSU. In 1946, Stalin himself stated:

Only in the first six months of the Great Patriotic War, more than 500,000 Communists died on the front lines leading the fight against Nazism, and overall more than 3,000,000 Communists died as the leading cadres in the war. They were the best of all of us – noble, pure, dedicated and selfless fighters for socialism, for the happiness of Soviet people. We miss them. If they were alive now, a lot of our problems would have been eliminated. The task of the Soviet creative people must reflect this, to show the future generations the best traits of a Soviet person. This must be the general line and aspiration for the development of literature, theatre, movies, music and art. (Stalin on Art and Culture, 1946. Revolutionary Democracy, retrieved from: North Star Compass) (IMG)

The Party had numerous communist blue-collar workers, numerous revolutionary intellectuals and bureau workers, and numerous kolkhoz peasants, and yet so many of them died in the Great Patriotic War. This had a severe impact on the CPSU membership. The annihilation of many Red Army generals, Soviet intelligence operatives, and CPSU activists damaged the Soviet Union to a world-historically significant level.

As shown in the table below, the percentage of communist (blue-collar) workers in the CPSU went down from 65.2% in 1932 to 33.8% in 1946. By contrast, the percentage of White Collar workers and intelligentsia in the Party went up from 7.9% in 1932 to 47.6% in 1946 and 49.8% by 1952. Clearly, the white-collar workers – the intelligentsia and the bureaucrats – formed the largest percentage and almost half of the CPSU membership, in contrast to the communist blue-collar workers who went down from a large majority to a minority. The Great Patriotic War killed numerous communist blue-collar workers and thus led to the white-collar workers – the intellectuals and bureaucrats – outnumbering the blue-collar workers the Party. Numerous communist personnel were exterminated by the Nazis, making the work of the CPSU much harder.

Social Composition (in terms of class or stratum) of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in Percentages			
Date	Blue Collar Workers	Peasantry	White Collar Workers (Intelligentsia, Officials, etc.)
January 1924*	44.0	28.8	27.2
July 1932*	65.2	26.9	7.9
January 1, 1946**¥	33.8	18.6	47.6
January 1, 1952**¥	32.2	18.0	49.8
January 1, 1956***¥	32.0	17.1	50.9

* (Communist Party Membership in the USSR, Princeton University Press, sponsored by: the Russian Institute of Columbia University, published under the auspices of the 'Studies of Russian Institute', author: Thomas Henry Rigby, 1968, p. 325. Citing: Great Soviet Encyclopedia (1st edition), Vol. 11, Col. 534; Partinoye Stroitelstvo, No. 21, November 1932, p. 48; Partinaya Zhizn, No. 1, January 1962, p. 47, No. 10, May 1965, p. 11 and No. 7, April 1967, p. 8; Pravda, March 30, 1966) (IMG)

** (The CPSU Under Brezhnev, CIA, April 15, 1976, p. 15. Citing: 'Partinaya Zhizn', No. 14, July 1973, p. 15) (IMG); note: the CIA data pertained to 1946 and beyond. The CIA specified that the peasantry spoken of was kolkhoz peasantry in particular.

*** Source: data confirmed by both of the above sources.

¥. Source: 'The CPSU: Stages of History', CPSU, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1985, pp. 96-97

Since the days of the October Revolution, the overwhelming majority of the intelligentsia, coming from feudal or bourgeois family backgrounds, were hostile to Soviet power. The official history of the CPSU in 1939 denounced the role of much of the intelligentsia as agents of fascist reaction in the Party of the proletariat:

The defeat of the Revolution of 1905 started a process of disintegration and degeneration in the ranks of the fellow-travelers of the revolution. Degenerate and decadent tendencies grew particularly marked among the intelligentsia. The fellow-travelers who came from the bourgeois camp to join the movement during the upsurge of the revolution deserted the Party in the days of reaction. Some of them joined the camp of the open enemies of the revolution, others entrenched themselves in such legally functioning working-class societies as still survived, and endeavoured to divert the proletariat from the path of revolution and to discredit the revolutionary party of the proletariat. Deserting the revolution the fellow-travelers tried to win the good graces of the reactionaries and to live in peace with tsardom.

The tsarist government took advantage of the defeat of the revolution to enlist the more cowardly and self-seeking fellow-travelers of the revolution as agents-provocateurs. These vile Judases were sent by the tsarist Okhrana into the working class and Party organizations, where they spied from within and betrayed revolutionaries.

The offensive of the counter-revolution was waged on the ideological front as well. There appeared a whole horde of fashionable writers who "criticized" Marxism, and "demolished" it, mocked and scoffed at the revolution, extolled treachery, and lauded sexual depravity under the guise of the "cult of individuality."

In the realm of philosophy increasing attempts were made to "criticize" and revise Marxism; there also appeared all sorts of religious trends camouflaged by pseudo-scientific theories.

"Criticizing" Marxism became fashionable.

All these gentlemen, despite their multifarious colouring, pursued one common aim: to divert the masses from the revolution.

Decadence and scepticism also affected a section of the Party intelligentsia, those who considered themselves Marxists but had never held firmly to the Marxist position. Among them were writers like Bogdanov, Bazarov, Lunacharsky (who had sided with the Bolsheviks in 1905), Yushkevich and Valentinov (Mensheviks). They launched their "criticism" simultaneously against the philosophical foundations of Marxist theory, i.e., against dialectical materialism, and against the fundamental Marxist principles of historical science, i.e., against historical materialism. This criticism differed from the usual criticism in that it was not conducted openly and squarely, but in a veiled and hypocritical form under the guise of "defending" the fundamental positions of Marxism. These people claimed that in the main they were Marxists, but that they wanted to "improve" Marxism—by ridding it of certain of its fundamental principles. In reality, they were hostile to Marxism, for they tried to undermine its theoretical foundations, although they hypocritically denied their hostility to Marxism and two-facedly continued to style themselves Marxists. The danger of this hypocritical criticism lay in the fact that it was calculated to deceive rank-and-file members of the Party and might lead them astray. The more hypocritical grew this criticism, which aimed at undermining the theoretical foundations of Marxism, the more dangerous it was to the Party, for the more it merged with the general campaign of the reactionaries against the Party, against the revolution. Some of the intellectuals who had deserted Marxism went so far as to advocate the founding of a new religion (these were known as "god-seekers" and "god-builders").

(HISTORY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION (BOLSHEVIKS), CPSU Central Committee, 1939, Chapter 4) (IMG)

The MI6 report by the British General Staff of the War Office stated:

there is evidence that a considerable number of intellectuals, previously anti-Bolshevist, have decided to throw in the lot, at least temporarily, with the Bolsheviks. (An Appreciation of the Internal Situation in Russia, War Office, General Staff April 25, 1919. In: "PEACE CONGRESS: PARIS", Secret, April 25, 1919. In: Foreign Office (1917-1919), p. 101) (IMG{October Revolution & Civil War})

The Lenin faction undertook measures to retain the scientists inside the Soviet Union so to advance the industry of the proletariat's state, while engaging in purge campaigns against the rest of the reactionary intelligentsia:

The overwhelming majority of scientists were hostile to the new regime, more hostile than they had been to the old regime, but neither side to the conflict could do without the other. With ... joy Lenin exiled religious philosophers and sociologists like Sorokin, but he repeatedly warned his comrades that natural scientists could not be treated the same way, however deviant their politics might be. (The Lysenko Affair, David Joravsky, 1970, p. 27) (IMG{Soviet Science})

In the years after the First World War, with the process of socialist construction, there came a small but growing stratum of intellectuals that came not from feudal or bourgeois families but that rather came from working class or kolkhoz peasant families. The proletarian or kolkhoznik family background of these new intellectuals greatly increased their tendency towards a scientific socialist outlook. This changed during the Great Patriotic War, as numerous revolutionary Soviet scientists, professors, researchers, journalists, etc. were murdered by the Nazis. The conditions of the intelligentsia of the USSR reverted back to the years prior to the days of the October Revolution. The counter-revolutionary intelligentsia began to fill up many of the academic and educational positions. Revisionism, anti-socialism disguised as socialism, therefore made up a much greater percentage of the intelligentsia of the USSR in the years after the Great Patriotic War. And such counter-revolutionary intelligentsia in addition to the bureaucrats, the white-collar workers, made up the bulk of the CPSU membership.

For this reason, after the Great Patriotic War, the communist faction in the USSR stepped up its campaign of cracking down on the counter-revolutionary ideas promoted by the CIA and MI6 among the intelligentsia of the Soviet Union. Zhdanovschina, the campaign spearheaded by Zhdanov with the aim of vigorously criticizing various intellectuals for their reactionary views, was launched.

C19S2. Exploiting Contradictions in Parallel Comprador Networks; The Soviet Communist Faction's Handling of the Comprador Pincer Assault

Understand this: Stalin's strategy of combat against the comprador agents in the socialist state apparatus was to allow for two comprador-dominated parallel unofficial intelligence networks, one left-opportunist and the other right-opportunist in rhetoric, and to pit these comprador-dominated intelligence networks against each other, even though, behind the scenes, these two parallel intelligence networks, both rooted in the comprador classes, were covertly allied and would form a bloc, a pincer assault with a left-opportunist flank and a right-opportunist flank, against the Stalin faction. Stalin pursued this strategy with the Trotskyite left-opportunists and the Bukharinite right-opportunists, the left-opportunist Yezhov network and the right-opportunist Yagoda network, the right-opportunist Beria network and the left-opportunist Malenkov network. **In each round of the fight, the Stalin faction would ally with comprador network 1 so to decimate, but not annihilate, the comprador network 2, and thereupon the Stalin faction would encircle with agents and coopt the comprador network 2 so to decimate comprador network 1; upon decimating comprador network 1, the Stalin faction would encircle with agents and thus re-coopt comprador network 1 against comprador network 2; and so forth the cycle would go on.** Such a divide and defeat strategy would gradually help annihilate both the comprador intelligence networks. Again, the two comprador networks are secretly allied, but, as they seek to launch a pincer assault on the communist centrist part of the spectrum, they divide themselves into two flanks, the left-opportunist flank (e.g. Trotsky, Malenkov) and the right-opportunist flank (e.g. Bukharin, Beria). The Stalin-led network would utilize these ostensible 'hostilities' between the covertly-allied left-opportunists and right-opportunists so to compile dossier against each of them, demote their members, erode their strengths, and thereby push for a gradual purge of all such comprador agents. To moderate the 'heat' of revolutionary transformation, the left-opportunists and right-opportunists would be used to respectively heat up and cool down the revolutionary transformation, like two components of a thermostat. This strategy pursued by the Stalin faction was clearly manifested in the collectivization drive and the Great Purge of the 1930s. However, the Beria network had personal experience with it. Sergo Beria wrote:

What were Stalin's methods of government? His first principle was to multiply the apparatuses. He encouraged the parallel development of the Party apparatus and that of the government, each of which was watched by a third apparatus, that of State Control, while State Security watched them all. The leader of the Party had at his disposal control organisations within the Party itself. Stalin did not create this system based on universal suspicion. Having inherited it from Lenin he had been able to use it to take power. He utilised the apparatuses against his rivals, whom he succeeded in supplanting because he had much more information than they had. Eventually, this arrangement promoted his personal power. The Party had the organs of repression under its orders, but it was the Party's leader who wielded the sword.

Stalin's second principle was to set those around him one against another. He was a master of this art. He whispered to one man something bad about another, then did the same with the latter.

(Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 145) (IMG)

I have read in the writings of Khrushchev and others that Stalin had begun to fear my father. Actually, he feared no one. He was quite aware of his power and did not know fear, but he was able to judge people's characters. It was not possible to attempt anything against Stalin... He was so strong, he had succeeded so well in setting those around him against each other, and had so effectively multiplied apparatuses which watched each other, that he had erected insurmountable obstacles. (...). Although my father did not control the security organs he had men in place who kept him informed of whatever was happening. Also, and above all, he had his own intelligence network, which was not dependent on any existing structure. Stalin had allowed him to form it (part of his tactic of using some against others) and had never gone back on that decision. He ... passed on to Stalin only facts compromising the organisations which were intriguing against him. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 246) (IMG)

As was mentioned, the Beria network and the Malenkov network were pitted against each other, even though, secretly, behind the scenes, Beria and Malenkov were closest allies. Sergo Beria recalled:

There were, in fact, provocateurs among them, working for Malenkov, who was already busy getting rid of all his potential rivals.

Whenever he saw my father was getting close to someone he began intriguing against that person. He wanted to be the only one close to my father, knowing well that he would never seek the first place [and] would always put Malenkov in front. Worse still, he had believed that he could make Kuznetsov one of his creatures, and now the man had taken up a position against him. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, pp. 215-216) (IMG)

The above quote exposes only a percentage of the depth of the overt-level contradictions behind two covert comprador allies.

Malenkov the left-opportunist was an agent of Beria the right-opportunist. The latter planned to promote Malenkov upon seizing power. Yet, Malenkov, owing to his overt-level ideological contradictions as a left-opportunist in contrast to Beria the right-opportunist, was coopted by the communists so to spearhead purges against the other agents of Beria, despite being an agent of Beria himself.

Beria and Malenkov, two allied comprador agents, were both supporters of the Gestapo agent Tito. Yet, the communist faction led by Stalin, well aware of Malenkov's support for Tito, coopted Malenkov to spearhead anti-Tito action:

After the break between Tito and Stalin in June 1948 my father explained to me that he had never disapproved of Tito: 'Every state has the right to pursue the policy of its choice.' He was conscious of the analogies between Yugoslavia and Georgia. (...). Malenkov, doubtless influenced by my father, who was against that condemnation and often cursed the Cominform, hesitated where the Yugoslav

question was concerned. He did not like the anti-Tito campaign but said that he was obliged to take part in it. That was not enough for Stalin, who stuck the label 'Titoist' on him as well as on my father. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 210) (IMG)

The number of parallel comprador networks, though often limited to two, of course needed not to be limited. At times, the Stalin faction sowed dissension and engineered splits among the comprador networks so to give rise to three, four, five, etc. parallel comprador networks, systematically setting maneuvering them against each other.

By 1951, the comprador/Titoist opposition stepped up efforts to circumvent socialist counter-intelligence intrigues and plotted to reduce the overt-level contradictions between the parallel comprador networks. As such, the comprador networks increased cooperation so to compromise the communist faction's attempt to pit them against each other. Nonetheless, the evidence overwhelmingly shows that even after the 1951 agreement, these parallel comprador networks continued their sharp contradiction with each other, despite not being as sharply contradictory as before 1951:

In 1951 the members of the Politburo, Bulganin, Malenkov, Khrushchev and my father began to appreciate that they were all in the same boat and it mattered little whether one of them was thrown overboard a few days before the others. They felt a sense of solidarity once they had faced the fact that none of them would be Stalin's successor.... **They therefore agreed among themselves not to allow Stalin to set one against another, and that they would immediately inform each other of anything Stalin said about them, so as to frustrate his manipulations. They recalled their former intrigues and buried their old grievances.** Khrushchev told my father that Stalin had asked him for reports on the national question when he was in the Ukraine, though in principle, policy on that matter was still a preserve of the NKVD. This solidarity among the members of the Politburo increased as time went by. They also confided in Mikoyan, who understood the situation. **But Stalin's intrigues left traces which were not completely wiped out.** It must be said that Stalin constructed his provocations around an element of truth.

After about six months Stalin guessed what was going on and unceremoniously demanded of the members of the Politburo: 'Tell me, are you forming a bloc against me?' He took the steps he thought appropriate and began to meet Ignatiev, the head of the State Security without going through the Politburo.

(Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 239. Bold added.) (IMG)

The overt-level contradictions between the covertly-allied parallel comprador networks continued after Stalin's death and led certain comprador networks, such as those of Khrushchev and Malenkov, to be coopted in the fight against other comprador networks, such as that of Beria.

The use of the parallel comprador networks was manifested in the struggle of the Stalin-Zhdanov faction against the Malenkov-Beria faction. Prior to the Great Patriotic War, while General Zhdanov was being deployed by the Stalin faction to the strategic city of Leningrad, Malenkov, the Trotskyite agent of Beria, experienced a rise in his prestige. The factional influence of Malenkov did not increase as a result of the deployment of Zhdanov to Leningrad, for Zhdanov's role as the commander of the Red Army forces during the German-Finnish Siege of Leningrad undermined the Axis menace, the allies of the Trotskyite agent Malenkov, and thus weakened Malenkov's power base. Nonetheless, Malenkov did see a rise in prestige, an elevation of image among the Soviet state personnel:

Malenkov, a rising young man who had become prominent only in February 1941, was made a member of the Supreme Defense Council, a five-man streamlined Politburo for the conduct of the war. In the Supreme Defense Council Malenkov was Stalin's immediate subordinate for Party affairs, with additional responsibility for aircraft production and for the relocation of Soviet industry from Western USSR to the east. (The Zhdanov-Malenkov Relationship, CIA, July 29, 1953, p. 1) (IMG{Greece})

By the end of the Great Patriotic War and the imposition of Soviet influence over Nazi-collaborationist Finland, Zhdanov returned to Moscow. Then, Zhdanov ... began undercutting Malenkov: he successfully unseated him from key positions, and then attacked such associates of his as Varga and Aleksandrov. As for Malenkov, he appeared to be concerned, from late 1946 on, with agricultural problems and suffered a great loss of prominence. (The Zhdanov-Malenkov Relationship, CIA, July 29, 1953, p. 2) (IMG{Greece})

Zhdanov, a revolutionary communist intellectual, was especially talented in combating the bulk of the intelligentsia, the bulk being corrupt and reactionary. Thus, Zhdanov spearheaded the campaign against intellectuals, the Party membership social base upon which Malenkov and Beria relied for their struggle against the communist faction emanating from the blue-collar workers. Varga, a Malenkov agent and a Hungarian crypto-anti-socialist economic, against the scientific principles of communism, had asserted that Peoples' Democracies were states whose character lied in between the dictatorship of the proletariat and the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie:

The social structure of these states differs from all those hitherto known to us; it is something totally new in the history of mankind. It is neither a bourgeois dictatorship nor a proletarian dictatorship. The old state apparatus has not been smashed, as in the Soviet Union, but re-organized by means of a continuous inclusion in it of the supporters of the new regime. They are not capitalist states in the ordinary sense of the word. Neither, however, are they Socialist states. The basis for their transition to Socialism is given by the nationalization of the most important means of production and by the essential character of the state. They may, with the maintenance of the present state apparatus, gradually pass over to Socialism, developing to an ever-increasing extent the socialist sector which already exists side by side with the simple commodity sector (peasant and artisan) and the capitalist sector, which has lost its dominant position.... (Democracy of a New Type, Eugene Varga, 1947)

This was of course a claim fundamentally opposed to the scientific theses of communism. The Titoists and their American masters considered Zhdanov to be a communist 'fanatic' and 'dogmatic':

Zhdanov is said to have been a fanatic Communist.... (The Zhdanov-Malenkov Relationship, CIA, July 29, 1953, p. 2) (IMG{Greece})

Zhdanov was no 'fanatic' communist. Rather, simply, he understood the fact of the incontrovertible correctness of the Soviet cause on all the grand-scale issues and on almost all micro-scale questions, when so many others around him did not. Zhdanov, a communist loyalist, could assist Stalin, Molotov, and Kaganovich in the Politburo, so to facilitate the outnumbering of the Beria-Malenkov group during the Politburo voting sessions on policy matters. By the end of the Great Patriotic War, Zhdanov returned to Moscow. Then,:

Zhdanov again managed to ... eclipse Malenkov. Zhdanov sold Stalin on the necessity for an ideological cleansing of the Communist Party and for a tightening up of Soviet society generally. Zhdanov himself spearheaded the ideological purge. He then began undercutting Malenkov: he successfully unseated him from key positions, and then attacked such associates of his as Varga and Aleksandrov. As for Malenkov, he appeared to be concerned, from late 1946 on, with agricultural problems and suffered a great loss of prominence. (The Zhdanov-Malenkov Relationship, CIA, July 29, 1953, p. 2) (IMG{Greece})

There was:

strong evidence of rivalry and enmity between Zhdanov and Malenkov during the immediate post-war period.... (Politics and the Soviet Army, Office of Current Intelligence, CIA, March 12, 1954, p. 3) (IMG)

After the Great Patriotic War, the Stalin-Zhdanov faction coopted Abakumov – a corrupt bureaucrat, thus a comprador class member, and an agent of Beria – for combat against the Beria-Malenkov group. Stalin personally supported Abakumov's appointment to leadership of the MGB and sowed dissension in the Beria network:

Thus, Stalin, pursuing his goal of keeping Beria under control, appointed Abakumov Minister of the MGB in 1946, and felt that since Abakumov was directly responsible for this dismissal of Merkulov he would not have the opportunity to maintain close relations with Beria. (Background on The Execution of Abakumov and the Leningrad Case of 1949, CIA, January 14, 1955, pp. 3-4) (IMG)

The promotion of Abakumov's rank, bringing for him a higher pay, was a bribe, a 'carrot', aimed at coopting him. The promotion of Abakumov at the expense of the Beriaite agent Merkulov was a way of isolating Abakumov (from the Beria network to which he truly belonged), so to better encircle Abakumov with communist faction agents, as a 'stick' to reinforce the 'carrot' in the cooptation process. At the same time, such a promotion obviously resulted in an artificial 'split' in the Beria network. It is nonetheless worth bearing in mind that, at heart, Abakumov was a Beria agent merely coopted to fight against the Beriaites. Indeed,:

After Stalin's death Abakumov told my father what had happened. He claimed that he had only been obeying formal orders from Stalin to complete a dossier against my father. Abakumov protested his devotion to my father and claimed to have done nothing about it. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 217) (IMG)

Having thus engineered the establishment of three parallel comprador networks, the Stalin faction then coopted Abakumov and his followers for combat against the Beria network and the Malenkov network. Thus, under the influence of Abakumov,:

In 1946, on the basis of Smersh documents, many leading generals in the Soviet Army and Air Force, including Marshal A. A. Kovikov, were arrested, decommissioned and sent to concentration camps for detention for various lengths of time, which were specified by a direct order from Stalin. During this period, his agentura disclosed a network of speculative operations in the Ministry of Aviation Industry, which included the Minister himself, Col. Gen. A. I. Shakhurin, who was later dismissed and arrested. This disclosure reflected directly on the position of Malenkov, who was responsible for this ministry during the war as a member of the State Committee of Defense. In addition, this also undermined the authority of one of Beria's closest friends, Army General V. N. Merkulov, Minister of Defense, who was removed from his position on orders of the Central Committee. In 1946, on the basis of Smersh documents, many leading generals in the Soviet Army and Air Force, including Marshal A. A. Novikov, were arrested, decommissioned, and sent to concentration camps for detention for various lengths of time, which were specified by a direct order from Stalin. (Background on The Execution of Abakumov and the Leningrad Case of 1949, CIA, January 14, 1955, p. 3) (IMG)

The return of Zhdanov and the rise of the communist-coopted Abakumov network undermined the Malenkov network and consequently also the Beria network. The blow to Malenkov's Titoist network was so strong that as:

early [as] October 1946, a source of the US Military Attaché in Moscow reported that Malenkov had suffered some measure of disgrace.... (The Zhdanov-Malenkov Relationship, CIA, July 29, 1953, p. 4) (IMG{Greece})

Sergo Beria too recalled

Stalin had begun involving himself in the affairs of the atomic committee in 1946, at the time of Malenkov's disgrace, which also marked a weakening of my father's position. It was then that he started to send for scientists. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, pp. 227-228) (IMG)

Abakumov, a bureaucrat, was naturally susceptible to a closer relationship with the MI6 agent Beria, the very man against whom Abakumov was tasked with spearheading purges. Regarding Abakumov's top ally in the Kremlin, a 1955 US intelligence named:

Beriy, with whom Abakumov had very close relations during the last few years before his arrest.... (Background on The Execution of Abakumov and the Leningrad Case of 1949, CIA, January 14, 1955, p. 4) (IMG)

Note that long prior to his arrest, Abakumov had been a Beria agent, only coopted and set 'against' the latter artificially through his promotion at the expense of Merkulov.

Kuznetsov, the Leningrad Titoist and close ally of MI6 agent Beria, deepened bonds with Abakumov:

Kuznetsov made a show of his friendship with Abakumov. They were constantly seen together. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 216) (IMG)

Petr Deriabin, a former high-ranking intelligence official of the Soviet Union who defected to the USA in 1954 and became one of the top sources for the CIA, added that Abakumov had a very corrupt personality:

Among the misdeeds of Abakumov were ... [i]gnoring "Communist moral principles" by participation in extramarital affairs and misusing government property by entertaining these women in bedrooms of our officers' club and of MGB safehouses, (True, from what I heard in the Guards Directorate.)

Abakumov had a very serious personal weakness that eventually became part of the pretext for arresting him. The weakness was women. Abakumov went to extremes, not in aberrations like the rapist Beria, but in frequency. He compounded the problem by taking his women to apartments that were supposed to be reserved for quite another type of clandestine meeting, between MGB officers and their agents. Time after time Abakumov compromised these safehouses, which thereupon lost their operational utility, by exposing them to outsiders – actresses, cheating wives, secretaries, foreign visitors, God knows who. Abakumov also took girlfriends to a special room in the MGB club where he stored expensive gifts for them. (Many other State Security generals were similarly guilty.)

One such girlfriend was Olga Chekhova, a German movie star. Abakumov had dispatched a plane to Berlin for her. She was flown to Moscow and taken to the best MGB safehouse for a 72-hour rendezvous. I have seen her photograph in MGB files. Then in her late 40s, she was singularly attractive. Olga was a distant relative of the Russian writer Anton Chekov. She was the descendent of an uncle of his who moved to Germany in the late 18th or early 19th century. She had circulated among the highest levels of the Nazi leadership, and she had been a Soviet agent since before the war. MGB files contained photographs of her with Hitler, Goering, and Goebbels together; with Martin Bormann; and with the last Gestapo Chief, Mueller – all taken before and during World War II. State Security recruited Olga before World War II but lost contact with her during the war, resuming the contact toward the end of 1945. As of 1952 the MGB

had determined Olga resided in West Germany, was considering her for operational use, and for the stated reason of tracking down a rumor that she made a trip to Moscow just after World War II (the one sponsored by Abakumov, presumably) asked the Berlin/Karlsborst residency to find out more about her.

Abakumov, furthermore, had been inattentive to complaints that the chief of his Secretariat, Chernov, was rude toward and uncooperative with elements of the MGB.

(‘Inside Stalin’s Kremlin: an eyewitness account of brutality, duplicity, and intrigue’, Petr Deriabin, pp. 58-60) (IMG)

As MI6 agent Beria’s ally:

Abakumov ... had free access to Stalin, because he had audio-surveillance put on the houses of all the members of the Politburo and all marshals of the Soviet Union. (The Execution of Viktor Semenovich Abakumov, CIA, January 25, 1955, p. 5) (IMG)

Over time, under Beria’s patronage, Abakumov rose as a prominent corrupt official himself, amassing 5 million rubles:

Abakumov’s ... personal property, which was looted for the most part in Germany, amounted to between four or five million rubles. (Background on The Execution of Abakumov and the Leningrad Case of 1949, CIA, January 14, 1955, p. 4) (IMG)

The top CIA spy Deriabin too confirmed:

Among the misdeeds of Abakumov were ... [m]isappropriation of government funds. (True, according to the confession of Abakumov’s wife, Tonya.) (‘Inside Stalin’s Kremlin: an eyewitness account of brutality, duplicity, and intrigue’, Petr Deriabin, pp. 58-59) (IMG)

He was later purged for this exact reason:

Abakumov was arrested in 1952 chiefly for moral degeneration, mistakes in his work, and for using his position for his personal interests. (Background on The Execution of Abakumov and the Leningrad Case of 1949, CIA, January 14, 1955, p. 4) (IMG)

C19S3.1. The Jewish Bourgeois-Nationalists and the Kremlin Doctors

Establishing a Yiddish anti-fascist committee in the USSR was undoubtedly a positive step, but the problem was that what was officially called the ‘Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee’ was the creature of Beria and Henry Morgenthau:

During the war my father initiated the creation of anti-fascist committees, including the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, which came into being in April-May 1942. The Jewish intellectual elite helped him to organise this committee, which was intended to form a permanent lobby that would mobilise Jewish capital, financial and political, throughout the world and influence American policy. The substantial sums that the Soviet Union received during the course of the war came to us thanks to the Jewish financial group.... Morgenthau and Lilienthal are the two names that I remember from this group. (‘Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin’s Kremlin, Sergo Beria, pp. 109-110) (IMG)

Note that Henry Morgenthau had been the US State Department official who founded the Zionist terrorist espionage organization, the Joint Distribution Committee (JDC or ‘Joint’):

The AJDC was founded in the autumn of 1914 in New York when Henry Morgenthau, US ambassador to Turkey, approached Louis Marshall and Jacob H. Schiff with a request for \$50,000 in support for the Jews in Palestine, who were suffering from famine. (Guide to the Sources on the Holocaust in Occupied Poland, European Holocaust Research Infrastructure (EHRI), Alina Skibińska, Translator: Jessica Taylor-Kucia, 2014, p. 243) (IMG{Israel})

Lavrenti Beria planted Henryk Erlich and Victor Alter, two Bundist leaders of the Kautskyite Second International, in charge of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee:

However, my father made a blunder when he wanted to give the leadership of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee to G. Erlich and V. Alter. They ... had formerly been critics of Stalin. In general he knew little of the conflicts between the Bund and the Bolsheviks. When Stalin saw their names on the list of future members of the Committee he became violently angry: ‘What’s this? You’ve taken people from the Bund, Trotskyists!’ And he ordered their arrests. After this gaffe my father delved into the history of the Bund: I saw Merkulov bring him huge files about it. Any Party could derive inspiration from the Bund’s remarkable organisation, he remarked. I heard my father express regret at the deaths of Erlich and Alter, talking to the actor Mikhoels, who then became the leader of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee. (‘Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin’s Kremlin, Sergo Beria, pp. 109-110) (IMG)

During 1943, when the US imperialists had shifted strategic orientation in favor of the Nazis against the USSR, Shlomo Mikhoels had a trip to the United States in which he engaged in secret negotiations with the United States, negotiations of a kind that could gain an anti-Soviet character:

Mikhoels ... was sent to the USA with the poet Fefer, between June and December 1943. At the same time, my father sent over there a Georgian film director named Kolotozov, accompanied by a very beautiful Leningrad actress. They were supposed to reactivate my father’s old contacts in Hollywood. My father advised Kolotozov to warn Mikhoels that his every move would be reported to the Soviet authorities by his closest colleague and friend Fefer, and to urge him to control his tongue and conceal even from his nearest companions the real purpose of the visit, keeping secret some of his meetings with Americans. The informer was not reporting to my father but to Abakumov and Merkulov. He was therefore unable to get rid of him and could influence Merkulov only at a very high level (which explains why Stalin dismissed Merkulov). Such a move would have attracted suspicion. Fefer was an enthusiastic skirt-chaser, so he was kept busy with women. In his absence, Mikhoels, accompanied by Kolotozov, was able to meet a certain number of influential financiers. Unfortunately he could not stay discreet. (‘Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin’s Kremlin, Sergo Beria, pp. 109-110) (IMG)

The fact that Beria tried to protect Mikhoels from getting caught by Soviet counter-intelligence for these secret negotiations is an indication of the treasonous nature of the visit. In fact, as confirmed by the Israeli anti-Soviet historian Gilboa, during the meeting with Weizmann, Mikhoels and his henchman Fefer gave the American Zionist intelligence official Weizmann ‘a picture of the Jewish community in Russia’ after allegedly 25 years of the loss of intelligence contact:

Firm evidence ... is to be found in Weizmann’s appraisal of his three-hour meeting with Mikhoels and Fefer in the United States, which he termed as a great privilege and a most moving occasion, after having been severed from Russian Jewry for twenty-five years. Weizmann stated that this talk had given him a picture of the Jewish community in Russia.... He said he believed they were interested in Zionism, or not opposed to it at all events. (The Black years of Soviet Jewry, Yehoshua A. Gilboa, p. 70) (IMG)

Fefer, the agent of Mikhoels, had been present in the conversation. Mikhoels and Fefer provided Chaim Weizmann, the Zionist agent of the American secret service, with intelligence materials concerning the conditions in the USSR. Moreover, **Fefer was to run a network of intelligence agents and**

killer-doctors in the Soviet Union. Detailing the intelligence connections between the killer-doctors in the Kremlin, the anti-Soviet Soros agent Brent said:

Fefer had recruited Etinger; Etinger had recruited Vinogradov; Vinogradov had recruited Yegorov; Kuznetsov had sold out to the Americans and had abetted Abakumov, who was preparing for a seizure of supreme power. ('Stalin's Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953', Harper Collins Publishers, Jonathan Brent, Vladimir Naumov, p. 210. Bold added.) (IMG)

Vinogradov was a personal doctor of Stalin. Vinogradov and Yegorov both were involved in the assassination of Zhdanov and were suspected of having masterminded the 1949 murder of Dimitrov, the 1952 murder of Choibalsan, the attempt to murder PCF General-Secretary Maurice Thorez and several others.

Motivated by Zionism, the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee sought to come up with a 'Crimean Proposal', which if implemented would have established an autonomous Jewish settler-colony in Crimea. Shimon Redlich, the agent and former fellow of the CIA front think tank Wilson Center, wrote:

Anastasya Potoskaya, Mikhoels' widow portrayed the atmosphere surrounding the submission of the "Crimean proposal": "...I recall those sleepless nights.... Mikhoels' wisdom was permeated with Hassidic romanticism and he believed that he could save his people...." (...). Mikhoels also discussed the matter with some of his close friends. As for opinions within the JAFK, there were some staunch opponents, particularly Ehrenburg ... [who] ... argued that Jewish evacuees should go back to their prewar homes.... ('War, the Holocaust, and Stalinism', Shimon Redlich, 2013, p. 46) (IMG)

James Rosenberg promised Mikhoels full assistance in this plan:

The "Crimean Proposal" affirmed that the plan for a Jewish republic enjoyed massive support among Soviet Jews and would result in extensive assistance from world Jewry. As we know, Jewish organizations in the US, and particularly the JDC, had promised such assistance to Mikhoels and Fefer a few months earlier. ('War, the Holocaust, and Stalinism', Shimon Redlich, 2013, p. 46) (IMG)

The Proposal was sent to the Soviet leadership:

A copy of the "Crimean Proposal" addressed to Stalin, dated February 15, 1944, is on file in the JAFK archive. An identical copy, dated February 21, addressed to Molotov, is on file in the Party archive.' Molotov sent the proposal to Malenkov, Mikoyan, Shcherbakov and Voznesensky on February 24. ('War, the Holocaust, and Stalinism', Shimon Redlich, 2013,p. 47) (IMG)

Raul Wallenberg was one of the Zionist spies of the American secret service and he collaborated with the Nazis under the cover of 'bribing' (read: funding) them in order to 'save the Jews'. Wallenberg was arrested by the SMERSH, the Soviet counter-intelligence. However, the SMERSH chief Abakumov was a Beria agent, and Abakumov was keen to protect the CIA-Mossad network inside the USSR. He therefore had a habit of slowly but surely murdering any Zionist American spy who was willing to testify compromising information against the CIA-Mossad network inside the USSR. For the cases of the deaths of several Zionist spies arrested in the USSR, the fingers point to Abakumov as the perpetrator. For the death of Shlomo Mikhoels, the fingers point to Abakumov as the conspirator. Of course, throughout his career at the high command, Abakumov was backed by Beria. These murders were part of the case made against him by Riyumin's network and are part of the reason why Stalin promoted Riyumin against Abakumov. The Soviet counter-intelligence indeed arrested Wallenberg in order to extract confessions from him as compromising materials against the Beria-backed Zionist elements in the 'Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee'. Conveniently, since Abakumov was in charge of these efforts, before much compromising material could come out of Wallenberg's mouth against Beria's network, Wallenberg died:

Two or three years later, after his return to Moscow, he told me that Abakumov's Smersh had seized Wallenberg in Budapest in January 1945. Like me, Serov did not know of the connection between Wallenberg and my father. I mentioned the matter to my father as though this had been an exploit of our services. He looked at me and asked: 'where did you hear that name?' 'Serov spoke to me about him.'

My father then telephoned Serov and covered him with invective. 'What got into you to spread such gossip? And before my son, too!' At the time I did not understand this reaction. Later, when the affair of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee was used to undermine my father's position, he explained to me that Wallenberg had been kidnapped for the same reason. My father was the target aimed at through Wallenberg. The Wallenberg family had acted as intermediaries with the Finnish government in the armistice negotiations with the USSR. Raul Wallenberg had connections with the British, German and Soviet services and had used these relationships to save Jews. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 111) (IMG)

The agenda of the Beria agent Abakumov was to save the Zionist intelligence operatives even if that meant murdering the ones arrested by the Soviet counter-intelligence so to prevent the rest of the Zionist intelligence network from being exposed:

Among the misdeeds of Abakumov were ... [f]ailure to take "active measures" against Zionists and failure to heed the Central Committee about removing Broverman from the minister's Secretariat. (True....) ('Inside Stalin's Kremlin: an eyewitness account of brutality, duplicity, and intrigue', Petr Deriabin, pp. 58-59) (IMG)

Shlomo Mikhoels is widely believed to have been murdered by Lavrenti Beria:

One explanation, apparently deliberately leaked out by Moscow to Jewish Communist and leftist circles abroad ... is significant in the light of subsequent happenings: it claimed that Mikhoels had been silenced by American intelligence agents after the Soviet security services had uncovered an extensive spy ring, operated in the USSR by the American Joint Distribution Committee and headed by Mikhoels on behalf of U.S. intelligence. (The Black years of Soviet Jewry, Yehoshua A. Gilboa, p. 83) (IMG)

Mikhoels's murder was a planned, deliberate move. To be assured of this, it was not necessary to wait fifteen years until a Soviet Lithuanian paper should report that Mikhoels had been killed by Beria's agents; already towards the end of 1948 it had become increasingly clear that the alleged accident in Minsk had been an official act. "When Zuskin was arrested," Ehrenburg wrote, "everybody started wondering how Mikhoels had lost his life." Binyamin Zuskin, who had ranked sector Mikhoels at the Jewish State Theater in Moscow, had been a pointed its director on Mikhoels's death. His arrest at the end of 1948 was a link in the chain of mass arrests and liquidations. (The Black years of Soviet Jewry, Yehoshua A. Gilboa, p. 84) (IMG)

Solomon Mikhoels, founder of the Moscow Yiddish theater, was liquidated on orders of Stalin's security police chief Lavrenti Beria, the Soviet news paper Lituaniya Sovietskaya has reported, according to the French press today.

This was the first time that a Soviet organ had officially given the facts of Mikhoels death. Until now Soviet sources had claimed that Mikhoels had died in an automobile accident in 1948. The Lithuanian newspaper said that Mikhoels, a former head of the wartime Soviet Anti-Fascist Committee, died “a victim of Beria’s infamy.” Beria was executed by the Khrushchev regime following Stalin’s death. (Soviet Newspaper Admits Mikhoels Was Killed by Order of Authorities, Jewish Telegraphic Agency, January 17, 1963) (IMG)

A close associate of Fefer was Dr. Shimeliovich. Among the absurd blood-libelous slanders of the Zionist Dr. Shimeliovich was the outrageous comment that the USSR – the state responsible for saving millions of Ashkenazim from extermination – was not only ‘anti-Semitic’, but also that its alleged ‘anti-Semitism’ was worse than even Nazi Germany’s. Shimon Redlich, the agent and former fellow of the CIA front think tank Wilson Center, wrote:

[S]ubmitted by Dr. Shimeliovich, [it] was considered “too nationalistic.” Shimeliovich emphasized the unique tragedy of the Jews under German rule and severely criticized anti-semitism and discrimination against Jews in the non-occupied parts of the country. He openly spoke of the fact that “Anti-semitism in the USSR often causes more anguish than the annihilation of more than four million Jews by the Germans.” Finally, a letter addressed to Stalin and signed by Mikhoels, Fefer and Epshteyn, was drafted mid-February, 1944. The “Crimean Proposal” opened with an impressive statement of what would later be referred to as the Holocaust. It spoke of the total annihilation of the Jews in Nazi-occupied territories of the USSR and of the “tragedy which the Jewish people is suffering in the present war.” Many Jewish evacuees in, according to the letter, did not consider their places of origin, which had turned into mass cemeteries for their kin, as desirable places for postwar resettlement. Hundreds of thousands of Jews from the territories acquired by the USSR in 1939-1940 would stay within the country and seek places to settle. In addition to demographic arguments, the letter also pointed to the national-cultural needs of Soviet Jews after the war. Jewish cultural and professional cadres were not very welcome by other Soviet nationalities who, with the passage of time, had developed their own national intelligentsia. The few existing Jewish cultural institutions were not able to satisfy the needs of the Soviet Jewish population. The letter also explicitly mentioned “new outbursts of anti-semitism.” Since the Jews were experiencing the greatest tragedy in their history, and since their loyalty and patriotism had been proven on the battle front, they became particularly sensitive to wartime anti-semitism, which evoked “sharp reaction in the soul of every Soviet Jews.” The suggested solution to these painful problems would be the establishment of a Soviet Jewish republic, preferably in the Crimea. The Crimea, according to the letter, was “one of the regions where, subject to political considerations, this is possible.” Did such an appeal, formulated in February, 1944, mean that the signatories knew about the future fate of the Crimean Tatars? (...). The letter went on to recommend that even before the liberation of the Crimea, a Government commission should be appointed to examine the idea. This, too, may indicate that the planned deportation of the Crimean Tatars might have been known to the signatories. (‘War, the Holocaust, and Stalinism’, Shimon Redlich, 2013, p. 46) (IMG)

The Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee was working towards the establishment of a Yiddish bourgeois-nationalist regime in Crimea. In so doing, their leaders Mikhoel and Shimeliovich were backed fully by the American-Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (JDC, or ‘Joint’), the espionage front and center for the Mossad and the CIA.

Much of what has been written about Shimeliovich is with regards to his activity as an agent of the Mossad and the CIA in the Soviet Union. It is remarkable, also, that Shimeliovich was a prominent doctor in Moscow. In 1952, Moscow accused Shimeliovich and Mikhoels as being middlemen or couriers between the CIA and a group of doctors whom the Kremlin accused of being spies and assassins:

Singled out as the doctors’ intermediaries were A. B. Shimelevich, last identified as head doctor at the Botkin Hospital in Moscow in 1947, and Solomon Mikhoels, Chairman of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee during World War II. (The Doctors’ Plot, CIA, July 15, 1953, p. 2) (IMG)

In a book published by the Yale University Press, the Amnesty International official Joshua Rubenstein confirmed:

Shimeliovich also directly supervised Dr. Miron Vovsi, a first cousin to Mikhoels who had served as a chief physician of the Red Army during the war. (Stalin’s Secret Pogrom: The Postwar Inquisition of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, Yale University Press, Joshua Rubenstein, Vladimir Pavlovich Naumov, p. 54) (IMG)

Along with Rubenstein, the Israeli anti-Soviet historian Gilboa corroborated:

Professor Miron Vovsi, a former leader in the Soviet army’s medical corps with the rank of major-general, was a relative of Mikhoels (whose surname had originally been Vovsi) and had also been one of the personalities connected with the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee.... (The Black years of Soviet Jewry, Yehoshua A. Gilboa, p. 299) (No Image)

Furthermore, Vovsi worked closely with another prominent Kremlin doctor named Vladimir Vinogradov, who as will be shown in greater detail shortly later, was directly responsible for the murder of Andrei Zhdanov. According to the Jerusalem Post journalist Louis Rapoport:

Vovsi worked closely with Vinogradov, who was the number-one Kremlin doctor and a giant of Soviet medicine. (Stalin’s War against the Jews, Louis Rapoport, p. 148) (No Image)

Quite importantly, Miron Meyer Vovsi was also an:
Israeli Citizen....

(‘Re: Dr. Meyer VOVSI, Israeli Citizen’, To: Foreign Office Visa Section, From: Ladislao Molnar (Deputy Director of Health Department for the American-Jewish Joint Distribution Committee), January 19, 1953, p. 1) (IMG)

In itself, being an Israeli citizen was not an issue. The problem was the question of dual citizenship. The counter-intelligence divisions of the intelligence services from countries all over the world, both in the socialist camp and in the pro-fascist camp, agree that to be a citizen of two opposing countries and to have a prominent position in one of these two countries should raise suspicion. It does not automatically mean espionage or loyalty to a hostile power, but it does deserve to be investigated.

During late 1952, Vovsi was spending time in Israel, with the British diplomatic channels arguing that he stays there for a while:

As you will note, the British Council suggests that Dr. Vovsi remain in Tel-Aviv until they can confirm his placement at St. Pancras [in London]. (‘Re: Dr Vovsi Med. File #23815a’, To: Dr. Boris Pliskin (in: Malben, Israel), Alexander Gonik (the Medical Director of the American-Jewish Joint Distribution Committee), December 16, 1952, p. 1) (IMG)

This was happening at the time of the media campaign of the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies denouncing the Israeli regime as an American imperialist military base. Furthermore, this was at the time of the arrest of the Titoist killer-doctors by the Soviet intelligence. Under the pretext of granting a 'scholarship' to the Israeli doctor, the American-Jewish Joint Distribution Committee financed Vovsi:

Dr Meyer Vovsi has been awarded by our organization a six months' scholarship.... ('Re: Dr. Meyer VOVSI, Israeli Citizen', To: Foreign Office Visa Section, From: Ladislao Molnar (Deputy Director of Health Department for the American-Jewish Joint Distribution Committee), January 19, 1953, p. 1) (IMG)

We take this opportunity to confirm that our organization will bear the costs of transportation of Dr. and Mrs. Vovsi, their maintenance while in England, and tuition. ('Re: Dr. Meyer VOVSI, Israeli Citizen', To: Foreign Office Visa Section, From: Ladislao Molnar (Deputy Director of Health Department for the American-Jewish Joint Distribution Committee), January 19, 1953, p. 1) (IMG)

In late January, 1953, the CIA-funded/Mossad-funded Zionist Dr. Vovsi was arrested in the USSR and denounced as a medical assassin throughout the Soviet press. I cannot confirm the allegations of medical sabotage and espionage. However, Vovsi's prominent position in the USSR as a dual citizen, his ties to the British diplomatic channels, his close connections with Dr. Vinogradov, and above all the financing of him by the JDC under the cover of supporting his 'education' (read: training) made him very suspicious.

According to one article titled 'Zionist Agents of the American Secret Service', written by a very prominent Soviet intelligence analyst Vladislav Minayev, Vovsi was:

connected with the "Joint," an international Jewish bourgeois-nationalist organization founded by the American secret service, supposedly for the assistance of Jews in other countries. In reality, this organization, under the direction of the American secret service, conducts wide-scale espionage, terrorist and other subversive activities in a number of countries, including the Soviet Union. One of the arrested men, Vovsi, admitted during the interrogation, that he had received a directive from the "Joint" Zionist organization in the United States "to exterminate leading cadres of the U.S.S.R." (Zionist Agents of the American Secret Service, New Times, Vladislav Minayev, January 21, 1953, pp. 1-2. Re-published in: CIA)

Even as late as February of that year, the American-Israeli intelligence had the audacity to continue to plan for funding Dr. Vovsi:

Scholarship Committee has established at £ 50 ~ a month the amount to which he will be entitled during 6 months stay in England. As we were informed that the scholarships granted by the British Council are in the neighborhood of £ 30-35, we believe that this grant will be very adequate to cover all Dr. Vovsi's expenses. ('Re: Dr. Meyer VOVSI Med. File #23815', To: Malben, Tel Aviv, Ladislao Molnar (Deputy Director of Health Department for the American-Jewish Joint Distribution Committee), February 16, 1953, p. 1) (IMG)

In this case, 'our Accounting Department', said Molnar, would:

pay him his allowance. ('Re: Dr. Meyer VOVSI Med. File #23815a', To: Malben, Tel Aviv, Ladislao Molnar (Deputy Director of Health Department for the American-Jewish Joint Distribution Committee), February 16, 1953, p. 1) (IMG)

C19S3.2. The Assassination of Andrei Zhdanov

It is of course completely natural that Anglo-American imperialists would desire to assassinate key communist revolutionaries so to further undermine the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies. In the late 1940s, the CIA plots for assassinating communist leaders were revealed as 'Project X'. The 'U.S. News' reported:

strong-arm squads would be formed under American guidance [and] assassination of key communists would be encouraged. (I Choose Peace, Konni Zilliacus, p. 212, citing: U.S. News) (IMG)

Under this plan, strong-arm squads would be formed under American guidance. Assassination of key Communists would be encouraged. American agents, parachuted into Eastern Europe, would be used to coordinate anti-Communist action. (From Trotsky To Tito, James Klugmann, 1951, citing: U.S. News)

One of the major targets of the imperialist-fascist secret service assassination plots was Zhdanov. As confirmed by Timothy Snyder of the Council on Foreign Relations, in July of 1948,:

Zhdanov suffered a heart attack, the first of several. (Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin, Timothy Snyder, p. 337)

Kees Boterbloem – a history professor at the University of South Florida and a scholar on Zhdanov – put the situation as follows:

On 27 August Zhdanov suffered another heart attack that **was not recognized**, it seems, **by Vinogradov, Egorov**, or Vasilenko, who arrived by plane at the spa **the next day**, accompanied by the radiologist Lydia Timashuk, who prepared an electrocardiogram. **She concluded that Zhdanov's condition called for strict bedrest, but the other five attending doctors disagreed with her and rejected her diagnosis.** On 29 August, on the suggestion of Zhdanov's bodyguard, A.M. Belov, Timashuk warned the head of the Kremlin bodyguards, Vlasik, about a possible misdiagnosis of Zhdanov's illness, but it was too late. In the early hours of 31 August 1948, Zhdanov, on his way to the washroom, suffered a final fatal heart attack. ('Life and Times of Andrei Zhdanov, 1896-1948', Kees Boterbloem, 2004, p. 333. Bold added.) (IMG)

As Boterbloem stated above, and as confirmed by the Soros agent Brent, the electrocardiogram of Zhdanov's heart was done by:

Timashuk [who] had been a "rank-and-file doctor at the Kremlin Hospital," managing the electrocardiograph unit, with little authority to dispute the findings of the distinguished professors and doctors.... ('Stalin's Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953', Harper Collins Publishers, Jonathan Brent, Vladimir Naumov, p. 14) (IMG)

Note that the team of the Kremlin doctors arrived 'the next day', almost 24 hours late. This has also been confirmed by Jonathan Brent, currently the head of the Zionist think tank YIVO. As the director of the Yale University Press from 1991 to 2009, Jonathan Brent was invited by and received the financial support of the CIA agent George Soros, in founding the 'Annals of Communism' series. The Soros agent Brent conducted extensive research on the history of the USSR, deep into the long-held secret archives of the Soviet intelligence, and employed numerous prestigious scholars – from the US National Security Council or Council on Foreign Relations – in publishing several books regarding Soviet history. As Brent rightly stated, the electrocardiogram of Zhdanov's heart was done just as late:

At seven-thirty in the morning of August 28, Timashuk was summoned to Valdai. Why she was summoned to Valdai on that date has never been explained. Timashuk took an electrocardiogram of Zhdanov's heart ... and she became convinced that Zhdanov had recently suffered a myocardial infarct.... She immediately brought this information to the attention of Maiorov, Vinogradov, Vasilenko, and

Yegorov. ('Stalin's Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953', Harper Collins Publishers, Jonathan Brent, Vladimir Naumov, p. 19) (IMG)

However, Timashuk:

was told [by Yegorov and Co.] to alter her conclusion.... ('Stalin's Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953', Harper Collins Publishers, Jonathan Brent, Vladimir Naumov, p. 19) (IMG)

This was:

a demand with which she did not comply. ('Stalin's Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953', Harper Collins Publishers, Jonathan Brent, Vladimir Naumov, p. 19) (IMG)

Resisting the threats by Yegorov and Vinogradov to alter her conclusions, Timashuk began writing a letter to Vlasik:

As the head of the Kremlin security guards, Vlasik was responsible for ensuring the physical safety of all leading party and Politburo members. He was the right individual to be informed about this matter, and Timashuk expected him to show her letter to the Politburo, if not directly to Stalin himself. This, she assumed, would bring the responsible parties to justice so that correct medical treatment could be provided. ('Stalin's Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953', Harper Collins Publishers, Jonathan Brent, Vladimir Naumov, p. 15) (IMG)

An excerpt of Timashuk's letter on August 29 is as follows:

I consider that the consultants and physician doctor MAIOROV underestimate the unquestionably grave condition of com. ZHDANOV, permitting him to get up from bed, stroll about in the park, visit the cinema, and so forth, that this provoked the second attack [of August 29] and worsened the indications of the EKG of August 28, and in the future this regimen may lead to a fateful outcome. ('Stalin's Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953', Harper Collins Publishers, Jonathan Brent, Vladimir Naumov, p. 15. Citing: Timashuk to Vlasik, August 29, 1948.) (IMG)

Noteworthy is that:

Timashuk's initial letter had not raised the accusation of murder.... ('Stalin's Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953', Harper Collins Publishers, Jonathan Brent, Vladimir Naumov, p. 14) (IMG)

Timashuk thus sent her secret letter:

Timashuk's secret letter to Vlasik included the transcript of Zhdanov's EKG examination of August 28, on the basis of which he disputed the conclusions and did not receive a strict bed rest regimen that her diagnosis of a myocardial infarct (heart attack) would have indicated for him. ('Stalin's Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953', Harper Collins Publishers, Jonathan Brent, Vladimir Naumov, p. 14) (IMG)

Nonetheless:

all concerned instantly realized the menacing implications of her charge. ('Stalin's Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953', Harper Collins Publishers, Jonathan Brent, Vladimir Naumov, p. 14) (IMG)

However,:

She could hardly have expected what happened next. Her letter of denunciation had been expeditiously delivered through covert and secure channel, but she soon suspected that it had nonetheless fallen almost immediately into the hands of Dr. Yegorov himself, chief among those she accused. From the Politburo, from the Ministry of State Security (MGB), from Stalin she heard nothing. Nor would she for several years to come. ('Stalin's Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953', Harper Collins Publishers, Jonathan Brent, Vladimir Naumov, p. 15) (IMG)

Yegorov himself was an affiliate of the MGB:

Yegorov held the military rank of major general, and ... had close administrative ties to important governmental networks, including the MGB (the KGB of the time).... ('Stalin's Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953', Harper Collins Publishers, Jonathan Brent, Vladimir Naumov, p. 16) (IMG)

The roots of Yegorov also went to the Zionist intelligence network controlled by the American intelligence service. Recall from C19S3 that Fefer, the agent of Mikhoels, had been present in the conversation in which Mikhoels and Fefer provided Chaim Weizmann, the Zionist agent of the American secret service, with intelligence materials concerning the conditions in the USSR. Fefer began to run a network of agents and physicians in the Soviet Union:

Firm evidence ... is to be found in Weizmann's appraisal of his three-hour meeting with Mikhoels and Fefer in the United States, which he termed as a great privilege and a most moving occasion, after having been severed from Russian Jewry for twenty-five years. Weizmann stated that this talk had given him a picture of the Jewish community in Russia.... He said he believed they were interested in Zionism, or not opposed to it at all events. (The Black years of Soviet Jewry, Yehoshua A. Gilboa, p. 70) (IMG)

Fefer had recruited Etinger; Etinger had recruited Vinogradov; Vinogradov had recruited Yegorov; Kuznetsov had sold out to the Americans and had abetted Abakumov, who was preparing for a seizure of supreme power. ('Stalin's Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953', Harper Collins Publishers, Jonathan Brent, Vladimir Naumov, p. 210) (IMG)

Vinogradov was a personal doctor of Stalin. Vinogradov and Yegorov both were involved in the assassination of Zhdanov and were suspected of having masterminded the 1949 murder of Dimitrov, the 1952 murder of Choibalsan, the attempt to murder PCF General-Secretary Maurice Thorez, and several others.

As the head of the LSUK, which was the Kremlin medical staff, Yegorov had deliberately concealed the syphilitic condition of Beria from Stalin:

Vinogradov and Yegorov, two of the three Gentiles named by Pravda, were said to be "old agents of British intelligence." Stalin had fired Vinogradov as his personal physician on grounds that he concealed Beria's syphilitic condition. One who did engage in this conspiracy of concealment from Stalin had been the officer heading LSUK, and that was Yegorov. ('Inside Stalin's Kremlin: an eyewitness account of brutality, duplicity, and intrigue', Petr Deriabin, p. 105) (IMG)

Vinogradov, furthermore, had close contacts with Beria:

Professor Vinogradov often visited our house. He was not the attending doctor, but we were happy to communicate with this interesting person. (My Father is People's Commissar Beria, Sergo Beria) (IMG)

The head of the MGB was Viktor Abakumov, the financially and sexually corrupt official who had entered a pact with Beria against the USSR. Regarding Timashuk's letter, the CIA agent Petr Deriabin confirmed:

Abakumov ... did not inform Stalin about [Timashuk's] first letter. Perhaps Abakumov suspected that if he were its target, Stalin himself had been the "architect." ('Inside Stalin's Kremlin: an eyewitness account of brutality, duplicity, and intrigue', Petr Deriabin, p. 49) (IMG)

It was most likely Abakumov himself who had informed his friend in the MGB, Yegorov, about this letter:

The letter got into the hands of Dr. P.I. Yegorov, head of the Kremlin hospital and a high-level KGB [MGB] affiliate responsible for the well being of all Politburo members. ('A tangled conspiracy tale, Soviet style', Los Angeles Times, Nina L. Khrushcheva, February 22, 2004) (IMG)

At the same time:

On ... August 29, the date of her first letter to the authorities, Zhdanov suffered his second severe attack in Valdai again. Timashuk was called from Moscow, where she found Vinogradov, Yegorov, Vasilenko and Maiorov in attendance. ('Stalin's Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953', Harper Collins Publishers, Jonathan Brent, Vladimir Naumov, p. 19) (IMG)

Last time, Yegorov and Co. attended Zhdanov one day late; this time, Yegorov and Co. did attend Zhdanov, but, much to the suspicion of Timashuk, they made sure to delay the electrocardiogram (EKG) for one day:

Yegorov and Vinogradov instructed her to delay taking another EKG until the following day, August 30. She could not understand this and interpreted it as another indication of inadequate medical attention. She found the doctors' refusal to entertain the idea of a heart attack or take appropriate measures both inexplicable and inexcusable, and she expressed her anxiety to the chief of Zhdanov's bodyguards, A M. Belov. She told him that she reason to suspect the doctors of mistreating Zhdanov. ('Stalin's Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953', Harper Collins Publishers, Jonathan Brent, Vladimir Naumov, p. 19) (IMG)

And:

The EKG taken on August 30 convinced Timashuk even more that Zhdanov had suffered a heart attack. Once again the doctors categorically instructed her to write nothing about this in her reports. ('Stalin's Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953', Harper Collins Publishers, Jonathan Brent, Vladimir Naumov, p. 20) (IMG)

the doctors' notes from this period suggest that they did not fully record the progressive alteration in Zhdanov's medical condition or the treatment they provided. From August 7, when Karpai left Valdi, to August 30, the doctors appear to have been consciously manipulating the official medical record so that Zhdanov's death could eventually be presented as "sudden" and "unexpected." ('Stalin's Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953', Harper Collins Publishers, Jonathan Brent, Vladimir Naumov, p. 64) (IMG)

The next day, Timashuk discovered that Zhdanov had received fatal 'treatment' by the doctors:

Agitated by the situation in which found herself, Timashuk began to interview the nursing staff. What she discovered appalled her still more. The nurses told her that, instead of strict bed rest, Zhdanov had been allowed to go for walks in the park, take massages, go to the movies, and get up from his bed to use the lavatory. Her August 29 letter to Vlasik emphasized the fatal possibilities of such treatment. ('Stalin's Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953', Harper Collins Publishers, Jonathan Brent, Vladimir Naumov, p. 20) (IMG)

On August 31, 1948, the date of Zhdanov's death:

Timashuk was certain that the "fatal outcome" she had predicted had resulted from negligent treatment. In her mind the charge had now become murder. ('Stalin's Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953', Harper Collins Publishers, Jonathan Brent, Vladimir Naumov, p. 20) (IMG)

Timashuk sent a second letter. However,:

Timashuk's second letter worsened the problem for Abakumov. He could hardly tell Stalin about it without admitting the existence of the first letter and trying to explain why Stalin had not been informed. No explanation would satisfy Stalin. He would blame Abakumov and the Guards Directorate, anybody and everybody, for failure to prevent the "murder" of Zhdanov. ('Inside Stalin's Kremlin: an eyewitness account of brutality, duplicity, and intrigue', Petr Deriabin, p. 49) (IMG)

As confirmed by a prominent anti-Soviet official in the Soviet intelligence consulted by Deriabin, Abakumov refused to disclose:

the first two Timashuk letters to Stalin. ('Inside Stalin's Kremlin: an eyewitness account of brutality, duplicity, and intrigue', Petr Deriabin, p. 49)

Colonel Goryshev confirmed that these worries inhibited our minister [i.e. Abakumov] from disclosing the first two Timashuk letters to Stalin. My boss mentioned Abakumov's concerns later in 1950 when he told me that Timashuk had resumed writing accusatory letters. ('Inside Stalin's Kremlin: an eyewitness account of brutality, duplicity, and intrigue', Petr Deriabin, p. 49) (IMG)

The Soros agent Jonathan Brent wrote:

A letter from her to Lieutenant General Vlasik should have gone straight to the Politburo; to the minister of state security, V. S. Abakumov; and if necessary to Stalin. Appropriate action should have been taken. The safety of the state was in question. Her urgent warning should have elicited an instant response. She remained upset, and four days after Zhdanov's death, on September 4, 1948, wrote another covert letter, this time to Suranov.... ('Stalin's Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953', Harper Collins Publishers, Jonathan Brent, Vladimir Naumov, p. 16) (IMG)

The CIA too confirmed:

Because the contents of the report supported facts involving physicians who were attending a number of members of the government, Shtsherbakov [i.e. Shcherbakov] among others, Timashuk's report got into the hands of Vlasik, who was at that time chief of the guard protecting the members of the government. Vlasik wrote on the report the remark "yurunda" (Baloney) and put it on the shelf. This "yurunda" soon made the rounds at the Ministry as a sort of joke. ('Committee of State Security / The Doctors' Plot and Its Reversal', CIA, September 24, 1954, pp. 1-2. Underline added.) (IMG)

Vlasik thus betrayed the USSR through such a great crime.

Shortly thereafter, an autopsy of Zhdanov was to be done:

On Poskrebyshev's orders, the post-mortem was carried out in an ill-lit, shoddy bathroom in Kuznetsov's presence. (Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar, Simon Sebag Montefiore, 2003) (IMG)

The autopsy obviously was done hastily:

The hastily prepared autopsy, performed in Zhdanov's bathtub in Valdai on the evening of August 31, with the staff masseuse, nurse Turkina, taking notes.... ('Stalin's Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953', Harper Collins Publishers, Jonathan Brent, Vladimir Naumov, p. 20) (IMG)

The official autopsy report of Zhdanov supported the line of the Titoist killer-doctors:

"The death of comrade ZHDANOV, A. A., followed the paralysis of morbidly changing heart that was the consequence of sharp arteriosclerosis of the coronary vessels in combination with general arteriosclerosis. As a result of heart failure there was a sharp attack of emphysema." No heart attack [was mentioned]. ('Stalin's Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953', Harper Collins Publishers, Jonathan Brent, Vladimir Naumov, p. 21) (IMG)

However:

Timashuk could not be quieted or convinced. ('Stalin's Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953', Harper Collins Publishers, Jonathan Brent, Vladimir Naumov, p. 20) (IMG)

In late 1952, Yegorov, Vinogradov, and several others responsible for the death of Zhdanov were arrested. However, after the death of Stalin, they were released by Beria. After his release from prison, Vinogradov had absolutely no need to fear another arrest:

Finally released ... Vinogradov had no need to fear further retribution or punishment. ('Stalin's Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953', Harper Collins Publishers, Jonathan Brent, Vladimir Naumov, p. 48) (IMG)

Nonetheless, during this time when he was off jail and had no need to fear, he made a very important confession:

it is necessary to acknowledge that the autopsy of A. A. ZHDANOV, who died on 31 August, disclosed that he had suffered a recent myocardial infarct. Therefore the rejection of this by me, professors V. Kh. VASILENKO, and P. I. YEGOROV and doctors G. I. MAIOROV and S. E. KARPAI was a mistake on our part. ('Stalin's Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953', Harper Collins Publishers, Jonathan Brent, Vladimir Naumov, p. 48. Citing: 'Concerning the history of the illness of A. A. ZHDANOV', Vladimir Vinogradov, March 27, 1953, p. 4) (IMG)

How could it be a 'mistake' when in fact Yegorov, Vinogradov, Maiorov and Karpai knew and were directly warned of the real results of the autopsy! Regarding the autopsy:

Timashuk sensed collusion.... ('Stalin's Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953', Harper Collins Publishers, Jonathan Brent, Vladimir Naumov, p. 20) (IMG)

Clearly, this was a cover-up:

The professors were terrified that their misdiagnosis and cover-up would be exposed so they sacked and denounced Timashuk.... (Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar, Simon Sebag Montefiore, 2003)

A few days after the death of Zhdanov:

On September 6, 1948, ... an emergency session of experts was convened in the Kremlin Hospital to investigate whether the doctors who treated him in Valdai had misdiagnosed Zhdanov's illness and had provided criminally negligent treatment. ('Stalin's Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953', Harper Collins Publishers, Jonathan Brent, Vladimir Naumov, p. 13) (IMG)

However, Timashuk's line was heavily bashed by the Titoist doctors in that session. The next day, Timashuk:

was summarily dismissed on September 7 by Yegorov as manager of the electrocardiographic unit of the Kremlin Hospital and thrown in to the outer darkness of a considerably inferior position in the second polyclinic of the system. Dangerous, stupid, ill-educated, incendiary – in Yegorov's view, Timashuk was an individual to be treated with contempt. ('Stalin's Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953', Harper Collins Publishers, Jonathan Brent, Vladimir Naumov, p. 46) (IMG)

Only an anti-Soviet medical saboteur would ensure delay in the proper treatment of Zhdanov, wrong treatment of Zhdanov, hasty autopsy of Zhdanov after his death, and withholding such critical information about the death of Zhdanov. Clearly, this was an incriminating case of medical sabotage by the killer-doctors of the Kremlin hospital, who arrived almost 24 hours after Zhdanov's heart attack, who made the EKG late for another 24 hours, who knowingly denied the well-evidenced fact that Zhdanov had a heart attack, who at least according to the nurses did not enforce a strict bed regimen for Zhdanov, and who sought to cover up their criminal activity by firing Timashuk. The killer-doctors had collaborators. Again, recall that the intelligence service roots of these Titoist killer-doctors went to Fefer, Mikhoels, and Chaim Weizmann. At home, these killer-doctors were members of the MGB and had direct links with Vlasik, Kuznetsov, Abakumov, three agents of the MI6 agent Lavrenti Beria. The fingerprints of the CIA, MI6, and Mossad can be seen in this conspiracy.

Other Kremlin physicians, also belonging to the intelligence network led by Weizmann, played important roles in the Zhdanov assassination. One of them was Dr. Etinger:

The diagnosis is always established in combination with the clinical facts. For your information, we invited the leading specialists of the Soviet nation – academician ZELENNIN, Professor NEZLIN, Professor ETINGER. They evaluated this electrocardiogram differently [than yours and in agreement with us] on the basis of the clinical data. Is it possible that you really believe yourself to be the Alpha and the Omega...? I can no longer permit you to work in the Lechsanupra system, because you create discord and dangerous confusion in the treatment of each individual.... You are not even interested in x-rays. Clinical facts don't interest you.... ('Stalin's Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953', Harper Collins Publishers, Jonathan Brent, Vladimir Naumov, p. 34. Citing: Stenographic records, September 6, 1948, p. 12) (IMG)

Recall that Etinger too had been recruited by the Weizmann network. Etinger argued that:

There are no indications of coronary thrombosis. What is present is a grave form of chronic, coronary failure in combination with attacks of cardiac asthma. ('Stalin's Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953', Harper Collins Publishers, Jonathan Brent, Vladimir Naumov, p. 35) (IMG)

To this, Dr. Zelenin responded:

I concur with Professor Etinger that against the hypertension, the patient had severe coronary arteriosclerosis and above all suffered lack of nourishment to the anterior wall.... Facts pointing to a thrombosis do not exist either clinically or from the electrocardiograph; there

is no evidence of a major infarct. ('Stalin's Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953', Harper Collins Publishers, Jonathan Brent, Vladimir Naumov, p. 35) (IMG)

'Etinger's comments at the August 31 session', the authors said, was summed up in the following quote:

The patient had a severe lesion of the coronary vessels owing to hypertension.... Definite indications of a coronary thrombosis are not present. There is a severe form of chronic coronary failure that coincides with cardiac asthma. Manifestations of heart failure have grown up. In connection with a *grave form of chronic coronary failure* the formation of small centers of necrosis is possible (emphasis added)." Zelenin appeared to concur, saying "Undoubtedly this patient is an old hypertensive, with progressive hypertension.... This circumstance – that there were two attacks – is not associated with the clinical picture of an infarct, and I think that there was no massive infarct.... And from the point of view of prognosis each successive attack would be severe and even threatening."

Vinogradov eventually admitted that "ZELENIN gave a garbled conclusion that subsequently allowed me to say that the conclusion did not find a myocardial infarct in A. A. ZHDANOV." This was, in fact, what happened when on August 31, Vinogradov summed up the opinion of the consulting committee:

So, this is the conclusion that was formed at the time ... there is no objection to this diagnosis? (All professors agree.) I would like to turn to you with the question: After the first attack [in July], he was subjected to strict quiet and was kept to his bed. He was not permitted to get up, he used a bedpan. Only after approximately two weeks did he get up a bit. he was permitted to use the toilet' he was given massages on his hands and legs. they did not though his spine. We permitted him to get up, make a few steps in front of the bed and at the maximum he twice went about 50 meters around the verandah.

I want to ask you to turn your competence to this question: Was this incorrect?

"No," Professor Etinger immediately declared. "It was correct."

('Stalin's Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953', Harper Collins Publishers, Jonathan Brent, Vladimir Naumov, p. 61. Citing: Protocol of a face-to-face confrontation between Vinogradov and Karpai, February 18, 1954, pp. 3-9. Interrogation of Vinogradov, November 18, 1952, p. 6. Stenogram, August 31, 1948, p. 10. Parentheses, bold, and Italics in this quote are all original.) (IMG)

After being fired by the killer-doctors, the Hero of the Soviet Union and the brave medical freedom-fighter, Timashuk, wrote letters to Kuznetsov, the self-disguised traitor and enemy of Zhdanov who had worked 'with' Zhdanov back when Zhdanov was in Leningrad. Little – if any at all – did Timashuk know of the treasonous character of Kuznetsov and Co. On September 15, 1948, therefore, she sent a letter to Kuznetsov on the death of Zhdanov:

Knowing that she would get no justice from Yegorov or his immediate associates, Timashuk next wrote a letter to A. A. Kuznetsov, the Central Committee secretary with security affairs. She restated her opinion about the diagnosis of Zhdanov's illness.... In her letter to Kuznetsov dated September 15, 1948, a week after the session with Yegorov, she emphasized what earlier she had claimed was never part of her accusation against the doctors: "the treatment and regimen given A. A. Zhdanov *were incorrect*; that is to say, the disease of myocardial infarct demands strict bed rest for the course of several months. In fact, he was allowed to move around (strolls in the park twice per day, going to the cinema, and further physical exertions)." (Emphasis added.) She continued: "Rudely, improperly, without any lawful grounds, Professor Yegorov on 8 September has thrown me out of the Kremlin Hospital to an affiliated polyclinic for the ostensible purpose of improving the work being done there." Timashuk received no reply. Eventually she would write another letter to Kuznetsov in early 1949. This one, too, went unanswered. ('Stalin's Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953', Harper Collins Publishers, Jonathan Brent, Vladimir Naumov, pp. 48-49) (IMG)

In early 1949 she wrote once more to Kuznetsov. Again she received no reply. The implication was obvious: Kuznetsov took too no interest in saving Zhdanov's life. ('Stalin's Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953', Harper Collins Publishers, Jonathan Brent, Vladimir Naumov, p. 208) (IMG)

Kuznetsov had every reason to cover up the murder of Zhdanov. Kuznetsov could not betray his friend Abakumov, who also was involved in the cover-up of the murder. Note that:

Kuznetsov made a show of his friendship with Abakumov. They were constantly seen together. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 216) (IMG)

Note also that Kuznetsov was one of the leaders of the Leningrad Titoists, a network of Yugoslav intelligence agents who promoted Russian bourgeois-nationalism as a means of fomenting ethnic tensions in the USSR, so to pave the way to the partition of the USSR.

By the time of Zhdanov's death, Kuznetsov was already a member of the Central Committee (CC) and a prominent official in the Soviet intelligence allied to Abakumov. The CIA reported:

In 1948, Kuznetsov was transferred ... to the CC as one of its secretaries and Popkov became head of the Leningrad Party organization on the recommendation of Kuznetsov. As Secretary of the CC, Kuznetsov had direct influence on the external political matters of the Communist Party. Everything which was received from foreign rezidentury of Soviet intelligence organizations was sent in one copy to Kuznetsov's secretariat, as well as to Stalin, Molotov, Beriya, and Malenkov. (Background on The Execution of Abakumov and the Leningrad Case of 1949, CIA, January 14, 1955, p. 2) (IMG)

The death of Zhdanov destroyed one of the true comrades of Stalin in the Politburo; Stalin was still able to coopt Malenkov against Beria and Beria against Malenkov, but surely, the death of a true communist loyalist was a blow to Stalin's efforts in ousting the Titoist members of the Politburo. A prominent strategist and fighter against imperialism had fallen. The MI6 killer-doctors' murder of Zhdanov:

on 31 August 1948 signalled the end of the so-called Zhdanov period. After his Death, Malenkov rapidly achieved a high position in official listings of the Politburo, which was generally taken to indicate that he had returned to grace. Malenkov then allegedly initiated a purge of various persons who owed their positions to Zhdanov's influence. (The Zhdanov-Malenkov Relationship, CIA, July 29, 1953, p. 3) (IMG{Greece})

Timashuk again wrote a third letter to Stalin, which was also suppressed by Abakumov in collaboration with his agents Poskrebyshv and Vlasik, who were officially in charge of Stalin's personal self-defense:

In her third, [Timashuk] reiterated the charge about doctors misprescribing for Zhdanov and added a new claim: they used the same method to kill Zhdanov's brother-in-law, Aleksandr Shcherbakov. (...). "How did Abakumov handle the third letter?" I asked Goryshev. "Gingerly. He took it to the Kremlin, to Poskrebyshv." (...). "It was logical for Abakumov to go to Poskrebyshv with the letter," I

said. "I've heard that they get along well." "Oh, they do, Petr Sergeevich, and I venture to say that Abakumov wanted to trade on Poskrebyshev's friendship with General Vlasik. Needless to say, LSUIK comes under Vlasik as the chief of our directorate, and I'm sure you know too that Vlasik and Poskrebyshev enjoy... er, they get together socially."

"So did Poskrebyshev show the letter to the Big Chief [Stalin]?"

"Far from that," [Colonel] Goryshev said. "They agreed that the only thing to do was to suppress all three letters from her and henceforth ignore Timashuk's accusations. Abakumov returned from the Kremlin with a warning to Sled-Chast'."

"A warning?"

"Our Minister [Abakumov] told Sled-Chast', 'If the investigation of the doctors is reopened again, we'll all lose our heads.'" Stalin would see to that.

(‘Inside Stalin’s Kremlin: an eyewitness account of brutality, duplicity, and intrigue’, Petr Deriabin, p. 51) (IMG)

C19S3.3. The Cases of Shcherbakov, Kalinin, Dimitrov, and Choibalsan / The ‘Treatment’ of Thorez

An indication of the political hostilities between Beria and Shcherbakov can be observed in the following excerpt of Sergo Beria’s biography his father:

Shcherbakov ... took leave of us. After he had gone my father said to my mother ‘I never want to see that shit here again.’ (‘Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin’s Kremlin’, Sergo Beria, p. 244) (IMG)

Clearly, Beria did not like Shcherbakov. Note that the above quote from Sergo Beria was under the heading “*The Doctors’ Plot.*” Though not a proof, it is nevertheless a hint of Beria being the one to have eliminated ‘that shit’ – referring to Shcherbakov – who he would ‘never ... see ... again’ after 1945, when Shcherbakov died. In the official CPSU statement denouncing the killer-doctors, Shcherbakov was mentioned alongside Zhdanov as one of the key figures assassinated by those killer-doctors.

Moreover:

In June 1946, Dr. Vinogradov was a member of a panel of physicians who signed the death certificate for President Mikhail Kalinin. He and his colleagues were also reported to have treated Maurice Thorez, the late Georgi Dimitrov of Bulgaria, Communist hero of the Reichstag Fire Trial in Nazi Germany, and the late Marshal Choi Balsan of the Mongolian Peoples Republic. (‘Dr. Vladimir Vinogradov Dies; Soviet Therapist Held in ‘Plot’’, New York Times, July 31, 1964) (IMG)

Dr. Petr Ivanovich Yegorov, the killer-doctor and henchman of Vinogradov in the ‘treatment’ of Zhdanov and Dimitrov,;

had actually been Chief of the Kremlin’s medical directorate, and hence had ... treated at one time or another all of the Politburo members, including Stalin himself, Dimitrov, and Choibalsan. The French Communist press had reported that Vinogradov and another of the accused doctors, Grinstein, had treated Thorez. It is known, for example, that Yegorov treated Kalinin. (The Doctors’ Plot, CIA, July 15, 1953, p. 1) (IMG)

Both Dimitrov and Zhdanov were ‘treated’ by the same CIA-MI6 killer-doctors aiming for the resignation of Stalin for ‘health reasons’. Both Dimitrov and Zhdanov died at around the same time, and both at a relatively young age. Surely, 67 years is old enough, but for a charismatic Bulgarian leader who should have received high-quality medical care, 67 years old is way too young an age to die a natural death. No need to mention Zhdanov’s death at the age of 52, which was certainly a murder, as documented in C19S3.2.

Stalin, too, found these deaths suspicious:

Efim Smirnov, a member of the Academy of Medical Sciences, said he visited Stalin at his Black Sea vacation home before the middle of January 1953 and found him suspicious about the medical care given a former Leningrad party leader, Andrei A. Zhdanov, and a Bulgarian party chief, Georgy M. Dimitrov.

Smirnov said Stalin remarked to him: “One doctor treated them, and both of them died.”

(Stalin Suspicious of Doctors During Last Months of Life, AP Archives, John-Thor Dahlburg, February 4, 1988) (IMG)

The leader of People’s Democratic Mongolia, Choibalsan, was treated by the same doctors and died a suspicious death in 1952. The life of Maurice Thorez too was in danger though the French communist leader ultimately survived – for the while.

C19S3.4. Etinger Dead

As mentioned previously, Etinger had been recruited by a Zionist intelligence network controlled by the American intelligence service, and had a role in the murder of Andrei Zhdanov. Some time in the late 1940s or early 1950s, the Soviet intelligence service arrested Etinger:

Etinger had been arrested not as a doctor, but as a Jew who ardently supported the state of Israel. (‘Stalin’s Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953’, Harper Collins Publishers, Jonathan Brent, Vladimir Naumov, p. 94) (IMG)

Abakumov was the reactionary Beria agent who wanted the Etinger case closed

At the end of January Abakumov told Ryumin to shelve the investigation and assigned him to another case.

It was here that Ryumin took the initiative that would earn him his unprecedented rise. Instead of dropping the Etinger case, Ryumin secretly made twenty-four trips to Lefortovo, interrogating Etinger thirty-nine times, between January 2 [1951] and the evening of March 2 [1951]

(‘Stalin’s Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953’, Harper Collins Publishers, Jonathan Brent, Vladimir Naumov, p. 111) (IMG)

To the benefit of Abakumov, Etinger died in prison:

On March 2, [1951,] Etinger returned from one such unauthorized interrogation to his cell at 5:15 PM, according to the official summary.

He tasted a piece of [poisoned?] bread, made several steps in the direction of the door, and fell unconscious to the floor. (‘Stalin’s Last Crime: The Plot Against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953’, Harper Collins Publishers, Jonathan Brent, Vladimir Naumov, p. 111) (IMG)

This was far from being the first time that a Zionist agent whose confessions would pose a grave threat to Abakumov was being eliminated and silenced. Mikhoels was another one. Another suspected of being so was Wallenberg. Such a case of the Abakumov network eliminating the doctors who could give important confessions was not without precedent. In yet another case, the Abakumov network deliberately tortured some of the doctors so that they would be eliminated, with one dying of supposed ‘pneumonia’:

"That's how it stood after [Timashuk's] first letter," I prompted.

"Yes, but then [Timashuk] wrote the second letter. There was hell to pay considering that Comrade Zhdanov had just died. Abakumov told Sled-Chast' to reopen the investigation and put more oomph into it. This time they threw three doctors in the Lubyanka and gave them a tough going over—you know how Sled-Chast' usually interrogates, Petr Sergeyevich. It was not the toughest going over that can be dished out, but one of the doctors died in jail, they said from pneumonia. Who'd believe that?"

"I don't know anyone who would. Did the doctors confess?"

"No confessions. Nothing. (...)"

(‘Inside Stalin’s Kremlin: an eyewitness account of brutality, duplicity, and intrigue’, Petr Deriabin, p. 49) (IMG)

C19S3.5. ‘Anti-Semitism’? / The Alleged ‘Hate America’ Campaign

All of those doctors were agents of the MI6 agent Beria’s network as well as of the CIA-owned Zionist network led by Chaim Weizmann. Not all of those doctors were ‘Jewish’; some were ‘gentiles’. In fact, the most strategic conspirators from among the doctors, Yegorov and Vinogradov, were ‘gentiles’:

Vinogradov and Yegorov, two of the three Gentiles named by Pravda, were said to be "old agents of British intelligence." Stalin had fired Vinogradov as his personal physician on grounds that he concealed Beria's syphilitic condition. One who did engage in this conspiracy of concealment from Stalin had been the officer heading LSUK, and that was Yegorov. (‘Inside Stalin’s Kremlin: an eyewitness account of brutality, duplicity, and intrigue’, Petr Deriabin, p. 105) (IMG)

The Doctors’ Plot was a conspiracy that involved both ‘Jews’ and ‘gentiles’, with the ‘gentiles’ among them being at the forefront of the medical-terror plots and playing no less strategically significant roles than the ‘Jewish’ conspirators. The ‘gentile’ conspirators fostered close ties to Jewish bourgeois-nationalist intelligence networks. The CIA’s avenue towards these ‘gentiles’ was the Chaim Weizmann network, which closely cooperated with the JDC and the Ben-Gurion faction in Israel. Beria’s avenue of cooperation with them was via the Abakumov network in the MGB, and the ‘Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee’ influenced by the Bundist agents linked to the Second International. Beria was tied to the JDC via Morgenthau and to the Weizmann network via the ‘Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee’. The Soviet purges against CIA-MI6-backed ‘Islamists’ were condemned as ‘oppression of Muslims’, Soviet purges against CIA-MI6-backed Ukrainian fascists were described as ‘Great-Russian Chauvinism’, etc. This time, given that the terror espionage organization was ‘Jewish’ in self-description, the purges were called ‘anti-Semitic’.

The Soviet state emphasized the bourgeois-nationalist feature of the Jews involved in the Doctors’ Plot case, a fact which, as American intelligence admitted, weakens the thesis that the campaign was anti-Semitic. In a telegram to the US Secretary of State in January 1953, US ambassador J. D. Beam admitted that the Soviet government’s emphasis on the ‘bourgeois-nationalist’ character, rather than the possibly Jewish background, of the doctors, indicated that the purges in the USSR and the Peoples Democracies was not out of hostility to Jews and ‘Jews’ as a whole:

Perhaps heavy play given Jewish bourgeois nationalist aspect should cause us [to] re-evaluate Jewish element [in] recent Czech trials.

However, [the] very identification of these groups as “Jewish Bourgeois nationalist” lessens to [a] certain degree [the] hypothesis which has been advanced that anti-Semitism as such is important and [a] growing element [in] Soviet and satellite policy. (MOSCOW EMBTEL 1036 – DOCTORS PLOT, SW:JKS: HMR/15, CIA, Jacob D. Beam, January 14, 1953, p. 2) (IMG)

A CIA document admitted that there were:

no incidents of violence against Jews in the USSR.... (‘1. Resistance Potential and Unrest in the USSR 2. Resistance in Poland’, CIA, date distributed: June 22, 1955, p. 4) (IMG)

Although the CIA document was distributed in 1955, the date of information goes back to much longer and encompassed the entire post-war period including – but not limited to – 1946. In fact, another CIA document, this one dated February 1953, stated:

Another indication of cautious approach is the fact that Ilya Ehrenburg was chosen to make the first attack against Israel and the Zionist movement. What better way to offset the shock in Communist ranks and charges of anti-Semitism from the West than to utilize a well-known Soviet anti-Zionist Jew to launch the attack? (THE JEWISH QUESTION IN SOVIET AND SATELLITE PROPAGANDA, CIA, February 10, 1953, p. 6) (IMG{Israel})

There is no indication that the Kremlin proposes to imitate Hitler in the use of racialist anti-Semitism with the ultimate intention of wiping out the Jews. On the contrary, there are some signs, as the award of the Stalin prize to Ehrenburg, of measures to forestall indiscriminate anti-Semitism. (THE JEWISH QUESTION IN SOVIET AND SATELLITE PROPAGANDA, CIA, February 10, 1953, p. 23) (IMG{Israel})

In spite of this, the Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett, Ben-Gurion’s henchman, instructed his subordinates in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to launch a vicious anti-Soviet slander campaign, explicitly stating that Israel “should not rely on the facts” and instead should “incite” “public tension” for “arousing public opinion constantly and repeatedly” against Moscow. Israel and its agents based in Washington launched a campaign to denounce the USSR and the Peoples’ Democracies as hostile to the Israelites. While acknowledging that the doctors’ plot case in the USSR is a prelude for a purge of “unreliable elements,” the Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett remarked:

Here are my instructions in the matter of Moscow's calumnies

(a) This is not a major line of policy but the result of a general trend to strengthen the regime whether for its own sake or in preparation for war, by means of blood-letting, tightening internal espionage, targeting a scapegoat and laying the groundwork for the mass liquidation of unreliable elements.

(b) Even if for Moscow the libel is of secondary importance, for us it is the crux of the matter.

(c) The libel is the outcome of a deliberate decision, and we should expect more such manifestations and prepare for a prolonged campaign.

(d) We have very few weapons in hand and we should not underestimate the [importance of] arousing public opinion constantly and repeatedly, on the assumption that Moscow is not entirely indifferent to the repercussions of its policy in international public opinion and its influence on people and circles sympathetic to it.

(e) **We should not rely on the facts themselves to maintain the level of public tension; we must constantly incite it.**

Therefore, I favoured from the beginning the initiative for a world Jewish conference to react to the calumnies. This is now the government's stance. The conference should be convened in Paris for greater resonance in Europe. The government of Israel will not

participate in either the initiative or the debates but will send an observer. The conference of the organizations for reparations can serve as a precedent for the composition which should be as broad as possible. The aims of the conference: (1) condemnation and refutation of the calumny in a well-considered, dignified and forceful manner; (2) unification of Jewish public opinion and isolation of the enemies of the Jewish people's (3) an appeal to world public opinion; (4) Let My People Go.

The conference will not go beyond the bounds of demanding rectification of the slander of the Jewish people and its organizations, (voicing) its concern for the safety of the Jewish masses, their protection and the demand for their aliya, the denunciation of hatred of the Jewish people and an appeal to the world to rise up against it. It will not condemn communism as a regime and will not overtly join the political war against the Soviet Union.

(CODED TEE ISA 130.09/2309/12, M. Sharett to the Israeli Embassy in Washington, Tel Aviv, February 2, 1953. In: "Documents on Israeli-Soviet Relations, 1941-1953, Parts 1-2", p. 873. Bold added) (IMG)

Sharett thereby created the ideological basis and the atmosphere which encouraged the assault on the Soviet Embassy. The Soviet Foreign Ministry blamed him for this precise issue. On February 1953, shortly after a terror bombing against the Soviet Embassy in Tel Aviv, the USSR officially broke diplomatic relations with the Zionist regime:

The 20 July announcement that the USSR and Israel have agreed to resume diplomatic relations, broken off 12 February after the bombing of the Soviet legation in Tel Aviv, is the logical culmination of Moscow's reversal of the anti-Zionist campaign which was vigorously pressed during the last months of Stalin's life. (The Beria Purge and Subsequent Soviet Policy, Central Intelligence Agency, July 24, 1953, p. 8) (IMG)

The Soviet campaign against the Japanese-backed pan-Islamists was denounced as 'oppression of Muslims', the Soviet campaign against the Ukrainian Nazi-collaborationists was condemned as Soviet 'anti-Ukrainian chauvinism'. American imperialist propaganda went so ludicrously far as to denounce the Soviet hostility to the American imperialists as a "Hate America" campaign, when in fact the Soviets emphasized that the target was American imperialism and not the people of the United States:

Ambassador Kennan sees a "line of retreat" from the Soviet "hate-America" campaign revealed in Soviet efforts to deny its existence. He believes that the Soviet Union realizes that the hate campaign conflicts with the basic "peace"thesis and might conceivably alienate fellow travelers and intellectuals on the fringe of the Communist movement. Consequently, to retrieve the situation, the Soviet Union is assuming an attitude of "shocked innocence" and protesting its "friendship to the American people."

Comment: The "hate-America" campaign has not abated in intensity in spite of recent attempts to cross it with the theme of "friendship with the American people."

The USSR has in the past proved capable of exploiting two diametrically opposed propaganda themes at one time. The Soviet Union has shown itself increasingly sensitive to American exposures of its hate propaganda, however, and the present denials are probably designed to maintain the effectiveness of the campaign, which would be seriously impaired by exposure of its motives.

(Kennan comments on Soviet denials of the "hate-America" campaign. In: CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN, CIA, August 7, 1952, p. 3. No screenshot.)

The Soviets actively raised the vigilance of the Soviet people against imperialist America, but the 'America' condemned in that context connoted American imperialism, and clearly not the whole country and the people of the United States. The CIA admitted that, along with the campaign to expose American imperialist aggression, the Soviet media was promoting the theme of Soviet friendliness to the people of the United States:

The Soviet Union has been increasingly sensitive of American accusations in regard to its "hate America" campaign. Although the Soviet campaign to "expose US aggressiveness" continues unabated, the new theme of Soviet friendliness to the American people has been added. This theme was given extensive attention at the recent meeting of the World Peace Council in Berlin. (Soviet press denies existence of a "hate-America" campaign. In: CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST, CIA, August 5, 1952, p. 1) (IMG)

And much as how the Soviet campaign against American imperialism was preposterously condemned as a "Hate" campaign against the people of the United States, the Soviet measures not against the good people of Israel but against the conspiracies of the Mossad and its CIA-MI6 handlers, was denounced as "anti-Semitic." Furthermore, rumours that the Soviet Union was hostile to Israel's right of existence as a country are CIA-Mossad slanders. The Soviet dictatorship of the proletariat had much to gain from overthrowing the murderous Zionist regime, to be replaced by a People's Democracy in Israel, but nothing favourable to socialism would have come out of support for the Palestinian chauvinist objective of 'destroying Israel' as a country.

C19S4. The 1949 Leningrad Purge

The CIA reported:

In 1944, Kuznetsov replaced Zhdanov as Party boss in Leningrad. (Background on The Execution of Abakumov and the Leningrad Case of 1949, CIA, January 14, 1955, p. 2) (IMG)

Zhdanov was by then being promoted to a position in the Kremlin. In vast contrast to the Western press depiction of Kuznetsov as a 'Zhdanov protégé', the former in fact belonged to MI6 agent Beria's faction, and was thus hostile to the USSR. Sergo Beria confirmed:

Kuznetsov was very close to my father, contrary to the widely-held idea that he was Zhdanov's man.... My father had already sometimes made use of him during the war. I knew him well.... (...). Kuznetsov sometimes, though very rarely, visited us in Moscow. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 215) (IMG)

In addition:

Despite the post he now occupied, Kuznetsov wanted the Party reorganized. Like my father, he wanted to end the Party's interference in the economy. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 215) (IMG)

Back then, although the proletariat had lost their majority in the membership composition, the Party was still under the influence of a very large percentage of kolkhozniks and proletarians. Party influence over the economy retained a large portion of the influence of the proletariat and kolkhozniks over the economy, whereas the independence of the economic ministries from subordination by the Party would have allowed the corrupt bureaucrats in the economic ministries to take the reins, not be held accountable, and cruise ahead with their corruption campaign.

The Beria-Kuznetsov alliance went back to as early as the days of the Great Patriotic War. At the time, Kuznetsov:

came to see us at the Military Academy, discussed matters with us and attended Party meetings. He was subsequently accused of seeking support from the youth. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 215) (IMG)

The phrase 'seeking support from the youth' refers to a very specific group of young people – Russian bourgeois-nationalists who wanted the Russian SFSR to have a privileged position over other republics in the Soviet Union, hence to foment ethnic tensions and hatred of the Russians among non-Russians. Referring to these particular youth, Sergo Beria recalled:

I remember things said by young men returned from the front, who belonged to Communist organisations in Leningrad, when I was still a student and Kuznetsov was a Secretary of the regional Party committee. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 215) (IMG)

Such Russian bourgeois-nationalist youth asked:

Why did Russia not have its own Party organisation: Why was Leningrad, a cultural, political, and economic centre which might count for more than Moscow, reduced to this humiliating status? ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 215) (IMG)

The attempt to place Russia above other SSRs was a part of the plot to drive a wedge between the other nationalities and the Russians hence to isolate the Russians. Such ethnic tension could help pave the way for the partition of the USSR. As an enemy of the Soviet Union, Kuznetsov was planning to promote such ethnic tensions in the Soviet Union. Supporting Kuznetsov in such efforts was Voznesensky who also held:

ultra-chauvinistic notions.... ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 215) (IMG)

The fact that the Titoists in charge of the Party's Leningrad branch were the agents of Beria is once again testament to the material nonexistence of 'nationalism' in the classless meaning of the term. Beria, a Georgian bourgeois-nationalist who constantly complained about Bolshevik "Russian colonialism" in Georgia, was allied to the Russian chauvinist gang that called for the colonial "superiority" of Russia over the other Socialist Soviet Republics including Georgia. Superficially 'contradictory' chauvinisms, in this case Georgian bourgeois-nationalism and Russian bourgeois-nationalism, are direct allies, for they emanate from the same parasitic classes. The question is not so much whether 'nationalism' in its classless sense can be good or evil; the question rather is whether it can exist beyond imagination; and the answer to the question is that no, 'nationalism' in its classless connotation has almost never bore material existence. Beria the "Georgian nationalist" was so disloyal to the Georgian nation that he allied with the Kuznetsov the Russian chauvinist and Kuznetsov the "believer" in the superiority of Russia allied with a Georgian anti-Russian chauvinist. By the way, so much for Stalin's alleged "agenda" of promoting Greater Russian chauvinism at the expense of the minorities, the Russian chauvinist foes of the Union of the SSRs were being annihilated by Stalin and his comrades.

In 1949, there was an election in the Leningrad Party organization. Although some party members had voted against Popkov, the result of the election was announced as a 'unanimous' vote for Popkov. Two CIA documents confirmed:

In 1949, as a result of the elections which took place in the Leningrad Party organization, Popkov was re-elected as Secretary of the Leningrad Oblast Party Committee. After the secret balloting, the election results were read by the Election Commission (Schmetnaya Kommissiya), which stated that without exception all members of the Party conference had voted for Popkov. A few days later, letters began to arrive at the Central Committee, directed specifically to Stalin, from many members of the party conference, who it seemed, had voted against Popkov and were very surprised at the peculiar results of the balloting. (Background on The Execution of Abakumov and the Leningrad Case of 1949, CIA, January 14, 1955, p. 2) (IMG)

Popkov was up for re-election as First Secretary and Kuznetsov was up for election to the Leningrad Oblast Committee. Several voters cast ballots against the entire slate, but the commission certifying the election felt that it would look more proper if the election was unanimous. They took their problem to Kuznetsov, who told them that it was their affair, thus indirectly countenancing the falsification. (The Execution of Viktor Semenovich Abakumov, CIA, January 25, 1955, p. 4) (IMG)

It seems like Kuznetsov was trusted by some of those who did not know his true face, perhaps because he was wrongly described by the bourgeois media as a 'protégé' of Zhdanov.

At least:

One of those who had voted against the slate then wrote to Stalin informing him that the election had not been unanimous. (The Execution of Viktor Semenovich Abakumov, CIA, January 25, 1955, p. 4) (IMG)

Clearly, the letters of the Party members showed that Kuznetsov, the electoral commission, as well as almost certainly Popkov himself, had committed electoral fraud during the 1949 elections of Leningrad. The communist faction led by Stalin investigated the case:

A special commission, appointed by the Central Committee, was sent to Leningrad to investigate the situation. The commission found that the results of the election had been shuffled with Popkov's knowledge, and that there were all kinds of discrepancies in the work of the oblast Party Committee. (Background on The Execution of Abakumov and the Leningrad Case of 1949, CIA, January 14, 1955, p. 2) (IMG)

Referring to Voznesensky and Kuznetsov, Sergo Beria recalled:

My father had no reason to persecute the two Leningraders; he had other things to worry about. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 215) (IMG)

Kuznetsov and Beria were under careful surveillance by the Soviet intelligence service:

A few days before his arrest, in August 1949, Kuznetsov came to our house. He told us that he knew he was being watched. 'I am, too,' my father replied. 'I advise you to be careful what you say to your friends in the Party.' ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 215) (IMG)

Then,:

Stalin used this charge [of electoral fraud] as the basis for the arrests which followed. Kuznetsov had attended the election as Party representative from the center and was held doubly responsible for the falsification. (The Execution of Viktor Semenovich Abakumov, CIA, January 25, 1955, p. 4) (IMG)

Ruthless purges began as a result of which:

Popkov and some of his responsible assistants who had close relations with him vanished without a trace. (Background on The Execution of Abakumov and the Leningrad Case of 1949, CIA, January 14, 1955, p. 2) (IMG)

Because Voznesensky supported the Yugoslav agents in Leningrad during the purge of Leningrad,:

he [i.e. Voznesensky] went down with them [i.e. Yugoslav agents in Leningrad]. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 216) (IMG)

Voznesensky was responsible for damaging the Soviet economic planning. The CIA confirmed:

Voznesenskiy ... made major errors in economic planning.... (Background on The Execution of Abakumov and the Leningrad Case of 1949, CIA, January 14, 1955, p. 3) (IMG)

Voznesensky, however, was an economist. It seemed unlikely that an economist so knowledgeable as him would 'err' in economic planning, and seemed more likely that his 'errors' were actually a deliberate act of economic sabotage against the Soviet state. A Soviet engineer who defected to the countries of the US-led camp reported hearing that Voznesensky conducted economic sabotage by deliberately presenting false reports about the state of the Soviet economy:

A Soviet engineer who defected from the USSR in 1949, reported hearing that Voznesensky had been removed because he had attempted to deceive Stalin regarding the degree of the fulfillment of the Five Year Plan. (The Balance of Power August 1948 to October 1950, HR70-14, CIA, August 5, 1953, pp. 10-11) (IMG)

In fact, those were not really 'errors' – they were intentional acts of economic sabotage aimed at undermining the industrial backbone to the Soviet military. Like Beria, Voznesensky wanted to reduce Soviet investments into the military:

Voznesensky also understood that we needed to reduce the hypertrophy of the military-industrial complex, which distorted our system, and my father thought well of him for that. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 215) (IMG)

Voznesensky's opposition to the development of the military-industrial backbone:

brought him into conflict with the Party's organs.... ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 215) (IMG)

Even Sergo Beria admits:

Voznesensky did not have the makings of a leader. He would never have been able to head an apparatus or even a ministry. He was, instead, an economist, and his rudeness to his subordinates was not enough to make him a talented administrator. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 215) (IMG)

The fact that Voznesensky's intention in the first place was to undermine the military-industrial backbone of the USSR and that he did indeed 'mistakenly' undermine the military-industrial backbone of the USSR is evidence that the 'mistakes' were deliberate acts of sabotage. Voznesensky was duly demoted, tried, and executed.

Other individuals that were ruthlessly purged were listed by the CIA document:

G. M. Popov, Secretary of the Moscow Oblast Party Committee, and Lt. Gen. I. V. Kovalev, Minister of Communications (sic; Transportation), who like Popov ... used Party funds to build dachy for his mistresses, and finally went so far as ordering a spur-line for his villa on the Black Sea. For the same type of sins, Stalin's personal favorite, Rear Admiral I. D. Papanin, Chairman of the Chief Directorate of the Northern Sear Route, was removed from his post. Papanin soon acquired a taste for the pleasures of social life and built a home, also not with his own money, which, in size, surpassed the estates of great pre-Revolutionary landowners. He had for his own use about ten automobiles, including an amphibious vehicle he had received from the US under Lend-Lease and which he used for duck hunting. To top it all, he ordered the peasants from the nearby collectives to construct a pond for his white swans, for which his wife had a weakness. (Background on The Execution of Abakumov and the Leningrad Case of 1949, CIA, January 14, 1955, p. 3) (IMG)

Note that in the Soviet Union, purges were carried out based on law – not on who was 'Stalin's personal favorite'. The survival of a Party member was not dependent on the Soviet leader's emotions. Of course, Joseph Stalin endorsed the purge of Papanin, upon discovering that the latter was corrupt. **In short, the CIA agrees that the people whom Stalin wanted punished were indeed 'guilty' and that the purges affected guilty individuals 'regardless of their position or rank in the Party':**

Thus, Stalin ruthlessly punished the guilty, regardless of their position or rank in the Party. (Background on The Execution of Abakumov and the Leningrad Case of 1949, CIA, January 14, 1955, p. 3) (IMG)

The communist faction, reliant upon the blue-collar workers in the CPSU and entrenched in many parts of the military and security bodies, was waging the class struggles to entrench its dominance over the state apparatus and to eliminate the corrupt bureaucratic class that constituted the key class base of the Titoists in the Soviet Union.

The corrupt bureaucrats of Leningrad had deep UDB connections as well. In January 1948, Tito's gang in Yugoslavia sent a delegation headed by Milovan Djilas to the Soviet Union. As Djilas wrote in his memoirs, he was politely welcomed by Zhdanov in Moscow, but clearly, Zhdanov and Djilas did not get along much. Djilas recalled:

Even if we had not been idle we still would have wished to see Leningrad, the city of the Russian Revolution and the city of many beauties. I approached Zhdanov concerning this and he graciously agreed. But I also detected a certain reserve. The meeting [with Zhdanov] lasted barely ten minutes. (Conversations with Stalin, Milovan Djilas, p. 166) (IMG)

On the other hand, Djilas was warmly welcomed and could 'get along with' the 'humane' and 'warm' leaders of Leningrad (Popkov and Kuznetsov), who could 'understand the language' of Djilas:

Our encounter with Leningrad's officials added human warmth to our admiration. They were all, to a man, simple, educated, hard-working people who had taken on their shoulders and still bore in their hearts the tragic greatness of the city. But they lived lonely lives and were glad to meet men from another clime and culture [such as Yugoslav leaders]. We got along with them easily and quickly – as men who had experienced a similar fate. Though it never occurred to us to complain about the Soviet leaders, still we observed that these men approached the life of their city and citizens – that most cultured and most industrialized center in the vast Russian land – in a simpler and more human way than was the case in Moscow.

It seemed to me that I could very quickly arrive at a common political language with these people simply by employing the language of humanity. Indeed, I was not surprised to hear two years later that these people, too, had failed to escape the totalitarian millstone just because they dared also to be men.

(Conversations with Stalin, Milovan Djilas, pp. 168-169) (IMG)


The Leningrad leaders were in fact Yugoslav agents – hence Djilas liked them. They leaked intelligence for the Yugoslav delegation:

In January 1948 a Yugoslav delegation led by Milovan Djilas had visited Leningrad and had gotten along well with party leaders there; they had received information from the Leningraders about Soviet internal politics, a leak that had annoyed Stalin. (Rulers and Victims: The Russians in the Soviet Union, Harvard University Press, Geoffrey A. Hosking, p. 254) (IMG)

Again, one ally of the Yugoslav agents in the Kremlin was the Soviet Union's head of the State Central Planning Commission, Nikolai Voznesensky. 'Voznesensky', Sergo Beria recalled,:

supported the Leningraders.... ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 216) (IMG)

Nor was the death toll of the Leningrad so high. A US intelligence file provided a graph of the membership statistics of the CPSU. As can be seen from the graph (to which I added the red line for the reader to more easily see), there was no dramatic decline in Party membership whatsoever. Also, note that alongside the shaded graph, there is the non-shaded zig-zag curve; that one represents the percentage change in Party membership; and for the period of the Leningrad purge, it shows a membership increase. The graph shows that there had historically been considerable declines in Party membership – such as for the period of the Great Purge and the Great Patriotic War – but the Leningrad Purge was not one of them.



Left: the larger part of graph shown by the CIA document. Middle & Right: zooming in on the period of the Leningrad Purge; the zoom shows almost no change in the Party membership. See: (U.S.S.R., National Intelligence Survey, No. 26, CIA, April 1974, p. 7) (IMG{Mortality})

C19S5. The Demotion of Molotov and the Purge of Polina Zhemchuzhina

The arrest of Polina Zhemchuzhina, Molotov's wife, on charges of collaboration with the Mossad appears to have been a conspiracy by the Malenkov network with the objective of forcing the demotion of Molotov. The case against Zhemchuzhina had begun during the Yezhov years, for even during those years she had meetings with Zionist leaders. The cooptation and rise of Beria was utilized as a counter-weight against the undue and baseless suspicion directed against Zhemchuzhina and thus she was saved from a fake 'anti-Zionist' witch-hunt:

In Yezhov's time the Party organs began to compile a dossier on Zhemchuzhina. Malenkov busied himself assembling the items and my father was ordered to investigate Zhemchuzhina's links with the Zionists.

One day Stalin showed him the Central Committee's dossier which proved Zhemchuzhina's anti-Party activity³⁴ and told him to check the accusations, making it plain that they were to be confirmed. 'He did not doubt that I would do as he wished,' my father told me. He examined all the reports, dating back to Yezhov. Zhemchuzhina's only sin was to have helped some Jews. She had indeed met representatives of Zionist organisations, but officially and with the permission of the Politburo, and so of Stalin. They [i.e. the Yezhovites] wanted to make this a crime on her part. 'These charges don't stand up. They only want to organise a provocation against Molotov,' said my father to Stalin, who took his report and did not mention the matter again.

('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 169) (IMG)

Malenkov belonged to the Yezhovite group that assembled the dossier against Polina. During the late 1930s, the case against Polina was dropped. However, in 1949, the allegations against her were raised again. The initiative for arresting Zhemchuzhina came from the enemies of Stalin and Molotov, but neither Stalin nor Molotov voted against such an initiative because she had been discredited. Sergo Beria recalled:

In February 1949 the initiative for Zhemchuzhina's arrest came not from Stalin but from people who were competing for his succession.

('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 169) (IMG)

Furthermore, Zhemchuzhina seemed to not blame Stalin for her imprisonment – or at least her admiration for Stalin implied such:

Molotov loved only Zhemchuzhina, who was herself madly in love, all her life, with Stalin. 'There's a man!' she said to Molotov. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 170) (IMG)

The 'evidence' against Zhemchuzhina rested on her hanging out with Israel's ambassador to the Soviet Union, Golda Meir. Lionized in the West, Golda has been wrongly referred to as Israel's 'Iron Lady'. Yet, anyone with a basic knowledge of Golda Meir would know how weak a woman she was. From Moshe Dayan to Ariel Sharon to David Eleazar, Haim Bar-Lev, and Yitzhak Rabin, no one who knew Golda Meir took her seriously. In fact, the Mapam-Palmach faction in the Israeli state apparatus installed her at the helm of Israel's regime precisely for how mentally weak and pliable, and hence easily controllable, she was. No doubt Polina Zhemchuzhina's too frequent hanging out with Golda was unwise as it could be used to discredit Polina, but it is difficult to imagine precisely how a brilliant Yiddish revolutionary woman like her could be a 'Zionist agent' recruited by a weak woman and loser like Golda Meir. Furthermore, although like most Yiddish women, Zhemchuzhina loved Stalin, she grew critical of Stalin's anti-Zionist and anti-Bundist policy:

During the war Zhemchuzhina took an active part in the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee despite my father's warnings. Later she sharply criticised Stalin's anti-Jewish policy. How could he not understand that the Jewish people deserved help after all they had done for the revolution? Ought the proletarian state not to show its gratitude? Molotov said nothing. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 170) (IMG)

Do the calculations. The narrative aimed at framing up Zhemchuzhina would go like this: "Zhemchuzhina befriends Golda Meir, the head of the Mossad base in Moscow. Agent Zhemchuzhina then begins to promote hostile agitation against Soviet power by calling for Bundist settlement in Crimea, which, during the Third World War, would be used by the fascists as a Yiddish settler-colonial separatist base subservient to Anglo-American imperialism." True, befriending Golda Meir and then pushing for Bundist settlement in Crimea normally does imply intelligence service work for the imperialist secret services. However, in exceptionally rare cases, individuals render services to imperialist secret services not as agents but as 'useful idiots'. Polina Zhemchuzhina was a smart woman and did not have evil intentions, but on this issue, she acted usefully-idiotic in favour of the Zionist intelligence network, thus making a case against herself and leaving Molotov and Stalin no excuse to save her from a frame-up.

The imprudent actions of Zhemchuzhina did not represent Molotov's views:

Molotov dared not say anything to Zhemchuzhina, because he was afraid of her. Knowing her volcanic temper, he feared that she would go and make a scene before Stalin. However, he complained to Stalin.... ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 169) (IMG)

my father revealed to us that Molotov had applied Party policy like an automaton and had had people shot, in great numbers, on the basis of mere suspicion. He told us all that in a quite objective way. He warned my mother that Zhemchuzhina was an independent woman with her own ideas. Molotov put up with this, though his attitude was disapproved of by his Politburo colleagues. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 170) (IMG)

Even though Molotov did not agree with his wife's behaviour, the arrest of Zhemchuzhina in turn made her husband Molotov appear as the 'compromised' 'honey-trapped' husband of a 'Zionist agent'. His 'soft' attitude towards his wife was used as an excuse by the Yezhovite agent Malenkov to depict Molotov as a man 'soft' on American imperialism. Malenkov successfully engineered the demotion of Molotov in March 1949, weeks after the imprisonment of Zhemchuzhina. Molotov was replaced by Vyshinsky, a communist loyalist despised by the Titoist faction. Despite the loyalty of Vyshinsky to the socialist state, the position of the communist forces in the Ministry had undoubtedly become weaker with the ouster of Molotov.

C19S6. The Titoist Faction led by Beria Undermines the Soviet Military-Industrial Backbone / CIA Stance on Consumer Goods vs. Producer Goods

Many harbour the delusion that the development of nuclear weapons by the USSR meant that the USSR did not need to invest in its conventional weapons as much, since the USSR was 'not' going to be invaded ever again. This perspective is incorrect. First of all, having nuclear weapons does not automatically prevent a state from being aggressed; the Georgian regime, an Anglo-American satellites state, invaded the nuclear-armed Russian Federation in 2008. Secondly, the USSR needed conventional weapons in order to undermine the terrorist guerrillas that the CIA and MI6 sponsored inside the Soviet Union, the Peoples' Democracies, and other anti-imperialist allies of the USSR. Thirdly, the USSR needed to develop conventional weapons in order to militarily assist the Vietnamese freedom-fighters, the North Koreans in the Korean War, the anti-imperialist Arabs and Mapamite Hebrews in the struggle against the Israeli regime and the reactionary Arab regimes, the anti-Apartheid activists in South Africa, the Latin American guerrillas. All of these wars in which the USSR was to be covertly involved required conventional weapons. Developing nuclear weapons was crucial, no doubt; but the struggle does not end there. The development of nuclear weapons merely turns direct wars into covert or indirect ones.

Stalin supported investments into conventional weapons as well, whereas his Titoist opponents – Beria, Malenkov, Khrushchev, Mikoyan, and Bulganin – opposed him on this matter. The existence of the intelligentsia as the majority in the CPSU meant that the USSR was going to begin to decline. The was USSR running out of time. In order to counter this tendency to decline, it was necessary that the USSR, for a while, speeds up with the expansion of the anti-imperialist movements worldwide, or else the balance would tilt in favor of the enemies of the USSR and the USSR would implode:

Also, he thought that **time was working in the West's favour**, that the relations of forces was at this moment **as favourable to the USSR as it could be**. So he set himself to prepare, not public opinion but those close to him, by repeating to them that war was inevitable, and that the Americans would start it. He claimed to have documents that proved his assertions. There were indeed American plans for a preventative war. (...). My father tried in vain to prove to Stalin that the Americans were not at all ready to go to war.... ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 233. Bold added.) (IMG)

The mass-scale development of conventional weapons, the multiplication of bombers, tanks and missiles, all our military preparations pointed to the imminent launching of an offensive. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, pp. 233-234) (IMG)

Rushing is usually what the Trotskyites advocate, but in the context of the USSR, a country that was soon to reach its peak and begin to decline, it was necessary to cause as much damage to the imperialist armies worldwide through the conventional weapons, so that through the weakening of the imperialist militaries, the imperialist intelligence services would also have a weaker backbone, hence being less able to penetrate the USSR. Failing to maximize damage during the golden era of the USSR would have only allowed the imperialists to strike the USSR more easily when it had begun to decline.

Beria on the other hand, advocated the surrender of East Germany to West Germany, the decentralization of the economy, and a cut in military spending:

In 1949-50 the decay of our economy because of the age of our infrastructures and the equipment of our basic industries provided my father with an excuse to go back on the offensive. He initiated economic discussions, using the argument of efficiency, which safeguarded him from accusations of ideological deviation. He urged that Germany be reunited at all costs, that our military expenditure and the size of our armed forces be reduced, and that our production of conventional weapons be cut down in favour of concentration on new types of armament. Only an agreement with Germany would furnish the resources needed to rescue our economy. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 227) (IMG)

For this reason, the Beria group gave false data on the production of the military equipment in 1949-1951 in order to undermine the armed forces of the Soviet Union:

Vannikov thought of a stratagem which he proudly explained to my father. The industries controlled by him published production figures that fell short of reality, so that we could freely dispose of the surpluses that did not appear in the official data. Many people knew of this subterfuge, but nobody brought it to Stalin's attention. Unfortunately, it was impossible to apply this system to foodstuffs, a domain in which it was harder to fiddle the figures. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, pp. 226-227) (IMG)

Who was Vannikov? Vannikov was a military general of the Red Army, arrested in 1941 and was supposed to be executed for treason. However, Beria managed to ensure that he survives and that Stalin would be misinformed of Vannikov's death. Later on, when the Nazi Germans invaded, the leverage of the Stalin faction reduced, which allowed Beria to catapult this renegade back to his position in the armaments sector. Thanks to the lobby of Beria, Vannikov was honoured in the USSR, even though he was a traitor:

Vannikov, my father's deputy and the Number Two of the atomic project, was short and thick-set. Intelligent and kindly eyes brightened his big bald head. Three times a Hero of Socialist Labour, he had known many vicissitudes. When he was Commissar for Armaments he was arrested, in June 1941, and condemned to death. My father succeeded in preventing the worst from happening. When war broke out Stalin remembered him. 'What a pity, an intelligent man like him would have been useful today,' he remarked. 'Who knows, perhaps he may have survived somewhere in the camps,' said my father. Stalin was not deceived by this reply and blamed him for it later. A fortnight after this conversation Vannikov was presented to him and he was made Minister. My father thought highly of him. He ... liked me and I kept his confidences to myself. I did not want interference by my father in our relations. Vannikov, who came from Baku, was over 50, and I was 25 years old. He tried to educate me. 'What feelings do you think this regime arouses in me?' he asked. 'I hate it and yet I work for it. And I work honestly. What else can I do?' One day he said to me: 'I soon gave up my career in the Party. I went to Moscow, studied engineering while living from hand to mouth, and got a diploma. But I liked power at that time. Instead of shutting myself up in research I had to go into politics and end up as a Minister. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 181) (IMG)

The Titoist faction led by Beria was aiming to undermine the nuclear power of the USSR so that the Soviets cannot focus on the conventional military after developing their nuclear weapons. The Titoist faction aimed to undermine the conventional arms production of the USSR in order to prevent Soviet arms exports to the anti-imperialist forces. Remember that the anti-imperialist progressive bourgeois-democracy in Syria as well as the Lebanese republic, were all militarily funded by the Stalin-era Soviet Union during the 1940s and 1950s. The People's Democratic Korea especially needed the arms for the war of liberation against Anglo-American imperialism. The undermining of the Soviet conventional arms could utterly decimate the anti-imperialist forces worldwide. It was not just that, however.

The reduction of the amount of weaponry available to the socialist forces would have weakened the dictatorship of the proletariat. Note that the dictatorship of the proletariat is essentially the control of the proletariat over the means of violence. The reduction of the quantity of the means of violence available to the agents of the proletariat would – in relative terms – mean a greater amount of means of violence available to the anti-proletarian comprador forces in the socialist country. A lowering of the quantity of the means of violence available to the dictatorship of the proletariat results in the reduction of the hold of the proletariat over the state and an increase in the influence of the class enemies of the proletariat. Hence, a reduction in the amount of military funds available to the dictatorship of the proletariat results in an increase in the influence of the comprador agents inside the workers' state at the expense of the proletariat.

In the context of the Soviet Union, a reduction in the quantity and quality of the conventional and non-conventional arms of the Red Army would have rolled back the influence of the communist faction of the Red Army while increasing the influence of the Titoist commanders in the Red Army. The weakening of the Soviet military and the weakening of the armed forces of the Soviet allies would have altogether inflicted heavy costs upon the Red Army, thus reducing the funds available for the communist faction of the Red Army. Such a reduction of funds would force the Red Army's communist faction to reallocate funds away from the anti-Titoist secret service struggle onto compensating the military losses. As such, the Titoist faction in the Red Army could gain greater leverage, thus allowing the Beria-led network to systematically demote the communist loyalist commanders in the Red Army, eliminate such commanders, plant Titoist agents in the command of the Red Army, and thereby make the means of violence in the USSR dominated no longer by the agents of the proletariat but by the agents of the comprador bourgeoisie, particularly the corrupt bureaucrats. Through these means, socialism in the USSR could be liquidated and replaced with comprador capitalism.

Beria promised Stalin the hydrogen bomb, not fulfilling the promise until after Stalin died:

We exploded our second bomb in 1951. This was already more than just a copy of the American bomb.¹⁶ To persuade Stalin to be patient my father dangled before him the prospect of something still better - the hydrogen bomb, very much more effective. But he was not in a hurry to explode it. In my opinion, it was ready in 1952 but my father waited till Stalin died before deciding to test it, in July 1953. He knew very well that Stalin wanted to have the H-bomb before the Americans so as to be able to start a war with them.

Stalin began to harass my father and Kurchatov, demanding that they speed up manufacture to the utmost. (It had begun while we were still working on the two previous bombs.) When they both explained to him that at least three or four years would have to pass before the project was complete, he suspected that Kurchatov was hand in glove with my father. Stalin had begun involving himself in the affairs of the atomic committee in 1946, at the time of Malenkov's disgrace, which also marked a weakening of my father's position. It was then that he started to send for scientists.

(Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, pp. 227-228) (IMG)

Beria thus sabotaged the Soviet nuclear program as well. Beria most likely had the bomb ready by 1952. However, he hid it to delay the Soviet nuclear program and to prevent Stalin from purging him, given that the bomb was needed for preventing an Anglo-American imperialist invasion. The early finishing off of the hydrogen bomb would have meant that the defense of the USSR would have been secured insofar as nuclear retaliation capability was concerned, and the USSR could duly focus on the conventional weapons, to wage the Cold War against the Anglo-Americans, as opposed to engaging in a hot war. Developing those nuclear weapons would have given the USSR the deterrence capability that would allow it to stockpile conventional arms for exporting the socialist and progressive bourgeois-democratic revolutions in the areas surrounding the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies. Stalin was not fooled by Beria's 'Hydrogen Bomb' card. He obviously put pressure on the Beria gang although Stalin did not have enough agents to have the capability to pressure Beria to behave properly with respect to the nuclear weapons. Only in 1946, as stated above, did Stalin have such capabilities.

Such measures by Beria were of course supported by the CIA. The CIA promoted the view that consumer goods must be prioritized over producer goods. In other words, the CIA propagated the thesis that heavy industry – the sector that assisted the growth of the military and the consumer goods – shall be de-emphasized. Concerning the civilians of the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies, the US intelligence high command, the National Security Council (NSC), set as its plan:

To stimulate their desire for more consumer's goods by bringing them to realize how rich are the fruits of free labor and how much they themselves could gain from a government which primarily sought their well-being and not conquest. (104. National Security Council Report, Washington, June 29, 1956., NSC 5607, STATEMENT OF POLICY ON EAST-WEST EXCHANGES) (IMG)

The citizens' 'well-being' is a euphemism for consumer goods whereas 'conquest' is a euphemism for military-industrial backbone strengthened through investments into producer goods or heavy industry. The enemies of the freedom forces promoted the reduction in emphasis over producer goods in the Soviet-led camp so to undermine the latter's productive forces. The emphasis over the consumer goods was a demagogical measure in itself, for it did not account for the fact that investment into producer goods actually helps multiply consumer goods, that investments into heavy industry boosts light industry, and that establishing {the means of the production of the means of production} multiplies the rate of expansion of the means of production. In 'The Economic Problems', Stalin famously attacked this view that favoured the consumer goods over the producer goods, light industry over heavy industry. Furthermore, the comprador classes which pushed for the reduction in military-industrial investments in the socialist countries did so as a way of reducing the means of violence available to the agents of the proletariat, so to roll back the influence of the proletariat over the means of violence and hence over the state in general. Such a rollback of the agents of the proletariat would have allowed the expanded influence of the comprador classes, such as the corrupt bureaucrats, over the means of violence and thus over the state in general. Upon gaining influence over the state as a whole, the comprador classes would worked to directly sabotage not only the producer goods and military but also the very consumer goods for which they preached. Remember Sergo Beria's words regarding the Beriaite drive to sabotage food industry: 'Vannikov thought of a stratagem which he proudly explained to my father. The industries controlled by him published production figures that fell short of reality, so that we could freely dispose of the surpluses that did not appear in the official data. Many people knew of this subterfuge, but nobody brought it to Stalin's attention. Unfortunately, it was impossible to apply this system to foodstuffs, a domain in which it was harder to fiddle the figures.'

C19S7.1. Some Purges Prior to the 19th CPSU Congress in 1952

Amy Knight of the CIA front think tank Wilson Center, remarked:

Abakumov's replacement was none other than [Semyon] Ignat'ev, the former associate of the Zhdanov group whom Beria and Malenkov had managed to remove from the Belorussian Secretariat in 1949. (Beria: Stalin's First Lieutenant, Amy Knight, p. 158) (IMG)

Her remarks are true, but in a more complicated manner than would appear. As has been mentioned before, Malenkov and Beria were covertly allies while being 'enemies' on the overt level. Covertly, Ignatiyev was an agent of Malenkov and hence also an agent of Beria. However, on a more overt level, Ignatiyev was an ally of Malenkov and an 'enemy' of Beria. Therefore, on the covert level, Malenkov and Beria did indeed oppose Ignatiyev's rise because Ignatiyev could help in the anti-Beria purges, but on a somewhat more overt level, only Beria opposed the rise of Ignatiyev whereas Malenkov supported Ignatiyev's rise.

Ignatiyev, although a Malenkov agent, was nonetheless useful to the Stalin faction precisely because Ignatiyev was weak, had few connections, and was more susceptible to becoming a docile yes-man of the Stalin faction of the Central Committee in carrying out the anti-Titoist purges against the Beria faction:

When he was made head of State Security in July 1951 Ignat'ev behaved as a docile tool of the Central Committee. (Beria: Stalin's First Lieutenant, Amy Knight, p. 217) (IMG)

During this period, Malenkov, coopted by the communist faction, was compelled to pursue anti-Beria purges.

Stalin coopted Malenkov to undermine Vlasik and Poskrebyshev who were indeed traitors. Malenkov too tried to use his overt-level 'alliance' with Stalin as a channel for intelligence penetration into Stalin's entourage but Stalin prevented this. Sergo Beria recalled:

Doubtless at Stalin's instigation, Malenkov undertook to discredit Vlasik and Poskrebyshev, though they were fanatically devoted to their master. He wanted to replace them with his own men and ordered Ignat'ev to compile a compromising dossier that would show them to be corrupt. It appeared that they used Stalin's name to enrich themselves. Poskrebyshev rushed to my father to seek his help (this man often came to our house and my father put up with him). He proclaimed his innocence, certainly lying. My father replied that he could do nothing, as he was in a much worse situation. 'Have you ever lifted your little finger for me? You can only rely on the wisdom of Iosif Vissarionovich.' Poor Poskrebyshev was ready to climb up to the ceiling. Eventually he was made to retire. Nevertheless Malenkov succeeded only partly in gaining control of Stalin's immediate entourage. He did not manage to infiltrate the Secretariat completely. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 247) (IMG)

For his treason, Vlasik was further demoted to the point of being arrested and sent to the corrective labour example. Timashuk experienced a rise in prestige as well as greater responsibility, while a Soviet intelligence official named Riyumin was promoted:

Because the contents of the report supported facts involving physicians who were attending a number of members of the government, Shtsherbakov [i.e. Shcherbakov] among others, Timashuk's report got into the hands of Vlasik, who was at that time chief of the guard protecting the members of the government. Vlasik wrote on the report the remark "yurunda" (Baloney) and put it on the shelf. This "yurunda" soon made the rounds at the Ministry as a sort of joke. In 1952 one of the operational bosses going over the old reports

happened to pick up the Timashuk report. It just happened a campaign against Jewish elements in the Ministry was on at that time. This colleague again submitted this "overt" report to his superiors and from here it went on up to Stalin. Vlasik was punished for negligence. From house arrest he was transferred to a concentration camp, since at that time he was already on the way out, and replaced by Col Rakov. By order of Stalin himself a "hot time" came for Timashuk. She wrote voluminous "uncovering" material on the Jewish element among the doctors. Investigation of the case was entrusted to a certain Ryumin, promoted after the arrest of Abakumov, and Ryumin handed it to the Central Committee and the former Deputy Minister Ignatiev. Ignatiev held this post when the anti-Jewish campaign started. Ryumin knew how to exploit the case with the whole technical know how of the MVD. ('Committee of State Security / The Doctors' Plot and Its Reversal', CIA, September 24, 1954, pp. 1-2) (IMG)

Some individuals would object by stating that Vlasik was 'framed'. These individuals harbour an erroneous view. Surely, some innocent individuals at the lower ranks of the Soviet government and whom Stalin was not very familiar with could have been framed in Stalin's name and without Stalin's consent. However, Vlasik was very familiar to Stalin. And so, had Vlasik been innocent, Stalin would have gone ahead to support him against the frame-up. Some would object that Stalin might have 'known' that Vlasik was 'innocent', but that he had so little power. This too is incorrect. Stalin had much less power in those years than in the prewar years, but he still had enough power to be able to pursue much of his agenda in the postwar years. Stalin had enough power that even after Stalin's own death, the faction that Stalin had headed managed to purge Malenkov and Beria even though that same Stalin faction also lost to Khrushchev, for historical-material reasons that will be explained later. It follows that while Stalin was relatively weaker, he was not a mere figurehead. Had he been a mere figurehead, he would have been assassinated much earlier, because his enemies could not have tolerated the physical existence of Stalin even as a politically powerless man. Stalin had enough surveillance and intelligence capability to have his faction's intelligence agents to watch out for frame-up of powerful officials around him. And he could save Vlasik. However, Stalin did not save Vlasik from the purge because Vlasik was a vicious traitor to the USSR.

Some would ask the question: why would Stalin not be so vigilant as to prevent his enemies from being in charge of his physical protection in the first place? The question is wrong. Placing one's enemy agents ostensibly 'in charge' of one's own physical protection is often used as a means of demoting those enemy agents from much more sensitive positions such as the heights of the intelligence service and the command of the military down to becoming a semi-figurehead 'in charge' of one's own physical protection. Such a demotion allows for the more sensitive intelligence positions to be filled with one's trusted agents who in turn could more easily surveil the demoted person and semi-figurehead 'in charge' of one's own physical protection. This was the case of Vlasik, who from the top ranks of the Cheka and OGPU was demoted in the 1930s down to the person ostensibly 'heading' the physical protection force guarding Stalin. That such a demotion occurred in the 1930s is clear evidence that Vlasik was an old enemy of Stalin, not an old friend. The real on-the-ground physical protection of Stalin was done by Stalin's trusted and trustworthy guards, the honorable fighters who risked their lives to protect the CPSU General-Secretary; the protection was not done by the crooked Vlasik. Of course, even having such a disloyal element as Vlasik ostensibly 'in charge' of one's personal guards was still risky and was too much, which is why it was high time that Vlasik would be purged. Demoting renegades to being ostensibly 'in command' of those genuinely providing one's physical protection is not unique to Stalin by the way. I know for a fact that it is an intelligence technique used in other countries as well. Of course, one has to ensure that the traitor demoted to being the ostensible commander of the personal protection units really becomes as much of a figurehead as possible, or else there will be room for abuse and assassination.

Purges of the associates of Vlasik, Poskrebyshev, and Abakumov occurred by mid-1952. Purges against suspects encircling Stalin occurred:

- Personal chief of staff and aide in directing MGB activities: position vacant since Poskrebyshev's removal in April 1952.
- Minister of State Security: the inexperienced Ignatyev since April 1952.
- Chief of the Guards Directorate: none since April 1952.
- Personal bodyguards: reduced by half in mid-1952.
- Chief of personal bodyguards: replaced in mid-1952 by a colonel lacking command experience in this specialty.
- Personal chauffeurs and bodyguards: also replaced in mid-1952.
- Personal servants at the dacha in Kuntsevo: cut back in mid-1952.

('Inside Stalin's Kremlin: an eyewitness account of brutality, duplicity, and intrigue', Petr Deriabin, pp. 120-121) (IMG)

The cut in the guards personnel was of course risky because it reduced the troop size for defending Stalin's life; however, even more dangerous was enemy infiltration into Stalin's guards personnel. Hence, the policy of reducing the guards personnel made sense in this context. Many of the guards and officers 'protecting' Stalin were actually unreliable elements and so Stalin decided to reduce the number of his guards:

Up to May 1952 this guard numbered more than 400 persons, actual guards and household attendants. When the commission for re-examining the guard directorate was established in May 1952, Stalin declared that 200 people were enough for his personal guard, and therefore ordered it to be cut in half. However, the actual number who remained from June 1952 until Stalin's death was 250. Of these 250 persons, probably only 60 to 70 were actual physical guards. The rest were chauffeurs, cooks, barbers, gardeners, household servants, and so forth. (CHIEF GUARD DIRECTORATE, CIA, February 25, 1955, p. 7) (IMG)

C19S7.2. The 19th CPSU Congress in 1952 & the Ascendancy of the Titoists to Dominance / The Physical Elimination of Stalin and the Suspicious Deaths of Red Army Commanders

After the Great Patriotic War, Khrushchev formed a closer relationship with MI6 agent Lavrenti Beria:

He thought Khrushchev was crafty and perfidious, extremely dangerous despite his illiteracy. After the war he made a show of passionate friendship for my father, who thought this funny, but eventually let himself be taken by it. Khrushchev never contradicted him openly.

(Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 166) (IMG)

Khrushchev himself had had long-standing friendly relations with British intelligence. He admitted this in his own memoirs:

I will add here only one incident having to do with a left-wing British Labourite. I forget his name. He died three years ago. I was well acquainted with him. He was our good friend, a man of Finnish extraction. He was so devoted to the Soviet Union that the Labourites expelled him from their party. He wanted to come visit us. Stalin who was already ill suddenly took it into his head that this man was an agent, a foreign spy (and during the war he actually had served in the military intelligence). He didn't deny that he had served in British intelligence. And so he was not granted a visa to visit the Soviet Union, although at the time he had been speaking publicly in our favor. Later I met with him, and he said to me: "Comrade Khrushchev, people didn't understand me correctly. I was always your friend. It was

wrong to treat me like that. I will be your friend till the day I die." ('Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev, Volume 3: Statesman, 1953-1964', Watson Institute, Nikita Khrushchev, p. 89) (IMG)

The man whom Khrushchev was describing was a very famous Titoist military-political intelligence officer for the MI6, named Konni Zilliacus. Stephen Shenfield, who translated to English the memoirs of Khrushchev, confirmed that Khrushchev was speaking of the anti-Soviet warrior and MI6 operative Zilliacus:

Khrushchev is referring to the left-wing Labour Party politician Konni Zilliacus (1894–1971). Although Zilliacus served as an intelligence officer for the British interventionary force in the Russian Far East in early 1918, he was opposed to the foreign intervention and undermined it by leaking information about the situation in Siberia to the press. In the interwar period he worked for the League of Nations. Elected to parliament in 1945, he was one of six Labour members who in 1949 voted against Britain joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), leading to his expulsion from the Labour Party and the loss of his seat in 1950. He was readmitted to the Labour Party in 1952 and reelected to Parliament in 1955. He continued to pursue a left-wing line in foreign and defense policy, supporting the movement for unilateral nuclear disarmament and later protesting against the American intervention in Vietnam. See Biographies. [SS] (N. S. Khrushchev, Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev, Volume 3: Statesman, 1953-1964, Watson Institute, p. 90) (IMG)

Konni Zilliacus featured prominently during the Slansky trials in Czechoslovakia:

In 1947, Fierlinger copied Slansky on two letters from Zilliacus, which security later found in Slansky's files. Marginal notes made it clear that Slansky had read them. Slansky had also received some letters through diplomatic means. From 1946 to 1948 he met with Zilliacus three times in the presence of others. (Report on the Murder of the General Secretary, Karel Kaplan, 1990, p. 183) (IMG)

During the Slansky trials (see C15S8), it was alleged by the Czechoslovak government that the MI6-Mossad agent Slansky was working for Konni Zilliacus and had contacts of an intelligence character with him. Regardless of whether or not this specific allegation against Slansky was correct, it was very well-known by the officials of the USSR and the Peoples' Democracy that Zilliacus was a prominent MI6 official. He was regarded as unofficially an MI6 spy-master. For some information on what the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies stated regarding Zilliacus, the reader can refer to the transcript of the trials, the English-language translation of which is available online on archive.org at the time of writing.

Thus Khrushchev, Malenkov, and Beria began to gossip among each other against Stalin:

After our arrival in Moscow some members of the Politburo, such as Malenkov [and] Khrushchev ... who wanted to win my father's approval, started to read to him some disagreeable remarks that Stalin had [allegedly] made about him. Khrushchev said that one day when he was boasting to Stalin about his successes in Ukrainian agriculture the latter had barked: 'Stop boring me with your plantations, like Beria with his rubbish about citrus fruits!' Now my father's citrus fruits were like his own children to him. In cultivating them he had sought a means of consoling himself... My father took the blow. Khrushchev was quite pleased, I thought. When he had left my mother said: 'Don't take that to heart, Lavrenti. He may have made up that story.'

'No, Nina,' my father replied. 'That was no lie. Khrushchev told the truth.'

(Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 145) (IMG)

As was detailed in C9S3, long before 1951, as early as the 1930s, Khrushchev, Malenkov, Beria, Bulganin, and Mikoyan were agents of the same faction, together constituted a network of anti-communist activity, and were closely allied. However, outwardly, they pretended to contradict each other, with some members of the group adopting left-deviationist lines and the other members adopting right-deviationist lines as their outwardly appearance. In 1951, these agents decided to reduce the level of their outwardly contradictions and to mobilize into a more direct and joint confrontation against the Stalin faction. In 1951, Khrushchev, Malenkov, Beria, Bulganin, and Mikoyan consolidated their Titoist bloc to fight against Stalin in the Politburo:

In 1951 the members of the Politburo, Bulganin, Malenkov, Khrushchev and my father began to appreciate that they were all in the same boat and it mattered little whether one of them was thrown overboard a few days before the others. They felt a sense of solidarity once they had faced the fact that none of them would be Stalin's successor.... They therefore agreed among themselves not to allow Stalin to set one against another, and that they would immediately inform each other of anything Stalin said about them, so as to frustrate his manipulations. They recalled their former intrigues and buried their old grievances. Khrushchev told my father that Stalin had asked him for reports on the national question when he was in the Ukraine, though in principle, policy on that matter was still a preserve of the NKVD. This solidarity among the members of the Politburo increased as time went by. They also confided in Mikoyan, who understood the situation. But Stalin's intrigues left traces which were not completely wiped out. It must be said that Stalin constructed his provocations around an element of truth.

After about six months Stalin guessed what was going on and unceremoniously demanded of the members of the Politburo: 'Tell me, are you forming a bloc against me?' He took the steps he thought appropriate and began to meet Ignatiev, the head of the State Security without going through the Politburo.

(Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 239) (IMG)

Malenkov, Khrushchev, and Bulganin were doubtless not so direct with Stalin as my father was, but [Stalin] could have no doubt that my father enjoyed their support. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 247) (IMG)

The consolidation of this bloc, it is worth noting, was also corroborated by Enver Hoxha:

Mikoyan ... plotted with Nikita Khrushchev against Stalin, whom they had decided to murder. He admitted this with his own mouth to Mehmet and me in February 1960. After the putsch they linked up with American imperialism, and set about the destruction to its foundations of the great work of Lenin and Stalin, socialism in the Soviet Union. (The Khrushchevites, Chapter 3, Enver Hoxha)

The alliance between Khrushchev and Beria was completely covert. At the overt level, they were still 'enemies' and Stalin utilized such an overt-level 'hostility' as a means of undermining them. Even during this time, when Khrushchev was completely a covert ally of Lavrenti Beria, Khrushchev, having been coopted by the Stalin faction, was waging the secret service conflict against one of Beria's most important henchmen, Abakumov:

Stalin had appointed Politburo Member Nikita Khrushchev as secretary of the Moscow Party Organization in 1949. Two years later Khrushchev chose to come to the MGB Officers' Club and address several hundred of us Party activists from State Security in the

windowless auditorium. Such a visit was without precedent. Not by chance, Khrushchev's subject was our responsibility to the Party. His underlying purpose apparently was to invigorate CPSU discipline—for which read "loyalty to the aftermath of the arrests of the MGB chiefs in August 1951, the month before Khrushchev spoke. He mentioned our former minister only once during his 45 minutes on the podium. He said that Abakumov had failed to detect "the nationalistic-Trotskyite tendencies" of the Leningrad Party Organization. (...). Khrushchev thus implied that, for this reason, Abakumov, his deputies, and many other MGB officers were being sent to prison. Later the CPSUI Central Committee repeated the charge about Abakumov's "lack of vigilance" regarding the Leningrad Party Organization. This and additional accusations appeared in a secret Central Committee letter that was read aloud to us MGB Party activists a month or two after Khrushchev's speech. ('Inside Stalin's Kremlin: an eyewitness account of brutality, duplicity, and intrigue', Petr Deriabin, p. 58) (IMG)

The key political battle that resulted in the decline of the Stalin faction was the 19th CPSU Congress, the Congress in which the white collar elements in the Party held the largest percentage though not yet the above-50% majority, whereas the blue-collar elements in the Party held a minority. Surely the kolkhoz peasantry bore characteristics very similar to the proletarians and played a role strongly favourable to socialism but it would obviously be an exaggeration to state that the kolkhoz peasantry in behaviour were as 'proletarian' as the proletariat itself. All of these years of emphasis on theoretical work, during the post-war period, all these years of Zhdanovschina, not only was significant for the entire communist movement, but also served as a tool against the political influence of the liberal intelligentsia, who comprised the bulk of the CPSU. It was aimed at discrediting the intelligentsia. However, ultimately, such efforts to cut the intelligentsia to size did not succeed to the level desired, and the intelligentsia continued to dominate the Party. Regarding the dominant role of the intellectuals in the Party Congress, the CIA's Office of Current Intelligence (OCI) acknowledged:

Preliminary analysis of the composition of the delegation and comparison with previous congresses shows that the importance of the intelligentsia in Party affairs is greatly increasing. (Developments in the Soviet Party Congress, Office of Current Intelligence, CIA, October 9, 1952, p. 3) (IMG)

Another report, this time by the CIA's Office of National Estimates (ONE) corroborated:

The base of the Party has been broadened, thereby depriving the industrial proletariat of its membership monopoly. The duties of the members have been increased, but instead of being professional revolutionists, they are now predominantly informers and propagandists. (The Changes in the 1952 Statutes of the CPSU, Staff Memorandum No. 298, Office of National Estimates, CIA, December 19, 1952, p. 1) (IMG)

By the time of the 19th Party Congress, the Stalin faction of the Party was so weak that Stalin was compelled to resign from his position as the General Secretary of the CPSU:

I remember hearing all four of them refer to a statement Stalin had made after the 19th Congress, when he spoke of withdrawing from public life. They recalled that he had already, several years earlier, hinted at retirement, but concluded that, this time, they should call his bluff. ... They toyed with the idea of offering him an honorary position which would allow him to end his days in tranquillity haloed with glory but without real power. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 247) (IMG)

Resignation has always had a twofold character. At times, resignation by a top official can be a means of provoking a revolt against the other officials; in those situations, resignation could help Stalin in specific situations. However, in 1952, the circumstances were different. During the 19th Party Congress, Stalin was encircled by the white collar elements in the Party, which generated the strength of the Titoist faction. For this, and for a number of other reasons, Stalin's resignation was not some kind of a tactic for combatting the Titoists per se, but was an unmistakeable evidence of the sharp demotion of Stalin. As such, Stalin lost:

his positions as CPSU general secretary and de facto chief of State Security. ('Inside Stalin's Kremlin: an eyewitness account of brutality, duplicity, and intrigue', Petr Deriabin, p. 119) (IMG)

Furthermore,:

it is generally agreed that Malenkov dominated the XIX Party Congress. (Politics and the Soviet Army, Office of Current Intelligence, CIA, March 12, 1954, p. 3) (IMG)

Malenkov, by then the real General Secretary of the CPSU, gave the report of the Central Committee, a report which had been given by the former General Secretary Stalin in the previous congresses:

The increased importance accorded to the regional Party secretaries, as demonstrated in their election to the leading Party organs, reemphasized Malenkov's key position. Since the basis of their selection appears to have been more their personal qualifications and connections than the significance of the geographical areas which they represented, it is highly probable that they owed their advancement to Malenkov. ... The Congress itself was apparently dominated, at least indirectly, by Malenkov since it was he who delivered the keynote address, i.e., the "report" of the Central Committee, which at past congresses had been given by Stalin. (INDECISION AND STRESS 1950-1952, CAESAR – 8, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), August 21, 1953) (IMG)

To put it simply, **Stalin had no real official position in the USSR from October 1952 onwards**. He was simply broadly 'the leader of the Soviet Union' but there was no government position he held. As Sergo Beria stated in the above quote, the Beria-Malenkov-Khrushchev-Bulganin-Mikoyan bloc 'toyed with the idea of offering [Stalin] an honorary position which would allow him to end his days in tranquillity haloed with glory but without real power.' Stalin's leadership of the Soviet Union from late 1952 onwards was merely an informal leadership through an informal network of friends and agents who fought the secret service conflict on his side against the Beria-led bloc.

Malenkov, an agent of Beria, was by then the real leader of the USSR. The new Party composition indeed would have generated someone like Malenkov as the new head of the CPSU. The white-collar elements in the Party were the largest minority – hence promoting Titoism – but they were not a majority, let alone an overwhelming majority, meaning that the communists of the Stalin faction still had some influence. And Malenkov – being covertly a Beria agent, but overtly an 'ally' of Stalin – reflected precisely the condition of the Party composition. Overall, through Malenkov, Titoist influence over the high level of the Party leadership increased. Crucially, as a result of the loss of his position as the General Secretary of the CPSU, Stalin no longer had control over the Soviet counter-intelligence apparatus. And a leader without a counter-

intelligence service resembles a head without eyes. Nor were the unofficial network that he had through his comrades in the armed forces able to help him much, because this unofficial network had been severely damaged as a result of the Great Patriotic War. Indeed,:

Stalin ... would have liked to get rid of the other four [Beria, Malenkov, Khrushchev, and Bulganin], but he was no longer in control of all the levers of power. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 243) (IMG)

Without such 'Eyes', without a powerful network of intelligence agents, Stalin was soon to lose his life as well, and the communists in the high ranks of the Soviet military were to undergo a period of demotion. Already, as a result of the 19th Party Congress, Leonid Govorov, a well-known ally of Zhdanov, was omitted from the list through a supposed 'oversight':

The first of a series of peculiar events involving military personalities occurred two weeks after the publication of the list of Central Committee members at the close of the Party Congress. On 30 October 1952, a special announcement was made by the Party Secretariat to the effect that Marshal L. A. Govorov had been elected a candidate member but had been omitted from the list through an oversight. Such an error is almost unheard of in the USSR, in view of the importance of these listings, so that the explanation given can scarcely be accepted. It has been suggested that Govorov's belated appointment indicates that he represented a faction which had been side-tracked at the Congress but had begun a strong fight to regain its position immediately afterwards. Govorov, Inspector General of the Soviet Army since January 1947 ... was closely associated with Zhdanov in the defense of Leningrad during World War II and was one of four chief orators at Zhdanov's funeral in September 1948, speaking on behalf of the Ministry of Armed Forces. (Politics and the Soviet Army, Office of Current Intelligence, CIA, March 12, 1954, p. 3) (IMG)

If Govorov, as a remnant of the Zhdanov group was passed over at the Congress, he must have had exceedingly powerful backers to have had his name added to the list. (Politics and the Soviet Army, Office of Current Intelligence, CIA, March 12, 1954, p. 3) (IMG)

Pay attention to the following part of the above quote: 'It has been suggested that Govorov's belated appointment indicates that he represented a faction which had been side-tracked at the Congress but had begun a strong fight to regain its position immediately afterwards'. Again, this very much reflects the conditions of the 19th Party Congress, because the white-collar elements held the upper hand as a dominant minority, but there was still hope for the blue-collar elements in the Party. This is also why Stalin was able to go ahead with some of his plans after the Party Congress, but he succeeded only partially:

Stalin ... had important plans for the 19th Party Congress, which was held in October 1952, but he was unable to complete them fully. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 242) (IMG)

One move initiated by the Stalin faction during the 19th Party Congress was the enlargement of the Presidium. Stalin, Sergo Beria recalled, had to be satisfied with creating an enlarged Presidium of 25 members and 11 deputies, which was to provide him with support for the coming purges. In order to intimidate the Politburo and the Central Committee, he started to talk about 'strengthening the Cheka,' and bringing Chekists into the Central Committee. He praised 'Cheka methods' and so on. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 242) (IMG)

Titoist agents Malenkov, Bulganin, Khrushchev, Mikoyan, and Beria together constituted 5 out of the 9 members of the Politburo. More members in the Politburo would have helped Stalin put the Titoist Bloc members in a minority position, thereby helping him to carry out the purges against the Titoist conspirators. Stalin particularly promoted communist and communist-coopted elements. **Stalin's plan was to promote Malenkov against Beria, Khrushchev against Malenkov, and Brezhnev against Khrushchev. That Khrushchev, Malenkov and Beria were covertly allies, and that Brezhnev was an agent of Khrushchev, was a definitive fact. However, on the overt level, they opposed each other, and they could be used against each other.** That is why Stalin brought Brezhnev to the high ranks:

In August 1951, after Ignat'ev's appointment, several new men, all associated with Khrushchev, suddenly appeared in the MGB: A. A. Epishev, a party secretary in Ukraine, and I. T. Savchenko, also from the Ukrainian party apparatus, became deputy ministers of State Security; V. E. Makarev, a former Moscow party official during Khrushchev's tenure there in the 1930s, became chief of the MGB Personnel Department. In addition, a lesser official named N. R. Mironov, who had served in the Ukrainian party apparatus under Khrushchev's protégé Leonid Brezhnev was brought to Moscow to work for the MGB. (Beria: Stalin's First Lieutenant, Amy Knight, p. 158) (IMG)

The next stage was to unfold a few months later, with ... Khrushchev suffering the same fate. No great problem there. Stalin would have left no witness in place. He would have got rid of the old Politburo and promoted new people, idiots like Brezhnev. After winning the Third World War he was determined to correct all the 'mistaken' interpretations of historical events which had been current in the West. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 243) (IMG)

Many people make the mistake that Brezhnev himself was a 'great communist' and a staunch anti-Titoist. Actually, the facts show that Brezhnev was a Khrushchev agent, but on the overt level, the line that Brezhnev was promoting was very favorable for the Stalin faction against Khrushchev, Malenkov, Beria, Bulganin, and Mikoyan. This is why Stalin himself during his lifetime, and the remnants of the Stalin faction after Stalin died (e.g. Vasilevsky and Shtemenko and people close to them) promoted Brezhnev in the overt-level struggles.

Stalin also resisted against revisionist pressures by encouraging communists outside the USSR to pursue global revolutionary class struggle against imperialist reaction:

It is not impossible that Stalin's speech at the 19th Party Congress, directed to the foreign Communist parties, was designed to supply to non-Soviet Communists what the new CPSU constitution fails to offer: the spirit of world revolution and the assurance that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union will remain the source of world revolutionary strength and inspiration. (The Changes in the 1952 Statutes of the CPSU, Staff Memorandum No. 298, Office of National Estimates, CIA, December 19, 1952, p. 2) (IMG)

As in the past, Stalin wanted to expand the Soviet military in order to wage the covert war against the imperialists through the anti-imperialist anti-colonial liberation movement. His enemies – Sergo Beria included – slandered such a campaign of his as to mean that Stalin wanted to launch a Third World War, even though the CIA confirms that he did not. Opposition to the Soviet military and Stalin's line regarding the expansion of the Soviet military in the covert conflict against the Anglo-Americans, was more powerful than ever by 1952. Sergo said:

I must emphasise that opposition was very much stronger in 1952 than it had been in 1945. If Stalin had decided at that time to conquer all Europe my father could not have stopped him, whereas in 1952 the group opposed to war was much more numerous, organized, and more resolute. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 247) (IMG)

Stalin had, in 1952, a plan of action for the years ahead. He had defined his objectives and the means to obtain them. He was perhaps less interested in current affairs precisely because he was concentrating all his efforts on his grand design. He was neither senile nor mad. Until the last months of his life Stalin was in good physical condition and his mind and will were intact. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 242) (IMG)

There indeed existed the obvious correlation between the anti-Stalin opposition, the plot to demote and murder the Soviet Red Army generals, and the plot to undermine the Soviet armed forces. Referring to Stalin's attempt to build up Soviet military, the former head of KGB archives Mikhail Poltoranin said:

This actually has to do with why they killed Stalin. (Churchill Had Stalin Killed, US Bombed Russian Far East in 50s - Top Russian Official (Video - Mikhail Poltoranin), Russia Insider, May 17, 2018. I watched the video I which Poltoranin made this remark. The video is available online. However, the screenshot of the transcripts from a 'pro-Russia' website has been provided) (IMG)

Whereas Stalin had lost much influence over the Soviet counter-intelligence and did not have a powerful unofficial intelligence network, Beria held the upper hand in this respect:

In 1952, my father felt able to face up to Stalin. (...). Although my father did not control the security organs he had men in place who kept him informed of whatever was happening. All, and above all, he had his own intelligence network which was not dependent on any existing structure. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 246) (IMG)

The coming of the doctors' plot was no coincidence. The same network of doctors that had operated against Zhdanov, was now to target the generals Govorov, Shtemenko, Vasilevsky, Konev, and Stalin. All of these generals and Stalin were allied to each other and were at odds with the Beria faction. Referring to Vasilevsky, Shtemenko, and Konev, a working paper of the CIA staff noted that:

all three had been close associates in the military ministry at Moscow after 1948. (Politics and the Soviet Army, Office of Current Intelligence, CIA, March 12, 1954, p. 5) (IMG)

Furthermore, it is well-known that Vasilevsky had been a close comrade of Stalin:

Marshal Vasilevsky, Minister of War prior to the 1953 reorganization ... served in the Stavka under Zhukov during World War II and therefore had been quite close to Stalin. (Politics and the Soviet Army, Office of Current Intelligence, CIA, March 12, 1954, p. 5) (IMG)

Konev and Shtemenko are actually well-documented to have been foes of Beria, and comrades of Stalin. This has also been documented by Deriabin who wrote:

Deputy Minister of Defense Konev and Armed Forces Chief of Staff Shtemenko – were enemies of Beria. He had tried to undercut them with Stalin by relaying rumors about their disloyalty. Beria's failed effort irked Stalin in the case of Shtemenko, who was his favorite military officer. When the German Army marched to the outskirts of Moscow in 1941, Stalin and Shtemenko bunkered together two levels below ground in the Kirovskaya subway station; the rest of the General Staff stayed in a command post one level below ground in the Byelorussian metro station. ('Inside Stalin's Kremlin: an eyewitness account of brutality, duplicity, and intrigue', Petr Deriabin, pp. 104-105) (IMG)

As such, Shtemenko, Konev, and Vasilevsky formed a network of Soviet generals who sided with Stalin against Beria. To them was added the top Zhdanov protégé, Govorov. The 'accidental' omission of Govorov from the Party's electoral list was no coincidence. Regarding Govorov and Konev, the CIA further reported:

Govorov and Konev ... both are believed to have enjoyed the full confidence and trust of Stalin. (CAESAR 12: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN POLITICAL STATUS OF SOVIET ARMED FORCES, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), September 20, 1955, September 20, 1955, p. A-2) (IMG)

The 19th Party Congress, through the reduction of Stalin's influence over the Soviet counter-intelligence afforded the Beria faction the excellent opportunity with which to reduce the security of the communist generals in the Red Army and then pave the way for their deaths. A CIA report stated: doctor-plot ... made top military leaders its chief target. (POLITICS AND DOCTRINAL DIFFERENCES AMONG THE SOVIET MILITARY ELITE, CIA, The Research Series of the 'Foreign Broadcast Information Service', Propaganda Report, July 27, 1955, p. 14) (IMG)

Referring to the killer-doctors arrested, Deriabin wrote:

the accused and Beria seemingly cooperated. ('Inside Stalin's Kremlin: an eyewitness account of brutality, duplicity, and intrigue', Petr Deriabin, p. 104) (IMG)

The following excerpt of the book by Sergo Beria confirms that the Doctor's Plot case was directed against Beria. In the section headlined, the "The Doctors' Plot," Sergo Beria confirmed this. He wrote:

The Doctors' Plot

My father was at bay. Our second alert came at the end of 1952. 'This time, you know, it's irreparable,' he said to me. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 243) (IMG)

Almost at the same time, the purge of the Beria agents in the Mingrelian clan in Georgia was taking place. Sergo Beria continued:

While in Moscow they were denouncing ... the doctors, in Georgia a parallel campaign was being waged against the Mingrelians. One day my father came in with a stack of newspapers and said to me: 'Here, read. You'll gain from it for your study of Soviet politics. Don't forget one thing: these two affairs are aimed at me and therefore at our family' He was not expressly named as the guilty man, but he knew from his contacts that every accused person was interrogated regarding his relations with my father and about any orders received from him. Stalin was assembling a dossier and waiting for the right moment to bring it into play. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 244) (IMG)

Sergo added:

The doctors concerned were divided into two categories, the British spies and the American spies. All the Jewish doctors, described as British spies, were alleged to be Beria's men. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 243) (IMG)

Sergo Beria was expressing the matter in a somewhat distorted matter. Not all of those doctors were Jewish; many were so-called 'gentiles' if we may use that term. The killer-doctors did work for so-called 'Jewish' intelligence services – the Weizmann network, the JDC, the Mossad – but they also worked for so-called 'gentile' intelligence services such as the CIA, MI6, as well as the Abakumov network in the MGB. Simply put, the 'Jewish'

and 'non-Jewish' killer-doctors worked for 'Jewish' and 'non-Jewish' intelligence agents. What feature of the purge of the killer-doctors, then, resulted in the CIA-MI6-Mossad media to highlight the 'Jewish' aspects of those doctors, and to loudly denounce the purge as 'anti-Semitic'? Equivalently, in most of the previous anti-CIA anti-MI6 purges too, the purges against the 'pan-Islamists' were condemned as 'oppression of Muslims', the purges against Tsarist priests were condemned as 'oppression of Christians', the purges against the Ukrainian fascists were condemned as 'Great-Russian Chauvinism', etc. Whereas in the other cases, Islamists, Ukrainian bourgeois-nationalists, Georgian bourgeois-nationalists, etc. were used by the CIA and MI6, in this case, the CIA-MI6 used Zionist and Bundist networks to carry out such hostile anti-Soviet activity. The Soviet media this time mentioned the 'Jewish' anti-Soviet intelligence networks, hence why the purge of the killer-doctors was condemned as 'anti-Semitic'. As far as are concerned the accurate allegations of the Beria-MI6 connections pointed out by Sergo Beria, Sergo was not wrong – on this issue, the CIA agent Deriabin backed up Sergo Beria's remarks:

The alleged involvement of British intelligence pointed toward sharpening another nail for Beria's coffin. Before he joined the CPSU, and before the Soviets overthrew the Mussavat government ruling Azerbaijan in 1920, Beria was an employee of the Mussavat police. Separately, Pravda claimed that the Mussavat government "operated under the control of British intelligence organs." ('Inside Stalin's Kremlin: an eyewitness account of brutality, duplicity, and intrigue', Petr Deriabin, p. 105) (IMG)

This:

case against the "saboteur-doctors" was Stalin's last stand. If the case mushroomed into a purge that destroyed rivals, Stalin would have been restored to his positions as CPSU general secretary and de facto chief of State Security. ('Inside Stalin's Kremlin: an eyewitness account of brutality, duplicity, and intrigue', Petr Deriabin, p. 119) (IMG)

The launching of the Doctors' Plot Case was the means by which the communists in the Red Army sought to launch a resistance against Beria. During the period of the media campaign regarding the Doctors' Plot,:

Konev ... wrote a denunciation accusing some doctors of wanting to send him to the other world. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 243) (IMG)

Such a campaign of denunciations was a part of a broader vigilance campaign aimed at keeping the communist personnel of the Soviet state on high alert and ready for mobilization against the Titoist faction. Stalin had a habit of using such vigilance-raising measures.

It was clear that the Doctors' Plot was a prelude to a Great Purge, if such a thing would have been possible again. Sergo recalled:

To [the Doctors' Plot Case] was added the Slansky affair in Czechoslovakia. I was with Vannikov when we heard the news on the radio, on 22 November 1952. He commented 'It's set out like in 1937'. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 243) (IMG)

In 1952, Stalin began to purge 'Beria's men' so to eventually get to purge Beria. Sergo recalled:

'But why didn't he dismiss you along with ... Mikoyan?' I asked. 'That was a tactical maneuver,' my father replied. 'He fears to confront me openly because he fears that I might resist. (...)' (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 243) (IMG)

The rise of the Eisenhower Administration in the United States resulted in the further deterioration of the international situation. Like Eisenhower, Truman was a staunch supporter of international fascism as well. However, Truman also had no choice but to be partially accountable to the Democratic Party. The Democratic Party had in it many individuals belonging to the Truman faction, but a significant segment of the Democratic Party was made up of the remnants of the Roosevelt faction, which drew its support directly from the working class 'Democrat' voters. As such, Truman had no choice but to be accountable to these Roosevelt faction agents to some extent. With the successful ouster of Truman and the rise of Eisenhower, the pro-fascist elements in the United States gained greater strength. Like Truman, the Truman-era CIA leaders were also pro-fascist but they too were accountable to the agents of the Roosevelt faction from the Democratic Party. With the ouster of Truman, these CIA leaders were replaced by Allen Dulles, a pro-fascist CIA boss who was less accountable to the Roosevelt faction. In any case, with the rise of the Eisenhower-Dulles group, US imperialism was able to operate more aggressively on a global scale.

In this midst, some may ask: would it not have been better, for the sake of the Soviet Union and all the oppressed masses, to assassinate Beria so that the freedom movements would be saved? Such a question has idealist presuppositions, and emphasizes the role of Beria as an individual and fails to account for the great mountain of agents upon whom Beria relied. Such a question therefore is devoid of a historical materialist analysis. No, Stalin should not have tried to assassinate Lavrenti Beria because (1) Beria would be replaced merely by another Beria agent, (2) assassination plots, under the risk of being discovered, would have brought Stalin and the USSR into disrepute as 'state terrorist', and (3) assassinating Beria was extremely difficult to carry out in the first place, for Beria had numerous agents that would have informed him of the terror plot, thus allowing him to foil it. Even the assassination of not just Beria but also Malenkov, Mikoyan, Khrushchev and Bulganin would have merely replaced them with other Titoist renegades who had countless agents in the Soviet state and had the support of the white collar elements in the Party, the elements with the greatest percentage in Party membership composition. The best avenue and the only possible avenue was to undercut the material base of these renegades in the Party and state apparatus, and then to go after those renegades and purge those renegades legally.

Sergo Beria wrote:

I asked my father if we should wait like sheep going to be slaughtered. 'Things won't go that far,' he replied. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 244) (IMG)

Beria prepared himself and his family for a fight and flight respectively:

My father had learnt to foresee Stalin's actions and reactions, in small matters and great, with infallible precision, because he had studied his behaviour in detail and knew what his aims were. In small matters as in great, Stalin's tactic was the same. My father told me that the operations against himself that had started some time earlier had entered a new phase and a direct attack was becoming possible: 'Now it is not just me anymore,' he added. 'Your mother and you are also targeted. I know that statements against me have been collected, showing me as an enemy and a wrecker. I will take the necessary measures so far as I am concerned. As for you, I suggest that you make friends with the crews of the test aircraft. In case of necessity, when I give you the signal, take with your mother and your family. Otherwise he will destroy you all.' (...) I was in a state of shock. It stunned me to learn that Stalin was preparing to get rid of my father. 'Doesn't he realise that you are devoted to him?' I stammered. 'Where did you get the idea that I was devoted to him?' he replied. 'The age of vassals and suzerains is past. Many times I have had to act under constraint. Now, though, he has gone too far. One

is devoted to someone because one loves him or because one shares his ideas. How can you think that I am devoted to Stalin? No question of that.' (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 238) (IMG)

In the meantime, Stalin himself was far more careful:

Stalin was now in greater isolation than ever in his Kremlin office. Bodyguards noticed that after Pravda printed the saboteur-doctors story on January 13, Stalin behaved more cautiously than ever before. He ceased entertaining leaders at his dacha in Kuntsevo, he had Guards officers employ more stringent security measures for his trips by limousine between Kuntsevo and the Kremlin, and he received Politburo members only in his Kremlin office, never seeing Beria alone. Stalin, it seemed, feared that revealing his intentions about the purge intensified his opponents' incentives to assassinate him. ('Inside Stalin's Kremlin: an eyewitness account of brutality, duplicity, and intrigue', Petr Deriabin, p. 121) (IMG)

The fact that Stalin was really careful not to show up much in public during those last weeks of his life was because he was being extremely cautious to protect his life.

Behind Stalin's back, Lavrenti Beria began a campaign of 'violently criticizing' the line of Stalin. Sergo wrote:

I have the very clear impression that in 1952 my father acted so to make Stalin realise that he would not let himself go like a lamb to the slaughter but was ready to declare open war on him should Stalin decide on his liquidation. (...). Previously he had been extremely cautious ... but now he began violently criticizing Stalin's policy.... (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 245) (IMG)

Of course, the goal of such 'violent criticizing' was to rally the high-ranking officials of the Soviet state against Stalin. At the same time:

They led us in the MGB to believe that in the Politburo as well as in State Security, Stalin had lost the struggle with Beria. (...). I imagine Beria putting forward two arguments to persuade a majority of Politburo members to join him in a rebellion against Stalin. The first argument would have been this: Stalin intended the purge to envelop the entire Politburo old guard – Malenkov, Khrushchev, Bulganin, Voroshilov, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, and Molotov besides Beria. After that, and following his pattern of the past, it was only a matter of time before Stalin purged some or all of the 16 new members whom he appointed in October 1952. To cancel the purge, the eight old guard members (including Beria) needed five new members for a majority of 13 votes to 12 (including Stalin's). Assuming a democratic process at work in the Politburo, Beria won a majority over to his side, against Stalin."

Second, Politburo members needed no persuasion that Stalin should not repeat the pattern of past purges. Where Politburo members needed persuasion was on the point that Stalin could not repeat the pattern. Beria may have argued that Stalin had lost the capability to conduct a purge because he no longer controlled the MGB – Beria did.

('Inside Stalin's Kremlin: an eyewitness account of brutality, duplicity, and intrigue', Petr Deriabin, p. 119) (IMG)

By February, the tide in the political struggle turned fully in the favour of Lavrenti Beria. Indeed:

From late January through February 1953 the indications of a drastic shift in power accumulated. ('Inside Stalin's Kremlin: an eyewitness account of brutality, duplicity, and intrigue', Petr Deriabin, p. 119) (IMG)

Red Army commanders close to Stalin were politically (and most likely, physically) eliminated one after another:

Beria's foe and Stalin's favorite general, Armed Forces Chief of Staff Colonel General Sergey Shtemenko, also lost his job in February. The Politburo took this action at the insistence of Beria, after consultation with former Defense Minister Bulganin. Only later did Stalin learn of it. In addition, the Politburo fired Minister of Public Health Dr. Yefim Smirnov, who had been serving simultaneously as Stalin's personal physician.

Lieutenant General Nikolay ("Fat Kolya") Spiridonov and Major General Petr Kosynkin had been commandant and deputy commandant, respectively, of the Kremlin Kommandatura since 1939. Of the two, General Kosynkin was on more intimate terms with Stalin. He spent less time supervising Kommandatura subordinates than standing at Stalin's elbow and fulfilling his requests for personal services.

The obituary for Kosynkin said that he died "unexpectedly" of a heart attack, in the line of duty, on February 17.3 On the next Saturday I happened to see Colonel Nosarev's deputy for Kommandatura Personnel-Security as we left the main MGB headquarters building. Hailing this lieutenant colonel, I caught up with him, and we walked together for a block or two.

"Too bad about Comrade Kosynkin," I said.

"Yeah, too bad. It hit Colonel Nosarev and me pretty hard."

"Well, it's a severe blow to the Big Chief too, I often saw Comrade Kosynkin opening the car door when the Big Chiefs limousine drove up to the Council of Ministers building.

"Yeah, Comrade Kosynkin was always there," said the lieutenant colonel.

"And almost always the Big Chief would smile at him and say a few words. By the way, was it known that Comrade Kosynkin had a heart condition?"

('Inside Stalin's Kremlin: an eyewitness account of brutality, duplicity, and intrigue', Petr Deriabin, p. 118) (IMG)

Deriabin added:

Kommandatura Deputy Kosynkin, who died in mid-February, had been a Stalin loyalist.... ('Inside Stalin's Kremlin: an eyewitness account of brutality, duplicity, and intrigue', Petr Deriabin, p. 120) (IMG)

Shtemenko was demoted in 1952:

Of the 5 military officers (Shtemenko, Konev, Vasilevski, Levchenko, and Govorov) who figured in the doctors' plot, ... Shtemenko seems to have suffered a definite decline in position. As he was removed from his post as Chief of Staff of the Army in the autumn of 1952.... He was elected an alternate member of the Central Committee in October 1952. He was reported in East Germany from roughly October 1952 to April 1953, and was last seen at the May Day celebration in Moscow in 1953. (CAESAR 12: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN POLITICAL STATUS OF SOVIET ARMED FORCES, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), September 20, 1955, pp. A-1 to A-2) (IMG)

Konev too was demoted:

Govorov in 1946 had become inspector general of the armed forces, which position was taken over by Marshal Konev from 1950 to 1952. Konev was sent from Moscow in 1952 to the Carpathian Military District, and it is not known whether Govorov regained his former position of inspector general at that time. (CAESAR 12: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN POLITICAL STATUS OF SOVIET ARMED FORCES, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), September 20, 1955, p. A-2) (IMG)

It should be obvious enough that the demotion of a military general is a step for making them be considered as less important and hence reducing a lower allocation of guards for personal defense – hence a step to assassination. Beria managed to promote one of his agents in the Red Army Artemiyev:

In 1952, my father ... had not sat with folded arms but had put his men into key posts. He had appointed one such to head Moscow Military District, Artemiev, who had previously commanded the frontier guards. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 246) (IMG)

Although Stalin was healthy enough to continue leadership, the killer-doctor Vinogradov, an agent of Beria, advised Stalin to desert his post for 'health' reasons:

[Stalin's] personal physician, Professor V. N. Vinogradov had advised that Stalin step down as head of the government for health reasons. (Surg Neurol Int. 2011; 2: 161., Published online 2011 Nov 14., Stalin's mysterious death, Miguel A. Faria) (IMG)

Beria of course ultimately sought to eliminate Stalin. However, Beria and his bloc could not officially unseat Stalin due to his overwhelming popularity throughout the USSR:

Explaining the removal of "the beloved leader" to the Party and to the public at large presented grave difficulties. The Politburo had to be prudent in letting it be known that Stalin had been unseated—to disclose the mutiny clumsily might stir up violence and cause the shedding of Politburo blood. Telling the truth was not feasible—to declare at this time that the doctors' plot was a fabrication by Stalin might open Pandora's box. Not only would the truth raise questions about the legitimacy of the post-Stalin regime, the truth could spark a counterrevolution against everyone in the Kremlin, including Stalin, or a counterrevolution led by Stalin against his successors. While it sought a solution, the Politburo had no choice but to keep Stalin on as the titular head of the Party and government. ('Inside Stalin's Kremlin: an eyewitness account of brutality, duplicity, and intrigue', Petr Deriabin, p. 120) (IMG)

Thus, the only realistic way remaining for Beria was to assassinate Stalin under the cover of 'natural' death. As the plot against Stalin was being hatched, it was necessary for Beria to maintain grip on the medical staff. Hence, the influence of Beria in the medical staff of the Kremlin and the armed forces increased:

Tretyakov succeeded Smirnov as minister in February 1953. Under Beria's auspices, Kuperin replaced the imprisoned Yegorov as head of LSUIK prior to March of that year; until then he had been chief of the MGB's own medical office. The names of the "best medical personnel" attending Stalin didn't include those of his personal physician Smirnov nor his predecessor, Vinogradov, who had been jailed with Yegorov. ('Inside Stalin's Kremlin: an eyewitness account of brutality, duplicity, and intrigue', Petr Deriabin, p. 232. The book by Deriabin was published by his son Petr Deriabin Jr. This quote is from the 'Notes' section of the book, written by Deriabin but added to the book by Deriabin Jr. in the final version of Deriabin's book.) (IMG)

Stalin's personal physician and the chief of the Armed Forces General Staff were both dismissed in February 1953. Also, during that 21-month period the number of Stalin's bodyguards was cut in half, many of his personal staffers were reassigned, and the inexperienced Ignatyev took charge of the Guards Directorate. Gradually the means for protecting Stalin's life had withered.

In the 30 years since Stalin had been named CPSU general secretary, the quality of MGB protection for his life was never worse than toward the end of February 1953. The stripping of Stalin's personal security and his increased vulnerability were apparent. ('Inside Stalin's Kremlin: an eyewitness account of brutality, duplicity, and intrigue', Petr Deriabin, pp. 120-121) (IMG)

Deriabin further remarked:

Stalin could not be permitted to live, I believe, due to the risk that he would attempt a counter coup. The Politburo, therefore, overthrew Stalin in February 1953 to avert a purge. Stalin's timely death was the solution – Beria's, Malenkov's and possibly others' – to the problem of disposing of the deposed Stalin. ('Inside Stalin's Kremlin: an eyewitness account of brutality, duplicity, and intrigue', Petr Deriabin, p. 131) (IMG)

Corroborating Deriabin, Sergo recalls that his father Lavrenti Beria specifically said the following in reference to Stalin:

It will be better for him to die. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 249) (IMG)

Khrushchev confessed a very important piece of information about Saturday, February 28, 1953. That night, Stalin was a guest at a dinner party; and that dinner party was hosted by the members of the Titoist-Terrorist Bloc: Beria, Khrushchev, Malenkov, and Bulganin. Subsequently Stalin's good health radically deteriorated.

On the evening and night of Saturday, Feb. 28, to Sunday, March 1, he [Khrushchev], Malenkov, Beria and Bulganin were in Stalin's company. They saw a movie at the Kremlin, then went to the Blizhny dacha and drank until 5 or 6 in the morning. (THE DAYS OF STALIN'S DEATH, New York Times, Harrison E. Salisbury, April 17, 1983) (IMG)

The CIA spy Petr Deriabin remarked:

According to Khrushchev, on Saturday night Stalin was host to Beria, Malenkov, Khrushchev, and Bulganin at a late dinner party in Stalin's dacha, and his illness began following the dinner party. (Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Petr Deriabin, pp. 126-127) (IMG)

The British Empire's naval intelligence officer Ian Grey wrote:

Death came suddenly. On the evening of Saturday, February 28, 1953, Malenkov, Beria, Bulganin, and Khrushchev had dined at Kuntsevo. Stalin had been in a good humor, and the evening had been jovial. When Sunday, March 1, passed without his usual call, summoning them or discussing business by telephone, all were surprised.

(...). Later Sunday night, the duty officer of the guard telephoned Malenkov, Beria, Bulganin, and Khrushchev at their dachas. Stalin had not rung for his dinner. He feared that something had happened, but the guards did not dare to go into his room. All four rushed from their dachas to Kuntsevo. Voroshilov and Kaganovich were summoned. When they gained entrance to his room, they found Stalin lying fully dressed on a rug. He was in a coma.

(Stalin, Ian Grey) (IMG)

Stalin was poisoned with cyanide. That was when his conditions began to deteriorate, leading to his death.

This is confirmed by Mikhail Poltoranin, the former head of the KGB archives during the Yeltsin Era, who had studied the archives on the conditions of Stalin's death. Below is an excerpt of the transcript of his interview:

INTERVIEWER: Was Stalin poisoned?

POLTORANIN: Yes he was

INTERVIEWER: Are you making an official statement, as the person who used to head the committee on declassifying KGB archives, under Yeltsin?

POLTORANIN: Yes

-Joseph Stalin was poisoned?

POLTORANIN: Joseph Stalin died an unnatural death.... (...).

INTERVIEWER: So who was it that killed Stalin?

POLTORANIN: So listen... (...). Then there were the statements of various officials – there was Enver Hoxha, when Mikoyan came to visit a Hoxha congress – [Hoxha] made a statement that the leadership of the USSR are 'cynical conspirators'

So the likes of Mikoyan traveled the world and bragged about the way they killed Stalin. When I went to look into it myself, what actually happened...

INTERVIEWER: The archives themselves?

POLTORANIN: Yes, the materials themselves...

INTERVIEWER: So what's being hidden from us? What's being hidden from us is that Stalin was poisoned. That it was special operation, which was prepared over a long time.

POLTORANIN: Because by then, a new number of people from Stalin's close circle had already been removed; Poskrebyshev, Vlasik, the Kremlin commandant [Kosynkin] strangely died - who was very close to Stalin. Then (Lavrentiy) Beria appointed a new head of the Kremlin clinic [Kuperin], responsible for all medicines.

In February, 1953 – Stalin began to feel unwell at his holiday home. [Maybe] from a drink of water, or he used to wet his finger when he turned pages – he used to read a lot – maybe that's how it got in... we don't know...

But we do know what the blood and urine samples showed. Well, firstly there was an enlarged liver – this shows toxicity. His leucocytes were four times the norm. This is the white blood cell that fights against toxins.

He experienced vomiting with blood in it, and his skin was a bright pink color with dark patches under the arms, etc...

INTERVIEWER: Was it cyanide? What was the medicine he was given?

POLTORANIN: We looked through his medical log, all his checkups were in it. He was a healthy guy – he had mild first stage hypertension and some rheumatism in his knees.

INTERVIEWER: And nothing else?

POLTORANIN: And nothing else...

And all of the sudden these symptoms are documented. But a conclusion whether he's poisoned – it wasn't written. But there was one person, professor Ruskov, who carried out the anatomical examination of Stalin's body – and he wrote a report to [Kuperin,] the new head of the Kremlin clinic. The new one, that Beria had appointed. He wrote that Stalin was poisoned. Poisoned by cyanide, cyanic acid. All the symptoms pointed to that – and when the body was examined, his airways and mucus membranes were damaged with dots of cyanic acid. Three days after the report – this person died.

INTERVIEWER: Professor Ruskov?

POLTORANIN: Yes. But not only did he die – his house was searched and all the documents in it were destroyed. But, through insufficient diligence, although the majority of his documents on Stalin were destroyed, Ruskov had another copy of the report.

INTERVIEWER: So a copy remained intact elsewhere? And you've had that in your own hands?

POLTORANIN: Yes, I read it with my own eyes. So there you go....

(Churchill Had Stalin Killed, US Bombed Russian Far East in 50s - Top Russian Official (Video - Mikhail Poltoranin), Russia Insider, May 17, 2018) (IMG)

Faria published an article based on the findings of Russian author and researcher Edvard Radzinsky. Tukov, Starostin, Lozgachev, and Khrustalev were three of Stalin's bodyguards in his dacha. Radzinsky interviewed or asked questions from Starostin and Lozgachev, who were still alive.

According to Starostin's testimony:

Stalin gave an order [to the guards] he had never given before.... Stalin told his servants and guardsmen in the words of Tukov, "I'm going to bed. I shouldn't be wanting you. You can go to bed too." (Surg Neurol Int. 2011; 2: 161., Published online 2011 Nov 14., Stalin's mysterious death, Miguel A. Faria) (IMG)

However, Lozgachev testified in an interview with Radzinsky:

it was not Stalin who gave that unusual order but another guardsman, attachment Khrustalev, who had left the dacha at 10:00 a.m. on March 1. Only then was Khrustalev relieved by the aforementioned guards, Starostin, Tukov, and Lozgachev. (Surg Neurol Int. 2011; 2: 161., Published online 2011 Nov 14., Stalin's mysterious death, Miguel A. Faria) (IMG)

More specifically, according to Lozgachev:

Before leaving [the guards] that morning, Khrustalev told them: "Well, guys, here is an order we've never been given before. The Boss said, 'Go to bed, all of you, I don't need anything. I am going to bed myself. I shouldn't need you today.'" To Radzinsky, there was more here than meets the eye, and he clarifies the situation, "To be precise, [Lozgachev] heard it not from the Boss but from the attachment Khrustalev, who passed down the order, and left the dacha the next morning." (Surg Neurol Int. 2011; 2: 161., Published online 2011 Nov 14., Stalin's mysterious death, Miguel A. Faria) (IMG)

Khrustalev was a Beria agent:

Radzinsky posited that after Nikolai Vlasik, Stalin's ... longtime bodyguard, had been arrested and implicated in the contrived Doctors' Plot as well as the developing purge of the MGB, Beria, in an act of personal survival, recruited Khrustalev, a bodyguard strategically placed in Stalin's current personal attachment. (Surg Neurol Int. 2011; 2: 161., Published online 2011 Nov 14., Stalin's mysterious death, Miguel A. Faria) (IMG)

The guards noticed a suspicious silence from Stalin, as Lozgachev said:

The next day was Sunday. At ten, as usual, we were gathered in the kitchen, just about to plan things for the day. At ten there was no movement that was the phrase we used when he was sleeping. And then it struck eleven — and still no movement. At twelve — still none. That was already strange: usually he got up between 11 and 12, but sometimes he was awake as early as 10. Soon it was one — still no movement. His telephones may have rung, but when he was asleep they were normally switched through to other rooms.

‘Starostin and I were sitting together and Starostin said: ‘There's something wrong. What shall we do?’

And indeed, what were we to do — go in to [help] him? But he had always told us categorically: if there was ‘no movement’, we were not to go in. Or else we’d be severely punished. So there we were, sitting in our lodge (connected with his rooms by a 25-meter corridor), it was already six in the evening, and we had no clue what to do. Suddenly the guard outside rang us: ‘I can see the light in the small dining room.’ Well, we thought, thank God, everything was OK. We were all at our posts, on full alert, ready to go, and then, again... nothing. At eight — nothing. We did not know what to do. At nine — no movement. We did not know what to do. At nine — no movement. At ten — none.

(Surg Neurol Int. 2011; 2: 161., Published online 2011 Nov 14., Stalin's mysterious death, Miguel A. Faria) (IMG)

Then, the guards decided to enter the room, with Lozgachev leading the way:

I [Lozgachev] said to Starostin: ‘Go on, you go, you are the chief guard, it's your responsibility.’ He said: ‘I am afraid.’ I said: ‘Fine, you’re afraid, but I’m not about to play the hero.’

At that moment some mail was delivered — a package from the Central Committee. And it was usually our duty to hand over the mail. Mine, to be more exact. ‘All right, then,’ I said. ‘Wish me luck, boys’. (...).

Well, I opened the door, walked loudly down the corridor. The room where we put documents was right next to the small dining room.

(Surg Neurol Int. 2011; 2: 161., Published online 2011 Nov 14., Stalin's mysterious death, Miguel A. Faria) (IMG)

Then:

I [Lozgachev] went into that room and looked through the open door into the small dining room and saw the Boss lying on the floor, his right hand out-stretched...like this [here Lozgachev stretched out his half-bent arm]. I froze. My arms and legs refused to obey me. He had not yet lost consciousness, but he couldn’t speak. He had good hearing, he’d obviously heard my footsteps and seemed to be trying to summon me to help him. I hurried to him and asked: ‘Comrade Stalin, what's wrong?’ He’d wet himself and he wanted to pull something up with his left hand. I said to him: ‘Should I call a doctor?’ He made some incoherent noise — like ‘Dz...Dz...’ (Surg Neurol Int. 2011; 2: 161., Published online 2011 Nov 14., Stalin's mysterious death, Miguel A. Faria) (IMG)

Lozgachev recalled:

On the floor there was a pocket-watch and a copy of *Pravda*. And the watch showed, when I looked at it, half past six. So this had happened to him at half past six. On the table, I remember, there was a bottle of Narzan mineral water. He must have been going to get it when the light went on. While I was talking to him, which must have been for two or three minutes, suddenly he snored quietly... I heard this quiet snoring, as if he was sleeping. (Surg Neurol Int. 2011; 2: 161., Published online 2011 Nov 14., Stalin's mysterious death, Miguel A. Faria) (IMG)

The guards phoned ‘everybody’:

I picked up the receiver of the house phone. I was trembling and sweat beading on my forehead, and phoned Starostin: ‘Come to the house, quick.’ Starostin came in, and stood dumbstruck. The Boss had lost consciousness. I said: ‘Let's lay him on the sofa, he's not comfortable on the floor.’ Tukov and Motia Butusova came in behind Starostin. Together, we put him on the sofa. I said to Starostin: ‘Go and phone everybody, and I mean everybody.’ He went off to phone, but I did not leave the Master. He lay motionless, except for snoring. Starostin phoned Ignatiev at the KGB, but he panicked and told Starostin to try Beria and Malenkov. While he was phoning, we got an idea — to move him to the big sofa in the large dining room. There was more air there. Together, we lifted him and laid him down on the sofa, then covered him with a blanket — he was shivering from the cold. Butusova unrolled his sleeves. (Surg Neurol Int. 2011; 2: 161., Published online 2011 Nov 14., Stalin's mysterious death, Miguel A. Faria) (IMG)

Beria, in particular, responded very late.

At that point Starostin got through to Malenkov. About half an hour had gone by when Malenkov phoned us back and said: ‘I can’t find Beria.’ (Surg Neurol Int. 2011; 2: 161., Published online 2011 Nov 14., Stalin's mysterious death, Miguel A. Faria) (IMG)

Beria deliberately let Stalin die, for Beria himself had been the engineer of the assassination of the former General Secretary, as will be shown later.

While knowing that Stalin was deeply ill, Beria pretended that nothing had happened and that Stalin was ‘only’ sleeping:

Another half hour passed, Beria phoned: ‘Don’t tell anybody about Comrade Stalin's illness’. At 3 o’clock in the morning, I heard a car approaching.”

At this point, Radzinsky notes that it had now been four hours since the first phone call and many more hours since Stalin had been struck down by the sudden illness, and he had been lying there without medical assistance all that time. Malenkov and Beria finally arrived without Khrushchev.

(...). Malenkov's shoes creaked. And I remember how he took them off and stuck them under his arm. He came in: ‘What's up with the Boss?’ He was lying there, snoring gently... **Beria swore at me, and said, ‘What are you panicking for? The Boss is sound asleep. Let's go, Malenkov!’ I explained everything to him, how he’d been lying on the floor and how he could only make inarticulate noises. Beria said to me: ‘Don’t panic, and don’t bother us. And don’t disturb Comrade Stalin.’** And they left.

(Surg Neurol Int. 2011; 2: 161., Published online 2011 Nov 14., Stalin's mysterious death, Miguel A. Faria. **Bold added.**) (IMG)

L. Beria confidently told his son Sergo that Stalin would soon cease to be, according to Sergo himself:

My father had plans which he had formed years earlier. I did not see him during those days. (...). Two or three days later he came to lunch and told me that Stalin would never return to political activity, even if he recovered. (Beria: Inside Stalin’s Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 249) (IMG)

The doctors arrived:

And again, I was left alone. I thought I should call Starostin again and have him alert everybody again. I said: 'If you don't, he'll die, and our heads will roll. Phone them and tell them to come.' (...). The doctors arrived between 8:30 and 9:00 A.M."

([Surg Neurol Int.](#) 2011; 2: 161., Published online 2011 Nov 14., Stalin's mysterious death, [Miguel A. Faria](#)) (IMG)

By then, Faria adds:

Thirteen hours had now passed without Stalin receiving any medical assistance. ([Surg Neurol Int.](#) 2011; 2: 161., Published online 2011 Nov 14., Stalin's mysterious death, [Miguel A. Faria](#)) (IMG)

The official conclusion by the Titoist doctors was that Stalin had hemorrhage:

The doctors were all scared stiff... They stared at him and shook. They had to examine him, but their hands were too shaky. To make it worse, the dentist took out his dentures, and dropped them by accident. He was so frightened. Professor Lukomsky said, 'We must get his shirt off and take his pressure.' I tore his shirt off and they started taking his blood pressure. Then everybody examined him and asked us who was there when he collapsed. We thought, that was it, the end. They'll just put us in the car and it's goodbye. But no, thank God, the doctors came to the conclusion that he'd had a hemorrhage. Then there were lots of people, and, actually, from that moment we did not have anything to do with it. I stood in the door. People — the newly arrived — crowded around behind me. I remembered [MGB] Minister Ignatiev was too scared to come in. I said, 'Come on in, there is no need to be shy.' That day, the second of March, they brought Svetlana." ([Surg Neurol Int.](#) 2011; 2: 161., Published online 2011 Nov 14., Stalin's mysterious death, [Miguel A. Faria](#)) (IMG)

Deriabin, who had his own theory on the way that Stalin was murdered, concluded in definitive sentence form:

I conclude that Beria was responsible for the death of Stalin, Malenkov was his accomplice, and Khrushchev and Bulganin were accessories after the fact. ('Inside Stalin's Kremlin: an eyewitness account of brutality, duplicity, and intrigue', Petr Deriabin, p. 131) (IMG)

The evidence presented above – how Beria sought to delay the treatment of Stalin, Beria's desire that Stalin dies, the actions of the Beria agent Khrustalev, the changes in the Kremlin clinic, etc. – all leave no doubt as to Beria's role in the murder of Stalin.

Sergo Beria himself explicitly states that he does not rule out the likelihood of L. Beria assassinating Stalin, since L. Beria had nothing to lose:

But my father knew that he no longer had anything to lose. It was possible only to sacrifice oneself in assassinating Stalin. My father being neither a coward nor a sheep walking submissively to the slaughterhouse, I do not rule out the possibility that he may have thought of doing something like that. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 246) (IMG)

As early as 1949, the relations between Stalin and Beria got 'colder' and Stalin expected terrorist attacks from Beria:

I don't think the relations between them [Stalin and Beria] worsened as the result of a particular episode. It was a slow process which remained for a long time hidden from third parties. Stalin became more and more polite and formal with him, which was a clear sign of increasing alienation. Beginning in 1949, he allowed his hostility to show in a wider circle, while my father began to express himself more frankly about Stalin in conversation with me. He was irritated that he could no longer contain himself. His nerves were frayed. (...). I think there is only one word that described what my father felt in those days: hatred. Stalin was hateful to him because he expected a death-blow to come from that quarter at any moment.

(Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 237) (IMG)

Molotov recalled that Beria dropped the following hint about killing Stalin:

While on the rostrum of the Mausoleum [where Stalin and Lenin were buried] with him on May 1, 1953, he did drop hints. (...). He said, "I did him in!" – as if this had benefited me. Of course he wanted to ingratiate himself with me: "I saved all of you!" (Molotov Remembers, Feliks Chuev, p. 237) (IMG)

According to Enver Hoxha, shortly prior to his death, Stalin had said straight to their faces that they 'will sell the Soviet Union' once he dies:

Such elements as Khrushchev, Mikoyan, Beria and their apparatchiki hid the truth from Stalin. In one way or another, they misled and deceived Stalin. He did not trust them, therefore he had told them to their faces, ". . . when I am gone you will sell the Soviet Union."

Khrushchev himself admitted this. And it turned out just as Stalin foresaw. (The Khrushchevites, Enver Hoxha, Chapter 1)

When Stalin died, Beria made sure that all the incriminating documents were eliminated.

Between March 2 and 5, when Stalin died, members of his inner circle were dividing the spoils of power. Beria had already gone through the Kremlin vault and removed incriminating documents. ([Surg Neurol Int.](#) 2011; 2: 161., Published online 2011 Nov 14., Stalin's mysterious death, [Miguel A. Faria](#)) (IMG)

This was hinted at by Poltoranin as well:

Beria appointed a new head of the Kremlin clinic, responsible for all medicines. (...). But there was one person, professor Rusakov, who carried out the anatomical examination of Stalin's body – and he wrote a report to the new head of the Kremlin clinic. The new one, that Beria had appointed. He wrote that Stalin was poisoned. Poisoned by cyanide, cyanic acid. All the symptoms pointed to that – and when the body was examined, his airways and mucus membranes were damaged with dots of cyanic acid. Three days after the report – this person died. Three days after the report – this person [Rusakov] died. (...). But not only did he die, his house was searched and all the documents in it were destroyed. But, through insufficient diligence, although the majority of his documents on Stalin were destroyed, Rusakov had another copy of the report. (Churchill Had Stalin Killed, US Bombed Russian Far East in 50s - Top Russian Official (Video - Mikhail Poltoranin), Russia Insider, May 17, 2018) (IMG)

Beria destroyed almost all documents that incriminated him and his Titoist clique for killing Stalin. Immediately after the murder of Stalin, the guards and officers protecting him and all of those around him who could provide more details on the circumstances of the death of Stalin were dispersed throughout the Soviet Union. The CIA reported:

Following the death of Stalin, the Guard [protecting him] was cut down to some extent again and personnel engaged in guarding Stalin were either dismissed or transferred to the provinces. (...). Guard Directorate No. 1 [the Guard Directorate responsible for the physical defense of Stalin] was liquidated after Stalin died. (...). After Stalin's death the Central Committee of the Communist Party issued instructions to the effect that all members of Stalin's personal guard were to be given other jobs but that none of them was to remain in

the MVD in Moscow. [T]he reason for this order was that the Politburo and especially Malenkov were glad that Stalin died and they wanted his memory to die with him. Therefore, they did not want any rumors or legends about the details of Stalin's personal life circulating in Moscow.

Ordinary workers, such as gardeners, were simply given their work-books and released. All officers and persons who had had access to Stalin were given jobs in the provinces. A very few, however, managed to stay in Moscow but not in the MVD.

(CHIEF GUARD DIRECTORATE, CIA, February 25, 1955, pp. 6-7) (IMG)

Beria's agent, Khrustalev, died mysteriously:

'They got rid of everybody. They'd summon you and send you away from Moscow, 'leave the city immediately and take the family with you'. Starostin, Orlov, and Tukov decided to go and see Beria. To ask him not to send them away. So they went into his office, and he said: 'If you don't want to be out there, you will be down there.' And he pointed down to the ground. So away they went. (...). Khrustalev fell ill and died soon after... Orlov and Starostin were given jobs in Vladimir, and I stayed at 'the facility' — the facility was empty, with me as superintendent. It was handed over to the Ministry of Health.... That was the end of the nearer dacha." (Surg Neurol Int. 2011; 2: 161., Published online 2011 Nov 14., Stalin's mysterious death, Miguel A. Faria) (IMG)

It is likely that Khrustalev died naturally, that Beria aimed to use Khrustalev well after Stalin's death. However, there is a small though significant probability that Khrustalev 'had' to die so that incriminating evidence on Stalin's death would be eliminated.

The doctors' plot case was quickly dropped and the Titoist General Zhukov had a rise in prestige:

In the days before Stalin's death top military leaders were drawn into the conflicting currents of Soviet politics, at least as symbols and probably more substantially, by the 13 January 1953 announcement of a thwarted assassination plot on the part of seven doctors. All the intended victims named in the "disclosure" of the plot were from the ranks of the top marshals, generals and admirals. Whatever the intended consequences of the doctor-plot for the military leadership, they were apparently nullified by Stalin's death. The doctors were exonerated on 4 April 1953, and in the following months some members of the military group whose prestige had been enhanced by the announcement of the plot seemed to decline in authority. Konev, one of the highest-ranking targets, dropped from public view. Zhukov, previously in disfavor, became a First Deputy Defense Minister; his name began appearing prominently at receptions in early April 1953, although during Stalin's reign the military had been represented chiefly by the inactive Budenny. (POLITICS AND DOCTRINAL DIFFERENCES AMONG THE SOVIET MILITARY ELITE, CIA, The Research Series of the 'Foreign Broadcast Information Service', Propaganda Report, July 27, 1955, p. 1) (IMG)

C19S8. The Vigilance Campaign *** IMG-All-{Democratization}

In the USSR, the importance of security and intelligence studies were frequently emphasized. A US intelligence document provides a useful summary of the vigilance campaign and intelligence studies in the USSR. As correctly stated by the CIA document, the entirety of the Soviet people – especially the inexperienced youth – were consistently encouraged to learn intelligence matters. Pravda reminded the Soviet people that the class struggles in the USSR had not ceased and that they were rather manifested in the form of struggles against saboteurs and enemy agents.

According to the CIA document, a Soviet media broadcast implied that the economically corrupt bureaucrats are a comprador bourgeois class serving the enemy, even if they may not be outright agents of the enemy. Other Soviet media documents that I personally read and were not mentioned in the CIA document also emphasized the fact that corrupt bureaucrats belong to the category of comprador bourgeoisie, not national bourgeoisie. While it would be slanderous to refer to all corrupt politicians as automatically and necessarily imperialist spies, there is no doubt that many of them were. Furthermore, all corrupt oligarchic bureaucrats in anti-imperialist countries belong to the category of the comprador bourgeoisie and feed off of espionage networks, even if they themselves would not be spies.

The Soviet media highlighted the absolutely crucial point that embezzlers and corrupt bureaucrats in anti-imperialist countries constitute a variant of the comprador bourgeoisie as opposed to the national bourgeoisie, even if they may appear as national bourgeoisie. Far too often, this critically important point is missed. Far too often, some half-backed 'anti-imperialists' start arguing that corruption concentrates wealth into the hands of a new class of oligarchs and thus a new 'national-bourgeois class' 'emerges' and so the corrupt oligarchs of the anti-imperialist country will supposedly seek to 'expand' this country's industrial production. Far too often, liberals and left-wing reactionaries attribute corruption to the anti-imperialist faction of anti-imperialist states and fail to acknowledge that corrupt politicians all without exception belong to the pro-imperialist fifth column in anti-imperialist states, even if some genuinely anti-imperialist politicians may appear superficially 'allied' to corrupt politicians, and even if some genuinely corrupt bureaucrats repeat the correct anti-imperialist narratives.

Another highlight of the excerpts of the CIA document is that it refers to a book by a prominent Soviet author on intelligence studies, Vladislav Minayev. The CIA presents some of the highlights of Minayev's work. The CIA document does not mention that Minayev's works also mentioned the intelligence activities of Tito's fascist group in favor of the Gestapo and Anglo-American intelligence.

Anyways, here are excerpts of the CIA document:

The vigilance campaign still gets heavy play on the [USSR's] home service, and is exploited indirectly in a variety of contexts ranging from agricultural shortcomings to embezzlement of state funds and immorality in private life. School teachers are enjoined to imbue their young students with a sense of "watchfulness," Komsomols and nonpartisan youths are urged to read available publications on "how to recognize the enemy within" and Party organisations throughout the country are advised to make screening of applicants for membership more thorough than has been the case heretofore. Political vigilance, like charity, begins at home, that is within the ranks of the Communist Party, according to ZARYA VOSTOKA of 3 February. The party is the most coveted organization in the Soviet structure; spies and diversionists "of every stripe" (vsekh mastei) would like to worm their way in for "espionage and sedition" purposes. (...).

In a double page PRAVDA article on revolutionary vigilance broadcast on 6 February, Kozhev declares that the "recently unmasked disgusting group of corrupt Jewish bourgeois-nationalists" provides additional proof, if any were needed, that intensified political vigilance must become second nature with every citizen of the Soviet Union. (...). Reminding the Soviet people that there can be no two views on the current international situation, Kozhev admits that different opinions on the subject have been voiced by "ill-starred politicians" ... "dogmatists and scholastics".... Some of them "even went so far as to say" ... that the USSR was no longer threatened by imperialism thereby implying that relaxation of vigilance was in order. Such "reasoning" ... is said [by the article] to be anti-Marxian

and harmful since it betrays an underestimation of the potential danger residing in the politically-unstable elements of Soviet society and the enemies' capacity of exploiting it:

It would be wrong to believe that with the liquidation of the exploiter classes in the USSR international capital lost the opportunity of recruiting its agents within our country ... fragments of the broken exploiter classes still exist here and there; so do the disguised followers of the routed anti-Soviet groups – Mensheviks, Social Revolutionaries, Trotskyites, Bukharinites and bourgeois-nationalists.

(...). Referring to the class struggle ... Kozhev again implies that a certain section of Soviet opinion held that since class warfare was over in the Soviet Union it need no longer claim the concentrated attention of Party theoreticians. This contention is countered by the assertion that class struggle is a permanent feature of international and Soviet life and cannot therefore be ignored. For regardless of the forms it assumes – civil war, intervention, blockade or border incidents “engineered by the Anglo-American intelligence” –

the class struggle has been, is and will remain a struggle between Socialism and capitalism on an international scale. (...). In other words, says Kozhev quoting Stalin, if one end of the class struggle is operative within the framework of the USSR the other end extends into the bourgeois states that surround us.

A broadcast from Dnepropetrovsk (4 February) quotes a ZARYA editorial as saying that there is no difference between the common variety of “thieves of socialist property” and political subversives: both are “a godsend to the enemy”....

(...). KRASNOYE ZNAMYA (6 February) warns against the popular pastime of “becoming intoxicated with success” for which there is no justification since the enemies' intrigues and anti-Soviet machinations tend to intensify in proportion to “our forward movement.” Too many officials are inclined to forget that we are still surrounded by hostile countries: “They forget that capitalist surrounding is not an empty phrase but a real and unpleasant phenomenon”.... An earlier broadcast from Stanislav (3 February) says there is no point in trying to define the difference between political and other offenses against the State since they all come under the same category and their common purpose is to undermine the country's economic foundation: “the thief who steals public property ... is also [typically] a spy and a traitor”....

Alien Influence on Youth. SOTSIALISTICHESKIY DONBAS (4 February) is concerned about the serious shortcomings and “low ideological level” of studies in the Komsomol education network. With the “most mortal” enemies of the Soviet people trying to infiltrate and undermine every phase of our life, the paper says, it is of particular importance to safeguard the Soviet youths from the wicked influences of reactionary bourgeois ideology. We must use “all forms and means” of propaganda activity and mass-political work to educate in the young Soviet people “... toward the criminal American imperialism” and expose the attempts of its agents, the [imperialist-backed] bourgeois nationalists of all species who are still to be found among us. (...). The Komsomols cannot afford to “forget for a single moment” that the remnants of the exploiting classes and “all sorts of scum” ... in our country are trying to make use of our unstable elements for their nefarious aims. It is therefore the sacred duty of a Komsomol ... always “to be vigilant, to stop all idle gaping, casting and chatter.” Pursuing the vigilance theme on the next day, the same paper urges every citizen of the USSR, Communist and nonpartisan, to read all available literature dealing with foreign intelligence and espionage so that he may learn to “recognize the enemy and his subversive methods.” Highly recommended in this connection is a recently-published book by V. Minayev, “The Secret Weapon of the Doomed” ... which “exposed” American hostile activities against the USSR in the past several decades. “It is necessary to read it. It is absolutely essential for each one of us to do so!”

The items quoted below are typical of the rest of the available material on the current vigilance campaign transmitted centrally and locally:

Smolensk, 4 February – the US Government has allocated 100 million dollars for subversive, terrorist and espionage work against our country.... The revelation of Party and State secrets is a crime against the Party and is incompatible with its membership (RABOCHIY PUT editorial);

Moscow, 6 February – Anybody who indulges in such vices in private life as drunkenness, grabbing and flippant passions cannot be a reliable fighter ... all this is used by the enemies to demoralize the Komsomol and thus deprave them politically.... It is time to put an end to the harmful, fallacious view that daily life is a private affair (KOM SOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA editorial);

Kurgan, 8 February – It is imperative to educate the Soviet people in the spirit of loyalty ... and to teach them to oppose any insidious tricks of foreign intelligence and to heighten the preparedness of the Soviet people to defend the interests and honor of our Socialist fatherland (KRASNY KURGAN editorial);

Minsk, 5 February – Another fault of propaganda work is that lectures do not assume a militant character and do not expose bourgeois ideology, and in particular that of United States imperialism (ZVYAZDA editorial).

No Thy Enemy. In a lengthy review of Minayev's book “The Secret Weapon of the Doomed” published in IZVESTIA on 8 February and quoted by the Moscow radio on the same day, Petrov makes the point that to know one's enemy one must study his underhand methods of operation. Minayev's book is therefore invaluable from that point of view: it “reveals the cruel methods” ... employed by the imperialist intelligence services. American subversive activities against the USSR, according to the book, pre-date the Second World War by a number of years when Trotskyites, Bukharinites and Zinovyevites had been employed to undermine the foundation of the young Soviet Republic. Such activities are said to have become intensified during the last war with the object of “establishing secret contact with the German-fascist intelligence and the Gestapo behind the back of the Soviet Union”.... Implicit also in Minayev's book, as quoted in Petrov's review, is the attempt to associate American wartime help to the USSR (presumably lend-lease) with subversive activities. The US, it is stated, had shipped to the Soviet Union 235,000 packages of carrot, salad, pea and other vegetable seeds – all of them labelled “to the brave people of the USSR,” but

in addition to the vegetable seeds they all contained also seeds of poisonous weeds which are harmful to human beings and animals.

(...). The expansion of the American intelligence in the post-war years has been particularly rapid, Minayev tells his readers, and it now comprises “over 100 thousand employees and agents”.... Spies and diversionists are said to be trained “in most of the American universities” ... including numerous specialized schools. Similar cadres are being trained, under American sponsorship, in Western Germany and Austria, Yugoslavia and Turkey. Indeed there is hardly any sphere of human activity, including the foreign embassies in Moscow, according to Minayev, that has not been affected by the insidious machinations of US intelligence. Even such organizations as UNESCO and the International Children's Emergency Fund are “utilized for the purposes” ... of American espionage. Referring to the sources of aid at the disposal of the American intelligence service, Minayev declares that

the most active aid to American intelligence is offered by the Vatican and the bourgeois-nationalist Zionist organizations.

(INDICATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL VULNERABILITIES, CIA, Information from: Foreign Documents or Radio Broadcasts, Date of Information: February 3, 1953 to February 9, 1953. Date Distributed: March 16, 1953, pp. 2-6) (IMG)

The vigilance campaign, the campaign to further educate the Soviet population, was also a part of the campaign of the communist faction against revisionist intellectualism, to educate the populace against liberal anti-purge influences and to promote the mentality of a socialist counter-intelligence officer among Party members. Most importantly for the context of 1952-1953, the vigilance campaign was a tactic by the Stalin faction to mobilize much more of the Soviet state personnel against the Beria gang. Not every communist loyalist in the USSR was on high alert about the threat posed by the Beria group and the killer-doctors' terror plots. Raising vigilance could reinforce the tendency by the communist loyalists to take active measures against corruption throughout the Soviet Union, hence undermining the corrupt bureaucrats that formed the class base of the Titoist faction headed by Beria.

*** IMG-All-{Titoist Coup}-{The Reign of Beria}

C19S9. The Rise of the Beriaite Titoists

With the death of Stalin and some of the communist Red Army generals, the influence of the communist agents of the proletariat over the means of violence somewhat decreased while the Titoist agents of finance capital and the corrupt bureaucrats in the Soviet state apparatus could advance their agenda of further undermining the influence of the proletariat in the military and intelligence bodies, so to transition the Soviet Union away from a socialist dictatorship of the proletariat onto an anti-Soviet dictatorship of the comprador bourgeoisie. Lavrenti Beria was the leader of the vast network of the corrupt bureaucrats allied to Anglo-American finance capital. Stalin's death was a cause for him to rejoice:

Once Stalin was buried, the Politburo members started to swagger around. 'Now we'll put the country on its feet again.' My father was pleased because he could now implement reforms that previously had been inconceivable. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 251) (IMG)

In his memoirs, Enver Hoxha recalled how only a day after Stalin's death, the Titoists had determined their official positions for themselves in the government:

One day after Stalin's death on March 6, 1953, the Central Committee of the party, the Council of Ministers and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR were summoned to an urgent joint meeting. On occasions of great losses, such as the death of Stalin, urgent meetings are necessary and indispensable. However, the many important changes which were announced in the press one day later, showed that this urgent meeting had been held for no other reason but . . . the sharing out of posts! Stalin had only just died, his body had not yet been placed in the hall where the final homage was to be paid, the program for the organization of paying homage and the funeral ceremony was still not worked out, the Soviet communists and the Soviet people were weeping over their great loss, while the top Soviet leadership found the time to share out the portfolios! Malenkov became premier, [and] Beria became first deputy premier and minister of internal affairs. . . . (The Khrushchevites, Enver Hoxha, Chapter 1)

Long before the death of Stalin, the Titoists had planned which position each of them will get after their joint assassination of Stalin. Either way, according to Amy Knight:

Although Khrushchev claims they did not meet to make decisions until after Stalin died, in fact the bureau of the CC Presidium – consisting of Beria, Bulganin, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Malenkov, Pervukhin, Saburov, and Khrushchev – met during the night of 4-5 March. They decided at this meeting to do away with the enlarged CC Presidium [which Stalin fought for] reverting to the earlier practice of having only a Presidium. (Beria: Stalin's First Lieutenant, Amy Knight, pp. 180-181)

Beria was restored to his position as the head of the Soviet intelligence service. Although Beria was not officially at the highest position in the Soviet government, through his agents Malenkov and Khrushchev, Beria was able to exercise enough influence so as to be the de facto leader of the Soviet state. One has to remember that the Politburo was to make the more immediate decisions. With the death of Stalin, the Politburo was firmly dominated by authoritarian-minded Titoist assassins, who felt no need to consult the Central Committee of the Party, let alone the rest of the Party. Hence the Central Committee and other members of the Party were not going to have as much influence over the policy-making procedures for quite some time. This fact gave Beria and other autocratic Titoist assassins ample time and room to unilaterally make significant changes to the situation in the Democratic Bloc for the first few months after the death of Stalin. The Party certainly had the power to check the policies of the Kremlin Titoists, but the Party membership already was dominated by the intelligentsia and bureaucrats and hence there was little motivation – but not zero motivation – on the side of the Party membership majority to combat the Titoist assassins' policies anyways. This fact too gave Beria and other Kremlin Titoists audacity to make steps in dismantling the socialist bloc.

In its quest to undermine socialism, the Titoist Beria faction in the USSR pursued the following three main concurrent courses of action:

- (1) **To Weaken the Soviet Military.** The Soviet military was not so directly involved in combat worldwide, but was covertly involved in the conventional/guerilla wars in East Asia, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe. Undermining the Soviet military's covert/proxy wars in the region would have rolled back the dominant tendency, the communist tendency, in the Red Army staff, while increasing the leverage of the Titoist generals in the Red Army in their factional conflict. That is, the communist faction in the Red Army would be bogged down in the conflicts, thus having less funds for waging the secret service conflict against the Titoist generals in the Red Army, hence allowing for increased influence by the Titoist elements in the Red Army. More Titoist influence in the Red Army would mean more Titoist influence in the Soviet intelligence bodies that relied on the Red Army for their operations in the first place. More Titoist influence in the Soviet intelligence service would assist the Beria gang in its campaign to elevate the positions of the Trotskyites and Titoists.
- (2) **To Elevate the Position of the Corrupt Bureaucrats in the Soviet State.** As the private sector was illegal and suppressed in the USSR, the main base for the agents of fascist reaction in the USSR was the corrupt bureaucrats. The decentralization of the Soviet state apparatus would have minimized economic coordination thus allowing the corrupt bureaucrats to profit and to rise in strength. The increased influence of the corrupt bureaucrats in the Soviet state would be a counter-weight to the influence of the proletariat in the workers' state. This would assist the Titoists in their efforts towards yielding a dictatorship of the comprador bourgeoisie.

(3) **To Link up with Anglo-American Finance Capital.** The corrupt bureaucrats in the USSR were the class allies of the Anglo-American finance capital, the pro-fascist type of finance capital. Linking up with the Anglo-American finance capital via the CIA and MI6 would assist the Titoists in their efforts to hit the Red Army and the communist foes of the Titoists while elevating the corrupt bureaucrats upon whom the Titoists relied. The Titoists in the USSR did not have a military force of their own. As such, they required alien armed forces, such as the Ukrainian fascists backed by the CIA and MI6, to hit the interests of the proletariat in the Soviet military. To the Anglo-American imperialist intelligence agencies, the Titoists would provide the intelligence materials on what to hit, whereas the terror armies fighting the proxy war for the Anglo-American intelligence agencies would do the hitting. In this process, the way would be paved on the one hand for the Anglo-American finance capital to more easily colonize the countries allied to the USSR (and to eventually go after colonizing the territory of the former USSR itself), and on the other hand, the corrupt bureaucrats in the USSR would be able to more easily profit out of undermining the communist agents of the proletariat in the armed forces.

To weaken the Soviet military,:

My father who was still in charge of the military-industrial complex, put a brake on the arms programme, reducing the mass-production of tanks, guns, and aircraft. . Here too he met with strong resistance, especially from Bulganin [who at the time was encircled and coopted by the agents of the Stalin faction]. The war party [i.e. referring to Stalin faction] in the Ministry of Defence, especially the commanders of the land army, howled that this was treason, and began to hate my father. This group continued to rage after his death, and Khrushchev had to use Zhukov to combat them. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 261) (IMG)

As assistance to the CIA-MI6-backed terrorists such as the UPA, AK, Nazis, etc. Beria also sought to withdraw the Soviet Red Army forces from Eastern Europe altogether:

My father told us that he was now going to succeed in applying the policy which he had wanted to apply after the war and which Stalin had prevented: to go back to governments of coalition with the socialists [social democrats] and to withdraw our troops from Central Europe. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 264) (IMG)

Together with the plan to partition the Soviet Union, Lavrenti Beria went ahead and promoted the establishment of a Titoist-dominated 'autonomous' army for each of the Soviet Socialist Republics, so that these Titoist-dominated local armies would serve as a counter-weight to the Red Army and could duly pave the road for the partition of that country. Zhukov sympathized with Beria every single step of the way, but because Zhukov was surrounded more by the communists in the Red Army, Zhukov felt no choice but to oppose Lavrenti Beria on some questions. In any case, Beria tried to aggressively pursue his agenda:

Zhukov and my father had a dispute about territorial formations and national armies. My father thought them necessary. Zhukov replied, saying that admitting this principle would lead to the destruction of the Soviet Union. There must be only one army [in Zhukov's opinion]. At most one might tolerate a regiment that carried a Ukrainian flag, comparable to the Ukraine's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Even that, though, he thought went too far. My father saw nothing inexpedient in authorising the creation of national guards. They would look grand at receptions for foreign heads of state. He could very well picture a Ukrainian national guard dressed in Cossack costume and carrying sabres. The police, too, he thought, should be autochthonous. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 261) (IMG)

Lavrenti Beria sought to pave the way for the partition of the USSR:

He merely wanted to move the centre of gravity from Moscow to the republics ... because he thought that the economic prosperity of the USSR would be the quickest way to independence for the republics. The Soviet federation had to be decentralized. Only defence, transport and foreign policy should remain the responsibility of the central administrations, while everything else would fall within the competence of the local authorities. The various territorial units which had been delimited arbitrarily by the Soviet power should be redrawn in conformity with ethnic criteria, but without harming economic connections. He discussed these questions fairly frankly with Khrushchev and Malenkov. Those two rascals were not so foolish as to contradict him. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 295) (IMG)

While Beria did argue that the military should remain centralized, he argued such only to make his program of decentralization appear more reasonable, because as stated above, Beria supported the decentralization of the military as well. The Ukrainian fascist separatists were the weapons of Beria in the fight against the Soviet state, the dictatorship of the proletariat. Leonid Kravchuk was the first President of Ukraine since the 1991 collapse. A staunch Ukrainian fascist separatist, he rose to power in the early 1990s 'thanks to' Gorbachev. Kravchuk was also the man whom Beria sought to put in charge of Ukraine. In fact, Beria sought to free the Ukrainian nationalist-separatists from prison, put them in charge of Ukraine, and help them 'pursue the well-being of [their] people' by separating from Titoist Russia.

The former president of the Ukraine, Kravchuk, was one of a group of young men from western Ukraine whom my father had wanted to bring forward. The machinery of repression had destroyed them, Kravchuk escaping by a miracle. In Poland, I met Ukrainian nationalists who had spent fifteen or twenty years in the camps. Our ambassador was much afraid that my meeting with these men might turn sour on me. He warned me: 'I know what you're like. Try to control yourself this time.' These Ukrainians were older than I was. Imagine elephants advancing towards one another! But these men fell into my arms. 'These people know nothing,' they told me. 'In 1953 your father summoned us to Moscow with other leaders of the nationalist movements and told us "I consider that your criticisms of the Soviet regime are fundamentally correct. Every people has the right to defend its interests within the Soviet state. I propose that you enter the government and put together a policy for the well-being of your people."' And when that happened to him which you know about, we were tortured for three months to get us to tell what he had said. But we held out, and collected fifteen extra years.' My father had spoken also of bringing back the emigres, without obliging them to become Communists. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 261) (IMG)

As can be seen, the Beria faction, whose primary base was the corrupt bureaucrats, was aiming to infiltrate the Ukrainian fascist agents of the kulaks into the socialist state.

During the Stalin era, the influence of the proletariat over the state increased, while the influence of the corrupt bureaucrats decreased. This was seen in the demotion of the corrupt bureaucrats to lower ranks of the industrial apparatus. Beria was seeking to reverse that trend:

My father thought that the middle echelon of the industrial apparatus supported him, and this was true. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 270) (IMG)

Decentralization itself not only inherently promoted bureaucracy, but also gave greater power to the middle-echelon bureaucrats – who had previously been demoted to such a lower position thanks to the constant pressures of the dictatorship of the proletariat – so that they may have their own local independent kingdoms within the industries, kingdoms engaged in mafia competition among each other rather than coordinating for the betterment of the industrial production.

Beria also wanted to privatize the USSR's light industry and construction sectors:

This time, my father was supported by [Titoist agents in the] Gosplan, by the energy-producing complex and by the arms industry. Together with Saburov he advocated releasing light industry and building work from state control. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 227) (IMG)

Concurrent with the push for the weakening of the Soviet military, the demotion of the communist generals from the Stalin faction after Stalin's death, and the elevation of corrupt bureaucrats, Beria and his Titoist henchmen actively pursued the project for a coup d'états against the Soviet state. Beria was in a rush because he knew that just less than 50% of the CPSU was made up of the blue-collar workers and the kolkhozniks, which served as an obstacle to the Titoists reliant on the intelligentsia and the bureaucrats in the CPSU. The proletarians and kolkhoz peasants served as a class base in the Party, upon whom the communists in the Red Army and intelligence bodies could rely. The anti-Soviet actions of Beria were raising the vigilance of the communists in the Soviet state, which could lead to more active measures that would slow down the pace of inevitable Titoization, a slow-down which could come with Beria's execution as well. Hence:

My father ... was in a hurry because he realized that the time he had in which to act freely was limited. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 265) (IMG)

The CIA stated:

The preparations for Beriya's usurpation of authority began immediately after the death of Stalin. (BERIYA PURGE, CIA, May 28, 1954, p. 2) (IMG)

Beria wanted to stage a military coup. He thus began his large-scale sabotage of the Soviet intelligence service, dramatically cutting down its personnel, planting his Titoist agents at the helm of the intelligence service especially regarding domestic affairs, and withdrawing Soviet intelligence agents abroad to undermine Soviet extraterritorial intelligence and special operations:

When L. P. Beriya became Minister of Internal Affairs of the Soviet Union after the merger of the MVD and MGB in 1953, he began, in accordance with resolution of the new administration to reorganize the State machinery, to cut down sharply (about 50 percent) the personnel of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (both the central administration and the provincial organs), supposedly dismissing principally old and experienced workers. Simultaneously, Beriya ordered the recall of most of the residents [resident agents] and more experienced workers from the MVD offices abroad, with the exception of the Tokyo office because of its special position. (BERIYA PURGE, CIA, May 28, 1954, p. 1) (IMG)

Sergio Beria, the son of Lavrenti Beria, confirmed:

My father counted on shaking off the MVD before the congress met, or at any rate he voiced that hope to my mother. He wanted to pass the following measures without delay: to attach intelligence and the frontier guards to the Ministry of Defence, at the head of which he would have put Zhukov, and to abolish the MVD's own armed forces. He dreamt of being able to devote himself to administering the economy, thanks to his good relations with Zhukov. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 265) (IMG)

Those whom Beria placed in power were corrupt bourgeois-nationalists and traitors to the dictatorship of the proletariat:

Many of these replacements had been arrested previously or had been removed from responsible positions because of excessive drinking, as had been the case with Pavel Yakovlevich Meshik in Ukraine. Another example was Vladimir Georgiyevich Dekanovoz, who had been released by Molotov for immoral behavior and subsequently had held a minor position in Moscow as Chief of Supplies in either VOKS [USSR's commission for inter-cultural understanding and cultural relations with foreign countries] or the World Peace Council. (...). However, Beria's replacements were either his former supporters or persons who ... could be counted upon to follow his orders.... Fadeykin ... was unsuited to his job and incapable of handling a large staff. Further dissatisfaction among the MVD workers stemmed from the fact that when the [Caucasian bourgeois-nationalist] Colonel General Bogdan Zakharovich Kobulov became First Deputy Minister, he showed preference towards the Georgians, Armenians, and other national minorities. For instance, he appointed Lieutenant General L. B. Vlodimirskiy, who had spent some time in prison, and another named Shlyuger ... who had been imprisoned for dereliction of duty. Lieutenant General Belkin was a further example of an appointee whose nationality was other than Russian. All of them were appointed to high positions and their appointments created misunderstandings and unnecessary rumours.

(The Beriya Purge, CIA, June 8, 1954, pp. 1-2) (IMG)

Beria's understanding was that because:

these replacements had been offended by their treatment under the Stalin regime [i.e. when they were purged under Stalin], they would be faithful to Beriya upon their reinstatement in positions of authority. (The Beriya Purge, CIA, June 8, 1954, pp. 1-2) (IMG)

In order to transform the Soviet intelligence service, the Titoists needed to criminalize the socialist agents responsible for the purges and to rehabilitate and decriminalize the 'victims' of the Stalin-era purges. Indeed, Beria initiated the project for which Khrushchev and Gorbachev later took credit. Beria, not Khrushchev, was the supreme rehabilitator of Trotskyism. Regarding the Stalin-era purges, including the anti-Trotskyite purges of the 1930s,:

Some time [after Stalin's death] my father drew up the instructions for the committee charged with rehabilitations. He recommended that all the trials be reviewed, including the pre-war ones, and **that Trotskyism be treated as a political tendency and not as spying.** Malenkov, Saburov and Pervukhin sided with him, but ... Kaganovich opposed, presenting a resolution to the effect that this would be premature. This was a problem that called for a special study. Rehabilitation commissions had to be set up, the people had to be prepared, saved from shock, and we must avoid harming the international Communist movement. On that last point my father, irritated at being

blamed for 'hastiness,' replied drily that the Party and everything to gain in taking the initiative in exposing past crimes, if it wanted to be respected world-wide. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 259. Bold added) (IMG{Factional Conflict & Great Purge})
For the plot to overthrow the Soviet state in collaboration with Lavrenti Beria:
Zhukov thought that only a military coup d'état could get things going. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 267) (IMG)

Another commander associated to Beria was the notorious Pavel Artemiyev:

Besides Beriya, the following persons took part in the plot: the Commander-in-Chief of the Moscow Military District, Colonel General Pavel Artemevich Artemyev (at one time he was employed by the MVD)... Goglidze, Kobulov, Dekanozov, and Merkulov were arrested later. (BERIYA PURGE, CIA, May 28, 1954, p. 2) (IMG)

Clearly, Beria was trying to practically destroy the MVD, and install his agents at the helm, and one of his many agents was the fake 'hero' of Stalingrad, General Zhukov, the treasonous general who did nothing good for the USSR and who stole the credit for the Stalingrad victory from Vasilevsky. Ukrainian Nazis continue foolishly regard Zhukov as their enemy when in fact Zhukov was on their side.

Lavrenti Beria, as Sergo Beria recalled, wanted also 'to abolish the MVD's own armed forces.' Beria simply wanted to weaken the MVD as much as possible. Beria targeted MVD counter-intelligence, which was one of the most sensitive sectors of the security apparatus as it was the body responsible for the purges.

The CIA document also reported:

To the general surprise of the officers of the Second Chief Directorate, the former chief of Beriya's secretariat when Beriya was People's Commissar for Internal Affairs of the USSR, Lieutenant General Stefan Solomonovich Mamulov, was appointed to the post of Chief of the Second Chief Directorate of the MVD. General Mamulov belongs to the category of administrative workers; he does not have much practical experience in counterespionage or, especially, in espionage work. Mamulov's lack of practical experience reflected in a certain measure of the work of resident offices of the MVD abroad. (BERIYA PURGE, CIA, May 28, 1954, p. 2) (IMG)

While the agency of Kobulov, Kruglov, Merkulov, Dekanozov, etc. for Beria is voluminously well-documented, I have no information that Mamulov was a Beria agent per se. Perhaps that is the point. Beria faced a formidable resistance from the MVD counter-intelligence and found it difficult to plant his own agents there, and so he likely went for the second best option he had, namely the planting of less experienced enemy agents such as Mamulov so that of MVD counter-intelligence would have a weaker command.

On the other hand, Beria targeted the Malenkov agents in the Soviet intelligence. The thing that characterized Malenkov and his agents was that although they belonged to Beria's Titoist network, they were encircled by the agents of the Stalin faction; and so for the sake of their political survival, they had to cooperate with Stalin faction agents. At the same time, they had enough lobbying power not to be fully purged by Stalin faction, since the existence of Beria's agents and the fact that they pretended to oppose Beria's faction caused the Stalin faction to genuinely need them for sowing division in Beria's camp. Such a characteristic of Malenkov and his agents was the result of the campaign launched by the SMERSH and Zhdanov against Malenkov and his agents, causing the latter category to be hit so hard that they were compelled and coopted to cooperate with Stalin faction. Beria and Malenkov were close friends. However, since Malenkov was more encircled by communist or pro-communist intelligence agents than Beria was, Malenkov had to take the side of the communists on many issues. Hence, there came rumours of ideological differences between Beria and Malenkov, rumours that were technically incorrect but partially based on facts nonetheless. The CIA document again reported on this:

The preparations for Beriya's usurpation of authority began immediately after the death of Stalin. At that time there were rumors in Moscow among persons close to governmental circles, and especially among the administrative personnel of the MVD, about differences of opinion on questions of state politics which had arisen between Beriya and Malenkov. These rumors seem somewhat paradoxical because of the long and close friendly relations of these two men. (BERIYA PURGE, CIA, May 28, 1954, p. 2) (IMG)

Ignatyev, an agent of Malenkov, had cooperated with the Stalin faction's agents too much for Beria to accept. Although belonging to the Titoist network, Ignatyev was too encircled and too compromised by Stalin faction agents around him and so Beria could not rely on him. As replacement, Goglidze and Kobulov, two well-known agents of Beria who were purged by Stalin faction, were reinstated in top positions:

Beriyia reinstated in the positions of the central administration of the Ministry persons close to him, such as the Colonel General Bogdan Zakharovich Kobulov (who had been removed from the post of Deputy Minister of the MGB USSR in 1946), and others with whom he had worked in the past, including those persons who had been working with him lately in the organization of the Council of Ministers [the Committee of Information]. The chief of the MGB administration for Khabarovsk Kray, Colonel General Sergey Arsenyevich Goglidze, was ordered to Moscow and was appointed one of Beriya's deputies shortly before the removal of Semen Denisovich Ignatyev. (BERIYA PURGE, CIA, May 28, 1954, p. 1) (IMG)

the methods of work of these auditing commissions were often biased. After the arrest of Abakumov, Goglidze's authority was strengthened again. Shortly afterwards he was appointed Deputy Minister of State Security and stayed in this post after the merger of the MVD and MGB. (BERIYA PURGE, CIA, May 28, 1954, p. 6) (IMG)

Abakumov, a corrupt official and an agent of Beria, was also encircled by Stalin faction agents and thus had been compromised enough to be compelled to cooperate with Stalin faction. Again, Sergo Beria recalled:

After Stalin's death Abakumov told my father what had happened. He claimed that he had only been obeying formal orders from Stalin to complete a dossier against my father. Abakumov protested his devotion to my father and claimed to have done nothing about it. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 217) (IMG)

Beriyia removed many of these communist faction agents encircling Abakumov so that Abakumov would have a freer hand in pursuing a pro-Beriyia campaign. Beriyia also removed many of the agents encircling Ignatyev. The US intelligence document stated:

There were many changes among the personnel who remained after the dismissals in the central apparatus of the MVD. Most of the workers who occupied administrative posts under Colonel General Viktor Semenovich Abakumov and Ignatyev were dismissed. Some who were close to Abakumov and Ignatyev, especially those in the Investigation Section and in the then Second Chief Directorate (counterintelligence) of the former Ministry of State Security, were arrested. Conditions at that time in the ministry of internal affairs were reminiscent of the years of the "big purge". Responsible workers had to go through the terrible times twice – the purge carried out by Beriyia, and more severe purge organized by Malenkov after Beriyia's arrest. (BERIYA PURGE, CIA, May 28, 1954, p. 1) (IMG)

Indeed, some of the anti-Beria intelligence agents within the Soviet counter-intelligence were arrested. Beria's reign over the Soviet intelligence in 1953 boosted the torturers in the Soviet intelligence:

It frequently happened that Beriya questions personally some prisoner who was not giving the desired testimony, and in such cases he applied refined tortures, in comparison with which the horrors of the Spanish Inquisition are understood to be child's play. In confirmation of these facts, the bill of indictment stated that the investigating organs had material evidence in the form of the instruments of torture used by Beriya and found during the search of his personal belongings. (BERIYA PURGE, CIA, May 28, 1954, p. 3) (IMG)

Beria also tried to purge Molotov:

Seeing how stupidly obstinate Molotov was, my father proposed that he be replaced by Maisky at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 'If you don't agree, you can resign. Times have changed and the spirit of the Council of Ministers must also evolve,' he told Molotov. Maisky would clear up our position in relation to the Western powers. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 265) (IMG)

Maisky had met Mossad representatives in London and had expressed sympathies with the Zionist cause in the past. Stalin is known to have maximized efforts to demote Maisky, There is nothing surprising about Maisky being a Beria agent and pro-Anglo-American.

Knowing that there were anti-Titoist plans by the communist faction, Beria tried to do in 1953 what Khrushchev succeeded in doing in 1956: to give a Titoization speech. Beria therefore decided to call for a Party congress in Georgia in order to make 'revelations' against the Stalin-era Soviet state, to purge his enemies, and to pursue his Titoization 'reforms':

My father ... was in a hurry because he realized that the time he had in which to act freely was limited. I think that he certainly had hidden motives when he proposed the calling of a congress. He wanted to get rid of his colleagues because he knew that something was being hatched against him. He foresaw that the test of strength would take place at that congress, and he prepared actively for that. He could count on the support from the leading personnel in the economy, from the scientists, from some diplomats, from the military and from the heads of the republics. (...). He intended to set forth before the delegates in the name of the country's leadership a coherent program of reforms in domestic and foreign policy. He thought that, when they had learnt the truth about past events, the congress majority would rally to him and give him their support. I remain convinced that he was not mistaken. Once his colleagues had retired he would be able to proceed legitimately with reforms. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 265) (IMG)

Beria, who had saved the Zionist agents of the American secret service, was planning to give a speech on Stalin-era 'anti-Semitism'. In that congress,:

My father ... did perhaps intend to make certain revelations. I have only indirect signs of this: some of his collaborators mentioned to me dossiers that he had entrusted to them. Before he died, my father's secretary Lyudvigov, a man of Polish origin, was able to tell me that my father had ordered him to compose a report on anti-Semitism in Russia and the world. Clearly, my father was preparing to write an article or deliver a speech on the harmfulness of anti-Semitism. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 265) (IMG)

Somewhat related to the above remark by Sergo Beria is the following quote from a CIA document:

when Beria came to power he wanted to show the people that Stalin's bloody regime had come to an end and, since he himself was half-Jewish, the policy regarding the Jews was changed. ('Committee of State Security / The Doctors' Plot and Its Reversal', CIA, September 24, 1954, p. 2) (IMG)

The Stalin-era USSR had liberated countless Yiddish people from extermination prior to, during, and after the Great Patriotic War, was waging a war against the Home Army terrorists responsible for the anti-Semitic pogroms in Poland, and was a true friend of the people of Israel. Allegations of 'anti-Semitism' are baseless slanders spread by the Jewish bourgeois-nationalist agents of the Anglo-American secret services, such as the CIA-backed or MI6-backed Zionist or Bundist currents. It was obvious that the 'anti-Semitism' label was being used by the MI6 agent Beria and his gang against the USSR, due to the communist stance against the anti-communist Zionist subversion campaign sponsored by the CIA-MI6 network. However,:

the members of the Presidium forestalled him. They knew that my father was more intelligent and stronger than they were. If he managed to carry through the reorganisation he had begun, they would become redundant. My father's mistake was to have revealed some things too soon. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 265) (IMG)

Indeed, as Sergo implied above, the pace of Titoization by Beria was so quick that Beria's true face was exposed to the MVD. This had a vigilance-raising effect in the MVD. Prior to his purge of the MVD personnel, among the MVD workers:

Beriya had enjoyed a high reputation prior to his taking over the MVD. (The Beriya Purge, CIA, June 8, 1954, p. 2) (IMG)

In fact:

When Beriya was re-appointed Minister of Internal Affairs [MVD], after Stalin's death, all MVD workers thought that the system within the MVD would be much improved. (The Beriya Purge, CIA, June 8, 1954, p. 1) (IMG)

However:

when Beriya began to remove leading officials who had served under previous ministers and to replace them with his old cronies, the opinion among MVD employees was that the best men were being released and replaced by irresponsible persons whom Beriya was drawing from the archives. (The Beriya Purge, CIA, June 8, 1954, p. 1) (IMG)

The rapid pace of the Titoization efforts by Beria had a vigilance-raising effect in the MVD, resulting in the MVD to spearhead the purges against the Beria group, with Khrushchev opportunistically joining in. Deriabin wrote:

In regard to the attempted coup, the two volumes of Khrushchev's memoirs contain nothing about Kruglov, the MVD, and their forewarning of Beria's intentions; nothing about Beria positioning MGB troops preparatory to the seizure of power; nothing about the Politburo counter-positioning Army units; nothing about the arrests of Beria's six henchmen; nothing about the intensive investigations of possible complicity by the Moscow Military District. Khrushchev would have his readers think that he was first to divine Beria's motives and that he based his suspicions on recommendations Beria made to Politburo members. The memoirs do describe Beria's arrest, but that is the most to be said for the Khrushchev version of the showdown. ('Inside Stalin's Kremlin: an eyewitness account of brutality, duplicity, and intrigue', Petr Deriabin, p. 159) (IMG)

The Beria group pursued its counter-revolutionary program with knowledge of the **historical materialist fact that the benefits (for the Titoist faction) of causing material damages to the Soviet state would outweigh the costs of the ruin of the Beria group's reputation**, for reputation is a lesser-material factor whereas damage to the Red Army, a colour revolution in Germany, a CIA-MI6 coup in Iran, etc. are all material factors.

It is true that lesser-material factors such as popularity can help agitate one's followers towards inflicting material damages against the enemy. However, so is it also true that popularity is best gained through material dominance (i.e. dominance over the economy, military, intelligence, etc.) and the translation of the material dominance to the ideational sector (i.e. the media, the 'popularity contest', etc.). The material strength can not only help assure dominance in the material sector, in the economy and the military, but also help to reduce the costs of financing a media and public relations (PR) campaign to rehabilitate much of one's negative public image and to make one either more popular or not so hated as to cause a popular uprising against oneself. In the context of the Titoist-communist conflict, causing material damages upon the Soviet state would reduce the backlash capabilities of the anti-Beria elements; the policies of the reactionary classes against the proletariat could never be popular among those proletarians affected by such policies but surely gaining control over the military and intelligence and then translating such control over the military and intelligence bodies towards gaining control over the media, could help mislead enough of the Soviet public to erode the strength of an anti-Beria backlash. In that respect, in pursuing the counter-revolutionary action against the Soviet state with utmost speed, Beria was pursuing a correct strategy from a Titoist viewpoint, for he was materially devastating the Soviet state at the low cost of having a negative reputation among the Soviet state personnel. That aspect of Beria's strategy was not flawed.

What, then, went strategically/tactically wrong? Why was the Beria group purged? The most important factor is that the communist faction, despite facing material damages inflicted upon them by the Beria group, still had enough material factors, such as enough of the means of violence, under its influence in order to wage a backlash against the Beria group. Beria and his team knew of plots against them by the communist faction but were kept in the dark concerning the tactical details planned by the communist faction against them. Even then, the communist tide against Beria could be countered by the Beria group not through the Beria group keeping their own reputation 'clean', but by inflicting even more material damage on the communist faction. Given that the communist faction in the Soviet Union had enough material strength to be able to purge large segments of the Beria group, what was needed was the unity and general mobilization of the communist forces in the Soviet state apparatus towards an anti-Titoist and anti-Beriaite purge. This general mobilization was brought about because the quick counter-revolutionary measures of Beria raised the alarm and vigilance among the communists. The increased vigilance allowed the communists to quickly take action, amass more anti-Beriaite agents, and to use the material capabilities under their influence to hunt down Beria and his team. Note that had the communist faction in the Soviet state not had much of the material factors under its influence, the high vigilance and the will to hunt-down Beria would not have been enough to yield an anti-Beriaite purge; from this, once again one can reaffirm that the Beriaite policy of quickly inflicting maximum damage on the Soviet state was a correct policy (from a Titoist viewpoint) even though it raised the vigilance of the Beria gang's foes. The Beria group did not really make any strategic mistakes in confrontation with the communist faction. Beria even pursued the correct strategy of preparing for an escape from the Soviet Union. The classic tactic for escaping is to set up ratlines for escape and to spread false rumours of one's death. Indeed, take for example the purge against the Slansky ring during which Jan Bojko, a prominent agent of the Slansky faction, aimed to escape to Yugoslavia by exploiting the false rumours of his 'death':

Bojko was a close collaborator of Gen. Bredich Reicin, executed during the purge of the Slansky group. Bojko, a Slovak, generally believed dead, had actually been concealed by Slansky's followers and was detected trying to reach Austria on the way to Yugoslavia with important documents.

His capture revealed a conspiracy involving the highest circles of Communist leadership and increased Soviet suspicion with regard to Czechoslovak unwillingness to purge unreliable elements. Soviet authorities have placed the responsibility on Dr. Stefan Reiss, a former Minister of Justice, a Hungarian Jew by birth, but considered a Slovak. He is a protégé of President Zapotocky. (Investigation of Czechoslovak leaders, CIA, February 15, 1954, p. 1) (IMG)

During the July attempt at hunting down Beria, the Titoist faction in the Soviet Union spread the lies about Beria's 'death' back then:

At the same time a rumour of [Lavrenti Beria's] death was put about, without official confirmation. Many people believed it. Khrushchev and his clique ... spread this rumour deliberately. . ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 271) (IMG)

Hence, there was every indication that the Titoists led by Beria had readied themselves not just for a coup against the Soviet state but also for avenues of escape in case they were to be arrested. If you cannot beat them, join them and rise to lead them so that you may mislead them. Two of Beria's own agents, Khrushchev and Malenkov, were deployed to lead – and hence mislead – the communist efforts towards a purge against the Beria faction, and to ensure the continuity of Titoist influence in case the anti-Beriaite purge succeeds. After all, Beria knew well that a plot was hatched against him:

My father ... was in a hurry because he realized that the time he had in which to act freely was limited. (...). He wanted to get rid of his colleagues because he knew that something was being hatched against him. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 265) (IMG)

It was just the case though that, naturally, Beria and his team did not know about all the tactical details of the communist plot to purge them, and thus failed to counter such a move. Beria was lured into a meeting of the Central Committee and thereupon he was arrested.

At the same time, the deployment of Khrushchev and Malenkov into the leadership of the communist camp did not just mean Beriaite influence over the communist network but also meant communist cooptation of Malenkov and Khrushchev, since infiltration into the communist camp could only come through adopting most of the aspects of the policy line pursued by the communist faction in the Soviet Union. Hence, Malenkov, with utmost reluctance, participated in the anti-Beria coup.

Anyways, the CIA document stated:

One of the variations of Malenkov's plan called for Beria's arrest at a meeting of the Central Committee of the CPSU, which was scheduled for the end of June 1953 (approximately the 26th or 27th). Malenkov, however, was not quite sure that Beria would be present at the meeting of the members of the Central Committee because he had previously several times failed to appear at such meetings and had begun to disregard Malenkov in general. (BERIYA PURGE, CIA, May 28, 1954, p. 2) (IMG)

To this end,:

All the preparations for the arrest of Beria and his accomplices were carried out [by a communist team ostensibly headed] by Malenkov in complete secrecy. Among the persons who took part in these preparations were members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, whom Malenkov trusted completely; they were issued arms. The officers from the Chief Guard Directorate

of the MVD who were on duty in the buildings of the Central Committee, the Council of Ministers, and the Kremlin were totally isolated and had no way of even guessing of the plans for the arrest of Beriya, let alone the members of the central apparatus of the MVD in general. For their part, Konev and Zhukov selected the generals and senior officers whom they trusted most and who could be relied upon in case of need. (BERIYA PURGE, CIA, May 28, 1954, p. 2) (IMG)

However, the tide had turned far too strongly against Beria for Zhukov to collaborate with Beria. Hence, Zhukov actually opportunistically joined Konev in the fight against Beria:

Marshal Konev, Zhukov and Bulganin, two guards divisions were ordered to Moscow on an urgent basis from their quarters in the Urals. (BERIYA PURGE, CIA, May 28, 1954, p. 2) (IMG)

It was expected that Malenkov would put up an armed resistance because the army leaders were on Malenkov's side. Therefore, General Aremyev ordered two divisions from the Moscow Military District to Moscow in time for the coup d'état. One of the divisions was armored. (BERIYA PURGE, CIA, May 28, 1954, p. 2) (IMG)

Some people would argue that after having eliminated Stalin, Malenkov and Khrushchev had genuinely turned against Beria, out of greed for personal power. According to this narrative, Beria, Malenkov, and Khrushchev had all allied with each other to get rid of Stalin, but turned against each other after having eliminated Stalin. This narrative, untenable empirically, is nonsense dialectically. It is contradicted empirically by the fact that in the past too, long before the death of Stalin, Khrushchev was acting against Beria even when Khrushchev was establishing closer covert bonds with Beria. Recall from C19S2 and C19S7.2 that Khrushchev had entrenched his alliance with Beria in 1951, and yet, even then, Khrushchev, having been coopted by the Stalin faction, was pursuing the purge of the Abakumov group, the henchmen of Beria in the Soviet intelligence service. Clearly, just as how well before Stalin's death, Khrushchev was an agent of Beria while pretending to be 'against' Beria, Khrushchev behaved the same way after Stalin's death. The exact same goes for the Malenkov group, which, well before Stalin's death, had been coopted by the Stalin faction against the Beria group – the Malenkov network was coopted to spearhead the Mingrelian Purge and the Leningrad Purge, both anti-Beriaite purges – even when the Malenkov group was deepening its bonds with the Beria network; and the same was done by the Malenkov group after Stalin's death. Notice, by the way, that even well after the death of Stalin, Zhukov was allied to Lavrenti Beria as Sergo Beria rightly recalled; and yet, Zhukov too opportunistically joined the anti-Beriaite tide in order to save himself from communist-led anti-Beriaite purges. The case of Malenkov's and Khrushchev's 'hostility' to their covert ally Lavrenti Beria was no different. Hence, the narrative that 'suddenly', Malenkov and Khrushchev turned 'against' Beria, out of an opportunistic greed for power, or because Stalin had died, is empirically contradicted.

Yet, it is also nonsense, dialectically. The ally of my ally is my ally. Khrushchev was allied to the Anglo-American imperialists. Beria was allied to the Anglo-American imperialists. No need to mention their long history of mutual collaboration. They represented the same class forces and were backed by the same class forces. To believe that Beria and Khrushchev would be genuinely opposed to each other is to believe in anti-dialectical superstition. Malenkov had misgivings about Beria attending the meeting of the Central Committee; such a misgiving was natural as Malenkov – coopted, closely surveiled, and compelled into anti-Beriaism by the communists – was making a move against Beria reluctantly. Thus, reported the CIA,:

In spite of Malenkov's misgivings, Beriya came to this meeting of the Central Committee. By the time Malenkov was ready to speak, all the entrances and exits of the building where the meeting was held were blocked by armed members of the Central Committee, and the MVD guards were removed from their posts. (...). During the meeting Beriya felt that something was not right and tried to leave the meeting hall, but was not permitted to do so. After Malenkov had charged Beriya with criminal anti-State activities, Zhukov and Konev personally arrested him. (BERIYA PURGE, CIA, May 28, 1954, p. 3) (IMG)

There came:

Beriya's angry protests at Malenkov's infamous injustice, then his tearful pleas for freedom, and so on. (BERIYA PURGE, CIA, May 28, 1954, p. 3) (IMG)

As the reader may recall from Molotov's memoirs, when Beria got arrested, Beria got into his begging mode. The CIA document partially corroborates this by noting the:

picture of the transformation of this man, who only a few minutes ago was a haughty and self-assured statesman, into a flabby distraught creature begging for mercy was tragic and left a very unpleasant feeling with all those who were present. (BERIYA PURGE, CIA, May 28, 1954, p. 3) (IMG)

The person leading the trial of Beria was Konev, the old comrade of Stalin:

It is characteristic that the special legal board for the trial of Beriya and his accomplices consisted basically of responsible workers of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the representatives of the armed forces. The trial was held under conditions of great secrecy, and very few persons, even from among the leaders of the MVD of the USSR, actually knew about what happened at this trial. Marshal Ivan Stepanovich Konev was appointed chairman of the trial of Beriya and his accomplices. (BERIYA PURGE, CIA, May 28, 1954, p. 3) (IMG)

Thence,:

After Beriya's arrest a thorough purge was made of the personnel of the central apparatus of the MVD, its oblast and kray administrations, and also the Ministries of Internal Affairs of the union republics, especially in Georgia and Armenia. Many of the leading workers were arrested. (BERIYA PURGE, CIA, May 28, 1954, p. 4) (IMG)

The purge of Beria indeed partially entailed the backlash of the MVD intelligence agents who belonged to the Stalin faction, against Beria and the agents whom he had planted in charge of the MVD. Indeed, after the arrest of Beria, there came about the purge of many Beria agents throughout the MVD:

The same evening the employees of the central apparatus of the MVD were ordered to destroy all pictures of Beriya. Shortly afterwards began the arrest of the leading personnel of the MVD. Malenkov appointed the special commission of the Central Committee under the chairmanship of Nikolai Nikolayevich Shatalin with the task of carrying out the general purge among the personnel of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (central administration as well as provincial branches). In other words, there began the hunting for and the destruction of Beriya's partisans – large and small. (BERIYA PURGE, CIA, May 28, 1954, p. 4) (IMG)

Many of the corrupt officials in the Soviet counter-intelligence apparatus were purged, thus allowing for a spirit of democracy within the Soviet intelligence:

as a result of the measures taken and the liquidation of the remains of “Beriyaism”, [the] system of the State Security organs became incomparably more democratic, and that the struggle against bureaucratism, bad organization, and arrogance of individual chiefs was carried on decisively, especially in the Second Chief Directorate. For example, Colonel A. M. Korotkov, who was noted for his rudeness and his contemptuous attitude toward his subordinates, became [so kind in his outwardly behaviour that he began to appear as] almost a saint as a result of these measures. (BERIYA PURGE, CIA, May 28, 1954, p. 4) (IMG)

Of course, the spirit of democracy in the Soviet counter-intelligence is not to imply the establishment of some absurd application of the ‘worker self-management’ model in the counter-intelligence. Rather, it is to mean less bureaucratic terror inside the counter-intelligence sector. Through the purge of Beria, General Konev, as the head of the remnants of the Stalin faction, also gained some increased strength in the USSR:

Marshal Konev's status has definitely risen; he has advanced from a military district commander to a deputy defense minister as revealed in April 1955 to the commander of the Soviet-Satellite combined staff in May 1955. (CAESAR 12: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN POLITICAL STATUS OF SOVIET ARMED FORCES, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), September 20, 1955, p. A-1) (IMG{Titoist Coup})

After the purge of Beria, the Malenkov group was further weakened since the Malenkov group had extensively collaborated with Beria’s group. On the overt level, Khrushchev opposed Malenkov. The best thing about Nikita Khrushchev was that he was the stupidest one among the original clique of Titoist assassins in the Soviet leadership. A dumb renegade is always easier to contain than a smart renegade. The Stalin faction headed by Konev supported Nikita Khrushchev’s overt-level ‘opposition’ against Malenkov and thereby assisted in the demotion of Malenkov in 1954. Led by Konev, the communists in the Soviet security and purging apparatus found it easier to manage Khrushchev and thus supported his rise. Later on in 1957, Malenkov pretended to be a ‘Stalinist’ and started to oppose Nikita Khrushchev on the overt level; that was when the sympathies of the communists went towards an overt-level alliance with Malenkov’s group against the Khrushchev group.

The Beria agents had already been betraying the USSR long before their defection to the territories of the US-led bloc. However, The defection of the Beria agents

Beria was accused of being an MI6 agent, a rapist, a torturer, and a terrorist:

The crimes of Beriya and his accomplices against the State forms the main part of the bill of indictment. This part described at length the espionage Beriya did for foreign intelligence organisations and his anti-Soviet subversive activity in the sphere of Socialist construction. The statement was simply a paper with greater detail than the official announcement of the Soviet Government about the arrest of Beriya and his accomplices. (BERIYA PURGE, CIA, May 28, 1954, p. 4) (IMG)

Further, Beriya was accused of complete moral and personal corruption. In confirmation, the bill of indictment cited the fact that during the time which Beriya had lived in Moscow (since 1938) he had seduced a great number of Moscow girls (the statement indicated “over two hundred”). Many pages of the indictment were devoted to Beriya’s romantic adventures; (BERIYA PURGE, CIA, May 28, 1954, p. 3) (IMG)

After the sentence of Beriya and his group had been carried out, the main headquarters of the MVD had read at closed Party meetings the bill of indictment of Beriya’s group. From the time spent in reading this bill of indictment (about five hours), one can judge the quantity of sins which these persons were accused. In particular, Beriya was accused of inhuman cruelties and animal sadism with regard to individual persons arrested by State Security organs. (BERIYA PURGE, CIA, May 28, 1954, p. 3) (IMG)

The above excerpts do not mention that Beria was accused of being an MI6 agent but the reader can research for themselves on this; it is well-known that Beria was officially accused of being an MI6 agent, a supporter of separatist terror groups, and a supporter of MI6 satellite states.

One of the other henchmen of Lavrenti Beria purged was Viktor Abakumov. However, as a part of the communist faction's compromise with the Khrushchev-Malenkov group, one of the official 'reasons' given for the execution of Abakumov was that he caused the Leningrad purge. That is, the officially stated argument and 'reason' for the purge of Abakumov was partially wrong, but the real behind-the-scene reason, which was Abakumov's service to Beria, was correct. The same goes for some of the accusations against Beria for the latter supposedly being the willing enforcer of every ‘murderous’ policy line of Stalin. The real reason for the purge was concerning his treasonous intelligence activities for Anglo-American intelligence services, but he was blamed by the Khrushchev group for some of the correct policies of the Stalin era anyways.

C19S10. Deepening Links with the CIA-MI6 *** IMG-All-{The Reign of Beria}

Knowing that the MI6 agent Beria and his Titoist henchmen had conquered the pinnacles of power, Churchill took initiative in expanding relations with the USSR, as a channel for extended intelligence penetration, which could assist the Beria faction further in its Titoization efforts. The Americans too were acutely aware of the Titoization in the USSR and the changes coming about, although not as aware as the British. Christian Ostermann, a leading intelligence official from the CIA front think tank Wilson Center, wrote:

Delicately balancing hardline skepticism with a more conciliatory approach toward the post-Stalin leadership in Moscow, Eisenhower’s “Chance for Peace” speech of April 16, 1953 cautiously made any détente in U.S.-Soviet relations contingent upon Kremlin concessions such as free elections in Eastern Europe or the signing of an Austrian peace treaty.

It was British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, who, though initially rather dubious about a Soviet change of heart, was more willing to explore potential opportunities which seemed possible with the change of leadership, thus breaking with the skeptical and reserved reception which Moscow’s peace offensive had met in the West. On April 20, Churchill not only backed the U.S. “initiative” but also indicated that he favored high-level talks with the new Soviet leadership. Following the Pravda article of April 25, which had signaled Russian willingness for talks on Germany, the British Prime Minister, in a speech in Parliament on May 16, boldly called for a “conference on the highest level [...] between the leading powers without delay,” holding out the possibility of “a generation of peace.” In going well beyond Eisenhower’s “deeds, not words” approach, Churchill was primarily motivated by his belief that a negotiated settlement was necessary to prevent nuclear war and that the new Soviet leadership was amenable to personal diplomacy. Moreover, the prime minister felt that the West could now negotiate from a position of strength and that Eisenhower was thus also ready for negotiations.

(‘The United States and the East German Uprising of 1953, and the Limits of Rollback’, Wilson Center, Christian F. Ostermann (Director), December 1994, p. 12) (IMG)

After the arrest and purge of Beria, Beria's agents fled to the countries dominated by the imperialist camp and they provided plenty of intelligence to the Anglo-Americans. A US intelligence official admitted:

Much CIA information, direct from Moscow, comes from Russians who served under the liquidated Beria and defect to our side, pouring out secrets [to us] (THE MYSTERIOUS DOINGS OF THE CIA: America's Secret Agents: Part Two, The Saturday Evening Post, Richard Harkness, Gladys Harkness, November 6, 1954, p. 66. In: CIA archives) (IMG{GDR})

C19S11. Deepening Ties with the UDB *** IMG-All-{The Reign of Beria}

Beria aimed to force the USSR to bow to Titoist Yugoslavia:

My father's second project in the sphere of foreign policy was to bring about reconciliation with Tito's Yugoslavia. He pointed out to his colleagues that Tito had not joined the Atlantic alliance in spite of the extremely difficult situation his country was in. He had held out. The USSR ought, therefore, as soon as possible, to admit the wrong it and the Cominform had done, and reveal the whole truth on that affair. (Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 263) (IMG)

He sent a letter to Rankovic, offering him the chance for a secret meeting:

Beria's second effort focused on Yugoslavia. He was about to send a secret emissary to Belgrade to offer Yugoslav Prime Minister Alexander Rankovic a secret meeting, and, ultimately, the restoration of friendly relations. Again, this step, if taken, would have meant a major revision of the Stalin-Molotov line in foreign policy. Earlier in the spring, the Presidium (on Beria's initiative?) had quietly decided to stop the "hate-Tito" campaign.... (The Cold War: Cold War Espionage and Spying, Vol. 4, Lori Lyn Bogle, p. 22) (IMG)

In the letter to Rankovic, Beria requested:

a secret meeting with Rankovich and Tito to normalize relations between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. (Beria: Stalin's First Lieutenant, Amy Knight, p. 206) (IMG)

The person who was to carry that letter to Rankovic and Tito on Beria's behalf was Colonel Fedoseyev who was later arrested for the same reason:

Several days after Beriya's arrest, Party meetings were held in each administration of the Ministry of Internal Affairs on orders from the Central Committee. These meetings bore the usual character expressions of indignation towards the "enemy of the people" and self-flagellation for the lack of the required political and "Chekist" alertness. Usually at such meetings some scapegoats are found for sins which until then have been known to no one, and secret enemies of the Soviet regime are "denounced". This is what also happened at the meeting of the workers of the Second Chief Directorate. One of the speakers declared as the chief of a department, a specialist in intelligence, Colonel Fedoseyev, was a partisan of Beriya and that he should be handed over to the investigating organs. According to the speaker, Beriya personally was training Colonel Fedoseyev for a trip to Yugoslavia, where he was to conduct some kind of very important negotiations on state affairs with Marshall Tito. In proof of his words, the speaker added that a personal letter addressed to Tito was found in Beriya's private safe, and that it was this letter that Colonel Fedoseyev was to deliver to Tito. Fedoseyev most categorically denied the accusations; however, he was later arrested. (BERIYA PURGE, CIA, May 28, 1954, p. 4) (IMG)

However,:

This initiative was never undertaken. Beria was arrested on 26 June and the question of his undercover approach to Tito was one of the many charges brought against him. At the 2-7 July Plenum of the Soviet Communist Party Molotov made clear that ... Beria had gone too far by referring to 'Comrade Tito and Comrade Rankovic; dropping talk of Yugoslavia as a fascist state and restoring 'bourgeois' relations was all that was being sought. Faithful to the rhetoric of the past, Molotov referred to 'Tito and his band', and he even hinted that Beria had been interested in following Tito's path by creating some sort of popular front organisation within the Soviet Union which would have operated alongside the Communist Party. (Tito: A Biography, Geoffrey Swain, p. 110) (IMG)

Beria's letter was:

held as proof that Beria was, in Molotov's words, an "agent of the class enemy." (Beria: Stalin's First Lieutenant, Amy Knight, p. 206) (IMG)

Although the improvement of relations with Tito's Regime was not a good idea, Molotov, as a remnant of the communist faction, at least to sought to block the Titoization of the Soviet Union.

The CIA spy Deriabin wrote:

Beria offered assurances to Czechoslovakia that the USSR would not continue to interfere in Czech internal affairs, and he wrote a personal letter to Marshal Tito apologizing for the manner in which Stalin had treated him. The MGB officer who would carry the letter to Tito showed it to me. The final sentence said, "Let us cast the past aside and look ahead to the resumption of diplomatic relations between our two nations." ('Inside Stalin's Kremlin: an eyewitness account of brutality, duplicity, and intrigue', Petr Deriabin) (IMG)

C19S12. Zionists Rehabilitated – 1953

The Anglo-American Zionist agents and killer-doctors involved in the deaths of Zhdanov and Shcherbakov were rehabilitated by Beria:

In a memorandum to the Presidium dated 1 April 1953, Beria detailed to his colleagues the falsifications and tortures in the 'Doctors' Plot' arguing that it was necessary to 'fully rehabilitate and immediately release all detained doctors and members of their families'. Thus on 4 April 1953, Pravda published a decree from the Ministry of Interior announcing that the defendants were 'fully rehabilitated as to the accusations of sabotage, terrorism and espionage brought against them, and ... released from detention'. With these words, 'rehabilitation' made its appearance in the Soviet public parlance. (De-Stalinizing Eastern Europe, Kevin McDermott, Matthew Stibbe, Marc Elie, p. 28) (IMG)

At that time a statement was published to the effect that the Jews had been acquitted. Of course Ryumin and Timashuk were blamed for everything. ('Committee of State Security / The Doctors' Plot and Its Reversal', CIA, September 24, 1954, p. 2) (IMG)

The Stalin-era USSR pursued the correct policy of seeking friendship with the people of Israel, but the Ben-Gurion regime, a terror state in service to Anglo-American imperialism, agitated anti-Soviet propaganda deliberately for the purpose of terror incitement against the Soviets. This terror incitement culminated in the bombing of the Soviet Embassy in Tel Aviv by Shabak-backed 'Kingdom of Israel' terrorists, consequently the breaking

of Soviet diplomatic relations with the regime of Israel, despite the Soviet state's continued rightful recognition of Israel as a state. As a stab in the back of the Soviet diplomatic corps, the Beria group re-established diplomatic relations between the USSR and Israel:

The 20 July announcement that the USSR and Israel have agreed to resume diplomatic relations, broken off 12 February after the bombing of the Soviet legation in Tel Aviv, is the logical culmination of Moscow's reversal of the anti-Zionist campaign which was vigorously pressed during the last months of Stalin's life. (The Beria Purge and Subsequent Soviet Policy, Central Intelligence Agency, July 24, p. 8) (IMG{Israel})

Chapter 20

C20S1. The Colour Revolution in East Germany – June 1953 *** IMG-All-{GDR }

As previously demonstrated in C15S9, the German Democratic Republic, faced with the problems of agriculture, embarked upon a program of gradually collectivizing its agriculture, emphasizing the voluntary process of joining kolkhoz, and actually demonstrated success in this regard. Nonetheless, the East Germans were not so fortunate by the end of 1952, since unfavorable weather conditions yet again hit East Germany, alongside Poland and Czechoslovakia. The following is an excerpt of a document by the CIA's Office of Research and Reports regarding this matter:

A. Northern Area (Poland, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia)

In the northern area of the European Satellites the fall of 1952 was characterized by above-normal precipitation, with the result that fall plowing and sowing of grains for harvest in 1953 were considerably hampered. Despite the fact that spring plowing and sowing were aided by favorable weather over most of the area, it is believed that the over-all acreage of bread grain will be less than prewar, because of failure to fulfill the fall sowing plans for winter wheat and rye.

Available weather information and reports from the American Embassy in Moscow indicate that cold and lack of rain characterized the spring much of Poland, although more abundant rainfall appears to have occurred in June. Favorable conditions for spring work were reported in East Germany and Czechoslovakia. Rainfall appears to have been gradually adequate to abundant in the late spring and summer months, and in July heavy rains were reported to have caused harvesting difficulties for grain and cultivation difficulties for root and vegetable crops.

(‘CROP CONDITIONS IN THE SOVIET BLOC, 1953 (RR IM-379)’, CIA, Office of Research and Reports, September 23, 1953, p. 4) (IMG)

Another CIA document, while spreading the usual propaganda against the communists, nonetheless acknowledged that there was a poor crop year in Germany at the time:

The "new course" in East Germany, first outlined on 9 June 1953, followed a 12-month period of intense effort to communize the country rapidly. On top of an overly ambitious 5 -year plan (goals of which had been advanced one to two years in many cases) and a high level of reparations, was imposed a rapid remilitarization program and **a poor crop year**. The impossibility of fulfilling these combined tasks was obvious.... Through the end of May, Party leaders, in vituperative and uncompromising speeches, emphasized rapid socialization of the GDR, describing this as the means by which German unity would be accomplished. (Economic Characteristics of the New Course in the USSR and East Europe, CIA, September 29, 1953, p. 7) (IMG)

The unfavorable weather caused food shortages in East Germany, which was something that gave the Moscow Titoists an opportunity to pursue their pro-Nazi agenda against the German Democratic Republic. As confirmed by Lavrenti's son Sergo Beria, Lavrenti Beria had a pro-imperialist agenda on Germany:

My father [Beria] would have liked to form two blocs, uniting the neutral countries of Central and Eastern Europe – one around Poland, the other around Dimitrov's Bulgaria and Tito's Yugoslavia. In his mind this arrangement should be completed by a unified and non-socialist Germany. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 196) (IMG)

Hence in late December of 1952, when the agriculture of East Germany was already being damaged by the unfavorable weather, Beria met with some of Nazi Germany's officials, including Erwin Respondek and Joseph Wirth. This fact was reported to the CIA by Wirth:

Dr. Joseph Wirth, a former German chancellor, claims that he saw Lavrenti Beria in Berlin-Karlshorst in December 1952. The arrangements for the meeting were made by Dr. Erwin Respondek, formerly of the German Foreign Service, who was also present at the interview.

Wirth alleges that he has been asked to take over an important post in a new East German government which, he was told, will be established soon. He was told by Beria that the Russians are planning a new policy toward Germany, and was asked to collaborate in it. (Meeting between Wirth and Beria, CIA, July 7, 1953, p. 1) (IMG)

Erwin Respondek had been a high-ranking Nazi German official who had spied for the Americans, as shown in C10S4. With Respondek was Wirth. As a leading member of the German 'Centre Party', Joseph Wirth had officially supported the Enabling Act, the act which was to give the Nazi leaders the tyrannical powers they obtained after the Reichstag Fire. Wirth and others voted along the Nazis in its favor:

What little resistance there remained among Center Party parliamentarians to the Enabling Act dissipated, leading even Bruning and like-minded Catholic politicians such as Joseph Wirth to fall into line and vote with the Hitler government. (Soldier of Christ: The Life of Pope Pius XII, Robert A. Ventresca, p. 79) (IMG)

As can be seen, a new policy by Beria had begun with regards to East Germany. The conquest of power and the assassination of Stalin by Beria and the Titoist faction created new opportunities for Beria in the plot to overthrow the government of East Germany. Upon seizing power in March 1953, the Titoist faction in the Soviet Union drafted new documents dictating for the reversal of socialization. Against the pressure of the Titoist faction in Moscow, the SED refused to pursue the reversal of the socialization, but inevitably unable to confront the Moscow-based Titoists with utmost vigour, the SED drafted a document that called for a slowdown of socialization and some reforms. The Moscow-based Titoists were furious and Beria began to insult Ulbricht for drafting a document of mere slowdown reforms in response, as opposed to the complete reversal of the socialization course undertaken. Christian Ostermann, a leading official and scholar of the CIA's front think tank Wilson Center, wrote:

According to the memoirs of SED Politburo member Rudolf Herrnstadt, the editor of the party organ Neues Deutschland, the SED leaders had to take quite a beating as all of the Soviet comrades rejected the superficial draft. Beria displayed particular aggressiveness, allegedly throwing the documents at Ulbricht across the table with the words: "This is a bad remake of our document!"

The Soviet leaders acknowledged that "we all have made mistakes" and that the recommendations were not meant as "accusations," but insisted that "everything has to be based on a change in the conditions in the G.D.R." Demanding that the SED leaders should "not worry about [their] prestige," Malenkov warned that "if we don't correct [the political line] now, a catastrophe will happen." The Soviet leaders appealed to the Germans to "correct fast and vigorously."

(*"This Is Not A Politburo, But A Madhouse": The Post-Stalin Succession Struggle, Soviet Deutschlandpolitik and the SED: New Evidence from Russian, German, and Hungarian Archives*, COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT, Bulletin 10, Christian F. Ostermann, p. 66) (IMG)

Had the communist faction maintained dominance over the Politburo, the USSR would have rendered generous assistance to the East Germans against the poor agricultural conditions, much as how the USSR did this to Czechoslovakia in 1949-1951 (see C15S8). However, the Titoist bullies were in power, and hence aid to communists was not coming. The East Germans were, in the words of a book published by the Harvard University Press,:

Unable to obtain aid from the Soviet Union.... (From *Nazism to Communism: German Schoolteachers Under Two Dictatorships*, Harvard University Press, Charles B. Lansing, 2010, p. 207) (IMG)

On the one hand, the communist workers' faction of the SED, headed by Ulbricht, was isolated by the Kremlin Titoists, and the East German People's Democracy was defunded. On the other hand, the Kremlin Titoists continued to assist the Titoist and Kautskyite elements of the SED. Indeed, one of Beria's top agents in East Germany was Zaisser, who supported the handing over of East Germany to West Germany:

In so far as Beria is concerned, there is evidence that Stalin's erstwhile henchman strongly advocated a moderate economic policy for all of Eastern Europe in order to stabilize Central Europe and head off West German rearmament. He supported a group within the East German leadership led by Minister for State Security Zaisser. Zaisser ... called for a remodeling of the Socialist Unity Party into an all-German labor party and for negotiations on reunification, on the assumption that it was impossible to build Socialism in a divided country. (*SOVIET POLICY TOWARD GERMANY, 1952-1954*, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), May 31, 1963, p. 6) (IMG)

The call for the reversal of socialization and the westward strategic reorientation of Germany by the Moscow Titoists also helped the Kautskyite SPD grouping in the SED, which during the Stalin era had been reduced to a minority dominated by the communist workers' faction. In the newly arising conditions, the Kautskyites gained the upper hand and the power of Grotewohl – the representative of the German SPD contingent of the SED – and the SPD contingent in general was boosted against the communist workers' faction within the SED led by Ulbricht:

In East Germany, US officials were quick to notice in the days following Stalin's death that Walter Ulbricht was taking special pains to straighten out his record. His 8 March policy statement, published in the East German press prior to Malenkov's funeral oration, attributed to Stalin's guidance policies that Ulbricht had long espoused. At the same time at a late March meeting of the Soviet Control Commission [headed by Semenev] Grotewohl had criticized the SED Central Committee and, indirectly, Ulbricht for failure to meet successfully the problems of reparations, refugees and consumer goods shortages. The relative mildness of East German reaction to West German Bundestag ratification of the EDC and the contractual agreements was taken at the time as a possible indication that Ulbricht's strong policies were less acceptable than they had been previously. (*GERMANY*, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), July 16, 1953, p. 1) (IMG)

Beria's goal with regards to all of the Peoples' Democracies was to promote the Kautskyite ('socialist') elements in some of the popular fronts at the expense of the communists:

My father told us that he was now going to succeed in applying the policy which he had wanted to apply after the war and which Stalin had prevented: to go back to governments of coalition with the socialists and to withdraw our troops from Central Europe. (*Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin*, Sergo Beria, p. 264) (IMG)

When the Grotewohl faction's influence increased,:

The East Germans recently invited the West German Socialist Party to send a commission to East Germany to cooperate with the Socialist Unity Party. (*CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN*, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), March 20, 1953, p. 6) (IMG)

Thus, West German imperialist agents who called themselves "social democrats" were invited into East Germany. Against this set-up, later on,:

On 5 May Ulbricht continued his hard line when he bitterly denounced the West German Socialists as traitors to the working class despite their opposition to the Bonn and Paris treaties. Ulbricht's propaganda tactic of basing the unity campaign on the ... thesis that an increasingly communized East Germany would become more attractive to West Germans demonstrated an inflexibility inconsistent with the emphasis being given to the German unity campaign in statements emanating from Moscow. (*GERMANY*, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), July 16, 1953, p. 2) (IMG)

In the meantime, in the absence of Soviet aid, and the constant lobbying of the Kremlin Titoists, the best response for East Germany was to strengthen itself against imperialists on the one hand and Titoist stabs in the back on the other hand. East Germany needed its economy improved so to alleviate the economic problems resultant from a lack of Soviet aid on the one hand and the poor harvest and natural weather problems, and to strengthen the influence of communists over the state in the face of imperialist and Titoist pressures. Thus, it was necessary to end the artificially low work norms which had reduced productivity. As such, the norms were increased by 10%. A book published by the Harvard University Press stated:

Aware that previous attempts at raising the traditionally low work norms by means of collective work agreements had failed, East German officials unleashed a massive campaign to introduce what they called "technically determined work norms," culminating in May 1953 with the state decreeing a 10 percent increase in the workers' quotas. Since many workers relied on the bonuses that came with the regular overfulfillment of artificially low work norms, the announced increase represented a potential 25 to 30 percent cut in real wages. (From *Nazism to Communism: German Schoolteachers Under Two Dictatorships*, Harvard University Press, Charles B. Lansing, 2010, p. 207) (IMG)

As confirmed by Helene Seppain of the CIA's Wilson Center, Semenev was a Beria agent:

A Malenkov-Beria man, Semyonov saw his task as keeping a reunified Germany disarmed. (*Contrasting US and German Attitudes to Soviet Trade, 1917-91: Politics by Economic Means*, Helene Seppain (former Wilson Center scholar), 1992, p. 108) (IMG)

As a top representative of the Moscow Titoists, Semenev was a key agent bringing the Titoist 'New Course' and conspiring to undermine Ulbricht and his communist workers' faction in the SED:

We now know that Semenev returned to East Berlin with a "new course." Moscow was prepared to sacrifice Ulbricht, or at least downgrade him.... ('SOVIET POLICY TOWARD GERMANY, 1952-1954', CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), May 31, 1963, p. 5) (IMG)

The stab in the back of the East German communists by the Kremlin Titoists helped the renegades in the SED to step up their comprador bourgeois 'criticism' of the socialization and collectivization policies of East Germany, while blaming these matters on Ulbricht's supposed 'dictatorial style':

Grotewohl's notes of the June 2-4 Kremlin meetings do not reflect any personal criticism of Ulbricht, who had stood for the accelerated socialization program. Following their return to Berlin on June 5, however, discussion within the SED Politburo of how and when to publicize the New Course document quickly turned into criticism of Ulbricht's dictatorial leadership style. During SED Politburo meetings on June 6 and 9, fellow Politburo members vented their dissatisfaction with Ulbricht's personality cult and management of the Secretariat. ('"This Is Not A Politburo, But A Madhouse": The Post-Stalin Succession Struggle, Soviet Deutschlandpolitik and the SED: New Evidence from Russian, German, and Hungarian Archives', COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT, Bulletin 10, Christian F. Ostermann, p. 66) (IMG)

Now to be sure, the right to criticize and express opinions is something that all communists should support, and so, the fact that these renegades had the legal right to criticize in the democratic centralism manner is a good thing, but their 'criticism' itself was baseless and anti-scientific.

In this counter-revolutionary ritual of advancing Kremlin Titoist interests through 'criticism':

Semenev, who had returned with the SED delegation from Moscow and participated in the sessions, seemed increasingly inclined to support Ulbricht's critics. ('"This Is Not A Politburo, But A Madhouse": The Post-Stalin Succession Struggle, Soviet Deutschlandpolitik and the SED: New Evidence from Russian, German, and Hungarian Archives', COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT, Bulletin 10, Christian F. Ostermann, p. 66) (IMG)

Finally:

The Politburo finally decided to draw up a comprehensive statement on "the self-criticism of the work of the Politburo and the Secretariat" which would be presented to the CPSU Central Committee Presidium. It also resolved to set up a commission, composed of Ulbricht, State Security chief Wilhelm Zaisser, Oelßner, Herrstadt, and Berlin SED boss Hans Jendretzky, to "prepare an organizational reform of the working methods of the Politburo and Secretariat." ('"This Is Not A Politburo, But A Madhouse": The Post-Stalin Succession Struggle, Soviet Deutschlandpolitik and the SED: New Evidence from Russian, German, and Hungarian Archives', COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT, Bulletin 10, Christian F. Ostermann, p. 66) (IMG)

So much for the supposedly 'democratic' mindset of the Titoist assassins at the helm of the CPSU, the East German leaders were ordered to reverse course, and to swiftly impose this New Course on the rest of the Party from above. The communists in SED leadership opposed such a dictatorial behavior but there was so little they could do in the face of the much-mightier Moscow-based Titoist bullies who held many more strings than they did:

Most Politburo members agreed that the announcement of the New Course program warranted careful preparation of the party and the population at large, but Semenev urged speedy implementation of Moscow's instructions. When, on the evening of June 10, Herrstadt pleaded with Semenev to give the SED two week's time to prepare the policy change, the High Commissioner insisted that "the communiqué has to be in the paper tomorrow, warning the Neues Deutschland editor that "you may not have a state for much longer." Heeding Semenev's order, the Politburo announced the "New Course" liberalization program in Neues Deutschland on June 11. As expected by Herrstadt and others, the communiqué with its frank admission of past mistakes came as a surprise to many in and out of the party. Reports from local party organizations, carefully monitored by the SED headquarters in Berlin indicated with great candor the widespread disappointment, disbelief, confusion and shock within party ranks as well as the populace. To many, the communiqué signaled the SED's final bankruptcy and the beginning of its demise. Party members felt betrayed and "panicky".... ('"This Is Not A Politburo, But A Madhouse": The Post-Stalin Succession Struggle, Soviet Deutschlandpolitik and the SED: New Evidence from Russian, German, and Hungarian Archives', COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT, Bulletin 10, Christian F. Ostermann, p. 67) (IMG)

The Kremlin Titoists were forcing this Titoist New Course, as a means of capitulating to the US-led bloc of Atlantic powers:

The decisions of the Political Bureau of the SED and the government order of 11 June 1953, in which the change of course was made definite, unquestionably followed as a result of Semenev's directions. Semenev wanted to get rid of the obstacles to an understanding with the West, which obstacles were, in his opinion, obvious enough. (CHRONOLOGY AND ORDER OF BATTLE IN SOVIET ZONE/JUNE 1953 UPRISING, CIA, December 14, 1953, p. 5) (IMG)

Crucially, the New Course imposed by Kremlin Titoists was to sabotage East German industrial reconstruction and rearmament efforts through the shift of emphasis away from heavy industry onto light industry, and hence through the de-emphasis of the development of the industrial backbone to the society and military. This new policy line would have of course also prevented the expansion of the working class base in East Germany, hence weakening communist influence there. According to Ostermann, an intelligence report to the Kruglov (a Beria agent) stated that almost everyone in the SED Politburo, foremost among them Ulbricht himself, opposed the shift away from heavy industry to the consumer goods sector:

A recently declassified report to the USSR Minister of Internal Affairs [and Beria agent] S. Kruglov by the KGB deputy resident in Berlin, Ivan Fadeikin, throws new light on the events within the SED Politburo. In a June 30 conversation with Soviet officials, the GDR Minister of Trade and Supply Curt Wach reported on the opposition which the New Course instructions from Moscow, particularly the shift of resources from the heavy to consumer goods industries, had encountered within the SED Politburo on June 9. Just about everybody seemed to oppose a plan tabled by the Minister of Machine Construction, Hermann Rau according to which 1.3 billion marks would be reallocated to light industries. Key members of the SED leadership — Rau himself, Wilhelm Leuschner, Chairman of the State Planning Commission, Fritz Selbmann, Minister for the Ore-Mining Industry, Fred Oelßner, Anton Ackermann — opposed the plan to cut back on heavy industry. According to Wach, Ulbricht most vehemently spoke out against the plan, arguing that "[w]e cannot free up such resources. Rau's plan disorganizes the national economy, and our economy is already disorganized as it is." ('"This Is Not A Politburo, But A Madhouse": The Post-Stalin Succession Struggle, Soviet Deutschlandpolitik and the SED: New Evidence from Russian,

German, and Hungarian Archives', COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT, Bulletin 10, Christian F. Ostermann, p. 66) (IMG)

Nonetheless, with the pressure of Semenev and other Kremlin Titoists, this policy was enforced for the time being:

If the 9 June SED course of action is implemented, as indicated by Grotewohl on 21 June, the East German quest for economic self-sufficiency, premised on build-up heavy industry at expense consumer goods production, in effect has been scrapped. This bound to shift weight of importance from industrial proletariat to farmers and consumer goods producers entailing serious weakening SED influence in its role as vanguard industrial proletariat. This in turn tends weaken Soviet hold over east zone populace. (CIA BERLIN ANALYSIS OF UPRISING IN EAST GERMANY, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), No. 4511, July 8, 1953, p. 3) (IMG)

With the blessing of the Moscow Titoists, the Kautskyite renegade from the Second International, Grotewohl, took steps to promote the Evangelical Church, the infamously CIA-backed church that promoted an anti-Semitic neoconservative Christian Zionist messianist vision of the world:

On 10 June 1953 there was a statement by the representatives of the Soviet Zone, with Prime Minister Grotewohl at their head, during the course of a conversation with Bishop Dibelius and five bishops from the Soviet Zone of the Evangelical Church, that all measures hostile to the church in the Soviet Zone Republic would be adjusted, they declared themselves ready to guarantee the independence of church affairs according to the provisions of the constitution. (...). The agreement with the Evangelical bishops of the Soviet Zone, looking to the abandonment of the attack on the churches which had taken place the day before, was expressly confirmed. (CHRONOLOGY AND ORDER OF BATTLE IN SOVIET ZONE/JUNE 1953 UPRISING, CIA, December 14, 1953, p. 3) (IMG)

Then,:

The "new course" which Semenov had commenced was put into effect by a series of further measures by the Soviet administration. (CHRONOLOGY AND ORDER OF BATTLE IN SOVIET ZONE/JUNE 1953 UPRISING, CIA, December 14, 1953, p. 4) (IMG)

In order to undermine East Germany's military defenses, one of the first measures undertaken by the Moscow Titoist agents in East Germany was to impose the end of the paramilitary training in the 'Society for Sport and Technique', as part of the program to capitulate to the West:

The paramilitary GST-training (GST = Gesellschaft für Sport und Technik) was stopped at once. On 17 June 1953 it was arranged that, when resumed, this training was to proceed only in accord with certain special measures. The decision not to continue the GST-training, in the form hitherto used, was announced in instructions for agitators on 8 and 11 June 1953. It was further stated that the relaxation of tension now appearing in the realm of higher politics must not be disturbed by any false steps of a militant-political nature. This decision was emphasized in the report of a dissolution at the district headquarters of the GST on 12 June 1953. (CHRONOLOGY AND ORDER OF BATTLE IN SOVIET ZONE/JUNE 1953 UPRISING, CIA, December 14, 1953, p. 4) (IMG)

And:

All work in the construction project at Ruegen harbor was stopped on 11 June 1953, on orders of the Ministerial Council of the Soviet Zone. The continuation of security work at the projects under construction was to be closed down until 31 August 1953. Only a temporary halt in the work seemed to be involved, however. (CHRONOLOGY AND ORDER OF BATTLE IN SOVIET ZONE/JUNE 1953 UPRISING, CIA, December 14, 1953, p. 4) (IMG)

The KVP, which was a military force recruiting predominantly out of the Nazi German POWs in the USSR, was an unreliable institution but could nonetheless be useful in the transfer of military knowledge and expertise to the communists in East Germany. Under the New Course, however, the transfer of military knowledge to East German communists from these former Nazi German POWs ceased:

The change in course by the Soviet Zone administration in the first half of June 1953 ... also affected the Volkspolizei in various ways:

a) Limitation of the buildings of the KVP.

b) Breaking off of the military training of 18 to 30 year old members of the SED and FDJ, already being carried out by the KVP.

(CHRONOLOGY AND ORDER OF BATTLE IN SOVIET ZONE/JUNE 1953 UPRISING, CIA, December 14, 1953, p. 21) (IMG)

While the defense, security apparatus, and economy of East Germany was being systematically undermined by the Beria agent Semenev and other Moscow Titoist agents assisting him, the SED also lost prestige as a result of the New Course. Thus, some SED members:

called for Ulbricht's resignation. Many thought the SED retreat from crash socialization resulted from pressure by the West German government under Konrad Adenauer and the Western powers, evidenced by such reports as the one from the small town of Seehausen where "the entire village is in the bar, drinking to the health of Adenauer." To make matters worse, the only segment of the population which seemed to have been excluded from the New Course liberalization were — paradoxically — the workers: the raised work norms arbitrarily imposed on May 28 remained in force. Labor dissatisfaction was further fueled when the SED regime, groping to maintain its authority, confirmed the controversial norm increases on June 13. ("This Is Not A Politburo, But A Madhouse": The Post-Stalin Succession Struggle, Soviet Deutschlandpolitik and the SED: New Evidence from Russian, German, and Hungarian Archives', COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT, Bulletin 10, Christian F. Ostermann, p. 67) (IMG)

In terms of the psychological warfare, therefore, on the one hand the SED had retreated in the face of the comprador bourgeois ideology, and on the other hand, the workers were to work for higher norms, norms which surely were justified economically, but which were used as excuse for launching a colour revolution.

The American intelligence service definitely had a hand in promoting this colour revolution. Colour revolutions are launched obviously not through paying every single protester to come into the streets, but rather through constant propaganda work and psychological warfare, which serves as the arousal factor driving some of the ordinary individuals into the streets to clash with the People's Democracy.

The economic situation in the neighbouring Peoples' Democracies was not so dissimilar to that of East Germany. Poland and Czechoslovakia faced trouble in their agriculture due to the unfavorable weather conditions, as noted by the CIA. Yet, in spite of this fact, the colour revolution occurred in East Germany, but not in other People's Democracies at the time. Indeed, the CIA admitted that the belief that large-scale protests were simultaneously occurring in other Peoples' Democracies is groundless:

Western reports of large-scale demonstrations in Poland as an aftermath of the East German riots are denied by US embassy officials in Warsaw. They report that the situation is calm in Warsaw, and they noted no evidence of demonstrations or increased security precautions during the trips through, central, northern and southwestern Poland in late June.

Similarly, reports of strikes and demonstrations throughout the other Satellites are unconfirmed and probably untrue.

(NSC Briefing: EAST GERMANY, CIA/NSC, July 8, 1953, p. 10) (IMG)

While there were rumours that in Poland there was unrest as well,:

US embassy in Warsaw denied unrest and martial law in Poland. (CHRONOLOGY OF RECENT EVENTS IN THE SOVIET ORBIT, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), July 14, 1953, p. 4) (IMG)

Why did the protests happen in East Germany at the time and not in other places?

It is indeed the case that in East Germany, a large percentage of the German workers had a high level of respect for communism. Indeed, on the esteem for communism among the German workers, the US intelligence had reported:

The esteem for Communism among the German workers rose considerably during the Spanish Civil War – a crucial period in Europe; it declined sharply during the German-Russian non-aggression pact, and climbed steeply with the decline of Germany's military fortunes on her Eastern Front. (THE FREE GERMANY MANIFESTO AND THE GERMAN PEOPLE, Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Branch of Research and Analysis (R&A#1033), Europe-Africa Division, Psychological Warfare Subdivision, Central European Section, August 6, 1943, p. 19) (IMG{Soviet Intelligence in Nazi Germany})

The 'Hitlerite majority' in Germany was primarily concentrated in and emanating from the agrarian petit-bourgeois areas, located mainly in southern Germany, unlike in north German, which was industrialized, proletarianized, and historically a zone of anti-Hitlerite uprisings such as the Stennes rebellion (see C10S7). Hitler's lieutenant, Hermann Rauschning, recalled:

Hitler's nature was incomprehensible to the North German. (Hitler Speaks, Hermann Rauschning, 1939, p. 165) (IMG{Soviet Intelligence in Nazi Germany})

East Germany, located to the northeast of Germany, was proletarian-populated territory alien to Hitlerism. Furthermore, the German proletarians were immensely satisfied with the conditions in which they lived, as late as November 12, 1952 in East Germany:

There is much satisfaction with improvement in living standards, the greater range of goods offered, and the somewhat easier work tempo. A great number of special privileges are given to the working intellectuals, to labor heroes and master peasants, and the prizes or orders these person get are accompanied by material, cultural, and educational privileges. The great number of vacation homes for these elite and their children were mentioned most approvingly, and the division of the population into the followers of the regime, enjoying these privileges, and the others, the loafers and idlers has been very well adapted to German mentality. A point of pride is the new housing projects in East Berlin, especially the Stalinalle. All new apartments will be reserved for the elite, and this is an attractive form of social pressure. (SED and East German Communist Views on Unification, CIA, November 12, 1952, p. 2) (IMG)

All of this then begs the question: why the colour revolution in East Germany at the time? Had the colour revolution encompassed the entirety, majority, or even just slightly less than 50% of the East German working class, the colour revolution would have been far more widespread, far mightier, and far more difficult to put an end to. The colour revolution clearly was not such, and, considering the pro-communist attitudes of a significantly large percentage of the German proletarians, it is clear that the colour revolutionary uprising did not recruit as large of a mass of the German proletarians as the Anglo-American media has claimed. Nonetheless, inevitably, a certain percentage of the German workers, immensely influenced by the propaganda of the Hitlerian years, continued to retain their militantly anti-Soviet views and were very easy to agitate into colour revolutionary action against the People's Democratic state of East Germany. Any kind of a shock, be it economic or political, had the potential for sparking protests by them, although naturally, the economic shocks were more effective for agitation among the workers. The sudden decline of the East German economy in the year 1953 as a result of the poor weather conditions coupled with the backstabbing of the Moscow Titoists severely deteriorated the German economy enough to spark some protests.

The protests would not have expanded into major riots, unless with the propaganda and agitation of the CIA-MI6 media outlets. Several documents prove that the colour revolution was instigated by the propaganda and intelligence apparatus of the Anglo-American imperialists. A major CIA document confirmed that the colour revolutionary workers were 'summoned by the West' into the streets, The US intelligence document stated:

The main factor was the body of workers of the Soviet Zone, free from bourgeois struggles for security but driven to the limit. Summoned by the West and emerging for the first time from their eight-year submission to a system of organized isolation, they became aware of their revolutionary strength, though occasionally overestimating the real possibilities in changed mood. (CHRONOLOGY AND ORDER OF BATTLE IN SOVIET ZONE/JUNE 1953 UPRISING, CIA, December 14, 1953, p. 23) (IMG)

The psychological and media warfare operation for spreading the riots to outside of Berlin so to bog down Red Army troops outside Berlin, was done by the 'Radio in the American Sector' (Rundfunk im Amerikanischen Sektor – RIAS). Describing the establishment of the RIAS, the US State Department stated:

RIAS, the official radio station of the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, was established to provide a mass medium of expression for the democratic West in Berlin and the Soviet Zone.

In the fall of 1945, when it became apparent at the outset of quadripartite relations that the Soviets would not relinquish unilateral control of Radio Berlin, the Americans decided to establish their own radio service. This service went into operation on February 7, 1946....

(RIAS [Radio in American Sector] Berlin, US State Department, 1953, p. 2) (IMG)

US intelligence agent and prominent Wilson Center scholar Christian Osterman admitted that the RIAS was instrumental on spreading the riots:

RIAS' broadcasts were instrumental in quickly spreading the riots from Berlin to more remote areas of the GDR.... ("Keeping the Pot Simmering": The United States and the East German Uprising of 1953', Christian F. Ostermann (National Security Archive, Washington), German Studies Review, Vol. 19, No. 1 (February 1996), Published By: The Johns Hopkins University Press, p. 66) (IMG)

RIAS was located in West Germany and West Berlin. The Anglo-American intelligence presence in Berlin no doubt assisted the propaganda process. In an abbreviated report, the CIA/NSC reported that West Berlin served as a secure base of Anglo-American and West German intelligence services, provided a safe haven for anti-GDR elements, and kept up the 'resistance' spirit of the populations:

Spontaneity [of the] uprising [is] not detracting from essential role played by West Berlin, symbol free society, offering sanctuary to persecuted, secure base [of] allied and German information and cold war agencies. Uprisings vindicate US and British policy hold on to Berlin even at risk [of] World War III and tribute to foresightedness [of] those who persisted [in] keeping alive resistance spirit [of the] east zone populace by all methods short of direct intervention. (CIA BERLIN ANALYSIS OF UPRISING IN EAST GERMANY, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), No. 4511, July 8, 1953, p. 4) (IMG)

All of these points made in the above CIA/NSC quote would seem too trivial to need to be mentioned, since Anglo-American intelligence and propaganda presence and activity against East Germany was a constant factor anyways. However, there is more to the story behind the above quote,

than may at first appear. The other US intelligence document provided more precise details as to how West Berlin kept up the 'resistance spirit' and provided a hub for counter-revolutionaries. The intelligence document not only reaffirmed the crucial role played by RIAS in fomenting the colour revolution, but also stated that 'strike commandos' moved to Berlin to gain access to the riot's leadership center:

Spread of the Revolt in the Zone:

[N]ews of the beginning of the disturbances in East Berlin had already reached all cities in the Soviet Zone on 16 June 1953. On one side they were quickly spread everywhere by RIAS and other Western Zone radio stations, on the other side by railroad men, chauffeurs, and travelers. In many cities, the news from East Berlin led to immediate preparations for strikes and demonstrations, on 17 June 1953. In the Leuna-Werke, strike commandos decided to go to Berlin and share the demonstrations there. They supposed – as did many other demonstrating groups – that there was a central direction in Berlin guiding the revolt in the whole zone. The Leuna workers wanted to get in touch with this center. On 17 June 1953, however, they were prevented from going farther on their way through the Soviet troops. (CHRONOLOGY AND ORDER OF BATTLE IN SOVIET ZONE/JUNE 1953 UPRISING, CIA, December 14, 1953, p. 12) (IMG)

There was indeed leadership shown by CIA operatives in carrying out further labour unrest and sabotaging East German industry. One of the most important American mainstream news media outlets was 'The Saturday Evening Post', journalists of which interviewed anonymous top CIA officials and congressional intelligence committee staff. A US intelligence official interviewed made a very important remark in 1954 regarding the intelligence activity of the CIA:

Q[uestion]: Does CIA co-operate with anti-communist resistance and freedom movements in the satellite countries and in nations threatened by Red subversion?

A[nsWER]: Besides its spy network and the open CIA function of research, the agency operates a superclandestine third force – the top-secret activity of aiding and abetting freedom forces where the patriotism of captive peoples may be fanned from a spark into action.

In one satellite, where factory workers were grousing about Red pay cuts and stepped-up norms, an agent trained in the technique of labor organizations promoted work slowdowns.

(THE MYSTERIOUS DOINGS OF THE CIA: America's Secret Agents: Part Two, The Saturday Evening Post, Richard Harkness, Gladys Harkness, November 6, 1954, p. 67. In: CIA archives) (IMG{GDR})

Until November 1954, at least, there was clearly only one so-called 'satellite' that had an uprising by 'factory workers' against 'Red pay cuts and stepped-up norms', and that was the German Democratic Republic. Without naming East Germany, the CIA official above is admitting that the CIA 'promoted work slowdowns' in East Germany, which shows that the high level of organization in the June 1953 colour revolution was no coincidence, but was the work of the US intelligence.

The uprising furthermore was admitted by the CIA's Office of Current Intelligence (OCI) to have seemingly had good leadership by experienced tacticians:

local uprising in some instances said to have shown remarkable degree organization, suggesting ad hoc leadership by experienced tacticians and good mass discipline. (CIA BERLIN ANALYSIS OF UPRISING IN EAST GERMANY, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), No. 4511, July 8, 1953, p. 2) (IMG)

The above pieces of evidence fully confirm the role played by RIAS in fomenting the colour revolution, and the Atlantic camp in 'summoning' the colour revolutionaries into the streets. The documents almost confirm - but not fully confirm - that there were operatives on the ground, in the field, in East Germany leading the sabotage and worker unrest.

While the reader may be tempted to assume that the colour revolution was launched directly for the purpose of the immediate collapse of the East German government, this assumption is not correct. This colour revolution in fact was launched for the purpose not of immediately yielding the full and thorough collapse of the incumbent government, but for the purpose of gathering the mass force which rolls back the dominant faction, the progressive faction, of the Red Army and the East German government while elevating the Titoist agents fascism inside the German government so that these Titoist agents would be able to more smoothly pursue their Titoization agenda. The American intelligence and propaganda apparatus, through fomenting such a colour revolutionary uprising was creating the required 'pressure from below' with which to give the Titoists in the USSR and East Germany greater leverage in forcing upon the communist faction the advancement of even more Titoist reforms. This is why the Kremlin Titoists, recognizing the importance of the CIA colour revolution objectives, supported the colour revolutionary protests. The class interests of the Titoists representing the bureaucrats, the kulaks, and the comprador mercantile capital were fully aligned with the class interests of Anglo-American finance capital, for they all were waging a class war against the proletariat and the kolkhoz peasantry.

No doubt the right to criticize is a democratic right to be cherished by communists, but Semenev's 'Soviet High Commission' was trying to utilize the criticism in the form of demonstrations as a pressure from below with which to undermine the previous 'course of the government and the SED', hence to promote the revisionist New Course. Referring to the attitude of Semenev's 'Soviet High Commission' towards the demonstrations, the CIA confirmed:

the Soviet High Commission ... was inclined to a demonstrative criticism of the previous course of the government and the SED, which was to be reoriented on the "people's opinion." (CHRONOLOGY AND ORDER OF BATTLE IN SOVIET ZONE/JUNE 1953 UPRISING, CIA, December 14, 1953, p. 11) (IMG)

Semenev was of course an agent of Beria and Beria was an agent of Britain and Israel, hence it being natural for them to support a CIA colour revolution that could impose from below the Titoist 'New Course' on SED.

To provoke violent riots, it was also strategically necessary for the Titoists to give the colour revolution the martyrs it needed for the latter to gain the excuse for violence of epic proportions. The savagery and liberality shown by the KVP, a military and security institution controlled by the Beria agent Zaisser was in line with this objective. The KVP, which was formed by the Nazi German POWs in Soviet camps and was under the direct legal and political control of Zaisser's Interior Ministry, was naturally a highly unreliable institute filled with diversionaries. David Childs – the fellow at the Royal Society of Art and the history scholar who won awards from the German foreign ministry for his research on East Germany – wrote:

the KVP was under the command of ... Wilhelm Zaisser and Heinz Hoffmann. Both had served in the International Brigades in Spain....

('The GDR (RLE: German Politics): Moscow's German Ally', David Childs, 2015, p. 271) (IMG)

The diversionary and pro-imperialist saboteurial character of Zaisser's KVP is exposed in the fact that on the one hand, Zaisser's KVP terrorized protesters 'recklessly', thereby provoking more riots, and on the other hand, showed huge leniency towards the riots through outright desertions once the riots were provoked into existence. The CIA reported:

Information regarding [the KVP] runs all the way from desertion to reckless firing. The reports that have come in strongly suggest that the KVP could not be relied upon in case of internal trouble, at least not to the degree of the Soviet authorities. (CHRONOLOGY AND ORDER OF BATTLE IN SOVIET ZONE/JUNE 1953 UPRISING, CIA, December 14, 1953, p. 23) (IMG)

The pincer assault of the KVP's rogues against the socialist forces was a reflection of the Beria-Zaisser network's strategy of combat against People's Democratic Germany. The policy of simultaneously (1) sowing terror for provoking colour revolutions and (2) liberality towards colour revolutions in East Germany was the strategy masterminded in this case by Beria. On the one hand, Beria, through Semenev, was imposing upon the East Germans liberality towards reaction. He used Zaisser to this end:

In so far as Beria is concerned, there is evidence that Stalin's erstwhile henchman strongly advocated a moderate economic policy for all of Eastern Europe in order to stabilize Central Europe and head off West German rearmament. He supported a group within the East German leadership led by Minister for State Security Zaisser. Zaisser ... called for a remodeling of the Socialist Unity Party into an all-German labor party and for negotiations on reunification, on the assumption that it was impossible to build Socialism in a divided country. ('SOVIET POLICY TOWARD GERMANY, 1952-1954', CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), May 31, 1963, p. 6) (IMG)

On the other hand, that same 'liberal' Beria was promoting an extremely vicious 'crackdown' on the protesters, so to provoke more riots. Molotov recalled in his memoirs:

Let the Germans rise up against us?! Everything would have turned shaky, the imperialists would have taken action. There would have been a total collapse.

As soon as reports of the events in the GDR started to come in, Beria was among the first to say, "We must act! Unhesitatingly! Ruthlessly! Most urgently!"

(Molotov Remembers, Interviewer: Feliks Chuev, Interviewee: V. Molotov, p. 380) (IMG)

In these conditions, the violent riots quickly spread, with terror attacks targeting and shaking the foundation of East Germany's security. The following are only some of the many examples provided by US intelligence regarding violent riots in different East German cities:

f) Goerlitz: Prison seized by demonstrators. Prisoners freed. Burgomaster thrown out of his office.

g) Jena: The building of the SSD was demolished by rioters and attacked by the crowd. Political prisoners were freed, documents burned.

h) Quedlinburg: Demonstrations began as early as 6 a.m. on 17 June 1953. SSD building in Breitscheidstrasse seized, documents destroyed. District police station occupied. Police commandos disarmed and locked in the cellars. House of the DFB (Demokratischer Frauenbund) and the House of Freedom taken. One Soviet officer and two Soviet soldiers disarmed by the crowd and thrown out of the windows. All three probably killed. Soviet measures of retaliation and numerous arrests.

i) Rathenow: Starting point of demonstrations on 17 June 1953 was the Optical Works. The SED offices were occupied by rioters, documents burned. SSD official Hagedorn killed by the mob.

j) Rosslau: Assault on the prison by demonstrators. One hundred eighty prisoners freed.

k) Rostock-Warnemunde: Revolt of the workmen in Rostock in the Dieselmotor Works (VEB) in Rostock on 17 June 1953. Numerous machines rendered useless, fire in several workshops. Damage to equipment about 500,000 DM, according to estimate. Resumption of production will not be possible for three to four weeks. VoPo assault units stoned.

(CHRONOLOGY AND ORDER OF BATTLE IN SOVIET ZONE/JUNE 1953 UPRISING, CIA, December 14, 1953, p. 16) (IMG)

In some cities there were encounters quite as serious as those in East Berlin. The demonstrators did not confine themselves to processions and fights with the SED and the VoPo, but stormed administration buildings, SED-Centrals, police stations, prisons, and jails. In many places houses and documents were burned. In several cases VoPos and SED members, especially officials of the SSD, were killed.

(CHRONOLOGY AND ORDER OF BATTLE IN SOVIET ZONE/JUNE 1953 UPRISING, CIA, December 14, 1953, p. 13) (IMG)

Through the launching of these terrorist attacks on the East German military, security, intelligence, police, etc. units, the rioters furthered the agenda of the Kremlin Titoists, namely to weaken the East German defenses and security to render it easier to be devoured by West Germany. The colour revolutionary stab from the front against East Germany was to accompany the Moscow Titoist stab from the back.

The vast series of the counter-revolutionary policies pursued by the Beria group had a vigilance-raising effect on the Soviet counter-intelligence and military personnel. Beria, who had a positive reputation among many Soviet state personnel, was by then despised by many of the same personnel, as mentioned before. Hence, the vigilance-raising effect led to the quick counter-measures by the communist faction in the Soviet intelligence and military bodies. In response to the disaster in East Germany,:

the Soviet leaders allied themselves against Beria in Moscow. Beria's "radical notions" evidently were made known to the Communist bloc elite soon after his fall. ('SOVIET POLICY TOWARD GERMANY, 1952-1954', CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), May 31, 1963, p. 6) (IMG)

Had Beria's ally Khrushchev sided with Beria at this point, Khrushchev would have fallen with Beria soon. Knowing this, Khrushchev decided to overtly take a stance against his covert friend. Thus:

Khrushchev and Ulbricht have since accused Beria and Malenkov of advocating in early 1953 a policy which they charge would have led to abandonment of East Germany. ('SOVIET POLICY TOWARD GERMANY, 1952-1954', CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), May 31, 1963, p. 6) (IMG)

In this new situation, in East Germany, some of the Beriaites were cracked down upon:

After Beria's downfall the remaining Soviet leaders moved to restore Ulbricht's primacy in East Germany. Ulbricht pounced on Beria's proteges in his party, accusing them of treachery to the party and its program. At the 15th SED central committee plenum in July 1953, he publicly linked Beria with Zaisser and his clique; The Soviet leadership renewed its endorsement of Ulbricht during an August 1953 visit to Moscow. ('SOVIET POLICY TOWARD GERMANY, 1952-1954', CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), May 31, 1963, p. 6) (IMG)

Facing the new Titoist tide in the bloc, and the defunding done by the Kremlin Titoists, Walter Ulbricht decided to lobby for the reduction in East German reparations payments. Already, when the June 1953 debates were going on, Ulbricht advocated the reduction in reparations, but was not able to go very far with reducing the reparations payment:

With the GDR lacking sufficient resources, Ulbricht instead favored a different approach. Shifting the burden to the Soviets, who after all, had decreed the policy shift, he argued that “we should turn to the Soviet government with the request that they lower the reparations payments.” A fellow Politburo member succinctly pointed to the thought that must have been on everybody’s mind: the only way “to get out of this catastrophic situation and improve our position” was for the Soviet Union to “[render] us the same help that the USA is giving Western Germany through the Marshall Plan.” As Wach recounted, “[n]o one reacted to this statement.” (““This Is Not A Politburo, But A Madhouse””: The Post-Stalin Succession Struggle, Soviet Deutschlandpolitik and the SED: New Evidence from Russian, German, and Hungarian Archives’, COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT, Bulletin 10, Christian F. Ostermann, pp. 66-67) (IMG)

However, with the downfall of Beria and his group, the East German communists were able to lobby for aid. Walter Ulbricht knew how to counter-bully the Titoist assassins in the Kremlin into a less incorrect line, and into partially supporting East Germany. As confirmed by the CIA, Ulbricht in particular knew:

much about lobbying in Moscow to frustrate undesirable developments. (THE IMPLICATIONS OF ULBRICHT'S RETIREMENT FOR EAST GERMANY: INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM, No. 1687/71, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, May 4, 1971, p. 3) (IMG)

Enver Hoxha described Ulbricht as a ‘haughty stiff-necked German’ who knew how to counter-bully the Moscow Titoist bullies into assisting East Germany against the Anglo-American imperialists:

Ulbricht ... was a haughty, stiff-necked German, not only with small parties like ours, but also with the others. He had this opinion about relations with the Soviets: “You have occupied us, you have stripped us of industry, but now you must supply us with big credits and food, so that Democratic Germany will build up and reach the level of the German Federal Republic.” He demanded such credits arrogantly and he got them. He forced Khrushchev to say in a joint meeting: “We must assist Germany so that it becomes our show-case to the West.” And Ulbricht did not hesitate to tell the Soviets in our presence: “You must speed up your aid because there is bureaucracy.” “Where is the bureaucracy,” asked Mikoyan “in your country?” “No, not at all in our country but in yours,” replied Ulbricht. (The Khrushchevites, Enver Hoxha)

C20S2. Austria *** IMG-All-{GDR}{Hungary}

It was necessary that the US-aligned Nazi-friendly Austrian regime would be deprived as much as possible from the useful industrial equipment. As such, the Soviets duly deprived Austria from the equipment. According to the Hague Convention and according to the Yalta agreement, the USSR had a right to seize Nazi Germany’s military-industrial assets as part of reparations and war booty. The Soviets had two main strategies for the assets seized: (1) develop those industrial assets and use them to generate goods and services to be imported into the USSR as part of reparations, and then, upon receiving the reparations, hand over those assets back to the respective countries in which those assets had existed; (2) strip the industrial assets and take them into the USSR. The Stalin-era USSR pursued strategy 1 for the countries in which popular-democratic order had greater potential for establishment or in which People’s Democratic system had already been established, since by eventually turning over those assets to the Peoples’ Democracies, the USSR could help in the industrial development of those states; the Stalin-era USSR pursued strategy 2 for the countries in which, owing to high Anglo-American intelligence and military presence, there was little chance for People’s Democratic development at the time, and so much the better if those countries get deprived of their industrial assets. Referring to Stalin-era Soviet policy in Austria, the CIA referred to the case:

of Soviet plants in Austria where USIA plants had been almost completely stripped of all useful equipment following World War II. (SOVIET ECONOMIC ENTERPRISES IN HUNGARY, CIA, May 27, 1955 / June 21, 1955, p. 4) (IMG)

By depriving Austria from those industrial plants, the Soviet Union was not conducting economic terrorism against the Austrian proletarians, and was not ruining their lives. The plants which the Austrian reactionaries had under their control were used for producing armaments to sponsor terrorists who cross-border infiltrated and had the blood of many proletarians on their hands. Better deprive the Austrian regime from such plants; better to deprive the state sponsor of terror from the industrial means of exporting terror.

With the rise of the Titoist faction onto power, Soviet policy changed, and there came about an effort to promote the military-industrial development of countries under Anglo-American intelligence and military influence. The USIA (abbreviation for ‘Directorate of Soviet Assets in Austria’) as such never regained its prewar capacity, and only after the treasonous Titoist gang of Khrushchev seized power in the Kremlin in March 1953 did some physical capital arrive, as part of the Moscow Titoists’ efforts to fund to the CIA-backed pro-Nazi Austrian terror regime:

This dismantled equipment had been shipped by the USSR and USIA plants never regained their prewar capacity even though the USSR did install some modern equipment and started a belated drive to rebuild these plants in 1954. (SOVIET ECONOMIC ENTERPRISES IN HUNGARY, CIA, May 27, 1955 / June 21, 1955, p. 4) (IMG)

East Germany and the other Peoples’ democracies had their heavy industries de-funded by the Kremlin Titoists, whereas Austrian industry was to grow.

C20S3. Hungary – 1953 *** IMG-All-{GDR}{Hungary}

Christian F. Ostermann, a prominent official in the US intelligence front think tank Wilson Center, wrote:

The June 2-4 talks with the East German leaders have to be viewed against the background of a larger effort by the post-Stalin Soviet leadership to halt and mitigate some of the worst excesses of Stalinist rule in East Central Europe. Similar talks, which, in each case, resulted in the announcement of a “New Course” program were held with the Hungarian leadership (13-16 June 1953) and the Albanian leader Enver Hoxha later that month. The transcript of the Soviet-Hungarian talks on June 13-16, are instructive for several reasons: Much fuller than the fragmentary Grotewohl notes, the transcript of the Soviet-Hungarian meeting is striking for its similarities: as in the German case, the discussion focused on the “audacious” industrialization and socialization drive and the abuses of power (especially by the security police), though cadre questions received considerable attention, too. As before with the East Germans, the Soviet leaders “urgently” demanded changes and warned that “a catastrophe will occur if we do not improve the situation.” Once again, Malenkov and Beria were harshest and most “passionate” in their criticism, though Molotov and Bulganin did not lag behind. Unlike the earlier talks with the German leaders, however, Soviet criticism was vented primarily at premier and party chief Matyas Rakosi, the leading proponent of Stalinist rule in Hungary. Criticism of Rakosi’s rule, his personal involvement in most political issues, and his “personality cult”

quickly produced changes within the leadership: within days of their return from Moscow, Rakosi resigned from the premiership which was given to the agrarian specialist Imre Nagy (though Rakosi stayed on as party leader). (“‘This Is Not A Politburo, But A Madhouse’: The Post-Stalin Succession Struggle, Soviet Deutschlandpolitik and the SED: New Evidence from Russian, German, and Hungarian Archives’, COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT, Bulletin 10, Christian F. Ostermann, p. 66) (IMG)

Sergo Beria confirmed that Lavrenti Beria despised Matyas Rakosi:

Another he could not endure was [PCF leader] Jacques Duclos, who reminded him of Rakosi: ‘reptiles,’ he called them. (Beria: Inside Stalin’s Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 196) (IMG)

Liquidationist in line, Beria called for the dissolution of the Party within the Popular Front and the resignation of Rakosi:

my father told Rakosi that the Party must no longer interfere in the economy and that domination of the Council of Ministers by the Party ought long ago to have been ended in the Soviet Union and, a fortiori, in the People’s Democracies. ‘Busy yourselves with ideology and the education of the masses if you want to stay in politics in spite of your health problems. But you would do better to resign,’ he said. (Beria: Inside Stalin’s Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 264) (IMG)

The Titoist faction in the Soviet Union led by the gang of Lavrenti Beria elevated the Nagy faction:

‘You were wrong, there are no irreplaceable people,’ my father had shot back. Rakosi therefore had to submit to the decision of the Presidium by which he was to devote himself to ideology, leaving the government to Imre Nagy. (Beria: Inside Stalin’s Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 264) (IMG)

Imre Nagy, the MI6 agent and official leader of the Hungarian colour revolution of 1956, was also a Beria agent:

I well remember the Hungarians Nagy, Kadar and Rajk. They were Communists but they understood that Communism could not sit on bayonets in their country. Some agreed with the idea of a coalition with the Social Democrats, which would have allowed them to get close to Austria. My father was very friendly with Imre Nagy. He had been evacuated to Georgia during the war and had enjoyed his stay! It is said that he had behaved badly when he was in the Comintern. I never heard my father say anything about that. He simply told me that Nagy was one of the people on whom he could rely in carrying out his plans. (‘Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin’s Kremlin’, Sergo Beria, p. 197) (IMG)

Beria indeed installed Nagy as the leader of Hungary in 1953. He was able to do so because in Hungary, the communists had not been able to consolidate influence and there had not been enough purges of counter-revolutionaries. The blue-collar elements did not have as much state control, and Hungary’s economy remained largely agrarian, meaning that there did not exist a large class of proletariat. In countries with a large peasant population and a small blue-collar worker population, it was usually easier to oust the ‘Stalinist’ leaders.

In 1953, Hungary began the ‘New Course’ which involved economic liberalization and the release of CIA-backed fascists including Janos Kadar, about whom more details will be provided later:

The proclamation of the New Course with Imre Nagy as premier in the summer of 1953 brought new personalities to the fore and instituted liberalized policies in agriculture and industry at the expense of doctrinaire Communists who had profited from earlier economic policies. Violent opposition from these elements was silenced by Rakosi; apparently on Moscow’s orders, and the new policies enforced. During the summer of 1954, Nagy emerged as a genuine leader backed by the majority of the central committee. But Nagy’s resort to extraparty mechanisms to gain popular and his encouragement of unrestrained criticism of regime policies drove Rakosi to seek the support of the Kremlin against Nagy. Meanwhile, the liberation of Janos Kadar and other imprisoned Communists strengthened party moderate forces against the former leadership. (FACTIONALISM IN THE HUNGARIAN WORKERS (COMMUNIST) PARTY (1945-1956), CIA, January 28, 1957, p. II) (IMG)

By helping Titoist agent Imre Nagy to rise to power, Beria got Hungary on the road to the fascist terror that was to come about in 1956.

C20S4. Beriaite Conspiracies in Poland *** IMG-All-{Poland}

The effects of the Beria gang’s Titoist New Course were to be seen in People’s Democratic Poland too. The brutal Beria gang placed heavy pressure on People’s Democratic Poland to prevent the purge of Spychalski, the former Gestapo spy, who had become an American-Israeli agent by 1946 and a British agent by 1947, and who had sought to launch an MI6-backed Titoist military coup in Poland to install Gomulka onto power. The CIA reported:

Bierut was in Moscow prior to Beria’s arrest and Beria instructed the Poles to keep the case of Bishop Kaczmarek in suspension and not to conduct a public trial. Beria wanted Kaczmarek released from jail pending further developments. Beria was also of the opinion that the Spychalski trial should also be delayed but that Spychalski was to be kept in prison. Bierut was called to Moscow approximately three to four days before the publication of the information that Beria was under arrest. (...). Bierut returned to Moscow after the arrest of Beria and at this time Malenkov and other Soviet officials told Bierut that Beria’s plans concerning Polish trials were not realistic. Bierut received instructions that the trial of Bishop Kaczmarek should be conducted as soon as possible and that preparations should be made for the trial of Spychalski. (EFFECTS OF BERIA’S ARREST IN POLAND, CIA, February 5, 1954, p. 1) (IMG)

C20S5. Khrushchev and Moscow Titoists Rehabilitate Nazi German Troops – 1954-1956 *** IMG-All-{Gulag}

Why does the Western media hail Nikita Khrushchev as a ‘liberator’? It is because he and his Titoist henchmen ‘liberated’ Axis troops and fascist gangs from the corrective labour camps, allowing them to commit their savage crimes within Soviet territory.

From 1953 onwards, the guards were allowed to fraternize with the pro-American fascist criminals, which, not surprisingly, emboldened these criminals:

The guards escorting the prisoners often would strike up a conversation and chat with the prisoners, and tried to maintain an almost friendly relationship. From that time on the prisoners often went as far as to be rude to the guards.... The criminals would shout: “Wait until the Americans come – we’ll hang you all!” (‘1. FORCED LABOR CAMPS IN THE USSR 2. TRANSFER OF PRISONERS BETWEEN CAMPS 3. DECREES ON RELEASE FROM FORCED LABOR 4. ATTITUDE OF SOVIET PRISON OFFICIALS TOWARD SUSPECTS 1945 TO THE END OF 1955’, CIA, February 11, 1957, p. 3) (IMG)

Worse yet, numerous pro-American fascist criminals were released by the MI6 agent Khrushchev's Titoist gang, allowing them to commit more crimes in the USSR. The US intelligence reported:

The 1953 amnesty was for ordinary criminals. Approximately one-half per cent of the prisoners in Ozerlag were released. Up to 70% of the prisoners in Angarlag were released. They were released in one grand sweep, in approximately one week. Within the next three months the majority of them were rearrested for crimes which they had newly committed and returned to Angarlag. ('1. FORCED LABOR CAMPS IN THE USSR 2. TRANSFER OF PRISONERS BETWEEN CAMPS 3. DECREES ON RELEASE FROM FORCED LABOR 4. ATTITUDE OF SOVIET PRISON OFFICIALS TOWARD SUSPECTS 1945 TO THE END OF 1955', CIA, February 11, 1957, p. 2) (IMG)

The Titoist faction led by the Beria-Malenkov-Khrushchev group brought about the freedom of criminals, who were by then able to re-commit criminals out in the open. This, however, was by no means the worst of it. In fact, British agent Khrushchev and his Titoist gang released from jail 1.5 million Nazi/Axis troops.

Within the context of international agreements and Soviet laws, many Axis / Nazi German POWs were repatriated by the USSR back to their respective countries. This implementation of this policy well preceded the assassination of Stalin, and well preceded the 19th CPSU congress. The repatriation policy of the USSR, however, did not mean that the Axis troops that had committed crimes were not to be tried. Indeed, they were tried to terms of corrective labour for between 5 to 10 years. The Titoist ruling clique in the Kremlin presented a fundamentally revisionist and pro-fascist misinterpretation of the repatriation policy, taking it to mean that Nazi German troops in general have to be released from jail *as swiftly as possible*. The CIA reported:

Following World War II, a large but unknown number of foreign nationals became prisoners of war in the USSR. These prisoners came from virtually every country of Europe, the Middle East, and the Far East, and estimates of their total have ranged from a few hundred thousand to several million: It has also been estimated that "anything up to 10 percent" of all prisoners in about 1950 were foreign nationals. **As noted previously, beginning about 1950, large numbers of these prisoners of war (particularly Germans) were tried under Soviet criminal laws and sentenced to terms of corrective labor, usually of 5 to 10 years, for various crimes against the state.** Although substantial numbers of prisoners of war had been released before the death of Stalin, the USSR has been pursuing since 1953 a **systematic** policy of freeing foreign nationals from the prison camps. Numerous returned prisoners report evidence of this policy.... According to these returnees, a concerted effort was made beginning in 1953-54 to collect prisoners of a given nationality in special camps preparatory to repatriation, a process which took many months in most cases and even several years in some instances. (FORCED LABOR IN THE USSR 1953-57, CIA, Office of Research and Reports, September 12, 1958, pp. 22-23. Bold added) (IMG)

The CIA also noted that Kudriatsev, a major official at the time, admitted that massive swathes of those jailed were released since March 1953:

The Soviet Deputy Procurator General, P.I. Kudriatsev, intimated that about 3 million persons had been under detention in the USSR in March 1953, almost half of whom were political prisoners, but that at that time (May 1957) only about 800,000 or 900,000 persons were imprisoned, of whom about 18,000 were political prisoners. Kudriatsev also stated that the number of prisoners had been reduced by 70 percent since the death of Stalin, that 52 percent of those detained at that time were released as a result of the amnesty of 27 March 1953, that more than half of those then (presumably in May 1957) serving sentences had been sentenced after March 1953, and that the number of prisoners then was less than in the 1920's and less than one-third of the number in prerevolutionary Russia. These are the first figures ever released by Soviet officials concerning the prison population and, in light of current agitation among Soviet jurists for the release of crime statistics, suggest that the USSR may be preparing to issue official statistics concerning crime rates and the criminal population. (FORCED LABOR IN THE USSR 1953-57, CIA, Office of Research and Reports, September 12, 1958, p. 22) (IMG)

The CIA specifically pointed out that the Nazi collaborators were forgiven, with their sentences halved and many of them outright freed from jail:

A decree of 17 September 1955 permitted the immediate release of persons sentenced up to 10 years for collaborating with the Germans during World War II, and sentences of 10 years or more for such crimes were halved. The decree also released, regardless of length of sentence, those persons who were imprisoned for serving in the German army and police or in "special German units." (FORCED LABOR IN THE USSR 1953-57, CIA, Office of Research and Reports, September 12, 1958, p. 8) (IMG)

The total number released is unknown. In 1953, all Japanese war criminals and, allegedly, 9,000 Germans were released. In late 1955 and early 1956, 9,652 German prisoners were repatriated as a result of an agreement reached between West Germany and the USSR in October 1955. The Soviet Red Cross denied that any German prisoners of war remained in the USSR in 1957. All remaining Japanese prisoners allegedly have been freed as a result of the special amnesty for such persons issued in December 1956. (...). During 1953-56 the USSR released numerous Hungarians, Rumanians, ... Iranians, and other foreign prisoners of many nationalities. (FORCED LABOR IN THE USSR 1953-57, CIA, Office of Research and Reports, September 12, 1958, p. 23) (IMG)

The Titoist Regime freed tens of thousands of Nazis, Nazi Collaborators, and Japanese Fascists:

Tens of thousands of others were also set free on the basis of a September 1955 amnesty for "wartime collaborators." (Gulag Survivor, Nancy Adler, p. 22)

Stalin's successor Khrushchev took a more conciliatory course and found the German POWs — the Soviet Union called them war criminals, which many of them were — to be a useful bargaining chip. At the Berlin four-power conference preceding the Paris Treaties, for example, Khrushchev hinted about their release to improve his negotiating position. In January 1955 it was rumored that Khrushchev was negotiating the release with the leftist opposition parties in Bonn in an attempt to weaken Adenauer's government. The West German government was falling victim to its own overinflated POW propaganda, which made the issue appear much more important than it was: in April 1953 Adenauer gave the official number as 300,000 POWs; in August West Germany told a United Nations commission on POWs that there were 102,958; by early 1955 Adenauer only spoke of 40—50,000 men, and finally, right before the Moscow trip, the Bonn Foreign Office admitted that there were actually only "about 9,000" men still being held. (Legacies of Dachau: The Uses and Abuses of a Concentration Camp, 1933-2001, Harold Marcuse, p. 125) (IMG)

Certain prisoners of war indeed do have a right to be freed and repatriated according to the Geneva Convention. However, there are conditions and exceptions to this especially regarding the war criminals. The sentences were reduced and many war criminals were released. This was the problem of Khrushchev's Titoist group.

And as an agent of the Anglo-American Imperialists, this move by him produced:

a favorable reaction in the West at no cost to the USSR. (Probability of Soviet Release of Some World War II Prisoners, May 5, 1953, CIA, p. 1)

The media of the US-led bloc praises Nikita Khrushchev and the Titoists for ending the corrective labour system and freeing those jailed in it; this is not surprising since the Western intelligence services were not only in cahoots with the Axis forces, they were mostly established by the Axis forces. Khrushchev's release of those jailed, an act which was hailed by the West, was the release of the fascist bandits, the Nazi-collaborationists, and the criminals who re-committed their crimes on Soviet soil. There is no reason to doubt nor is there reason to regard as imperialist propaganda, the CIA's claim that Nikita Khrushchev's group was responsible for the release of countless Axis troops, since it is already documented that those arrested during the Stalin-era were Axis troops, fascist thugs, and common criminals, and it is also well-known that Khrushchev released the prisoners thereby ending the Gulag system. Plus, the CIA propagandists were on Khrushchev's side anyways.

*** IMG-All-{Titoist Coup} {Khrushchev – Political}

C20S6. The Promotion of Idealistic Military Theories as Pretext for Military Sabotage

Why did the British secret service, the Anglo-American media, and Nikita Khrushchev keep emphasizing that Stalin was not aware that the Great Patriotic War was coming, that Stalin did not expect Hitler to invade after the Molotov-Ribbentrop negotiations? There are many reasons for this, but all of these reasons originate from at least two key reasons.

The first key reason is that they sought to make Stalin appear as though he regarded Nazi Germany as his ally, and so did not expect a war with them in the first place. This is a part of the conspiracy to rehabilitate the British media, the Nazi secret service, and the Trotskyites for stating that the USSR had betrayed the anti-Nazi struggle.

The second key reason for this however was that by promoting such a narrative, they were seeking to exaggerate the importance of surprise attacks while playing down the importance of the historical-material factors of war.

The historical materialist and dialectical approach to warfare takes into account the importance of surprise attacks and emphasizes utmost vigilance against any potential enemy strikes, but it does not exaggerate the importance of strategic surprise to the point that the historical-material factors of warfare are ignored. This is actually basic common sense. Assuming all else constant, if an army of swordsmen launched a surprise invasion against an army of advanced tanks, artillery, etc., the surprise of the attack can only get the army of swordsmen so far – and not very far. On the other hand, imagine if two armies are of completely equal military strength in every sense except that one of the armies has the advantage of launching a surprise assault on the other army. Obviously, if all else constant, the army launching the surprise attack will have relative victory if not absolute victory. The case of the Great Patriotic War was somewhere in between these two extremes of spectrum. The Soviet and Nazi militaries had a comparable strength but obviously not equal strength. This meant that while the surprise attack was one of the important factors, it was not necessarily the only decisive factor. This is why on the one hand:

Stalin did not deny that strategic surprise could determine the outcome of war and even seemed to admit the possibility that Germany's surprise attack might have been decisive. (POLITICS AND DOCTRINAL DIFFERENCES AMONG THE SOVIET MILITARY ELITE, CIA, The Research Series of the 'Foreign Broadcast Information Service', Propaganda Report, July 27, 1955, p. 12) (IMG)

And on the other hand:

Stalin ... asserted .. that ... "the momentum of unexpectedness and suddenness which constituted the reserve strength of the German fascist troops has been fully spent." Stalin ... did not depreciate the factor of surprise.... (POLITICS AND DOCTRINAL DIFFERENCES AMONG THE SOVIET MILITARY ELITE, CIA, The Research Series of the 'Foreign Broadcast Information Service', Propaganda Report, July 27, 1955, p. 12) (IMG)

More specifically,:

Stalin ... in his Order of the Day on Army Day, 23 February 1942, during the Soviet winter offensive which followed the German failure to capture Moscow in the first months of the war [said]:

Now ... the issue of the war will not be decided by such a fortuitous ... factor as suddenness, but by such constantly operating factors as the strength of the rear, the morale of the army, the quantity and quality of the divisions, the armament of the army, and the organizational abilities of the army commanders.

(POLITICS AND DOCTRINAL DIFFERENCES AMONG THE SOVIET MILITARY ELITE, CIA, The Research Series of the 'Foreign Broadcast Information Service', Propaganda Report, July 27, 1955, p. 12) (IMG)

The 'constantly operating factors' to which Stalin refers are what I like to refer to as the historical-material factors of warfare, since the concept of the 'constantly operating factors' is actually a translation of historical materialism into the realm of the military affairs. The 'strength of the rear' and the 'the quantity and quality of the divisions, the armament of the army' are all different parts and aspects of the military-industrial backbone and hence of the productive forces. Closely related to the concept of the productive forces in warfare is the material factor of geography, especially insofar as the control over and exploitation of the strategic natural resources (e.g. the oil in the Soviet Caucasus) are concerned. The 'morale of the army' relates the less-material factors such as culture and individual psyche. I will mention the applicability of other historical materialist concepts into the military field later in this section. However, by now, it should be clear to the reader as to why the fortuitous factor of surprise can hardly be as significant a factor as the more material factors such as geography and productive forces with regards to military affairs.

To summarize with regards to the relationship of surprise to factors that are more material: (1) surprise is not as material a factor as the 'the strength of the rear, the morale of the army, the quantity and quality of the divisions, the armament of the army', and any other more material factors; (2) surprise can be the decisive factor if two armies are equally strong in all the material factors except for the element of surprise itself; (3) Surprise could be a major factor if two armies are comparable – but not equal – in strength in terms of the other material factors of war, but in that situation, surprise cannot necessarily be the only decisive factor.

It takes no genius to understand this point with regards to the relative importance of the fortuitous factor of surprise. However, unfortunately, the revisionists seriously had the audacity to challenge even such a basic fact, causing debates in the USSR and significant policy implications, and knowing that many people would not pay enough attention, would not be vigilance, and would not challenge them.

Playing up the importance of surprise attacks to the point that the advancement of the historical-material factors of warfare are ignored is a blatantly infantile idealistic approach to military affairs. All this media hype about Stalin allegedly – and it is a false allegation as documented in C10S4_–

being surprised by the Nazi invasion was a means of exaggerating the significance of the surprise attack and its impact on the war, hence to gain the excuse to downplay the importance of heavy industry and the development of the military-industrial backbone. The latter in turn was a means of stagnating and sabotaging the development of the Soviet military-industrial backbone.

The Moscow Titoists and their agents promoted the idealist view on the military. It should come as no surprise that:

Soviet discussions of the relative significance of surprise and the constant factors in war have almost invariably invoked the authority of Stalin... (POLITICS AND DOCTRINAL DIFFERENCES AMONG THE SOVIET MILITARY ELITE, CIA, The Research Series of the 'Foreign Broadcast Information Service', Propaganda Report, July 27, 1955, p. 11) (IMG)

After the Great Patriotic War and persisting until mid-1953, the recognition of the critical importance of historical-material factors of war – also known as the constantly operating factors of war – was integrated into Soviet defense 'doctrines' as Soviet military science common-sense:

After the war ... it evolved into a tenet of Soviet "military science" which by constant repetition tended to imply a general strategic depreciation of the surprise factor. Thus the LARGE SOVIET ENCYCLOPEDIA (1954) contended that "surprise and other accidental features of the situation can only yield temporary successes." Marshal Malinovsky, writing in RED STAR on Army Day 1952, even came close to interpreting Stalin's remark as meaning that strategic surprise could not be decisive and that Soviet military strategy should be based only on the constant factors. After quoting Stalin, he asserted:

The Stalinist formulation of permanently operating factors provides the key to the understanding of the decisive conditions of victory in a modern war. The profound scientific analysis (sic) of these factors made by Stalin is of enormous theoretical and practical significance. In military and organizational work, the consideration of correct utilization of these factors make it possible to concentrate the chief attention on the solution of basic problems determining the fate of the war.

A similar passage appears in the 1950 edition of Stalin's official biography and thus certainly had Stalin's personal approval.

(POLITICS AND DOCTRINAL DIFFERENCES AMONG THE SOVIET MILITARY ELITE, CIA, The Research Series of the 'Foreign Broadcast Information Service', Propaganda Report, July 27, 1955, p. 12) (IMG)

And:

In the weeks before [Stalin's] death, Chuikov [not to be confused with Zhukov] said that Stalin's strategy at Stalingrad comprise "the use of active defense to exhaust the enemy, grind down his manpower and material, and then launch a counteroffensive" (2 February 1953) and Sokolovsky discussed active defense strategy in World War II (PRAVDA, 23 February 1953); (POLITICS AND DOCTRINAL DIFFERENCES AMONG THE SOVIET MILITARY ELITE, CIA, The Research Series of the 'Foreign Broadcast Information Service', Propaganda Report, July 27, 1955, p. 14) (IMG)

After the death of Stalin, the communist loyalists in the Red Army, a prominent figure among whom was Vasilevsky, continued to promote the scientific historical materialist view regarding war, and promoted the narrative on constantly operating or historical-material factors of war:

References to the thesis on constantly operative as against fortuitous factors continued after Stalin's death, when its place in postwar Soviet military doctrine was no longer dependent on his personal influence. It was affirmed by Vasilevsky after Stalin's death (9 March 1953) and by Lieutenant General Kozlov (16 February 1954). Although indications of increased respect for strategic surprise were evident in early 1954, the strongest depreciation of the surprise factor, and apparently the only explicit elite denial that strategic surprise could be decisive, came more than a year after Stalin's death, in an article by the second ranking professional soldier of the USSR, Vasilevsky, on 9 May 1954, ten months before Marshal Rotmistrov was to attack underestimation of the surprise factor and declare that it could be decisive in war. (POLITICS AND DOCTRINAL DIFFERENCES AMONG THE SOVIET MILITARY ELITE, CIA, The Research Series of the 'Foreign Broadcast Information Service', Propaganda Report, July 27, 1955, p. 12) (IMG)

With regards to the specific material conditions of the USSR in the face of the Nazi assault during the Great Patriotic War, and the Anglo-American assault on the Caucasus for World War III, the USSR had promoted the concept of active defense, which entailed that the historical-material factors in the USSR would be used to deprive the relatively less material factor of a surprise attack from its momentum and its effectiveness; then, the historical-material factors of war would be used to push back against the imperialist-fascist aggressors. Therefore, it is important to note that the notion of active defense was the strategic application of the historical materialist notion of the constantly operative factors of warfare into the military historical-material conditions of the USSR. Here is an excerpt of the CIA document on this:

2. Active Defense

While strategic surprise and the constant factors are correlative and usually discussed together, the concept of "active defense" is infrequently related to them explicitly. The connection is firmly established, however, by Sokolovsky's PRAVDA article on Army Day 1953, which contends that an active defense strategy relies on the constant factors in war:

The key to the understanding of this regularity [in war] is the thesis worked out by Stalin on the permanently operating surprise factors which determine the outcome of war. This thesis makes possible a genuine scientific approach to the preparation of the country and the army for active defense and the eve solution of most important strategic problems in the course of the war itself on the basis of a thorough assessment of the economic, moral and military potential of the fighting countries.

(...). The general concept of active defense has served as a political doctrine and propaganda slogan as well as a military doctrine. Sokolovsky's 1953 Army Day article declared that,:

preparing the country for active defense goes far beyond the framework of purely military problems. These preparations comprise an economic, political, ideological, scientific, technical and actual military approach affecting the whole sphere of life and work of both State and people.

a. Active Defense as a Military Doctrine: Active defense has been used to characterize the strategy of assuming a defensive posture in order to exhaust the enemy before launching the counteroffensive. It was applied by Stalin to the early stages of World War II:

It is a well-known fact that following the temporary withdrawal caused by the German imperialists' perfidious attack, the Red Army turned the tide of war and went over from active defense to a successful offensive against enemy troops.

(...). Bulganin [stated in 1949:]

Stalin's outstanding service as a military theoretician is his solution of the questions of active defense and the counteroffensive. It is difficult to overestimate the importance of the Stalin theory on these questions and the Stalin art of its application for the victory of the Soviet armed forces in the Great Fatherland War. To realize that importance, suffice it to recall the part in the war played by the Moscow, Stalingrad and Kursk battles which were classic examples of active defense and counteroffensive.

It is possible that Bulganin in this statement was not expressing his own views and was merely seeking to please Stalin.

(POLITICS AND DOCTRINAL DIFFERENCES AMONG THE SOVIET MILITARY ELITE, CIA, The Research Series of the 'Foreign Broadcast Information Service', Propaganda Report, July 27, 1955, pp. 12-14) (IMG)

The idealist emphasis on the surprise factor was denounced as adventurist:

The concept of active defense based on the prime importance of constantly operative factors, was after the war repeatedly set against the "adventurist" strategy of reliance on such a fortuitous factor as strategic surprise with the goal of achieving a "blitzkrieg" victory. Pronouncements on Soviet political-military strategy stressed "preparations for active defense" and ability to mobilize rapidly if required. According to Bulganin at the XIX Party Congress, the Soviet people made "no secret of the fact that our economy can in the shortest possible time be switched to a war footing." Vasilevsky made the same point as late as V-E Day 1945, when he claimed that "the socialist structure made it possible to transform the whole economy of the country onto a war basis in the shortest time...." (POLITICS AND DOCTRINAL DIFFERENCES AMONG THE SOVIET MILITARY ELITE, CIA, The Research Series of the 'Foreign Broadcast Information Service', Propaganda Report, July 27, 1955, p. 15) (IMG)

Beside geography and productive forces, another important historical-material factor is the class orientation of the army staff. By that, what is meant here is not whether the army commanders are from working class backgrounds or not, nor is it about the anarchist concept of worker unions directly democratically electing the military commanders. These are imperialist-sponsored, petit-bourgeois, left-deviationist, idealist 'workerist' ideas with a superficially 'proletarian' coloring. Rather, by the term 'class orientation', what is meant is simply is: loyalty. It answers the question: to what side of history are the staff in the military and industry loyal? To the imperialist-fascist finance capital and their secret services, or to the anti-imperialist and anti-fascist side of history combatting the enemy secret services and confronting finance capital? The agents of the enemy in the military use diversionary/saboteurial tactics such as: (1) attack the enemy where it is strong and refuse to attack the enemy where it is weak; (2) launch military provocations to hand the enemy the excuse for invasion and then once the enemy invades, move the defense troops away so that the front would be opened for the enemy; etc. These elements existed in the military of the USSR and they were duly purged. The purge of the agents of the imperialist-fascist secret services and those loyal to finance capital was a purge that was necessary for preparations for active defense during the Great Patriotic War and anti-imperialist struggles before, during, and after the War. The reorientation of the military and industrial staff away from the class forces loyal to finance capital towards the class forces hostile to finance capital marked the work of the USSR with regards to the historical-material factor, the class orientation of the military.

During the period of the doctors' plot case and during the 19th CPSU congress, the importance of class orientation as a historical-material factor to account for was emphasized by communists such as Stalin, Molotov, Govorov as well as by Malenkov, the crypto-Titoist who pretended to side with the communist faction:

Active Defense as a Political Doctrine: In its more general meaning, as a way of describing those elements in national policy which are directed toward maintaining the security of the Soviet State, active defense received special prominence at the XIX Party Congress in October 1952, when it was introduced into the Party Statutes: One of "the chief tasks of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union now [is] to strengthen in every respect the active defense of the Soviet country against aggressive actions of its enemies." This provision was cited, along with other calls for strengthening active defense, by professional military leaders and by Bulganin at the Party Congress and in the following months, most notably on Army Day 1953.

The Congress' emphasis on the task of active defense was particularly noted by Marshal of the Soviet Union Govorov, who mentioned the doctor-plot in his 23 February RED STAR article and was himself allegedly one of its intended victims. The Report to the Congress by Malenkov, in surveying the decade of "preparation for active defense" before the war, cited the purge of the thirties as one of these preparations. It seems possible that the political activation of the doctrine in the Warsaw fall of 1952 and winter of 1953 was related to the doctor-plot which made top military leaders its chief target.

(POLITICS AND DOCTRINAL DIFFERENCES AMONG THE SOVIET MILITARY ELITE, CIA, The Research Series of the 'Foreign Broadcast Information Service', Propaganda Report, July 27, 1955, p. 14) (IMG)

Additionally, according to the CIA,:

One of the targets, Marshal Govorov, writing in RED STAR on 23 February 1953, referred to the plot, recalled the purges of the thirties in discussing Soviet defense capabilities, and called for one-man leadership in the Army -- a rare injunction from a top marshal. Govorov's involvement in Soviet politics was explicitly acknowledged at his funeral (22 March 1955) by the Moscow Party Secretary Kapitanov: "Govorov...devoted much attention to political work and took an active part in the Moscow Party organization of the capital." Sokolovsky, who was not among the alleged targets of the doctor-plot, did not mention it in a PRAVDA article appearing at the same time as Govorov's. (POLITICS AND DOCTRINAL DIFFERENCES AMONG THE SOVIET MILITARY ELITE, CIA, The Research Series of the 'Foreign Broadcast Information Service', Propaganda Report, July 27, 1955, p. 1) (IMG)

Naturally, since the purges were denounced after the assassination of Stalin, the concept of the class orientation of the military staff was simply ignored. Referring to the purges of the military as the 'political meaning' of the 'the concept of active defense', the CIA stated:

Shortly after Stalin's death the concept of active defense lost its political meaning, just as it tended to lose its military meaning as a description of the first stage in World War II. It was used retrospectively to characterize the economic preparations for the war and in general calls for strengthening the country. Even with this diffused meaning, the concept was apparently no longer acceptable after February 1955, since no allusions to it have been noted since that date. (POLITICS AND DOCTRINAL DIFFERENCES AMONG THE SOVIET MILITARY ELITE, CIA, The Research Series of the 'Foreign Broadcast Information Service', Propaganda Report, July 27, 1955, p. 15) (IMG)

After the death of Stalin, Vasilevsky was at the forefront of the theoretical struggle to preserve Stalin's historical materialist line on warfare:

Vasilevsky is the only top marshal who persisted after Stalin's death in propagating the most distinctive of the Stalinist views on Soviet military doctrine and World War II. In his 1954 Army Day article he spoke of the "period of active defense" at the beginning of the war and described the operations of the Soviet Army in this period as "the implementation" of active defense. In the same article he depreciated the factor of surprise by contrasting the views of Soviet and bourgeois military science on its importance: "Soviet military science, unlike bourgeois military [pseudo-]science, does not exaggerate the significance of such for gratuitous elements as the element of surprise." (POLITICS AND DOCTRINAL DIFFERENCES AMONG THE SOVIET MILITARY ELITE, CIA, The Research Series of the 'Foreign Broadcast Information Service', Propaganda Report, July 27, 1955, p. 22) (IMG)

The historical materialist elevation of the historical-material factors of war and relative depreciation of the fortuitous factor of surprise by Vasilevsky did not mean that he depreciated the importance of vigilance:

In his RED STAR article on [August 1953] Vasilevsky, while stressing the constant factors in war and denying the decisiveness of strategic surprise, amplified the call for vigilance. (POLITICS AND DOCTRINAL DIFFERENCES AMONG THE SOVIET MILITARY ELITE, CIA, The Research Series of the 'Foreign Broadcast Information Service', Propaganda Report, July 27, 1955, pp. 15) (IMG)

In spite of the struggles of the communist faction, however, the Moscow Titoists – already possessing a strong socio-economic base in the CPSU membership thanks to the white-collar worker element – were able to easily bulldoze their way through and pursue their agenda of weakening the historical materialist conceptions of warfare, despite the resistance of Vasilevsky:

Since Stalin's death, professional military leaders have rarely characterized the early surge of World War II as one of active defense. (...). Vasilevsky, in a commemorative article immediately afterwards, put ... stress on Stalin's application of active defense.... But the only subsequent known instance is another article by Vasilevsky almost a year later, on Armed Forces Day 1954 (RED STAR):

Already in the first period of the Great Fatherland War – the period of active defense – the Soviet Army showed in the great battle of Moscow that it was capable of beating the vaunted Hitlerite troops. Implementing the active defense, the Soviet Armed Forces frustrated Hitler's plan of blitzkrieg war....

Here again, as in his depreciation of the surprise factor on 9 May 1954, Vasilevsky persisted in affirming Stalinist military doctrine until midway in the interval between Stalin's death and the current revision of doctrine, well after other top leaders had discarded it.

(POLITICS AND DOCTRINAL DIFFERENCES AMONG THE SOVIET MILITARY ELITE, CIA, The Research Series of the 'Foreign Broadcast Information Service', Propaganda Report, July 27, 1955, p. 14) (IMG)

The composition of the CPSU had the white-collar elements as half of the membership, which was enough to pursue a revisionist counter-revolutionary line, but not large enough to pursue a swift dismantlement of everything that the communists had built in the USSR. Khrushchev embodied the membership composition of the Party and the tendency of the Party to pursue counter-revolutionary changes in a gradual – as opposed to swift, Beria-style – manner. Thus, unlike the speedy Titoist Beria and the somewhat speedy Titoist Malenkov, the position of the relatively slow-motion Titoist Khrushchev at the helm of the CPSU was well-entrenched. This meant that the Titoists in the Red Army could cautiously pursue their counter-revolutionary Titoist line. This is the reason that:

Chuikov, the first marshal of the Soviet Union to accept publicly the enhanced significance of surprise, did so immediately following the January session of the Central Committee which confirmed Khrushchev's victory over Malenkov. (POLITICS AND DOCTRINAL DIFFERENCES AMONG THE SOVIET MILITARY ELITE, CIA, The Research Series of the 'Foreign Broadcast Information Service', Propaganda Report, July 27, 1955, p. 25) (IMG)

Hence:

Soviet military doctrine in the past half year has been radically altered by a reappraisal of the decisiveness of surprise attack in modern war, particularly in view of developments in nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery. Indications of this change occur in recent pronouncements of the top soviet marshals, but the only extended discussions of it to date are by a professional military man, Marshal Rotmistrov (in the 24 March RED STAR) and by a Party-military official, Lieutenant General Shatilov (in the 28 May LITERARY GAZETTE). (POLITICS AND DOCTRINAL DIFFERENCES AMONG THE SOVIET MILITARY ELITE, CIA, The Research Series of the 'Foreign Broadcast Information Service', Propaganda Report, July 27, 1955, p. 11) (IMG)

According to the CIA, other Red Army commanders followed, in challenging Stalin's and Vasilevsky's common-sense historical materialist views on military science:

The correlation among the three concepts is also evident in the fact that Rotmistrov's and Shatilov's recent articles revising upward the significance of the surprise element also depreciated the concept of active defense. (...). Shatilov, in his 28 May 1955 article revising Soviet military doctrine, strongly criticized active defense[:]

(...). It must be pointed out that our literature on the Great Fatherland War often portrays and idealizes the initial stages of the war as a classic form of defense – so-called "active defense" – and that in addition authors are trying, in contradiction to reality, to portray the events themselves as if "active defense" had been planned ahead of time and was included in the consideration of our command; in fact the initial stages of the war, constituting a sudden enemy invasion with numerical superiority in tanks and planes, were unfavorable for our country and its Army which ... experienced the bitterness of withdrawal. A primitive interpretation of the initial period of the war, perverting living reality in any sector, be it in fiction, or scientific works cannot be tolerated.

(POLITICS AND DOCTRINAL DIFFERENCES AMONG THE SOVIET MILITARY ELITE, CIA, The Research Series of the 'Foreign Broadcast Information Service', Propaganda Report, July 27, 1955, p. 13) (IMG)

Those Kremlin Titoists who promoted this idealist notion regarding the surprise attack were the same Kremlin Titoists who, in a flagrantly hypocritical self-contradiction, denied that there was any potential for enemy attack in general, again to gain the excuse for stagnating the military-industrial backbone. The same Khrushchev who denounced Stalin for not preparing for war also claimed that there is no need to prepare for war. Surely the imperialists were not going to launch a total war on nuclear-armed USSR but they did launch numerous proxy wars against the pro-Soviet forces, such as the Arabs during the Arab-Israeli war of 1948, the Koreans during the Korean War, and the wars against the Ukrainian fascists inside the USSR itself. In the case of the Korean War, the USA also 'mistakenly' and temporarily invaded the USSR in 1950 during the Korean War, by bombing Soviet air bases, but then apologized for it. To fail to build up the Soviet Union's conventional weapons sector constituted a godsend to the sworn enemies of socialism.

C20S7. Titoists Expand Influence over Red Army, De-Fund Soviet Military, Capitulate to American Imperialism / CIA Coup against Mosaddeq 'Thanks' to Stalin Death

Importantly, to weaken the leverage of the communist elements with influence in the Red Army, to prevent the funding of anti-colonial movements, and to pave the way for the partition of the territory of the former Soviet Union, the Khrushchev group drastically de-funded the Red Army. In the words of the prominent CIA and RAND Corporation official Myron Rush:

Khrushchev cut back on the growth of military spending and sharply reduced the size of the armed forces, at a time when the United States had a large and widening margin of military superiority.... (The Soviet Military Build-up and the Coming Succession: A Review Essay. Reviewed Work: 'Stalin's Successors: Leadership, Stability, and Change in the Soviet Union' by Seweryn Bialer. Review by: Myron Rush. Source: International Security, Spring, 1981, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Spring, 1981), p. 183. Published by: The MIT Press) (IMG{Khrushchev – Political})

The decline of the communist forces in the USSR allowed for the CIA to more aggressively pursue its agenda around the world. Allen Dulles, the real head of the Eisenhower Administration, overthrew the communist-friendly governments of Iran and Guatemala. The United States could by then shift away from focusing on the defense of the US heartland and could instead aggressively pursue the overthrow of the pro-communist forces. An anonymous CIA official interviewed, stated:

Evidence points to a shifting of emphasis from a “dollar-defense” line based solely on developing and stockpiling more and more military weapons [for World War III against the Soviet Union] to a strategy of countering the communists underground.... This was the strategy in Guatemala, where we alerted “freedom forces” who were then able to drive the Reds to the surface and hand them a sound defeat. (THE MYSTERIOUS DOINGS OF THE CIA: America’s Secret Agents: Part One, The Saturday Evening Post, Richard Harkness, Gladys Harkness, October 30, 1954, p. 22. In: CIA archives) (IMG{GDR})

The so-called ‘freedom forces’ is yet another term that the CIA has hijacked for its reactionary agenda, and which deserves to be reclaimed by the actual freedom forces.

Anyways, Guatemala’s situation was repeated in Iran as well, in which the Mosaddeq Administration, which was backed by the Soviets and the Tudeh Party, was overthrown and a monarcho-fascist regime was installed. Mosaddeq wrote in his memoirs:

The death of Stalin on March 5 created the suitable conditions for the overthrow of my government. (Memoirs and Pains of Mohammad Mosaddeq, Mohammad Mosaddeq, p. 189) (IMG{Iran})

And the other one was [Anthony] Eden, the Foreign Minister of Britain’s Conservative Government, who after a while of waiting, as soon as Stalin died and thus the setting for the oppressive behavior of the colonial regimes was created, made a trip to America and convinced the President Eisenhower to trade the freedom of a nation with a 40% share of stock [from Iran’s oil].... (Memoirs and Pains of Mohammad Mosaddeq, Mohammad Mosaddeq, pp. 395-396, underline added) (IMG{Iran})

Indeed, the death of Stalin, ‘created the suitable conditions for the overthrow’ of the Mosaddeqist bourgeois-democratic government. The bourgeois-democratic anti-colonial state is a state controlled by the anti-colonial national-bourgeoisie. As the national-bourgeoisie of the colonial countries is weak in its confrontation towards the colonial imperial bourgeoisie, the anti-colonial national bourgeoisie aims to increase its influence over the state and the economy through an alliance with the proletariat. As such, the anti-colonial national bourgeoisie elevates the proletariat into the bourgeois state apparatus, giving the bourgeois state some of the characteristics of the dictatorship of the proletariat; this adoption of elements of the dictatorship of the proletariat by the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie yields bourgeois-democracy. Not in every government does this proletarian alliance with the national-bourgeoisie take the form of communist party support for the progressive bourgeois state but in the case of Iran, it did. The communist-led popular front party, the Tudeh Party, supported Mosaddeq. So did the USSR itself. The coup against Stalin and some of the other Red Army generals led to the withdrawal of communist influence in Iran, thus causing the 1953 coup.

The facts mentioned here are also corroborated by the prominent Titoist Third Force officials. Masoud Hejazi, a founder of the Titoist Third Force, recalled that Mohammad-Ali Khonji, another Titoist ‘Third Force’ founder, had analyzed that the elimination of Joseph Stalin and the rise of the Titoist circle meant that Mosaddeq could no longer rely on Soviet assistance against the coup. In his memoirs, referring to Mosaddeq’s view that Stalin’s death led to the coup, Hejazi recalled:

The interesting thing is that Dr. Mohammad-Ali Khonji, as stated before, had reached the same conclusion [as Mosaddeq on the role of Stalin’s elimination on the AJAX coup]. In one of the meetings of the Joint Executive Committee and the Central Committee of the Toilers’ Party of the Iranian Nation (Third Force), he spent a number of hours to analyze the international political situation concerning Iran, and concluded that due to the death of Joseph Stalin, the Soviet government has moved away from its aggressive [confrontational] approach in the Cold War and is now busy caring about its own domestic affairs, and Dr. Mosaddeq can no longer utilize the existing contradictions between the Eastern Bloc on the one side and the Western Bloc on the other, and as such, Western colonial policy, through England and America having reached common understanding, will pursue the necessary measures for bringing about the collapse of Dr. Mosaddeq’s government. (“Events and Judgements, 1950-1960: The Memoirs of Masoud Hejazi”, Masoud Hejazi, p. 316) (IMG{Iran})

As a result of the de-funding and de-budgeting of the Soviet Red Army, the Titoists were able to expand influence over the means of violence, thus taking another major step in transition the USSR from a dictatorship of the proletariat to the dictatorship of the comprador bourgeoisie. The middle of 1955 was a critical moment in Soviet history, for it was then that the Titoist faction gained enough power to be able to more aggressively pursue its counter-revolutionary agenda. The increased strength of the Titoist faction arose out of the fact that Govorov, one of the most important communist agents at the high command of the Red Army, died under mysterious circumstances. Eventually, and conveniently for the Kremlin Titoists who had opposed the ‘Zhdanovite’ commander, Govorov died at the age of 58, and:

The detailed medical bulletin issued 20 March 1955 on the illness and death of Marshal Govorov may have been intended to silence any suspicions that his death might have been due to unnatural causes. In the ceremony surrounding his funeral, coming as it did so shortly after the removal of Malenkov, great efforts were made to show the unity of party and government with the military leaders. Virtually all leading party and government officials stood for a short time at his bier, and all subsequently attended his funeral on Red Square. This tribute was in marked contrast to that accorded to Marshal Tolbukhi, who died in 1949, when only Bulganin and Shvernik stood by the bier and only six Politburo. (CAESAR 12: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN POLITICAL STATUS OF SOVIET ARMED FORCES, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), September 20, 1955, pp. A-1 to A-2) (IMG{Titoist Coup})

Konev whose position had become weaker did not rise against Khrushchev while Zhukov, the traitor in the Battle of Stalingrad, spoke out in favor of the Gestapo agent Tito:

Konev was cautious and restrained in discussing the Yugoslav question, but Zhukov (on 1 May) gave an accolade to the Yugoslavs and to Tito for their wartime roles and appealed personally for a rapprochement. This statement was apparently designed either to support Khrushchev's Belgrade visit or to establish a claim for credit for the rapprochement. (POLITICS AND DOCTRINAL DIFFERENCES AMONG THE SOVIET MILITARY ELITE, CIA, The Research Series of the 'Foreign Broadcast Information Service', Propaganda Report, July 27, 1955, p. 9) (IMG{Titoist Coup})

By expanding influence over the Soviet military, the Titoist faction could then more easily pursue its Titoization agenda well before the 20th CPSU Congress. The Red Army and the intelligence bodies closely cooperating with it served as the guards of the CPSU against the increased membership of the corrupt bureaucrats in the CPSU. By reducing communist influence in the Red Army, the Titoists led by Khrushchev could then increase the membership percentage of the bureaucrats in the CPSU. A SAVAK spy with extensive contacts to the international communist movement and the Warsaw Pact countries stated that the leadership of the CPSU had become a band of corrupt bureaucrats:

All of this has a material origin and is a sign that the particular stratum that governs the government as well as the leadership of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union has grown too bureaucratic and prosperous, and this is the basis for the growth of capitalism in the Soviet Union and can lead to the ... transition to capitalism. (The Interrogation session of Mr. Parviz Nikkhah [Jalaseh Bazjuyi az Aqaye Mohandes Parviz Nikkhah], SAVAK, Parviz Nikkhah, June 1965. Source: 'Parviz Nikkhah According to SAVAK Documents' [Parviz Nikkhah be Revayat e Asnad e SAVAK] book, page 187. In: The Center of Historical Documents Survey) (IMG{Khrushchev – Political})

Indeed, by the time of the 20th CPSU Congress and for a long time beyond it, the intelligentsia and the bureaucrats – the white-collar elements – gained the majority in the percentage membership composition thus being able to vote for the Titoization program initiated by the Khrushchev group. The Titoization Speech, the so-called 'Secret' Speech, was the vigilance-reducing speech through which Khrushchev was to gain the support of the white-collar majority in the Party in the struggle against communism in the Soviet Union. It was to assist the Titoists led by Khrushchev in the struggle to criminalize the Soviet intelligence service and to decriminalize the 'victims' of the Soviet intelligence service, hence allowing the Titoists to take over the Soviet security bodies, ensuring the transition of the USSR from a dictatorship of the proletariat to the dictatorship of the Titoist comprador bourgeoisie, particularly the dictatorship of the corrupt bureaucratic oligarchic bourgeoisie.

The real meaning of the phrase 'the Stalin era' is the era during which the industrial blue-collar workers held numerical dominance over a democratic centralist Party that dominated the government apparatus of the Soviet Union, and during which the communist agents backed by the CPSU held a dominant position over the USSR's means of violence, the armed forces and the intelligence bodies. The practical meaning of the phrase 'the Khrushchev era' in turn is the era during which the white-collar elements – i.e. the intelligentsia, the bureaucrats, and so-called 'technocrats' – held numerical dominance over the Party and factional dominance over the Red Army command. Even the personality of Stalin naturally rose to leadership due to the hold of the industrial blue-collar workers over the Party whereas the personality of Khrushchev naturally rose to the top due to the numerical dominance of the white-collar workers over the Party. Contrary to the idealist belief, the tip of the iceberg does not stand on air and then generate the rest of the iceberg and mountain underneath it; rather, in accordance with the historical materialist science, the tip of the iceberg is the culmination of the rise of the massive mountain that elevated the tip of the iceberg to such a high position. Personally, I disagree with the use of such phrases as 'the Soviet Union under Stalin' or the 'USSR under Khrushchev' because such phrases cultivate the idealist notion that the 'tip of the iceberg' – Stalin or Khrushchev – generated the rest of the system which they led. It is incontrovertibly true that Stalin and Khrushchev were leaders that greatly influenced the course of events in the system 'under' their leadership and many of the Soviet policies were "Stalin's policies", but the class composition of the system 'under' their leadership had a greater impact on whom – Stalin or Khrushchev? – would be the leader, than the one leader on the class composition of the system.

In this specific context, when the intelligentsia and the bureaucrats thinly dominated, how do we distinguish between a dictatorship of the proletariat and the dictatorship of the comprador bourgeoisie? How do we know which one was running the state? We know this not only on the basis that the white-collar elements slightly dominated the Party but also on the basis that the general policy direction of the state became one of further and further economic decentralization in order to strengthen the bureaucrats and the general foreign policy direction of the state was one of undermining the peoples' democracies and the anti-imperialist states from Hungary to Albania to North Korea to Egypt. The general policy direction in the favour of the reactionary forces demonstrated that the domination of the CPSU by the white-collar elements and the domination of the means of violence by the Titoist agents reliant upon the white-collar elements did have the effect of resulting in reactionary policies being pursued.

The corrupt bureaucrats that upheld Khrushchev were, as a comprador class, allied to the Anglo-American finance capital. This was directly reflected in the fact that Khrushchev, the man representing them, was an agent of the MI6. Before 1953, Khrushchev's track record was one of close relations with the MI6 spymaster Konni Zilliacus (see C19S7.2), knowing that Zilliacus was an MI6 spy, and with the MI6 agent Beria, knowing that Beria was definitely a traitor. After 1953, everywhere in Khrushchev's track record, one can see activities for the MI6, the foremost among them being his full-on collaboration with the UDB regime in Yugoslavia in all spheres, and the UDB was a CIA-MI6- BND front. Khrushchev's extensive collaboration with the Tito-Rankovic gang is incontrovertible proof of his collaboration with the British intelligence service. Khrushchev's open ties to Zilliacus, an MI6 official Khrushchev knew to be an MI6 official, served to reinforce the contacts with the MI6.

From hereon, the comprador bourgeois government of the territory of the former Soviet Union after the 1955-1956 overthrow of the dictatorship of the proletariat will be referred to in this book as 'Eurasia', so to distinguish it from the socialist Soviet Union. Socialism was temporarily restored in that country in the late 1970s and the early 1980s (more on this later) and for that time period, the term used in this book to refer to the government of that territory is again the 'Soviet Union' or 'USSR'.

C20S8. A Reply to the '1991 Capitalist Restoration' Argument

Some of those who argue that the socialism was overthrown in December 1991, harbour the anti-dialectical stance that until a state is 'suddenly' torn apart, the way it was 'suddenly' torn apart in 1917 or in 1991, a state cannot undergo a change its class character. A gradual change of the class character of a state is impossible, they argue. This view is anti-dialectical, for it ignores the law of the 'leap from quantity to quality'. The law of the 'leap from quantity to quality', explained in depth by Engels in Anti-Duhring, is one of the fundamental concepts of dialectics largely ignored by the proponents of the 'suddenness' theory. Actually, the key to determining the class character of a state is not whether such a state was established or

overthrown suddenly or gradually. Rather, the key to determining the class character of a state is the issue of classes' control over the means of violence. Control over the means of violence is the sole characteristic that determines the class character of a state, and taking control over the means of violence can be done gradually or suddenly.

The question of the control over the means of violence is the alpha and the omega of the communist stance against Kautskyism. Kautskyism is a treacherous tendency for it promotes the thesis that merely electing the 'good politicians' into office will be enough for the establishment of a progressive state; the communists on the other hand argue that the 'good politicians' must be supported through increasing their faction's control over the means of violence. The Kautskyites argue that some legislations for reforms are enough; the communists on the other hand argue that real reforms can only be enforced through control over the means of violence. The Kautskyites refuse to support military operations aimed at inflicting material costs upon the dominant anti-proletarian faction of the anti-proletarian armies; the communists call for 'revolutionary defeatism' against such reactionary armies in order to inflict enough material costs to reduce the leverage of the dominant faction of the reactionary army, so that the minority faction in the army, representing the intelligence agents of the proletariat, can take over the rest of the army and thus control the means of violence and yield real effective change. There are a number of other problems with Kautskyism, but the essence of the matter boils down to this question of the means of violence.

The transition to socialism requires the proletariat to conquer the command of the means of violence. Such a conquest of the command of the means of violence can be gradual, sudden, or a combination of gradual and sudden, but it must, of necessity, be an armed conquest. That is the key feature that sets apart a socialist from the Kautskyite illusory. It is no Kautskyite deviation to argue that the class character of a state can be changed gradually, so long as the argument notes that the gradual change has come through an armed conquest of the means of violence by a certain faction representing certain class interests. Recall that most of the Peoples' Democracies, Czechoslovakia being the main exception, were at first officially established and declared as communist-led bourgeois states and they were to transition towards socialist statehood and dictatorship of the proletariat, not through a sudden ripping apart the state as a whole and launching a revolt from below to demolish the troops, but through a leap from quantity to quality, a revolutionary change involving the proletariat masses from below and the armed vanguard of the working class from the top. Similarly, there is no reason to believe that a socialist state cannot transition to a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie without a 1991-style demolition of the state; on the contrary, the overthrow of socialism can occur through the leap from quantity to quality, which certainly was greatly helped by the fact that the Axis invasion exterminated so many blue-collar elements in the CPSU.

C20S9. The Secret Speech *** IMG-All-{Khrushchev – Political}

The Titoization speech was a Trotskyite-fascist propaganda work not written by Khrushchev alone, but by a web of Titoist elements inside and outside the CPSU. There was a commission behind the selection of the lies to be stated:

his "Secret Speech" [was] a document in fact composed by a commission headed by veteran party ideologue Piotr Pospelov.... (Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers' Party: From De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism, Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 37, Vladimir Tismăneanu, May 2002, p. 13) (IMG{Romania})

Informing his SAVAK chiefs, a SAVAK spy with extensive contacts to the international communist movement and the Warsaw Pact countries remarked:

Khrushchev had neither the spiritual ability nor the necessary communist understanding....

(The Interrogation session of Mr. Parviz Nikkhah [Jalaseh Bazjuyi az Aqaye Mohandes Parviz Nikkhah], SAVAK, Parviz Nikkhah, Khordad 22, 1344 / June 12, 1965. Source: 'Parviz Nikkhah According to SAVAK Documents' [Parviz Nikkhah be Revayat e Asnad e SAVAK] book, page 187. In: The Center of Historical Documents Survey) (IMG)

The SAVAK spy further stated:

Regarding the knowledge of Marxism, I have not seen anyone among the Soviet leaders who has been able to deal with major world issues based on Marxism-Leninism and materialism, and dialectics and historical materialism.

Suslov, who is apparently the current theorist of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, not only does not seem to be a communist, but he has such characteristics of the petty bourgeoisie that his theories are more similar to those of the petty bourgeois ideology.

From the point of view of having Marxist political knowledge, I do not see much value in the current Soviet leaders.

(The Interrogation session of Mr. Parviz Nikkhah [Jalaseh Bazjuyi az Aqaye Mohandes Parviz Nikkhah], SAVAK, Parviz Nikkhah, Khordad 22, 1344 / June 12, 1965. Source: 'Parviz Nikkhah According to SAVAK Documents' [Parviz Nikkhah be Revayat e Asnad e SAVAK] book, page 187. In: The Center of Historical Documents Survey) (IMG)

Expressing their extreme satisfaction, a memorandum of the US Government noted:

The denigration of Stalin and Moscow's acceptance of Titoism have created difficulties in Soviet relations with the satellites; (...). This fluid situation in the satellites has increased the previously limited U.S. capabilities to influence a basic change in ... the satellites. (...).

There is a possibility that an internal relaxation might result in the long run in the development of forces and pressures leading to fundamental changes of the satellite system in the direction of national independence [read: colonial dependence on Washington]

(NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET SATELLITES IN EASTERN EUROPE, NSC-5608, 73. National Security Council Report, Washington, July 3, 1956. In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1955-1957, EASTERN EUROPE, VOLUME XXV) (IMG)

I need not mention that the regime in Washington cared little for the 'national independence', 'individual freedom and security' or 'popular will' of Eastern European countries; these were merely euphemisms serving as cover for American plans to install their social-fascist neo-colonies in Eastern Europe. The thesis of the existence of a third camp in between the anti-imperialist camp and the pro-imperialist camp is a thesis in favor of deception for the purpose of intelligence penetration; The 'third' force between the pro-imperialist forces and the anti-imperialist forces would either be a pro-imperialist force disguised as 'neutral' (e.g. Tito and his fascist gang) or an anti-imperialist force disguised as 'neutral' (e.g. Nehru-era India, Mosaddeq-era Iran, Quwwatli-era Syria). Khrushchev made it clear that he sided with the former category – the pro-imperialist 'neutrality' headed by Tito's group.

The Titoization speech was a huge service to the MI6. Referring to the clandestine propaganda activity of the MI6 in Eastern Europe, the anti-Soviet British military intelligence officer Michael Smith remarked:

Copies of the speech were run off in their thousands and were distributed clandestinely throughout eastern Europe, fuelling demands for reform, particularly in Poland and Hungary. ('New Cloak, Old Dagger', Michael Smith. p. 123) (IMG)

Pro-MI6 reforms were on the way:

As details of the secret speech became more widely known, the clamour for reforms began to grow. ('New Cloak, Old Dagger', Michael Smith. p. 123) (IMG)

The notes prepared by US intelligence for the meeting of the National Security Council (NSC) are especially instructive. Not only do they state that the attack on the Stalin-era USSR was an excellent opportunity for the US-led camp, they also somewhat implied that Stalin's books must be removed and burnt, which is actually something that the Khrushchevians indeed implemented since that time. Another remarkable thing stated was that the degradation of Stalin could help Mao seize Stalin's spot. The following are excerpts of the notes:

1. Attempt to destroy Stalin tradition presents grave problems for Soviet Union and real opportunity for Western World attack – overt and covert.
 2. If Stalin degraded then Mao [i.e. Chinese Chairman Mao] takes his place along side of Lenin.
 3. For 25 years Stalin not only Soviet dictator but also leading theoretician and great war hero. They, therefore, have three-fold task of destruction.
 - a) Tens of millions of copies of his works are scattered throughout the Soviet Union, Stalin on Leninism, Short History of Communist Party, etc., etc. Can they remove and burn these?
 - b) Every history book filled with Stalin eulogies. Also Encyclopedia Britannicas....
 - c) If Stalin a gangster, what is position of other members of the gang? Molotov worked with him for 40 years; Khrushchev held key job under him for 18 [years], Bulganin, 21 [years], Mikoyan 30 [years], Kaganovich 28 [years] and Malenkov 27 years. (...).
- ('NSC BRIEFING - 22 MARCH 1956', NSC, March 22, 1956, p. 1) (IMG)

The NSC document also stated:

5. Stalin was artisan of Soviet foreign policy for 25 years. These should now be repudiated. Example: Korea, Berlin, Rejection of Marshall Plan, etc. And do Tehran, Yalta ad Potsdam agreements still stand? ('NSC BRIEFING - 22 MARCH 1956', NSC, March 22, 1956, p. 2) (IMG)
8. Name of Stalingrad should be changed; Stalinalee in Berlin and all places bearing his name; his body removed from mausoleum next to Lenin, statues and other mementoes destroyed. ('NSC BRIEFING - 22 MARCH 1956', NSC, March 22, 1956, p. 3) (IMG)

Word by word, Khrushchev was implementing these.

C20S10. Criminalizing the Soviet Intelligence Service *** IMG-All-{Khrushchev – Political}

One of the major objectives of the 1956 Titoization Speech was to criminalize the Soviet intelligence service while decriminalizing the reactionary agents 'victimized' by the Soviet intelligence service. The document by the National Security Council (NSC) of the United States stated:

7. (...). If Stalin is as bad as they say, should not Army move in and liquidate his long time henchmen who still run government? Should not all of Stalin's appointments through Soviet Union be reviewed and replaced? ('NSC BRIEFING - 22 MARCH 1956', NSC, March 22, 1956, p. 2) (IMG)

The 'henchmen' referred to the counter-intelligence officers in the USSR who had combated imperialist-fascist secret service infiltrators and comprador agents in the USSR, in an affair that reached its climax during the Great Purge. It is important to note that the rehabilitation of the imperialist-fascist agents purged during the Stalin era was not just an attack on Stalin and socialism, but was also an assault upon the communist and progressive elements in the Soviet counter-intelligence sector, who had combatted the fifth column. The decriminalization of the Trotskyite/Bukharinite fifth columnists would have criminalized the communists and progressives who purged the fifth column; the denunciation of the accusations against the fifth column as 'frame-up' would have served to actually frame up the communist and progressive elements in the counter-intelligence. In other words, the Moscow Titoists' 'rehabilitation' efforts was not just a war for a revisionist re-writing of history, but was also a war on the counter-intelligence service, so to allow the infiltration of Titoists in the counter-intelligence. And upon conquering the counter-intelligence sector, there would be little room for filtering out agents who would take over the extraterritorial intelligence, the military, the economy, and the cultural affairs. In a letter to the 'Japanese Communist Party' published in TASS and archived by the CIA, Nikita Khrushchev stated:

Espionage is needed by those who prepare for aggression. The Soviet Union is deeply dedicated to the cause of peace. It does not intend to attack anybody. Therefore, the Soviet Union has no intention of engaging in espionage against other states.... (KHRUSHCHEV: TEST-BAN PACT POSSIBLE NOW, Khrushchev Letter to Nozaka, Text of Khrushchev's reply to a letter from Japanese Communist Party Chairman Sanzo Nozaka., Moscow Tass in English to Europe 2013 GMT, June 28, 1962. In; Daily Report, Foreign Radio Broadcasts, Issues No. 126, CIA, BB-2 to BB-3) (IMG)

Ladislav Bittman, a former Czechoslovak intelligence officer who defected to the Atlantic intelligence services, quoted Nikita Khrushchev on this as well:

As late as 1962, Nikita Khrushchev claimed that "espionage is needed by those who prepare for aggression. The Soviet Union is deeply dedicated to the cause of peace. It does not intend to attack anybody. Therefore, the Soviet Union has no intention of engaging in espionage." (The KGB and Soviet Disinformation, International Defense Publishers, Ladislav Bittman, 1983, p. 19) (IMG)

Denying the existence of the extraterritorial intelligence by Party chief would have not only given imperialist-fascist secret services the excuse to denounce communists as blatant liars, but also would have served a revisionist rhetoric that would have set the ideological basis for Khrushchev to go ahead with his words and to destroy the extraterritorial intelligence service. The denunciation of Stalin by Khrushchev was a part of Khrushchev's plot towards opening up the USSR for foreign intelligence services. A SAVAK spy with extensive contacts to the international communist movement and with the Warsaw Pact countries, stated:

When Khrushchev became head of the Soviet Party and government, he sought to wash away all the mistakes that had been made in the Soviet Party and government by accusing Stalin, in order to establish better relations with the Western world, and to present himself to the world as a philanthropist and a capable communist. (The Interrogation session of Mr. Parviz Nikkhah [Jalaseh Bazjuyi az Aqaye Mohandes Parviz Nikkhah], SAVAK, Parviz Nikkhah, June 1965. Source: 'Parviz Nikkhah According to SAVAK Documents' [Parviz Nikkhah be Revayat e Asnad e SAVAK] book, page 187. In: The Center of Historical Documents Survey) (IMG)

Under very suspicious circumstances, the Soviet intelligence agents that had penetrated the pro-fascist camp suddenly were easy prey to hunt down. In Israel for example, as was mentioned in much greater detail in C16S6, there was a powerful intelligence service taking the form of a communist-led 'Socialist Zionist' popular-front party, Mapam. Via the Mapam, many luminaries infiltrated the ranks of the Israeli military and intelligence apparatus. Ze'ev Avni, through the Mapam, rose to become a leading official in the Mossad and the Israeli Foreign Ministry. However,;

Avni was caught early in 1956 and sentenced to fourteen years' imprisonment. (The Mitrokhin Archive II: The KGB in the World, Christopher Andrew, 2005, p. 194) (IMG{Mapam})

The precise date of Avni's arrest was in April, only one month after the 20th CPSU Congress. The 20th CPSU Congress was the onset of a course of 'de-Stalinizing' the Soviet intelligence service. 'De-Stalinizing' the Soviet intelligence service really meant destroying the Soviet intelligence service, elevating MI6 operatives at its high ranks, and most importantly for Avni's case, eliminating the agents of the Stalin faction in the Soviet intelligence. One of those Stalin faction loyalists reportedly was Avni:

Avni ... told his interrogator that Stalin had been a 'genius' and initially refused to believe that Khrushchev's 'Secret Speech' of 1956 denouncing Stalin was genuine. (The Mitrokhin Archive II: The KGB in the World, Christopher Andrew, 2005, p. 193) (IMG{Mapam})

The 'De-Stalinization' of the Israel branch of the Soviet intelligence service probably came about in the form of the betrayal of Avni to the Shin-Bet chief, Isser Harel. 1956 was also the year in which the 'Cambridge Five', who were described as the Stalin-era Soviet spies in the high ranks of the MI6, were publicly exposed.

Levi Levi, an alleged Soviet spy in Israel, was captured in 1957:

Zeev Avni, who worked in the Foreign Ministry and carried out special missions for the Mossad, was caught, convicted and sentenced to a lengthy prison term in 1956. Levi (Lucian) Levi worked for the Operations Unit (today the Operations Branch), of the Shin Bet, which as part of its mission, according to foreign reports from Poland, broke into the embassies of the communist countries, in order to photograph documents and install listening devices. He was arrested and sentenced to prison in 1957. (In Depth: The KGB's long history of running agents in Israel, The Jerusalem Post, Yossi Melman, October 27, 2016) (IMG{Mapam})

Another case in point of how Khrushchev further undermined the extraterritorial intelligence is with regards to Orthodox Christianity. It must be remembered that during the Stalin era, the Orthodox Church was utilized by Soviet intelligence as a tool of extraterritorial influence (see C15S7), with which to reduce the influence of the MI6-backed fascist Vatican mafia. Knowing this, the British agent Khrushchev scored points in favor of the MI6-backed fascist Vatican mafia by attacking its rival, Orthodox Christianity. The MI6 operative Richard West wrote:

Khrushchev's denunciations of Stalin, his friendship with Tito and his boisterous clowning manner led the West to believe that he was a 'liberal', new-style Communist of the Yugoslav kind. However, in some respects, Khrushchev was even more despotic and cruel than Stalin [who was neither despotic nor cruel], particularly in his persecution of Christian believers. In a major offensive against the Russian orthodox Church, Khrushchev imprisoned scores of bishops, priests and nuns.... He reduced the number of churches to 7,000, representing a loss of two-thirds. The seminaries were reduced from eight to three, and the number of functioning monasteries from sixty-seven to twenty-one. (Tito: and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, p. 268) (IMG)

Again, none of this is to defend the reactionary content of Orthodox Christianity. The point rather is that it was a useful weapon of extraterritorial soft power and intelligence, which Khrushchev seriously undermined.

Note also Richard West's contrasting of Khrushchev with Stalin. Too often in Anglo-American media, Stalin is slandered as having been more cruel towards those who believed in religion, whereas Khrushchev is praised as kinder towards the religious. This myth, however, is debunked by the MI6 operative Richard West who admitted that the opposite was true. While communists should indeed campaign against religion, such a campaign must not be via terroristic means. Lenin and Stalin opposed forceful campaigns against religion (see the relevant previous chapters and sections), and instead advocated persuasion and anti-religious propaganda. Forcing irreligiosity was not only anti-democratic, but also would have stirred up religious uprisings against communism, while driving a wedge between the Party and the predominantly religious proletarian/peasant masses – and that is what the Trotskyite-Titoist agent of the MI6 and UDB, Khrushchev, intended.

C20S11. The Further Decline of the Economy Since 1956 *** IMG-All-{Khrushchev – Political}

The CIA's Office of Research and Reports (ORR) provided a detailed report on the decline of the Soviet-People's Democratic camp economy from the highest rate of growth to an economy on the decline:

The confidence in the economic strength and solidarity of the Sino- Soviet Bloc which was expressed so firmly at the Twentieth Party Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR in early 1956 weakened by the end of 1956. Strength is still there, but the solidarity has been proved not so strong as had been thought, and the internal economic problems of the various countries loom larger than expected. To the critics of the Communist system, events have been encouraging, to the Communists, sobering. Bloc countries are now in a period of transition and of unstable relationships -- a period of reorganization, of re-planning, of renegotiation, and of regrouping.

By early 1956 the Sino-Soviet Bloc had become an impressive aggregation of economic power. Its population was 900 million. Its total gross national product (GNP) was 38 percent that of the NATO countries, almost 70 percent that of the US. Its rate of economic growth was significantly more rapid than the present growth of the NATO powers or of the US.

Despite the confidence expressed in early 1956, deep economic problems lurk under the surface today.

(Survey of the Economies of the Sino-Soviet Bloc, CIA, Office of Research and Reports (ORR), September 13, 1957, p. 1) (IMG)

A big reason for the economic decline and disintegration of the Eastern Bloc was the Khrushchev faction's attempt to make each country invest less in its industrialization and more in its consumer goods.

Today it is no longer necessary for each socialist country to develop all branches of heavy industry, as had to be done by the Soviet Union, which for a long time was the only socialist country, and existed in a capitalist encirclement. Now, when there is a powerful community of socialist countries whose defence potential and security is based on the industrial might of the entire socialist camp, each European people's democracy can specialise in developing those industries and producing those goods for which it has the most favourable natural and economic conditions. This at the same time creates the necessary prerequisites for releasing considerable resources to develop agriculture and the light industries, and on this basis to satisfy more and more fully the material and cultural requirements of the peoples. (Report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolshevik), Twentieth CPSU Congress, Nikita Khrushchev, p. 10)

Prioritizing heavy industry was needed for establishing the means of production that would produce the means of production, hence growing the economy, The Khrushchev group was aiming to prevent this from happening.

C20S12. Regarding Criticism of Stalin and Stalin-era USSR

The USSR was a massive country with vast amounts of resources not only natural but also human. The USSR possessed a powerful intelligence apparatus, both for extraterritorial intelligence and for domestic intelligence. It also had a massive body of experts and advisors in all fields. The communists in the USSR were, furthermore, able to at least identify who the top wreckers and counter-revolutionaries were and were able to stay vigilant against their deceptions.

The General-Secretary of the CPSU, in leading the Party of the proletariat, had access to all this body of expertise, intelligence, resources, advisory, etc. As such, the General-Secretary of the CPSU had access to massive loads of information upon which to make decisions. Failure to account for the General-Secretary's access to such extensive and deep amount of information would be a failure to take into account the historical-material realities of the USSR and hence would be a failure to make a historical materialist scientific analysis. Stalin was armed with a strong understanding of dialectics and the historical materialist science. This meant that he could analyze the information that reached him scientifically. Thus, in terms of policy making and strategic assessments, he could make informed, scientific, and strategically correct decisions regarding any aspect of Soviet life towards which he was responsible. It would be rare for someone so well-armed with dialectical and historical materialist vision on the one hand, and such a large access to information and data on the other hand, to make errors in policy making and strategic decisions. Where Stalin as the head of the Soviet Union did make mistakes on policy-making and strategic issues was when there was a failure of or insufficient level of intelligence and information provided, such as with regards to the exact timing of the Nazi invasion, or perhaps when he was compelled to resign from the position of General Secretary of the CPSU in 1952 thus having less access to intelligence materials. However, it would not be fair to blame Stalin for that since he was not personally responsible for going out there and gathering military intelligence. It was not his fault that people failed to provide a good quantity or quality of information to him. So that 'error' of not being able to prophesy what would happen or what is happening is obviously not a real error in the field of policy-making and strategic decision-making. An analyst who says that Stalin made errors in the realm of policy-making and strategic decisions will have to take into account the massive load of information and expertise to which any General Secretary of the CPSU would have had and with which the General Secretary could make well-informed decisions. And by taking into account the fact that the General Secretary could make well-informed decisions, an analyst who states that Stalin made mistakes in the macro-level and mid-level issues could minimize misjudgement of Stalin, and perhaps even arrive at the conclusion that Stalin did not err at the macro-level and mid-level which the analyst initially believed Stalin made.

A similar kind of statement can be made about Gorbachev; as the chief of the Titoist 'CPSU', Gorbachev made well-informed decisions based on the historical materialist science and dialectics – the difference though was that Gorbachev was on the opposing side of history, the side of comprador reaction. Insofar as is concerned the pursuit of his comprador and pro-imperialist objectives, I am not aware of any strategic error committed by Gorbachev at the macro- and medium levels. Similarly, Khrushchev, while relatively unintelligent, had excellent advisors knowledgeable about methods of counter-revolutionary activity, and thus he pursued his comprador objectives systematically with low amounts of strategic error. Tito, the evil genius leader of Yugoslavia's fascist resistance against Soviet power, made few grand-strategic and medium-scale errors insofar as serving the fascist cause is concerned. The strategic correctness of Tito's policy line (from a reactionary fascist viewpoint) was reinforced by the flooding of Tito with the intelligence materials provided to him. However, Tito himself had a good understanding of dialectics, hence his ability to perform well from a fascist standpoint. Whenever I hear the yellow journalist media state that so-and-so major leader with so much access to information made a strategic mistake at the grand level or at the medium level, I go on alert and doubt such claims. Major leaders with plenty of access to information have indeed made some mistakes on the medium-level policy matters but almost never in the grand strategic level. Hitler did not make a strategic mistake to invade the Soviet Union, although he made mistakes in some of the medium-level planning details in addition to some of the tactical details. Dyck Cheney did not make a strategic mistake to invade Iraq, and the 2003 invasion of Iraq did not benefit Iran. Such narratives that grand strategic moves are dependent upon the mistakes, or lack thereof, of individual leaders are yellow journalistic idealistic narratives. Such massive military and intelligence bodies do not so easily allow such grand-strategic mistakes to be made. The same goes for Stalin. Insofar as the grand strategies are concerned, CPSU General-Secretary Stalin and the Stalin-era USSR never did anything wrong from the viewpoint of someone who seeks the advancement of the cause of the proletariat. From collectivization to the Great Purge, from the Nazi-Soviet commercial relations to the friendship with the people of Israel, policies after policies of the USSR were each shining in more glory than the other despite appearing 'evil'.

The medium-level policy matters were largely a matter of experience and knowledge of dialectics and historical materialism. The less the experience, the more the mistakes; the more the experience, the less the mistakes. Take for example the following remark by Stalin:

Marx and Engels believed that we needed a militia-based army. In our first years, we also thought that only a militia-based army was needed. Life has taught us that that was incorrect. Today, in order to defend the country, we need a modern army with various specialists. A militia-based army is good only in the situation where war is decided with the rifle. Today we should discard this old militia-based army. Today the army is not the manufacture army, but the machine army. Therefore, we need people in the army who know machines. ('Conversation between Joseph V. Stalin and SED leadership', Wilson Center, April 07, 1952, p. 3. Conversation between Joseph V. Stalin and SED leadership, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Library of Congress, Dmitri Volkogonov Collection; according to Mikhail Narinsky, April 07, 1952. A copy can be found in Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Moscow (AP RF), fond (f.) 45, opis' (op.) 1, delo (d.) 303, list (l.) 179.) (IMG)

As time went by, experience piled up. In the beginning phase of the October Revolution and the Civil War, many Soviet officials, despite having positive intentions, had low experience and therefore made mistakes in the medium-level policy matters, Stalin's error on the militia-based army being a case in point. Later on, over time, they learned from such errors, did not repeat them, and tried to fix them. Stalin, due to being well-versed in historical materialism and dialectics, was a careful, cautious observer, quickly learning from experience. He managed to learn from his errors quicker than most of his colleagues, which was a factor that gave rise to his leadership of the CPSU in the first place.

I sometimes get accused of fostering this cult of personality and refusing to accept that Stalin made mistakes, treating him as a demigod. Such accusations are baseless. My counter-argument against such accusations is that these accusers do not judge political leaders from a historical materialist perspective. Such accusers do not look at the fact that the political leaders being judged had access to plenty of information, were battle-hardened, and intuitively dialectical and historical materialist even if fighting for the reactionary side of history. From the viewpoint of American

imperialism, Allen Dulles, Moshe Dayan, and Robert McFarlane made no mistakes in the grand-strategic and very few mistakes in the medium-level policy matters. They almost never erred against the interests of the finance capital which they served. In the same way, at that macro- and medium levels of decision-making, Stalin almost never erred against the interests of the proletariat which he served. At the scale of the small details of life and in the tactics of political struggle, everyone makes many small mistakes and Stalin could not have been an exception.

C20S13. The Nazi Rebellion in Hungary / Yugoslavia supports Nazi rebels / The Role of the Intelligentsia in the Rebellion / Yuri Andropov was a Trotskyist-Titoist agent of the MI6, UDB, and Horthyite Rebels *** IMG-All-{Hungary}

The Titoization Speech of 1956 greatly emboldened the Hungarian intelligentsia and agitated them with the anti-communist speech needed for a colour revolutionary action against the Hungarian state:

After the 20th Party Congress in the USSR, a completely different mood came into being. Among the writers and other intellectuals, so-called isolated groups came into existence; these groups organized debating evenings, with their main motive being that Hungary must again become master of its own house and that the interests of the Hungarian people should again be put first. A writers' newspaper was again published, originally once per month, later weekly. In this paper the government was strongly criticized and mistakes were traced. (...). The writers' newspapers came to be read more and more by industrial workers in Budapest and Csepel, and the newspaper boys who for the sake of security always hid these newspapers under the official newspapers, made three or four times the price for the writers' newspapers. ('PRE-REVOLT CONDITIONS 2. HUNGARIAN REVOLT IN OCTOBER 1956 3. ADVANCED EDUCATION', February 7, 1958, pp. C-6 to C-7) (IMG)

As the MI6 officer Michael Smith recalled, once the American intelligence obtained a copy of Khrushchev's full speech,:

Copies of the speech were run off in their thousands and were distributed clandestinely throughout eastern Europe, fuelling demands for reform, particularly in Poland and Hungary. ('New Cloak, Old Dagger', Michael Smith, 1996. p. 123) (IMG)

The result of spreading such 'information' was greater colour revolutionary unrest by the liberal intelligentsia:

As details of the secret speech became more widely known, the clamour for reforms began to grow. ('New Cloak, Old Dagger', Michael Smith. p. 123) (IMG)

Titoist Yugoslavia utilized the Khrushchev group's Titoization drive to agitate the Hungarian intelligentsia into a Titoist colour revolutionary movement:

In April 1956 a Hungarian, rather Communist transmitter came on the air; this transmitter was on Yugoslavian soil. The chief doctrine of this radio station was that Hungary should build up its own [Titoist] [pseudo-]socialist state. The official Yugoslavian transmitters were hindered from 1948 until the beginning of 1956 by jammers. ('PRE-REVOLT CONDITIONS 2. HUNGARIAN REVOLT IN OCTOBER 1956 3. ADVANCED EDUCATION', February 7, 1958, p. G-4) (IMG)

At the same time, the Moscow Titoists, in collusion with the Belgrade Titoists, worked to install the Hungarian Titoists onto power:

conferences were being carried on between the Russian leaders and Tito. Tito had demanded that the reparation payments, among others those from Hungary, which had been stopped by Stalin in 1948, should be resumed, and that the relationships with Hungary should be improved. His great enemy in Hungary, RAKOSI, immediately fell along with his supporters as a victim of the de-Stalinization and was succeeded by GERO. ('PRE-REVOLT CONDITIONS 2. HUNGARIAN REVOLT IN OCTOBER 1956 3. ADVANCED EDUCATION', February 7, 1958, p. C-7) (IMG)

Khrushchev and Mikoyan personally were involved in ousting Rakosi and promoting the Titoist foes of Rakosi. As the CIA stated:

The extreme de-Stalinization pronouncements of Khrushchev and Mikoyan at the 20th congress of the Soviet Communist Party dealt a drastic blow to the Rakosi regime and encouraged his opponents into renewed efforts to oust him and institute liberalized policies. (FACTIONALISM IN THE HUNGARIAN WORKERS (COMMUNIST) PARTY (1945-1956), CIA, January, 28, 1957, p. III) (IMG)

The party was shattered as the result of a series of Soviet policy moves culminating in the de-Stalinization pronouncements of Khrushchev and Mikoyan at the 20th congress of the Soviet Communist Party. These measures split the party into hostile factions and precipitated dissension in the organization from top to bottom. (FACTIONALISM IN THE HUNGARIAN WORKERS (COMMUNIST) PARTY (1945-1956), CIA, January, 28, 1957, p. I) (IMG)

Mikoyan reportedly arrived on 14 July, rejected Rakosi's proposal for the arrest of some 400 persons, including some forty writers and ... Imre Nagy, and apparently was sustained in his verdict by Khrushchev. It strongly appears that Rakosi was forced to resign as party chief when his plans for coping with the opposition were rejected. Rakosi's subsequent references to his guilt of "cult of personality" suggests that Mikoyan may have lectured him on the subject during his visit to Budapest. (FACTIONALISM IN THE HUNGARIAN WORKERS (COMMUNIST) PARTY (1945-1956), CIA, January, 28, 1957, p. 72) (IMG)

Gero was Hungary's Malenkov equivalent; in other words, he was a Titoist but of the kind that was somewhat more coopted by the communists, unlike Nagy who was not really coopted by the communists much. Nonetheless, during the Gero era, the,:

the rehabilitation of [Yugoslav-backed Nazi anti-Semite] RAJK with complete restoration of honor took place.... ('PRE-REVOLT CONDITIONS 2. HUNGARIAN REVOLT IN OCTOBER 1956 3. ADVANCED EDUCATION', February 7, 1958, p. C-6) (IMG)

The rise of the Titoist faction in Hungary led to the elevation of the fascist agents into the Hungarian military and intelligence apparatus, an elevation that was reinforced morally by the criminalization of the Hungarian counter-intelligence service which had hunted the Nazi agent Rajk down. As the CIA document had stated, RAKOSI, immediately fell along with his supporters as a victim of the de-Stalinization'. At the same time, this gave the pro-Nazi elements the operational freedom they needed for counter-revolutionary action against the people of Hungary. Then,:

In October 1956 GERO and some of his close fellow workers made the trip to Belgrade [just when a rebellion had started in Hungary].

Meanwhile revolt had started in Hungary also.... ('PRE-REVOLT CONDITIONS 2. HUNGARIAN REVOLT IN OCTOBER 1956 3. ADVANCED EDUCATION', February 7, 1958, p. C-7) (IMG)

With the planned absence of Gero, Hungary's Malenkov equivalent, the non-coopted Titoists gained much greater operational freedom and engaged in a colour revolution. With the support of Hungary's Titoist leadership, the Hungarian intelligentsia first staged rallies, which – very importantly – were supported by the counter-revolutionary elements of the AVH. This is important because it shows that the Titoist elements had indeed risen in the ranks of the Hungarian security apparatus. The colour revolutionary intelligentsia moved towards Hungary's radio station in order to be able to

further agitate the intelligentsia. However, the doors were locked. The reactionary elements in the Hungarian security, AVH, intervened, shot the guards, and allowed the colour revolutionary students to continue their measures. The CIA reported:

a movement of sympathy with the Poles arose; **this was supported by the [the Titoist] Hungarian leaders for reasons of opportunism.** A mass meeting was to be held by Hungarian youth at the Joseph Behm Square, where the statue of this Polish freedom hero stands. A great many people got time off to attend the this meeting and rather small Behm Square could not contain this mass of people. Meanwhile GERO, who was just returning from Belgrade, had ordered that the meeting could not be held, but shortly thereafter permission was given. The meeting took place on 23 October in the afternoon. Before that, the Petofi club had called upon the Disz (Communist Youth Organization) to close ranks with it on a number of points containing the demands of the Hungarian youth for more democracy. The crowd met in the square by the Parliament building. **The Budapest students** had decided on this, and the leadership of the Disz had joined them. Here it was demanded that the program of the Hungarian youth should be made known over the radio, for which purpose the mass moved to the radio station in Budapest. When this building appeared to be completely locked, people tried by force to get access to the station. **Some young officers tried to intervene but were shot down by AVH troops who had arrived in the meantime.** ('PRE-REVOLT CONDITIONS 2. HUNGARIAN REVOLT IN OCTOBER 1956 3. ADVANCED EDUCATION', February 7, 1958, p. C-7 to C-8. Bold added) (IMG)

The colour revolutionary uprising of the intelligentsia, timed with the arrival of Gero to Belgrade and the opportune time for Nagy to launch the rebellion, was far from spontaneous, especially considering how supported it was by the Titoist elements in the AVH and the Hungarian military. And furthermore, as reported by The Independent, the MI6 officer Michael Smith said:

The [British intelligence] officers I spoke to said there was an intention to cause an uprising in Hungary. (MI6 trained Rebels to fight Soviets in Hungarian Revolt, The Independent, Christopher Bellamy, October 22, 1996) (IMG)

Hence came the colour revolution. The colour revolution created the pressure from below with which the Nagy gang were able to conquer power and purge the communist faction:

Confronted with this crisis, the party central committee and politburo were called into hasty session on the night of 23-24 October. (...).

During the stormy all-night session several Stalinists were thrown out of the political committee ... and replaced by two moderates (Szanto and Kobol) and one Nagyist, Losonczy. In the early morning hours, Nagy was chosen premier. The following day – 25 October – with the fighting mounting in violence, Erno Gero was deposed as party first secretary and Janos Kadar elected in his place.


(FACTIONALISM IN THE HUNGARIAN WORKERS (COMMUNIST) PARTY (1945-1956), CIA, January, 28, 1957, p. 79) (IMG)

Contrary to what is often claimed, there is no evidence of a major involvement of the Hungarian proletarians in the colour revolution. Certain segments of the Hungarian workers surely did involve in the colour revolution, of course.

The 1953 Titoist New Course de-emphasized heavy industry and producer goods, and promoted economic decentralization. The effects of this were clearly reflected in the situation in Hungary. The Titoization agenda and the New Course, caused an economic disaster in Hungary. Hungary was seeing steady and high level of economic growth until 1953, but the growth began to slow down after the 1953 introduction of the Titoist 'New Course'. With the purge of the Beriaites and the rise of the Gero group, which was coopted by the Rakosi faction in 1954, growth partially resumed, but by 1955, when the Khrushchev faction reasserted influence, growth in Hungary ceased and in fact the economy began to sharply decline. Unrest, therefore, began to grow. However, even then, the discontent did not grow into the active participation of the workers, unlike what the Trotskyites often claim. Recall from C10S7, that even those proletarians who had become enthusiastic members of the Nazi Party ended up serving as a major communist fifth column, a pool of spies for the KPD and the USSR, as well as Strasserite rebels waging a shadow war against the Hitler gang. If even those 'Nazified' proletarians ended up serving as a de facto anti-Nazi fifth column inside the Nazi Party, what reason is there to believe that the Hungarian proletariat would become a horde of diehard Titoist fascist counter-revolutionaries? There is no reason to believe such, nor is there any evidence that such a thing occurred. Despite the slight involvement of Hungarian workers, the core of the so called 'proletarian revolution' was not at all by the proletariat but by the Hungarian intelligentsia. Some workers' councils were reportedly established but even then, the workers in such councils did not engage as much in the colour revolution. The core of the 'revolution' was by the intelligentsia and was mainly based not in the factories but in the universities:

the leaders of the revolution at the universities were the following, among others: Ladislaus POSZNAR, Alex PERGEL, Johann VINCE, Johann VARGA, Edith MOLNAR, Eduard NEMETHY, Alex SAL, and Zoltan MEREY, all of whom were taken prisoner by the KADAR regime. Bela JANKO, and Ladislaus GRUBER were in this central leadership. these people were representatives of the various faculties of the Budapest University and the Technical High School. There was also a group of intellectuals occupied with the complete reconstruction of Hungary. Leading figures among them were Georg ADAM, a writer; Ladislaus KARDOS and Georg MARKOS, professors. The revolutionary council of the Medical University consisted of representatives of the professors, lecturers, and assistants

HUNGARY
GROSS VALUE OF PRODUCTION OF CONSUMER GOODS AND PRODUCER GOODS
1938, 1948-57, and 1960 plan



('LIGHT INDUSTRY IN HUNGARY 1947-57', Economic Intelligence Report, Office of Research and Reports, CIA, July 31, 1957, p. 8)

and students. The first one was represented by Dr. Stephan PATAKY and Dr. Zoltan ZSEBLK.... ('PRE-REVOLT CONDITIONS 2. HUNGARIAN REVOLT IN OCTOBER 1956 3. ADVANCED EDUCATION', February 7, 1958, p. C-9) (IMG)

Then events followed very fast. **People quit work everywhere, and in the shortest possible time, in all offices, places of work, plants, and so forth workers' councils** were chosen by free and secret written ballot. **In the meantime the fighting groups had gotten a great number of weapons from the Kilian barracks, where a young Captain had taken over the leadership and opened up the stores of weapons. Also supplies of weapons came freely from the factory militias of the large plants in and around Budapest.** Then government had lost its power and shortly before his resignation GERO, on the basis of the Warsaw Pact, called in the help of the Russian troops. **In the meantime the leaders of the revolution at the universities kept themselves busy trying to create a nucleus out of the writers to form a coordinating organ between the various revolutionary councils, which at first worked completely independently.** This was, of course, a result of the great spontaneity of the revolution. Couriers instituted communications between the various councils and after some days, there really was coordination. **Also, close contact was maintained with the NAGY government. At the urging of the coordinating organ NAGY reported that as quickly as possible discussions would be opened with the Russians concerning the withdrawal of the Russian troops.** ('PRE-REVOLT CONDITIONS 2. HUNGARIAN REVOLT IN OCTOBER 1956 3. ADVANCED EDUCATION', February 7, 1958, pp. C-8 to C-9. Bold added.) (IMG)

The above CIA report itself contained a number of anti-Soviet and anti-communist biases, of course, presenting the fascist war in Hungary as a 'pro-democracy' uprising. However, even in that biased CIA report, no evidence was provided of an active 'proletarian' involvement in the 'revolutionary' efforts of the Hungarian intelligentsia. The maximum amount of 'evidence' was that 'People quite work' – which could easily be due to the feeling of unsafety as a result of the 'revolution' – and that "workers' councils" were formed in the factories. The formation of workers' councils and the self-management of factories would reduce economic discipline but could hardly be the active 'proletarian revolution' which the Trotskyites describe. The 'revolution' in Hungary was mainly done by the intelligentsia, and the involvement of the pro-'revolution' elements among the proletarians was at best conservative and limited to mere formation of 'councils' in factories. Again, when even the Nazi-minded among the German proletarians served as a crypto-anti-fascist fifth column in the Nazi movement, what reason is there to believe that Hungary's proletarians would suddenly become active pro-Horthyite warriors? Historical experience has shown many a time that those proletarian masses indoctrinated with reactionary pro-fascist anti-communist propaganda end up not fighting as much the progressive and communist forces and direct their hawkish rhetoric towards the imperialists, accusing the latter of allegedly not being anti-communist and chauvinist 'enough'. In the United States, this fake 'anti-communism' of the proletarians is concentrated in the Trump's electoral base, which preaches American supremacy while actually accusing the American corporations and American intelligence of being run by 'Marxists'. In Israel, the post-2005 pro-Putinist 'far-right' movements, which receive the support of the Hebrew proletarians, are anti-Arab and anti-communist in rhetoric but have struck the IDF, CIA, Mossad, and private banks tens of times more than they have struck the Arab civilians and the communist cause. In short, some individual proletarians, many from parasitic class backgrounds such as kulaks, would be serious anti-communists, but the bulk of those proletarians influenced by anti-communist or pro-fascist ideas tend to direct their energy towards combat against the actual fascists and anti-communists, all the while being soft on the real communists and real anti-fascists. It follows that the fascist 'revolution' in Hungary could not possibly be anything close to an 'uprising of the proletarians' and that the formation of councils was the maximum level of 'proletarian defiance against the regime'.

Another noteworthy member of the Nagy regime was Georgi Lukacs, the Titoist 'philosopher' and 'sociologist' whose elevation was clearly indicative of the elevation of the liberal intelligentsia in the Hungarian regime apparatus and the inherent links of the intelligentsia with the MI6-backed Nazis:

Lukacs returned to Hungary in 1945 and though his record with non-Party intellectuals during the Cold War is not emblemished, he did in 1956 become a minister of the brief communist revolutionary government of Imre Nagy, which opposed the Soviet Union. (Moscow, the Fourth Rome, Katerina Clark. p. 347. No Image)

Nagy undertook the radical Titoization of the Hungarian system:

Nagy from the outset took a more extreme position than the moderates. On 28 October [four days since the start of the rebellion] he declared that the bloody fighting between revolutionaries and Soviet and AVH forces was due to "mistakes and crimes" of the past ten years, and denied that counterrevolutionary elements were behind the insurrection. (...). He assented to the suspension of collectivization (28 October) and abolition of the crop collection system (30 October). (FACTIONALISM IN THE HUNGARIAN WORKERS (COMMUNIST) PARTY (1945-1956), CIA, January, 28, 1957, p. 81) (IMG)

With the high level of influence over the military and intelligence bodies by the Titoists elevated by Khrushchev, Mikoyan, and Tito, the resources of the Hungarian military were being diverted by rogue Hungarian military officials directly to the colour revolutionaries as stated previously. The Titoist colour revolutionary intelligentsia were armed by the CIA and MI6 via Austria. The vehemently anti-Soviet MI6 official Michael Smith wrote:

On 23 October 1956 a student demonstration calling for free elections, the withdrawal of Russian troops and the return of Nagy brought a quarter of a million people on to the streets of Budapest. Large numbers of weapons began to appear in the crowd. Some came from the American arms caches in Austria and other almost certainly were British. Fighting broke out with security forces. In an attempt to placate the demonstrators, Nagy was reappointed Prime Minister. There was sporadic fighting for several days, followed by a series of reforms introduced by Nagy, including the disbandment of AVH secret police.... ('New Cloak, Old Dagger', Michael Smith, pp. 123-124) (IMG)

Long before the colour revolution, the CIA and MI6 had been preparing for such a day:

American intelligence had stepped up its covert operations in Eastern Europe in the twelve-month period leading to the Hungarian uprising, training the 'Red Sox' teams of Polish, Hungarian, Czech and Romanian emigres for covert action inside their home countries. Allen Dulles, the head of the CIA, told the National Security Council that 'developments in the satellites present the greatest opportunity for the last ten years both covertly and overtly to exploit the situation'. ('New Cloak, Old Dagger', Michael Smith. p. 122) (IMG)

Prior to the uprising:

MI6 had been active behind the scenes for some time providing covert assistance to potential Hungarian rebels and was aware that they were planning an uprising. (New Cloak, Old Dagger. Michael Smith. p. 123) (IMG)

The British had been in close contact with dissident elements inside Hungary for some time, spiriting them across the border into the British zone of Austria for resistance training preparation for a future uprising. ('New Cloak, Old Dagger', Michael Smith. p. 123) (IMG)

In fact:

Certainly MI6 planned to support resistance fighters in both Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The SIS representatives in Prague and Budapest went out into the woods burying stay-behind packs like those that were being hidden in the Austrian Alps by Preston and Giles. ('New Cloak, Old Dagger', Michael Smith. p. 123) (IMG)

Describing the details of the MI6 involvement, Smith stated:

But dissidents appear to have made their own way across the border rendezvousing with their contact in true Cold War fashion, often quite literally under a certain lamp-post in a backstreet of a border town. A military officer working for MI6 would then take them up into the mountains for a four-day crash course in a variety of military skills before they were infiltrated back into Hungary. ('New Cloak, Old Dagger', Michael Smith. p. 123) (IMG)

British intelligence had stumbled on a startlingly easy way of getting people out of Hungary and into Austria. An illegal frontier crosser admitted that her nephew, a driver on one of the trains taking Soviet staff officers from Hungary to their HQ in Austria, had smuggled her across the border in the cab. ('New Cloak, Old Dagger', Michael Smith. p. 123) (IMG)

As The Independent reported,:

the weapons used were American, and others almost certainly British. (MI6 trained Rebels to fight Soviets in Hungarian Revolt, The Independent, Christopher Bellamy, October 22, 1996) (IMG)

Smith further stated that the:

MI6 and the CIA had buried arms caches in the woods around Prague and Budapest for use by "stay-behind" parties or fifth columnists in case of war. (MI6 trained Rebels to fight Soviets in Hungarian Revolt, The Independent, Christopher Bellamy, October 22, 1996) (IMG)

A British intelligence officer interviewed by Smith recalled:

We were taking them up into the mountains and giving them a sort of ... crash course. I would be told to pick somebody up from a street corner at a certain time of night in the pouring rain. Graz was our staging point. Then, after we'd trained them - explosives, weapons training - I used to take them back ... We were training the agents for the uprising. (MI6 trained Rebels to fight Soviets in Hungarian Revolt, The Independent, Christopher Bellamy, October 22, 1996) (IMG)

Meanwhile, the Anglo-American imperialist press propagated the myth that the Hungarian 'revolution' was completely spontaneous, that the 'revolutionaries' got virtually no assistance from the Anglo-American intelligence organizations supposedly because the Anglo-Americans could only focus on the Suez Crisis at the time and not on Hungary, and that the 'revolution' was by the proletarians. The Anglo-Americans kept on denying involvement in the events in Hungary in order to present it as spontaneous, so that more Hungarians participate in it without fear of foreign schemes – and this too was a part of the media work. The colour revolution that Nikita Khrushchev and other Kremlin Titoists had helped ignite also gave them the excuse to 'be busy' with Hungary so to not come to the aid of the Masriyin in the face of the Anglo-Israeli invasion of Egypt. Yet, it was not just the CIA and MI6 which had a role in the colour revolution. Recall that Yugoslavia had set up a radio to agitate the intelligentsia towards a colour revolution. Yugoslav involvement did not end there.

The Nazi German Panzerwaffe troops harbored by Titoist Yugoslavia were then deployed to Budapest to launch the massive anti-communist terror operations and anti-Semitic pogroms:

two trucks with panzer troops had been on the way from Yugoslavia to Budapest. This would have been after 4 November, and it is said that the trucks with the panzer troops, which had surrounded Budapest, were taken prisoner. ('PRE-REVOLT CONDITIONS 2. HUNGARIAN REVOLT IN OCTOBER 1956 3. ADVANCED EDUCATION', February 7, 1958, p. G-3) (IMG)

The role of the Yugoslav regime in instigating the colour revolution had also been confirmed by the Warsaw Pact media at the time, by the Red Army officials, as well as by the memoirs of Enver Hoxha. The gang of the Gestapo agent Tito went farther than mere incitement and even served as the harbourer of the Nazi Wehrmacht's Panzerwaffe troops deployed to Hungary for fighting supposedly on behalf of the Hungarian people.

Numerous Nazi-aligned Horthyites participated in the colour revolution along with the UDB-backed Panzerwaffe troops. The CIA reported:

Of course, some individuals who took an active part in the revolution have a background in the days of the [pro-Nazi] Horthy regime: for instance, army officers who joined the freedom fighters or provided them with weapons, have been officers in Horthy's army.... (Some Lessons of the Hungarian Revolution, CIA, p. 5) (IMG)

Fierce nationalism, as the CIA pointed out, played a prominent role in the rebellion:

These events [in Hungary] encouraged the fierce nationalism which had characterized all of Hungary's history. (...). Nationalist symbols (the flag, the anthem, the coat of arms) played a significant role throughout the recent events. (Some Lessons of the Hungarian Revolution, CIA, p. 2) (IMG)

Specifically providing the defining characteristics of the kind of fierce nationalism spoken of, the CIA stated:

Hungarian nationalism is **anti-Slav, anti-Rumanian, anti-Czechoslovakian, anti-Semitic**, and anti-Communist. On the positive side it is Christian, **pro-German** ... and pro-Western, consisting of a deeply ingrained sense of the historic role of Hungary as a Christian nation and an outpost of Western civilization and culture. The establishment of Roman Catholicism as Hungary's national religion in 1000 A.D. oriented not only religious feeling but also the nation's culture and political development toward the West.... (Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas Hungary, CIA, August, 1957, p. 4. Bold added) (IMG)

The kind of 'fierce nationalism' manifest in those protests was an anti-Semitic one:

rejection of Hungarian [territorial] revisionist ambitions, [and] the disproportionate number of Jews in high official positions, ... are forceful illustrations that Communism is the very antithesis of Hungarian nationalism. (Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas Hungary, CIA, August, 1957, p. 4) (IMG)

The CIA confirmed that the vast majority of Hungary's Yiddish population had an extremely low counter-revolutionary potential and that the Yiddish-Hungarians supported the Red Army intervention and the communist-coopted Kadar group. The US intelligence also confirmed that the Hungarian 'revolutionaries' launched many pogroms. As always, a large minority of the Yiddish, some of the Yiddish intelligentsia and most Yiddish bureaucrats, were collaborating with the Nazis against the proletarian majority of Hungary's Yiddish population. Jewish pro-Nazi organizations subservient to

American imperialism credibly claimed that a large minority of the Yiddish population in Hungary actively supported the 'revolutionaries' (Yugoslav-harboured Panzerwaffe troops). The following is an excerpt of the CIA document:

One U.S. Jewish spokesman, apparently well-informed, has claimed that some 25,000 Jews in Hungary joined in the revolt against Communism. Another source, also well-informed, claims that 16,000 Jews were among the great tide of Hungarian refugees which crossed the frontier and found haven in Austria. Granted these allegations are true, the question remains as to what part was taken in the rebellion by the remaining 100,000 or more Jews in Hungary. No conclusive answer is possible, but the available information suggests that while many of these Jews took no action either for or against the government, a large percentage actively supported the Kadar regime and the Soviet intervention. In this connection it may be noted that the ... Hungarian secret police (AVH), which [mostly] remained loyal to the Communist Party throughout the rebellion and was the principal target of revolutionary fury, is believed to have been staffed in considerable measure by Jewish [proletarian] personnel.

Under present conditions existing in Hungary, both the resistance potential of the Hungarian Jews and their possible utility to Special Forces appear to be exceptionally poor. A large proportion, possibly the majority, of the Jewish population is apparently loyal to the Kadar regime either through conviction or desire to live in peace. Of the Jews who sympathized with or aided the recent revolt, it seems likely that many have been badly shaken by the **anti-Semitic outbursts of the revolutionaries** and now ask themselves whether the position of the Jews in a liberated Hungary would be any better than under a Communist government.

(Resistance Factors and Special Forces Areas Hungary, CIA, August, 1957, pp. 97-98. Bold added.) (IMG)

The Jewish Telegraphic Agency (JTA) too confirmed that pogroms throughout Hungary were taking place during the 'revolution', although, ever the propaganda weapon of the Anglo-American imperialist agencies, the JTA claimed that the attacks were 'sporadic' rather than pervasive and systematic:

The revolution saw sporadic attacks on Jews in small towns across the country, with some targeted as representatives of the regime and others **simply for being Jews. In Budapest, a few soap-box orators raged against "the Jews," and some elderly Jews say they feared the revolution would turn against them.** All told, some 200,000 Hungarians, or some 2 percent of the population, fled the country, including an estimated 20,000 Jews, or one-fifth of the Jewish population. (1956 crises decimated two Jewish communities, in Hungary and Egypt, Michael Jordan, October 25, 2006. Bold added.) (IMG)

For the Gestapo agent Tito and his Nazi terror band, the Holocaust was not enough. Tito and his gang felt thirst for the blood of a seventh million. For them, the quota of the seventh million was a measure of career success. Nowhere and never did they miss the chance to directly and materially support the pogromists, be they the Gestapo torturers in Yugoslavia, the Nazi Wehrmacht's Panzerwaffe troops in Hungary, the infamous Nazi spy General Marian Spychalski in Poland, the Gestapo agent Anwar Sadat in Egypt, the PLO terrorists in Lebanon, and the Saddamite Iraqi regime. So correctly the Stalin-era Soviet Foreign Ministry describe Tito, that proud Nazi in the closet, as Hitler's successor:

The Tito fascist clique is an abominable product of the darkest forces of international reaction. The imperialists rightly regard Tito as Hitler's successor. It is no accident that when the fascists captured power in Germany the Tito-Rankovic clique was in the service of the Hitlerite Gestapo which later turned over the Yugoslav traitors to the secret services of other imperialist powers. (Tito-Rankovic Clique Has Established Fascist Regime in Yugoslavia, A. Kalinin, April 14, 1950. In: Information Bulletin, Soviet Union. Posol'stvo (U.S.), p. 221) (IMG{Titoist Yugoslavia})

The Yugoslav regime staffed its UDB fascist secret service with Gestapo cadres. The Titoist-Nazi Yugoslav regime agitated for such an anti-Semitic pogromist 'revolution' and harboured the Panzerwaffe troops that carried out the anti-Semitic terror as part of the systematic annihilation campaign against Hungary's pro-communist loyalist Yiddish population. All this time, the CIA-funded media propagated the myth that Titoist Yugoslavia, the dictatorship that picked up the mantle of Himmler and Eichmann, was Eastern Europe's 'most philo-Semitic' 'socialist' state under the 'benevolent' reign of which the Semitic communities culturally 'flourished'.

A prominent Nazi anti-Semitic commander of the CIA-backed MI6-backed Hungarian fascist rebels was Bela Kiraly. Nagy released Bela Kiraly and made him the leader of the Hungarian rebel armed forces and planted other counter-revolutionary fascist agents to become prominent leaders of the Hungarian government:

He permitted the revolutionary reorganization of the Defense Ministry and the appointment of revolutionaries (Maleter and Kovacs) and ex-prisoners (e.g., Bela Kiraly) to top military posts. (FACTIONALISM IN THE HUNGARIAN WORKERS (COMMUNIST) PARTY (1945-1956), CIA, January, 28, 1957, p. 81) (IMG)

Bela Kiraly was a former Nazi commander in Hungary. According to 'The Independent',:

Kiraly stayed with the army when Hungary's leader, Miklos Horthy, was removed from power by the pro-Nazi Arrow Cross movement in October 1944 after he had ordered Hungarian forces to cease fighting. On Hitler's orders the Arrow Cross were determined to continue the war to the end. Days before that end came for Hungary, in March 1945, Kiraly was put in charge of defending the town of Koeszeg on the Austrian border. (Bela Kiraly: Soldier who led Hungarian resistance against the Soviet Union during the 1956 uprising, The Independent, Gabriel Patros, Saturday 11 July 2009, underline added) (IMG)

For his Nazi activities, he was:

a victim of the old Stalinist regime.... (Bela Kiraly: Soldier who led Hungarian resistance against the Soviet Union during the 1956 uprising, The Independent, Gabriel Patros, Saturday 11 July 2009) (IMG)

Kiraly attended:

Kiraly was released weeks before the 1956 Revolution, and was in hospital recovering from an operation when fighting erupted in Budapest on 23 October. Five days later he was smuggled out of hospital, against doctors' orders, to attend a national gathering of armed revolutionary groups. Such was his reputation both in military terms and as a victim of the old Stalinist regime, that he was almost immediately elected Commander-in-Chief of the newly formed National Guard which brought together the various revolutionary groups with sympathetic units from the established security forces. (Bela Kiraly: Soldier who led Hungarian resistance against the Soviet Union during the 1956 uprising, The Independent, Gabriel Patros, Saturday 11 July 2009) (IMG)

True, the USSR had collapsed in early 1956 and Eurasia was a dictatorship of the comprador bourgeoisie, but the membership composition of the Titoist 'CPSU' was such that the Titoist white-collar elements only had a slight margin over the non-white-collar elements, the proletarians and kolkhozniks. They were in the weaker position, but had power enough so as to raise vigilance against the fatal dangers of Titoization and to coopt some of the Titoist agents in the 'CPSU' against Titoization, if Khrushchev showed an unacceptably poor a performance. The communist loyalists that operated within the Eurasian state apparatus and the 'CPSU' could persuade enough ordinary elements in the Party, even them who would have normally sided with Khrushchev, and to coopt enough the Titoists under the pressure of the proletarians to temporarily 'cross the floor' and side with the communist faction, and thereby form the majority with which to compel Khrushchev to take proper action. Indeed, a memorandum from the US National Security Council (NSC) stated:

Following this development there had been a flood of intelligence material alleging new and serious rifts over the Yugoslav problem among the Soviet leaders. It was the burden of many of these reports that Khrushchev was now completely isolated in support of the new and more liberal approach to Yugoslavia. Certain Yugoslav sources were insisting that Khrushchev's opponents are arguing that Tito's policies are dangerously weakening the control of the USSR over its satellites. Whatever the precise truth of all these rumors, General Cabell said that the CIA believed that recently Soviet policy toward the satellites had given rise to concern and that the Soviet leaders believed they will now have to shift their course and again tighten their controls. On the other hand, General Cabell pointed out that Bulganin and Mikoyan had been at least as closely associated with the new policy of liberalism toward the satellites as Khrushchev himself. (Memorandum of Discussion at the 298th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, September 27, 1956. In: 'Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957', Vol. 26, Central and Southeastern Europe, US Department of State, p. 747) (IMG)

As such, Khrushchev was eventually, and with much reluctance and delay, compelled to engage against the Hungarian colour revolutionaries by sending the Red Army. In late October 1956, there was:

full-scale fighting between AVH troops and the rioters (24 October), Soviet troops intervened. (FACTIONALISM IN THE HUNGARIAN WORKERS (COMMUNIST) PARTY (1945-1956), CIA, January, 28, 1957, p. IV) (IMG)

On November 1, 1956, Nagy officially announced the withdrawal of Hungary from the Warsaw Pact and appealed to the US-led camp for support:

On 1 November, presumably under the influence of extreme revolutionaries and faced with the build-up of Soviet armies, Nagy took the extreme step of proclaiming Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw pact and asking for the neutralization of Hungary under the protection of the United Nations. (FACTIONALISM IN THE HUNGARIAN WORKERS (COMMUNIST) PARTY (1945-1956), CIA, January, 28, 1957, p. 81) (IMG)

Red Army troops entered Hungary and obliterated many of the fascist forces led by Nagy. Fearing execution by the superior Red Army troops,:

Nagy and most of his ministers sought refuge at the Yugoslav embassy. With no one left to take orders from, Kiraly led several thousand members of the National Guard out of his headquarters in the centre of Budapest, first to the outskirts of the city and then to the Bakony mountains in western Hungary. (Bela Kiraly: Soldier who led Hungarian resistance against the Soviet Union during the 1956 uprising, The Independent, Gabriel Patros, Saturday 11 July 2009, underline added) (IMG)

Tito's gang gave refuge to Nagy. The communist forces in Eurasia later compelled Tito's gang to release Nagy from the Yugoslav embassy, upon promise of not hurting Nagy. Nagy was subsequently executed.

The Yugoslav regime continued to insist that the Red Army must leave Hungary. According to the research wing of the CIA's RFE/RL:

The Yugoslav delegate UN, Jozhe BRILEY, sprung a last night by joining the growing demand from the non-Communist world that Soviet troops be withdrawn from Hungary and the Hungarians be permitted to manage their own affairs.

BRILEY told an emergency session of the General Assembly that his government was opposed to intervention of foreign forces in any country. "The less interference, from whatever source, the better for the Hungarian people."

(YUGOSLAV REACTION TO HUNGARY, Evaluation and Research Section, Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty Research Institute, November 9, 1956, p. 1. In: Open Society Archives, Budapest, Hungary) (IMG)

Although the Red Army rightly intervened in Hungary, once again the slight margin which the Titoists had over the communists in the struggle for control over the Red Army was manifest, this time in the choice of who was to lead the new Hungary. Janos Kadar, a former deputy and ally of Laszlo Rajk with ties to the Horthyite intelligence service during the Great Patriotic War, was the deputy to Imre Nagy during the 'Hungarian Revolution'. While Nagy's chances of political survival had ceased, the Marshal of the Renegades Tito decided to go ahead with supporting the next 'best' Titoist candidate in Hungary at the time, Janos Kadar. Importantly, **Yuri Andropov, a pro-Nazi MI6 agent and the Eurasian ambassador to Hungary at the time, supported the Nazi Hungarian rebels led by Imre Nagy, an assisted Tito in the efforts to install Kadar.** Such facts are well-documented.

To document Andropov's treasonous activities, let us start with an excerpt of the Sergo Beria biography of Lavrenti Beria. Sergio Beria recalled that many years later, when Andropov had emerged as the chief of the KGB, Andropov had told Sergo Beria:

'I have closely studied your father's proposals on economic and foreign policy fields. Many of them are absolutely correct.' ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 277) (IMG)

Note that Lavrenti Beria had been the top supporter of the Imre Nagy faction. That Yuri Andropov would hail 'Many' of the economic and foreign policy lines of Lavrenti Beria was strongly indicative of what was to come. Vyacheslav Matuzov, among the most prominent KGB officials in the 1970s and the 1980s, confirmed that Yuri Andropov's intelligence roots can be traced to Leon Trotsky, and that Andropov was one of the leaders of Gorbachev's 'Perestroika':

The mechanism of "perestroika" was carried out by Primakov's supporters outside the KGB, partially attracting from there the personnel that Andropov personally created. After all, Andropov also came to the KGB and the Central Committee not from scratch. And here it is interesting to consider the roots of Andropov himself. (...). Andropov was the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Komsomol of the Karelo-Finnish SSR. Otto Kuusinen stood behind him. Who was Kuusinen associated with? With Lieutenant General of State Security Yevgeny Pitovranov. This is the "father" of all the Andropovs, Primakovs and other leaders of "perestroika". (...). The thread runs from the Comintern and Leon Trotsky. The "red thread" in this story is the struggle of Joseph Stalin against Trotskyism in the ranks of the law enforcement agencies. In my opinion, all this was created on the basis of the special services. ('Vyacheslav Matuzov:

Mikhail Gorbachev was a pawn in the plan for the collapse of the USSR', EurAsia Daily, interviewer: Sarkis Tsaturyan, March 11, 2019) (IMG)

Enver Hoxha recalled in his memoirs that Yuri Andropov supported the Nagy faction and the Nazi terrorist insurgents in 1956:

The Soviet ambassador in Hungary was a certain Andropov, a KGB man, who was elevated to power later and played a dirty role against us. This agent, with the label of ambassador, found himself surrounded by the counter-revolution which broke out. Even when the counter-revolutionary events were taking place openly, when Nagy came to the head of the government, the Soviets still continued to support him, apparently hoping that they could keep him under control. During those days, after the first half-hearted intervention of the Soviet army, Andropov told our ambassador in Budapest:

“We cannot call the insurgents counter-revolutionaries because there are honest people among them. The new government is good and it is necessary to support it in order to stabilize the situation.”

“What do you think of Nagy’s speeches?” our ambassador asked him.

“They are not bad,” replied Andropov, and when our comrade pointed out that what was being said about the Soviet Union did not seem to be correct, he replied:

“There is anti-Sovietism, but Nagy’s recent speech was not bad, it was not anti-Soviet. He wants to maintain links with the masses. The Political Bureau is good and has credit.

The counter-revolutionaries acted with such arrogance that they forced Andropov, together with all his staff, out into the street and left them there for hours on end. We instructed our ambassador in Budapest to take measures for the defence of the embassy and its staff, and to place a machine-gun at the top of the stairs. If the counter-revolutionaries dared to attack the embassy he was to open fire without hesitation. **But when our ambassador asked Andropov for weapons to ensure the defence of our embassy, he refused:**

“We have diplomatic immunity, therefore no one will touch you.”

“What diplomatic immunity?!” said our ambassador. “They threw you out into the street.”

“No, no,” said Andropov, “if we give you arms, some incident might be created.”

“Very well,” said our representative. “I am making you an official request on behalf of the Albanian government.”

“I shall ask Moscow,” said Andropov, and when the request was refused our ambassador declared:

“All right, only I am letting you know that we shall defend ourselves with the pistol and shotguns we have.”

The Soviet ambassador had shut himself up in the embassy and did not dare to stick his head out. A responsible functionary of the Foreign Ministry of Hungary, who was being chased by the bandits, **sought refuge in our embassy and we admitted him. He told our comrades that he had gone to the Soviet embassy but they had turned him away.**

(The Khrushchevites, Enver Hoxha, Chapter 9. Bold added.) (IMG)

The New York Times – having interviewed several Hungarians and ‘Westerners’ in Budapest, Geneva, and elsewhere, who knew Yuri Andropov during his years in Hungary – reported that Yuri Andropov sought to prevent the intervention of the Red Army against the Nagy faction:

On Nov. 1, 1956, with the streets of Budapest blackened from battle, with Soviet forces pouring into the country despite their agreed withdrawal from the capital, Imre Nagy, the leader of the Government, who sought to bring about change, found himself under pressure from all sides. He called Mr. Andropov to his office and denounced the troop movements.

The Soviet Ambassador said he knew nothing of this but promised to find out. Some time later, after what Hungarians close to the situation have described as a heated telephone conversation, he gave his word that the influx of Soviet troops would be halted. (...) The next day, the new commander of the national guard, Gen. Bela Kiraly, was sent to the Soviet Embassy to look into the Ambassador's complaints that Hungarians were sacking it. Mr. Kiraly, who now teaches at Brooklyn College, remembers that Mr. Andropov assured him, "Believe me, general, the Soviet people are Hungary's best friends." He offered immediate negotiations to discuss a new withdrawal of the Soviet troops.

(SOME INSIGHTS INTO ANDROPOV GLEANED FROM BUDAPEST ROLE, The New York Times, R. W. Apple Jr., December 28, 1982. “The writer of the following article [R. W. Apple Jr.] interviewed Hungarians and Westerners in Budapest, Geneva and elsewhere who knew Yuri V. Andropov during his years in Hungary on their expectations for the new Soviet leader.”) (IMG)

Upon finding out that Red Army intervention into Hungary had grow inevitable, Yuri Andropov found that the next ‘best’ candidate, from a Titoist perspective, was the deputy leader of the Hungarian Nazi rebel regime, Janos Kadar. Andropov persuaded Kadar, a Nagy faction loyalist, to pretend to oppose the Nagy faction and to deploy himself onto the camp of the Red Army:

According to several Hungarian sources, Mr. Andropov had already begun to make his plans for the country's future. On Nov. 1, Mr. Kadar, First Secretary of the party, and Ferenc Munnich, the Minister of the Interior in the Nagy Government, stopped at the Soviet Embassy and talked for some time, apparently to the Ambassador. Miklos Vasarhelyi, Mr. Nagy's press aide, who later spent four years in prison, said, "It was Andropov who talked to him first, and it was Andropov who persuaded Kadar to go over to the Soviet viewpoint."

(SOME INSIGHTS INTO ANDROPOV GLEANED FROM BUDAPEST ROLE, The New York Times, R. W. Apple Jr., December 28, 1982. “The writer of the following article [R. W. Apple Jr.] interviewed Hungarians and Westerners in Budapest, Geneva and elsewhere who knew Yuri V. Andropov during his years in Hungary on their expectations for the new Soviet leader.”) (IMG)

Through the MI6-backed Horthyite rebel and Titoist leader Janos Kadar, Andropov aimed to ensure the continuity of the Nagy faction’s project in Hungary after the overthrow of Imre Nagy’s immediate entourage. In other words, Kadar was to be a stay-behind agent of the Nagy faction, a Nagy loyalist who infiltrated the camp of the anti-Nagy forces so that the anti-Nagy opposition may be led, and misled, by an agent of the Nagy faction. Yuri Andropov decided to promote Janos Kadar at the behest of Tito himself:

It is widely believed in Budapest that Mr. Andropov was one of the key figures in persuading Nikita S. Khrushchev to install Mr. Kadar as Mr. Nagy's replacement. Khrushchev himself preferred Mr. Munnich, who had fought in the Russian Revolution and in the Red Army in World War II.

On the night of Nov. 2-3, however, Khrushchev was meeting President Tito of Yugoslavia at the latter's island retreat of Brijuni in the Adriatic Sea. According to the diary of a Yugoslav diplomat who was present, Tito argued strongly that Mr. Kadar would be more likely to attract a genuine popular following in Hungary, not least because he had served time in jail under the Stalinist Government of Matyas Rakosi.

"Andropov knew the opinion of Hungarian party leaders better than anyone else, and he knew the mood of the people," a close associate of Mr. Kadar said. "When Tito opted for Kadar, Andropov was in position to support him."

(SOME INSIGHTS INTO ANDROPOV GLEANED FROM BUDAPEST ROLE, The New York Times, R. W. Apple Jr., December 28, 1982. "The writer of the following article [R. W. Apple Jr.] interviewed Hungarians and Westerners in Budapest, Geneva and elsewhere who knew Yuri V. Andropov during his years in Hungary on their expectations for the new Soviet leader.") (IMG)

The CIA too confirmed that Janos Kadar, an agent of Nagy faction not really committed to cracking down on the Titoization efforts of the Nagy regime, was undertaking the pro-communist measures because he had been encircled by the communist intelligence agents who were planted around him under the guise of 'Soviet advisors':

the NAGY government had matters completely in hand on 3 November 1956 and without the support of the Russian troops, which in the meantime had been completely rotated, KADAR would not have gotten his foot in the door. Even during the first period of the KADAR regime, everything which had been changed and democratized by the revolutionary councils remained. People at the universities acted as though nothing had happened, tried to get things back on the rails as fast as possible and quietly to maintain the rights they had gained. KADAR, however, was completely surrounded by Russian advisors and is now a puppet of the Russian regime, a prisoner in his own Parliament building. Even after 4 November 1956 some people went ahead with the publishing of pamphlets, including a stenciled student newspaper which was read by the Hungarian population. ('PRE-REVOLT CONDITIONS 2. HUNGARIAN REVOLT IN OCTOBER 1956 3. ADVANCED EDUCATION', February 7, 1958, p. C-10) (IMG)

In other words, the anti-communist Kadar behaved like a 'communist', for he was coopted by the communist faction of the Soviet intelligence service. Nevertheless, the influence of the communists in the Soviet Red Army on Hungary was never sufficient so as to yield the replacement of the communist-coopted Titoist agent Janos Kadar with a communist loyalist anti-Titoist statesman. Kadar therefore served as the compromise candidate, the 'lesser Titoist'. Indeed, the 'lesser Titoist' 'lesser Nazi' Kadar group continued many of the Titoist policies lines albeit at a slower pace and to a lesser extent. The infamous American spymaster Noel Field, who had been released from Hungarian jail by Imre Nagy still roamed and operated freely in Hungary till the end of his life. Referring to the Noel Field family, Karel Kaplan, a West German intelligence agent, wrote in 1990:

All three Fields were released in October 1954. (The Report on the Murder of the General Secretary, Karel Kaplan, 1990, p. 25) (IMG)

The New York Times reported:

And after Soviet forces in 1956 toppled the Hungarian Government of Imre Nagy, which had released him, Noel Field upheld the new Hungarian regime of Premier Janos Kadar as having saved Hungary from "white terror." (Noel Field, Self-Exiled US Aide, is Dead, New York Times, September 14, 1970) (IMG)

Noel Field's condemnation of the 'White Terror' was obviously demagogical and was for fostering his cover as a fake 'communist'.

Noel Field died in Budapest, the Hungarian capital, in 1970 when Kadar was in power:

Noel Field, the former United States State Department official ... obtained asylum in Hungary with his wife, Herta, in 1954, died yesterday in a Budapest hospital. He was 66 years old and had long been suffering from cancer. (Noel Field, Self-Exiled US Aide, is Dead, New York Times, September 14, 1970) (IMG)

Regarding the influence of the Mossad in Hungary, the conditions also reflected the balance of forces. On the one hand, the Anglo-Yugoslav secret services had installed their agent Kadar at the helm and thus the UDB and MI6 had influence in Hungary. On the other hand, there was the Eurasian Red Army influence which countered the MI6-UDB influence in Hungary. This is reflected in the compromise situation with regards to the Zionist migration, involving the denial of passports to young people but permission for older people to leave:

Summary

Touval, on his own initiative, met with Hungarian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Szarka in order to express his gratitude on the successful beginning of emigration from Hungary and to ask that the Hungarians make sure that their instructions for issue of passports for anyone intending to leave for Israel be followed regardless of that person's age. Szarka said that to the best of his knowledge 80 passports for Israel are issued daily and that altogether 2,000 have been approved since December. He pledged to take action to remedy the denial of passports to young people as well as to enable the emigration of people previously imprisoned for Zionist activity.

(Coded Tel. 554, Outg.: 93.01/2295/13, 'M. Touval (Budapest) to the East European Division', January 24, 1957. In: 'DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL', State of Israel Archives, Vol. 12: The Sinai Campaign: The Political Struggle, October 1956 - March 1957, Edited by Nana Sagi, General editor: Yemima Rosenthal, Companion Volume, 2009, p. 310) (IMG{PD - Post-1953 Migration to Israel})

Note that the elderly Yiddish citizens of Hungary were not considered 'biologically valuable' for the Zionist state-building project. The Mossad was often reluctant to bring the elderly to Israel (see C16S2). Therefore, the Hungarian government's limitation of the Zionist migration to the elderly showed that the communist forces, backed by the Red Army presence, exercised an overall greater influence over Hungary than the forces of Titoist reaction.

A month prior, Israel had been promised by Hungary's deputy foreign minister that efforts would be maximized to assist in the channeling of the Yiddish citizens in Hungary through Yugoslavia so to eventually reach Israel:

Touval reports on his talk with Deputy Foreign Minister Sebes on the options for emigration from Hungary.

Sebes affirmed his government's readiness to allow emigration and said that he believes that in January approximately a thousand Jews would be able to leave for Israel. The age restrictions imposed on emigrants would not hold for those going to Israel. He requested that an effort be made to carry out the emigration quietly.

Touval pledged Israel's readiness to channel the emigrants through Yugoslavia or send them by air and said that the mere fact that substantial emigration has commenced would calm the Jews and they would await their turn. He expressed his readiness to recommend that in the agreement between Israel and Hungary, precedence would be given, as far as possible, to merchandise that they require.

The talk was held in a very friendly atmosphere. With the utmost caution, Touval is starting to envisage mass immigration from Hungary to Israel.

(Coded Tel. 529, Inc.: 130.09/2295/13, 'M. Touval (Budapest) to the Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the East European Division, December 25, 1956. In: 'DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL', State of Israel Archives, Vol.

12: The Sinai Campaign: The Political Struggle, October 1956 – March 1957, Edited by Nana Sagi, General editor: Yemima Rosenthal, Companion Volume, 2009, p. 207) (IMG)

The fact that the Kadar gang was in charge of Hungary on behalf of the Nagy faction even after the Red Army intervention serves as excellent proof of the depth of the influence which the Titoist faction in Moscow exercised over the Red Army. It shows that while the communist faction did have a large stake over the Eurasian state apparatus, the Titoist faction still thinly dominated in the Party, in the intelligence service, and in the military, not to mention also in the economic bodies.

C20S14. Economic Revisionism in Hungary

The well-known Anglo-Israeli intelligence operative Robert Maxwell – who was the father of Ghislaine Maxwell, the partner in crime of Jeffrey Epstein – was a ‘good’ friend of the Kadar group in Hungary. So welcomed was Maxwell by the Hungarians that got to write the introduction of a book of selected speeches and interviews by Kadar, a book that was published by the Hungarian government-controlled academic media. In the introduction to the book, Maxwell heaped praise on Kadar, but in the midst of such praise, he also pointed out that New Economic Mechanism, the revisionist policy advocated by Kadar and his group, brought greater autonomy for enterprises, and that Hungary was a member of the IMF:

The New Economic Mechanism has brought about major changes in industry which even allow workers to use State factories out of normal hours to produce goods for their own profit at privately negotiated prices. Factory managers are given greater autonomy, and personal accountability for performance has been increased throughout the economy. This flexibility of approach has brought benefits. Hungary is a member of the IMF and has improved its balance of payments, but her foreign debts are still relatively high. This has meant that the continuous improvement in the standard of living of the Hungarian people has halted over the last couple of years, although a modest resumption of economic growth is expected in 1985.

Kadar’s number one priority is the welfare and future of Hungary and her people, to which he has dedicated his whole life. Every problem, every situation, is tackled from the standpoint of Hungary and her place in the world. In this he is a fearless and formidable protagonist.

(Introduction, By: Robert Maxwell (General Editor of the ‘Leaders of the World’ Series), January 1985. In: ‘János Kádár: Selected Speeches and Interviews’, Akademiai Kiado, Budapest, 1985, pp. IX-X) (IMG)

In his speech to the Central Committee, Kadar emphasized that economic decentralization of management was "essential" "Marxist" "socialist reform":

The elements of the reform concerning the decentralization of distribution and management are also essential. Summing up, I believe I can say that the reform is a Marxist reform, a socialist reform. (Address to the Session of the Central Committee, Janos Kadar, November 24, 1967. In: ‘János Kádár: Selected Speeches and Interviews’, Akademiai Kiado, Budapest, 1985, p. 296) (IMG)

The CIA confirmed that the economic decentralization systematically decimated the Hungarian economy, for decentralization by nature drastically reduced coordination between the various economic bodies and empowered the local enterprises to engage in corrupt activities without any accountability to central bodies. Note that under a centralized economy, there would be no major problem regarding coordination. The centralization of the economic decision-making bodies away from many bureaus onto a few central bureaus would allow easier monitoring of the economy by the counter-intelligence agencies, for surveillance of a few central bureaus is easier than the surveillance of many scattered bureaus. Yet, decentralization did the precise opposite and empowered local enterprises to suck the budget while damaging production. Detailing the results of the New Economic Mechanism in Hungary, the CIA reported:

11. Under the NEM, the Hungarians hoped to cope with the investment problems by modernizing the construction and building materials industries and by decentralizing investment decision making. Beginning in 1969, substantial funds were earmarked for expanding output of cement, bricks, and other materials, and the construction industry was given a larger share of investment. Little payoff has been achieved so far or, in fact, was expected by the leadership in the short run.

12. **A more immediate impact came from decentralization but in the direction opposite to that expected. Enterprises and state banks were given significant investment authority at the expense of the often politically motivated ministries.** In theory, only firms that were profitable would be able to invest. The profits of an enterprise were to be divided into a profit sharing fund, a reserve fund, and a development fund. Development funds - the source of an enterprise's own investment - could be either invested or placed on deposit with the banks to earn interest, although interest rates are too low to offer an attractive alternative to investment. Enterprise funds also could be supplemented by state credits or grants or by bank credit. Bank and state credit would be parceled out according to three criteria: the size of the development fund of the enterprise applying for credit; the expected profitability of the project; and, for large projects, the contribution of the intended investment to national economic objectives. **Under the new system, nearly all investment would be initiated by enterprises.**

13. **The reformers' expectations were not realized. The now relatively unfettered enterprises refused to play by the new rules.** Even while the NEM was being devised, enterprises deliberately underreported their profit position in the hope of retaining more profits or obtaining higher subsidies. As a result, enterprise profits in the early stages of the reform were 50% larger than the government had expected. Development funds and self-initiated investment swelled excessively. Above-plan investment by enterprises amounted to 3.2 billion forints in 1969, and rose to 10 billion forints in 1971. **The inflationary rise in investment put considerable pressure on prices of building materials**, which, although heavily controlled, still increased by 4% in 1971. (...).

15. **As might be expected, enterprises frequently initiated projects without the required financial backing.** For example, the Tisza chemical combine began a \$25 million development program in 1971 with financial backing for about one-half of its program. The coal mining enterprises in Borsod placed orders for various installations even though their application for credit had not been finally approved. According to Deputy Premier Matyas Timar, the "motto" of enterprises was, "What is important is to get the work going; the state will give the missing money from its budget." A government audit in 1970 discovered that 32 enterprises did not have development funds to cover 3 billion forints in committed investment; the state financed about 70% of the difference, creating a substantial budget deficit. Meanwhile, the banks, which had been expected to play a major role in rationing investment, were simply sidestepped by enterprises.

16. **Even the major projects that remained in state hands were too numerous and not effectively controlled. The responsibility for various stages of these projects - from blueprint to construction - was scattered among enterprises and ministries, leading to**

breakdowns in coordination and cost overruns. The Ministry of Finance and the National Planning Office, which had been expected to coordinate and control major investments, had neither adequate information about nor effective veto over the projects being promoted by other ministries.

(HUNGARY: THE FIRST TEST OF THE NEW ECONOMIC MECHANISM: Intelligence Memorandum, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, May 1972, pp. 5-6. Bold and underline added.) (IMG)

Note that to this day, the CIA-funded media presents Hungary as the economic success model in the CMEA countries, calling Hungary “the happiest barracks” in the ‘Second World’ countries. The Kadar gang and their CIA backers hailed the decentralization measures in Hungary as ‘Goulash Communism’, the kind of a ‘socialism’ that allegedly brings plenty of food.

By the 1980s, the majority of the Party was white collar intelligentsia:

Three-quarters of the party members were originally industrial and agricultural workers; now, only one-third of them are. (Introductory Biography by L. Gyurko. In: ‘János Kádár: Selected Speeches and Interviews’, Akademiai Kiado, Budapest, 1985, p. 146) (IMG)

Twenty-nine per cent of the party’s members are industrial workers, 6 per cent are in agriculture, 41 per cent are intellectuals and white-collar workers, 16 per cent are pensioners, and 8 per cent work in other jobs. (Introductory Biography by L. Gyurko. In: ‘János Kádár: Selected Speeches and Interviews’, Akademiai Kiado, Budapest, 1985, p. 145) (IMG)

The Party was, furthermore, a "mass Party" as opposed to a vanguard democratic centralism Party:

The Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party is at once a mass party, and the leader of society, as the Constitution specifies. (Introductory Biography by L. Gyurko. In: ‘János Kádár: Selected Speeches and Interviews’, Akademiai Kiado, Budapest, 1985, p. 145) (IMG)

Hungarian Titoist leader Janos Kadar was of course a well-known Khrushchev supporter. Gyurko, a journalist and the official introduced of the book of the selected speeches, wrote:

It is well known that he liked Khrushchev; their relationship was built on the common struggle. I remember well what a shock it was to many Hungarians when Khrushchev was dismissed. The Stalinist period was still too close and the fear was very real that the change could mean a return to the old policy, to the old methods.

Kadar was in Poland that day. When he got back, the whole country waited to hear what he would say. I was there when he got off the special train at the railway station. he did not wait until he got his office, did not wait to consult and to be informed. He spoke to the country as soon as he got back. Calmly and frankly.

“A great variety of events have occurred in the past week. There was some news that we were very happy to hear, and some that was a source of surprise. I want to tell you this frankly and honestly. As you know, there have been personal change sin the top leadership of the Soviet Union. Comrade Khrushchev, who asked to be relieved of his post on grounds of his age and poor health, has been relieved of his post, and Comrades Brezhnev and Kosygin have been elected to take his place. In every country and in every party a matter of this nature is up to the party and the country to decide on. For my own part, I think that Comrade Khrushchev deserves a great deal of credit for his fight against the Stalinist personality cult, and for the fact that there is still peace. He worked for peace. (...).”

(Introductory Biography by L. Gyurko. In: ‘János Kádár: Selected Speeches and Interviews’, Akademiai Kiado, Budapest, 1985, pp. 139-140) (IMG)

C20S15. Economic Titoization in Poland / Bierut’s Suspicious Death / On Gierek’s Views / The Gestapo agents Spsychalski and Kaczorowska Rise to Power in Gomulka Era *** IMG-All-Poland}

Gross National Product: Poland

The following table shows the CIA estimates of Poland's level of growth in all economic sectors industry, agriculture, transport and communication, trade and services from 1950 to 1953 and from 1953 to 1955. Until 1953, according to the CIA estimates, industry, construction, transportation, and communication saw immense growth, but the agricultural sector suffered. The suffering of the agricultural sector was natural because forget not that Poland, just like East Germany and Czechoslovakia, had been affected by bad weather/climate conditions during those years:

	1950	1953	1954	1955
A. <u>Billion 1955 Dollars</u>				
Gross National Product	16.7	19.2	20.7	22.1
B. <u>Indexes (1950 = 100)</u>				
Gross National Product	100	115	124	132
Industry	100	132	146	161
Agriculture	100	97	99	101
Construction	100	149	151	151
Transport and Communication	100	140	149	166
Trade and Services	100	114	128	138

A. Northern Area (Poland, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia)

(‘EASTERN EUROPEAN GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT, 1950-1955’, CIA, September 27, 1956, p. 5) (IMG)

In the northern area of the European Satellites the fall of 1952 was characterized by above-normal precipitation, with the result that fall plowing and sowing of grains for harvest in 1953 were considerably hampered. Despite the fact that spring plowing and sowing were aided by favorable weather over most of the area, it is believed that the over-all acreage of bread grain will be less than prewar, because of failure to fulfill the fall sowing plans for winter wheat and rye.

Available weather information and reports from the American Embassy in Moscow indicate that cold and lack of rain characterized the spring much of Poland, although more abundant rainfall appears to have occurred in June. Favorable conditions for spring work were reported in East Germany and Czechoslovakia. Rainfall appears to have been gradually adequate to abundant in the late spring and summer months, and in July heavy rains were reported to have caused harvesting difficulties for grain and cultivation difficulties for root and vegetable crops.

(‘CROP CONDITIONS IN THE SOVIET BLOC, 1953 (RR IM-379)’, CIA, Office of Research and Reports, September 23, 1953, p. 4. Underline original) (IMG)

Had the policies of centralized industrialization and agricultural collectivization not been pursued, Polish agriculture would have been devastated far more as a result of the poor weather conditions, but thanks to the People's Democratic economic policies, agriculture did not suffer too badly. As in all of the Peoples' Democracies, Poland too probably suffered economically due to the treasonous activities of the Beria gang, but the restoration of communist influence during the Beria purge again improved the economy, and hence Poland saw an economic growth in all sectors until 1954 and a significant growth also until 1955. While negatively portraying the economic growth of Poland, the CIA did nonetheless make a number of confessions regarding the growth of industry. By the time the 1956 colour revolution and installation of the imperialist agent Gomulka occurred, the CIA reported:

Poland, although the largest European Satellite in area and population, ranks third in gross national product per capita. Largely an agricultural and mining economy at the end of World War II, Poland has subordinated agriculture and light industry in order to speed development of mining and heavy manufacturing. In tripling the output of the machine-building and defense industries during the Six Year Plan (1950-55), Poland outstripped even the expansion of its coal industry, which is its chief raw material asset, and became dependent on imports for other industrial raw materials and food. Although food availability per capita has returned to prewar levels, food distribution has not kept pace with rapid urbanization. The quality of the diet and of consumer goods has not improved commensurately with the growth of the economy or the effort extracted from the workers. (GOMULKA AND THE POLISH ECONOMY, CIA, Office of Research and Reports (ORR), November 7, 1956, p. 1) (IMG)

Shortly after Nikita Khrushchev's Titoization Speech, during the 20th CPSU Congress, on March 12, 1956, Boleslaw Bierut aged 64 died of 'natural' causes; hardly anyone in Poland ever believed the narrative that Bierut died of 'natural' causes. There have been many works speculating, not without basis, that martyr Bierut was murdered by the Khrushchev group because Bierut stood in the way of Titoization in Poland. Even an intelligence body as high as the US National Security Council (NSC) put quotation marks around the word "died" in describing the 'death' of Bierut:

What will leadership in those satellites now do? Bierut leader [of] Polish Communist Party "died" in Moscow. Rakosi must be trembling in Hungary and same [with] other satellite leaders to whom degradation [of] Stalin [was] incomprehensible. ('NSC BRIEFING - 22 MARCH 1956', NSC, March 22, 1956, p. 2) (IMG)

In 'The Khrushchevites', Enver Hoxha too hinted that Bierut's death was suspicious. After his tragic 'natural' death, Bierut was succeeded by Ochab. Ochab was to Poland what Malenkov was to the USSR and what Gero was to Hungary. Ochab was undoubtedly a Titoist but since he was encircled by communists around him, he was coopted into adopting a mostly-communist line on the overt level. With the endorsement of the Titoists dominating Moscow, a wave of Titoization began in Poland, resulting in economically neoliberal policies. This led to the spontaneous revolt of the Polish workers. It was known as the 'Poznan Riots':

Since the Polish press, has termed the rioting workers' complaints as "just demands," the government is likely to raise wages and improve working conditions in Poznan, thus probably inspiring demands for similar benefits elsewhere in Poland.

The embassy suggests that the apparently inept handling of the Poznan workers' demands prior to the demonstration may result in the removal of a number of officials.

(US EMBASSY VIEW ON CONSEQUENCES OF POZNAN RIOTS. In: Central Intelligence Bulletin, CIA, July 6, 1956, p. 5) (IMG)

The regime has implied in a party newspaper editorial of 29 June that the liberalization campaign will continue. However, the riots may result in a slowing of the process and a weakening of the position of liberal elements who were reportedly gaining strength in opposition to stricter [pro-communist] policies of party first secretary Ochab. (THE POZNAN RIOTS. In: Central Intelligence Bulletin, CIA, June 30, 1956, p. 3) (IMG)

The 'Poznan Riots' are often wrongly cited as a revolt 'for' liberalism when in fact the workers were protesting against the Titoization and economic liberalization pursued since the 1956 20th CPSU Congress. The CIA-funded mainstream media wrongly portrays the Polish communists as having condemned the worker protesters, when in fact the CIA archives prove that the Polish Party press termed the workers' complaints as just demands and that their voices were heard. To be sure, worker protests that are not led by a party or organization, particularly a progressive party or organization, are risky. While workers protesting peacefully against liberalization is good, proper organization of such protests helps to minimize the risks of such protests being exploited by the enemies of the proletariat.

To further strengthen the cause of the liberal intelligentsia,

Copies of the speech were run off in their thousands and were distributed clandestinely [by the MI6] throughout eastern Europe, fuelling demands for reform, particularly in Poland and Hungary. ('New Cloak, Old Dagger', Michael Smith. p. 123) (IMG)

At the same time, the Allen Dulles network had stepped up its operations against the Polish nation:

American intelligence had stepped up its covert operations in Eastern Europe in the twelve-month period leading to the Hungarian uprising, training the 'Red Sox' teams of Polish, Hungarian, Czech and Romanian emigres for covert action inside their home countries.

Allen Dulles, the head of the CIA, told the National Security Council that 'developments in the satellites present the greatest opportunity for the last ten years both covertly and overtly to exploit the situation'. ('New Cloak, Old Dagger', Michael Smith. p. 122) (IMG)

The course of Titoization pursued by the Moscow Titoists and the Polish Titoists gave Poland's reactionary intelligentsia the operational freedom for their colour revolutionary action against communism. As always, the intelligentsia chanted slogans for liberalism, Westernization, existentialism, etc. October 1956 was the infamous date in which the colour revolutionary intelligentsia mobilized, using such slogans, to install the Gestapo-Mossad spy Spychalski and his collaborator Gomulka. The US intelligence confirmed the important role of the intelligentsia in the October 1956 colour revolution:

The eruptions that took place in Poland and Hungary in 1956 saw the virtually complete disintegration of the regime controls over intellectual life. Writers, journalists, and artists led the way in taking over or disrupting government and party apparatuses of control. With the rise of Gomulka to power in Poland and the quelling of the Hungarian revolution, the new governments began to cast about for methods of re-establishing these controls. The Gomulka regime has relied in its efforts largely on persuasion, while the Kadar regime has vacillated between force and inducement. In both cases the resistance of the intellectuals has kept the regimes from achieving more than limited success. (...). When Gomulka returned to power in October 1956, the Polish Party's control over intellectual life was almost nonexistent. Writers were free from censorship; publishing houses were independent of effective State control. The main Party newspaper, Trybuna Ludu, did not necessarily present anything more than the views of its editors. (POSITION OF INTELLECTUALS

IN EASTERN EUROPE, IR No. 8005, Intelligence Report in OSS-INR Reports, Washington April 27, 1959. In: Foreign Relations of the United States, US State Department, p. 72) (IMG)

As a result of the colour revolution of the intelligentsia, the MI6's Home Army pogromists as well as the Nazis rose to the highest ranks of the Polish intelligence service. It was not just Spychalski and Gomulka who rose, but also many other Nazi agents, Home Army terrorists, etc. supported by the Gomulka-Spychalski group.

Before delving any further into this matter, it is important to introduce a political figure who was not so important at the time but later emerged as a key player. His name: Edward Gierek. He would later rise to become the General-Secretary of the Polish Party, succeeding Gomulka in the 1970s. Since his interview-memoirs will be cited extensively, it is worth providing some details about him.

Gierek was definitely a Titoist, not a communist. This became clear with regards to his positions on the Stalin-era USSR and on the 20th CPSU Congress. For start, he slandered the Stalin-era USSR as a tyrannical regime that brutally terrorized any and all critics of Stalin:

[Rolicki:] It is a pity that you did not put these thoughts into practice in the seventies.

[Gierek:] Sir, we will still have the opportunity to talk about the significant changes made to the party under my secretary. I can only say that I regret very much that in 1948 Gomulka's allies did not have enough strength to support his concept of delaying reunification. Unification, I would add with all responsibility, was imposed in Moscow. Stalin then acted like a man who has less and less time and has to unify all socialist countries, transform them into one fashion at a predetermined time. From the point of view of Stalinism, the unification of the party was a great success, while from the point of view of socialism, as it can be seen years later, it was a great failure. Its effects will be felt by a whole generation now. Unfortunately, I am making these considerations too late, but today I am fully aware that it was a great mistake.

[Rolicki:] I think Stalin would have crushed anyone who resisted his concept, and the PPS was undoubtedly doomed in one form or another to annihilation on the day the Yalta conference ended.

[Gierek:] I agree, but regret.... [latter ellipsis is by Gierek himself]

(The Interrupted Decade, Edward Gierek, Interviewer: Rolicki Janusz, 1990, pp. 51-52) (IMG)

'Stalinism', Gierek said, was an 'original sin'. Indeed, Gierek stated:

Throughout the entire time of People's Poland, the party was also burdened with the original sin of Stalinism, which the communist movement did not want to get rid of at first and then could not very much. (The Interrupted Decade, Edward Gierek, Interviewer: Rolicki Janusz, 1990, p. 49) (IMG)

Gierek also spoke in defense of the treasonous 'Polish Communist Party' (KPP), which had supported the MI6-backed pro-Nazi coup of Pilsudski, and had thus been thoroughly purged by the Soviets during the Great Purge. In slandering Stalin as 'murderous', Gierek said:

A year later, the Party was dissolved and its Central [Committee] activist was murdered on Stalin's orders. I believe that the KPP was one of the most severely experienced communist parties in history. (The Interrupted Decade, Edward Gierek, Interviewer: Rolicki Janusz, 1990, p. 19) (IMG)

The Titoization speech and policy line of the 20th CPSU congress brought Gierek the hope, because new Titoization changes were going to come:

I was, like everyone else, shocked by the 20th Congress. But I never counted myself as an orphan after the genius of Stalin. After September 17, which made a tremendously negative impression on me years ago, I never really shook off. The sediment of distrust remained forever. It didn't have any political significance, of course, but it did matter to me. Therefore, I will confess that I read Khrushchev's speech at the 20th Congress not only with being grilled but also with hope. For I thought that this was not the end of the changes, but only the tip of the iceberg, and after the revelations, deeper changes must come. (The Interrupted Decade, Edward Gierek, Interviewer: Rolicki Janusz, 1990, pp. 44-45) (IMG)

The 1956 colour revolution brought elevated him in the Polish Party as well:

[Rolicki:] Your further promotions are connected with the spring of 1956.

[Gierek:] Yes, I became the secretary of the Central Committee at the 6th Plenum, after the 20th Congress and the death of Bierut.

(The Interrupted Decade, Edward Gierek, Interviewer: Rolicki Janusz, 1990, p. 44) (IMG)

Unsurprisingly, Edward Gierek's social base lied in the white collar elements:

Edward Gierek ... draws his strength from his ... administration of Poland's major industrial center, the province of Katowice. Gierek has grouped around him discontented "technocrats," young party bureaucrats, and ideologically unassailable elements seeking economic and social reform. (POLISH COMMUNIST PARTY MOVES TO THE RIGHT, Weekly Summary: Special Report, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, November 1, 1968, p. 4) (IMG)

At the same time, his position in one of Poland's major industrial centers inevitably put upon him the pressure of the Polish proletarians living in that industrialized zone. In other words, this representative of the white collar elements was also significantly under the pressure of, and coopted by, the agents of the proletariat emanating from the Katowice zone. This led Gierek to adopt the line of a 'compromise candidate', the midpoint politician serving as the agent of the bureaucrats but also to a large extent coopted to serve the proletariat.

With the outbreak of the Titoist colour revolution in Poland, the Gestapo agent Gomulka rose to power and brought with him numerous fascist Home Army infiltrators such as Mieczyslaw Moczar, who gradually rose to become the head of Gomulka's intelligence service. Edward Gierek, who would later rise to become the General-Secretary of the Party, admitted the intelligence collaboration between Moczar and the MI6 front 'Home Army'. Gierek remarked:

on the wave of repairing the wrongs of the Home Army milieu, Moczar recruited several figures who were important in this circle....

(The Interrupted Decade, Edward Gierek, Interviewer: Rolicki Janusz, 1990, pp. 65-66) (IMG)

It is worth reminding that there is a difference between recruiting enemy agents so that they stab the imperialist enemy in the back vs. recruiting enemy agents so that they can enter and hence infiltrate the Polish intelligence service more easily. Since we know that Moczar was one of the Titoist elements who rose to power through the 1956 colour revolution, it should be obvious that the collaboration with the Home Army was for pro-Home Army objectives. Gierek also stated:

Moczar ... tried to reach an agreement with representatives of the Home Army movement. In this way, he created a broad platform for the cooperation of the war generation. (The Interrupted Decade, Edward Gierek, Interviewer: Rolicki Janusz, 1990, p. 65) (IMG)

As can be seen, Moczar was a collaborationist with the British secret service via the Home Army, the terrorist army that attack kolkhoz peasants, the terrorist army that closely allied with the Ukrainian fascist butchers of the Poles as early as 1946, the terrorist army that collaborated so extensively with the Gestapo and Japanese fascist secret services, the terrorist army that carried out pogroms against the Yiddish people so to expel them to Palestine so that they shall become the pawns of the Zionist settler-colonial project, the army that, without coordinating with the Soviets, launched the Warsaw Uprising ostensibly to 'fight' 'against' the Nazis but actually to help the Nazis break the spirit of the Polish nation, to wipe out the heroes of Warsaw, and to gain the political capital for extended MI6-AK-Gestapo presence in post-war Poland.

The CIA too confirmed:

The most vociferous of the two major groups of rightist challengers is the hard-line nationalistic, and anti-Semitic group led by former interior minister Mieczyslaw Moczar. Paradoxically, Moczar's faction has strong links to Gomulka. It derives from the "native" Communists or "partisans" who, under Gomulka's leadership, formed the core of the party in Poland during World War II. (POLISH COMMUNIST PARTY MOVES TO THE RIGHT, Weekly Summary: Special Report, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, November 1, 1968, p. 4) (IMG)

As late as 1968, the CIA reported:

Like the early Gomulka, Moczar prefers a nationalistic party and was an early opponent of the party's "Muscovite" wing. (POLISH COMMUNIST PARTY MOVES TO THE RIGHT, Weekly Summary: Special Report, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, November 1, 1968, p. 4) (IMG)

Furthermore, as shown previously in C13S4.6_(same quote repeated here), Moczar had risen to power during the 1940s with the assistance of Gomulka:

Gomulka ... had also built up a personal staff among the ... party leadership, who reflected his outlook completely. That group by this included **Zenon Kliszko**, **Marian Spychalski**, Wladyslaw Bienkowski, Alexander Kowalski, Ignacy Loga-Sowinski, **Mieczyslaw Moczar**, Marian Baryla, Ignacy Korczynski, and others. Several of them had charge of important spheres of activity in the party – Spychalski, for example, in the armed forces, Kliszko in party cadres, Kowalski in youth organizations, Moczar in the police and Bienkowski in the cultural sphere. (SOVIET STAFF STUDY – Gomulka and Polish Communist, Office of Current Intelligence, CIA, February 28, 1958, p. 23. Bold added.) (IMG{Poland})

As confirmed by Gierek, Moczar courted around himself the intelligentsia and mythologized himself as a 'great' wartime partisan leader:

Within a few years, [Moczar] created a legend around himself of a great partisan leader, and then the creator of the veterans' movement. (...). With the pen - as it was commonly believed - Żukrowski wrote "The Colors of the Fight", later filmed by Passendorfer. The book became reading and had a dozen or so editions, the film, although mediocre, did not leave the screens. Then, ... using quite cheap nationalist phrases, [Moczar] gained influence in artistic circles. Like a great patron of culture (and after March '68, while retaining his function in the ZBoWiD, he became the secretary of the Central Committee overseeing the army and the Ministry of the Interior), shining prizes and praise, flirting with smiles, gathered around him actors, significant writers, including Żukrowski, Bartelski and others. The spread of guerrilla "ideology" will someday hopefully be an interesting topic for historians.... (The Interrupted Decade, Edward Gierek, Interviewer: Rolicki Janusz, 1990, pp. 65-66) (IMG)

The CIA too confirmed that Moczar was on the side of the intelligentsia and the white-collar elements:

Moreover, [Moczar] has courted and won some of the same elements that would be more naturally allied with Gierek if they were in Katowice, i.e., the "technocrats," managers, and even the youth and intellectuals. But his call for change is unaccompanied by a discernible program, and it appeals mainly to those who cannot see beyond their own frustrated ambitions. (POLISH COMMUNIST PARTY MOVES TO THE RIGHT, Weekly Summary: Special Report, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, November 1, 1968, p. 6) (IMG)
Moczar has led the way in appealing to Polish pride in wartime resistance, exploiting to the full his role in it. (POLISH COMMUNIST PARTY MOVES TO THE RIGHT, Weekly Summary: Special Report, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, November 1, 1968, p. 5) (IMG)

Historical phenomena do not suddenly pop out of nowhere. Considering the fact that Moczar was betraying the revolutionary forces after World War II, it is not at all improbable that he was betraying the revolutionary forces during World War II as well.

The Titoist colour revolution made the MI6 agent and AK-collaborationist Moczar the deputy chief of the Interior Ministry:

After his return to power, Gomulka forgave [Moczar] for this betrayal. Moczar appeared in the central arena a few years after October as the deputy minister of the Interior Ministry responsible for security. (The Interrupted Decade, Edward Gierek, Interviewer: Rolicki Janusz, 1990, pp. 65-66) (IMG)

Numerous Gestapo spies, Home Army terrorists, American-Israeli intelligence agents, and MI6 operatives were catapulted into the high ranks of the Polish state, as a result of the MI6-backed 1956 Titoist colour revolution. They gained prominent positions in the intelligence service, the security apparatus, and vital economic sectors.

The British spy Konni Zilliacus freely travelled to Poland and was allowed by Gomulka to gather intelligence. His intelligence-gathering mission, his studies on the conditions in the Eastern European countries, allowed him to write a book titled 'A New Birth of Freedom?: World Communism after Stalin'. I did not spend the time to read the whole book, but I read parts of it. The book actually did not detail his entire intelligence assessments, but did, as the title suggests, happily conclude that Titoization was emerging victorious in much of Eastern Europe. The mere fact that Konni Zilliacus was welcomed by the Gomulka group in Poland is itself a strong evidence of the MI6 connections of the Gomulka group.

There was also for example a woman named Blanka Kaczorowska. As confessed by Witold Pronobis, the founder of a special research department of the CIA media Radio Free Europe, she was a Gestapo spy during World War II. Pronobis stated:

In Kalkstein's spying network, Blanka Kaczorowska, his fiancée and later wife (they got married in November 1942, i.e. at the time when they deliberately began their cooperation with the Gestapo), played a significant and particularly criminal role. Until the beginning of March 1944, she was active in the Second Department (information and intelligence) of the Home Army Headquarters and, unrecognized as a Gestapo agent, denounced more people. About twenty officers and soldiers in total. She withdrew from work in the underground on her own, justifying her decision with an increasingly visible pregnancy. It is known that she maintained close, friendly contacts with some of the Home Army officers handed over to the Gestapo! On her account, Lt. Col. Władysław Szczekowski "Leszczyca" and "Stanisław" from the 2nd Division of the Home Army Headquarters. A day later, his secretary Wanda Wóycicka "Dorotka" was captured on a Warsaw street, soon shot in the Pawiak prison.

Also in December 1943, due to the denunciation by Kaczorowska, a dozen or so employees of the Study Bureau of the Second Headquarters of the Home Army, including Irena and Janusz Wituski, Halina Skierska, Maria Dziubakowa, Maria Ike-Dunikowska, Natalia Rykowska, Eryk and Jadwiga Scharfenberg, were captured. It was Kaczorowska who denounced Karol Trojanowski "Radwan", the head of the Western Department of the offensive intelligence ("Stall"), who was her lead officer. This betrayal had further tragic consequences, as "Radwan" could not stand the brutal interrogations and revealed to the interrogators of the Gestapo other people involved in the work of the Polish underground.

The last victim of Kaczorowska was Dr. Jadwiga Krasicka from the Industrial and Economic Intelligence of the Home Army. Almost all of the people denounced by Kaczorowska died in torture rooms in Pawiak or in Szucha. After a cruel investigation, many took further victims ...

(Married to Betrayal: Blanka Kaczorowska and Ludwik Kalkstein, Focus Historia, Witold Pronobis, 2010) (IMG)

The charismatic head of the Home Army, General Stefan Grot-Rowecki, was handed over to Germany by the Poles: Eugeniusz Świerczewski, Blanka Kaczorowska and Ludwik Kalkstein. "The first was also liquidated by the Home Army, I talked to Kalkstein when he was lying on his deathbed, and fate took cruel revenge on Kaczorowska" - writes Witold Pronobis especially for "Focus Historia". Historian and former journalist of Radio Free Europe, and at the same time a relative of the general, he tracked his traitors for several dozen years. Here is his investigation report. (Married to Betrayal: Blanka Kaczorowska and Ludwik Kalkstein, Focus Historia, Witold Pronobis, 2010) (IMG)

Many genuinely anti-Nazi elements within the Polish Home Army were systematically exterminated so that the Polish Home Army would be sufficiently infiltrated and thus fully hijacked by the pro-Nazi terrorists loyal to the MI6, an intelligence service that was by then the ally of the Nazi secret service. During the Bierut era, the Gestapo spy Blanka Kaczorowska had been arrested for her crimes against Poland and was serving a prison sentence:

In 1945, Blanka Kaczorowska ... found her father in Łódź, Jan Kaczorowski, who was employed in the Łódź military judiciary. Through her father, she met a judge, then the owner of a private law firm, Roman Rawicz-Vogel. Although he was much older than her, after a few weeks she stayed with him and introduced her friends as her husband. In 1948, they moved to Warsaw and lived in a house purchased by her father at 15 Bachmacka Street. While still in Łódź, she began university studies at the Faculty of Humanities, which she graduated from in Warsaw. She joined the Polish Workers' Party (PPR) and was active in the "Życie" Academic Union of Young Struggle. After graduating, she found a job at the State Research Institute of Folk Art.

She was arrested when the management of the institute decided to send her to study doctoral studies in Prague. She was detained in December 1952 on charges of collaboration and agent collaboration with the Gestapo. Soon her trial was held, which ended with a life imprisonment.

(Married to Betrayal: Blanka Kaczorowska and Ludwik Kalkstein, Focus Historia, Witold Pronobis, 2010) (IMG)

The 1956 Titoist colour revolution brought the Gestapo spy Blanka Kaczorowska out of prison and allowed her to infiltrate into and earn income from the Polish intelligence service. Through the Polish secret service agencies, she was also able to install herself in charge of such critically sensitive economic sectors as the 'Import-Export Center for Chemicals', which even till today continues to be one of the top Polish conglomerates:

However, [Blanka Kaczorowska] only stayed for 5 years and left the walls of the prison in Fordon near Bydgoszcz in 1958.

She agreed to a close and loyal cooperation with the Security Service, proving her in her cell by eagerly reporting on her fellow prisoners. At the end of June 1959, she became a secret paid associate of Department II (responsible for counterintelligence) as agent "Katarzyna". Since her file was destroyed in 1982, I have not been able to recreate the exact nature of her collaboration, the people she denounced and the tasks she performed, also later in France. From 1949 to 1968 (with a break due to the arrest and imprisonment in 1953-1958), B. Kaczorowska and her son lived in Warsaw in the aforementioned house at ul. Bachmacka, together with the family of his brother Włodzimierz (he died in 1975). Later her daughter-in-law also moved in. Sister Irena, 8 years younger than Blanka, moved to Switzerland at the end of the 1960s and lived with her husband in Geneva.

Cooperation with the services also allowed Kaczorowska to find attractive jobs almost immediately after her release from prison. First, it was CIECh, i.e. Import-Export Center for Chemicals at the Powązkowska [zone] in Warsaw.

After a year she moved to the National Institute of Industrial Design (ul. Świętokrzyska 20), and a few months later to "Orbis". It was there, while working at the Foreign Tourist Service Department (ul. Krakowskie Przedmieście 40), that she became involved with the communist counterintelligence. Apparently, the type of tasks assigned to her changed over time, which in 1965 caused her to move to work as the main secretary at the "Foto-Kino-Film" Import and Export Headquarters (18 Foksal Street).

(Married to Betrayal: Blanka Kaczorowska and Ludwik Kalkstein, Focus Historia, Witold Pronobis, 2010) (IMG)

The rest of Moczar's team also was elevated in its positions. Referring to "Moczar and his allies," the CIA reported that in 1959,:

Gomulka, believing he could control them [Moczarists] on the basis of old loyalties, brought them into his regime to help with serious economic and administrative problems. (POLISH COMMUNIST PARTY MOVES TO THE RIGHT, Weekly Summary: Special Report, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, November 1, 1968, p. 4) (IMG)

With the installation of MI6 and Gestapo agents at the helm of the Polish intelligence, military, and economy, the way was opened for the front companies of American intelligence and US finance capital to 'invest' in Poland. Indeed, the US State Department emphasized the MI6 Titoist colour revolution in Poland created a new 'atmosphere in official United States-Polish relations' especially in 'informational ... fields' (i.e. intelligence sharing) and 'exchange of persons' (i.e. sending more American 'diplomatic' corps to Poland) so to 'keep open our channels of contact':

The events in Poland in October 1956 and the advent to power of the Gomulka regime afforded the United States opportunities to pursue policies designed to help sustain the Polish people in their struggle against the domination of the Soviet Union and world communism. In the past four years the United States has concluded with Poland a series of PL 480 sales agreements totaling \$365.3 million. In addition, a total of \$61 million in credits has been extended through the Export-Import Bank. The Polish people are aware of and appreciate this aid which has been of direct benefit to them. Of equal importance is the fact that our aid helps to create an atmosphere in official United States-Polish relations, such as those in the informational and exchange of persons fields, and thus to keep open our channels of contact with the Polish people. By and large our policy towards Poland and specially our aid to the Polish people enjoys the support of public and Congressional opinion, including the support of the Polish-American community in the United States. (SUBJECT:

Restoration of Trade Agreement Benefits to Imports from Poland: Memorandum From Secretary of State Herter to President Eisenhower, Washington, September 6, 1960. In: 'Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960', Vol. 10, Part 2, US Department of State, p. 293) (IMG)

The 1956 Titoist colour revolution in Poland, having installed Mossad agents such as Spsychalski, also directly benefited the Mossad in the Zionist migration to Israel. An intelligence document from the Mossad station in Warsaw, dated February 19, 1957, confirms that the 'abolition of Stalinism' in Poland allowed for the Zionist mass migration to Israel:

Katz states that the facts about mass immigration from Poland can no longer be kept quiet, but the wording of the publicity should be carefully controlled. It should be stressed that after the abolition of Stalinism, the reunion of families, which was arbitrarily stopped seven years ago, once again became feasible. However people leaving Poland, where private property was abolished, leave penniless. Immigration must not be used as proof that Poland is antisemitic. Jews leave because they want to go to the Jewish State and live as Jews. They also fear that reactionary and antisemitic elements may again succeed in putting a stop to reunion of families. (Coded Tel. 165, Inc.: 130.09/2306/12, 'K. Katz (Warsaw) to the East European Division', February 19, 1957. In: 'DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL', State of Israel Archives, Vol. 12: The Sinai Campaign: The Political Struggle, October 1956 – March 1957, Edited by Nana Sagi, General editor: Yemima Rosenthal, Companion Volume, 2009, p. 410) (IMG{PD – Post-1953 Migration to Israel})

C20S16. Economic Revisionist Policies in Poland *** IMG-All-{Poland}

The MI6-installed Titoist government of Gomulka embarked upon a policy of de-emphasized the heavy industry:

The new government of Wladyslaw Gomulka promised modification of the system and changes in the development strategy. Consumer goods received a larger share of the national product, and some quantities of grain and food were imported from the West. State control was mitigated by giving limited policy input to enterprises, and the rate of investment was reduced. (Country Studies: Poland, Federal Research Division of the US Library of Congress, Sponsored by US Department of the Army, Glenn E. Curtis, October 1992) (IMG)

Agriculture, furthermore, was decollectivized:

Among the reform measures of 1956, the ... significant lasting change was the decollectivization of agriculture. (Country Studies: Poland, Federal Research Division of the US Library of Congress, Sponsored by US Department of the Army, Glenn E. Curtis, October 1992) (IMG)

And:

a lively debate occurred on so-called "market socialism"..... (Country Studies: Poland, Federal Research Division of the US Library of Congress, Sponsored by US Department of the Army, Glenn E. Curtis, October 1992) (IMG)

Regarding the decentralization of the economy in Poland, the CIA reported:

The most extensive reorganization of the central governmental structure in the Satellites has occurred in the Polish government. Since the uprising of October 1956 a number of central staff offices have been dissolved, the State Planning Commission has been abolished, and a new and smaller commission with considerably reduced functions has been formed to take its place. The Council of Ministers was reorganized, special committees were established to handle special problems, and an Economic Council was set up. (REORGANIZATION OF ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT IN THE EUROPEAN SATELLITES 1956, CIA, Office of Research and Reports (ORR), October 14, 1957, p. 8) (IMG)

Further details of the decentralization are provided by US intelligence as follows:

In reorganizing the Polish Council of Ministers, bureaus as well as branch specialists of industry attached to the deputy premiers were eliminated. At the same time, 3 temporary organizations were created and attached to the Council, 1 for industrial production, 1 for building and transportation, and 1 for agricultural production and rural problems. In addition, special committees were established for investment plans, government housing, water economy, and plan technology.

Effective on 1 January 1957 an Economic Council was formed under the Polish Council of Ministers. The Economic Council is composed of 35 members (prominent economists and scientists) and will function as a temporary advisory body. The main task of the Economic Council is the preparation of a "Polish model of a socialist economy." It will deal with both current and long-range economic problems. According to one of the deputy chairmen, these problems will include such questions as the "autonomy and decentralization" of enterprises; a reform of the present system of prices, wages, and incentives; the comparative and appropriate rates of growth in the various branches of the national economy; and the possibilities of and limits to a rise in the standard of living. The first plenary meeting of the Economic Council took place on 9 February 1957.

The Polish government recently abolished the Ministry of State Control and established in its place a Supreme Control Chamber subordinated to the Sejm, or to its inner group when the Sejm is not in session, rather than to the Council of Ministers. The objective of this change is to broaden state control to include checking by the legislative branch (the Sejm) on administrative decisions and decrees as well as on the executive branch of government (the Council of Ministers).

The Polish Council of Ministers in the latter half of 1956 transferred some of its prerogatives to the individual ministries. Ministers may not exceed planned production costs and losses and make certain changes in the investment plan, within limits. Banks also were given additional responsibilities by the Council for controlling wage funds in order to prevent excessive expenditures attributed to "loosened wage discipline" on the part of some lower level supervisors.

(REORGANIZATION OF ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT IN THE EUROPEAN SATELLITES 1956, CIA, Office of Research and Reports (ORR), October 14, 1957, p. 9) (IMG)

A number of ministries in Poland, such as the Ministries of Forestry, the Food Industry, Internal Trade, and State Agricultural Farms, have undergone reorganization since mid-1956. In foreign trade, import-export companies such as Polimex (machinery) and Varimex (miscellaneous equipment and consumer goods) are being replaced by individual firms which will be "state controlled" but will have more operational freedom than their predecessors. In addition, the Ministry of Internal Trade has established local boards of trade in each of six cities to supervise local trade enterprises. In larger towns, municipal boards of trade will be established to handle local trade matters. Finally, a new draft law has been drawn up which provides for the merger of 10 economic ministries into 5 ministries.

The extensive reorganization of the Polish government illustrates the intention of present Polish leaders to focus the reorganization on their own specific needs rather than to follow automatically the Soviet pattern of development. In this manner, central bureaus attached to deputy premiers were abolished, the State Planning Commission was reduced in influence, and an Economic Council was set up to develop a Polish "model" of socialism.

(REORGANIZATION OF ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT IN THE EUROPEAN SATELLITES 1956, CIA, Office of Research and Reports (ORR), October 14, 1957, pp. 9-10) (IMG)

C20S17. The 1956 Titoization Speech: The Effects on East Germany *** IMG-All-{GDR}

The East German communists - including their leaders - opposed Khrushchev's Titoization agenda:

The instinctive response of the East German leaders therefore was to resist de-Stalinization. They experienced some initial confusion because some formal agreement with the Soviet denunciations of Stalin was required of them but quickly recovered and took the general line that the policies of the GDR were basically correct and that any tendency toward the "cult of personality" had been eliminated by 1953. This ... did not entirely satisfy the Party rank and file or the public, but, with only nominal steps to rehabilitate purged Communist leaders and political prisoners, the regime managed to keep unrest within manageable limits. ('TRENDS IN ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT IN EAST GERMANY 1945-57: ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT', CIA, Office of Research and Reports (ORR), May 15, 1958, pp. 24-25) (IMG)

The Titoization speech provided the psychological warfare and media warfare weapons required to launch the colour revolutions in Poland and Hungary. While East Germany did not experience a colour revolution, elements of colour revolutionary unrest could nonetheless be seen in it: unrest continued to be manifested by the ideological ferment among intellectuals and students..... ('TRENDS IN ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT IN EAST GERMANY 1945-57: ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT', CIA, Office of Research and Reports (ORR), May 15, 1958, p. 27) (IMG)

The colour revolutionary elements in East Germany created the pressure from below with which to impose the return of some purged Titoists back to power. It also brought to power some intellectuals who had ties to the Kautskyite Second International intelligence agents of West Germany, and who also had ties to the MI6 colour revolutions in Poland and Hungary:

The admission to the central committee of the East German Socialist Unity (Communist) Party (SED) of three former opponents of First Secretary Walter Ulbricht's policies may be designed to appease the restive intellectual element by giving it greater representation in high party circles. The most prominent of the three is Franz Dahlem, former politburo member who was once regarded as Ulbricht's principal opponent in the party. The other two are Hans Jendretzky, former Berlin party boss, and Alexander Abusch, leading East German intellectual. All three men were publicly criticized by the party in 1952-53.

These appointments do not necessarily presage any fundamental concessions to dissident elements demanding more freedom, as Dahlem, at least, appears to have been intimidated into supporting Ulbricht's policies. Ulbricht, in his speech to the central committee meeting last week, sharply rejected the concept of national Communism, once espoused by Dahlem, and declared that East Germany would not follow the Yugoslav pattern.

The ferment among intellectuals and students and their demands for more freedom are causing the regime serious concern. One group, led by a university professor who was arrested in late November 1956, reportedly had contacts with intellectuals in Hungary and Poland and with Social Democrats in German with a view toward encouraging changes in East Germany.

(FORMER OPPONENTS OF ULBRICHT ADMITTED TO EAST GERMAN PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE. In: Central Intelligence Bulletin, CIA, February 5, 1957, p. 6) (IMG)

All such Titoization changes were resisted by Ulbricht and his faction, as confirmed by the above documents. The fact that East Germany had a large industrial working class base made it easier for the communists to resist revisionism and Titoization. In the field of economics, there was a shift towards economic revisionism, decentralization in particular, but this too was met with a powerful resistance, thanks to the large industrial working class base that existed in East Germany. Decentralization occurred in this context through the setting up of the State Planning Commission as a separate bureaucratic body of its own, instead of a body subordinate to the Council of Ministers. Thus, a dual bureaucracy was established, and, as is well-known, bureaucratic proliferation is a means of sowing economic chaos, sabotage, and corruption. The CIA reported:

East Germany received first consideration. In May 1956 the State Planning Commission, which previously had functioned as an organ of the Council of Ministers, was set up as a separate legal entity. ('TRENDS IN ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT IN EAST GERMANY 1945-57: ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT', CIA, Office of Research and Reports (ORR), May 15, 1958, p. 25) (IMG)

State planning mechanisms were torn apart into smaller organizations and hence proliferating more bureaucracy:

Additional organizational measures specifically taken to long-term planning included the following: (a) the establishment of a Central Supply Commission for Mineral Resources (under a deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers) to check and coordinate assessments of the raw material potential of the GDR in order to provide a better basis for long-range economic planning and (b) the convening of an ad hoc commission of specialists by the Chairman of the State Planning Commission to oversee the utilization of economic reserves - that is, materials and production capacity. ('TRENDS IN ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT IN EAST GERMANY 1945-57: ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT', CIA, Office of Research and Reports (ORR), May 15, 1958, p. 25) (IMG)

However, as confirmed by the CIA, the GDR managed to slow down decentralization:

The East German regime postponed the delegation of additional responsibilities to enterprise management and justified the delay on the ground that thorough study of the operational problems of industry should precede further reform. In May 1956 an ad hoc commission was set up under Fritz Selbmann, Commissioner for Industry and Transport and Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, to study supply and inventory problems in industry, particularly excessive stocks of raw materials and semi-finished and finished goods.

The findings submitted to the Party Central Committee by this Commission were reportedly highly critical of the discrepancy between plan targets and market demand for products, the lack of sufficient advance notice of orders for special products, the failure of the GDR to acquire a continuous supply of critically needed materials from imports, excessive drains on the capital of enterprises by the government, and similar problems of a fundamental character. Moreover, the Commission allegedly concluded that these conditions could not be improved without altering some of the basic concepts of central planning and permitting greater flexibility in the operations

of individual industries. The Party Central Committee and the Council of Ministers, however, did not immediately act upon the recommendations of the ad hoc Commission, and the practical effect was to defer reform at the enterprise level indefinitely. Likewise, no was made to enhance the economic role of the local organs of the state administration as recommended by the 25th Plenum, although routine functions were in a few instances transferred to them on a piecemeal basis. In view of the de-Stalinization in the USSR, the Peoples Chamber of the GDR began with great fanfare to consider new legislation for "continuing the democratization" of government by increasing the powers of local organs. On 21 August 1956, two bills dealing, respectively, with the relationship between the Peoples Chamber and the local legislative assemblies and with the regulation of working methods of the administrative organs were given a first reading in the Peoples Chamber. Contrary to the usual custom of the Chamber, the bills were sent to committee in order to provide an opportunity for widespread publicity, and no serious attempt was made to enact them until after the uprisings in Poland and Hungary. Thus the leaders of the GDR were clearly more interested in propagandizing the public about their "democratic" intentions than in really enhancing the economic role of the local organs.

(‘TRENDS IN ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT IN EAST GERMANY 1945-57: ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT’, CIA, Office of Research and Reports (ORR), May 15, 1958, pp. 26-27) (IMG)

In East Germany:

After some initial panic [about the Hungarian colour revolution] they [i.e. East German communists] joined with the USSR in rejecting national Communism and in reaffirming Soviet Bloc solidarity. They also conducted an active campaign against the doctrines and experience of Poland and Yugoslavia and took vigorous measures to repress dissidents and "revisionists" in the GDR. (‘TRENDS IN ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT IN EAST GERMANY 1945-57: ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT’, CIA, Office of Research and Reports (ORR), May 15, 1958, p. 27) (IMG)

At the same time though, the MI6-backed colour revolution led by the anti-German chauvinist and Gestapo agent Gomulka meant that the Polish exports of coal and coke were reduced, and thus the East German economy was hit. Gomulka had helped his Gestapo and West German Nazi friends by stabbing East Germany in the back. Regarding the impact of the Polish colour revolution, the CIA reported:

Loss of vital imports from within the Soviet Bloc caused dislocations in the East German economy. The reduction in Polish shipments of hard coal and coke, for example, contributed to underfulfillment of production targets for steel, which in turn disrupted production schedules in other economic sectors. The October uprisings obviously were not the sole cause of the economic difficulties experienced by the GDR. (‘TRENDS IN ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT IN EAST GERMANY 1945-57: ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT’, CIA, Office of Research and Reports (ORR), May 15, 1958, p. 27) (IMG)

The disruption of coal supplies and the weakening of the East German economy weakened the East German communist faction and thus strengthened the Titoist and Kautskyite enemies of the East German communists. This allowed for greater lobbying power in favor of economic decentralization. On the other hand, since there already was a strong enough industrial blue-collar working class base in East Germany, the East German communists were able to partially mitigate these revisionist lobbies. Thus, East German leaders pretended to be interested in decentralizing the economy (and proliferating bureaucracy), but did not actually go forward with it as much as desired by the Kautskyites and Titoists:

The regime therefore took an ambivalent position on management reform after the October 1956 uprisings. Although adhering to the "hard line" ideologically, the leaders pretended to have some interest in workers' councils and other liberal innovations, without any intention of making serious use of these reforms. They also resumed implementation of the reform proposals of the 25th Plenum and attempted to convince the public that their efforts would adequately "decentralize" and "democratize" the economic structure. (‘TRENDS IN ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT IN EAST GERMANY 1945-57: ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT’, CIA, Office of Research and Reports (ORR), May 15, 1958, p. 27) (IMG)

C20S18. On the Construction of the Berlin Wall

Stalin once advised Pieck and Ulbricht:

The demarcation line between East and West Germany should be considered a border--and not just any border, but a dangerous one. We need to strengthen the defense of this border. The Germans will guard the first line of defense, and we will put Russian troops on the second line. Agents of Western countries are moving around the German Democratic Republic all too freely. They can decide to use some extreme measures and kill you or Comrade [Vasilii] Chuikov. This has to be taken into account. Therefore, we need strong border defenses. (‘Conversation between Joseph V. Stalin and SED leadership’, Wilson Center, April 07, 1952, p. 2. Conversation between Joseph V. Stalin and SED leadership, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Library of Congress, Dmitri Volkogonov Collection; according to Mikhail Narinsky, April 07, 1952. A copy can be found in Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Moscow (AP RF), fond (f.) 45, opis’ (op.) 1, delo (d.) 303, list (l.) 179.) (IMG)

During the era of Khrushchev, there was an effort at reducing the number of Red Army troops in East Germany, and to leave East German People’s Democracy defenseless against foreign aggression by cross-border infiltration of terrorists. In this midst, East Germany needed to come up with relatively cheap means of preventing foreign aggression by cross-border infiltration of terrorists. The German Democratic Republic had every legal and moral right to surround itself with defense barriers, be it with barbed wire or with walls, against foreign aggression by cross-border infiltration of terrorists. While the building of defense barriers is a morally and legally legitimate physical defense policy, the question is: whether the building of the wall, as opposed to barbed wire, helped the enemy more in terms of psychological warfare? Undoubtedly, the wall was of great use to the media of the US-led bloc for the purpose of anti-communist propaganda. However, establishing barbed wire instead of the wall would have been no better in terms of the psychological warfare since it would have been picked up by Western propaganda outlets as "evidence" that East Berlin was a giant "concentration camp" "surrounded by barbed wire" "in a manner reminiscent of the Nazi era." While barbed wire was used in some areas of East Germany, barbed wire was, in terms of psychological warfare, not much less detrimental than the wall, and in terms of physical defense, was obviously less effective than the wall.

C20S19. Titoization in Bulgaria

In the agrarian countries, the countries with a low blue-collar worker population, it was much easier to oust the communists. The peasants had favorable attitudes towards communism in many of these countries but owing to their petit-bourgeois attitudes, they were usually passive in the face of Titoization. Hence, by 1954, the Chervenkov faction began to weaken:

The personal position of Vulko Chervenkov has become rather delicate. In order to replace those who had disappeared from the Politburo and the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party [during the purge of Kostov's group] he had to appoint men who had been in the interior resistance, by far the most numerous and the youngest. The President of the Council has thus an important clique against him. The entire secretariat is here: Todor Zhivkov; Kruchev; Ganev, eliminated from the Politburo in May 1949 and again in March 1954; and Boris Taskov, who, because of continuous disputes with General Ivan Mikhaylov, was dismissed from the Presidency of the "Food and State Reserves" Administration in May 1952. In the Politburo, the clique includes Yugov and Zhivko Dzhinkov, mentioned above; Rayko Damyanov, washed out after the Delyana affair; Georgi Chankov, a member of the Clandestine Politburo in March 1944, an ally of Yugov's; and Staykov and Prakhov, recent arrivals on the scene. (BULGARIAN POLITICAL REVIEW, CIA, July 21, 1954, p. 3) (IMG)

By the time of the twentieth CPSU Congress, the Yugoslav intelligence agent Yugov rose to power:

For the Yugoslavs, the coming to power of Yugov is a success.... (POLITICAL CLIMATE AFTER CHERVONKOV DEMOTION AND STALIN DENIGRATION, CIA, October 31, 1956, p. 8) (IMG)

The collaboration of Yugov with the Yugoslav fascists is well-known. Around the same time, the Yugoslav agent Kostov was rehabilitated; Yugov and Kostov had never been real enemies. Todor Zhivkov was the kind of a counter-revolutionary who was able to so easily flip-flop and alter his rhetoric in favor of anyone he was talking to. In his speeches, it was hard to find an actual real point made, and there was so little criticism and self-criticism. Zhivkov was excellent at talking for hours upon hours without actually making any real point. In the cases in which he did make a point, it was stereotypically either aimed at attacking anti-Titoists for opposing the Yugoslav regime, or was aimed at slandering Dimitrov as a 'Titoist' and denouncing his 'naivete' for supposedly allowing Bulgaria to be devoured by Yugoslavia.

C20S20. Why the Cold War Continued

Why would Anglo-American imperialism ever continue the conflict against a country dominated by a comprador bourgeois state? Why continue the Cold War, when the socialist state in the territory of the former Soviet Union was overthrown?

Short answer: class struggles never end; when communism becomes the order, one shall continue to struggle against bourgeois restoration; when imperialism dominates, finance capital continues the class struggle for retaining such dominance; when political fighters are losing, they try to lose as little as possible, and when they are winning, they try to win as much as possible; there is never enough with class struggles.

Long answer: there are several reasons inherent to class struggles in general. Firstly, note that the dictatorship of a class is the quantitative dominance of a certain faction over a certain state; a dictatorship of the proletariat cannot possibly be the rule of the proletariat over all the aspects of a state but constitutes the decisive and strict dominance of the proletariat over the overwhelming majority of a state; in a dictatorship of the proletariat, the anti-proletarian classes inevitably catapult their intelligence agents into the ranks of the workers' state thus preventing the absolute 100% control over the state by the proletariat. Similarly, in a dictatorship of the comprador bourgeoisie, the comprador bourgeoisie do not have absolute 100% control over the comprador bourgeois state, but rather the proletarian class and the kolkhoz peasants catapult their communist agents to the ranks of the comprador state apparatus, thus creating a powerful opposition intelligence network against the comprador bourgeois forces within the comprador state. Hence, while the Titoist faction had gained the margin over the communist faction, it was not at all the case that the communist faction had ceased to exist. There still existed a chance that the communist faction would be able to resurge back to decisive dominance. The communist faction was responsible for diverting the funds of the Titoist state in Eurasia towards funding the anti-imperialist and anti-fascist forces worldwide instead of allowing those funds to be used by the Titoist state in Eurasia for the funding Titoist projects. As such, the communist faction continued to pose a menace. Eurasia had vast amounts of productive forces some of which were still under the influence of the communists. Those productive forces too had to, from the imperialist viewpoint, be dismantled so that Anglo-American finance capital's exploitation of the resources and the dismantlement of the productive forces could easily proceed.

To the contingent planners of the US-led bloc of imperialist powers, the overthrow of socialism and the establishment of the comprador bourgeoisie was not really the end, but was rather a beginning. The Anglo-American imperialists were well-trained in the science of contingent planning, meaning that they made plans against not only what already was happening, but also what may have potentially occurred. There was the potential that the proletariat would swiftly conquer power in Eurasia hence to reinstate the dictatorship of the proletariat; there was the potential that a national-bourgeois force would launch a putsch to overthrow the dictatorship of the comprador bourgeoisie and replace it with a dictatorship of the national bourgeoisie hostile to the interests of the US-led camp. In fact, in the late 1970s and the early 1980s, the dictatorship of the proletariat was briefly restored, but it was quickly overthrown again. As contingent planners therefore, the imperialists needed not just the overthrow of socialism but also the large-scale sabotage of the productive forces that had developed during the years of socialist development; they also needed the Eurasian heartland – the territory of the former Soviet Union, the largest country in the world with resource self-sufficiency – to be torn asunder, partitioned further and further so that it is easier to dominate; they also needed the culture of the peoples of the former Soviet Union to become further and further corrupt, reactionary, anti-communist, and pro-imperialist. Hence, the Eurasian Titoists, as agents of the CIA-led alliance of imperialist-fascist secret services, not only overthrew socialism and the Soviet Union, but also embarked on the project of sabotaging the productive forces of the Eurasian Heartland, pave the way for Eurasia's shrinkage and partition, and to sow corruption wheresoever they could find room for corruption.

The fact that the Titoist faction had a proverbial 51% stake, rather than an 80% stake let alone a 99% stake, over the state meant that while the state was dominated by the Titoist comprador bourgeoisie, there still existed a communist faction that had a proverbial 49% stake, thus being immensely capable of lobbying for pro-communist policies. This immense lobbying power which the communist faction had against the Titoist policies of the dominant comprador bourgeoisie obviously led to major discrepancies and self-contradictions in the Eurasian foreign policies and internal policies. For example, after the communist political forces compelled Nikita Khrushchev to place their nuclear warhead in Cuba, the MI6's 'good' boy Nikita took his revenge on the communists by striking a deal with American intelligence behind Guevara's and Castro's back, removing the nuclear warheads and allowing 'UN inspectors' (read: American spies) into Cuba to inspect the military intelligence even though Khrushchev knew that these 'inspections' were imperialist espionage. The Red Army militarily funded the Abdel-Nasser faction but so too is it true that the Kremlin conspired to

overthrow the United Arab Republic as shall be explained in further detail in C21S2.1. Ultimately, since Eurasia was a dictatorship of the Titoist comprador bourgeoisie, the Titoist faction eventually won in its fight against the communist faction, and hence Eurasia's economic infrastructure was sabotaged, and Eurasia was partitioned by 1991. Since the Titoist faction in 1956 was only slightly more powerful than the communist faction though, the process of bringing about the collapse of Eurasia took as long as 1991 – 1956 = 35 years, as opposed to just a few years.

The discrepancies in Eurasia's foreign policy line allowed Maoist propaganda to deliberately conflate the communist faction with the Titoist faction, hence to portray the communist faction as the same as the Titoist faction, hence to portray the communist fighters against the US-led bloc as collaborators with the US-led bloc! The laws of the crises of overproduction dictate that the communist faction would have collaborated with the American imperialists only if there was another power, such as a powerful Nazi Germany revived, that was more a threat to the communist and American imperialist projects, hence to draw the communists in Eurasia and US imperialists into an alliance against this greater threat. However, such a threat was practically non-existent, meaning that according to the laws of the crises of overproduction, Eurasia and the US-led camp would be the two main global rival forces. The rivalry, according to dialectical laws of history, could not possibly be limited to specific geographic areas or specific fields, but stretched onto all the different fields: in every corner of the planet, in the space, in the fields of culture, propaganda, military, intelligence, etc. Worse yet, the Maoist propagandists referred to the communist faction as 'Soviet social imperialist'. In other words, according to Mao and the Maoists, the 'Soviet social imperialists' and the US imperialists – which were the two main rivals – were cooperating with each other in many fields, as opposed to thoroughly confronting one another in all fields. Does that thesis sound familiar? That is the Kautskyite notion of 'ultra-imperialism', the notion that imperialist rivals will not compete with each other, will not launch devastating wars, and instead can come together, cooperate with each other, and form a peaceful harmony of imperialist powers; the implication of this fundamentally anti-'Leninist' thesis is that imperialist wars can be prevented. The global propaganda apparatus of the CIA-backed international Maoist reaction promoted Kautsky's anti-dialectical, anti-historical, anti-materialist, anti-scientific, and anti-communist argument.

C20S21. Why it is Impossible to Lose Hope

Even if one single imperialist power – for example, the United States – conquers the other imperialist powers, defeats all of its major rivals and goes on the path of victory and total dominance of the world, such an imperialist power would be quickly fractured into two imperialist powers, because each of the imperial elites dominating this imperialist power, out of utmost greed, would seek to get power for oneself and not the other imperial elites. Hence, a segment of the imperial elites dominating this imperialist power would defect to the camp of the enemies of this single world-dominating imperialist power and would thereby rally massive parts of this empire with oneself so to pave the way for the partition of this empire. It follows that there cannot ever be a single colonial empire dominating the world.

In the same ways, inter-imperialist alliances quickly break up. The term 'NATO' is ironic because it implies that imperialist France is strategically aligned with Anglo-American-German imperialism, whereas in reality, in spite of appearances to the contrary, French imperialism was unofficially allied to the USSR/Eurasia/Russia and the anti-imperialist forces throughout the Cold War so that French imperialism could defeat its Anglo-American-German imperialist rivals. Even if such an Anglo-American-German imperialist alliance were to take over almost all of the world, before such a global conquest, this Anglo-American-German imperialist alliance would split and these former allies would be rivals. Perhaps –perhaps! – for this reason did Stalin, a few months before the hybrid coup against him, mention this in *The Economic Problems*. He knew that even if the communists begin to lose, and even if the imperialists begin to win, the imperialists then begin to lose and the communists then begin to win. Inter-imperialist rivalry is the primary contradiction that weakens global imperial dominance and allows for the breathing room, the operational freedom, for the cause of the proletariat and the anti-colonial national bourgeoisie to rise, exploit inter-imperialist contradictions, and achieve its objectives. The inter-imperialist contradiction, the primary contradiction, allows for the proletarian-bourgeois conflict, the secondary contradiction, to result in the victory of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie – such did Stalin correctly imply in *The Economic Problems*. Therefore no matter how much defeat the proletariat face, they will win thanks to the imperialist bourgeoisie ensuring their own defeat.

C20S22. Revisionism in Mongolia *** IMG-All-{Mongolia}

Tsedenbal, the Trotskyite adventurer who had pretended to be staunchly pro-Soviet during the Choibalsan years, replaced the latter in 1952, and joined Nikita Khrushchev and other Kremlin Titoists in denouncing communism under the cover of denouncing 'Stalinism' in 1956. The Federal Research Division of the US Library of Congress:

Under the guidance of early party leaders Horloyn Choybalsan and Yumjaagiyn Tsedenbal, the principle of democratic centralism was weighted heavily toward its centralizing features, just as it was being applied in the Soviet Union under Josef Stalin. Purges, reprisals, and political violence in Mongolia mirrored the arbitrary behavior of Stalin. Choybalsan directed his attacks against political foes, rivals, and religious institutions. After Choybalsan's death in 1952 and Tsedenbal's emergence as the top party and government leader, Mongolian politics again followed the Soviet example. Starting in 1956, Tsedenbal initiated an extensive anti-Stalinist, anti-Choybalsan campaign, accusing the party leader of having conducted a "cult of personality" like Stalin. (Country Study: Mongolia, Federal Research Division of the US Library of Congress, sponsored by the US Department of the Army, edited by: Robert L. Worden & Andrea Matles Savada, June 1989) (IMG)

The Mongolian Party composition also changed during the approximately four decades of Titoist reign in Mongolia. As early as 1970, and probably much earlier, half of Mongolia's Party membership was made up of the intelligentsia and bureaucrats, whereas less than a third of the Party was made up of blue-collar workers. As early as 1968, half of the state legislature was dominated by intelligentsia. The US military colonel Dupuy reported:

There were 48,570 members of the MPRP in 1966, 3,000 of these being candidate-members. This was a significant increase over the figures for 1963, when reportedly the party had 41,015 members and 2,077 candidate-members. Nearly half of the party membership (49 percent) represents government officials. About 30 percent are classified by the party as workers, and the remaining 21 percent as livestock cooperative members. The Party's youth organization, the once dominant Revsomols, still has a larger membership than the parent is today very much a subsidiary organization to the MPRP.

The 48,000-plus members of the MPRP represent a very favored elite, slightly more than 4 percent of the population of 1.1 million. They owe their status to their preferred positions as functionaries of the Soviet-supported Mongolian Communist regime. There is no reason to believe that the overwhelming preponderance of this elite is not most satisfied with the regime. its accomplishments, and its

prospects. Because of the nature of the state and the society, the individual careers of the members of this elite are unusually closely tied to the political leadership of the Party and its ties in turn with the USSR. There is no evidence to suggest the likelihood of an early change in the attitude of this elite, whatever the change in its membership.

(Area Handbook for Mongolia, Vol. 550, Issue 76, Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Washington, D.C., Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Trevor Nevitt Dupuy, 1970, p. 233) (IMG)

In the election of June 1966 to the Great People's Khural, it is claimed that only 27 ballots in opposition were cast. In that Khural, still in office in 1968, reported results indicate that of the 287 members, about half were "workers and peasants" and the rest from the "intelligentsia" (largely government and Party officials and bureaucrats). Nearly 22 percent were women, (see ch. 10, The Governmental System). (Area Handbook for Mongolia, Vol. 550, Issue 76, Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Washington, D.C., Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Trevor Nevitt Dupuy, p. 235) (IMG)

The Mongolian Party adopted the line of the Kremlin Titoists headed by Khrushchev and Gorbachev, and was thus the Party of the revisionist intelligentsia and bureaucrats, and hence the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. By 1990, the revisionist Party and state apparatus had enough corruption and decentralization for the bourgeois state to transition from a state that was socialist in appearance but bourgeois in content, to a state that is bourgeois in appearance and content.

Chapter 21

C21S1. The New Titoization Drive in France's Communist Movement *** IMG-All-{PCF post-1953}

As a result of the 1956 Titoization speech, quick changes began in the line of the French Communist Party (PCF). The PCF, which had opposed the colonization of Algeria, began to officially support it to a significant extent, just a number of days after the Titoization speech, once the PCF leaders went to Moscow and returned from there:

COMMUNISTS MAY BACK MOLLET GOVERNMENT ON ALGERIA

The French Communist Party (PCF) is seriously considering supporting [the Kautskyite 'Socialist'] Premier Mollet in the National Assembly vote on special powers for Algeria, according to a member of President Coty's staff. The acting secretary general of the Socialist Party believes that the Communists may at least abstain. He comments that the current PCF line stressing "ties between France and Algeria" is an amazing change probably linked with the recent return of Communist leaders from Moscow.

The US embassy believes Mollet's chances are very favorable for winning the vote, which is expected by 13 March. Comment Communist support of Mollet for a strong policy in Algeria would indicate the party's determination to use every device to achieve a popular -front. In an effort to get widespread support on this issue, Mollet has been consulting with party leaders from the Communists to the Poujadists. None of the major nongovernment parties has committed itself. However, it is believed that the right-center would be unwilling to bring down the government now, particularly since the government's Algerian policy is much more to its liking than seemed possible when Mollet assumed office. In the event of Communist support, the right-center can also be expected to back the government in an effort to avoid the appearance of a popular front.

(COMMUNISTS MAY BACK MOLLET GOVERNMENT ON ALGERIA. In: CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN, 15740205, March 8, 1956, p. 4) (IMG)

As part of the Kremlin Titoist project to contain the expansion of the influence of the Abdel-Nasser faction, the Eurasian Titoist ambassador Vinogradov supported the 'French' colonial presence in Algeria so to strengthen American imperialist presence:

MOLLET WINS CONFIDENCE VOTES WITH COMMUNIST SUPPORT

The National Assembly's overwhelming support of Premier Mollet's request for extraordinary powers will give the French government a temporary respite to begin implementation of its Algerian policy. The government can now be expected to increase its military effort. At the same time it will attempt to win Moslem support by seeking to put into effect its announced program of economic, administrative, and social reform in Algeria.

The Communists, probably believing that the government's policy will end in failure, were willing to reverse their stand on Algerian independence and support the government rather than jeopardize their popular front objective. Soviet ambassador Vinogradov told a high French Foreign Ministry official on 7 March that the USSR supports continued French presence in North Africa. Vinogradov made no reply when the Frenchman asked: "Isn't it because you Russians would prefer to have a weak France in that strategic area rather than let it fall under the influence of the US?"

(MOLLET WINS CONFIDENCE VOTES WITH COMMUNIST SUPPORT. In: CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN, 15740205, March 13, 1956, p. 4) (IMG)

Vinogradov would not have known how to answer that question because the whole point of supporting the 'French' colonization of Algeria was to precisely ensure the continued presence of the Anglo-American and German imperialist domination of Algeria in the name of France.

Enver Hoxha too wrote:

The French Communist Party took an active part in the meeting of the Information Bureau which examined the situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. It condemned and sternly denounced the betrayal by Tito and his group.

However, after the death of Stalin and Khrushchev's advent to power, vacillations and deviations appeared again in the line of the French Communist Party and the stands of its leaders. These vacillations were apparent as early as 1954, in its attitude towards the liberation war of the Algerian people.

What did the French Communist Party do to assist this war? It waged only a propaganda campaign and nothing more.

(Eurocommunism is Anti-Communism, Hoxha, MIA)

There also came about the revisionist distortion of the concept of popular frontism, and there came the incorrect view that popular frontism and non-sectarian approach to proletarian class struggles was through subordination to the Kautskyite agents of imperialist-fascist secret services, who in France were represented by Mollet and his 'French Socialists'.

Hence, in line with the Kremlin Titoist emphasis on collaboration with the Kautskyite agents of imperialist-fascist secret services,:

Unity of action with the [Kautskyite fake] Socialists was given special emphasis at the congress, and the chief of the visiting Soviet delegation stated in his "directive" the great importance attached to such collaboration.... (CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY, CIA, July 26, 1956, p. 10 of 16) (IMG)

As with virtually every communist party, there came renewed pressure for having intellectuals into the Party:

Thorez ... baited an appeal to intellectuals to join the party by reiterating the "different roads to Socialism" thesis.... (CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY, CIA, July 26, 1956, p. 10 of 16) (IMG)

All of these facts about the partial Titoization of the PCF should not by any means imply that the French Communist Party was at its core, Titoist or revisionist. It is no exaggeration to say that PCF had a glorious history, with the Popular Front of the prewar years, the training of numerous communists and progressives, the leadership of the French Resistance during World War II, the planting of their leaders at - and hence infiltration into - the top ranks of the French imperialist state. The Party also waged a resistance against the Yugoslav regime and the Kremlin Titoists. In fact, the Titoization that occurred in the PCF was clearly under the pressure of the Kremlin Titoists and did not represent the true core of the PCF.

As part of the PCF resistance against the Moscow Titoists,:

Thorez ... claimed that nearly 50, 000 new members have joined since January, but added that some recruitment weaknesses exist, particularly among metal and mine workers. He also emphasized the weakness of the Communist youth organization.... (CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY, CIA, July 26, 1956, p. 10 of 16) (IMG)

Enver Hoxha wrote:

As to the leaders of the French Communist Party, such as Thorez, Duclos and others, however, it is a fact that at first they were dismayed at Khrushchev's "secret" report against Stalin and did not accept it. After this report was published in the Western press, the Political Bureau of the French Communist Party made a statement in which it condemned this report and expressed its reservations about the attacks on Stalin. Thorez personally, told me in regard to this problem: "We sought explanations from the Soviet comrades, they gave them to us, but we are not convinced." I pointed out to Thorez, "You are not convinced, while we do not agree in the least." Thus Thorez and the French Communist Party had long been aware of our opinion of the 20th Congress and of the Khrushchevites' slanders against Stalin.

The French and the Italians were like cat and mouse. I had talked with Thorez and Duclos about the stands of the leaders of the Italian Communist Party against the Marxist-Leninist line, in defence of the Titoite revisionists and against our Party. At first, they and the French as a whole seemed to behave well towards us. We stuck to our views and they to theirs. We continued our ceaseless attacks against the Titoites and they seemed to have no trust in Tito. We were on the same course in our stand towards the Italian leaders, too. (The Khrushchevites, Hoxha)

Not for nothing did Lavrenti Beria despise PCF leader Jacques Duclos:

Another he could not endure was Jacques Duclos, who reminded him of Rakosi: 'reptiles,' he called them. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 196) (IMG)

Hoxha continued:

Prior to the events which brought the split, Comrades Marcel Cachin and Gaston Monmousseau, two glorious veterans of communism, came to our country. Our whole Party and people welcomed them with joy and affection. I had very open and cordial talks with them. They visited our country, spoke to me about it with great sympathy, and wrote in glowing terms about our Party and people in "L'Humanité". Monmousseau also published a very pleasant book about our country. Sitting with me in front of the fire, he told me about the visit he made to Korça and his participation with the cooperativists of Korça in the grape harvest. In the course of our talk, I asked the author of "Jean Bécot", who is from Champagne, the place of famous wines:

"Comrade Monmousseau, what do you think of our wine?"

He replied pince-sans-rire³

"Like vinegar."

I laughed heartily and said:

"You are right, but tell me, what should we do about it?"

Monmousseau went on to speak for a whole hour about wine and this helped me greatly. I listened with admiration to the old man whose cheeks were glowing and eyes sparkling with enthusiasm, who had the colour of the wine of his birthplace, Champagne.

Before we went to the 81 parties' Meeting in Moscow, Maurice Thorez asked to come to our country for a holiday. We welcomed him with great pleasure. We thought (and we were not wrong) that he was sent by the Soviets to "soften us up".

When he was on holiday in Durrës, I told Thorez about all the vile things the Soviets had done to us.

Maurice listened attentively. He was astounded because he did not know these things. They had hidden everything from him. I spoke about the Bucharest Meeting and our stand at that meeting. He said that they had been informed about the stand of the Party of Labour of Albania at the Bucharest Meeting by the delegation from their party, and since this stand had impressed them, he had set out for Albania with the intention of talking about this question with us. Thorez said that the Bucharest Meeting was useful and did not pronounce himself at all on whether or not it was in order. He did not criticize our stand in Bucharest and when he had heard me out, all he said was:

"Comrade Enver, you must clear up these things they have done to you with the Soviet leadership."

As to the struggle against Titoism, Maurice Thorez approved everything. We saw him off by ship for Odessa.

In Moscow, before I spoke at the 81 parties' Meeting, Maurice Thorez invited us to dinner. This time it was obvious that he had come from Khrushchev to persuade us not to speak against the revisionist betrayal at the meeting, but he failed in his mission. We did not accept the mistaken "advice" he gave us.

Maurice Thorez criticized us in the meeting, but in moderate terms. However, after I had spoken, Jeannette Vermeersch, Thorez's wife, met me and said:

"Comrade Enver, where are you heading on this course you have begun? We do not understand you."

"You do not understand us today, but perhaps you will understand us tomorrow," I replied.

Everyone knows how things turned out for the French Communist Party. It, too, set out with determination on the revisionist road. It betrayed Marxism-Leninism and, with some nuances, followed the line of Khrushchev and Brezhnev.

(The Khrushchevites, Hoxha)

The full Titoization of the PCF, therefore, was resisted with some success by the Party. In the words of the CIA,:

The congress was geared to give incontrovertible evidence of party solidarity despite the effects of Moscow's de-Stalinization campaign. Maurice Thorez's re-election as secretary general and the Soviet delegate's reference to him as a "dear friend" emphasize his continuing leadership. Thorez paid lip service to the value of criticism of the cult of personality, but he stressed that such criticism could not be "transferred mechanically" to the French Communist party. The de-Stalinization drive within the French party thus seems to be successfully checked.... (CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY, CIA, July 26, 1956, p. 10 of 16) (IMG)

However, obviously, there were serious problems that arose. The communists of the PCF, Thorez and Duclos included, had always opposed the colonization of Algeria. This is well-documented and the CIA document cited previously briefly mentions it. Nonetheless, as with every other communist party, the Titoization speech inflicted severe pressure on the PCF to collaborate with the Kautskyites in various fields and not just in the occupation of Algeria. As mentioned before though, the Moscow Titoists wanted the PCF to fully and completely endorse the colonization of Algeria. The fact that, as Hoxha stated, the Party only partially opposed the colonization of Algeria during the mid-1950s is evidence of the factional dispute between the communist and Titoist factions of the PCF. Overall though, the PCF descended into a degree of Titoization. It did recover during the 1960s and the 1970s, and then went down again long later. Either way, what matters is that Moscow Titoist pressures on the PCF pushed it towards an anti-Algerian direction.

C21S2.1. Abdel-Nasser Faction wages Cold War against Moscow Titoists *** IMG-All-{UAR}

Imperialist media presents Gamal Abdel-Nasser and Nikita Khrushchev as great 'friends' and 'allies'. Such a portrayal is false. Abdel-Nasser was indeed allied to the anti-imperialist elements that surrounded Nikita Khrushchev and other Kremlin Titoists, but that does not mean that Abdel-Nasser was friends with Nikita Khrushchev and the Kremlin Titoists per se. On the contrary, Abdel-Nasser was engaged in a bloody cold war against Nikita Khrushchev and the Moscow Titoists; such a bloody cold war against Khrushchev and Co. was unfavorable to Anglo-American interests because Khrushchev and Co. were agents of Anglo-American intelligence; such a bloody cold war was favorable to the weak though significant anti-imperialist elements that surrounded Nikita Khrushchev and the Kremlin Titoists; such a bloody cold war was indirectly helpful to the weak though significant communist elements in the CPSU, elements which were a minority but which waged intra-Party struggles against the dominant white collar (intelligentsia and bureaucrat) elements that supported Titoism.

In a secret letter to Nikita Khrushchev, Gamal Abdel-Nasser complained that the Eurasians came to Egypt's aid far too late with regards to 1956 war. When the 1956 war began, Shukri El-Quwwatli – who had been a military ally of Stalin-era USSR and socialist Czechoslovakia – had gone to Moscow to ask for Eurasian assistance to Egypt against the aggressors. There, Quwwatli was mistreated by the Kremlin Titoists and Eurasian aid to Egypt was flatly rejected. Egypt had to face the Anglo-'Franco'-Israeli aggression on its own, and the Eurasian ultimatum against the aggressors came very late. Here are excerpts of Abdel-Nasser's letter:

The aggression came at the same time that we were preparing for negotiations in Geneva, on October 29, 1956.

You referred to a speech I gave in Damascus in which I said "We were standing in the face of the tripartite aggression on the battlefield alone, not waiting for anyone's help," but this phrase - as I felt from your speech and your statements - made you upset!

It did not occur to me to underestimate the value of the ultimatum given by Bulganin, the Soviet prime minister at the time, but the fact remains that we were on the battlefield alone. Our soldiers in Sinai were fighting alone, and our army and people were fighting in the streets of Port Sa'id alone.

The visit of Shukri al-Quwatli to Moscow was on October 30, 1956, and he had the opportunity to talk with Bulganin in the presence of a number of Soviet leaders and senior military marshals. I received a letter sent by al-Quwatli specifying your position on the aggression: the Soviet Union is not ready to enter a world war, and on this basis it cannot intervene militarily, even by sending volunteers, and that the most it can do to help us [Egyptians] is to send some equipment to us, along with some technicians!

What I did was; I removed this letter from the file which contained it, and put it in my pocket; Because I did not want anyone whose morale might be affected by reading it to see it, and it returned to its place as one of the state documents after the battle was over.

This document is an honor for us; it is the best proof that we fought, and were not only in the battlefield alone, but we knew that we would remain alone!

The Soviet ultimatum - the effect of which no one can deny - came from Moscow as a surprise to us, after 9 days had passed in which we were on the battlefield alone, and everything - even the Soviet ultimatum - depended on the steadfastness of this people, and their willingness to sacrifice.

It was the matter that necessitated statements - which did not fall from you on the site of contentment - about the truth in the matter of the tripartite aggression; Radio stations that speak in your name, and newspapers published in your countries, began - amid discussions between us and the Syrian Communist Party - thanks to this warning! It was my duty to put the role of the Egyptian people in its rightful place.

We appreciate your position and understand its motives, and it never occurred to us to ask you to enter a world war for us!

You [went on and] accused us of interfering in the internal affairs of others, but also in the affairs of the Soviet Union!

(Cairo-Moscow, Dar ul-Shoruq, Sami Ammareh) (IMG)

Syrian President Shukri El-Quwwatli had been overthrown in a CIA coup in 1949 by Colonel Za'im. A fascist terror state was established. However, later on, democracy was restored, and Quwwatli returned to the scene. Syria by then had been heavily infiltrated by the CIA. This meant that there was a strong chance that another coup against the Syrian democracy was coming. In this midst, Quwwatli advocated Syria's merger with Egypt. Abdel-Nasser knew quite well that economically, such a project was definitely not feasible; the reason why he accepted such an offer though was to assist Quwwatli in the purge of CIA agents in Syria. Thus, the merger of Egypt and Syria into the United Arab Republic (UAR) was not for the purpose of a real integration of those countries because such a project was not feasible – rather it was to undermine CIA-MI6-Mossad interests in Syria. Khrushchev and the Kremlin Titoists disliked the purge of the CIA-MI6-Mossad elements and so began a hostile policy against the unification of Syria and Egypt. In his letter to Khrushchev, Abdel-Nasser wrote:

As for the Unity [of Syria and Egypt into the United Arab Republic (UAR)], the evidence indicated that the new direction for it did not suit your tendencies and desires. The position of the Communist Party was on Unity; it did not accept the comprehensive consensus of the Syrian people for its establishment, and the communist MP Khaled Bakdash was the only one who preferred to flee, and then we found him resorting to some countries of the socialist bloc. Finally, he stood beside you in the celebration of the 21st Congress of the Communist Party, and began to attack the government of his country [Syria], which caused us anxiety and annoyance: its purpose [i.e. the purpose of the Unity of Egypt and Syria] is to violate the principles of peaceful coexistence in this public way!

It was also an indication of your direction; the Soviet Union, after the Declaration of Unity on February 1, 1958 from Cairo, remained for more than two weeks keen to refrain from expressing its opinion on it.

(Cairo-Moscow, Dar ul-Shoruq, Sami Ammareh) (IMG)

In his memoirs, Nikita Khrushchev admitted:

On the other hand, we did support Bagdash, and Bagdash was waging a struggle, exerting all the influence the Syrian Communist Party had – a struggle against unification with Egypt. ('Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev, Volume 3: Statesman, 1953-1964', Watson Institute, Nikita Khrushchev, p. 820) (IMG)

Khrushchev continued:

By that time the formation of the UAR had been accomplished. Syria fell under Nasser's leadership, and democratic conditions in that country were abolished. The Syrian Communist Party found itself in a difficult situation. Syria began to be trimmed down, having its hair cut to conform to the Egyptian social and political model. We, of course, did not support this and spoke out against it. Our position offended Nasser; he became unfavorably disposed toward us. That's fully understandable. He understood correctly that we were supporting the Communists of Syria, who were fighting against Egypt and against Nasser. ('Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev, Volume 3: Statesman, 1953-1964', Watson Institute, Nikita Khrushchev, p. 820) (IMG)

A campaign of fascistic slanders began by the Kremlin Titoist propaganda sheet, 'Pravda'. According to Abdel-Nasser, Pravda went so far as to claim that the notorious Khrushchev-backed Syrian politician Riad Al-Turk (who as I am writing, is still alive and is now 91 years old) was murdered in 1958 in a UAR prison! Abdel-Nasser responded in UAR media:

Informed circles in Cairo commented on what the Soviet newspaper Pravda published today against the United Arab Republic. (...). Pravda did not learn from the consequences of its abuse of the UAR, and today it is slipping into new abuses. In a way, if it indicates anything, it is due to the ignorance of its editor of the nature of the Arab people, who do not accept abuse, and who are determined to preserve their independence and dignity. Yesterday, the Soviet newspaper Pravda accused the UAR of killing Riyad al-Turk in the Mezzeh prison in Damascus, and carried out a campaign based on slanders and defamation. (Political comment by the President [Gamal Abdel-Nasser] in response to what was published by the Soviet newspaper Pravda attacking the United Arab Republic, Gamal Abdel-Nasser) (IMG)

Why would there be any surprise that Abdel-Nasser and Khrushchev would be enemies, in light of the fact that Khrushchev personally promoted Zionist? Also, socialist Czechoslovakia was a country that provided military assistance to the UAR. Khrushchev and other Kremlin Titoists imposed tough sanctions on and fomented colour revolutionary uprisings in Czechoslovakia, and supported Titoist-Zionist agents centered around Dubcek against communist blue-collar workers' elements in the Party headed by Novotny. Not only were sanctions imposed on the country that militarily funded Egypt/UAR, the Kremlin Titoists delayed as much as possible Eurasian arms sales to the UAR and then when the arms transfers were to come, they stopped the arms flow. In doing so, Khrushchev wished to push the UAR into Tito's hands and Khrushchev did partially succeed, since the UAR was forced to look to the Yugoslav regime for arms. Hoda Abdel-Nasser, the daughter of Gamal Abdel-Nasser, has very extensively studied the personal and secret intelligence papers of Gamal Abdel-Nasser. Hoda wrote:

A reciprocal media campaign took place between Gamal Abdel Nasser and Khrushchev several months after the Egyptian-Syrian union, despite its opposition to the interests of both countries. As for the Soviet Union, it entered the Middle East by selling arms to Egypt, after the West had been procrastinating with it for more than three years, during which Israel took advantage of the opportunity to carry out repeated attacks on its borders with Egypt. (...). Relations between the UAR and the Soviet Union had become volatile, but the general trend was for the worse. This was reflected to a large extent, especially with regard to the supply of weapons; as the delivery was stopped and the price was raised, the situation with regard to spare parts in particular became bad, and the UAR began looking for other sources of weapons, such as Yugoslavia or local industry. (Secret Letters between Nasser and Khrushchev, Hoda Gamal Abdel-Nasser, November 14, 2013) (IMG)

Yugoslavia and the UAR had contradicting stances on the Middle East issues. In order to contain the expansion of UAR influence into Lebanon, the US deployed its troops there. The response of Yugoslavia, the alleged 'ally' of the UAR, is interesting to note. The Yugoslav regime's Chargé d'Affaires Franc Primozic spoke to the US Secretary of State. Here are excerpts of the Memorandum of the Conversation between the two leaders:

The Secretary asked Mr. Primozic whether the Yugoslav Government considers that it is wrong to send troops to aid a friendly nation which has requested assistance in preserving its independence. Mr. Primozic replied that the UN is the proper body to take such action. ('SUBJECT: Yugoslav Chargé d'Affaires' discussion with the Secretary concerning Middle East crisis: Memorandum of Conversation', US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, Yugoslav Chargé d'Affaires ad interim Mr. Franc Primozic, July 19, 1958. In: 'Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960', Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey, Volume X, Part 2, p. 344) (IMG)

Sometimes, arguing that the US should invade a country via the UN is used by diplomats of anti-imperialist states as a cover and an excuse with which to block a US invasion. However,:

The Secretary then noted that the Soviet Union had vetoed a proposal in the Security Council which would have transferred to UN forces the responsibilities which US troops have assumed in Lebanon. He asked Mr. Primozic whether in the Yugoslav view this Soviet veto was a constructive step. Mr. Primozic conceded that it was not. The Secretary then continued that there are US military elements in some 30 countries throughout the world where they have been sent without involving the UN. Should they now be withdrawn, he asked. Mr. Primozic replied in the negative.... ('SUBJECT: Yugoslav Chargé d'Affaires' discussion with the Secretary concerning Middle East crisis: Memorandum of Conversation', US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, Yugoslav Chargé d'Affaires ad interim Mr. Franc Primozic, July 19, 1958. In: 'Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960', Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey, Volume X, Part 2, p. 344) (IMG)

According to the Yugoslav view, therefore, the 'US military elements in [approximately] 30 countries throughout the world' including in Lebanon should not have been withdrawn, and the Eurasian move to obstruct a US intervention into Lebanon via the UN was counter-productive.

The climax of the story, however, was manifested in Iraq. Iraq was where the covert intelligence war between the UAR and its allied freedom forces against the joint alliance of Khrushchev and the Kremlin Titoists, Tito's fascist gang, the SAVAK, the Mossad, the Kurdish bourgeois-nationalists, the Hashemites, and the Anglo-American secret services became bloodier and more violent than ever. There are many critical pieces to the story, but presenting all of them would require me to write too much; so I will only present the most important parts.

In Iraq existed was a circle of Nasserist Free Officers headed by Iraqi generals Abdel-Karim Al-Qasim and Abdel-Salam Aref. The former was a fake 'Nasserist' 'Free Officer' whereas the latter a real one. In July 1958, the battalions under the command of the Iraqi General Abdel-Karim Al-Qasim and the Iraqi Nasserist Free Officer Abdel-Salam Al-Aref were sent by the Hashemite Iraqi regime to support the Hashemite Jordanian regime. The Nasserist Free Officer Abdel-Salam Aref used this opportunity to launch a military coup against the Hashemite monarchy, to seize Baghdad's critical stations and thus to install a new state in Iraq. This was the critical time in which Abdel-Karim Al-Qasim, who at the time posed as a Nasserist Free Officer and as a 'friend' of Aref, to join Aref in the coup. However, Al-Qasim did not participate and thus betrayed the person to whom he presented himself as 'friend'. Instead of marching to Baghdad to help Aref, Al-Qasim stayed in Jordan thus to fulfill his mission of supporting the Jordanian monarchy. Fortunately, Aref succeeded in his coup despite Al-Qasim's stab in the back. Upon being informed of Aref's success, Al-Qasim rushed to Baghdad ostensibly to 'help' Aref but actually to launch a counter-coup against Aref and his comrades. As such, Al-Qasim made himself the first in command of the newly established Iraqi republic and made Aref the second. Shortly thereafter, Qasim made up slanders and excuses, and ousted Aref out of even the second-in-command position. To this day, the CIA-MI6-Mossad puppet media falsely presents the enemy of the Arab nation, Abdel-Karim Al-Qasim, as the true coup plotter and operator. The Moscow Titoists and the social-fascist 'Iraqi Communist Party' parroted the CIA-MI6-Mossad narrative. In his letter to Khrushchev, Abdel-Nasser remarked:

The [1958] Iraqi revolution was the beginning of the great crisis in our relations, although much of what was mentioned in your speech opened our eyes to the fact that the causes of misunderstanding between us extended to much before this revolution!

It is surprising that we hear from different circles an attack on Arab nationalism as a basis! [Our] solidarity with the Iraqi revolution began a long time ago; a number of the leaders of the Iraqi revolution - including Qasim, the Iraqi prime minister - had contacted us before the revolution, and asked that we help them in planning it. Our advice to them was; That they keep their affairs a secret even from us, and that they seek help only from their own people, and that only those who will bear the burden of implementing the revolution undertake the development of the revolution's plan.

After the Iraqi revolution succeeded, the Iraqi Communist Party wanted to seize the opportunity to control it; it took advantage of a personal dispute that broke out between Qassem and his deputy, Arif; in order to create an atmosphere of confusion to help him achieve his goals!

(Cairo-Moscow, Dar ul-Shoruq, Sami Ammareh) (IMG)

In the above quote regarding the 1958 Iraqi coup and counter-coup, Gamal Abdel-Nasser, who waged a bloody struggle against Abdel-Karim Al-Qasim, was being highly diplomatic, and thus used kind words in describing that traitor Qasim. Unlike what Abdel-Nasser diplomatically stated, the conflict between Aref and Al-Qasim was not as much a personal conflict, as it was a conflict between anti-imperialist and progressive forces headed by Aref and the imperialist-fascist reaction led by the MI6 agent Qasim. Upon seizing power, Qasim presented himself as a third force lying in between the reactionary Arab monarchies and the UAR. He started saying that Palestine was occupied by Egypt and by reactionary Jordan. In reality, the MI6 agent Qasim continued his old mission of serving the Hashemite monarchy in Jordan. Volumes of documents prove the irrefutable fact that the Abdel-Karim Al-Qasim regime was covertly allied to the British intelligence service. However, perhaps a top document on this matter is the following, in which it is admitted that Abdel-Karim Al-Qasim supported financial aid to the Anglo-American imperialists' comprador regime in Jordan:

Jordan Seeking Financial Aid From Iraq

Iraqi Prime Minister Qasim is favorably disposed toward a Jordanian request for financial assistance, according to information from the Lebanese ambassador in Baghdad who until recently handled Jordanian affairs there. The amount and terms of the aid sought were not disclosed. Qasim reportedly has not made a final decision on the matter.

Iraqi aid to Jordan probably would arouse considerable opposition among many Iraqis who are displeased over the rapprochement with Jordan, which they view as aligning Iraq against the UAR. Qasim, however, may consider that benevolence toward Jordan would enhance his prestige as an impartial Arab leader amid apparently rising pan-Arab sentiment in Iraq. A pro-government Baghdad newspaper has referred to possible efforts by the "Iraqi Government to eliminate differences between the UAR" and Jordan [by ousting the UAR and installed an Anglo-American puppet state in Egypt to make it like Jordan].

The Jordanian Government is preoccupied with the UAR's threat to its security and with its perennial financial problems. The Jordanians apparently hope Qasim will be helpful in both of these situations. King Husayn's regime swallowed its outrage over the murder of Husayn's Hashemite relatives in the Iraqi revolution of 1958 and recognized Qasim's regime in October 1960. Since then gradual progress has been made in re-establishing relations between the two countries.

(CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN, CIA, January 9, 1961, p. 3) (IMG)

In fact, according to Roby Barrett, a US State Department's Foreign Service Officer and fellow at CIA front think tanks,;

The British actually feared a Nasserist regime in Iraq and the potential consequences for the petroleum interests there and throughout the Gulf more than the potential threat of a Communist takeover. London pressed for continued arms shipments to Iraq, arguing that strengthening Qasim and the Iraqi military provided the most potent firewall against the [real] Communists and Nasserists. ('Intervention in Iraq, 1958-1959', The Middle East Institute, Roby Barrett, April 1, 2008) (IMG)

In a confidential conversation with Iran's Shah in the Buckingham Palace, Selwyn Lloyd, the Antony Eden-era Conservative British Secretary of State, admitted to the Shah that the MI6 was militarily funding the Khrushchevian-backed Al-Qasim regime:

After dinner at Buckingham Palace on the 5th of May I had a short conversation with the Shah. (...) I then spoke of our relations with the new Iraqi Government and our dilemma about arms. The Shah said that he thought we were right to agree to continue the supply of arms to Iraq and added that the situation seemed strange to Iranians. The Iraqis had [under Nasserist pressure] left the Baghdad Pact and

were flirting with [Khrushchevian pseudo-]Communism and they got arms both from the Russians and now from us [the MI6]. (EQ 10334/15, RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND SHAHANSHAH OF IRAN ON THE 5TH OF MAY, 1959, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd to Mr. J. W. Russell (Tehran), No. 69 Confidential, Foreign Office, May 8, 1959) (IMG)

Playing his usual hypocrisy games vis-à-vis the British, and to lobby the British into further military armaments of Pahlavi Iran, the Shah ostensibly expressed 'regrets' about the MI6 militarily funding of the Qasim regime; yet, it remains a fact, presenting the evidence of which is beyond the scope of this work, that the SAVAK ceased the campaign against Iraq's government as soon as the Qasim faction consolidated power against the Nasserist faction.

The MI6 agent Abdel-Karim Al-Qasim received the full support of the MI6 agent Nikita Khrushchev, who admitted in his memoirs:

We supported Kassem by all possible means.... ('Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev, Volume 3: Statesman, 1953-1964', Watson Institute, Nikita Khrushchev, p. 820) (IMG)

Al-Qasim and his fascist gang also received the support of Tito's group. Regarding Abdel-Nasser's line on the Abdel-Karim Al-Qasim regime, Tito explicitly said:

Nasser took an overly radical route and is needlessly and profusely inflaming the relations [with Iraq] . . . He can lose a lot of his own prestige . . . Nasser is a man who allows himself to be 'fired up' ... He should look at these things with more reservation and realism but I fear that this is not the case. ("Companions in misfortune": from passive neutralism to active un-commitment – the critical role of Yugoslavia', Svetozar Rajak. Citing: 'Tito's report on his trip to Asia and Africa before the Federal Executive Council, Belgrade, 17 March 1959, AJ, 837, I-2/11.' Chapter in: 'Neutrality and Neutralism in the Global Cold War', Routledge, edited by: Sandra Bott, Jussi M. Hanhimaki, Janick Marina Schaufelbuehl, & Marco Wyss, 2016) (IMG)

"Janko Smole, a high-ranking Yugoslav Party official, commented to a British diplomat" the following:

Nasser had made very serious blunders in the Middle East but the main negative factor in the situation was the degree of control achieved by the Iraqi communist party acting solely in the interest of the [Soviet] 'camp' ... Nasser, who had lost his head and behaved in a hysterical fashion, had made it easier for them to establish their grip. ("Companions in misfortune": from passive neutralism to active un-commitment – the critical role of Yugoslavia', Svetozar Rajak. Citing: 'T.W. Garvey, British Embassy in Belgrade to J.M. Addis, FCO, 15 April 1959, TNA, FO 371/145114.' Chapter in: 'Neutrality and Neutralism in the Global Cold War', Routledge, edited by: Sandra Bott, Jussi M. Hanhimaki, Janick Marina Schaufelbuehl, & Marco Wyss, 2016, p. 76) (IMG)

Horrible crimes against humanity were committed by the Al-Qasim regime. However, there was hope. Undoubtedly, the Iraqi Baath movement was infiltrated by fascist assassins such as Saddam, Ali Salih Al-Sa'di, and (later on) Nadhim Kzar, but at the time, the progressive revolutionary elements headed by Ahmad Hasan Al-Bakr held the upper hand. Upon the request of Michel Aflaq, the UAR began financing the Iraqi Baathists headed by General Ahmad Hasan Al-Bakr to help them in their counter-coup against Al-Qasim's gang. Knowing that a coup was being planned against the Abdel-Karim Al-Qasim faction, the Tito regime informed Abdel-Karim Qasim of the coup plot, thus allowing the Al-Qasim regime to hunt down the prominent Iraqi Ba'athist freedom-fighter Salih Mahdi Al-Ammash. Sa'id Aburish, a prominent journalist and spy for the CIA's Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, was a supporter of Abdel-Karim Al-Qasim, and lashed out at Abdel-Nasser and the Ba'athists for involvement in the coup against Qasim. Yet, Aburish also confirmed:

Kassem was not without friends and the **Yugoslavs**, among others, told him of the plot to overthrow him. Colonel Saleh Mahdi Ammassh, a Ba'athist officer in the Iraqi Army who was among the conspirators, was arrested in January 1963.... (Saddam Hussein: The Politics of Revenge, Sa'id Aburish, 2001, p. 56. Bold added.) (IMG)

Salih Mahdi Al-Ammash later rose to become a prominent Iraqi Ba'athist supporter of Hafez Al-Assad and a major foe of Saddam Hussein. Ammassh was assassinated by Saddam Hussein's Mukhaberat in the 1980s.

Yet in spite of the counter-measures by the Al-Qasim regime, the regime was still vulnerable, and in 1963, Ahmad Hasan Al-Bakr successfully launched a coup against Al-Qasim known as the Ramadan 1963 coup. However, much as how in July 1958 there occurred two military coups stacked closely on top of each other but presented as one coup, the Ramadan 1963 coup by Al-Bakr was followed by at least three other military coups so spatio-temporally proximate to Al-Bakr's coup that it appeared as though one coup happened in the Ramadan of 1963.

The net results of these four (or more) coups/counter-coups was that Ahmad Hasan Al-Bakr was able to re-install Abdel-Salam Aref as head of state but also that the Trotskyite mass-murderer Ali Salih Al-Sa'di was able to launch a reign of fascist terror: terrorizing Arabs, Kurds, Persians, fellow Baathists and Nasserists, communists, etc. He did this in order to provoke an uprising against the faction of Al-Bakr and Aref. He did indeed give the Anglo-Americans and Khrushchev and their agents the excuse to wrongly blame Aref for the mass-murder, kind of like how Stalin was blamed for Yezhovschina. By blaming Aref and Al-Bakr, Khrushchev and the Anglo-Americans were undermining the enemies of Ali Salih al-Sa'di hence to indirectly promote Al-Sa'di's gang to which Saddam is said to have belonged. The Moscow-based Titoists viciously slandered Iraq's UAR-backed government of committing a genocide in Iraq's Kurdistan region, as the following excerpts of a UN document reveal:

1. Mr. ARKADIEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that his delegation had addressed a letter (E/J809) to the President requesting the inclusion in the agenda of the current session a new item entitled "Policy of genocide which is being pursued by the Government of the Republic of Iraq against the Kurdish people". In submitting its request, the USSR delegation had been guided by the provisions of Article 62 of the Charter, and of General Assembly resolution 96 (I) of 11 December 1946 on the crime of genocide. To its letter of request the USSR delegation had attached a memorandum setting forth facts which confirmed that a policy of genocide was being pursued by the Iraqi Government against the Kurdish people. At the same time, the Soviet Government had addressed communications to the Governments of Iraq, Iran and Syria on the same question, giving the relevant facts of the case and proving that the matter had acquired serious international significance and should be drawn to the attention of United Nations organs.

2. In view of its international significance, the problem should be examined in the Economic and Social Council, for it was directly linked with the problems which came within the Council's competence, and with the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide which the Council had prepared. Moreover, the Council already had a number of items relating to human rights on its agenda.

3. The Soviet Union had been compelled to urge that the item should be included in the Council's agenda because at that time brutal reprisals were being conducted by the Iraqi authorities against the Kurdish people, who comprised nearly a quarter of the population of Iraq. Large-scale military action was being taken against peaceful Kurdish towns and villages; troops supported by aircraft, tanks and

artillery were gradually exterminating the civilian population, including children, women and old people; vast areas were being laid waste and large numbers of civilians were being driven from their homes.

4. Some might say that those data were available only to the Soviet Government, but that was not the case: the events had been publicized so widely that factual information could be obtained not only from official statements of the Soviet Government and from the Soviet press, but from such international newspapers as *Le Monde*, which bore out the Soviet statements in a leading article in its issue of 11 July, and the *New York Herald Tribune*, 10 July, which reported that three divisions, or 60 per cent of the Iraqi army, were conducting a merciless campaign against the Kurds, wiping Kurdish villages from the face of the earth with tanks, bulldozers and napalm bombs.

5. That was why the Soviet delegation had hastened to all the attention of the Economic and Social Council to the question, in order that the Council should use all its authority and influence to ensure that those merciless and brutal actions should be terminated forthwith.

(UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, 1278th meeting, Thursday, July 11, 1963, official records, Palais des Nations, Geneva, p. 1) (IMG)

Suddenly, the partners-in-crime of the butcher of Kosovo, the traitors who assisted the Marshal of the Traitors in the crimes against humanity, started 'worrying' about the 'genocide' in Iraqi Kurdistan. While murder of Kurds did occur, it could not be genocide per se, not as much because Al-Sa'di was murdering people semi-indiscriminately. To kill one border guard of a hostile state gives the foe the pretext for invasion; to kill a thousand border guards deters a foe from an invasion. Killing one border guard is a provocation of an enemy invasion, whereas killing a thousand border guards is a suppression of an enemy invasion. The same goes for genocide. A Kurdish bourgeois-nationalist rebellion, not a genocide, was desired by Al-Sa'di and his mafia. Annihilating the Kurds would have prevented a rebellion by the Kurdish bourgeois-nationalists, whereas massacring a relatively smaller number of Kurds would have provided the pretext for a bourgeois-nationalist rebellion. Al-Sa'di, an Arab, was also exterminating countless Arabs. He murdered people not to 'cleanse' entire ethnic groups, not to break the spirit of those ethnic groups, but to rather provoke the tribes of those ethnic groups into revolting against the Iraqi government.

Elsewhere in that UN document cited above, it is confirmed that India – a country that was allied to Stalin-era USSR and the UAR and which had assisted the UAR in hijacking Tito's 'Non-Aligned Movement' – refused to accept the Moscow Titoist line. Of course, India rejected the Eurasian Titoist line in the usual diplomatic language:

Mr. NEHRU (India) said he had listened to the statement of the Soviet Union representative with great attention and respect. (...). However, in dealing with such matters affecting a friendly country, there had to be some objective in view. The Indian objective was to help in promoting a peaceful atmosphere conducive to a peaceful settlement. The passing of resolutions condemning one side or the other would be of no help in creating such an atmosphere. It was India's desire and hope that the Government and people of Iraq would be able to overcome their difficulties. He was aware that they wished to avoid conflict, to solve their problems peacefully and to devote themselves to the great task of internal construction and development which was the principal task of all the Afro-Asian countries, including India. (...). Irrespective of legal and other considerations, and because of India's desire to help in promoting an atmosphere which would lead to reconciliation and peace rather than to bitterness and recrimination, his delegation was unable to support the Soviet proposal. [Nehru] appealed to the Soviet delegation to reconsider its initiative. The objective should be the promotion of peace rather than the aggravation of difficulties. (UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, 1278th meeting, Thursday, 11 July 1963, official records, Palais des Nations, Geneva, p. 2) (IMG)

To this day, many CIA spies on CIA payroll denounce Abdel-Nasser and his comrades as 'sellouts' to 'American imperialism' for the operations against the Qasim regime. Furthermore, Aref and Al-Bakr were trying to arrest Al-Sa'di for his numerous crimes and to execute him. By blaming Aref and Al-Bakr and Co. for the crimes of Al-Sa'di, the Khrushchev group were actually indirectly assisting Al-Sa'di, the very perpetrators of these mass-murders. Khrushchev wrote in his memoirs:

Bad relations had developed between Aref and us. We did not consider him a progressive-leaning person, and as an individual he was unpleasant. It was hard to have a conversation with him. Nasser gave a ceremonial dinner for his guests. Just prior to that, news arrived that Aref had carried out reprisals against the progressive forces in Iraq. I remarked to Nasser: "This is very distasteful. According to our information, Aref has arrested or killed a lot of people. It's distasteful even to sit next to such a person." The seating arrangement at President Nasser's table was such that I was supposed to sit right next to Aref. Nasser took exception to my remarks: "I think your information is incorrect. I don't think Aref has done this, especially while he's in Egypt as my guest and would be meeting with you. He has very much wanted to meet you and wants closer ties with the USSR."

I said to him: "I doubt it. Nothing like that has been evident in his speeches or his political line."

"I will find out right now," said Nasser, and hurried away.

After a little while [Nasser came back and] said: "Aref swears to God that he hasn't done any such thing, that these are fabrications of the capitalist press. Nothing of the sort has happened. They are lying. I [that is, Nasser] believe him because he's a devout religious person. He spends all his time on his knees, bowing toward Mecca and praying to Allah, asking Allah to answer his prayers about every possible problem. Aref is such a religious man that he's incapable of lying, I assure you."

The dinner proceeded with full ceremony, and afterward I had a talk with Aref, who brought up the subject on his own initiative. "The information you have received is inaccurate. It is apparently being circulated by persons who don't want improved relations between Iraq and the USSR. I have done no such thing, and I never would."

(Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev, Vol. 3, p. 832) (IMG)

A few years later, Abdel-Salam Aref was murdered by a plane crash 'incident', allowing for a CIA-backed fascist coup. Khrushchev was probably cheerful.

Although Khrushchev was officially ousted before 1965, the Titoist faction continued to wield a significant level of influence until early 1968. The Eurasian Titoists supported the military coup by the CIA agent Salah Jadid and his gang of Trotskyite-fascist butchers and torturers. In an interview after the Jadid coup, Michel Aflaq, who had been directly leading the Syrian branch of the Ba'ath Party prior to the Jadid coup, complained of the hostile attitude of the Eurasians towards the Ba'athists in Syria:

The Soviet Union is the largest socialist country and the largest progressive international weight in the world. Our party has faced hostility without serious justifications. However, we did not react and reciprocate the hostility. Rather, we were patient and ignored. We remained on the position dictated by revolutionary logic and the interest of the Arab nation in befriending the socialist state. Finally, the Soviet Union pushed hostility to the end when it supported the rebels against the party and considered the sons of the wealthy families

who were brought to power by tanks and who disguised themselves in the words of leftism and socialism as the true representatives of the party, while attacking the party and its leaders and founders who lived their lives in deprivation and fought for thirty years for socialism. And regarding the issues of the toiling Arab masses, [Moscow] accused them of being right-wing and reactionary.

It is not permissible for us to react and act in any way from which colonialism and reaction could benefit. However, in addition to this legitimate concern, this caution, and this wisdom, we must be faithful to the truth and to warn against getting carried away in the politics of force, imposition, arbitrariness and tyranny whatever the disparity between our strength and the strength of the Soviet Union. The truth is the measure; it is stronger than the largest force in the world and it [i.e. the truth] is on our side. Our answer to the Soviet Union will not be to go backwards in approaching the positions of the right and reactionary but rather in being faithful to our revolutionary approach and goals, and in clarifying our position to our people and to the progressive parties and movements in our country and in the world.

(The June 5 War and the time for Historic Action, Michel Aflaq, October 1967. In: 'Fi Sabil El-Ba'ath' [In the Path of Resurrection], Vol. 2, Michel Aflaq, pp. 269-270) (IMG)

The reign of Salah Jadid and his fascist gang, not to be confused with the Hafez Al-Assad era, was marked by barbaric terror, the handing over of the Golan Heights to Israel, the extension of Kuwaiti intelligence and Muslim Brotherhood terrorist networks in Syria, the rise of the Fatah, a conspiracy to transform the Arab National Movement (ANM) into a Maoist network, a hostile attitude towards the UAR and post-1969 Libya, and many other treasonous activities. Even after he was overthrown, Jadid continued his subversive activities against Syria through his correspondences from jail. He set up a subversive network within the Syrian Arab Army in order to launch a coup against the Al-Assad faction in 1976. By the late 1970s, his network also allied with fascist Iraq and Saddam's Mukhaberat.

It must also be recalled again that it was 'thanks' to the Kremlin Titoists that the 1953 coup in Iran happened. Mosaddeq made a reference to this matter (see C20S7 and C17S7). Furthermore, it was Khrushchev himself who stabbed the struggles against the Shah in the back, promoting peaceful coexistence with the regime. Khrushchev had the audacity to go as far as to make the ridiculous left-deviationist argument that since people in Iran are getting hungrier and hungrier under the Shah, they will automatically overthrow the Shah regime and that hence there is no point in revolutionary class struggles against Iran's regime because over time, the Shah's regime will be naturally overthrown! According to Special Report by the SAVAK:

Khrushchev made this clear to the American informant Walter Lippmann, saying that the poverty, misery and dissatisfaction of the Iranian people contributes to the advancement of communist goals in Iran.... (...). Khrushchev has stated that we do not need to take action with regards to Iran because the time in this country works in our favor, and it seems that Khrushchev does not want to spend anything in this country more than time. (The Special Report of the Foreign Intelligence and the Activities of Iranians Living Abroad [Gozaresh e Vizheh e Ettela'at e Khareji va Fa'aliat e Iranian e Moqim e Keshvar haye Kharej], SAVAK, p. 3. In: 'The Tudeh Party in Exile According to SAVAK Documents' [Hezb e Tudeh dar Kharej az Keshvar be Revayat e Asnad e SAVAK], Vol. 2, p. 549. In: The Center of Historical Documents Survey) (IMG)

The Iranian regime was also financially supported by the Moscow Titoists in late December 1954. During the Stalin era, the Shah faction demanded that the USSR 'repays' its 'debt' to Iran for 'invading' Iran during the Great Patriotic War. The USSR had no real obligation to pay Iran because Iran was rightly intervened in militarily by the USSR during the Great Patriotic War, an intervention that was morally just and in line with international law. On the contrary, the hostile regime in Iran was morally obliged to pay debt to the USSR for the former's criminal pro-Nazi activities during and prior to the Great Patriotic War. Nonetheless, during the Razmara era and the Mosaddeq era, the USSR began to change its stance and use the issue of 'debt' 'payment' as an excuse to fund the Razmara and the Mosaddeq administrations. Since Mosaddeq's position was still not very strong, however, Iran was still not ready just yet for being thoroughly funded by the Stalin-era USSR. Thus, the USSR took steps towards funding Iran under the cover of 'paying' its 'debt' for the 'invasion', but ultimately did not fund Iran because the USSR needed to ensure that any financial support it would provide to Iran would not fall into the hands of the enemies of the Mosaddeq faction and yet the Mosaddeq faction had still not gained enough influence over the Iranian regime. Stalin's death, as Mosaddeq had stated, paved the way for the 1953 coup (see C17S7). Furthermore, the Kremlin Titoists not only refused to support the Mosaddeq faction, but also, after the 1953 CIA-MI6 coup, provided financial support to the Shah regime in the form of the 'repayment' of the 'debt' in 1954:

The High Contracting Parties have agreed to a final settlement of all mutual financial claims relating to the period of the Second World War.... Within two weeks after the entry into force of the present Agreement, the State Bank of the USSR shall transfer to the National Bank of Iran in two consignments, at the frontier railway station of DzhulfaiIranskaya, 11,196,070.3 (eleven million one hundred and ninety-six thousand and seventy point three) grammes of gold in payment of the claims of the Iranian Side.... (IRAN and UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS – Agreement concerning the settlement of frontier and financial questions (with Protocols and annexes). Signed at Tehran, on 2 December 1954. Official texts: Persian and Russian. Registered by Iran on 24 January 1963. In: UN Treaty Series, UN, for: 1963, p. 260.) (IMG)

As such, the Kremlin Titoists paid for a 'debt' that the USSR should not have paid to Iran's regime. It is fair to say that this measure was basically funding the Shah's regime. The Titoists in Moscow also provided the Iranian regime with military funding. Bizhan Jazani, the founder and the primary theorist of the Organization of Iranian People's Fedai Guerrillas (OIPFG) and a former Tudeh Party activist, remains an icon of Iran's communist movement. He is even greatly praised by the Tudeh Party leaders. Jazani wrote the following concerning the Eurasian military aid to Iran's regime:

We have seen in this analysis that all opposition forces in Iran, even the Tudeh Central Committee (which considers it its duty to defend all aspects of Soviet diplomacy in Iran without exception), agree that the reactionary, anti-national, anti-democratic, anti-popular, and comprador nature of the Shah's regime has not changed, and that it is not in the path of the weakening of these features, but rather as explained previously, the recent maneuvers are especially for the entrenchment and of the positions of the Iranian regime, which contradict the interests of our nation, and the anti-colonial interests of the peoples of the Middle East and the [rest of the] world, and is in line with the strategies and tactics of neocolonialism.

Therefore, there are no objective factors that could justify the change in the policy of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries towards the Shah's regime, neither from the publication of national positions nor from the regime's foreign policy, and that is why we say and believe that unfortunately the Soviet Union violates socialist policy and proletarian internationalism. Today, a regime is flattered, a monarch is hailed as a "great reformer," a government is given weapons and economic aid with which to stabilize its government, which has had no fundamental change away from its much-despised past, the days in which the corruption in the palaces of the Shah were being revealed. Military aid to it is a betrayal of the peoples of Iran and the liberation movement[s] of the Middle East....

In a report to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on Sino-Pakistani relations on February 14, 1964, Mr. Suslov said: "The leadership apparatus of China, in addition to deteriorating its relations with India to an extraordinary level, has reached a point which, as you are aware, while not being a member of any official military pact, is practically an ally of Pakistan, a member state SEATO and CENTO, military pacts that pose a danger to the peace and security of the nations of Asia. The fact is that the leaders of China, by throwing away "all the revolutionary statements" of their own, have gone down a road which cannot be reconciled with the principled approach of the united front of the socialist countries in the struggle against the imperialist blocs. What can be said? The methods of the Chinese leaders about choosing their friend and ally is very strange. A question must be asked:

How can they dishonor and tarnish the socialist countries and the communist parties, and at the same time to flatter the reactionary regime of Pakistan right in front of the whole world? It is really incomprehensible. Would there be anyone who would believe that close relations with Pakistan is rooted in the interests of the progress and the development of the revolutionary struggles of the nations of Asia against imperialism, about which the Chinese leaders have stirred up controversy?"

(Suslov's Report, Persian translation, p. 27)

Indeed, what can be said! We ask, in particular, Mr. Suslov and the Central Committee of the Tudeh Party, which justifies Soviet policy: does anyone believe that approaching the Shah's regime and providing military and economic assistance to the Iranian government and political and propaganda support for the monarchy results in the advancement of the interests and the development of the struggle of the Asian nations against imperialism?!

How is it that no blind eye is turned towards the deviation of China towards the government of Pakistan, but a blind eye is turned to the deviation of the Soviet Union towards the government of Iran and even towards Pakistan itself? Why is the flattery of the reactionary regime of Pakistan condemned but the flattery of the Shah's regime is not reprehensible and even the Central Committee has tried to justify it as correct policy? Yes, "It is really incomprehensible" as to what the Shah's regime lacks in terms of its reactionary position from the Pakistani regime? The same reasons that led Suslov to ask "Would there be anyone who would believe that close relations with Pakistan is rooted in the interests of the progress and the development of the revolutionary struggles of the nations of Asia against imperialism?", compel the Communists of Iran and all the anti-colonial forces of the Iranian people, to ask, and especially to ask Mr. Suslov and the Central Committee of the Tudeh Party: Would there be anyone who would believe that close relations with Iran is rooted in the interests of the progress and the development of the revolutionary struggles of the nations of Asia against imperialism, and is based on proletarian internationalism?

In our view, the policy of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in Iran is contrary to the interests of the progress and development of the revolutionary struggle of the nations of Asia against imperialism, is contrary to the principles of proletarian internationalism, and constitutes anti-socialist diplomacy. That is because helping the Iranian government and further entrenches the reactionary and anti-national regime and the cause of imperialism in the Middle East....

(The Problems Facing the Iranian People's Anti-Colonial and Liberation Movement & the Most Critical Tasks of Iran's Communists in the Current Conditions, Bizhan Jazani, Autumn 1967. Reprinted by the: The Organization for the Unity of the Iranian People's Fedayeen, Winter 2003, pp. 13-14) (IMG)

The Eurasian armament of Iran's regime in 1967 (Brezhnev era) and during the Khrushchev period could not have been for the purpose of 'coopting' the regime of Iran. Sometimes, certain regimes under the significant influence of the reactionary forces can be overthrown through a progressive state's tied aid unto them. For example, in such a case, armaments would be provided on the condition that 'Soviet advisors' and 'Soviet technicians' (i.e. Soviet spies) would be placed in charge of installing those weapons. Such was why Stalin offered weapons sales to the Shah, provided that Soviet advisors/technicians would be running such equipment; the Shah, initially unaware that Stalin wanted 'advisors' and 'technicians' to come along with those

Soviet weapons to be installed, welcomed this weapons sales, but upon finding out about the real depth of the matter – that this was a plot for Soviet intelligence penetration – rejected the Soviet offer. Hence, sometimes, weapons sales can be a means of intelligence penetration. However, such weapons sales have to occur provided that there are mechanisms in place to prevent the reactionary forces from hijacking those weapons and expelling the spy-'technicians' or spy-'advisors'. Note that Stalin made that offer back in the mid-1940s, when Iran had been democratized, and the progressive forces had a significant influence; back then, there was a low chance of the Shah's faction from being able to hijack those weapons and expel the Soviet advisors. The scenario was radically different in 1967 when the fascist faction had more influence over the Iranian regime than before, due to the defeat inflicted upon the UAR in the 1967 War. The 1967 defeat of the UAR was directly correlated with the sharp demotion of the Nasserist agents in the high ranks of the SAVAK, a demotion which had rendered the Shah's faction all the more powerful. Clearly, arms sales to the Iranian regime back then would not have allowed intelligence penetration, for the SAVAK would have been able to easily receive those weapons and then, through excuses and blackmail, expel the spy-advisors and spy-technicians. Without a doubt, Iran's regime was being armed, not coopted, by the government of Eurasia, which proves that Moscow was dominated still by the Titoist comprador bourgeoisie.



Brezhnev, Shah, Empress Farah discuss arms sales to Iran.

Nikita Khrushchev also supported Israel's war against Egypt. Later, in his memoirs, he morally endorsed Moshe Dayan, argued that the Jews are culturally superior, that the UAR was the aggressor in the 1967 War, and that Israel was just defending itself through a pre-emptive strike against Egypt:

The main reason for Israel's victory was that **it had a higher cultural level** and better discipline in its army, and its officers had combat experience and excellent training. After all, very good specialists from many different countries had come together in Israel. For example, **I have a very high regard for their top general, [Moshe] Dayan, as a military man. He's a fine fellow! I said as a joke that if I was premier and he was in the Soviet Union, I would immediately appoint him our minister of defense. He is worthy of that.** The Jews are a people who have been dispersed all over the world. That's why it turned out that their officers were better trained, and so were their soldiers, their tank crews, and airplane pilots. What about the factor of fanaticism? Well, that's not primary. There are all sorts of fanatics. But if you pull down a fanatic's pants and whip him a few times, that fanatic will run off without looking back, so as not to get another whipping. The thing is that the Israelis were simply better organized, had a better mastery of their weapons, and made more intelligent use of them.

It was hard for the Egyptians to contend with them, and they paid dearly, **poor fellows**. To put it crudely, **they could ride camels** and knew how to handle rifles, but they had now been seated in tanks. (...).

I simply can't understand how such a thing happened. How could we have permitted it? I repeat, **the Soviet Union bears a major share of the responsibility** for what happened. With the possibilities we had of exerting influence **we could have restrained Nasser from going to war**. We had the possibility of giving President Nasser good advice, not to make a display of ardent militancy in demanding that UN peacekeeping troops be withdrawn. Also, it was not necessary to close the gulf that Israel used for commercial shipping.

In short, he shouldn't have heated up the atmosphere. But as things happened, an atmosphere of imminent war was created. That's how I understood the situation at the time. It's true that Israel started the war. It launched a surprise attack, **but it launched that attack preemptively**, to forestall its opponent, because both sides had already mobilized and were on a war footing. Israel struck first and easily achieved a thorough routing of Egypt's troops.

(Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev, Vol. 3, pp. 862-863. Bold added.) (IMG)

Yes, Khrushchev was being serious. He would have been a good comedian or clown, however, just by continuing to talk like a Khrushchev.

Again, it is essential to emphasize that these crimes against the peoples of the Middle East and North Africa were not committed by the 'national-bourgeois' elements in Eurasia, but were rather done by the comprador bourgeois elements. Khrushchev, the Kremlin Titoist assassins, and the white-collar workers in the CPSU that supported them were affiliated with the comprador classes, not the national bourgeoisie. They operated not for Eurasian interests but for the home-grown reactionary classes allied to Anglo-American finance capital.

Abdel-Nasser and other freedom fighters rightly decided to partially ally with Eurasia insofar as the communist and anti-imperialist elements in Eurasia maintained some influence. The conditions of class struggle in the USSR – particularly, the facts that Khrushchev and other Titoists dominating the state were supporters of the Dayanites in the Israeli regime but the government which Khrushchev headed provided some arms to Egypt – is demonstrative of the deep divisions in the Eurasian state.

At the same time, contrary to how some would seek to depict the matter, the communists or the proletariat did not continue to maintain the upper hand during the Khrushchev era. No, Eurasia was a dictatorship of the comprador bourgeoisie, which held the upper hand even in the Eurasian military. This is proven by the fact that Eurasia during the Khrushchev era provided not just financial support but also military support for the SAVAK regime in Iran, a regime posing a far greater menace to Egypt than Israel's regime.

Abdel-Nasser was also critical of the role of Tito's group for the latter's support for the Dubcek faction. Referring to Tito's group, in a 1968 conversation with Gromyko, Abdel-Nasser stated:

In fact, they [i.e. Tito's group] were reckless in their position on the issue of Czechoslovakia.... (Minutes of President Gamal Abdel Nasser's talks with Andrei Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Cairo, El-Qubba Palace, December 23, 1968, p. 17) (IMG)

Also worthy of consideration are Hoxha's remarks on Abdel-Nasser's relations with Tito. In part because a relatively small country like Albania did not have as much of an intelligence presence in the Middle East as it did in Yugoslavia, Enver Hoxha's assessments of the situation in Yugoslavia were often very correct but his assessments of the situation in the Middle East often contained serious flaws. Therefore, as Hoxha had information on Tito but not so much on Abdel-Nasser, the value of Hoxha's assessments of the Tito-Nasser relationship is mixed. Nonetheless, to the extent that it is worth, Hoxha said:

Apparently, Tito has lost all credit in Nasser's eyes.... Nasser has understood what Tito really is. (THE ANTI-IMPERIALIST STRUGGLE OF THE ARAB PEOPLES IS JUST, Enver Hoxha, May 25, 1967. In: The Reflections on the Middle East)

Nasser ... understood that Tito was a perfidious liar who hatched up plans to the detriment of the UAR and other peoples. In the UAR Tito's diabolical game was unmasked. (TITO, AN AGENT OF THE AMERICANS, FALSE FRIEND OF THE ARAB PEOPLES, HAS FOLDED HIS ARMS, Enver Hoxha, June 8, 1967. In: The Reflections on the Middle East)

Considering that Tito's gang supported the Israeli regime, the Al-Qasim regime in Iraq, the US military intervention in Lebanon, etc., it seems unlikely that Abdel-Nasser would support Tito's gang.

In 1968, thanks to the intervention of the Warsaw Pact in Czechoslovakia, the UDB was greatly shaken and thus the Tito gang began to lose some of its influence in the UDB. The communist forces gained a slightly greater level of influence in fascist Yugoslavia, thus forcing Tito's gang to capitulate to the anti-Titoist forces in Eurasia. In this midst, Abdel-Nasser was to serve as an intermediary, getting Tito's gang to 'improve relations' with the Eurasians:

but the truth is that Tito sent me a letter and I said it to the ambassador, in which he says: He wants to strengthen his relations with the Soviet Union, and he was talking about meeting two delegations from the two countries to speak. Of course, if having any chance like this, the West, and America is going to Yugoslavia! In fact, we see the need to settle relations with Yugoslavia very strategically. (Minutes of President Gamal Abdel Nasser's talks with Andrei Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Cairo, El-Qubba Palace, December 23, 1968, p. 17) (IMG)

Worthy of highlight is that such an improvement in Eurasian-Yugoslav relations in the 1970s occurred during the Brezhnev era, when the remnants of the Stalin faction, Shtemenko and Vasilevsky along with others, had seen a rise in their influence over the Eurasian state. In this case, whereas the improvement of relations with Yugoslavia during the 1950s and the 1960s was a case of capitulation to the Titoist forces, in the 1970s the improvement of relations with Yugoslavia, when Rankovic was forcibly demoted by the communist forces whose influence in the UDB had increased, was a case not of Eurasian capitulation to the Titoist regime in Yugoslavia but of the communist anti-Titoist agents in the Yugoslav regime forcing the latter to capitulate to the anti-Titoists. One must make the distinction between the 1970s vs. 1950s-1960s when it comes to 'improvement of relations' with Yugoslavia. In the 1970s, Tito remained a fascist agent of the Anglo-Americans but he was back then encircled and pressured by the 'Cominformists' so to capitulate to the Eurasians.

Yugoslavia, partially de-Titoized, began to serve as a transit point for aid sent from Moscow to Egypt:

Abdel Nasser: The second issue is the issue of Tito. The issue of Yugoslavia is very important to us, as it is the railway that brings [materials] from Moscow to Cairo from a [geo-]strategic point of view. As for the last time they made an air bridge, it was Yugoslavia. (Minutes of President Gamal Abdel Nasser's talks with Andrei Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Cairo, El-Qubba Palace, December 23, 1968, p. 17) (IMG)

Since, under the influence of Palestinian anti-Semitic propaganda, Arab public opinion had been misled against direct negotiations with Israel, the UAR negotiated with Israel via Yugoslavia and Romania:

Brezhnev: You do not have contact with Israel?

Abdel Nasser: Two indirect contacts..

The first contact is through Tito who met with Goldman, and Goldman said that Israel wants peace, and that they [i.e. Israeli leaders] are divided, and the Cabinet has a hard-line part, and a part that wants peace, and the majority wants peace, [and] Goldman wants peace. (...). The second call came from Romania. The Deputy Foreign Minister came to Egypt and said: He wants to come to a special issue of peace with Israel. He came and repeated the same words that Tito had said. I said: This talk contradicts what the government of Israel is doing.

(Minutes of the talks between President Gamal Abdel Nasser and Soviet leaders in Moscow, The morning of July 5, 1968, p. 16) (IMG)

C21S2.2. Khrushchev Faction on Sukarno and Indonesia *** IMG-All-{Indonesia}

According to the CIA, which in turn cites the conversation with Indonesia's foreign minister, Nikita Khrushchev insulted Sukarno:

Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio has told the American ambassador that Khrushchev's visit was the "toughest affair he has ever had to handle" and that there was almost constant bickering between President Sukarno and the Soviet leader. He quoted Sukarno as saying "I didn't invite this man here to be insulted by him." Subandrio gave the impression that Khrushchev had boasted of Soviet achievements, alluded to Indonesian bungling, and given blunt lectures on the virtues of Communism.

In discussing Indonesia's five-year plan, wanted detailed figures on the country's economy. When Sukarno said he was not interested in these details, Khrushchev told him, "You aren't socialist. Socialism consists of figures, figures, figures." "You are a robot," Sukarno retorted. When Khrushchev challenged Indonesia's purchase of Lockheed Electras as "imperialist aircraft," Sukarno replied that he was buying what he considered best suited for Indonesia.

(CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN, CIA, March 5, 1960, p. 2) (IMG)

C21S2.3. The Khrushchev Faction Promotes Zionist Migration *** IMG-All-{Zionist Migration post-1955}

As detailed in depth in C16S2, during the Stalin era, efforts were maximized to block Zionist migration. However, from 1955 onwards, by the time of the historic triumph of the Titoist faction led by Khrushchev, there came a radical shift in policy in favour of sending the USSR's Yiddish and Juhuri citizens as cannon-fodder for Moshe Dayan and Ariel Sharon. Mohammad Hasanein Heikal, a presidential envoy and diplomatic representative of Gamal Abdel-Nasser and a top media official of the United Arab Republic, wrote:

Throughout the periods extending from the mid-fifties to the end of the eighties – the rate of Jewish immigration from the Soviet Union did not exceed an annual average of four thousand immigrants. (On the Issue of Migration of Soviet Jews, Mohammad Hasanein Heikal, February 27, 1990, p. 2. From: nasser.bibalex.org) (IMG)

In other words, approximately 140,000 Yiddish and Juhuri citizens left Eurasia between 1955 to 1990. Some went directly to Israel. Others, who did not wish to go to a territory 'encircled' by the Arab states, were first lured into the West, in which they were bombarded enough with propaganda to end up in Israel.

For what it is worth, the PFLP Information Bulletin stated in 1975 that when many Zionist Jews were leaving Israel, there was also 'a large number of Soviet Jews ... immigrating to Israel, thus strengthening the Zionist state':

Immigration in 1974 dropped drastically and an increasing number of Israeli Jews left the country or expressed a desire to leave. Although a large number of Soviet Jews are immigrating to Israel, thus strengthening the Zionist state, there is on the other hand an increasing emigration of those Jews from Israel. (PFLP Information Bulletin, No. 16, March 1975 to April 1975, Foreign Relations Committee of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), p. 11) (IMG)

The PFLP media until 1979 was not very reliable on these matters, for the PFLP until then was dominated by the terrorist agents of Saddam Hussein's Mukhaberat. However, the above information is corroborated in spirit by Heikal's remarks and the PFLP's own later comments. By the late 1970s, an anti-Saddamite and pro-Syria faction led by the team of Abu Ali Mustafa was elevated to the leadership in the PFLP and temporarily began to exercise a much greater influence over the PFLP military and media, rendering the PFLP media more reliable as anti-imperialist media. In 1981, the reliable PFLP Information Bulletin confirmed that 1,100 Yiddish and Juhuri citizens from the Soviet Union migrated and became the potential cannon-fodder of Ariel Sharon:

The number of Jewish emigrants from the Soviet Union was 6,670 during the first half of 1981; only 1,100 of these immigrated to occupied Palestine; 84% changed their minds. (PFLP Information Bulletin, No. 59, February 1982, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), p. 16) (IMG)

According to Clive Jones of Britain's Royal Historical Society, Yuri Andropov and Kosygin were key figures behind the project for Zionist mass migration:

the world outcry ... coupled with the need to court Washington, allowed the reformers within the Kremlin – Kosygin and KGB Chief Yuri Andropov among them – to implement measures leading to large-scale emigration. ('Soviet Jewish Aliyah, 1989-1992: Impact and Implications for Israel and the Middle East', Clive Jones, 2013, p. 22) (IMG)

Yuri Andropov was a Titoist on the side of Beria. Sergio Beria recalled how the Anglo-Yugoslav agent (see C20S13) and KGB chief Yuri Andropov told Sergio Beria:

'I have closely studied your father's proposals on economic and foreign policy fields. Many of them are absolutely correct.' ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergio Beria, p. 277) (IMG)

The fact that there still occurred a large amount of Zionist migration during the Brezhnev era is a strong indication that the revolutionary forces in Eurasia were overall still not so strong as to halt to such a project. The inability to contain Zionist migration in the long-run is not on its own a proof of the comprador bourgeois character of the state, but serves as a reflection of the weakness of the proletarian class forces in Eurasia.

C21S3. Slight Proletarian Dominance or Slight Comprador Dominance?

Some argue that the communists and non-communist progressives' simultaneous maintenance of positive relations with Eurasia and negative relations with the Khrushchevians was not because the Titoists comprador forces maintained a majority stake and the proletariat a minority stake over the state, but that the reverse was the case; the proletariat, they allege, maintained a slim majority share while the comprador forces maintained a very large minority. This view is incorrect, for it again fails to account for why the strategic orientation of the Eurasian state was tilted in favour of the Yugoslav regime against the Peoples' Democracies, in favour of the SAVAK regime against the UAR. Strategic orientation is determined by the question of which faction dominates the military and intelligence bodies of a state, the means of violence, the determinants of the class character of a state. Strategic orientation is not weakly or moderately correlated with the class character of a state. Rather, it is most strongly correlated. It completely reflects on whose side of history – the side of the proletariat, the anti-colonial national bourgeoisie and the cooperativists? Or the side of finance capital, mercantile capital, the bureaucrats, the kulaks, and the feudal landlords? – the state is. And the strategic affiliation of the Khrushchev-era Eurasian state with the latter side of history was direct proof that the slight majority held by the white-collar elements in a CPSU which dominated the Red Army, had been a slight majority that transformed the strategic orientation of the state and, in correlation, converted the Eurasian state into a comprador bourgeois state, not a dictatorship of the proletariat.

C21S4. The 'Anti-Party' Group / On Voroshilov *** IMG-All-{Voroshilov}

In 1957, the Molotov faction in the CPSU spearheaded an attempt to oust Nikita Khrushchev from the leadership of Eurasia and to install Malenkov in replacement. Malenkov had previously taken Titoist stances and had held views at times more reactionary than those of Khrushchev. However, Malenkov, later re-coopted by the communists, began to assist Molotov in the struggle against Khrushchev's group. The efforts against Khrushchev proved unsuccessful. The latter, supported by an overwhelming majority in the Party, struck back, leading to the demotion of Molotov. To weaken communist influence, the communist-coopted Titoist agent Malenkov and Bulganin too were sharply demoted by the Khrushchev group.

One who belonged to the Molotov faction was Voroshilov. Many do not know that Voroshilov had always been a weak personality somewhat annoying Stalin. Voroshilov was no 'reactionary' man – a comrade of Stalin since the days of the Civil War, he had credentials as a fighter for socialism. However, many among his comrades criticized him for his underperformance. The Titoists had an easy time coopting him, due to his relatively weak personality. In 'The Khrushchevites', Enver Hoxha recalled how Voroshilov joined Nikita Khrushchev in slandering Stalin even in unofficial meetings. In 'Molotov Remembers', Molotov too criticized Voroshilov by mentioning that Voroshilov began to associate himself with the intelligentsia, showed poor performance in his tasks, and started disgracefully siding with Khrushchev. It may have been the case that Khrushchev had managed to intimidate Voroshilov into accepting his line, for Khrushchev used intimidation tactics often. Regardless, by 1957, Voroshilov showed some sympathies with the so-called 'anti-Party' group headed by Molotov and Malenkov against Khrushchev faction:

Khrushchev renewed the attack on the anti-party group in the USSR, which has long since been ousted from power, and for the first time publicly named Marshal Voroshilov – former titular chief of the Soviet state – as the seventh member of the group which had sought to unseat him in 1957. (CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN, CIA, October 18, 1961, p. 3) (IMG)

Enver Hoxha recalled:

At a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the party in the Kremlin, in the summer of 1957, after many criticisms, Khrushchev was left in the minority, and, as Polyansky told us from his own mouth, Khrushchev was dismissed from the task of the first secretary and was appointed minister of agriculture, since he was an "expert on *kukuruz*²". However, this situation did not last more than a few hours. Khrushchev and his supporters secretly gave the alarm, the marshals surrounded the Kremlin with tanks and soldiers and gave orders that not even a fly was to leave the Kremlin. On the other hand, aircraft were sent to the four corners of the Soviet Union to gather up the members of the Plenum of the CC of the CPSU. "Then," said Polyansky, this product of Khrushchev, "we entered the Kremlin and demanded admission to the meeting. Voroshilov came out and asked what we wanted. When we told him that we wanted to enter the meeting, he cut us short. When we threatened to use force he said: 'What does all this mean?' But we warned him: 'Mind your words, otherwise we shall arrest you.' We entered the meeting and changed the situation." Khrushchev was restored to power. (The Khrushchevites, Enver Hoxha, Chapter 6)

During the purge of the 'anti-Party' group, Voroshilov apparently continued to capitulate to Khrushchev, perhaps in part due to a calculated desire to stay in the system and revolt against the Khrushchev faction at a more opportune time, but certainly also in part because he was easy to cajole and blackmail.

C21S5. Khrushchev (Again) Sabotages the Economy on a Large-Scale through Decentralization / Kosygin Reforms *** IMG-All-{Economic Titoization in Eurasia}

As confirmed by the CIA's National Foreign Assessment Center,:

organizational disarray [was] created by Khrushchev's regional economic council (Sovnarkhoz) system.... (ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT IN THE SOVIET ECONOMY: THE CEASELESS SEARCH FOR PANACEAS, CIA, National Foreign Assessment Center, December 1977, p. 13) (IMG)

Details of the corrupt chaotic bureaucracy generated by the Sovnarkhozy of the Khrushchev-led Moscow Titoists is provided by Kenneth Whiting, a prominent scholar from the United States Department of the Air Force, and the Documentary Research Division of the Aerospace Studies Institute, Maxwell Airbase in Alabama. Whiting basically confirmed that the decentralization policy, which promoted bureaucracy, created a massive disarray in the Soviet economy, sowed chaos, and allowed the creation of loyalist cliques of corrupt nepotist families that neglected the needs of the whole economy and local needs. The following is an excerpt of the document by Whiting:

The Khrushchev Period.—Khrushchev, in his decade of power from 1955 to 1964, ... [was] an advocate of high priority for consumer goods and meaningful investment in agriculture. In his efforts to push his programs Khrushchev was very likely to thrash about nosily, suddenly decide upon a scheme for reorganizing some sector of the economy, or even the whole economy, and then rush about the Soviet Union excoriating officials right down to the local level if he thought them insufficiently responsive to his latest gambit. Needless to say, the Soviet economy was in a state of turmoil during Nikita's hey-day from 1957 to 1964. and even a brief outline of his many reorganizations is bound to seem like a complex story.

On May 7, 1957, Khrushchev addressed the Supreme Soviet on the subject of an overall reorganization of the Soviet economic management and announced some drastic changes. (...). In announcing the new program, Khrushchev stated:

The tasks of further advancing the national economy at the present stage of its development, as has already been said, make it necessary to shift the center of gravity of operational guidance of industry and construction closer to enterprises and construction projects. However, this can be done only by a transition from the management of the national economy through the industrial ministries and agencies to management based on territorial principles. The party Central Committee and the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers hold that the economic councils, which are to be set up in economic administrative regions should become the organizational form of such management.

(...). Under the new system a large number of economic ministries were abolished and 105 Councils of the National Economy (sovnarkhoz) established in their place. Each of the 15 republics had at least one sovnarkhoz, and large republics such as the Ukrainian S.S.R. and the R.S.F.S.R. had many. Each of the sovnarkhozy was thus charged with the guidance of a wide variety of enterprises within its geographical area.

In connection with the reorganization, the composition of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers underwent considerable change. Only six All-Union ministries (Construction of Electric Power Stations, Foreign Trade, Medium Machine Building, Railways, Sea Fleet, and Transport Construction) and ten union-republic ministries were retained. This was a drastic reduction from large numbers of ministries prior to the reorganization. But the new Council included 15 chairmen of the Republic Councils of Ministers as well as 11 high officials of Gosplan, raised to ministerial rank. In addition, the heads of over 20 state committees and commissars were also members. Thus the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers had over 60 members.

Under the new system the importance of the U.S.S.R. State Planning Commission, or Gosplan, was augmented considerably. Khrushchev summed up the role of Gosplan in his speech of May 7, 1957.

The U.S.S.R. State Planning Commission (Gosplan U.S.S.R.) must become the scientific economic planning agency of the country. It is called to submit the requirements of the national economy to profound and comprehensive study, to take into consideration the achievements of science and technology and, on this basis, to draw up proposals for the development of all branches of the national economy, taking the potentialities for the integrated development of the economy most carefully into account, and to rationally utilize resources in the general interests of the state. Under the new conditions, the national economic plans will be drafted on the basis of the union republics and the economic administrative regions. The U.S.S.R. State Planning Commission must insure the correct and proportionate development of the branches of the country's economy and check from these positions the plans of the different union republics and regions.

(...). The plans were formerly routed from Gosplan to ministry to glavk to enterprise, but under the new system they went from Gosplan to Republic Councils of Ministers to their Gosplans to sovnarkhozy to enterprise. This was mandatory if the local desires of the sovnarkhozy and Republic Councils of Ministers were not to take precedence over the goals of the national plan. (...).

The Councils of Ministers in the multi-sovnarkhoz republics found themselves overburdened with detail in trying to settle disputes among their sovnarkhozy. For example, the R.S.F.S.R. had 67 sovnarkhozy to cope with. In July 1960 all-Republic sovnarkhozy were set up in the R.S.F.S.R., the Ukraine, and Kazakhstan to deal with sovnarkhoz problems within their jurisdiction.

In May 1961 the Soviet leadership came up with a plan to establish 17 large economic regions (10 in the R.S.F.S.R., 3 in the Ukraine, one in Kazakhstan, one for the 3 Baltic Republics, one for the Transcaucasian Republics, and one for the 4 Central Asian Republics). These large economic regions were an attempt to coordinate the production of the various sovnarkhozy more in the way of what the central planners wanted. Nothing, however, seemed to lick the problem of "localism". New protective "family circles" composed of the top officials of the sovnarkhoz, the enterprises, and sometimes the Republic Gosplan were constantly emerging, and drastic penalties did not seem to stop the tendency. These officials put their local welfare first and the national plan second whenever they thought they could get away with it. Sometimes the sovnarkhoz tried to make itself self-sufficient so as not to be dependent on the vagaries of outside sources of supply, even though the local inputs cost more. In other words, they were guilty of the same sin that the former ministries had been accused of, but this time it was on a local level.

(Background Information on the Soviet Union, Air University, Maxwell Airbase Alabama, United States Department of the Air Force, Documentary Research Division of the Aerospace Studies Institute, 1970, Kenneth R. Whiting, pp. 58-60) (IMG)

Years later, the CIA reported on how some of Khrushchev gang's sabotage 'reforms' were repealed and stated:

The restoration of the economic ministries and the centralization of responsibility for some key functions in newly created state committees had a positive impact, eliminating the near-chaotic situation created by Khrushchev's organizational innovations. The implementation of other aspects of the reforms ... has been characterized by considerable recentralization of decision-making authority, removal of elements of spontaneity, and increasing complexity in decision-making rules and related incentives. (ORGANIZATION

AND MANAGEMENT IN THE SOVIET ECONOMY: THE CEASELESS SEARCH FOR PANACEAS, CIA, National Foreign Assessment Center, December 1977, p. 17) (IMG)

The year 1965 also saw another major sabotage policy partially enforced through a decentralization "reform." In fact, during this period, the spectre of Titoism-Beriyatism continued to haunt the Soviet economy. As Sergo Beria put it:

In 1965 Kosygin took up some of my father's ideas on the economy but applied them only partially. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 277) (IMG)

The prominent scholar Albert Szymanski, perhaps out of naivete rather than opportunist intent, defended the policies implemented by the Belgrade and Moscow Titoists, and wrote books in their defense. Szymanski, who stated that central planning was as dominant in Eurasia as it had ever been, nonetheless admitted:

The 1965 Kosygin Reforms reduced the number of planned targets assigned to enterprises from between 20 and 30 to eight. These were: (1) the total quantity of goods to be produced and sold, (2) the main assortment of these goods, (3) the size of the wage fund, (4) the amount and rate of profit, (5) the payment to and allocation from the state budget, (6) the volume of investment and exploitation of fixed assets, (7) the main assignment for improving technology, and (8) the allocation of material and technical supplies. In addition it should be remembered that all wage rates and prices, as well as interest rates and the main distribution of credit, remained centrally determined. The number one indicator of success by which managers were judged (and so their bonuses decided and their future careers determined) was 'realized output' i.e. the actual material quantity of goods sold. (Is the Red Flag Flying: The Political Economy of the Soviet Union Today, Albert Szymanski, June 1979, p. 40) (IMG)

The greater the number of indicators, the more the pressure on the enterprises to improve the different aspects of the production process, with regards to quantity, and more importantly, with regards to quality. That is, the large number of indicators would specify the qualitative details of the production. The dramatic reduction of the number of indicators was – contrary to Szymanski's beliefs – a severe decentralization program that dramatically reduced the quality of products. Hence, the decentralization amounted to yet another major economic sabotage by the Moscow Titoists. The media of the CPSU in 1971 reported that the 1965 reforms brought even greater autonomy for enterprises:

The [23rd] Congress adopted the Directives for the Five-Year Plan for 1966-70. It drew attention to the need to strengthen economic methods and stimuli in management of the economy, to improve planning and increase the economic initiative and independence of industrial enterprises and collective and state farms. (THE 24TH CONGRESS OF THE CPSU: What the Congress Discussed and Decided, March 30, 1971 to April 9, 1971, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, p. 78) (IMG{ Communist Resurgence })

Nonetheless, by the late 1960s, the communist anti-Titoist faction saw a rise in influence, and was able to partially undo some of the sabotage carried out by the Moscow Titoists:

Another reform occurred in 1973 which coincided with the re-centralization of authority over enterprises and which was probably its corollary. Facing the continuing problem of the geometrically growing complexity of central planning and the problems of decentralizing authority, individual enterprises are being consolidated into multi-enterprise associations. Each association either links enterprises which perform similar functions or links those that are closely integrated economically with each other (typically they are in close physical proximity). Thus considerable decision making power is now vested in this middle level between the enterprise and the ministry. Centrally planned targets are now given only to the association which in turn allocates its responsibilities to its various constituent units, thereby considerably simplifying the job of the centre without losing any fundamental control. The average number of enterprises per association is three to five with usually around 4,000 employees per association. (Is the Red Flag Flying: The Political Economy of the Soviet Union Today, Albert Szymanski, June 1979, p. 40) (IMG)

The correct policy would have of course been to restore the powers of the ministries, instead of creating these Associations of Production, the combined of enterprises mentioned above. However, the formation of such combines was nonetheless a partial though vastly insufficient undoing of the decentralization project.

C21S6. Bulgaria's Revisionist Economic Reform *** IMG-All-{Bulgaria}

With the blessing of the Kremlin Titoists, Bulgaria's Titoists headed by Zhivkov decentralized the state industries in a sneaky manner. In all economies, there are ministries and state enterprises. Scientific socialism advocates the gradual but steady centralization of the economy such that the rate of centralization correlates with the process of the development of the productive forces. Therefore, if scientific socialist policies were to be carried out in Bulgaria, the economy would have been concentrated in the economic ministries over time. The Titoists in Sofia on the other hand, skillfully decentralized the economy through the establishment of the 'state industrial associations', a series of economic organizational and planning bodies that lied in between the state enterprises and the economic ministries. The powers of the economic ministries were decentralized onto the state industrial associations, and the level of authority that economic ministries had over the state enterprises was handed over to these mid-level state industrial associations. As such, it appeared as though the economy was centralized away from state enterprises and onto the state industrial organizations, whereas in reality, the economy was decentralized from the economic ministries at the top onto the mid-level, the state industrial organizations. By the way, the same kind of a strategy had been pursued by the Slansky faction in Czechoslovakia in order to sabotage the economy, as shown in C15S8. A 1974 book published by the media of the 'Bulgarian Communist Party' Central Committee explained in depth the history of 'socialist' Bulgaria's political economy. The book admitted:

The state industrial associations, which in 1954 were renamed industrial departments and general directorates, generally until 1959, when the management of the national economy was organized on a territorial basis, represented superior organizations over enterprises with relatively broad autonomy in their operational management. They had the rights of legal entities, had certain features of separate business units, as they had the right to dispose of machinery, equipment, vehicles and valuables made available to the enterprises involved in them. However, their balance sheet and profit were formed as the sum of the balance sheets and profits of enterprises. The associations were not materially responsible for the results of the economic activity of their subordinate enterprises. However, with the planning system, with the right to shift fixed and working capital and direct bank credit, they were a unit in the management of enterprises, which even then showed its advantages and helped the development of industry, especially in some industries with more enterprises. Associations such as Vinprom, Tobacco Monopoly, Canning Industry and others managed to cover, direct and centralize the activity of purchasing, processing and marketing the products. With this, specific independent economic functions developed in them. In principle,

however, their main task was to manage, plan and control the activities of enterprises. In all cases, the main responsibility and the main economic functions were concentrated in the enterprises. (THE ECONOMIC POLICY OF THE BULGARIAN COMMUNIST PARTY, Partizdat (Publishing House, Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party), Sofia, 1974, pp. 196-197) (IMG)

Then, in 1959, the economy was further decentralized to a level below the state industrial organizations and still above the state enterprises. The growth of inefficient, corrupt, bureaucracies was encouraged through the decentralization:

In 1959 the form of economic management of enterprises was reorganized on an administrative-territorial basis. The associations were closed and the enterprises were subordinated to the "Industry" department of the district people's councils.

For about three years, the companies were territorially subordinated, but did not change their economic and legal nature. Until 1964, when the experimentation of a new system of management of the national economy began, they worked under the economic and legal conditions set by the Law on State-Owned Enterprises. According to these conditions, they had a certain property independence, had fixed and working capital and as a final result made a profit or had a loss. They had a separate account with the Bulgarian National Bank and were accountable to the state for the results of their business activities. The fixed assets and their working capital were expanded on the basis of a plan, using own and borrowed funds or funds from the state budget. The budget received taxes from enterprises, the most important of which was the turnover tax. The state could seize surpluses from the working capital of enterprises, cover their losses, provide subsidies and finance their capital investments free of charge. Due to the great need to centralize the accumulations for solving the main tasks of socialist construction, a significant part of the realized profit was accumulated in the state budget.

A characteristic feature of the functioning of business organizations during this period was the immediate planning of their activities on all indicators. The plan of the enterprises was built on their proposals, but after its compilation by the state authorities it took on a directive character. The system of material interest and stimulation of the collectives and the managements of the enterprises was built mainly on the basis of the implementation of the plans by volume and by some of the qualitative and value indicators. The savings from the salary fund, the reduction of the prime cost, the realization of the profit were sources or conditions for the formation of incentive funds, which served for the bonus of the leading engineering and technical personnel.

The economic relations between the enterprises were direct and each of them bore economic responsibility for the performance of the contracts. The companies were also a party in the negotiations with the bank for obtaining working capital loans. The capital investments they received were mostly gratuitous, depending on the planned needs. Their development depended mainly on the considerations provided for in the national economic plan.

(THE ECONOMIC POLICY OF THE BULGARIAN COMMUNIST PARTY, Partizdat (Publishing House, Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party), Sofia, 1974, pp. 197-198) (IMG)

Naturally, the decentralization of economic decision-making to local districts turned each district into its own independent economic 'kingdom', and these local kingdoms naturally had a tendency not to coordinate. The result was a highly uncoordinated, chaotic, inefficient bureaucratic economy. Furthermore, it is always more difficult for anti-corruption 'watchdog' or supervisory bodies to track corrupt activities among numerous local bureaus than it is for them to track in a few concentrated bureaus. The bureaucratic chaos and the weakened anti-corruption drive, boosted the corrupt bureaucratic class, upon which the Bulgarian Titoists relied, in that country. The US Department of the Army and the Federal Research Division of the US Library of Congress have always advocated economic decentralization. Yet so pervasive was the bureaucratic corruption resultant from decentralization that even the US Department of the Army and the Federal Research Division of the US Library of Congress could not hide the fact that in this system,:

major enterprise directors used newly decentralized financial resources to line their own pockets. (Bulgaria: A Country Study, Federal Research Division of the US Library of Congress, sponsored by the US Department of the Army, June 1992) (IMG)

C21S7. 'Peaceful Coexistence'

Lenin and Stalin denounced the Trotskyite thesis of worldwide military adventurism, in favor of the thesis of 'peaceful coexistence' between socialist and non-socialist states. At the same time, Lenin and Stalin argued for the intensification of class struggles within each country. They regarded participation in parliaments as a tool with which to pursue the agenda of an armed revolution. The MI6 agent Khrushchev, on the other hand, deliberately misinterpreted the line on 'peaceful coexistence' as meaning that class struggles should cease altogether, that any kind of revolutionary confrontation against imperialists and fascists must end, that armed struggle should completely cease, and that almost-exclusively parliamentary means for reaching 'socialism' should be adopted. The CIA's daily bulletin reported:

Khrushchev, prior to his visit to the United States, told Indian Communist party secretary Ajoy Ghosh that Communist parties in India and other non-bloc countries should avoid uprisings and other "warlike situations" since their overall effect would be harmful to the growth of Communism.... While Ghosh presumably presented the Soviet leader's remarks in a manner designed to give the greatest possible support to his own moderate position within the Indian party, Khrushchev's instructions are consistent with Moscow's current emphasis on relaxation of international tensions.

Khrushchev was reported by Ghosh as having justified his views on the grounds that if war can be avoided for three or four years, the military strength of the bloc will surpass that of the West, especially the United States. He also explained that while the USSR would try to give aid in the event of uprisings by "progressive forces" in non-bloc countries, violent actions would lead reactionary elements to unite in suppressing them.

The Soviet leader's counsel to Ghosh follows closely the advice given Indian Communists by letter from the Soviet party in late July just before the fall of the Kerala Communist regime. Moscow then suggested continuing to rely on "parliamentary means" to come to power. The Chinese Communists, while agreeing with this general policy line, suggested to Ghosh during his visit to Peiping in early September that the Indian party should adopt a "tougher" line in opposing Nehru and Congress party policies or it would risk losing the Indian Communist party's right wing to "reactionary forces." Ghosh, who returned to Peiping for national day celebrations on 1 October because of fears the Chinese might throw their support to the left wing of his party and thus jeopardize his position as party secretary, planned to leave Peiping for another visit to Moscow on 10 October.

(‘Khrushchev Advises on Communist Tactics’, CIA, October 10, 1959. In: ‘CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN[15787706]’, CIA, October 10, 1959, p. 1) (IMG)

Nikita Khrushchev's Titoist revisionist distortion of the Lenin-Stalin principle of 'peaceful coexistence' was manifested in every country.

C21S8. Dictatorial Khrushchev Fosters Cult of Personality Around Himself

Contrary to the Anglo-American imperialist propaganda which depicts Khrushchev as democratic and committed to collective leadership, the opposite is true. Khrushchev was dictatorial, and forced Party members to adopt his policy line. Myron Rush, an employee of the CIA and the RAND Corporation, reported:

Perhaps the most striking evidence of Khrushchev's capacity to change the composition of the leading bodies is the nature of the Central Committee elected at the 22nd Party Congress (1961). The majority of voting members (around 60 percent) were newly promoted; moreover, about half the candidate members from the previous Central Committee failed to win re-election. Khrushchev dominated the proceedings at Central Committee plenums, frequently bullying the speakers — even Politburo members. He was a great innovator, and while some of his schemes were successfully resisted, it is remarkable how many of his innovations actually were enacted (including some highly disruptive ones) and how much his successors found necessary to repeal. (Brezhnev and the Succession Issue, Myron Rush. In: Problems of Communism, Vol. 20, July – August 1970, p. 11) (IMG)

A SAVAK spy with extensive contacts to the international communist movement and the Warsaw Pact countries reported that in fact, Nikita Khrushchev:

created a new form of cult of personality in the Soviet Union. In fact, his aim was to take over Stalin's spot through demagogical measures and through compromise with the Western world. (The Interrogation session of Mr. Parviz Nikkhah [Jalaseh Bazjuyi az Aqaye Mohandes Parviz Nikkhah], SAVAK, Parviz Nikkhah, June 1965. Source: 'Parviz Nikkhah According to SAVAK Documents' [Parviz Nikkhah be Revayat e Asnad e SAVAK] book, page 187. In: The Center of Historical Documents Survey) (IMG)

The SAVAK spy continued:

He [i.e. Khrushchev] made serious errors in his relations with other socialist countries, ... in a vulgar way.

He basically forgot the relations of equality between the socialist countries and created the role of the father of the world of socialism for himself.

(The Interrogation session of Mr. Parviz Nikkhah [Jalaseh Bazjuyi az Aqaye Mohandes Parviz Nikkhah], SAVAK, Parviz Nikkhah, June 1965. Source: 'Parviz Nikkhah According to SAVAK Documents' [Parviz Nikkhah be Revayat e Asnad e SAVAK] book, page 187. In: The Center of Historical Documents Survey) (IMG)

Khrushchev also:

moved away from communism and pursued a policy line of megalomania and careerism. (The Interrogation session of Mr. Parviz Nikkhah [Jalaseh Bazjuyi az Aqaye Mohandes Parviz Nikkhah], SAVAK, Parviz Nikkhah, June 1965. Source: 'Parviz Nikkhah According to SAVAK Documents' [Parviz Nikkhah be Revayat e Asnad e SAVAK] book, page 187. In: The Center of Historical Documents Survey) (IMG)

C21S9. Confessing the End of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat / The Terror Attack in Novocherkassk *** IMG-All-{Khrushchev – Political}

Almost 5 years after the 1956 capitalist restoration and overthrow of the socialist Soviet state, Titoist leaders officially admitted that the country they ruled was no longer socialist. In 1961, the Party, partly owing to the fact that white-collar and bourgeois intellectual elements formed its majority, and partly under the dictatorial coercion of Khrushchev, officially denounced what it had already unofficially denounced years ago: dictatorship of the proletariat. Indeed, the new rules of the Party stated that the 'Communist Party' which used to be the Party of the proletariat, had become the 'party of the Soviet people as a whole' and that socialism had 'triumphed completely':

Socialism has triumphed completely and finally. The Communist Party, the party of the working class, has today become the party of the Soviet people as a whole. (Rules of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Adopted by the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, October 31, 1961, p. 5)

Not until the communist stage is reached can it be said that 'socialism has triumphed completely and finally'. And in this specific context, to argue that the party was the party of the 'Soviet people as a whole' would mean to also include the corrupt bureaucratic class hostile to the proletariat as a part of the 'Soviet people'. Anyways, thanks for almost admitting that the territory of the former Soviet Union was no longer ruled by the proletariat. Another course of action which the Khrushchev group undertook was to launch a suppressive terrorist attack on the workers in order to prevent the resurgence of the communist faction in the CPSU. By the early 1960s, popular pressure against the Khrushchev-Mikoyan group had begun to mount. Large-scale anti-Titoist manifestations of the working class in Novocherkassk occurred. In the streets, the proletarians demonstrated support for the legacies of the USSR, Lenin and Stalin, and against the corrupt Titoist elites. They also protested against the falling wages, and higher prices. The response of the ruling Titoist elites, the Khrushchev-Mikoyan group, was to shoot those workers. The case of the Novocherkassk massacre has been widely documented in the Anglo-American imperialist media. However, it has also been corroborated. In a 2018 statement, the Russian Communist Workers' Party, which is a new Party that emerged after 1991, confirmed:

Abandoning dictatorship of proletariat and the goal of socialism changed the class essence of the state. The state became incapable of acting in the interests of workers class, these interests being the interests of society during proletarian dictatorship. It's indicative to point out that the revisionist program of the nationwide party was adopted by the XXII Congress of CPSU in the autumn of 1961, whereas in June 1962 in the city Novocherkassk of Rostov Region there were applied troops against workers that expressed their protest against rising prices, falling wages and boorishness of the officials. The protesters were shot at. Thus we can say that dozens of victims among workers served as the first evidence of the so called nationwide state and the party led by N.S. Khrushchev in the making. (REPORT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE RUSSIAN COMMUNIST WORKERS' PARTY (RCWP-CPSU), 100 years since the Great October Socialist Revolution and the lessons for contemporary communists, April 18, 2018) (IMG)

C22S1. The Partial Resurgence of the Communists via Brezhnev Group *** IMG-All-{Communist Resurgence}

In post-1956 Eurasia, the only realistic way to restore socialism was for communists and their progressive allies to expand their influence over the Eurasian intelligence and military, so that proletariat would expand their influence over the means of violence, while minimizing the anti-communist Titoist faction's influence over the means of violence. Then, after controlling the means of violence, the communists could use legal mechanisms to purge off many of the corrupt bureaucrats and counter-revolutionary intellectuals that existed in the CPSU, and to lobby for greater percentage representation of blue-collar elements in the CPSU. Through the purges of the white-collar elements and the increased quantity of blue-collar elements, the leap from quantity to quality could occur, and socialism would be restored. The control of the communist agents of the proletariat over the means of violence could bring about purges that would change the character of the state; and the use of the means of violence would give these changes a revolutionary character, even though the change would be gradual and hence would superficially appear as 'reformistic'. This is why the communist comrades of Stalin in the Red Army – Shtemenko, Vasilevsky, and Konev – did not give up their positions in the military – the means of violence – after 1956, and continued to work within the Eurasian state apparatus.

The left-opportunist reactionary tools of imperialist-fascist secret services – e.g. Mao's gang and their Maoist followers – condemned those communists who did not give up their positions as 'collaborators', 'reformists', and 'revisionists'. Later on, they also added 'social-fascist' and 'social-imperialist' to the list of their swear words against these communists. Why did the Maoists do this? There were many reasons, but a key reason was to increase pressure on the communist forces who resisted the Titoist Khrushchev faction to give up their resistance, and thereby leave the stage to be dominated by the Titoist Khrushchev faction and their Anglo-American imperialist backers. The Maoist left-deviation sought to strengthen the Khrushchev right-deviation through such left-opportunist rhetoric, such revisionist rhetoric disguised as 'anti-revisionist'. Under the cover of 'fighting reformism', the Maoists wanted the communists to give up their influence over the means of violence, so that the only kind of resistance against the Khrushchevians would be the unarmed reformist 'resistance'. Under the cover of 'refusing' to collaborate with the Khrushchevians, the Maoists advocated what amounted to greater strength for the Khrushchevians. The hostile attitude towards communist influence over the Red Army is why Mao's gang launched the social-chauvinist invasion against Eurasia in the late 1960s, murdering Red Army units – during the late 1960s, communist comrades of Stalin, such as general Shtemenko, were elevated and gained more prominent positions in the military.

In Eurasia, the comprador bourgeois elements dominated the state, and hence Eurasia was a dictatorship of the comprador bourgeoisie. However, the dominance of the comprador elements was not as pervasive as it was, for example, in Yugoslavia. Hence, whereas in Eurasia, the communists could operate both covertly and overtly against the reactionary forces, in Yugoslavia, the way forward was for communists to operate covertly against the regime, try to infiltrate its ranks, and destabilize the state from within. In Eurasia, a 'communist' armed rebellion against the state would have bogged down the Red Army – the stronghold of the communist faction – for suppressing the rebellion, hence weakening the communist forces. In Yugoslavia on the other hand, the Yugoslav army was a stronghold of Titoist fascist butchers, and hence an armed communist rebellion against it would have weakened the Titoist faction and was thereby to be hailed as progressive. In judging whether an armed rebellion against a comprador bourgeois state is to be launched, one must ask: whom will the armed rebellion target – revolutionaries or reactionaries? If revolutionary infiltrators in the counter-revolutionary state would be the target of the armed rebellion from below, then the communists should not launch such a rebellion. If, however, the counter-revolutionaries in the counter-revolutionary state would be the inevitable target of the armed revolt from below, the armed rebellion from below should by all means be launched, in a manner that accounts for the strategic and tactical conditions.

Nikita Khrushchev was indeed able to undermine the socialist forces. However, the conditions of the world were not very favorable to the Khrushchev faction by the 1960s. Firstly, by 1962, the Kennedy Administration successfully curbed CIA influence worldwide, thereby giving the Khrushchev group less lobbying power in the struggle against the communist faction. The team of Kennedy had a direct role in staging counter-coups against imperialist-backed fascist regimes (one of which, by the way, was the Abdel-Karim Al-Qasim regime, supported by Khrushchev and the Anglo-American imperialists). The curbing of CIA influence allowed for the collapse of many imperialist-backed regimes in 1962-1964 all around the world. Inevitably, this global decline of the CIA influence during the Kennedy years favoured the communist faction in Moscow, resulting in the ouster of Nikita Khrushchev and his replacement by Leonid Brezhnev.

It is no secret that Brezhnev was a Titoist, and a pupil and agent of Nikita Khrushchev. This was mentioned in C19S7.2. Through the leadership of Brezhnev, the Titoist comprador bourgeoisie continued to exercise influence in Eurasian affairs. Nonetheless, the fact that the Khrushchev group planted its agent Brezhnev in charge of key aspects of the military also made Brezhnev more accessible to the communist anti-Titoist elements to be found in the military. In time, with the weakening of the Khrushchev faction in the early 1960s, the surrounding of Brezhnev by the communist anti-Titoist elements was tantamount to communist anti-Titoist encircling and hence coopting of Brezhnev. Coopted by the communists, Brezhnev organized the ouster of Khrushchev in 1964. During the period 1964-1968, the policy line of the Titoists headed by Khrushchev largely continued, but clearly began to decline. Note that during those years, the Titoists in Eurasia still had enough power to ensure the military funding of the regime of the Shah and in supporting the Salah Jadid group's Trotskyite coup against the Ba'athists in Syria in 1965 (see C21S2.1). At the same time, the communists were increasing their influence over the Red Army, and the Red Army was deploying its forces in the border with China in order to confront China's terror regime (see C23S5.4). By 1968, the communist faction in Eurasia had greater influence, the results of which were the elevation of Stalin's comrades, Red Army commanders Shtemenko and Vasilevsky in the hierarchy of the Warsaw Pact and Red Army forces. With the rise of Brezhnev therefore, anti-Titoist elements gained greater influence over the government. The Central Intelligence Agency rightly made note of:

The persistently expanding political role of the Soviet military leaders. (STALIN FULLY REHABILITATED AS WARTIME LEADER: SOVIET MILITARY NOW APPEAR TO BE REACHING FOR MORE POWER, March 1969, p. 4) (IMG)

It was not the case that the expansion of the influence of the military leaders was resulting in a military dictatorship instead of the rule of the Party. Rather the 'STALIN FULLY REHABILITATED AS WARTIME LEADER: SOVIET MILITARY NOW APPEAR TO BE REACHING FOR MORE POWER' CIA document's reference to the increase in the role of the military leaders was a reference to a specific faction, the communist faction, of the Red Army. As an indication of the trends in the ideological development, the CIA document added:

the military [were] prominent in [the] rehabilitation of Stalin as a wartime leader.... (STALIN FULLY REHABILITATED AS WARTIME LEADER: SOVIET MILITARY NOW APPEAR TO BE REACHING FOR MORE POWER, March 1969, p. 4) (IMG)

Karen Dawisha of the CIA's Brookings Institute wrote:

The question of Stalin's place in Soviet history had been fiercely argued since his death, with his contribution clearly receiving more favorable appraisal after Khrushchev was ousted. In June 1968 a book was published entitled *The General Staff During the War*, by General Sergei Shtemenko, who praised Stalin's wartime leadership. In a review of the book, *Krasnaya zvezda* commented that the

General Staff had not been so unprepared for the Nazi invasion as some historians believed. The attack had not thrown the General Staff into disarray, thanks primarily to Stalin, who had remained in the Kremlin throughout, refusing to evacuate the Staff headquarters to underground shelters in Kirovskaya Metro. Shtemenko, who had been demoted by Khrushchev for his loyalty to Stalin, was soon to regain some of his former prominence. He was to become the chief of staff of the Warsaw Pact only three weeks before the invasion of Czechoslovakia. (The Kremlin and the Prague Spring, Karen Dawisha, 1984, p. 205) (IMG{Czechoslovakia})

Correlated with the rise of the communist faction in the Red Army was the Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, the weakening of the Tito faction in Yugoslavia in 1968 and of the Gomulka faction in Poland in 1969-1970. In the Middle East, increased Eurasian military and intelligence presence was useful in strengthening Egyptian commandos in the War of Attrition against the Israeli occupation of the Sinai in 1969, a factor which elevated the Mapam faction led by the communist intelligence agent Yigal Allon in Israel. Correlated with these was the destabilization of the reactionary foes of Egypt – such as the royalist Libyan regime, the Jadidist Syrian regime, and the Abdel-Rahman Aref regime (not to be confused with Abdel-Salam Aref) – which led to the 1969 Free Officer coup in Libya, the Hafez Al-Assad faction's ascendancy to dominance in 1969-1970, and the 1968 Ahmad Hasan Al-Bakr faction's Ba'athist coup in Iraq. In Somalia, Siad Barre's terror gang was forced to capitulate to the communist faction of the Red Army; in South Yemen, the Abdel-Fattah Al-Isma'il faction was pushing ahead against the Maoist elements; in Saudi Arabia, the Faysal faction, the progressive bourgeois-democratic faction with a long history of strategic partnership with the Stalin-era USSR, saw a major boost in its influence. Even in Egypt, after the Sadatist takeover in 1970-1971, the Sadat gang was, for the while, so weak that the Nasserist forces in Egypt forced the Sadat gang to cooperate with Syria and Libya. There was a boost in Eurasian aid to Cuba. In France, after a brief setback in 1968-1969, the Gaullists, the agents of the French imperialist rivals of Anglo-American-German imperialism, saw a further boost in their influence at home. Many positive developments were occurring worldwide, thanks to the partial resurgence of the communist faction in the Red Army and the CPSU. So shaken were the dark forces of fascist reaction, thanks to only a partial – only a partial! – communist resurgence in the territory of the former Soviet Union.

In the sphere of the economy, many of the liberalization reforms which were sabotaging the economy were slowed down. As a result of the increased influence of the anti-Titoist elements, there was a:

Slow-down in economic reform (major elements of the program are not being implemented... (STALIN FULLY REHABILITATED AS WARTIME LEADER: SOVIET MILITARY NOW APPEAR TO BE REACHING FOR MORE POWER, March 1969, p. 4) (IMG)

The Maoist and Hoxhaist currents mislead progressive-minded individuals by claiming that the Brezhnev era was as bad as the Khrushchev era. It is worth reminding these left-deviationists that the policy of promoting Brezhnev against Khrushchev was the policy of Stalin. As mentioned in C19S7.2, Stalin's plan was to first coopt the Malenkov-Bulganin group and support this coopted group against the Beriaites and the Beriaites against the Malenkov-Bulganin group. The next step was to coopt the Khrushchev team and support it against the Beriaites and the Malenkov-Bulganin group. The third step was to coopt Brezhnev and then promote him against Khrushchev. The latter steps were basically 'Salami Tactics', Soviet-style. That Khrushchev, Malenkov and Beria were covertly allies, and that Brezhnev was an agent of Khrushchev, was a definitive fact. However, on the overt level, they pretended to have opposed each other, and they could be coopted and used against each other. That is why Stalin brought Brezhnev to the high ranks:

In August 1951, after Ignat'ev's appointment, several new men, all associated with Khrushchev, suddenly appeared in the MGB: A. A. Epishev, a party secretary in Ukraine, and I. T. Savchenko, also from the Ukrainian party apparatus, became deputy ministers of State Security; V. E. Makarev, a former Moscow party official during Khrushchev's tenure there in the 1930s, became chief of the MGB Personnel Department. In addition, a lesser official named N. R. Mironov, who had served in the Ukrainian party apparatus under Khrushchev's protégé Leonid Brezhnev was brought to Moscow to work for the MGB. (Beria: Stalin's First Lieutenant, Amy Knight, p. 158) (IMG)

The next stage was to unfold a few months later, with ... Khrushchev suffering the same fate. No great problem there. Stalin would have left no witness in place. He would have got rid of the old Politburo and promoted new people, idiots like Brezhnev. After winning the Third World War he was determined to correct all the 'mistaken' interpretations of historical events which had been current in the West. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergo Beria, p. 243) (IMG)

After Stalin's death, in the 1950s, General Konev had a role in coopting Malenkov and using him against Beria, then coopting and partnering with Khrushchev and using Khrushchev against Malenkov. General Shtemenko and General Vasilevsky were responsible for coopting and supporting Brezhnev against Khrushchev in the 1960s. Stalin, Konev, Shtemenko, and Vasilevsky were all communist friends, hostile to the Titoist faction, and were all named as the targets of the Doctors' Plot. Therefore, the narrative promoted by Maoist and Hoxhaist currents is quite misleading; it is true that Brezhnev himself was a Titoist reactionary 'at heart' but he was coopted by the communist forces and pursued many correct policies on different fronts.

During the Brezhnev era, the communists in the Red Army also increased confrontation against the Titoist Regimes, in particular:

the Rumanian and Yugoslav practice[s].... (STALIN FULLY REHABILITATED AS WARTIME LEADER: SOVIET MILITARY NOW APPEAR TO BE REACHING FOR MORE POWER, March 1969, p. 4) (IMG)

A tougher line on the Yugoslav regime was shown. One notable statement was

written by General Konstantin S. Bochkarev, a military theoretician, in the 14 February issue of the Ministry of Defense Daily Red Star (Krasnaya Zvezda). (STALIN FULLY REHABILITATED AS WARTIME LEADER: SOVIET MILITARY NOW APPEAR TO BE REACHING FOR MORE POWER, March 1969, p. 4) (IMG)

Remarkably:

the article Bochkarev was directing criticism, and possibly even implied threats, to the Rumanians and Yugoslavs. (STALIN FULLY REHABILITATED AS WARTIME LEADER: SOVIET MILITARY NOW APPEAR TO BE REACHING FOR MORE POWER, March 1969, p. 4) (IMG)

The Brezhnevian phenomenon was very well-reflected in the membership composition of the Party. Whereas the Khrushchevian era marked the rule of the white-collar elements as the dominant majority in the Party, the Brezhnevian era marked the rule of the white-collar elements as the dominant minority in the Party. This meant that like the Khrushchev era, Titoist policies were to continue, but also that unlike the Khrushchev era, the anti-

Titoist elements and the remnants of the communist faction could much greater exercise greater influence over the Party. The dictatorship of the comprador bourgeoisie in Eurasia was not overthrown, but it was weakened, no doubt.

The US State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research reported that the white collar / intelligentsia / bureaucrat stratum dominated the revisionist CPSU, but they dominated it no longer as a majority but as the largest minority; they now composed a significant amount less than 50% of the Party membership composition:

Over the years, the CPSU has become largely a white-collar organization of careerists although it attempts to retain contact with the "masses" through recruitment from the workers and, to a lesser degree, the peasants. Still, the tendency of the better educated and professionals to seek membership for opportunistic reasons reinforces trends that tend to turn the party into a conventional ruling caste. At the beginning of 1968, 94,000 doctors and candidates of arts and sciences were party members; this is more than half of the total number of scholars with advanced degrees in the USSR. Similarly, about 33% of the country's engineers, of the agronomists and livestock experts, 25% of the teachers, and of the medical doctors were party members in early 1968. Males predominate at a 4:1 ratio, although the percentage of women has risen from to in the last 40 years. The CPSU is overwhelmingly urban in composition; workers comprised 38% of total membership in 1967, white-collar employees and others comprised almost 46%; and only 16% came from collective farms. This last percentage sank to 11.4% in November 1969. (World Strength of the Communist Party Organizations, Issue 22, US Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, CIA, 1970, p. 72) (IMG)

Approximately 2-3 years later, there was an increase in the percentage of the blue-collar workers and again a decline in the percentage of the white-collar elements:

The period under review has seen further growth of the Party ranks and qualitative improvement in the composition of its membership. At present the CPSU membership is 14,455,321, or nine per cent of the country's adult population. The membership composition is as follows: workers, 40.1 per cent; farmers, 15.1 per cent; and office employees, 44.8 per cent. It should be noted that over two-thirds of these office employees are engineers, agronomists, teachers, doctors, scientists, and workers in the field of literature and art.

Three million people have joined the CPSU since the 23rd Congress. Of these, almost 1.6 million are workers. The speaker noted that the requirements for CPSU membership have been raised. The Party has begun to rid itself more resolutely of those who violate Party and state discipline, or abuse their official powers, or whose behaviour casts a slur on the name of Communist.

All these years the CPSU and its Central Committee have undeviatingly followed the line of further developing inner-Party democracy, observing the Leninist norms of Party life, and stepping up the activity of Communists. The Party has consistently implemented the principle of electivity and accountability of its leading bodies. The spirit of collective effort and collective leadership has taken firm root. Questions relating to Party work are discussed and decided on a thoroughly democratic basis.

(THE 24TH CONGRESS OF THE CPSU: What the Congress Discussed and Decided, March 30, 1971 to April 9, 1971, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, p. 20. MIA) (IMG)

Then, in 1976, there was again an increase in the percent composition of the blue-collar elements in the Party (41.6%), and a slight decline in the white-collar elements, the intelligentsia and other white-collar employees together forming 44%:

Since the 24th Congress, nearly 2.6 million men and women have been admitted into the CPSU. At present the Party has 15,694,000 members. Of them 41.6 per cent are workers, 13.9 per cent collective farmers, nearly 20 per cent intellectuals in the technical fields, and over 24 per cent workers in science, literature, the arts, education, public health, management and the military spheres. (Report of the CPSU Central Committee and the Immediate Tasks of the Party in Home and Foreign Policy, Leonid Brezhnev, February 24, 1976. In: Documents and Resolutions: The XXV Congress of the CPSU, Moscow, 1976, pp. 75-76. MIA) (IMG)

By 1981, the white-collar elements held only a slight margin over the blue-collar elements, according to the Party's report, but they continued to rule as the largest minority:

In the period under review the membership of the CPSU grew by 1,800,000. Today it has 17,480,000 members. Of these, 43.4 per cent are factory workers, 12.8 per cent are collective farmers and 43.8 per cent are members of the technical, scientific and creative intelligentsia, workers in education, medicine and culture, people working in administrative apparatus, and members of the armed forces. (Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the XXVI Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Immediate Tasks of the Party in Home and Foreign Policy, Leonid Brezhnev, February 23, 1981. In: Peace, Plans, and Progress: The 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, A New World Review Collection, edited by Marilyn Bechtel, David Laibman, & Daniel Rosenberg, 1981, p. 83. MIA) (IMG)

Social Composition (in terms of class or stratum) of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in Percentages			
Year	Workers	Cooperativist Peasants	White-Collar (Intelligentsia, 'Technocrats', Bureaucrats)
1946	33.8	18.6	47.6
1952	32.2	18.0	49.8
1956	32.0	17.1	50.9
1961	33.9	17.6	48.5
1966	37.8	16.2	46.0
1971	40.1	15.1	44.8
1976	41.6	13.9	44.5
1981	43.4	12.8	43.8
1983	44.1	12.4	43.5

(Source: 'The CPSU: Stages of History', CPSU, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1985, pp. 96-97. Depending on the specific year, the data above is either corroborated or validated by facts and statistics provided by the CIA.)

In this situation, since the white-collar elements only held a small margin over the blue-collar workers, the blue-collar workers and the cooperative peasants in the Party could together form a majority with which to dominate the minority white-collar elements. Surely, the cooperative peasantry were not as proletarian in class character as the actual proletariat, but surely also, their class interests converged enough with the working class to lead them to side with the blue-collar elements in the Party on most issues. The collectivized peasants, in a socialistic and collective manner, owned big agricultural businesses, thereby giving them the ability to afford taking risks against the reactionary class forces, unlike the petit-bourgeoisie who feel that they cannot afford to risk losing their businesses by standing up against finance capital. Due to this character of the collectivized peasantry, they are more susceptible to cooperation with the proletariat. **In this midst, the leap from quantity and quality had occurred enough to render Eurasia back into a dictatorship of the proletariat, albeit a fragile and weak dictatorship of the proletariat. For that period in time in the late 1970s and early 1980s, 'Eurasia' became the Soviet Union again, a socialist state.** By 1983, according to the CPSU data, the proletarians once again formed the largest percentage. The composition of the CPSU in the early 1980s bore some resemblance to the composition of the Party in the early 1920s. The difference however was that in the 1920s, the balance of power was not so decisively in favor of the Anglo-American imperialists, whereas in the 1980s, the global balance of power was in the favor of the Anglo-American imperialists. The Red Army was bogged down in the war in Afghanistan, meaning that communist and anti-Titoist elements in it had to reallocate more resources away from the fight against the Titoist bureaucrats onto fighting Al-Qaeda. This gave the white-collar elements more space to breathe in the political sense, and thus meant that the struggle for weakening the white-collar elements in the Party peaked by the early 1980s. With the bogging down of the Red Army in Afghanistan and the military setbacks it faced, the socialist faction that dominated the Soviet state apparatus was rolled back again and lost leverage, thereby giving increased strength to the Titoist faction. Hence, by the mid-1980s, the white-collar elements regained control over the state apparatus. The rise of the Gorbachevian tendency was a symptom of this white-collar control over the state, party, military, and intelligence bodies.

C22S2. East Germany Transitions to the Dictatorship of the Proletariat *** IMG-All-{GDR }

SED Party membership had the blue collar workers as the largest percentage. The blue-collar workers together with the kolkhoz peasants constituted the majority in the SED membership. It is worth mentioning that whereas the agrarian petit-bourgeoisie, who have too small of businesses to risk competition with imperialist finance capital, the kolkhoz farmers have big businesses, big businesses that are controlled democratically by the farmers working in them and which are large enough as businesses to be able to risk standing up against imperialism. Hence, the collective farmers gain a pro-socialist anti-imperialist class characteristic, making them allies of the proletariat.

In a document co-authored by Colonel Donald W. Bernier – the former Director of Foreign Intelligence Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence in the US Department of the Army – and William Giloane – a researcher working for the US State Department – it was written:

Statistics coming out of the Seventh Party Congress reported a total of 1,769,912 SED members, with blue-collar workers listed as the largest single component—over 45 percent of the party membership. Salaried workers, consisting largely of members of the bureaucracy in state and party offices, made up the next largest group, with some 16 percent of the total membership. In order to portray the SED as a worker's party, the leadership asserts that the salaried employees and the intelligentsia (see Glossary) are also workers. Compared to the party composition as reported in 1961, there was an 11-percent increase in the number of blue-collar workers by the time of the Seventh Party Congress and a decline in salaried employees from 32 to 16.1 percent. Because the for categorizing the membership are not known, however, the differences may be in the manner of classification rather than in actual in membership (see table 10). (AREA HANDBOOK FOR EAST GERMANY, Eugene K. Keefe, Donald W. Bernier, Lyle E. Brenneman, Wayne A. Culp, William Giloane, James M. Moore, Jr., 1972, p. 144) (IMG)

The table to the right, using information from the document by the Colonel, sheds light on the class struggles within the SED. By the 1970s, East Germany was ending the private sector:

Since December 1971 the government has been engaged in a major effort to nationalize the remaining private and semi-private enterprises, which employ one out of every seven industrial employees.

The industrial sector is 79% nationalized, while handicrafts and small artisan operations have a higher proportion of private and semi-nationalized ownership. Transportation and communications are 93% state-owned, while construction is 52% nationalized. Cooperatives make up about 80% of agricultural management, and state farms account for 16%. No other country in Eastern Europe has achieved collectivization to this extent. (Basic Data on the Economy of East Germany, US Department of Commerce, Office of East-West Trade Development, Bureau of East-West Trade, James Ellis, 1973, p. 5) (IMG)

Ending the private sector was important because the existence of the bourgeoisie even in the economy inevitably gets reflected in the upwards catapulting of the agents of the bourgeoisie into the state, even a workers' state. It is not the case that the continued existence of the bourgeoisie in the economy has no effect on the level of the influence of the proletariat over the proletariat's state. No, crippling the material base of the bourgeoisie in the economy leaves the enemies of the proletariat devoid of the material base through which to retain lobbying power in the workers' state. Hence, the great weakening of the private sector was of great importance for the rise of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Membership by Social Composition, of the Socialist Unity Party of East Germany, 1967

Social Classification	Percent of Total
Industrial workers (blue collar)	45.6
Salaried employees (white collar)	16.1
Intelligentsia	12.3
Pensioners	12.1
Cooperative farmers	6.4
Housewives	4.4
Students and school pupils	1.6
Producer cooperatives	0.8
Others (including businessmen and tradesmen in semi-state-owned semi-private enterprises)	0.7

(AREA HANDBOOK FOR EAST GERMANY, Eugene K. Keefe, Donald W. Bernier, Lyle E. Brenneman, Wayne A. Culp, William Giloane, James M. Moore, Jr., 1972, p. 146) (IMG)

It is worth mentioning a few caveats, however. Firstly, although the blue-collar workers together with the kolkhoz peasants formed the majority in the SED, so was it also true that a significantly large minority of the SED was made up of the remnants of the Kautskyite SPD faction headed by Grotewohl and other such traitors. Secondly, the bourgeois parties in East Germany were not dissolved and continued to exercise some influence over the East German state. Hence, the hold of the proletariat over the state was not as strong, despite the general dominance of the proletariat over the state. Unfortunately, by the late 1970s, the weakening of the socialist forces throughout Eastern Europe was paving the way towards the rollback of the proletariat's faction in the East German state and the increase in the strength of the corrupt bureaucrats in the East German state. This was manifested in the drastic economic decentralization and the elevation of the corrupt bureaucrats. The result was the liquidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the 1980s, a while prior to the official 1989 collapse of the 'German Democratic Republic' as a state.

C22S3. Libyan Jamahiriyah against Yugoslavia / Yugoslav Trouble-Making against Syria *** IMG-All-{Titoists against Libya and Syria}

It is often claimed that Muammar Al-Qadhafi was a real friend of the Mossad agent Tito. Such a narrative is false. Erik Goldstein, the Secretary of the Navy Senior Research Fellow at the US Naval War College, noted the opposition of Qadhafi and Castro against Yugoslavia's fascist leader. As early as 1973, and by:

the time of the Algiers conference, a split in the movement had become apparent. (...). Quaddafi and Castro ... soon found common cause against the United States, and united in opposition to Tito who preferred to remain less pro-Soviet. But Tito continued to remain in the minority as NAM members refused to equate Soviet imperialism with Western imperialism. ("Guide to International Relations and Diplomacy", Michael Graham Fry, Erik Goldstein, Richard Langhorne, 2002, p. 24) (IMG)

By 1975, the Anwar Sadat faction in Egypt had gained decisive control over the Egyptian state, and immensely boosted Egyptian Sadatist subversion against Syria and Libya. The Sadatist Egyptians could count on the support of Yugoslavia, which lobbied against the attempts to expel Egypt from the Non-Aligned Movement. A US State Department document leaked by the Wikileaks confirmed:

ON THE CREDIT SIDE, YUGOSLAV SUPPORT OF OUR EFFORTS WAS OCCASIONALLY HELPFUL. YUGOSLAV BACKING WAS IMPORTANT FOR SADAT WHEN HE CAME UNDER FIRE FROM RADICAL ARABS DURING THE SINAI DISENGAGEMENT NEGOTIATIONS (ALTHOUGH IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER THERE WILL BE ANY YUGOSLAV SUPPORT FOR SADAT'S RECENT ANTI-SOVIET ACTIONS). THE GOY [Government of Yugoslavia] SHOWED CONSIDERABLE COURAGE IN HEADING OFF THE MOVE AT THE LIMA NON-ALIGNED MEETING TO ADOPT A RESOLUTION CALLING FOR ISRAEL'S EXPULSION FROM THE UN, A KEY FACTOR IN PREVENTING THE ISSUE FROM COMING TO THE FLOOR OF THE UNGA. YUGOSLAVIA REACTED CONSTRUCTIVELY TO THE SECRETARY'S ECONOMIC PROPOSAL AT THE GA AND HAS CONTINUED AMONG THE MOST REALISTIC IN ON-GOING WORK ON THE DC-LDC ECONOMIC RELATIONS. FINALLY, BY ABSTAINING FOR THE FIRST TIME ON A PUERTO RICO RESOLUTION, YUGOSLAVIA DEMONSTRATED CLEARLY THAT IT WILL ON OCCASION TAKE OUR INTERESTS INTO CONSIDERATION IF WE FIGHT HARD ENOUGH (AND EARLY ENOUGH) FOR THEM. TWO DEVELOPMENTS IN THE YUGOSLAV-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP WERE USEFUL TO US. THE ARRESTS OF AND PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN IN YUGOSLAVIA AGAINST PRO-S[OV]IET COMINFORMISTS REMINDED THE WORLD OF CONTINUED SOVIET MEDDLING. DESPITE THE SOOTHING NOISES OF THE "PRAVDA" ARTICLE AND MINIC-GROMYKO COMMUNIQUE, THE YUGOSLAVS CONTINUE TO MAKE CLEAR THE NEED TO KEEP DEFENSES UP. IN PREPARATIONS FOR THE EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTY CONFERENCE, AND AS EVIDENCED BY DOLANC AT THE CPSU JAMBOREE, THE YUGOSLAVS HAVE LED A GROWING RESISTANCE TO SOVIET CONTROL OF THE MOVEMENT. (BUT THIS IS A TWO-EDGED SWORD FROM THE U.S. VIEWPOINT, HELPING TO LEGITIMIZE AND STRENGTHEN WESTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES EVEN AS IT ENCOURAGES THEIR INDEPENDENCE FROM MOSCOW.) (1976BELGRA01725_b, YUGOSLAVIA-ANNUAL POLICY ASSESSMENT, US Department of State, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, March 17, 1976, pp. 2-3. Bold added.) (IMG)

Against the Arab states and Cuba, the Yugoslav regime lobbied for the inclusion of Sadatist Egypt in the NAM. As a result of the seizure of the US Embassy in Tehran in 1979, a number of intelligence documents on Titoist-Sadatist collaboration were leaked. One US intelligence document uncovered due to the 1979 student seizure of the US Embassy in Tehran, revealed:

3. EVEN BEFORE THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE, THE PLO, IRAQ AND SYRIA HAD TURNED THEIR ATTENTION TO SUSPENDING EGYPT FROM THE NAM, SPECIFICALLY TO INSCRIBING AN ITEM ON THE AGENDA OF THE NACB MINISTERIAL IN COLOMBO. HOWEVER, THEIR INITIAL EFFORTS HAVE THE NACB CONSIDER EGYPT'S SUSPENSION FROM THE NAM DID NOT WORK. AT MEETINGS OF THE NACB. IN APRIL, FOR EXAMPLE, EGYPT—SUPPORTED BY SRI LANKA, INDIA, AND YUGOSLAVIA-- PREVENTED CIRCULATION OF T[he] LETTER QC ALL NAM MEMBERS ASKING FOR EGYPT'S SUSPENSION.

4. THIS PROCEDURAL SETBACK HAS PROMPTED SOME ARAB AMBASSADORS TO QUESTION THE FEASIBILITY OF SUSPENDING EGYPT FROM THE NAM AND OAU.

5. THE YUGOSLAVS AND INDIANS ARE SENDING MINISTERIAL LEVEL DELEGATIONS TO LOBBY AGAINST EGYPT'S SUSPENSION AMONG ASIAN AND ARAB MEMBERS OF THE NAM. TITO PLANS TO VISIT LIBYA ON MAY 31 TO URGE RESTRAINT ON QADHAFI.

6. IN ADDITION TO ITS OBJECTION ON PRINCIPLE TO EGYPT'S SUSPENSION, YUGOSLAVIA IS CONCERNED THAT THE INTENSITY OF ANTI-EGYPTIAN SENTIMENT AMONG THE OTHER ARAB STATES MAY FORCE BELGRADE TO TAKE SIDES. (...).

8. AS AN INFLUENTIAL MEMBER OF THE NAM AND THE HOST OF THE NEXT SUMMIT, CUBA'S POSITION IS ESPECIALLY [IM]PORTANT. ORDINARILY CUBA WOULD SUPPORT THE SUSPENSION MOVE OUT OF SYMPATHY WITH THE ARAB HARDLINERS AND A DESIRE TO RETALIATE FOR EGYPT'S PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS TO "EXPEL" CUBA....

(SUBJECT: INTSUM 820, To: London for Glaspie, Paris for Nicholas Murphy, Beijing for Ambassador Strauss. Also to: Department of Defense /Intelligence Support Activity. May 29, 1979. Bold added.) (IMG)

No wonder that a declassified CIA document corroborated:

In recent years Yugoslavia has been under assault from Cuba and other nonaligned radicals – as well as Moscow – for its allegedly lax record in supporting anti-Western causes. (Yugoslavia: PLO Ties and Terrorism, CIA, March 3, 1986) (IMG)

The Yugoslav regime's trouble-making against Libya and Syria was far from being limited to the diplomatic sphere. The Yugoslav regime also funded the PLO terrorists that were fighting against the Syrian Arab Army and the Libyan expeditionary forces in Lebanon in the 1970s and the 1980s. Further demonstrating the Yugoslav regime's malice is also the fact that Yugoslavia supported especially the Abu Nidal Organization (ANO), an army of terror that was supported by the fascist Iraqi Mukhaberat, the Rif'at-Khaddam-Khouli faction in Syria, the gang of Mousa Kousa and Abdel-Salam Jalloud in Libya, and the gang of Sadat in Egypt. The enemies of the Al-Assad faction and of the Al-Qadhafi faction were being materially sponsored by the Yugoslav regime. The CIA agreed that the Belgrade fascists provided arms to Abu Nidal's gang:

Our best evidence of Belgrade's involvement with international terrorism comes from Yugoslavia's long-standing cooperation with Abu Nidal's Black June Organization. (The Abu Nidal group, formerly known as Black June, was responsible for terrorist operations worldwide against conservative Arab governments, Israeli interests, and moderate Palestinian leaders). Yugoslavia reportedly agreed to allow Abu Nidal's group to use Yugoslavia for safe haven and transit as long as Black June kept it secret and informed Belgrade in advance. Belgrade refused a request for explosives but offered to provide assault rifles and training to Black June members. In exchange Black June reportedly transferred \$2 million to a Yugoslav bank and promised to induce other Arabs to invest in troubled Yugoslav firms. (Yugoslav Support for International Terrorist Groups, Directorate of Intelligence, CIA, September 17, 1984, p.2) (IMG)

The 'Black June' was the name which the ANO adopted as the name of the Lebanon branch of the ANO. The term 'Black June' was named after June 1976, when the Syrian Arab Army intervened in Lebanon to save that country from being further settler-colonized by the Palestinian terror network that was funded by Sadatist Egypt and Saddamite Iraq.

The ANO was able to move freely in European countries. Most permissive of the European regimes, however, was Yugoslavia. A US intelligence document leaked by the Wikileaks stated:

THE GROUP'S ABILITY TO MOVE AT WILL IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES [makes] THEIR ACTIVITIES HARDER TO TRACE. TO FACILITATE TRAVEL, THE ORGANIZATION HAS A RECORD OF USING MOROCCAN AND OTHER NORTH AFRICAN TRAVEL DOCUMENTS INCLUDING THOSE PRODUCED BY ITS OWN FORGING OPERATION. SOME COUNTRIES SUCH AS YUGOSLAVIA HAVE BEEN MORE PERMISSIVE THAN OTHERS IN ALLOWING ABU NIDAL MEMBERS FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT, APPARENTLY HOPING THAT THIS WILL BUY THEM A MODICUM OF IMMUNITY FROM TERRORIST ACTS. THERE IS GROWING RECOGNITION THAT THIS IS A DUBIOUS ASSUMPTION. (85STATE371963_a, ABU NIDAL TERRORISTS ORGANIZATION, US Secretary of State, December 6, 1985) (IMG)

The Libyans were well aware of Abu Nidal's connections to the Titoist-fascist Yugoslav secret service. According to a US State Department:

The [Yugoslav] government has denied, as has the United States, the assertion of Libyan ruler Qadhafi, carried in a US newspaper, that notorious Palestinian terrorist Abu Nidal was living in Yugoslavia. (Patterns of Global Terrorism, US Department of State, 1988, p. 35) (IMG)

The MI6 operative Patrick Seale, one of the foremost authors on Abu Nidal, confirmed that Yugoslavia was the primary center of Abu Nidal Organization:

Abu Nidal's oldest relationship in Eastern Europe was with Yugoslavia, where Palestinians had been going to study in large numbers since the 1960s. When Abu Nidal broke from Fatah in 1974, he managed to poach some of Fatah's students in Yugoslavia and used them to start recruiting in earnest, causing violent clashes between his supporters and Fatah's. In April 1980, his men in Belgrade threw a bomb at a car in which Abu Iyad was thought to be travelling. Not wanting further headaches of this sort, Yugoslav intelligence decided to open a line to Abu Nidal.

The Yugoslavs considered Abu Nidal a terrorist... But they ignored his activities.... He of course exploited such tolerance for all it was worth. From 1980 onward, he kept a secret representative in Belgrade: first Ali al-Farra (Dr. Kamal), then Iyad Muhammad (the husband of one of his nieces), then Ali Afifi, followed by others. As a result, from 1980 to 1985, Yugoslavia became the organizational center for Abu Nidal's European operations. Weapons were stored there; his teams of assassins coming in from Libya or Lebanon used Yugoslavia as a staging post on their way to other destinations; and weapons were moved from there into the rest of Europe. Inside the organization, Yugoslavia was considered "semisecure" in the sense that if its members got into trouble, the organization could usually strike an under-the-table deal with the Yugoslavs to get them out of it.

(Abu Nidal: A Gun For Hire, Patrick Seale, 1993, pp. 276-277) (IMG)

Back in 1958, Yugoslavia had supported the US intervention in Lebanon, which was aimed at containing the influence of anti-Zionist Egypt. Mossad agent Tito's successors continued his legacy. In 1982, the UDB-funded ANO helped Israel invade Lebanon. The Abu Nidal Organization, launched the assassination attempt against Shlomo Argov. While serving as the Israeli ambassador to the United Kingdom, Shlomo Argov was an agent of the Mapam Underground, the communist intelligence network in Israel that sought the establishment of a dictatorship of the proletariat in Israel, and a democratic peace between the Hebrew nation and the Arab nation in an Arab-Israeli strategic partnership to drive out the Anglo-American imperialists from the Middle East. The Zionist mainstream disliked Argov and would have loved to see him dead. The goal of the ANO was to on the one hand physically eliminate this Mapam Underground agent, while also giving the Ariel Sharon group in Israel the 'needed' pretext for invading Lebanon. The Israeli intelligence Colonel Efraim Karsh admitted:

Even worse, the attempt on the life of the Israeli Ambassador in London, Shlomo Argov, which was carried out by the Baghdad-based Abu Nidal terrorist group and which sparked the 1982 Lebanon War, the PLO's gravest military defeat since the 1970 Black September, was conceived by Saddam Hussein. It is inconceivable that Abu Nidal (who was later expelled from Baghdad) could have carried out such an operation without his host's approval. It was also common knowledge at the time that any Palestinian attack on Israeli targets was bound to lead to a general conflagration. Israel had publicly announced its determination to remove the Palestinian military threat to its civilian settlements in the Galilee, and was impatiently looking for an excuse to make good on its promise.

What could Hussein gain by providing the bellicose Israeli Defense Minister, Ariel Sharon, with a long-sought pretext to unleash Israeli troops on the Palestinian and Syrian forces in Lebanon? The diversion of Iran's attention from the war against Iraq, to the "treacherous attack by Zionism and imperialism" on brotherly Muslim states, who incidentally also turned out to be Tehran's main Arab allies. But

even if Tehran failed to live up to his expectations, an Israeli-Syrian-Palestinian confrontation in 1982 would still debilitate Iran's two most prominent Arab allies, thereby ensuring Iraq's western border against a perennial rival.

(Saddam Hussein: A Political Biography, Efraim Karsh, Inari Rautsi, 1991) (IMG)

As such, the Yugoslav intelligence, which was partially in service to the Mossad, yet again supported the Ariel Sharon faction in Israel, in devastating Lebanon, so as to contain the influence of Syria and of the revolutionary faction of Islamist Iran. Furthermore, in contrast to what is usually stated, the mainstream factions of Syria and Libya were not supporters of the Abu Nidal group. The ANO did receive support from the Khaddam-Khouli group in Syria, the enemies of the Al-Assad faction, and the Mousa Kousa group in Libya, the enemies of the Al-Qadhafi faction. The CIA's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) admitted that Syria had many problems with Abu Nidal's gang:

INR stated that it agrees that serious tensions have arisen between the Syrian Government and the ANO and that President Assad is unhappy with ANO's involvement in the Palestinian Camp Wars. Syria, moreover, is attempting to lower its profile in regard to the use of terrorism and to decouple itself from ANO terrorism generally. (SUBJECT: Counterterrorism Warning and Forecast Report, National Intelligence Council, CIA, FROM: Charles E. Allen (National Intelligence Officer for Counterterrorism), MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, June 1, 1987, pp. 4-5) (IMG)

Qadhafi is believed to have once verbally supported Abu Nidal and Arafat simultaneously, but he never really sympathized with Abu Nidal nor with Yasser Arafat, despite the appearance of 'friendship' with Arafat. Libya 'welcomed' Abu Nidal into Libya, by jailing him. American journalist on Arab affairs and British Petroleum Vice President Youssef Ibrahim reported in the New York Times (a copy of his article was published by The Washington Post):

Abu Nidal, the Palestinian widely considered one of the world's most dangerous terrorists, has been placed under house arrest by Libya, officials of the Palestine Liberation Organization here and Arab diplomats in Paris say.

The move against Abu Nidal, who lives in a compound near Tripoli, the Libyan capital, is believed to be a result of Arab and Palestinian pressure on Libya to put an end to his terrorist activities, which were becoming an obstacle to Arab diplomacy.

P.L.O. officials here and senior Egyptian diplomats said that ... President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt in October asked the Libyan leader, Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi, to either extradite Abu Nidal to Egypt or prevent him from mounting any terrorist operations from Libya as an essential condition for restored relations between the two nations.

There is no indication that Colonel Qaddafi intends to turn Abu Nidal over to Egypt, the officials said. Deadly Feud With P.L.O. Officials of the P.L.O., which has been Abu Nidal's principal enemy in the Arab world since he broke with it in 1973, said the developments could signal the end of the Abu Nidal organization, or at least the beginning of a long paralysis. The faction is believed responsible for terrorist attacks that have killed or wounded 900 people in at least 20 countries since 1974, when it was formed.

(...). Abu Nidal, who has lived in Libya since he was expelled from Syria in 1987, is wanted in Egypt for, among other things, the 1985 hijacking of an Egyptian airliner that ended with the deaths of 56 passengers in Malta during an attempted rescue.

His organization is held responsible for several of the most heinous acts of terrorism, including the killing of 21 people in the bombing of a synagogue in Istanbul in 1986. It has also claimed responsibility for the slaying of a leading Palestinian moderate, Issam Sartawi, in 1983.

Several Arab affairs experts said the Libyan action against Abu Nidal strongly suggests that his organization, the Fatah Revolutionary Council, is nearing collapse. Under pressure from several Arab governments, a growing number of its leaders and trained cadres have defected to the P.L.O.

Dissident senior leaders of the faction, Arab diplomats and P.L.O. officials had reported in early November that more than 150 members of the group, including more than 20 of its leaders, were slain this year and last year in an internecine struggle as Abu Nidal sought to assert absolute control over the group's 1,000 to 1,200 members and its considerable financial resources.

Officials said Colonel Qaddafi had ordered a search for the bodies of senior leaders of the group who were said to have been killed and buried inside the Abu Nidal compound near Tripoli.

(...). "The man's time is over," said a senior Arab diplomat and former intelligence official who is familiar with Abu Nidal's relations with Syria, Iraq, Libya and the P.L.O. '

(Abu Nidal Is Reportedly Placed Under House Arrest by Libyans, New York Times, Youssef Ibrahim, November 28, 1989) (IMG)

The Abu Nidal group was however responsible for kidnapping Musa Al-Sadr on behalf of Saddam Hussein's Mukhaberat and then making it appear as though the kidnapping was done by Qadhafi.

The Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies (JCSS), the Israeli think tank subordinate to IDF military intelligence (AMAN) and later renamed as the famous 'Institute for National Security Studies' (INSS), admitted in 1990 that since 1987 – the year in which the UDB agent Abu Nidal moved his troops to Libya – there was a significant reduction in the activity of the Abu Nidal's gang. Note that the Abu Nidal gang was officially called the Fatah Revolutionary Committee (FRC). The JCSS stated:

Additional factors that presumably produced a reduction in FRC international activity were intra-organizational. In 1987 Abu Nidal promised to halt terrorist activity in the international arena for a period of ten months, as part of a new strategy aimed at positioning himself closer to the mainstream of the Palestinian national movement and leadership. When this period ended in mid-'88, elements of the organization made a spectacular comeback to the international arena (for details, see Infer 1988.) By then, the entire framework of the Palestinian struggle had changed due to the outbreak of the uprising in the Territories, and the assaults were perpetrated to manifest dedication to the armed struggle. But the campaign generated friction within the group's ranks, focusing on the issue of the future course of the fight; this culminated by late 1989 in a series of intra-organizational assassinations in Lebanon and Libya, causing several prominent members to leave the FRC. All this took place against a backdrop of rumors concerning Abu Nidal's terminal illness, his worsening relationship with Qadhafi, and his house arrest by the Libyan ruler. (Inter: International Terrorism in 1989, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Anat Kurz, Spring 1990) (IMG)

Yugoslavia's regime was never a real friend of Assad-era Syria. By 1969, when the faction headed by Defense Minister Hafez Al-Assad had emerged as de facto triumphant in Syria, unofficially sidelining the Salah Jadid faction, Syrian strategic cooperation with Nasserist Egypt were maximized. In

a conversation with Gamal Abdel-Nasser about the tactical details of what would later become the October 1973 War, Hafez Al-Assad said that the Yugoslav military 'aid' offered to Syria was malfunctional:

Al-Assad: (...). We harbour no doubt as to the importance of having field artillery, counter-artillery. Yet, we are searching for it everywhere, in the West, even with smugglers and [their] companies, And in this, there is great difficulty.

Abdel Nasser: The Yugoslavs might be able to send it.

Al-Assad: They offered us a hexagonal cannon for about 19,000 Syrian pounds, which is used and has many faults, as I myself and Lieutenant-General Fawzi went out and tried it. After the battle, after the war, they sent me 3 cannons. We tried every cannon and they all had a malfunction!

(Minutes of President Gamal Abdel Nasser's talks with Syrian President Nouredine Al-Atassi, From the Egyptian Side: President Gamal Abdel-Nasser, Members of the Supreme Executive Committee: Anwar Sadat, Ali Sabri, Mohammad Fawzi, and others. From the Syrian side: Nureddin Al-Attasi, General Hafez Al-Assad, Sami Al-Droubi. El-Qubba Palace, Cairo, May 2, 1969, pp. 6-7) (IMG)

C22S4. Yugoslav, Romanian, and Chinese Support for Saddamite Iraq against the Republic of Iran *** IMG-All-{Titoist-Saddamite Connection}

During the Iran-Iraq War, the Yugoslav regime supplied Iraq with weapons against Iran, while it did not sell weapons to Iran. Ali Khamenei, who was the President of Iran during the Iran-Iraq War, recalled:

former Yugoslavia ... was one of Iraq's main centers of support.... (The Trip of Ayatollah Khamenei to Yugoslavia, Ali Khamenei, October 21, 2006. In: farsi.khamenei.ir) (IMG)

He also remembered:

After the war was over – I think it was the end of 1967 – I, then-President, and a number of other officials had a trip to the former Yugoslavia.... After a long and detail negotiation, they refused to even sell a tank to us! Meanwhile, whenever the Iraqis had low supply in the war front, all kinds of eastern and western tanks immediately came to them. (The Trip of Ayatollah Khamenei to Yugoslavia, Ali Khamenei, October 21, 2006. In: farsi.khamenei.ir) (IMG)

Regarding the superficial 'greeting' and 'respect' that the Yugoslav regime authorities had for Iran:

Back when I was President, I traveled to Yugoslavia. There, they pretended to respect us and welcome us. But no matter how much we insisted, they refused to give us any conventional weapons. (The Trip of the Supreme Leader to Yugoslavia, Ali Khamenei, September 16, 2010. In: farsi.khamenei.ir) (IMG)

The Islamic Revolution Documents Center, which is an official archives center of the Islamic Republic of Iran, listed **Romania, China, and Yugoslavia** as three of the sponsors of fascist Iraq during Saddam groups' fascist war on Iran:

In addition to the above list, countries such as Switzerland, Sweden, Poland, Yugoslavia, China, Romania, Italy, Singapore, etc. should also be added to the list of Saddam's supporters. (The 80 Countries that Armed Saddam in the War against Iran, Islamic Revolution Documents Center (IRDC), September 22, 2015) (IMG)

Anglo-American intelligence confirms that the Yugoslav regime supported Saddam's fascist war on the people of Iran. According to the International Crisis Group (ICG), which is a front for CIA agent George Soros's Open Society Foundation, the Titoist regime of Yugoslavia also exported 'several thousand Orkan rockets to Iraq in the late 1980s':

Given the presence of Iraqi specialists at Potoci, the partnership on developing the Orkan system, the Yugoslav success at manufacturing chemical-capable Orkan rockets, and the export of several thousand Orkan rockets to Iraq in the late 1980s, it is possible that technical cooperation extended to converting Iraqi Orkan rockets for chemical warheads. (ARMING SADDAM: THE YUGOSLAV CONNECTION, International Crisis Group (ICG), December 3, 2002, p. 6) (IMG)

The arming of the Iraqi fascist regime was yet another step in the long history of the Titoist collaboration with Saddam's group, a collaboration that began – back when Tito was alive – primarily through such terrorist organizations as the Abu Nidal group, which was one of the many contact points between the UDB, Mossad, SAVAK, Kuwaiti intelligence, Saudi intelligence, and Saddam's Mukhaberat. It is also worth noting that Abu Nidal carried out terrorist attacks in Syria in the 1970s and was the main culprit behind the kidnapping and murder of Musa Al-Sadr, which was wrongly blamed on Qadhafi.

C22S5. The Titoist Yugoslav regime on the British Occupation of Ireland and Apartheid South Africa *** IMG-All-{Richard West – Titoist Reign}

The Yugoslav regime opposed the freedom forces on every corner of the planet. The Yugoslav fascist propaganda sheets based in Belgrade hailed the British army of terror, the army of the colonial occupation of Ireland:

Significantly, the Belgrade newspapers were almost alone in Europe in taking the side of the British army in Northern Ireland. (Tito: and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, p. 303) (IMG)

Concerning Tito's stance on South Africa, the MI6 operative Richard West reported:

Nor did [Tito] lend support to terrorist organisations such as the African National Congress, which was subsidised by the Soviet Union. (Tito: and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, p. 284) (IMG)

C22S6.1. Revolutionary Cuba against Titoist Yugoslavia *** IMG-All-{Cuba}

In 1968, Fidel Castro revealed the depth of the crimes of the Yugoslav regime against the people of Cuba. In a speech he gave in denouncing the Yugoslav regime, Fidel Castro read a part of a document that was captured by the post-Batista Cuban revolutionary government. Parts of the document which Castro presented are as follows:

"From the military attache to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico, Mexico, D.F., 13 December 1958; Gen. Francisco Tabernilla Dolz, (?MP), Military City, Marianoa.

"My dear friend, I enclose various photographs which have been given me by the Yugoslav ambassador in this country – a great friend of mine. On a certain occasion I talked to him when I had been told that private negotiations were taking place about the possibility of acquiring armaments. He tells me that in fact he can supply us with various types of armaments that we might need, such as 30.06 rifles and so forth, and he talked about a type of boat like those in the photographs that could be of great use to us.

“He explains that he has an ample quantity of these torpedo boats, which would be very economical, since they produce with very cheap labor and have the best naval shipyards today, after the English.

“These boats have a speed of over 40 kilometers an hour. They have two antiaircraft machineguns, an antiaircraft gun, and torpedo launchers. There is also a great abundance of these torpedoes, which are very cheap.

“Although I explained to him that at this time the negotiations for any kind of armaments were suspended because we had acquired enough in other places, he told me that at any rate he would give me a list with exact specifications, cost, date of delivery, and freight charge to our ports.

“As soon as he gives me these data, I shall send them to you immediately. (...).

“Col. Chief A. P. Chaumon, military attache.”

(Castro Speech on Czechoslovakia 1968. In: ‘The Cuban Approach in the face of the Czechoslovak Crisis’ [El planteamiento Cubano frente a la crisis checoslovaca], Punto Final, The Movement of the Revolutionary Left, Santiago, Chile, Documents, September 10, 1968, pp. 11-12. Also see ‘Comments on Czechoslovakia’, Fidel Castro, 1968. Publisher: Havana Domestic Television and Radio Services in Spanish, August 24, 1968. Translated: US Government, Foreign Broadcast Information Service. Transcription/Markup: US Government/Steve Palmer. Source: Castro Speech Database. Proofread Alvaro Miranda (April 2021).) (IMG)

Castro’s speech was published not only by the Cuban government press but also by the Punto Final (‘Full Stop’), the media organ of the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (el Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria), a Guevarist-inspired guerrilla organization that later formed the armed detachments supporting the Allende government in the 1970s and attempted to foment subversion against the Pinochet-influenced Chilean military. The speech was translated to English by the US government agency Federal Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and subsequently copied and published by the Marxists Internet Archive (MIA), a Trotskyite-dominated online media outlet that publishes speeches and articles from all communists and – in the broadest sense – ‘leftists’. To ensure that the English translation is correct and not distorted by American imperialist propaganda, I checked the Spanish version and slightly altered the English translation provided by the FBIS/MIA so to increase the accuracy of the translation. The reader can check the screenshots of both the FBIS/MIA version and the original Spanish-language document in the Screenshots appendix section of this book.

Since the United States government, under the pressure of the remnants of the pro-Soviet Roosevelt faction in the Democratic Party had officially sanctioned the Batista regime, the American imperialist secret service decided to covertly sponsor Batista – much like how Reagan had denounced the Nicaraguan contras but also covertly funded it nonetheless. Explaining the nature of the document discovered, Fidel Castro explained:

Imagine our surprise some months later when, one day, poking around in the archives, in the archives of the Batista government, we found the text of this document... (...). Those who have read the history of Moncada know that this Chaumon was precisely the officer who perpetrated tens of assassinations in the Moncada garrison after the attack. He was the most criminal of all the officers, who assassinated tens of prisoners, and he was later sent to Mexico and was a “great friend” of the Yugoslav ambassador, to whom, 18 days before the triumph of the revolution in December 1958, when thousands of Cubans had been here – we had been fighting for 2 years – this ambassador, in the name of Yugoslavia, and after consulting, was offering all kinds of arms – cheap, economical, launches, everything.

How great, I say, was our indignation and surprise when we found this document in the archives, signed by the person who signed it, especially when we needed arms to defend ourselves from the imperialists, and they had put all kinds of obstacles in our way and did not sell us a single weapon, and they were offering arms to Batista just as the war was ending.

As we are not going to hold the worst opinion, we are not going to have the worst concept of the role that this party played, when even the imperialists would not sell arms to Batista, when not even the Yankees would sell them arms, these gentlemen were offering good and cheap arms.

(Castro Speech on Czechoslovakia 1968. In: ‘The Cuban Approach in the face of the Czechoslovak Crisis’ [El planteamiento Cubano frente a la crisis checoslovaca], Punto Final, The Movement of the Revolutionary Left, Santiago, Chile, Documents, September 10, 1968, p. 12. Also see ‘Comments on Czechoslovakia’, Fidel Castro, 1968. Publisher: Havana Domestic Television and Radio Services in Spanish, August 24, 1968. Translated: US Government, Foreign Broadcast Information Service. Transcription/Markup: US Government/Steve Palmer. Source: Castro Speech Database. Proofread Alvaro Miranda (April 2021).) (IMG)

Indeed, the fact that the Yugoslav regime supplied weapons to the Batista junta is also confirmed by the British intelligence agent Richard Gott, who served in the MI6 front ‘Royal Institute of International Relations’, which was the predecessor of the Chatham House. Gott wrote:

the Yugoslavs ... continued to supply Batista with weapons until the last moment. (Cuba: A New History, Yale University Press, Richard Gott, p. 164) (IMG)

In spite of the fact that the Yugoslav regime and the Anglo-American intelligence services continued to covertly sponsor the Batista junta, the Cuban revolutionaries succeeded in ousting the Batista junta in 1959.

In the sphere of domestic policy, a number of revolutionary economic reforms occurred in Cuba. A lesser-known one is that Cuba pursued the correct economic policy – fully endorsed by Che personally – of emphasizing producer goods over the consumer goods. In October 1964, Che wrote:

The transformations so far made in the Cuban economy have produced great changes in the structure of our foreign trade. As regards exports the changes have been limited chiefly to the opening up of new markets, with sugar continuing to be the main export article. On the other hand, the composition of our imports has changed completely during these five years. Imports of consumer goods, particularly durables, have decreased substantially in favor of capital equipment, while a small decrease can be noted in the imports of intermediate goods. The policy of substitution of imports is showing slow but tangible results. (The Cuban Economy: Its Past and Its Present Importance, Ernesto Che Guevara, October 1964. In: ‘Che, Selected Works of Ernesto Guevara’, The MIT Press, Edited and with an introduction by Rolando E. Bonachea & Nelson P. Valdes, 1969, pp. 144-145) (IMG)

At the same time, the Yugoslav intelligence missed no chance to conspire against the new revolutionary government of Cuba. The same Yugoslav embassy that had served as a base through which Yugoslavia would negotiate the arms sales to Batista, emerged as a base through which Tito’s gang stabbed Cuba in the back. After the revolution, initially the Cubans were not well aware of the criminal character of the Yugoslav regime. Hence, the Cuban revolutionaries decided to purchase arms from the Yugoslav regime – and the arms were never coming. Fidel Castro remarked:

I was saying that some will ask why have we been so tenacious in our attitude toward the Yugoslav League of Communists. We want to point out a fact, a very important fact from the beginning of the revolution regarding our relations with Yugoslavia. It was in the year

1959, when our country had already made the first laws, when not only had we begun in our country the agrarian reform that brought us into confrontation with imperialism, but also, in the United States, the first plot against us was already being hatched.

At that time we did not have relations as yet with the USSR or with other countries of the socialist camp. And we had to buy our arms in some capitalist countries. We made our first purchases of arms in Belgium and Italy. Because of pressure by the imperialists, and first not by pressure but by CIA conspiracy, there was an explosion on one of the ships coming from Belgium with arms, which resulted in around 80 victims. Later, the Belgian Government, under pressure from the U.S. Government, stopped selling arms.

Meanwhile, the United States was preparing its mercenaries against us and on the other hand was carrying out its policy of blockading our purchase of arms. The Italian Government at that time was under such pressures. We recall that we were trying to buy 16 mortars – 16 mortars from Italy, and they had already sold us four and [some parts] of the other 12. However, under the pressure of the Yankee imperialists, they stopped the sale of the 12 pieces. That left us practically with four pieces and [parts] of the others, but without the cannon.

In this situation, we turned to the government of Yugoslavia to try to buy some arms, including the 12 cannon and some 120 mortars and some other pieces. And here we have a report by the comrade in charge of that mission, Maj. Jose M. Fernandez Alvarez.

And here is it in synthesis; I am going to read this information. It says:

“In 1959, as the Batista tyranny was defeated, after the defeat of the tyranny, military equipment had to be acquired. This equipment was needed urgently and immediately to defend the revolution, whose laws and measures in process of being promulgated would surely cause hate among its logical enemies, who would try to destroy it.

“On a tip that was given us, we got in touch with the ambassador of the Yugoslav republic at the end of 1959 and at the beginning of 1960, in a very superficial manner. Later, we went to visit him in the Yugoslav Embassy on 42nd Street and (Tercera) Miramar, accompanied by Maj Raul Castro.

“On this visit, the minister of the armed forces informed the ambassador of Cuba’s interest in buying arms and equipment, especially light infantry arms, rifles, machineguns, rocket launchers, mortars, and ammunition.

“The ambassador was generally evasive, and when the minister said something about payments, he said that the matter of arms was a different matter in regard to payments and that many details [were involved]. The minister indicated to the ambassador that I should stay in contact with him to learn about prices and the arms available, and to carry forward negotiations in this regard.

“It was extraordinarily difficult to carry out this task since the lists were delayed. Evasive answers were constantly given us. It was said that there were no arms available and that they had to be manufactured, that the prices had not arrived; and when the prices were finally in our possession, they dealt especially with small caliber arms at extraordinarily high prices, even on the international market.

“Prior to this and afterward, when we tried to get arms in Yugoslavia, some comrades went to Yugoslavia and also tried to arrange for the purchase of arms with the same results, with the presentation of other obstacles.

“We can say that in no operation could we make progress, despite our negotiations and great interest, since the Yugoslav representation here in Cuba did not make it feasible.

“As a conclusion to the foregoing, we can say that Yugoslavia’s attitude was markedly opportunistic, since it wanted to be paid in dollars and at black market prices for the few lines that it offered.

“They said that the total amount of the operation did not justify the difficulties that they would have with the United States over selling us arms. And they were reluctant to give us the lists and prices. They proposed that discussions be carried out through a private Yugoslav commercial company as a screen, in order that the operation should not appear under that country’s name, and in general little cooperation was shown. But it appeared that Yugoslavia did not want to make the sale to us, and on the other hand it appeared opportunist or at least intended to dissuade us from the conditions stipulated.”

(Castro Speech on Czechoslovakia 1968. In: ‘The Cuban Approach in the face of the Czechoslovak Crisis’ [El planteamiento Cubano frente a la crisis checoslovaca], Punto Final, The Movement of the Revolutionary Left, Santiago, Chile, Documents, September 10, 1968, pp. 10-11. Comments on Czechoslovakia, Fidel Castro, 1968. Publisher: Havana Domestic Television and Radio Services in Spanish, August 24, 1968. Translated: US Government, Foreign Broadcast Information Service. Transcription/Markup: US Government/Steve Palmer. Source: Castro Speech Database. Proofread Alvaro Miranda (April 2021).) (IMG)

Therefore, in the face of conspiracies of American intelligence against the revolutionary government of Cuba, the latter was also stabbed in the back by the Yugoslavs who did everything they could to waste the time of the Cuban people. The distrust that the Cuban revolutionaries had towards the Yugoslav regime was also reflected in the remarks of Che Guevara. While Che Guevara – whether out of unawareness/naivete or out of diplomatic pragmatism – rejected the narrative that Tito’s gang were agents of imperialism, he nonetheless did show that, at least intuitively, he found Yugoslavia’s government problematic:

GUEVARA: (...). We must find ways and means by which to face the new issues brought about by removing the old situation and by building a socialist society.

REPORTER: What is your opinion of the Yugoslavian experiment in this respect?

GUEVARA: We definitely oppose the Yugoslavs, and we do not wish to use big flashy words on this subject; we are not talking about backsliding – but we also do not wish to talk about being stationary. We do not at all accuse the Yugoslavs of being agents of imperialism, and so forth – but we oppose them in a basic manner.

REPORTER: How?

GUEVARA: We believe that there are two ways in which we differ from the Yugoslav experiment: that is, in our reaction to Stalinism and in opposition to the Soviet Union to dictate to us its economic and leadership ideals.

(Interview with Al-Tali’ah, Al-Tali’ah, No. 4, April 1965. In: ‘Che, Selected Works of Ernesto Guevara’, The MIT Press, Edited and with an introduction by Rolando E. Bonachea & Nelson P. Valdes, 1969, p. 411) (IMG)

One of the many problems that Cuba had with the Eurasian Titoists headed by the Khrushchev gang and the Gomulka regime in Poland among others was precisely with regards to the issue of Yugoslavia. Fidel Castro later recalled:

The occurrences in Czechoslovakia only serve to confirm to us the correctness of the positions and the theses that our revolution and our party have been maintaining – our position at the Tricontinental Conference, our positions in the Latin American Solidarity Organization, and our positions regarding all the international problems – there is a series of facts that confirm this point of view. It is known, for

example, that one of the factors that we have explained – which explains – which has been a constant element of irritation in our relations with many countries of the socialist camp and with many communist parties is the problem of Yugoslavia. (Castro Speech on Czechoslovakia 1968. In: ‘The Cuban Approach in the face of the Czechoslovak Crisis’ [El planteamiento Cubano frente a la crisis checoslovaca], Punto Final, The Movement of the Revolutionary Left, Santiago, Chile, Documents, September 10, 1968, pp. 10-11. Comments on Czechoslovakia, Fidel Castro, 1968. Publisher: Havana Domestic Television and Radio Services in Spanish, August 24, 1968. Translated: US Government, Foreign Broadcast Information Service. Transcription/Markup: US Government/Steve Palmer. Source: Castro Speech Database. Proofread Alvaro Miranda (April 2021).) (IMG)

Castro continued:

However, recently in many countries, the communist parties, including the communist parties of the Warsaw Pact, have begun quite to forget the role and nature of the Yugoslav League of Communists. They began to call Yugoslavia a communist country, they began to call it a communist party, to invite the Yugoslav League of Communists to meetings of the socialist countries, to meetings of base organizations of the communist parties; and this evoked our constant opposition, our constant disagreement, our constant taking or exception, expressed on various occasions. (...). The communist movement for a long time – with much justification – kept that party ostracized. An infinity of articles written by all the parties appeared in publication against that movement, denouncing it, pointing a finger at it.

Afterward, naturally, some parties forgot this, and the friends, followers, the unconditionals, began also to forget this in the face of all the political preaching about the ideological resurgence of the revolutionary movement, which has led to these most dolorous situations. (Castro Speech on Czechoslovakia 1968. In: ‘The Cuban Approach in the face of the Czechoslovak Crisis’ [El planteamiento Cubano frente a la crisis checoslovaca], Punto Final, The Movement of the Revolutionary Left, Santiago, Chile, Documents, September 10, 1968, p. 10. Comments on Czechoslovakia, Fidel Castro, 1968. Publisher: Havana Domestic Television and Radio Services in Spanish, August 24, 1968. Translated: US Government, Foreign Broadcast Information Service. Transcription/Markup: US Government/Steve Palmer. Source: Castro Speech Database. Proofread Alvaro Miranda (April 2021).) (IMG)

At the same time, Cuba continued to maintain bonds with the enemies of the Yugoslav regime. When the Eurasian Titoists headed by the gang of Nikita Khrushchev imposed the fiercest pressures on different countries in order to make them break their relations with People’s Democratic, Cuba was one of the few countries that refused to bow to such intensive pressure. Fidel Castro said in 1967:

Our country never broke relations with Albania, when a large number of countries from the socialist camp broke relations with this country.

(FIDEL CASTRO SPEECH AT LASO CLOSING SESSION, Speech by Prime Minister Fidel Castro at closing ceremony of First LASO Conference, held in Havana's Chaplin Theater — Live, Havana Domestic Radio and Television Services in Spanish, Havana Domestic Radio, August 11, 1967. In: Castro Speech Database, Latin American Network Information Center (LANIC), University of Texas) (IMG)

In the meantime, the Yugoslav embassy continued its hostility to revolutionary Cuba. The MI6 operative Richard West recalled:

In Communist Cuba I happened to meet a diplomat from the Yugoslav Embassy. Apparently Fidel Castro’s bodyguards had recently shot up the embassy car and wounded one of their personnel, so he was not feeling well disposed to Cuba, but even this could not explain the flow of invective to which he subjected the country, making no effort to keep his voice down. He said that Fidel was just a tin-pot Latin American fascist, similar to Juan Peron, the Argentine dictator. He said that the Cubans lived in terror and hoped only to reach the United States. He added that when the revolutionary leader Che Guevara disappeared to try and start a revolt in Bolivia, Fidel Castro had an affair with Guevara’s wife. All this was told to me by the diplomat of a country supposed to be on the best of terms with Communist Cuba. (Tito: and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, p. 271) (IMG)

The freedom forces in Cuba greeted the Warsaw Pact intervention into Czechoslovakia in order to undermine the Yugoslav regime’s intelligence presence in that country. Regarding Warsaw Pact intervention into Czechoslovakia, the Maoists obviously blatantly sided with Tito’s fascist gang. Unfortunately, the Party of Labour of Albania – at the time under Maoist influence – overtly sided with the butcher of Kosovo on this matter, even though by then, covertly, Albania’s trade relations was being strategically realigned with Brezhnev-era Eurasia. Castro on the other hand, fully endorsed the Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia, which was obviously aimed at minimizing Yugoslav regime’s influence presence there:

Some people must have asked themselves the reason for that attitude – why Cuba is always emphasizing the role that the Yugoslav League of Communists Party plays in the world. What is the role of an instrument of imperialism that that party plays in the world?

Now, in relation to the occurrences in Czechoslovakia, the main promoter of all that bourgeois liberal policy – the main defender, the main promoter – was the organization of the so-called Yugoslav communists. They applauded with both hands all those liberal reforms, that whole concept of the party ceasing to be the instrument of revolutionary power, of power ceasing to be a function of the party – because this is very closely linked to the entire outlook of the Yugoslav League of Communists. All those criteria of political nature that completely deviate from Marxism, those criteria of an economic nature, are intimately linked with the Yugoslav League of Communists’ ideology. (...). And here we have the facts. It was this organization that was one of the principal promoters of the deformations of the political process in Czechoslovakia as the agent – that is what this organization is – of the imperialists.

Some will say that [I err, but] I am going to show at least some facts. Tito was received as a hero in Prague a few weeks ago. This was the result of what? Of the ideological weakening, of the political weakness.... And were we not saying, how this can be? And to what extremes we are going, when this element – known to be revisionist, condemned historically by the revolutionary movement, which has taken the role of an agent of imperialism – was received by [the intelligentsia of] a nation practically as a hero? Now, of course, Tito is one of those most scandalized by this event of the participation of Warsaw Pact countries in Czechoslovakia.

(Castro Speech on Czechoslovakia 1968. In: ‘The Cuban Approach in the face of the Czechoslovak Crisis’ [El planteamiento Cubano frente a la crisis checoslovaca], Punto Final, The Movement of the Revolutionary Left, Santiago, Chile, Documents, September 10, 1968, pp. 10-11. Comments on Czechoslovakia, Fidel Castro, 1968. Publisher: Havana Domestic Television and Radio Services in Spanish, August 24, 1968. Translated: US Government, Foreign Broadcast Information Service. Transcription/Markup: US Government/Steve Palmer. Source: Castro Speech Database. Proofread Alvaro Miranda (April 2021).) (IMG)

In the 1970s, when the Guatemalan terror regime, the CIA-installed fascist terror state hostile to Cuba, was being de-funded by the Carter Administration, the Administration whose aim was to stab US imperialism in the back, the Guatemalan regime could nonetheless comfortably rely on the regimes of Israel, South Africa, and Yugoslavia to provide the arms it needed:

In the early 1980s, a whole worldwide right-wing network could be seen in action in Guatemala, offering aid in whatever form was needed. General Rodolfo Lobos Zamora mentioned the United States, Israel, and Argentina as countries that offered Guatemala military aid “spontaneously” (*Enfoprensa*, 1984). Since 1975, Guatemala has received arms from the United States, Israel, France, Switzerland, Taiwan, Italy, Belgium, and Yugoslavia. (The Israeli Connection: Whom Israel Arms and Why, Benyamin Beit-Hallahmi, 1987, p. 82) (IMG)

Indeed, the hostile relations between Cuba and Yugoslavia continued well into the 1970s and the 1980s. During the 1970s, the Cuban communists were aiming to hijack the CIA-backed Titoist ‘Non-Aligned Movement’. In cooperation with Libya, Cuba spearheaded the attempt to isolate the reactionary gang of Tito. Erik Goldstein, the Secretary of the Navy Senior Research Fellow at the US Naval War College, noted the opposition of Qadhafi and Castro against Yugoslavia’s fascist leader. As early as 1973, and by:

the time of the Algiers conference, a split in the movement had become apparent. (...) Quaddafi and Castro ... soon found common cause against the United States, and united in opposition to Tito who preferred to remain less pro-Soviet. But Tito continued to remain in the minority as NAM members refused to equate Soviet imperialism with Western imperialism. (“Guide to International Relations and Diplomacy”, Michael Graham Fry, Erik Goldstein, Richard Langhorne, 2002, p. 24) (IMG)

As late as 1979, Castro continued to be opposed to Tito:

The debate between Castro and Tito continued at Havana, albeit in an anticlimatic fashion. Castro attacked the United States and China as the cause of the world's ills and reportedly sought to have the conference adopt a more openly pro-Soviet view of events. Tito responded by urging the Non-aligned Movement to remain independent from the superpowers. Efforts to bring the movement back to discussing economic difficulties and the debt crisis met with little success. (“Guide to International Relations and Diplomacy”, Michael Graham Fry, Erik Goldstein, Richard Langhorne, 2002, p. 26) (IMG)

Documents leaked due to the US Embassy seizure in Tehran in 1979, confirm that the US State Department regarded the interests of the dictatorship of the comprador bourgeoisie in Yugoslavia against People’s Democratic Cuba as in line with the interests of the United States:

UNDER SECRETARY NEWSOM NOTED THAT THE US WAS TALKING FIRST TO YUGOSLAVIA ABOUT THE CUBAN DRAFT BECAUSE WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT WE HAVE PARALLEL INTERESTS. (NNNNVV ESB028BRA554, PP RJQMHR, DE RUEHC #7420/02 2011651, ZNY CCCCC ZZH, P 200030Z, From: Secretary of State, Washington DC, To: RUDKRB/American Embassy Belgrade, Priority 2892, INFO ALL DIPLOMATIC POSTS PRIORITY, July 1979) (IMG)

After all, the Yugoslavs were struggling to defend American imperialist interests in the NAM:

THE YUGOSLAVS WILL FIGHT HARD TO AVOID POSITIONS THAT WILL OFFEND THE US, BUT IT IS POSSIBLE THAT IN THE END THERE WOULD BE SOME COMPROMISES THAT COULD CAUSE THE US SOME PROBLEMS. (NNNNVV ESB028BRA554, PP RJQMHR, DE RUEHC #7420/02 2011651, ZNY CCCCC ZZH, P 200030Z, From: Secretary of State, Washington DC, To: RUDKRB/American Embassy Belgrade, Priority 2892, INFO ALL DIPLOMATIC POSTS PRIORITY, July 1979) (IMG)

In order for the Tito regime to pursue such pro-American objectives:

BELOVSKY HOPED, HOWEVER, THAT WE [Americans] WOULD UNDERTAKE THESE EFFORTS IN A WAY THAT DID NOT SUGGEST INTERFERENCE IN NAM’S AFFAIRS AS THIS WOULD CONSTITUTE AN ADDITIONAL BURDEN THAT THE YUGOSLAVS AND OTHER MODERATES WOULD HAVE TO DEAL WITH. (NNNNVV ESB028BRA554, PP RJQMHR, DE RUEHC #7420/02 2011651, ZNY CCCCC ZZH, P 200030Z, From: Secretary of State, Washington DC, To: RUDKRB/American Embassy Belgrade, Priority 2892, INFO ALL DIPLOMATIC POSTS PRIORITY, July 1979) (IMG)

The United States pretended to be separate from the NAM, when in fact, the United States was supporting Yugoslav attempts to control the NAM.

C22S6.2. Revolutionary Cuba against the Moscow Titoists / People’s Democratic Development in Cuba with Brezhnev-era Eurasian Assistance / The Struggle for Establishing a Dictatorship of the Proletariat in Cuba / Some Theoretical Errors of Cuban Leadership *** IMG-All-{Cuba}

Revolutionary Cuba on the one hand faced the front-stabs of the imperialist powers headed by the United States, and the stabs in the back by the Moscow Titoists. Added to this was the fact that Cuba had poor economic infrastructure and a low availability of communist literature. All of these were obstacles in front of the Cuban proletariat, making it harder for them to achieve their objectives. There were at the same time factors that worked to Cuba’s advantage. By the end of the Great Patriotic War, the international colonial system had been severely damaged. This itself was a factor that assisted the Cuban people in their liberation from American yoke in the first place. At the same time, there were many other freedom movements that succeeded in the countries formerly colonized, thus paving the way for allies worldwide with which a revolutionary Cuba could trade, and thus break Americana encirclement. Furthermore, in spite of the dominance of the Titoist tendency in Eurasia, and despite the fact that Eurasia had become a dictatorship of the comprador bourgeoisie, there were nonetheless communists as well as progressives within the state apparatus of Eurasia, and they sympathized with Cuba’s struggles against Anglo-American intelligence. These communist and progressive elements that continued to exist in Eurasia made the effort to assist Cuba in the face of the aggression-by-infiltration projects of the American secret service.

The powerful existence of both the factors that favored and the factors that disfavored Cuba’s proletarian class is reflected in the foreign and domestic policies that the Cuban government pursued, and is also correlated with the strength of the worker membership within the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC). The purpose of this section is to expose both the lesser-known positive aspects and the lesser-known negative aspects of the situation in Cuba, with regards to political economy, international relations, and intelligence wars, to demonstrate the intensive class struggles and at times, stalemates, that occurred in that country.

A major problem between the Cuban revolutionary leadership and the Khrushchev group was the latter’s support for American military espionage against Cuba. Nikita Khrushchev agreed that the so-called ‘international inspectors’ on nuclear programs are nothing but spies seeking to collect military intelligence:

If inspection is established without confidence, this will not be inspection. With spoiled relations between countries, such inspection becomes a form of military intelligence aimed at choosing the most favorable moment for either of the parties to commit aggression. We entertain no thoughts of any aggressive attack and will certainly not accent such inspection. But if conditions of mutual confidence are created between countries, then the establishment of inspection will present no difficulties. (Interview with William Randolph Hearst,

Jr., Nikita Khrushchev, November 22, 1957, Pravda, November 28, 1957. In: 'Soviet World Outlook: A Handbook of Communist Statements', Bureau of Intelligence Research of the US State Department, July 1959, p. 201) (IMG)

The belief that 'UN inspectors' have historically been 'neutral' observers is a childish delusion. It is no secret that the 'UN inspectors' or 'nuclear inspectors' from the IAEA have historically been CIA-MI6 spies. The CIA spy Saddam Hussein defected to the anti-imperialist camp in 1989 and began to clash with the CIA; this is why after 1989, Saddam fiercely struggled against the arrival of 'UN inspectors' or 'nuclear inspectors' to Iraq. The 'inspectors' got into Iran's nuclear sites and subsequently Iran saw numerous explosions in its nuclear sector. The same Khrushchev who agreed that 'international inspectors' on nuclear matters are spies and the same Khrushchev who knew very well that the UN – the body that invaded Korea in 1950 – was an Anglo-American military and intelligence front, promoted such military intelligence gathering by the 'UN inspectors' in Cuba, something that got Khrushchev into a fierce clash with Fidel Castro:

On October 24 Khrushchev announced that he was determined to avoid "reckless decisions," and certain Soviet vessels en route to Cuba were ordered to change course. On October 28 Khrushchev advised the [US] President that he had given orders to "dismantle the arms which you describe as offensive and to crate them and return them to the Soviet Union." Khrushchev's agreement to permit U.N. observers to verify the dismantling of the missile sites was obstructed by Cuban Premier Fidel Castro, who refused to allow observers to come to Cuba. The United States therefore continued air and naval surveillance of Cuba and withheld any formal promise not to invade the country in the future. (USSR, Capsule Facts for the Armed Forces, Armed Forces Information Service, Department of Defense, October 1967, p. 8) (IMG)

Had Khrushchev committed such a treasonous policy 'in consultation' with Cuba's leaders, Khrushchev was still going to be a traitor and an enemy spy anyways. Referring to Khrushchev's behaviour regarding Cuba, a terrorist who had agreed to spy for the SAVAK told his bosses:

Regarding the question of Cuba and the Caribbean Sea crisis and regarding the treatment of Albania, [Khrushchev] made serious errors. Ostensibly to maintain world peace, [Khrushchev] agreed to capitulate to the Americans against Cuba's independence.... And if it were not for the steadfastness of the Cuban people, the Americans would have swallowed [Cuba]. (The Interrogation session of Mr. Parviz Nikkhah [Jalaseh Bazjuyi az Aqaye Mohandes Parviz Nikkhah], SAVAK, Parviz Nikkhah, Khordad 22, 1344 / June 12, 1965. Source: 'Parviz Nikkhah According to SAVAK Documents' [Parviz Nikkhah be Revayat e Asnad e SAVAK] book, page 187. In: The Center of Historical Documents Survey) (IMG)

Revolutionary Cuba's alliance with Eurasia was not because of the Khrushchev group but was rather in spite of the Khrushchev group. Some people hold the incorrect view that the deployment of weapons by Eurasia was a dangerous provocation and a profound error; these people are incorrect. The policy of ruthless confrontation with the United States and 'grabbing America by the throat' off the coast of Florida was a policy of anti-imperialist confrontation emanating from the remnants of the communist faction in Eurasia. Imperialist America's tough response to such confrontation by the Eurasians gave Khrushchev the leverage he needed to commit treason and to denounce such anti-CIA confrontation as 'reckless'. He therefore was able to allow the 'UN inspectors' (CIA-MI6 spies) to gather military intelligence on Cuba, and ensured the withdrawal of some of the Eurasian military units from Cuba.

By the mid-1960s, there came about an erosion of the power of the Nikita Khrushchev faction, and the communist anti-Titoist elements that had encircled the Khrushchev agent Leonid Brezhnev, coopted Brezhnev to make moves to oust Nikita Khrushchev. By October 1964, Khrushchev was officially ousted and Titoist influence in Moscow saw some – but by no means total – decline. The Cubans greeted the ouster of Nikita Khrushchev and the rise of the Brezhnev faction, although they were wary of the profound Titoist deviations that the Brezhnevians had as well, since after all Brezhnev too was covertly as Titoist as Khrushchev and overtly a mere lesser-Titoist. In that same month of Khrushchev's ouster, Che Guevara wrote the following in an article:

One of the main bases for the development of our sugar industry, as well as for the development of the country as a whole, is the agreement recently signed between the U.S.S.R. and Cuba. This guarantees to us future sales of enormous quantities of sugar at prices much above the average of those paid in the North American and world markets during the last twenty years. Apart from this and other favorable economic implications, the agreement signed with the U.S.S.R. is of political importance inasmuch as it provides an example of the relationship that can exist between an underdeveloped and a developed country when both belong to the socialist camp, in contrast to the commercial relations between the underdeveloped countries exporting raw materials and the industrialized capitalist countries—in which the permanent tendency is to make the balance of trade unfavorable to the poor nations. (The Cuban Economy: Its Past and Its Present Importance, Ernesto Che Guevara, October 1964. In: 'Che, Selected Works of Ernesto Guevara', The MIT Press, Edited and with an introduction by Rolando E. Bonachea & Nelson P. Valdes, 1969, pp. 145-146) (IMG)

The same Che Guevara that had fiercely denounced the Moscow Titoists headed by Khrushchev, wrote the above, which clearly reflects the Cuban recognition of some shifts occurring in Eurasia. Note that during the Khrushchev era, Che Guevara once openly declared that he will resist Cuba becoming dominated by the Moscow Titoists to the end:

BERGQUIST: You once said that Cuba would resist becoming a Soviet satellite to the "last drop of blood." But how "sovereign" were you when Khrushchev arranged with Kennedy for the missile withdrawal without consulting you?

GUEVARA: As you know from Fidel's speech, we had differences with the Soviet Union.

(Interview with Bergquist, No. 2, *Look Magazine*, April 1963. In: 'Che, Selected Works of Ernesto Guevara', The MIT Press, Edited and with an introduction by Rolando E. Bonachea & Nelson P. Valdes, 1969, p. 398) (IMG)

Much like most of the freedom forces around the world, the Cubans were hostile to the Kremlin Titoists headed by the Khrushchev gang but looked favorably towards an alliance with the remnants of the communist network and anti-Titoist elements that from the Soviet legacy. As such, Cuba opposed the Eurasian Titoists but sought to form an alliance with the anti-Titoist elements that existed in Eurasia. Che, who resisted the domination of Cuba by the Moscow Titoists, favoured strategic partnership with the Eurasians when signs of improvement came in the mid-1960s.

Castro knew that the Brezhnevians in the Warsaw Pact, while definitely preferable over the Khrushchevians in the overt level, were nonetheless Titoists on the covert level, and were not going to make the moves necessary to counter the Yugoslav regime influence, nor were they going to turn against the fascist enemies of Cuba in Latin America as much as they should have:

And we wonder whether, perhaps, this bitter experience with Czechoslovakia will not lead to a rectification of these errors, and whether the party of the League of Yugoslav Communists will cease to be accepted as a communist party, as a revolutionary party, and will cease to be invited to mass meetings and the political organizations of the socialist camp.

We are seeing many interesting things as a result of these events. It is explained that the countries of the Warsaw Pact sent armies to put down on imperialist plot and the development of counterrevolution in Czechoslovakia. However, it has caused us to disagree and be discontented and to protest over the fact that these same countries have been fomenting relations and a rapprochement of an economic, cultural, and political nature with the oligarchical governments of Latin America, which are not simply reactionary governments, exploiters of their peoples, but are shameful accomplices in the imperialist aggressions against Cuba and shameful accomplices in the economic blockage against Cuba. And these countries have seen themselves stimulated and encouraged by the fact that our friends, our natural allies, have forgotten this cavalier role, this traitorous role, that these governments carry out against a socialist country, the blockage policy which those countries carry out against a socialist country.

(Castro Speech on Czechoslovakia 1968. In: 'The Cuban Approach in the face of the Czechoslovak Crisis' [El planteamiento Cubano frente a la crisis checoslovaca], Punto Final, The Movement of the Revolutionary Left, Santiago, Chile, Documents, September 10, 1968, p. 12. Comments on Czechoslovakia, Fidel Castro, 1968. Publisher: Havana Domestic Television and Radio Services in Spanish, August 24, 1968. Translated: US Government, Foreign Broadcast Information Service. Transcription/Markup: US Government/Steve Palmer. Source: Castro Speech Database. Proofread Alvaro Miranda (April 2021).) (IMG)

Until early 1968, the Titoist faction in Moscow was still able to wield a high influence in many of the policy matters. This is reflected in the profound economic mismanagement that occurred in Cuba during this period, which could have been prevented through Eurasian aid. In 1966, the program for a harvest of 10 million tons by 1970, was launched. The Central Committee of the PCC noted that during this period there was:

an inefficient management of resources, which aggravated the financial problem and the shortage of workforce. (The Report to the First Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba: Historical Analysis of the Revolution, Cuban Communist Party, 1976, pp. 16-17. In: Congresos del PCC, Compendio Informativo Para Coberturas Periodísticas, Center for Information for the Press, Government of Cuba, congresopcc.cip.cu, Territorial y General Suarez, Plaza de la Revolucion, la Habana, 2021) (IMG)

The report by the Central Committee further added:

Organizational deficiencies and inadequate methods of direction and economic management were also present. The realities turned out to be more powerful than our purposes. (The Report to the First Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba: Historical Analysis of the Revolution, Cuban Communist Party, 1976, pp. 16-17. In: Congresos del PCC, Compendio Informativo Para Coberturas Periodísticas, Center for Information for the Press, Government of Cuba, congresopcc.cip.cu, Territorial y General Suarez, Plaza de la Revolucion, la Habana, 2021) (IMG)

During those years, severe mismanagement took place, including the left-deviationist policy of wage equalization:

However, in the social order between 1967 and 1969, negative trends such as the decoupling of wages from the production norm and the elimination of interest on credits and taxes charged to the peasantry took hold. All this, together with the fact that the issue of remuneration according to work was not taken into account, caused an excess of circulating money parallel to a shortage of supply of goods and services; promoting the conditions for the increase of absenteeism and labor indiscipline. (Politica Socioeconomica, Congresos del PCC, Compendio Informativo Para Coberturas Periodísticas, Center for Information for the Press, Government of Cuba, congresopcc.cip.cu, Territorial y General Suarez, Plaza de la Revolucion, la Habana, 2021) (IMG)

Surely, the economic mismanagement was something that happened inside of Cuba, but the Eurasians could provide technical expertise in preventing such a high level of mismanagement. Had the communist anti-Titoist elements in Eurasia had such a massive hold over politics, they surely would have been able to assist Cuba much earlier in preventing this catastrophe, but they obviously did not have as much power until 1968-1969. The revisionist policy of wage equalization and many other such bad policies were either abandoned or diminished in influence by 1969, but the effect was enough to cause the damage to the economy.

It would be wrong to entirely blame the Eurasian Titoists and the inadequate aid or 'aid' to Cuba as the factor for such economic problems. Cuba's economic management is known to have been directly influenced ideologically by the views of Che Guevara. Che Guevara held correct stances on a number of political-economic issues, one of which was the need to emphasize producer goods over consumer goods. However, he also held some erroneous theses that need to be mentioned, in order to shed light on the wage equalization policy that was promoted by many managers in Cuba at the time.

Despite Che's positive intentions, some of the views that he promoted gave greater ideological leverage to the anti-Cuba economic saboteurs in the Cuban economic management positions. It also misled many of the well-meaning albeit naïve individuals in the economic management positions. In particular, Che Guevara held incorrect views with regards to the question of material vs. moral incentives, and against the historical materialist science. What follows are a number of excerpts from the works of Che Guevara. The underline and bold of Che's writings is done by me to highlight those parts that are especially idealist. The square brackets are added by me and contain my critiques of the views in the quotes. Here is the quote from Che:

It is necessary to make one thing clear: We do not negate the objective need for material incentives, but we are reluctant to use them as a **fundamental** element. [The word 'element' is too broad. Insofar as incentives are concerned, promoting 'purely' moral incentives is a fundamental goal of communism, but communist historical materialist analysis holds that material incentives are the fundamental means of reaching this fundamental goal.]

We believe that in economics such a lever becomes an end in itself and then begins to impose its own force on the relationships among men. We should not forget that material incentives come from capitalism and are destined to die under **socialism**. [No, they are not destined to die under socialism, but are rather destined to die under communism, when production is so extremely high that material incentives in production become irrelevant.]

How are we going to make them die?

Little by little, through gradual increase in consumer goods for the people, which will make this type of incentive unnecessary—**we are told**. [We are told so by Marx and Engels in The Critique or the Gotha Programme. One should not be dogmatic about the ideas of Marx and Engels, but certainly on this issue, as with the vast majority of their other ideas, Marx and Engels are very correct.] We see in this answer a very rigid **mechanism**. [With all due respect to Che, Che's view on this matter is idealist. Since Che has an idealist stance on this matter, Che is incorrectly viewing scientific analysis as 'mechanistic' or mechanical materialist.]

Consumer goods, that is the watchword and the great molder, in the end, of consciousness, according to the defenders of the other system. We believe that direct material incentives and consciousness are **contradictory** terms. [No, they are not so contradictory. Material incentives lay the material foundation to the transition towards communism, and by laying the material foundation, they create the comfort and free up the needed time and space for individuals to develop their consciousness.]

This is one of the points at which our disagreement reaches concrete dimensions. It is no longer a matter of variations. To the defenders of financial self-management direct material incentives – projected into the future and accompanying the society in the diverse stages of building communism—do not contradict the "development" of consciousness. For us, they do. That is why **we fight against their predominance**; they mean a delay in the development of socialist **morality**.

(On the Budgetary System of Finance, Nuestra Industrial Revista Economica (Havana), Ernesto Che Guevara, February 1964, pp. 3-23. In: 'Che, Selected Works of Ernesto Guevara', The MIT Press, Edited and with an introduction by Rolando E. Bonachea & Nelson P. Valdes, 1969, p. 121) (IMG)

Che again promoted the left-deviationist notion that providing bonus payment for over-fulfilment is incorrect:

we do not accept that the principle of from each according to his capacity, to each according to his work be interpreted as the complete payment, bonus pay, for the overfulfillment of a given quota.... (On the Budgetary System of Finance, Nuestra Industrial Revista Economica (Havana), Ernesto Che Guevara, February 1964, pp. 3-23. In: 'Che, Selected Works of Ernesto Guevara', The MIT Press, Edited and with an introduction by Rolando E. Bonachea & Nelson P. Valdes, 1969, p. 124) (IMG)

The following quote also contains some obvious flaws but the latter part of the:

What, then, is the correct handling of material incentives? We believe that their existence cannot be forgotten, whether as a collective expression of the masses' strivings or as an individual presence; they are a reflection of the workers' mental habits from the old society. We do not have a clearly defined idea as to how to use material incentives collectively due to insufficiencies in the planning apparatus which prevent us from having absolute faith in the system and from having organized a structure until now that would permit us to steer clear of difficulties. We see the greatest danger in the antagonism created between the state administration and production organizations. This antagonism has been analyzed by the Soviet economist Liberman, who concludes that the methods of collective incentives should be changed, abandoning the old formula of rewards based on the fulfillment of quotas and moving to more advanced ones

Even if we disagree with Lieberman on the matter of how much emphasis should be given to material incentives (as a lever), we believe that his concern with the aberrations that the concept "fulfillment of the quota" has suffered is quite correct. The relations between enterprises and central organizations acquire contradictory forms and the methods used by the enterprises to obtain benefits sometimes have taken on characteristics that have nothing to do with socialist morality.

We believe that in a certain way the possibilities of development offered by the new production relationship for promoting the evolution of man in the direction of "the kingdom of freedom" are being wasted. We gave a detailed account of precisely this in our definition of the essential agreements of the system of interrelationships that exist between education and the development of production. One can embark on creating the new consciousness because there are new production relationships and, although in a general historical sense consciousness is a product of production relationships, the characteristics of the present period must be considered because there is a fundamental contradiction (on a worldwide level) between imperialism and socialism. Socialist ideas have influenced the consciousness of the whole world; that is why consciousness can develop and advance further than the particular stage of productive forces in a given country.

(On the Budgetary System of Finance, Nuestra Industrial Revista Economica (Havana), Ernesto Che Guevara, February 1964, pp. 3-23. In: 'Che, Selected Works of Ernesto Guevara', The MIT Press, Edited and with an introduction by Rolando E. Bonachea & Nelson P. Valdes, 1969, pp. 121-122) (IMG)

It surely is possible that with the spread of communist ideas worldwide, consciousness develops to the stage in which it becomes a more significant historical force than the other historical-material forces and factors, at the specific period of time. However, this would require an in-depth and extensive education of virtually all of the population of the world in the science of socialism. Only then can consciousness become a force potentially capable of overpowering all the other historical-material forces. This was clearly not the case in Che Guevara's time, however. Che Guevara was correct in stating that 'consciousness can develop and advance further than the particular stage of productive forces', but the implication he seemed to be drawing from that statement is incorrect, for it would certainly be an exaggeration to believe that consciousness can develop and advance so further and farther than the productive forces that consciousness would be able to yield a socialist society.

The issue of whether Fidel Castro was a communist or not is controversial. Some argue that he was never really a communist, whereas others argue that he was one as soon as he declared himself one. It is true that Fidel Castro and some of his followers in the Party harbored some erroneous views alien to scientific socialism. It is also true that Fidel Castro in the first years, even when he declared himself a 'communist', was not so well-versed in the science of communism to be a communist. In the 1960s and early 1970s, while having a good anti-imperialist intuition, Castro did not have a strong understanding of scientific socialism. However, by the mid-1970s, Castro gained practical knowledge of how to class-struggle, and used that knowledge in order to advance the influence of the proletariat over the state and that state's influence over the economy, thus advancing communist objectives. In the end, knowledge of the core tactics and strategies of waging proletarian class struggles constitutes the core knowledge of scientific socialism. And Fidel Castro, despite some of the theoretical errors he had, understood the core of scientific socialism by the mid-1970s. Some question whether the Castro faction (since the 1970s) was a communist faction in the PCC; such a view is erroneous. The Castro faction since the 1970s was striving for proletarian control over the state and a proletarian-controlled state's control over the economy and culture. As such, it was struggling for socialism.

The gradual rise of the Brezhnev faction in Eurasia meant that material changes occurred in the partial resurgence of the communist faction. Fidel Castro confirmed that improving Cuba's economic situation:

would not have been possible without the understanding of the Soviets, who accepted reduced amounts of sugar between 1972 and 1974 [i.e. Brezhnev era], without thereby reducing the increasing shipment of raw materials, food, fuel and equipment to Cuba and by increasing, on the other hand, the prices of our export products, thereby improving the terms of trade. (The Report to the First Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba: Historical Analysis of the Revolution, Cuban Communist Party, 1976, pp. 16-17. In: Congresos del PCC, Compendio Informativo Para Coberturas Periodisticas, Center for Information for the Press, Government of Cuba, congresopcc.cip.cu, Territorial y General Suarez, Plaza de la Revolucion, la Habana, 2021) (IMG)

The CIA-sponsored Maoist left-opportunists will promote the narrative that Cuba was a 'colony' of the 'Soviet social-imperialists' and so the 'social-fascist' 'puppet' Castro was merely promoting 'lies' to help his 'colonial masters'. However, an intelligence memorandum by the CIA's Office of National Estimates (ONE), which is responsible for handling economic data, confirmed:

Cuba also benefits from guaranteed Soviet purchases of sugar at prices usually above the world market level. (CHANGING INFLUENCES ON CUBAN FOREIGN POLICY, CIA, Office of National Estimates (ONE), December 29, 1972, p. 7) (IMG)

Long after the dismantlement of the CMEA and 30 years after the 1991 partition of Eurasia, when the Cubans were not under the 'duress' of the 'Soviet social-imperialists', the official website of the Cuban Communist Party (PCC) acknowledged that the CMEA – to which the Maoist left-opportunists refer as a 'Soviet social-imperialist' economic 'exploitation' body – gave preferential prices, a secure market, and necessary production inputs to Cuba:

In 1972, Cuba joined the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), which meant access to the necessary inputs for production processes and at the same time having a secure market for national productions, even with preferential prices. (Politica Socioeconomica, Congresos del PCC, Compendio Informativo Para Coberturas Periodisticas, Center for Information for the Press, Government of Cuba, congresopcc.cip.cu, Territorial y General Suarez, Plaza de la Revolucion, la Habana, 2021) (IMG)

Even though Cuba faced a drought in the early 1970s, Cuba nonetheless experienced a significant amount of economic growth, at least according to Cuban government source that emerged 30 years after the 1991 partition of Eurasia:

In general, between 1971 and 1975 the Cuban economy experienced an annual growth of 10%. (Politica Socioeconomica, Congresos del PCC, Compendio Informativo Para Coberturas Periodisticas, Center for Information for the Press, Government of Cuba, congresopcc.cip.cu, Territorial y General Suarez, Plaza de la Revolucion, la Habana, 2021) (IMG)

During the period 1970-1975, thanks to the assistance of the communist faction in Eurasia, as well as the fortunate increase in the world sugar prices, Cuba was able to import much of heavy industry from the Western countries. Cuba could not import much heavy industry from Eurasia since Eurasia was just recovering from years of Titoist economic sabotage inflicted upon heavy industry by the Khrushchev group. Anyways, the CIA reported:

Although Havana remains heavily dependent on Soviet trade and economic assistance, rising world sugar prices between 1970 and 1975 enabled Cuba to sharply step up purchases from the West. Despite a doubling of Cuban-Soviet trade in this same period, the share of imports from the West rose from 31 percent in 1970 to 48 percent in 1975. Havana considers many Western capital goods to be of higher quality than Soviet counterparts and has sought for some time to diversify its import sources. (The Cuban Economy and Trade with the West. In: WEEKLY SUMMARY, CIA, March 18, 1977, p. 14) (IMG)

Then in 1976, drought hit Cuba again, damaging its sugar production:

CUBA: Drought Hampers Sugar Production

Cuba's persistent drought probably will hamper sugar production this year despite improved efficiency by sugar processors. Sugar production this year will total about 6 million tons, roughly equal to last year's level. This stagnation reflects below-normal rainfall for the third consecutive year in the important cane-growing regions in eastern Cuba. Milling yields could improve, however, because of reduced caneburning and a planned increase in mechanical harvesting of the crop from 33 percent of total volume harvested in 1976 to 42 percent next year.

Stagnation of sugar output in 1977, together with prospective low world market sugar prices at least through mid-year, may force Cuba to curtail imports further from non-communist countries, already down by a third this year. Cuban hard-currency earnings in 1977 are unlikely to exceed this year's estimated \$800 million, an amount equal to only about two thirds of 1976 imports from non-communist countries. Cuba is reluctant to expand its hard-currency debt substantially beyond the current estimated \$1.3 billion because debt service obligations, estimated at \$400 million in 1977, are already burdensome. Imports from the USSR and other communist countries will probably be increased slightly again next year. Cuba will not feel a new financial constraint on imports from the communist countries because they will continue to pay 19 to 30 cents a pound for Cuban sugar compared with the likely free market price of 7 to 9 cents.

(‘CUBA: Drought Hampers Sugar Production’. In: NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN, December 27, 1976, pp. 6-7) (IMG)

By the way, the CIA document above once again confirmed that the Eurasians were purchasing Cuban sugar at a price two times to four times the world market price. If ‘Soviet social-imperialism’ bore material reality, then certainly the ‘Soviet social-imperialists’ did a poor job of ‘colonially exploiting’ ‘their appendage’ Cuba, contrary to how the global Maoist fascist reaction portrays the matter. The effects of the 1976 drought were perhaps somewhat more severe than the drought in the early 1970s, because they were coupled with drops in the world price of sugar, noted both the PCC and the CIA. The PCC media reported:

In that period, the economic evolution of the country as of 1976 was not without difficulties that led to the reconsideration of the goals agreed upon in the First Congress.

Among the adverse factors were the fall in the price of sugar, the severe droughts that affected the country for three years, the dependence of the national economy on the world capitalist market, and the deterioration of international economic relations, which was felt in the growing interest on foreign debt and on the increase in freight rates in international transport. (...). However, Fidel synthesized in the Central report rendered at the II Congress: “ *The current period 76-80, which is about to end, has been one of extraordinary advances in the organization of our economy, in the struggle to create the conditions for a greater efficiency in the use of our productive resources, and also of significant achievements in our economic development and in the purposes of increasingly satisfying the needs of our people, although it has been a period fraught with numerous difficulties of an objective nature, both internal and as external, which have prevented us from reaching everything that we have proposed.* ”

(Politica Socioeconomica, Congresos del PCC, Compendio Informativo Para Coberturas Periodisticas, Center for Information for the Press, Government of Cuba, congresopcc.cip.cu, Territorial y General Suarez, Plaza de la Revolucion, la Habana, 2021) (IMG)

The CIA too reported:

Stagnating Cuban sugar production, declining world sugar prices, and rapidly rising hard-currency debt led to a sharp cutback in Cuban imports from the West last year. Hard-currency earnings fell by approximately half, as the world free market price for sugar plummeted from 14 cents per pound at the beginning of the year to 7 or 8 cents per pound at the end of the year.

At the same time, Havana was forced to restrict additional borrowing because of its mounting hard-currency debt, estimated at \$1.3 billion, and the bleak prospects for a significant rebound in world free market sugar prices. An estimated 30 percent of deliveries from the noncommunist world were held up at Cuba's request.

Continued low world sugar prices will limit Havana's hard-currency earnings in 1977 to about \$800 million—close to the 1976 level.

(The Cuban Economy and Trade with the West. In: WEEKLY SUMMARY, CIA, March 18, 1977, p. 14) (IMG)

The economic damages inflicted upon Cuba reduced the amounts of funds available to the communist faction in Cuba, making it harder for the communist faction to wage the secret service conflict against the Titoist faction. This gave the Titoist faction greater lobbying power, leading to the pursuit of Titoist economic policies, especially the decentralization and further bureaucratization of the economy through the demagogical policy of 'worker self-management'. In 1976, the policy laid down in Cuba was the System of Direction and Planning of the Economy (SDPE). The SDPE system reaffirmed the policy of decentralizing planning to the local enterprises such that the planning process would become subordinate to the local districts' 'needs':

Planning is a unique system in which the three objective economic levels must be integrated: global of the entire national economy, branch and companies, coordinated with their territorial planning. The determining and decisive interest is that of the national economy as a whole. Therefore, the plans of the companies will be subordinate to the objectives of the development of the given territory, in aspects such as finances, standard of living, labor resources, local natural resources and others. (First Congress of the PCC: Thesis and Resolutions: On the System of Direction and Planning of the Economy, Cuban Communist Party, 1976, p. 5. In: Congresos del PCC, Compendio Informativo Para Coberturas Periodisticas, Center for Information for the Press, Government of Cuba, congresopcc.cip.cu, Territorial y General Suarez, Plaza de la Revolucion, la Habana, 2021) (IMG)

Part D of the new SDPE document approved of and advanced by the congress of the PCC called for the worker self-management principle – a populist means of decentralizing the economy and proliferating bureaucracy – to be incorporated into the planning process:

d) Combine the necessary centralization of the main decisions with the maximum possible participation of the workers, the administration of the companies and the intermediate levels of management in economic planning and management. In relation to this, it is necessary to grant the corresponding autonomy to companies in economic-operational decisions. (First Congress of the PCC: Thesis and Resolutions: On the System of Direction and Planning of the Economy, Cuban Communist Party, 1976, p. 2. In: Congresos del PCC, Compendio Informativo Para Coberturas Periodisticas, Center for Information for the Press, Government of Cuba, congresopcc.cip.cu, Territorial y General Suarez, Plaza de la Revolucion, la Habana, 2021) (IMG)

Again, remember that worker self-management makes the production slower by so-called 'democratizing' the individual enterprises. Along with such a demagogical anarchistic measure, came the decentralization of the economic decision-making to such enterprises. The decentralization sowed further chaos in the economy, making it harder for enterprises to coordinate. Out of such chaos grew the bureaucratic mess, that strengthened the corrupt bureaucrats at the expense of the proletariat in the secret service battle for control over the state. Furthermore, the centralization of the economy allows the communist counter-intelligence service to have to surveil only a few economic bodies, whereas the decentralization of the economy forces the counter-intelligence authorities to have to surveil many economic bodies, thus making it harder to hunt down the corrupt bureaucrats. Pay attention to the following data provided in 1976 congress of the PCC, which shows the percent membership composition in the Party:

Workers in Industrial Production, Agriculture, Construction, and Services: 35.9%

Professional and Technical Workers: 9.2%

Workers in the Tasks of Political and Administrative Direction: 42.1%

Administrative Workers: 4.1%

Small Farmers: 1.8%

Others: 6.9%

(First Congress of the PCC: Theses and Resolutions on the Internal Life of the Party, PCC, 1976, p. 4. p. 50. In: Congresos del PCC, Compendio Informativo Para Coberturas Periodisticas, Center for Information for the Press, Government of Cuba, congresopcc.cip.cu, Territorial y General Suarez, Plaza de la Revolucion, la Habana, 2021) (IMG)

As can be seen, the 'Workers in Industrial Production, Agriculture, Construction, and Services' and the 'Small Farmers' together comprised $35.9\% + 1.8\% = 37.7\%$ of the membership composition of the Party. On the other hand, adding the percent composition of the white-collar elements in the Party, represented by the 'Professional and Technical Workers', the 'Workers in the Tasks of Political and Administrative Direction', and the 'Administrative Workers', we get $9.2\% + 42.1\% + 4.1\% = 55.4\%$. As can be seen, the white-collar elements in the Party formed a majority at the time of the 1976 congress, which is what generated the Party line in favor of the revisionist pro-bureaucrat policy of economic decentralization.

After the 1976-1977 hit taken by the communist faction, however, there came some improvements in the conditions faced by Cuba, which once again strengthened the agents of the proletariat while undermining the agents of the bureaucrats. Fortunately, the revisionist economic policy of 'worker self-management' was implemented only partially:

The participation of the workers in the elaboration of the plans of the companies has not been possible to carry out at the desired level. At times, there has been a lack of programming the necessary time for their effective inclusion in this process. On other occasions, the meetings to discuss the Control Figures of the Plan have not been properly organized. In addition, there are cases of lack of attention from company administrations and central and local State agencies, in terms of fulfilling the task of fully informing the groups of workers.

In this way, it has been manifested, in many companies, the fact of not explaining to the workers, later, when the Directive Figures have been issued, the reasons that have led to not accepting their proposals for reasons that vary but that have, generally, fundamentals referring to supply difficulties or of a technical nature.

The participation of the workers in the elaboration of the plans is a basic element of the policy of the Communist Party and of the socialist State that favors the initiative of the masses and of the cadres and that constitutes a fundamental aspect of socialist democracy to which shall be given utmost attention.

(Second Congress of the PCC: Resolutions: On the System of the Direction and Planning of the Economy, Cuban Communist Party, 1980, pp. 2-3. In: Congresos del PCC, Compendio Informativo Para Coberturas Periodisticas, Center for Information for the Press, Government of Cuba, congresopcc.cip.cu, Territorial y General Suarez, Plaza de la Revolucion, la Habana, 2021) (IMG)

This was correlated with the fact that the communist faction in Cuba's Party was able to actually carry through with its agenda of increasing the working class representation in the percent membership composition of the Party. Hence, by the year 1980, the 'Production Workers' and the 'Service Workers' together reportedly formed 47.3% of the percent membership composition of the PCC (source: Vanguard Party Politics in Cuba, Marifeli Perez-Stable. In: 'Conflict and Change in Cuba', edited by Enrique A. Baloyra & James A. Morris, p. 75. Citing: Cuban government data.) (IMG). At the same time, the white collar elements formed $15.0 + 23.6 + 4.3 + 4.3 = 47.2\%$ of the Party membership ((source: Vanguard Party Politics in Cuba) (IMG). One could call this a neck-and-neck race between the white collar and blue collar elements. The election of Reagan in 1980, and the gradual replacement of the agents of the Carter faction with the agents of the G. H. W. Bush faction, further strengthened the CIA and the US military, allowing for a more aggressive projection of American imperialist influence in Latin America. Although by 1980, the pace of Titoization had been slowed down and the blue-collar elements had seen an increase in their membership percentage in the Party, the December 1980 congress saw a partial resurgence of Titoism. The second congress of the PCC in 1980 reaffirmed:

The participation of the workers in the elaboration of the plans is a basic element of the policy of the Communist Party and of the socialist state that favors the initiative of the masses and the cadres and that constitutes a fundamental aspect of socialist democracy to which there will be to be given the utmost attention. (Second Congress of the PCC: Resolutions: On the System of the Direction and Planning of the Economy, Cuban Communist Party, 1980, pp. 2-3. In: Congresos del PCC, Compendio Informativo Para Coberturas Periodisticas, Center for Information for the Press, Government of Cuba, congresopcc.cip.cu, Territorial y General Suarez, Plaza de la Revolucion, la Habana, 2021) (IMG)

The conditions became even worse in the mid-1980s, for there came an even greater increase in Titoist influence projected from Eurasia. During the era of the Anglo-American spy Gorbachev (see C24S4), the pressures on Cuba to decentralize was much stronger, because this was part of the strategy to sabotage Cuba's economy through greater bureaucratization. Thus, the PCC programs of the 1980s too decentralized the economy further and further:

In this sense, the Party and Government Measures Programs stand out as instruments of direction to ensure the economic and social objectives of the years 1983 and 1984, approved in the XI and VIII Plenary sessions of the Central Committee of the PCC in the years 1982 and 1983, respectively.

These Programs decentralized economic, social and political tasks as a way of ensuring the integral development of the country in the corresponding year and constituted a more efficient working instrument to centrally control those activities that were decisive to achieve prioritized objectives.

(Politica Socioeconomica, Congresos del PCC, Compendio Informativo Para Coberturas Periodisticas, Center for Information for the Press, Government of Cuba, congresopcc.cip.cu, Territorial y General Suarez, Plaza de la Revolucion, la Habana, 2021) (IMG)

Since the 1980s until the late 2010s at least, Cuba's economy had been decentralizing further and further, thus generating more and more economic inefficiencies and bureaucracy. The decentralization increased further afterwards, especially in the 1990s. Back in the Gorbachev years, CIA-sponsored media was actively spreading the news of the Castro faction's deep conflicts with the Gorbachev faction in Eurasia, so to give the Gorbachev faction the excuse to condemn the Cubans as 'disrespectful' to 'fraternal USSR' hence 'deserving' to be de-funded by the Eurasians. Once aid to Cuba would reduce, the Fidel Castro faction would be weakened and Gorbachev's agents in Cuba would gain greater leverage in the factional conflict, thus being able to rollback the proletarian influence over the Cuban state apparatus and open up that country to Anglo-American colonization. To foil such a conspiracy, Fidel Castro publicly endorsed Gorbachev and denied the correct accusations that he opposed Gorbachev. This was a correct move, and can be compared to the fact that a few days before Operation Barbarossa, the Soviet media deliberately denied that a war with Germany was soon to come.

With the Titoist faction in the CPSU – itself generated from the majority white collar membership – fully in charge by 1985, the pressures in favor of the bureaucrats and white collar elements in the PCC increased as well; hence, in 1985, the 'Production Workers' and the 'Service Workers' together comprised 43.2% of the percent membership composition of the PCC, whereas the white collar elements increased to 47.4% of the Party membership (source: Vanguard Party Politics in Cuba, Marifeli Perez-Stable. In: 'Conflict and Change in Cuba', edited by Enrique A. Baloyra & James A. Morris, p. 75. Citing: Cuban government data.) (IMG). The proletariat comprised a large minority in the PCC, but were not able to dominate the PCC. On the other hand, the white collar elements maintained a slight majority during that period. While Cuba's revolutionaries did make mistakes, for the most part, the problems concerning the role of the working class in the PCC as well as the decentralization measures are the result of the Anglo-American intelligence stabs in the front and the Titoist stabs in the back. At least for the period studied, it would not be fair to say that Cuba reached the phase of the 'dictatorship of the proletariat', and instead remained a progressive bourgeois-democracy that was led by the proletariat. In that respect, therefore, Cuba fulfilled the first stage of the development of People's Democracy but not the second stage. Left-deviationist currents misinterpret this phenomenon as to imply that one should launch another 'revolution from below', an armed rebellion to destroy the Cuban government in order to establish a socialist state – this view is incorrect. In Cuba, the proletariat already control a large segment of the state apparatus and it would be counterproductive and pro-imperialist to launch an armed rebellion to demolish the whole Cuban government. Rather, the correct step is for the Cuban proletariat to merely expand their influence over the state apparatus by gaining greater influence over the means of violence – the armed forces and the security and intelligence bodies – and then purging the corrupt bureaucrats in the Party and increasing the quantity of the communist blue-collar elements in the Party, as the key steps for the transition to the second stage of People's Democracy, namely the dictatorship of the proletariat. In the years examined, the Cuban proletariat, in the face of intense Titoist backstabbing and Anglo-American front-stabbing, could not establish a dictatorship of the proletariat. However, because of the assistance they received from the freedom forces worldwide, and obviously due to their own efforts as well, they were able to hold out and to entrench themselves as a large minority in the Cuban state, thus making Cuba a progressive bourgeois-democracy led by but not dictated by the proletarian class, much like many of the Peoples' Democracies in their first stage. With the decline of imperialism, Titoism will decline as well and the proletarian elements in the state can increase their quantity to cause a qualitative leap, thereby making Cuba a well-entrenched dictatorship of the proletariat.

There is and has been plenty of mismanagement and bureaucracy in Cuba going back to the 1960s. The reason why the Cuban system deserves admiration is that it advanced more than all the other Latin American countries in combatting such bureaucracy by elevating the class enemies of the bureaucrats – the proletariat – over the state. In many of the other Latin American countries, under the banner of liberalization, the black-marketeers and bureaucratic oligarchic thieves were legalized and placed in charge of government; and since they were legalized and given state legitimacy, they were no longer defined as bureaucrats, mis-managers, and black-marketeers. Cuba has advanced more than most others because it has cracked down on so many parasitic class forces and has elevated the proletariat as replacement; that is what the progressives should have presented as the admirable

feature about Cuba. More correct than the narrative that the US sanctions have made Cuba poor, is the narrative that the sanctions imposed by US finance capital have given increased factional leverage to the corrupt bureaucrats in Cuba thus causing internal economic mismanagement and sabotage. Unfortunately, many progressives have been somewhat dishonest about Cuba, by sweeping the fact of the bureaucratic class there under the rug. The problem with such a dishonest narrative is that it presents Cuban society as almost monolithically proletarian and socialist, does not recognize that class struggles between the bureaucrats and the proletariat exist, and thus presents anything that goes wrong in Cuba as purely 'externally'-made. It does not mention the alliance of US finance capital (an 'external factor') with the corrupt bureaucrats (the 'internal factor') in Cuba, and does not mention the Cuban proletariat's struggle against the Cuban bureaucrats who generate the fifth column serving US intelligence and cause deformities in the Cuban system. Hence, the reason why Cuba deserves admiration is not that therein thrives a rosy economy, which actually exists only in the exaggerative descriptions of the romantics, but rather the admirable thing about Cuba is that it has remained as a state far more under the influence of the proletarian class than most of the other states since the 1989-1991 collapses. And such a continued high influence of the proletariat over the Cuban state has allowed that country to retain the vital economic standards and has prevented that country from descending into the reign of economic terror by which most of Latin America was struck.

C22S7. People's Democratic Development in Albania / Titoization and Anti-Titoist Resistance in Albania *** IMG-All-{Albania}

Even as late as 1955;

Yugoslav clandestine activities against Albania have continued, at any rate until recently. Cedo Mijovic, Kapllan, ... and Vlado Popovic, who is a major in the UDB, are among the chief recruiters of Albanian agents who are sent into Albania. General Dushan Mugosha (member of the Communist Party of Serbia, Deputy in the Federal Parliament, and a director of all immigrants) does not appear as one of the recruiters, although he directs these activities. He certainly wants to overthrow the present Tirana regime and substitute one under Yugoslav influence. But Mugosha has said that they must wait for the opportune moment. ('1. Yugoslav-Albanian Relations 2. Yugoslav Attitude vis-à-vis the Soviet Union 3. League of Albanian Refugees (Prizren Committee)', CIA, January 3, 1955, p. 2) (IMG)

Hence,:

The Yugoslav Government geeks, in a quiet way, a closer relationship with the National Committee for a Free Albania - NCFa, and with the Albanian emigrants in the West, in an effort to gain greater influence in this refugee community. ('1. Yugoslav-Albanian Relations 2. Yugoslav Attitude vis-à-vis the Soviet Union 3. League of Albanian Refugees (Prizren Committee)', CIA, January 3, 1955, p. 2) (IMG)

Yet, Albania was bullied by the Kremlin Titoists to re-establish diplomatic relations with the Yugoslav regime and to allow a Yugoslav fascist spy ('Yugoslav ambassador') into Albania. Nonetheless, the Albanians refused to give much fanfare to the Yugoslav regime:

No fanfare accompanied the renewal of diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia, and the arrival of the Yugoslav ambassador in Tirana was barely mentioned in the press. ('1. ALBANIAN REACTION TO GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION 2. NEW ECONOMIC POLICY 3. RAPPROCHEMENT WITH YUGOSLAVIA', CIA, March 13, 1955, p. 2) (IMG)

A document by the CIA Office of Current Intelligence (OCI) stated:

Preoccupied with the maintenance of domestic order, both public and party, plagued with the most primitive economy in all of Europe, and ... suspicious of Yugoslavia, the Albanian leaders have been unhappy with the trend of soviet policies since the death of Stalin. Inter alia, only lip service – and not much of that – was paid to the post-1954 Soviet bloc campaign to improve relations with Yugoslavia. (ALBANIAN RELATIONS WITH THE USSR AND COMMUNIST CHINA, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), May 30, 1961, p. 1) (IMG)

The Kremlin Titoists assassins who rose to power after murdering Stalin, stabbed People's Democratic Albania in the back by discouraging Albanian investment into heavy industry, so to keep it an agrarian country with a weak military-industrial backbone, so that it could be easily colonized by the Yugoslav regime. This fact has been confirmed by Enver Hoxha and the Albanian media several times (see for example 'The Khrushchevites'). However, it has also been confirmed by CIA-Mossad agents. For example, the Soros agent Miranda Vickers wrote:

During the war, Italian mineral exploration had revealed the extent of Albania's raw material base, yet both Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union wanted the Albanians to concentrate on developing agriculture rather than their considerable mineral resources. (The Albanians: A Modern History, Miranda Vickers, 2011) (IMG)

The emphasis was to no longer be on heavy industry but rather on agriculture:

In 1954, Enver Hoxha, First Secretary of the Albanian Party Central Committee, announced that the USSR had granted Albania considerable credit and other economic privileges for the further development of the country's economy. It was implied that the economic aid was of an agricultural nature. ('SOVIET ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC: LOANS, CREDITS, AND GRANTS', Intelligence Memorandum, CIA, August 20, 1956, p. 14) (IMG{Bulgaria})

Thus:

The government's new economic policy to increase production of consumer goods, introduced in the summer of 1953, has been disappointing. ('1. ALBANIAN REACTION TO GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION 2. NEW ECONOMIC POLICY 3. RAPPROCHEMENT WITH YUGOSLAVIA', CIA, March 13, 1955, p. 2) (IMG)

The defunding of Albanian heavy industry 'thanks' to the pressures of Moscow Titoists no doubt resulted in only partial success in the Five Year Plan:

During the 1950s Albania embarked on an ambitious programme of electrification and industrialization. Despite protests from Moscow, greater attention was paid to the exploitation of Albania's rich mineral wealth, which included chrome, oil, nickel, coal and copper. The first five-year plan, 1950-5, which was aimed primarily at relieving acute shortages and strengthening the overall economy, proved to be far too ambitious.... It did, however, manage to produce the Vlore cement works, a sugar-cane factory, the tobacco fermentation plant at Shkoder, and the Tirana textile combine, plus a few tractors and threshing machines. (The Albanians: A Modern History, Miranda Vickers, 2011) (IMG)

Meanwhile, the Yugoslav regime continued its hostile and subversive activities against People's Democratic Albania, even after the exchange of embassies:

All Albanian political emigrants in Yugoslavia believed they were going to be sent back to Albania after the exchange of embassies. Mugosha issued a declaration that they would never do this, regardless of relations with Albania, and drew attention to Tito's declarations on the subject of normalization. ('1. Yugoslav-Albanian Relations 2. Yugoslav Attitude vis-à-vis the Soviet Union 3. League of Albanian Refugees (Prizren Committee)', CIA, January 3, 1955, p. 2) (IMG{Titoist Yugoslavia})

As always, there was a correlation between the wave of Titoization that struck the Party of Labour of Albania between 1953 to 1956 and the increase in the Party recruitment of the white-collar elements. In the 3rd Congress of the Party of Labour of Albania, Enver Hoxha remarked:

As Marxism-Leninism and the experience of our Party teach us, the strength of the Party and the steel unity of its ranks rests, first of all, on the social composition of the Party, on the quality and purity of its ranks. It is for this reason that the strengthening of the composition of our Party has been and remains one of the primary problems.

During the period since the 2nd Congress, the party organizations have carried out more careful work to bring into the ranks of the Party the best people, those most loyal and determined, in the first place, from the working class, from the ranks of the working peasantry, and the people's intelligentsia. As a result of this work, some successes have been achieved in the improvement of the composition of the Party. At the 2nd Congress only 11.5 per cent of the members were of worker status, whereas today workers comprise 17.7 per cent of the membership of the Party, that is, there is an increase of 6.2 per cent. In the admissions to the Party during this period workers make up 23.55 per cent, members of the agricultural cooperatives 6.18 per cent, members of the artisan cooperatives 2.61 per cent, poor and middle peasants 37.5 per cent, while office workers, students, and so on, make up 30.15 per cent.

From the above figures it results that, despite some advance in comparison with the past, in the work for the improvement of the composition of the Party, especially as regards the more rapid increase of its ranks with workers, we have not done very well. In the admissions to the Party, not only do workers not occupy the first place but, in comparison with those admitted from the other strata, in particular from among the office workers, the percentage of workers is still quite unsatisfactory.

All the conditions have been created in our country for the constant strengthening of the composition of the Party, because our industry has been set up and is growing. Increasing the ranks of the Party with elements from the working class is a vital question for the Party. However, it is noticed that some party committees and organizations do not properly tackle the problem of training elements from the working class for admission to the Party, but frequently submit to the requests of office workers, carried away by the phrases, in the ready presentation of which such people are well skilled. The party organizations should thoroughly understand that the time has come when they must achieve a more marked increase in the percentage of workers in the total membership of the Party, and educate these elements from the working class through active work. Naturally, this does not mean that from now on we should fling the doors of the Party wide open to all the workers who may wish to join the Party.

(REPORT AT THE 3rd CONGRESS OF THE PLA, Central Committee of the Party of Labour of Albania, Enver Hoxha, May 25, 1956. In: Enver Hoxha Selected Works, Vol. 2, The "8 Nëntori" Publishing House, Tirana, 1975, p. 555-557. MIA)

Hoxha credibly claimed that some within the Party were liberally recruiting white collar elements while not sufficiently elevating the blue-collar elements in political education so to join Party membership. Since the previous Congress of the Party was in 1952, it is likely that Moscow Titoist pressures and influence in the Party resulted in such a shift. This factor definitely also must have reinforced the pro-Titoization tendency in the 3rd Congress.

At the time, since the reactionary character of the Khrushchev group had not yet become well-known amongst communists, an open revolt against the Khrushchev group would not have been feasible, and such an open revolt would have been exploited by the Titoists to crush the then-isolated communist resistance against Titoization. With the advent of the 20th CPSU Congress and Khrushchev's infamous Titoization speech, Enver Hoxha, like pretty much every other communist leader in the bloc, paid lip service to Khrushchev's Titoist theses in order to survive politically against Khrushchev's Titoization agenda, buy time, so that later on, when the true face of the Moscow Titoists had been revealed enough, the fomenting of a strong action against Khrushchev's group could be undertaken. The excerpt of Hoxha's speech is provided by the Communist League of UK, which was the well-known Hoxhaist organization founded by the famous 'Hoxhaist before Hoxha' William Bland, one of the most well known authors in support of the Party of Labour of Albania. Here is the excerpt of Hoxha's speech cited by the Communist League (UK):

The 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has made a profound Marxist-Leninist analysis of the decisive role played in the building of socialism and communism by the masses of the people, and the great damage caused by the cult of personality, alien to Marxism-Leninism.

These incorrect and non-Marxist conceptions on the individual were developed and cultivated over a long period in regard to Comrade Stalin.

The great error of J. V. Stalin lies in the fact that not only did he accept the praises and flatteries addressed to him, but he himself supported and encouraged these anti-Marxist viewpoints.

The cult of personality and the leadership practice of J. V. Stalin were marked by the open violation of Leninist principles of the collective leadership of the Party, were marked by violations of the Leninist norms of the Party. The contempt of J. V. Stalin for the norms of Party life and for the principle of collective leadership of the Party, the solution of problems in an individual manner on his part, the contempt for Party opinion, taking even severe measures against those who expressed a contrary opinion to his own could not fail to cause, and did cause, great harm, producing grave deviations from Leninist rules of the life of the Party and the violation of revolutionary legality. He did not show the necessary vigilance on the eve of the Patriotic War against Nazi Germany; he did not devote the necessary attention to the further development of socialist agriculture and to the material well-being of the collective farms; he supported and incited an erroneous line in the Yugoslav affairs.

(Enver Hoxha: 'Rapport d'activite du comité central du Parti du Travail d'Albanie au Ille Congres du Parti' (Report on the Activity of the Central Committee of the Party of Labour of Albania to the 3rd Congress of the Party) (May 1956); Tirana; 1956; p. 180, 181, 182-83. In: 'DIMITROV: REPLY TO READER', Communist League (UK)) (IMG)

This fact – Hoxha's lip service to Khrushchev's Titoist theses – was later covered up and omitted by Hoxha probably so that he could present his resistance against Khrushchev as completely firm and devoid of the slightest 'vacillation'. Hoxha's temporary lip service in favor of the Titoist theses of the 20th CPSU congress was a strategically necessary means of pretending to fit in the Eastern Bloc, because back then, an open revolt against Khrushchev would have served the Titoists by helping them isolate the Albanian communists. Khrushchev was to be overtly confronted at a later

more opportune time, when Khrushchev and the degenerate nature of the Titoist theses of the 20th Congress were sufficiently exposed among the communists of the Eastern Bloc. This correct strategy which the Party of Labour of Albania pursued was also the correct strategy pursued by the Romanian communists headed by Gheorghiu-Dej and the French communists headed by Maurice Thorez. Both of the latter leaders tried to do what Hoxha did.

Even as late as the 1980s, Hoxha – while acknowledging that Dej and Thorez were opposed to the Yugoslav regime and hostile to Nikita Khrushchev's lines – also made the error of denouncing Dej and Thorez for their temporary lip service to Khrushchev's counter-revolutionary theses; in other words, Hoxha criticized Dej and Thorez for doing precisely what Hoxha himself had done. All the while, having largely omitted the fact of Hoxha's own temporary lip service to Khrushchev's Titoist theses, Hoxha presented himself as inflexibly opposed to the Kremlin Titoists. While the fact of omitting Hoxha's own lip service to the Titoist theses is understandable and was perhaps needed for keeping the 'moral high ground' against the left-opportunists, the fact that Hoxha criticized Dej and Thorez for pursuing the same strategy that Hoxha himself pursued was a historiographic error from Hoxha. The opportunity for confronting the Kremlin Titoists did emerge for Albania by the 1960s. The CIA Office of Current Intelligence stated:

An opportunity for registering Albania's strong discontent arose in the spring of 1960, when Peiping brought its growing dispute with Moscow into the open. Here for the first time was a potential center of support for a militant dissent from Soviet strategy. At both the Soviet-convened Communist conferences at Bucharest, in June and at Moscow in November, the Albanian leaders, Hoxha and Shehu, unequivocally, and seemingly irrevocably, cast their lot with Peiping. (ALBANIAN RELATIONS WITH THE USSR AND COMMUNIST CHINA, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), May 30, 1961, p. 1) (IMG)

Albania's alliance with the People's Republic of China must not be understood as genuine friendship with that regime. Enver Hoxha basically regarded Chinese government's 'opposition' to Khrushchev and the Kremlin Titoists as semi-fake. Here is an excerpt of a document written by him in 1962:

THE CHINESE ARE GIVING KHRUSHCHEV A HAND (APRIL 6, 1962)

The Chinese ambassador came to transmit to me a message from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to the Central Committee of the Party of Labour of Albania which, in substance, says: The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China is of the opinion that a meeting should be held with the Soviets on the basis of the proposals of the parties of Indonesia, Vietnam and New Zealand, in order to iron out differences and strengthen the unity of the socialist camp. We must take the initiative, say the Chinese comrades, and uphold the banner of unity. They add that the conditions we have laid down for this meeting are understandable to the Chinese, but will not be accepted by the other parties, therefore, for its part, **the Communist Party of China lays down no preconditions.** It proposes that we exchange party delegations to discuss the issue.

We shall reply to them. We accept the exchange of delegations with the Communist Party of China, but we will not alter our stand in the least in regard to the proposed meeting with the Soviet revisionists.

This is a wrong course the Chinese comrades are trying to lead us on to, it is an opportunist road of vacillations and concessions to the Khrushchev traitor group which finds itself in grave difficulties, and is intriguing in order to escape defeat. The Chinese comrades are giving it a hand to pull it out of the mire, giving it the possibility to strengthen its positions and go on the attack again.

(Reflections on China, Enver Hoxha. Bold added)

Negotiations with enemies are useful, but require preconditions. According to Hoxha, the Chinese government was willing to iron out differences without preconditions. While Hoxha regarded China as an ally, he did not see them as being truly on his side. Nonetheless, for the while, the Chinese regime leaders held a line useful to the Party of Labour of Albania, hence the overt-level alliance of the two parties. However, none of that is to mean that at any point in time did the Albanians regard the Chinese regime leaders as true comrades. Enver Hoxha further stated:

Many a time later I have turned back to this period of the history of the Communist Party of China, trying to figure out how and why the profoundly revisionist line of 1956 [adopted by the Chinese] subsequently seemed to change direction, and for a time, became "pure", "anti-revisionist" and "Marxist-Leninist". It is a fact, for example, that in 1960 the Communist Party of China seemed to be strongly opposing the revisionist theses of Nikita Khrushchev and confirmed that "it was defending Marxism-Leninism" from the distortions which were being made to it, etc. It was precisely because China came out against modern revisionism in 1960 and seemed to be adhering to Marxist-Leninist positions that brought about that our Party stood shoulder to shoulder with it in the struggle which we had begun against the Khrushchevites.

However, time confirmed, and this is reflected extensively in the documents of our Party, that in no instance, either in 1956 or in the '60s did the Communist Party of China proceed or act from the positions of Marxism-Leninism.

In 1956 it rushed to take up the banner of revisionism, in order to elbow Khrushchev out and gain the role of the leader in the communist and workers' movement for itself. But when Mao Zedong and his associates saw that they would not easily emerge triumphant over the patriarch of modern revisionism, Khrushchev, through the revisionist contest, they changed their tactic, pretended to reject their former flag, presented themselves as "pure Marxist-Leninists", striving in this way, to win those positions which they had been unable to win with their former tactic. When this second tactic turned out no good, either, they "discarded" their second, allegedly Marxist-Leninist, flag and came out in the arena as they had always been, opportunists, loyal champions of a line of conciliation and capitulation towards capital and reaction. We were to see all these things confirmed in practice, through a long, difficult and glorious struggle which our Party waged in defence of Marxism-Leninism.

(The Khrushchevites, Hoxha)

People's Democratic Albania 'allied' with the left-deviationist government of China as means of countering the right-deviation of the Kremlin Titoists headed by Khrushchev, much as how the Stalin faction in the CPSU 'allied' with the remnants of the Trotskyite left-deviationists in order to keep the Bukharinite right-deviation in check. And much as how the Bukharinites and Trotskyites were overtly hostile to each other but covertly allied to launch a pincer attack on the USSR on behalf of imperialists, the Maoist left-deviationist regime of China and the Khrushchevian right-deviationist administration in Eurasia were overtly hostile but covertly allied. Both the Chinese Maoists and the Khrushchevian Eurasians were allied to the Yugoslav regime and supported international Titoism (more on this later). People's Democratic Albania could never possibly be a true friend of the Chinese regime because China's regime was a Yugoslav satellite of the left-deviationist type, even though for a while, China 'criticized' Tito and his regime, but also semi-officially praised it several times. Nonetheless, Albania rightly 'allied' with left-deviationist Titoist China to keep the right-deviationist Titoist administration in Eurasia in check, much as how the communist faction led by Stalin 'allied' with remnants of Trotskyites so to

weaken Bukharin's right-wing faction and so to move away from NEP. It was not impossible to utilize the fake 'contradictions' between the Chinese Maoists and the Khrushchevians in order to obtain concessions. The Syrian Arab Republic during the Al-Assad years was able to, through a special process, compel the Iranian regime led by the Shah to provide loans to Syria, while Syria was working to further undermine the regime of the Shah under the guise of fighting against the 'enemies' of Iran's regime. Anyways, the new situation allowed Albania to get the Chinese to sponsor Albania, thus allowing Albania to industrialize and allowing the Albanian communists to stand up against the Moscow Titoists:

The Chinese Communists, on the other hand, have in many ways indicated their support of the "heretical" Albanian stand. They, for example, replaced Moscow as Albania's principal supplier of grain, providing about 180,000 tons since last September for credit (as against 70,000 tons from the USSR, at least a part of which required cash) – this despite famine conditions in China. And in late April, they announced a new, long-term Sino-Albanian aid agreement granting 125,000,000 in credits for Albania's Five Year Plan (1961-1965). These actions substantially reduce the ability of Moscow to apply economic pressure against Tirana. (ALBANIAN RELATIONS WITH THE USSR AND COMMUNIST CHINA, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), May 30, 1961, p. 3) (IMG)

On the other hand, the Kremlin Titoists – in an operation headed by the Anglo-Yugoslav agent Yuri Andropov (see C20S13) – launched a Putsch against the Party of Labour of Albania and above all targeted Hoxha himself:

Their latest move against Moscow, however, came this month with the holding of a public trial of ten "traitors and spies" who were charged with seeking – as agents of Greece, Yugoslavia, and the United States – to overthrow the Albanian regime. Testimony during the trial, was in fact, directed against Soviet policies particularly those toward Yugoslavia. The coup itself, far from being hatched in the Free World, represented – according to all of our evidence – an attempt by the USSR last summer to purge the party of anti-Soviet and pro-Chinese elements.

Since that abortive coup, Moscow has attacked Tirana through economic pressures, innuendo in public speeches, and direct criticism of the Albanian party by ... Italian Communist Party chief Togliatti.

(ALBANIAN RELATIONS WITH THE USSR AND COMMUNIST CHINA, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), May 30, 1961, pp. 1-2) (IMG)

It is important to note that the putsch launched against the Hoxha faction was not a case of Eurasia seeking to establish its own 'imperial' domination over Albania. Rather, the goal was to turn Albania into a Titoist state to be devoured by the Balkan Empire, so that the Anglo-Americans would control that territory. In other words, the coup was a plot aimed at pushing Albania out of the Eastern Bloc instead of having it be 'controlled' by Eurasia.

Since the 1960s, plans were established for developing a network of bunkers to defend Albania against foreign aggression by the Greeks in the south, the Yugoslavs in the north, and the Italians in the west. Tito's fascist group established a settler-colonial fascist apartheid regime in Kosovo. In their desire to extend the boundaries of their Titoist settler-colonial empire, Belgrade's ruling fascist junta hatched plots for the swallow-up of Albania. In such circumstances, setting up special defensive networks of bunkers throughout Albania was a necessary means of resisting a potential Yugoslav regime aggression.

As with the rest of the Peoples' Democracies, Albania faced heavy economic pressures, which weakened the communist faction in that country and allowed the counter-revolutionary faction to grow. This led to the implementation of the revisionist 'worker self-management' line which was later famously criticized by Hoxha himself. Michael Kaser, who provided economic advice on Eastern Europe to several of the Western governments and NATO bodies, wrote:

However, by 1965 it had become clear that the Albanian leadership was not satisfied with the outcomes generated by the economic system.

The Third Five-Year Plan target for global industrial production was 97 percent fulfilled. Taking into account the economic difficulties caused by the Soviet Union's economic blockade, it would seem that the industrial sector of the Albanian economy had performed well over the period 1961-65. However, it should be recalled that following the split with the Soviet Union in 1961 there was a drastic downward revision of plan targets and, as the discussion in Section III shows other sectors fared less well than industry. Thus, under admittedly difficult environmental circumstances, the classical Soviet model of economic administration was not producing economic growth rates to satisfy leadership. More seriously, it has been suggested that economic failures were "a major factor in triggering off the unrest that began to spread through Albania during 1965 and 1966". In other words, Enver Hoxha's position as leader of the PLA was in jeopardy and this, probably more than any other factor indicated the [tendency toward] change.

(...). In October 1965 the PLA took a further step, apparently attempting to [respond to] the level of popular unrest, when its Central Committee, in conjunction with the Council of Ministers issued a call to the masses to participate in drawing up the Fourth Five-Year Plan. In the document, it was explained that Albania was surrounded by imperialist and revisionist enemies, and was being subjected to an economic blockade and that, therefore, would have to build socialism relying on its own resources. (...). It was argued that investments and construction projects should be more profitable, timely and essential". Workers were exhorted to approve plans which minimized expense and waste and party members were reminded that their duty was to further the "ideo-political" education of the workers. The only specific change in planning introduced in the Appeal was that henceforth workers in enterprises would discuss broad plan targets, which the enterprises would use in drafting a detailed project plan rather than be sent a detailed plan from the state hierarchy.

(ALBANIA – A UNIQUELY SOCIALIST ECONOMY, Michael Kaser and Adi Schnytzer, East European Economies Post-Helsinki: A Compendium of Papers Submitted to the Joint Economic Committee of the Congress of the United States, pp. 586-588) (IMG)

William Ash, at the time a Maoist sympathizer with People's Democratic Albania, was one of the people who travelled to that country to study it and provide information for other sympathizers with Albania. William Ash too wrote:

Industrial enterprises in Albania are the property of the people and are run by the class enjoying state power, the workers themselves who, indeed, through their representatives in the Government manage the country's entire economy. But is this merely an ideal or do the workers actually exercise control in the places where they are employed?

The managers of enterprises are appointed by the appropriate ministry and are responsible to it for the organisation of production. In this task they are assisted by the Party branch, the trade union and the various workers' collectives in that particular concern. Manager, Party and trade union run the enterprise in compliance with the directives of the current plan on the basis of democratic centralism, combining centralised leadership with the maximum creative participation of workers engaged directly in production.

(Pickaxe and Rifle: The Story of the Albanian People, William Ash, 1974, pp. 165-166) (IMG)

Another serious problem with the economic policy of People's Democratic Albania was the petit-bourgeois left-deviationist wage equalization program. In this regard, William Ash wrote:

Correct relations between workers on the factory floor and those in leadership positions are maintained by a system of payments in which there is no pronounced disparity. The ratio between low, average and high pay is among the lowest if not the lowest in the world, brought about by consistently lowering the salaries of all high ranking officials including state and Party leaders while improving the rates of pay of those in the medium or lower brackets. Since 1966 when Enver Hoxha at the Fifth Party Congress called for special efforts in implementing socialist principles, higher salaries have been cut twice and there has been a steady rise in lower rates of pay and pensions. (Pickaxe and Rifle: The Story of the Albanian People, William Ash, 1974, pp. 167-168) (IMG)

Providing further details on the wage equalization which Ash himself supported, Ash wrote:

In the huge Mao Tsetung textile combine at Berat the manager receives 1100 leks a month and the lowest paid workers start at 550. Skilled technicians receive about 750. At the caustic soda factory in Vlora the chief engineer gets 900 leks, the director 1000, those doing light work from 500 to 550 and average workers between 700 and 750. The manager of the copper wire factory in Shkodra gets only 880 leks per month because it is fully-automated and comparatively easy to run, while the workers, 60% of whom are women and young girls, make about 600 leks. All women, who have been drawn into industry in ever increasing numbers, have always received equal pay for equal work. At the tractor spare parts factory in Tirana workers get on the average 600 leks a month, the chief engineer 900 and model workers may make as much as 1000. Workers, invariably men, engaged in particularly hard or hazardous work like mining, heavy loading and unloading, dyeing where lead paints are used, diving or glass smelting, receive more pay, often exceeding the salaries of directors; but there is a continuous movement by the use of new techniques and equipment toward eliminating the heavier and more hazardous jobs.

To compare these payments in industry with those to writers and intellectuals: teachers, depending on qualifications, start at about 550 leks per month, rising at the end of five years to 700 and after 20 years to 750. They receive an additional 20 leks per month if they take posts in rural areas. Full time writers in the Writers Union are paid about 800 leks.

(Pickaxe and Rifle: The Story of the Albanian People, William Ash, 1974, p. 169) (IMG)

To be clear, by 'wage equalization', the idea is not that the wages were equal for everyone. Rather, their differentials were reduced to an unreasonable level shown above. Enver Hoxha himself personally supported wage differentials as a means of supposedly changing the consciousness of the people and supposedly shifting it away from 'bourgeois' attitudes. Hoxha said:

The differentials must be reduced, the high salaries should be cut down further so that the raised standards of living for a certain category of people will not encourage the desire for a bourgeois way of life, the desire for material gain and stimulus. (CADRES MUST BE TRAINED IN THE SCHOOL OF THE WORKING CLASS, Enver Hoxha, March 31, 1975. In: Enver Hoxha Selected Works, Vol. 4, Central Committee of the Party of Labour of Albania)

If someone earned a high amount of wealth through unjust methods, then it would be fair for the socialist state to reduce his income or wealth. However, if someone tried very hard and earned a correspondingly and proportionately high amount of income, then it would be unjust for their income to be cut. The Party of Labour of Albania was pursuing the left-wing revisionist policy of reducing wage differentials to such an unreasonable level demonstrated by William Ash (himself a sympathizer with this system) above. Worse yet, Enver Hoxha himself called for even greater wage equalization in order to 'weaken' bourgeois attitudes. This was a blatant Maoist left-deviation from Hoxha. As for bourgeois attitudes, they can be weakened through cultural work to inspire – but not force – people to spend their money for the good of the society instead of themselves; the state had no right to seize the wealth of people who earned it through their efforts, nor would state theft of people's money reduce greed.

The Party of Labour of Albania, due to its alliance with China, was able to obtain a significant number of concessions from that left-opportunist Mao regime. In certain periods in time, however, the Party of Labour of Albania, especially until the mid-1960s, was under the influence of the Chinese state. The Chinese state itself was under the heavy influence of the Chinese peasantry. The influence upon Albania of a Chinese government upon which the petit-bourgeoisie have a high influence meant a significantly high influence of the petit-bourgeois forces over Albania. Enver Hoxha himself had some of such petit-bourgeois deviations in the form of Maoist left-deviations.

The most significant Maoist left-deviationist line parroted by People's Democratic Albania was the narrative that firstly, the revisionist "Soviet Union" had become a social-imperialist power competing with American imperialism, and that secondly, this "Soviet social-imperialist" rival of the US imperialism cooperated with American imperialism globally! This kind of a rhetoric, which is a repeat of the Kautskyite notion of 'ultra-imperialism', is to be found all over Hoxha's writing and is seen throughout Zeri i Popullit, the organ of the Albanian Party. The reason for how and why this 'Soviet social-imperialist' collaboration with American imperialism is a revisionist and Kautskyite notion has been explained in C20S20 and C1S2. Many Hoxhaists have been sincere communists, have sincerely struggled against American imperialists, and have objectively contributed very positively to the movement of the proletariat; however, such left-opportunist discourse regarding the 'Soviet social-imperialists' and their allies was undoubtedly a godsend to the countless Maoist spies of the American secret service who started presenting themselves as 'Hoxhaists', and helped convert many – though not all – 'Hoxhaist' parties into the weapons of the Anglo-American secret services.

Nonetheless, what matters more than calling Eurasia "social-imperialist" is that the Party of Labour of Albania correctly recognized that the US-led camp is the greatest and greater enemy of the world, and thus refused to accept the Chinese revisionist notion of 'Three Worlds Theory'. Albania also realigned itself economically and strategically with the allies of Brezhnev-era Eurasia, and thus covertly realigned itself with Brezhnev-era Eurasia, even though it overtly continued to denounce them as 'social-imperialist'.

Well before the mid-1960s, Enver Hoxha had already criticized the Chinese several times. Some of the documents for this have been revealed and many more of such documents exist from Hoxha. However, from the mid-1960s onwards, the criticism of China went up to another level albeit initially in 'secret'. Secretly in Party meetings, Enver Hoxha began to criticize China's left-deviationist and revisionist policies as early as 1966, as shown previously. Then, in 1967, the relations declined even further:

Albanian-Chinese relations outwardly appear solid, but there are indications that Tirana's friendship for Peking peaked in early 1967, and has since cooled off. (EASTERN EUROPEAN INTELLIGENCER, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), April 18, 1968, p. 1) (IMG)

The Brezhnev group, coopted by the communist faction, saw an increase in its influence at the expense of the Khrushchev group. The rise of the Brezhnevians was a partial resurgence of the communist faction, using their cooptee Brezhnev as the vehicle of influence. Since Eurasia, increasingly under the influence of the communist resurgents, was practically no longer a real threat to People's Democratic Albania, Albania found it easier to

increase its trade with the other Eastern European countries in the latter half of the 1960s. Although outwardly, Albania continued to denounce Eurasia, in practice, there was an increase in covert commercial relations with Eurasia - 'covert' not in the sense that it was some kind of a secretive smuggling operation, but rather covert in the sense that Eurasia boosted its economic trade relations with the Eastern European states. In a document co-authored by William Giloane, a researcher employed by the US State Department, it is stated:

In 1964 Communist China's share of the trade was equal to that of the Soviet Union in 1960, and the actual volume represented by that share was 23 percent larger. During the 1962-68 period trade with Communist China amounted to about half the total trade volume, but the share of Communist China declined below that level toward the end of this period. This decline was the result of a successful effort by the leadership to expand the country's trade with ... Communist Eastern Europe....

Trade with the Communist countries of Eastern Europe, other than Yugoslavia, continued after the break with the Soviet Union and increased by 66 percent from 226 million leks in 1960 to about 375 million leks in 1968. The share of this group in total trade rose during this period from 35 to 40 percent, almost entirely after 1964. Albania's most important trade partner in this group has been Czechoslovakia, second only to Communist China with a volume of 118 million leks in 1968, equivalent to about 12 percent of Albania's total trade volume in that year. Following Czechoslovakia in order of importance were Poland, East Germany, and Bulgaria, with trade volumes ranging from 69 million to 53 million leks. Trade with Hungary and Romania amounted to about 40 million leks and 32 million leks, respectively. With the exception of Poland and Romania, Albania's trade balance with the countries of Eastern Europe (Area Handbook for Albania, Vol. 550, Issue 98, Eugene K. Keefe, William Giloane, Sarah Jane Elpern, James M. Moore, Jr., Stephen Peters, Eston T. White, 1971, p. 172) (IMG)

Since Albania boosted its trade relations with the Eastern European allies of Eurasia, it follows that Albania, dialectically speaking, de facto covertly boosted economic relations with Eurasia, with Eurasia's Eastern European allies as the intermediary for covertness. Whereas the Khrushchev group had sanctioned Eastern European countries and was seeking to push them into the Western trade orbit, the Brezhnevians in Eurasia were trying to move the Eastern European countries farther away from the US-led camp and closer to Eurasia instead. Albania did not restore relations with the Eurasians directly, but boosted ties with the Eastern European states that were closer to Eurasia. This gave Albania greater leverage for more freely criticizing the Chinese revisionists. This fact about Albania's increased economic relations with Eurasia's camp is significant because it shows that (1) the Brezhnevian tendency in Eurasia reduced pressures on Albania on the covert level; (2) Albania, while independent and self-reliant, was not 'xenophobically' 'autarkic'; (3) by the laws of dialectics, assuming the absence of miscoordination and misunderstanding, there can be no third force in politics; and 'third force' is almost always a delusion; hence, by the laws of dialectics, Albania's move away from a pro-Western China would have meant an inevitable unavoidable move towards an anti-Western Eurasia; and although Albanian media presented socialist Albania as a 'third force' miraculously lying in between 'Soviet social-imperialists' (Eurasia) and the Sino-Western alliance, in practice Albania covertly shifted further towards the Eurasian camp. To be sure, trumpeting the quasi-myth ('quasi' as in 'almost') of a third force in one's media can be useful for the pursuit of covert operations and deceiving one's enemies, but in the end, none of that means that the 'third force' is no longer a quasi-myth.

The Party of Labour of Albania, despite adopting the Maoist left-deviationist line, went up an anti-Maoist route in practice and – indirectly and de facto – boosted strategic partnership with the resurged communist faction in Eurasia. Even if Hoxha himself genuinely believed such foolish theories as 'Soviet social imperialism', he still could not avoid the material forces much more powerful, the inevitable tendency of the People's Democratic Albanian state to partner with the communist agents of the proletariat resurging in Eurasia. The Party of Labour of Albania covered itself with such a Maoist left-opportunist veneer while being communist anti-Maoist in practice and at core. This pseudo-Maoism of the Party of Labour of Albania is rooted in the proletarianized and kolkhoznik composition of the Party. Concerning the composition of the Party, the CIA reported:

Total party membership in January 1970 was officially announced as 75,673. This figure represents about 3.5% of the country's total population and an increase in membership of 9,346 since November 1966 when total party membership was 66,327. Workers accounted for about 35% of the total party membership, peasants almost 29%, and white-collar workers about 36%. Since 1966, the percentage of party members classed as workers has slowly increased. Of the new party members selected during the period 1966-69, 35% were workers, 45% collective farmers, and only 16% white-collar employees. Efforts are continually made to increase the number of women party members, who in 1966 amounted to 12.5% of the total membership. The regime is also concerned about the unequal geographic distribution of the party membership. Although the rural population is twice as large as the urban population, 68% of party members live in urban areas. Despite the great number of peasants joining the party in 1966-69, the percentage of peasants in the total party membership in 1970 was only 0.02% higher than in 1966, indicating, in part, changes in job status. (NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 20: ALBANIA: GENERAL SURVEY, CIA, August 1971, p. 47) (IMG)

In 1982, Richard Staar - a major CIA official, US State Department intelligence research specialist, and Hoover Institute fellow - wrote:

More recent statistics indicate that the proportion of industrial workers in the party had increased to 38.0 percent and the proportion of peasants on collective farms to 29.4 percent. The remaining 32.6 percent in late 1981 were probably for the most part government officials, intelligentsia, and members of the armed forces. (Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe: Fourth Edition, The Hoover Institute, Richard F. Staar, 1982, p. 5) (IMG)

The Party definitely made a constant effort at increasing the blue-collar elements and reducing the percentage of the white-collar elements. Enver Hoxha said:

Now 122,600 communists, of whom nearly 38 per cent are workers, 29.4 per cent cooperativists and 32.6 per cent office workers, are militating in the ranks of the Party. (...); 24,363 candidates for membership, 42.40 per cent of them workers, 40.43 per cent cooperativists and 17.17 per cent office workers, have been admitted to the Party in the years following the 7th Congress. (REPORT TO THE 8th CONGRESS OF THE PLA, Central Committee of the Party of Labour of Albania, Enver Hoxha, November 1, 1981. In: Enver Hoxha Selected Works, Vol. 6, The "8 Nëntori" Publishing House, Tirana, 1987, p. 352. MIA)

The proletarians, despite not forming an above-50% majority in the Party, did constitute the largest percentage of the Party. Reinforcing the hold of the proletariat over the Party were the kolkhozniks that emerged in the late 1960s with the success of the collectivization drive. At the same time, the Party of Labour of Albania was initially composed in its membership primarily of the petit-bourgeois peasantry rather than the kolkhoznik peasantry. This strength of the petit-bourgeoisie in the Party of Labour of Albania in the initial years gave some strength to the Titoism-Maoism current in it, leading to the adoption of reactionary Maoist left-opportunist stances – alongside the correct anti-Titoist anti-Khrushchevian stances it held – and the material implementation of some of such Maoist lines. However, the rendering of the petit-bourgeois contingent in the Party into a kolkhoznik contingent led this Maoist-deviationist Party to become more communistic at its core, while retaining its previously-adopted Maoist left-opportunist

line no longer as the core of the policy line of the Party but merely as the appearance, the veneer, of the Party. In other words, the core of the Party's character was communist proletarian and kolkhoznik, while the veneer of the Party, the outwardly shell, continued to retain the legacy of Maoist petit-bourgeois left-deviationism. (Note that the proletarianization of the membership/electorate of a party/movement does not automatically change the veneer into a communist one, but does change the core class orientation of that party/movement into a communistic or pro-communist one. Such was why the proletarianization of the staff of the Storm-Troopers rendered that staff into a pool of KPD-Soviet agents disguised as Strasserite 'Nazis' (see C10S7), such as why the Democratic Party of Roosevelt and Kennedy ended up becoming the party of the pro-Soviet traitors to American imperialism disguised as 'liberals', etc.). The characteristics of the Party of Labour of Albania were reflected in the personality of Enver Hoxha himself as well. Hoxha was a communist with some Maoist left-deviations.

C22S8. The Demotion of Rankovic

The gradual resurgence of the communist faction in the Red Army in the mid-1960s weakened the UDB, bogging it down in several theatres, thus giving greater room for action for the freedom fighters in Kosovo in 1960s. As a result, Tito's ally Rankovic lost his position as the UDB chief and was demoted in July 1966. Enver Hoxha recalled:

To save their own skins, to save the system of terror, oppression and exploitation which is being shaken to its foundations, J.B. Tito and his clique have «sacrificed» their closest collaborator Ranković on whom they loaded all the blame and made the scapegoat for all the failures, [so-called] mistakes, crimes and defeats of the Titoite regime to date. (WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR GENOCIDE IN KOSOVA?, Enver Hoxha)

Tito was obviously being a hypocrite in blaming Rankovic for the crimes that he himself had committed in cooperation with Rankovic. However, the demotion of Rankovic was not without a material cause; it was a setback for the Tito regime itself. Under the pressure of the growing tide of the 'Cominformists' in Yugoslavia, Tito's gang was forced to give some concessions to the Eurasians and to improve relations with Eurasia in a manner that weakened the Titoist faction in Yugoslavia.

C22S9. Counter-Revolutionary Stabs in the Back of Socialist Czechoslovakia *** IMG-All-{Czechoslovakia}

The Czechoslovak Communist Party represented the reality of Czechoslovakia as well. The fact that the Czechoslovak Communist Party had the industrial blue-collar workers with staunchly pro-Soviet anti-West-German views as majority led to committed communists to rise to the top ranks of the Party. It is worth noting that the communist leader Novotny had the support of the Czechoslovak industrial (blue-collar) working class. Even as late as February 29, 1968, when Novotny was alleged to be in his least popular, the CIA stated:

Novotny's strength ... lies among ideological conservatives, industrial workers, and the government and party bureaucrats at regional district levels. (CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN, CIA, February 29, 1968, p. 6) (IMG)

Enver Hoxha too expressed favorable views towards the top Czechoslovak leaders, though he was critical of Novotny:

In my opinion, the Czechoslovaks were different from the others. They were more serious than all of them. I have spoken about Gottwald, but it must be said that we Albanians also got along well with those who came after him. We were sincere with them, as with all the others, but the Czech leadership behaved well towards us, too. They had respect for our people and our Party. They were not very lively, but I can say they were restrained, correct and kindly.

Novotny and Shiroky, Dolansky and Kopecky, whom I have met and talked with many times, when I went to their country on business or for holidays with the family, behaved openly and in a modest way with me and all our comrades. That conceit and arrogance, which was apparent in the others, was not to be seen in them.

(...). In Czechoslovakia the difference was even greater. Whether in Prague, Bratislava, Karlovy Vary, Brno and many other places to which I have travelled, either officially or privately, I have been free to go wherever I wanted, whenever I wanted, with one obvious guard and everywhere I have been welcomed in a very cordial and friendly way. In the course of a trip, they themselves spontaneously took me to strategic places. Wherever I have gone in Czechoslovakia, either in official talks or in free conversations with the families of Novotny and Shiroky in Prague and Karlovy Vary, or with Bacilek in Slovakia and with a number of party secretaries in various towns and factories, the conversations have been sincere, joyous, happy and not formal. There was not that heavy atmosphere which I felt in the Soviet Union, despite the great love we had for that country and that people.

(...). But as I said above, after the death of Gottwald, the Khrushchevites were getting their grip on Czechoslovakia. It seemed that Novotny, as the first secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, adhered to correct positions, but time showed that he was a wavering opportunist element, and thus, in one way or another, he did the work for Khrushchev and Co. He played a major role in carrying through the plans which made Czechoslovakia a dominion occupied by Russian tanks.

(The Khrushchevites, Enver Hoxha, Chapter 5)

Regarding the Red Army's intervention in Czechoslovakia, Novotny had the correct position, and Hoxha was incorrect. However, as the above quote rightly suggests, Novotny, Siroky, and Dolansky followed the path of Gottwald and Stalin on key issues. These communist leaders in Czechoslovakia were the tip of the iceberg in their Party, the iceberg being the majority industrial blue-collar workers in the Party.

Czechoslovakia was an industrial socialist country with a large blue-collar working class base, and the workers there were vehemently anti-Nazi and pro-communist. The memory of Munich 1938 was not forgotten. Many such workers were well-educated in the science of socialism. This not only politically strengthened the socialist state, it also allowed for Czechoslovakia to face less economic problems even in the face of the stabs in the back by the Kremlin Titoists. The CIA reported:

Economic conditions had improved in Czechoslovakia in 1955. According to official claims, the growth of gross industrial production equalled the previous peak year's (1953) figure and the real wages index rose from 59 to 72, while the cost of living dropped from 139 to 130. The highest level of pre-war agricultural production was claimed to have been exceeded in 1955, for the first time. Complaints of food and other shortages were comparatively rare in Czechoslovakia, by far the most prosperous of the Satellites. In political and intellectual spheres, there were no signs of ferment, in striking contrast to Poland and Hungary. Not that everybody was satisfied in Czechoslovakia, far from it, but there was less economic cause for dissatisfaction. There had been no split of any consequence in the Party, in which the Stalinists, headed by Antonin Novotny, the General Secretary, and Viliam Siroky, the Prime Minister, held complete control, with President Zapotocky presumably smoothing out eventual disagreements. (COMMUNISM IN EASTERN EUROPE POST-

STALIN DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SATELLITES: Part II/D: Czechoslovakia, CIA, Senior Research Staff on International Communism, December 31, 1958, p. 1) (IMG)

While problems came about as a result of Kremlin Titoists in the back swiftly after the assassination of Stalin, Czechoslovakia was able to partially recover:

The economic plans of the regime, announced in February 1956, mirrored a conviction that the troubles which had set in after Stalin's death in 1953 had been successfully overcome. (COMMUNISM IN EASTERN EUROPE POST-STALIN DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SATELLITES: Part II/D: Czechoslovakia, CIA, Senior Research Staff on International Communism, December 31, 1958, p. 1) (IMG)

Industrial Czechoslovakia had inherent weaknesses too, however. The industrial capitalism in Czechoslovakia had not developed into a very highly concentrated monopoly capitalism, meaning that there were many capitalists in Czechoslovakia. This is important because capitalist property-owners married and would form families, resulting in there being numerous families forming a large bourgeois stratum. This in turn gave rise to a large stratum of intellectuals from bourgeois family roots. Thus, much as how the industrialization of Czechoslovakia was a blessing, the fact that capitalism was not heavily concentrated into a few monopolies gave rise to numerous capitalist families and hence a large stratum of liberal intellectuals in Czechoslovakia. The counter-revolutionary intelligentsia were a lobbying force for Titoist influence in Czechia.

Unlike Czechia, Slovakia was not very industrialized. The population there was to a large extent agrarian petit-bourgeois. Unlike the proletarians, who have nothing to lose except their 'chains' in the struggle against finance capital, the petit-bourgeoisie have small businesses which they may lose. At the same time, unlike the national bourgeoisie and the cooperative peasants who have big businesses with which they can take the risk of engaging in a struggle against finance capital, the petit-bourgeoisie do not have such big businesses and therefore cannot afford to take major risks in the struggle against finance capital. The inability of the petit-bourgeoisie to wage a struggle against imperialism results in the areas populated by the petit-bourgeoisie to become easy prey to material domination by finance capital. Such was the reason that Slovakia was a channel through which the Nazi Germans were able to more easily conquer Czechoslovakia. Such was the reason that Slovakia became a major hub for fascism. Such was the reason that after the Czechoslovak Revolution of 1948, Slovakia continued to be the major base of the Trotskyite and Titoist agents of the CIA, MI6, UDB, Mossad, BND, etc.

Socialist Czechoslovakia faced serious challenges, because firstly, it was front-stabbed by the imperialist camp and their agents in Czechoslovakia, and backstabbed by the Moscow Titoists who supported the imperialist secret service plans against it. Titoist reaction could count on the Trotskyite agents retaining influence in Slovakia, the intelligentsia in Czechia, all in a united front led by finance capital against the Czechoslovak proletarians. The Titoization speech by Khrushchev in 1956 did cause damage to socialist Czechoslovakia, despite the strong resistance by the proletarian state. The Czechoslovaks first defended Stalin against Khrushchev's accusation, and stood against Khrushchev's other Titoist theses. Later on, when facing greater pressure, they presented the Titoist counter-revolutionary Slansky and his group as the 'Stalinists' of Czechoslovakia and stated that Czechoslovakia had already 'de-Stalinized' well before the USSR. This was a means by which the Czechoslovak communists were able to continue their 'Stalinism' under the guise of the 'anti-Stalinism' approved of by the Moscow Titoists. The CIA's senior research staff wrote:

5. The top leadership of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, being one of those which was quite satisfied with conditions as they were ... apparently decided that, so long as the 20th Congress had reaffirmed the admissibility of different roads to socialism, it might as well differ from the USSR in the matter of de-Stalinization. When, therefore, the regional Party meetings held on March 5 to discuss the lessons of the 20th Congress revealed considerable lower level interest in this particular subject, the official press service, CTK, issued the following day a lengthy report in which the chief points were applied in general terms to Czechoslovakia, but Stalin was defended rather than accused. While the report admitted the necessity of overcoming "all the remnants and the recurrences of the cult of the individual and agreed that in the later period of his activities, Stalin committed many mistakes, shortcomings appeared in his work, such as in the principle of collective leadership, it also declared that it was necessary to see "the positive role which Stalin played." His was the "historical merit" of having "resolutely frustrated the attempts of enemies who tried to destroy the Party and Soviet State." In other words, Stalin had, according to the report, saved Russia and Communism. How much did his mistakes and shortcomings weigh in the balance?

6. As more and more details of Khrushchev's indictment of Stalin leaked out and news of developments in Poland kept coming in, feeling in Czechoslovakia rose considerably. The Party leadership found it expedient to howl with the wolves for a while. In a report issued on April 10, the Central Committee of the Party gave an extensive criticism of Stalin's mistakes and admitted that the cult of personality had seriously corrupted the Czechoslovak Party. Two days later, the Party mouthpiece, Rude Pravo, carried the further admission that the security organs had frequently violated socialist legality and that a special commission appointed by the Political Bureau had been investigating trials for the last 18 months. It had been found, the paper stated, that it was Rudolf Slansky, the Party leader executed in November 1952, and two of his associates, who had introduced the practice of violating socialist legality, and that these violations had continued even after his exposure. Persons found to have been innocent had been released.

7. The providential discovery that Slansky had been responsible for the death of many innocent people presumably made it impossible for the Czechoslovak Communists to follow the example of their Hungarian and Bulgarian comrades in parallel cases and to rehabilitate him. It was true, as Premier Siroky admitted to a New York Times correspondent on April 13, that Slansky had been falsely accused of Titoism and that "certain manifestations of anti-Semitism" - eleven of the fourteen defendants in the Slansky trial had been Jews - "had been mistakenly introduced," but Slansky had on the other hand been subsequently found guilty of another serious crime. His culpability was, on balance, no less. Besides, Slansky's and his associates' conviction as "Trotskyite, Zionist, bourgeois, nationalist traitors and enemies of the Czechoslovak people and of Socialism" stood. Siroky was apparently not in the least troubled by the fact that all the foreign fellow conspirators besides Tito named by Slansky in his confession — Gomulka, Kostov, and Rajk had been officially declared innocent, or by the fact that Rude Pravo had the day before denounced the sentencing of people "on the mere basis of their own confession obtained by illegal methods, without there being any material proof." That apparently only applied to sentences of which Slansky was the author, not the victim. Neither did Siroky explain why the three live members of the Slansky conspiracy, who had received only jail sentences, were being released.

(COMMUNISM IN EASTERN EUROPE POST-STALIN DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SATELLITES: Part II/D: Czechoslovakia, CIA, Senior Research Staff on International Communism, December 31, 1958, pp. 2-4) (IMG)

The Czechoslovak communists opposed the Titoist opposition to Stalin's line, but did not come out openly against it, since that would have undermined the socialist state in Czechoslovakia. The US intelligence document further stated:

The episode spotlighted the embarrassing situation which the Czechoslovak holdovers from the Stalin era shared with most of their satellite colleagues. They were ... foresighted enough to oppose de-Stalinization and liberalization, yet unable openly to contradict Khrushchev, on whose support their continuance in power depended more than ever. A concrete proof of their disorientation was their failure to issue directives to the lower level apparatchiki who had the difficult task of presiding over local Party meetings in which the "historic" resolutions of the 20th Congresses were discussed. The result was an outburst of criticism at the lower levels, which it seemed expedient to calm by jettisoning some expendable ballast and granting some superficial concessions, but without sacrificing any of the material bases of power. (COMMUNISM IN EASTERN EUROPE POST-STALIN DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SATELLITES: Part II/D: Czechoslovakia, CIA, Senior Research Staff on International Communism, December 31, 1958, p. 4) (IMG)

The stab in the back of the Czechoslovak communists led to the ouster of the well-known communist revolutionary Alexei Cepicka, a relative of Gottwald. It led to the colour revolutionary uprising of the liberal intelligentsia, the fifth column of the BND, Mossad, MI6, CIA, etc. It also caused some change in the budget and economic planning in general. The CIA reported:

The 1956 budget, introduced on February 9, showed a 17.4 percent increase over 1955 in investment in heavy industry, but, true to the Khrushchev line, an almost identical increase in agricultural investment. As further proof of the regime's solicitude for the people, a price reduction on a number of consumer goods, estimated to increase purchasing power by 6.5 percent, followed on April 1. (...).

9. The victim selected to be thrown to the wolves was ... Minister of Defense, Alexej Cepicka. His expulsion from the Politburo and dismissal from the posts of First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense were announced on April 25, on the grounds of "shortcomings and mistakes he committed in the execution of state and party functions." But the fact that he was a son-in-law of Gottwald was certainly more important. (...).

10. Intellectuals also were restive. The Czechoslovak Writers Congress, meeting April 22-29, deplored the damage to literature caused by the cult of personality and condemned the "code of esthetics" which was supposed to guide writers as an "incredible collection of half-truths and regular inconsistencies. Two writers, Jaroslav Seifert and Frantisek Hrubin, insisted that writers should represent the conscience of their nation and accused them of having betrayed their mission by indulging in evasions and lies. Even the Congress chairman, Jan Drda, considered a Party stalwart, declared that in the future, writers must reflect the people's "justified dissatisfactions" and take into account the conflicts and "contradictions" of everyday life. Although the Party had, in a message read by President Zapotocky, announced its intention of giving writers "more freedom" and encouraged them to be "bold and fearless" in their creative work, it was getting more than it bargained for. Zapotocky took the floor a second time and rebuked the more outspoken writers for their wholesale condemnation of the past and for their failure to understand the Party's present policy. Nevertheless, Hrubin and Seifert were elected members of the new "collective leadership," while two orthodox writers sponsored by the regime were blackballed.

12. Student meetings were even more outspoken. Typical resolutions demanded, besides greater freedom for students, numerous political reforms: release of political prisoners, permission for opposition parties to function effectively, an end to newspaper censorship and to jamming, access to banned Western literature, and freedom to travel abroad. Some resolutions protested against the unjustified idealization of the Soviet Union and the privileges accorded Soviet citizens, and asked pointed questions about the Jachymov uranium mines.

13. Even the Communist Youth League was the scene of stormy sessions. Mlada Fronta (April 27) reported that besides excessive study hours, compulsory attendance and overcrowding, the "unpersuasive and dogmatic lectures in Marxism-Leninism" and the Minister of Education were sharply criticized. On May 6, the paper announced that the Minister had received the delegates of the Youth League and that many of the demands would probably be met.

14. More sensational still was the permission granted the students to hold the Majales, a traditional student parade, for the first time since 1938. On May 20, columns of students carrying placards reproducing many of the student protests and demands and dragging floats biting satirizing conditions in Czechoslovakia marched unmolested down the streets of Prague. The chants of the marching students are reported to have included demands for the removal of President Zapotocky and First Slovak Party Secretary Bacilek.

(COMMUNISM IN EASTERN EUROPE POST-STALIN DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SATELLITES: Part II/D: Czechoslovakia, CIA, Senior Research Staff on International Communism, December 31, 1958, pp. 1-7) (IMG)

There was also a rise in Slovak separatism:

The resurgence of separatism within Slovakia since the Soviet 20th party congress in February 1956 has been of mounting concern to the Prague regime, and since the Slovak party congress in April 1957 has been condemned in increasingly stronger terms by Czech party boss Antonin Novotny. (CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN [15772430], CIA, January 17, 1958, p. 1) (IMG)

Further reporting on decentralization in Czechoslovakia, the CIA reported:

Prague's implementation of an economic decentralization program this year has caused popular discontent to spread. Over 100,000 have been hit by labor relocation plans and large-scale reductions of the central administrative staffs, but the population does not seem generally disposed to make trouble. Within the party, underlying discontent – possibly extending into the top echelon – is hidden from the public behind an appearance of solidarity. Serious differences are not likely to break into the open before or during the party congress in June. (CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN [15772422], CIA, April 15, 1958, p. 1) (IMG)

The industrial sector of Czechoslovakia was being sabotaged through decentralization, causing widespread popular discontent and an economic downturn. Without simultaneous advancements in industry, however, the swift advancement in collectivization would be very difficult, and perhaps would be also premature. Yet, a project for the swift 'collectivization' of agriculture in the absence of industrial advancements began:

The program for economic reform recently begun in Czechoslovakia has caused widespread popular discontent. Over one hundred thousand persons have been affected by the labor relocation plans, and the lives of several hundred thousands, primarily in Prague and other cities, have been unsettled. Furthermore the government has renewed last year's collectivization offensive, with the intention of increasing the area of agricultural socialization from the present 65 percent to more than 80 percent by the end of 1959. It hopes to socialize all agriculture in the country within the next three years. The collectivization campaign will be carried out primarily in Slovakia and may intensify existing separatism there.

There are no signs, however, that the population is any more disposed than in the past to make trouble. The regime is alert to this dissatisfaction and has indicated, both through propaganda and a vigilance campaign specifically directed against Slovak nationalism, that it will permit no interference or challenge.

(CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN [15772422], CIA, April 15, 1958, p. 1) (IMG)

As a result of the prematurely swift advancements in ‘collectivization’, the CIA-backed Slovak separatist tendency gained strength. The industrial decentralization also gave the Slovak separatists greater leverage over the rest of the economy of Slovakia. According to the CIA:

Slovak Nationalism Increasing Problem for Czechoslovak Regime

Nationalist elements in Slovakia apparently are attempting to use the Czechoslovak regime's economic decentralization program to benefit their own regional interests at the expense of nationwide goals.

In a strongly worded speech to the Slovak party central committee plenum meeting of 9-10 January, Slovak Party First Secretary Bacilek complained that there were separatist tendencies in various sectors of cultural, political, and scientific life, and even in some of the central offices. The dismissal on 13 January of Slovak Deputy Premier Stefan Sebesta, responsible for industrial and urban construction, probably is the first step to remove officials with nationalistic tendencies, who, according to Bacilek, have appeared at the highest levels of the Slovak government.

(...). The tone of Bacilek's speech indicates that the situation now demands the ruthless stamping out of “bourgeois nationalist” elements promised by Novotny last April when he first publicly warned the Slovak dissidents to conform or suffer the consequences.

(CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN[15772430], CIA, January 17, 1958, p. 1) (IMG)

The Czechoslovak intelligentsia, the fifth column of the Yugoslav regime, argued that the economy was damaged because it was not decentralized enough, whereas the Novotny faction, the communist agents of the proletariat, argued that the sabotage of the economy was the direct result of the counter-revolutionary strategy of decentralization. The CIA reported:

Basically the serious concern with economic reform and the radical nature of some of the proposals being entertained in Czechoslovakia stem from the near absence of economic growth during the past [two and a half] years. As early as 1962, Czechoslovak economists were pressing for reforms, and the need to improve techniques of planning and management was emphasized at the Party Congress in December 1962. Party leader Novotny, however, continued to blame some of the country's economic difficulties on the partial decentralization of 1958-60 and called for a tightening of central controls. (CZECHOSLOVAKIA DEBATES MARKET SOCIALISM, Current Support Brief, CIA, Office of Research and Reports (ORR), 1964, p. 2) (IMG)

The economic sabotage that the intelligentsia caused allowed for the Titoist fifth column to push such prominent communists as Viliam Siroky (Vilem Siroky) out of power, push Novotny to the wall, and install Titoist elements – particularly the neoliberal economist Ota Sik – into the heights of power:

In 1963, as the economic situation deteriorated further and cultural ferment accompanied a new wave of “destalinization,” criticism of the regime's policies increased greatly, and some of the critics argued – in direct contradiction of Novotny – that the error in 1958-60 had been in decentralizing too little. Novotny and his followers were forced to admit that planning had been overambitious, that serious mistakes had been made in the allocation of investments, and that incentives did not give enough stimulus to technical progress and improvement in the quality of output. Then, in the wake of a Party and government shakeup of September 1963, which replaced some of the dogmatic officials (especially Vilem Siroky) by more pragmatic men such as Jozef Lenart and Drahomir Kolder, the Party gave official blessing to a thoroughgoing debate on the economic system. A group of economists, headed by Ota Sik, a member of the Central Committee of the Party and Chief of the Economics Institute of the Academy of Sciences, was charged with an intensive study of possible reforms and asked to present its recommendations to the leadership through the newly organized Economic Commission of the Party. Sik told a Central Committee Plenum in December 1963 that the traditional Soviet forms of socialist management no longer worked in Czechoslovakia.... (CZECHOSLOVAKIA DEBATES MARKET SOCIALISM, Current Support Brief, CIA, Office of Research and Reports (ORR), 1964, p. 2) (IMG)

Led by Ota Sik, the Czechoslovak intelligentsia proposed liberalizing the Czechoslovak economy. A report by the RAND Corporation stated:

The Czech economists proposed – they referred to their proposal as the New Economic Model – to imitate the Yugoslav Marxists and introduce a Socialist market, a hybrid combining state ownership with a restricted play of market forces. Over a period of years the central planning machinery would be dismantled, prices would be permitted to seek their own level, the domestic market would be opened to Western competition, and the management of factories (as distinct from their ownership) would be turned over to men who, regardless of their politics, could make a profit. Factories which did not turn up in the black would be closed, and the temporary unemployment of their workers accepted as the lesser evil. The general direction of economic development would be regulated by the manipulation of such indirect levers as taxation and monetary policy. (THE DECLINE OF COMMUNISM IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California, Richard V. Burks, DTIC: AD0676274, p. 6) (IMG)

The Novotny faction, the faction of the communist blue-collar workers in the Party, was referred to by Anglo-American media as the ‘conservative’ faction, a propaganda term used to imply that the communists wanted ‘backwardness’ and that the liberals were seeking to ‘rejuvenate’ Czechoslovakia. The communist faction continued to resist such a counter-revolutionary policy line promoted by the intelligentsia:

It seems unlikely that the present leadership will give enterprises anywhere near the amount of authority desired by the liberals or allow market forces to determine output except within narrow limits. According to Novotny, reforms will be introduced “step by step ... with much prudence” and “without upsetting upheavals.” This cautious approach gives the conservative forces every opportunity to prevent fundamental changes.... (CZECHOSLOVAKIA DEBATES MARKET SOCIALISM, Current Support Brief, CIA, Office of Research and Reports (ORR), 1964, p. 7) (IMG)

Novotny and his comrades were well aware of how destructive such liberalization would have been. The NEM would have brought a corrupt bourgeois system, with greater autonomy for the local bureaus increasing bureaucratic corruption; the NEM would have fostered the chaos of the market; the NEM would have gotten workers out of their jobs, resulting in widespread unemployment. Longer-term unemployment promotes the lumpen-proletarian mentality, the mentality of bandits, terrorists, and violent reactionary protesters haunted by bestial frenzy, unwilling to reason. Over time, the further immiseration of the unemployed could create a massive lumpen-proletarian force, rather than a proletarian force, that would be exploited by finance capital and the corrupt bureaucrats to launch a reactionary rebellion against the communist faction in the Czechoslovak state, thus giving the intelligentsia greater leverage for even greater economic liberalization and Titoization. The RAND Corporation report stated:

It was not long, however, before it became apparent that the introduction of the New Economic Model seriously threatened the power of the party apparatus. It was not so much that the NEM ran counter to the traditional teachings of Marxism-Leninism, though that was important. It was rather that the emergence of an autonomous class of industrial managers chosen on the basis of ability would deprive

the apparatus at local levels of its main employment, the detailed supervision of the enterprise, and would consequently bring about the downgrading or unemployment of large numbers of the faithful. There were other, even less pleasant implications. If managers were granted autonomy in a market situation, should not trade unions be permitted to protect the interests of the working class, even if this involved a restoration of the right to strike? If factory managers should have autonomy, why not collective farm managers? Indeed, if the management of factories, under the general supervision of the party, were turned over to man who knew how to turn a fast crown, perhaps the management of ideas should be given to writers and others professionally concerned with communication. The NEM soon became a political football, conservatives opposing it because of the danger that its implementation would lead to other liberalizing changes, revisionists pushing for it in the hope of changing much more than the economy and bringing into being, perhaps, a new political model. Novotny tried to compromise by accepting economic reform in principle, but withholding the personnel changes necessary to implement it. After heavy infighting he was replaced (January 1968) by a leadership which meant to carry out wide-ranging political reform as the prerequisite not only of market Socialism but of the conciliation of an angry public opinion as well. (THE DECLINE OF COMMUNISM IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California, Richard V. Burks, DTIC: AD0676274, pp. 6-7) (IMG)

The Moscow Titoists covertly imposed sanctions on socialist Czechoslovakia. The excommunication of China and Albania by the Kremlin Titoists did not just undermine People's Democratic Albania and the people of China, but also undermined the Korean, Romanian, and Czechoslovak Peoples' Democracies. The expulsion of China was a means of sanctioning not only China, but also the Peoples' Democracies, Czechoslovakia included. A document by the RAND Corporation stated:

Aside from the general slow down in intra-Bloc trade, Czechoslovakia's new Eastern market was also affected by a series of more immediate disasters. The quarrel between Soviet Russia and Communist China ended with a virtual severance of trade between Prague and Peking, ending the Czech dream of penetrating the huge Chinese market and leaving Prague stuck with enormously expensive turbogenerators designed to Chinese specifications. The Romanian national deviation brought further trouble; as a proportion of total Romanian imports Czechoslovak machinery dropped rapidly from 50 to 10 percent. The Russians also began to refuse delivery of various shipments of Czech machinery, on the ominous grounds that they were below world market standards. (...). The decline in machinery shipments to the East not only precipitated the recession of 1962-65 but it also suggested that, if Prague wished to maintain a high rate of economic growth in the future, Czechoslovakia should re-enter the capitalist market on a major scale and necessarily, reduce the degree of her economic dependence on the USSR. Such a shift in the patterns of trade would, however, have political significance. (THE DECLINE OF COMMUNISM IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California, Richard V. Burks, DTIC: AD0676274, pp. 4-5) (IMG)

Again, since Czechoslovakia was under siege by Titoists from all the countries around her, and because Czechoslovakia faced counter-revolutionary Mossad-backed bourgeois-nationalist elements in Slovakia, it was not so tough for the intelligentsia to lobby for the NEM to be implemented. The NEM thus became the policy of Czechoslovakia. In mid-1967, the US Congressional Subcommittee on International Trade reported:

Now the command economy is being dismantled. The role of the central authorities in determining production has been reduced. Ministries will play a smaller role in day-to-day operations. Production will respond to the world market through the introduction of flexible prices and by the pressure of imports on domestic prices. Enterprises will produce to make a profit rather than to fulfill centrally determined targets. (Initially, some profits may be illusory because some raw material inputs are subsidized by the entire economy). This is entailing a rebirth of cost accounting. (THE FIAT-SOVIET AUTO PLANT AND COMMUNIST ECONOMIC REFORMS: A REPORT, House Resolution 1043, 8th Congress, 2nd Session, Subcommittee on International Trade, Committee on Banking and Currency, US House of Representatives, March 1, 1967, p. 52) (IMG)

The report went on:

New investment will be largely made from enterprise profits or from loans approved by the State Bank in coordination with the Central Planning Commission. Loans from the State Bank will bear interest rates, working from a prime rate of 6 percent, which will reflect the Bank's estimate of the soundness of the proposed investment. Should the Bank not be willing to make the loan, an enterprise may proceed from its own funds. (THE FIAT-SOVIET AUTO PLANT AND COMMUNIST ECONOMIC REFORMS: A REPORT, House Resolution 1043, 8th Congress, 2nd Session, Subcommittee on International Trade, Committee on Banking and Currency, US House of Representatives, March 1, 1967, p. 52) (IMG)

And:

When enterprises cannot make a profit they must nevertheless pay workers a minimum wage. State subsidies to cover wage deficits: tax deficits and loan arrears will be on a selective basis for limited periods. (THE FIAT-SOVIET AUTO PLANT AND COMMUNIST ECONOMIC REFORMS: A REPORT, House Resolution 1043, 8th Congress, 2nd Session, Subcommittee on International Trade, Committee on Banking and Currency, US House of Representatives, March 1, 1967, p. 52) (IMG)

Most importantly, the unprofitable factories (such as in heavy industry) would have to be not just closed down, but also outright dismantled, with their industrial equipment and physical capital to be taken away for profitable use:

Enterprises which cannot make a go of it must close and their resources (labor, capital, equipment) must be shifted to profitable use. This introduces the capitalist concept of "business failure" and "frictional unemployment" to the Communist world. (THE FIAT-SOVIET AUTO PLANT AND COMMUNIST ECONOMIC REFORMS: A REPORT, House Resolution 1043, 8th Congress, 2nd Session, Subcommittee on International Trade, Committee on Banking and Currency, US House of Representatives, March 1, 1967, p. 52) (IMG)

For example:

a coal mine and two coke ovens in Bohemia were closed on grounds of unprofitability. Some of their workers are to be retrained and some absorbed into more efficient mines as part of a program which is designed to ease the frictions of shifting labor into more efficient uses. The official trade union movement has been given responsibility for being prepared to retrain over 502000 workers a year. (THE FIAT-SOVIET AUTO PLANT AND COMMUNIST ECONOMIC REFORMS: A REPORT, House Resolution 1043, 8th Congress, 2nd Session, Subcommittee on International Trade, Committee on Banking and Currency, US House of Representatives, March 1, 1967, p. 52) (IMG)

In other words, the policy line propagated and enforced by the Czechoslovak Titoist intelligentsia was that in order for Czechoslovakia to have economic 'growth', it has to have its industrial infrastructure dismantled! The counter-revolutionary effects of this need no mention and are quite obvious: (1) the destruction of the military-industrial backbone that would assist Czechoslovakia against an invasion by NATO and Yugoslavia; (2) large-scale unemployment and misery in Czechoslovakia to cause a lumpen-proletarian colour revolutionary uprising against the socialist state, which would create further costs for the communist faction and bring to power the Titoists.

As a result of such a large-scale program for Titoist sabotage against industrial Czechoslovakia, there came:

economic troubles for the most highly industrialized nation in eastern Europe. (The Soviet Decision to Invade Czechoslovakia, Advanced Research Paper, Naval War College, Robert M. Guth, 1975, p. 3) (IMG)

The severe economic damage inflicted upon People's Democratic Czechoslovakia reduced the amounts of funds available to the communist faction, rendering it more difficult for the communist faction to pursue its secret service conflict against the Titoist faction. The result was the ascendancy of the Dubcek faction and the demotion of the Novotny faction, the communist faction.

The rise of the Dubcek faction in Czechoslovakia in the late 1960s, however, also coincided with the rise of the Brezhnev faction in Eurasia. Again, although Brezhnev was a Titoist at core, he nonetheless was coopted by the communist anti-Titoist faction in Moscow, which is what led Novotny to call for Brezhnev's aid against the Titoist faction of the Party. However, this time, Brezhnev apparently showed his Titoist face and, ever the double-faced opportunist, reportedly refused to strongly support Novotny, tacitly backing Dubcek instead. According to the leader of the modern revisionist 'Communist Party of Moravia and Bohemia' (KSCM):

Dubcek, replacing Novotny, was a Moscow's choice, too. Novotny was, on the contrary, sacrificed as a scape-goat. ('50 years after the Prague events of 21 August 1968: The Guardian interview with Josef Skala, leader of the KSCM Leninist wing'. In: Marx21, August 21, 2018) (IMG)

The CIA too stated:

Initially backed by Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, Dubcek had replaced ... Antonin Novotny in December 1967. ('A Look Back ... The Prague Spring & the Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia', CIA, 2008) (IMG)

A document published by the US Naval War College stated:

Novotny's attacks on his critics — [bourgeois-minded] economists, writers, and intellectuals — did not help the situation, for all of these enemies were highly capable of expressing themselves. Coupled with discontent among the Slovak minority, these troubles led to a revolt against Novotny which reached its climax at the January 1968 plenum of the Czechoslovak Central Committee when Alexander Dubcek, a Slovak, was elected party secretary. The change was seen as no cause for alarm at the Kremlin, as Dubcek was an old associate of Brezhnev. According to one account, the two men had known each other when they were students in Moscow. The Soviet leader had spoken personally with Dubcek only a few weeks before the latter's elevation to the party secretaryship, when he was still First Secretary of the Slovak Communist Party. Novotny had invited Brezhnev to visit Czechoslovakia in December of 1967, in hope of receiving support in the face of increasing political opposition. Before returning to Moscow, Brezhnev had surprised Dubcek with a visit during which he took the measure of the young "firebrand." When he left, Brezhnev abandoned Novotny, saying "Eto vashe delo" ("It is your affair.") and gave Dubcek de facto endorsement by doing nothing to interfere in the events which were taking place. Dubcek of course was no firebrand but a fairly unassuming and unimpressive if serious party functionary with a good record as a loyal communist party member, educated in the Soviet Union. William Shawcross' recent biography cites him as a man who had, in the Kremlin's eyes, an almost perfect pedigree. Son of working-class parents, brought up and educated in the Soviet Union, loyal apparatchik, university in Moscow, a man whose regard for Russia had always been quite unconditional, who seemed, in many ways, more Russian than Czechoslovak—this was someone of whom the Kremlin need have no fear.

That Brezhnev's assessment of the situation was faulty and the responsibility for succeeding events rests with him is historically accurate. (The Soviet Decision to Invade Czechoslovakia, Advanced Research Paper, Naval War College, Robert M. Guth, 1975, pp. 3-4) (IMG)

Already, the economy of Czechoslovakia was in shambles, and the Brezhnev group (intentionally) failed to provide the necessary support to the Novotny faction in the Party. The communist industrial blue-collar workers' contingent in the Party, therefore, was on the verge of removal from dominance. The more immediate cause of the ouster of team Novotny and the rise to power of the Dubcek faction was the final tactical blow: the defection of General Sejna.

Sejna, a corrupt Titoist element in the Czechoslovak military and intelligence sectors, was politically weak. The agents of the Novotny faction had encircled Sejna and compelled Sejna to cooperate in undermining the other corrupt Titoist elements in Czechoslovakia. However, the Titoist faction of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, already with tremendous power by the late 1960s, was able to utilize Sejna to its own advantage. The severe economic damage inflicted upon the Czechoslovak economy had reduced the funds for the Novotny faction of the Czechoslovak intelligence service, causing Sejna to be less encircled by the Czechoslovak counter-intelligence, allowing Sejna more room to maneuver not as cooptee of the communists but as the true agent of Titoism he had always been. Sejna, an imperialist intelligence agent, defected to the West almost certainly via Yugoslavia. Beside the provision of military and political intelligence to the West, the defection of Sejna also had propaganda advantages for the Dubcek faction. It must be remembered that Dubcek and his Titoist faction were already accused of being agents of Yugoslavia, Israel, the Anglo-Americans, etc. Through the defection of Sejna, Dubcek's Titoist faction were able to reverse the tide in the propaganda war and to denounce Novotny's ostensible 'ally' Sejna as a means by which to denounce Novotny himself and the communist elements in the Czechoslovak military and intelligence. Not only were Dubcek and his Titoist faction able to present themselves as purgers of foreign spies and corrupt elements, they were also able to purge the faction that actually opposed corruption and foreign anti-communist anti-Czechoslovak espionage. The result was a large-scale purge that encompassed Novotny, his comrades in the Party, and the communists in the military and intelligence of Czechoslovakia, paving the way for the rise of the Titoist agents of the Anglo-American imperialists in Czechoslovakia. The Titoist agents were expanding their influence over the means of violence, paving the way for the establishment of a comprador bourgeois state, and the liquidation of the proletarian state. Regarding the case of Sejna, the following is a part of the report by the US Naval War College document:

Consider the curious case of General Sejna, the man who precipitated the fall of Novotny and set in motion a series of events in intelligence and security circles which culminated in the August invasion — the man who, in Aristotelian terms, could be viewed as the material cause of the invasion. The first public notice he received appeared in the New York Times datelined Prague, March 2, 1968, and headlined, "General Accused of Theft Flees From Czechoslovakia." The brief story was that "Czechoslovakia's military prosecutor

said today that Maj. Gen. Jan Sejna, wanted on charges of 'large-scale machinations with grass seed,' had fled the country." Subsequently it appeared that Sejna had fled through Yugoslavia to the West, and had requested and received approval for permanent residence in the United States. He was accompanied by his son and girl friend, leaving his wife in Prague to report his disappearance to the newspapers and giving his defection more the air of escapade than escape. The 22-year-old girl friend was described by the State Department as the son's fiancée and by the Czechs as the General's girlfriend. The wife's plight as well as her comments to the press tended to make the State Department's claim suspect or the young lady's position ambivalent.

But who was General Sejna, and why did his disappearance cause such a stir? Surely his grass seed manipulations would not have caused Marshal Ivan I. Yakubovsky, the Soviet commander of all Warsaw Pact forces, to make a hurried trip to Prague to "learn the extent of damage to Communist-bloc security." Part of the answer was that Sejna, as a Major General in the Czech Army, was in a position to provide Western intelligence with considerable information concerning Czechoslovak and Warsaw Pact forces and plans. But why the arrests and suicides which followed and the wholesale reorganization of the security section of the Czechoslovak Ministry of the Interior? Major General Jan Sejna, forty years old at the time of his defection, was a "political general," a senior communist party official assigned to the military and given a military rank to perform his assignment – security. He was a friend of the Novotny family and a close friend of the President's 37-year-old son, Antonin Novotny, Jr. As secretary of the Party Committee in the Ministry of Defense, Sejna worked for Miroslav Mamula, the head of the Central Committee's Department of State Administration, a euphemism for Czechoslovakia's security organization. It was Mamula who was the first senior official ousted by Dubcek after election as First Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee. On the military aide, Sejna had worked for Colonel General Valdimir Janko, a Deputy to the Defense Minister, General Bohumir Lomaky. Sejna was a member of Parliament.

In the unprecedented climate of the Prague Spring questions arose in Parliament and in the press, with the result that the Sejna story became public very quickly. When it was all out, Sejna stood accused of masterminding a military putsch to restore Novotny's power. The plan, which he is accused of having actually set in motion, was developed with the approval of Mamula and implemented by Sejna together with Deputy Defense Minister Janko. As a result, in mid-December 1967, Czech armored units were moving toward Prague and Bratislava. They were stopped by order of Dubcek upon learning of the moves from General Vaclav Prchlik, who was then head of the Army's Military Political Administration and who was instrumental in arranging their return to base without incident.

Named to investigate the Sejna affair was General Prchlik who in January 1968 had been appointed Mamula's successor as head of the Central Committee's Department of State Administration. As the investigation proceeded, a scandal unfolded which led to the suicide of General Janko, dismissals of the Minister of the Interior and the Attorney General, and resignations of a Deputy Premier, two Central Committee secretaries, and the Defense Minister. Finally, on the twenty-first of March, less than three weeks after Sejna's flight became known. President Novotny himself, in response to intense pressure and apparently having abandoned hope for support and intervention from the Soviet Union, resigned.

The after-effects of the Sejna affair went further. One theory holds that Marshal Yakubovsky's hurried visit to Prague on February 28 served a dual purpose—to consult urgently with Czech political and military officials regarding the security implications of Sejna's defection and to examine the feasibility of military intervention in Czechoslovakia. This view is based on retrospective estimates made by Czechoslovak intelligence officers and by the Czechoslovak Defense Minister, General Martin Dzur, that six months were needed to develop the necessary plans for the 22 August invasion. Whether or not this was the case and whether, if so, Yakubovsky was acting from personal motives, for the Soviet military, or for the Soviet government, remains a puzzle. At least one commentator, however, has marked the Yakubovsky visit as the beginning of Soviet military pressure for action against Czechoslovakia:

Within a couple of days of General Sejna's flight. Marshal Ivan Yakubovsky, commander-in-chief of the forces of the Warsaw Pact organization, arrived in Prague. It was no ceremonial visit. The marshal went straight to see Mr. Dubcek, Mr. Novotny, who was then still President of the country, and Mr. Josef Lenart, who was still Prime Minister. Though little is known about what passed between the Russian marshal and the Czechoslovak leaders on that occasion, there is every reason to believe that it marked the beginning of the long campaign of pressure by the Russian military to restore their control of Czechoslovak territory. It was nearly six months later before the campaign succeeded, with the invasion of Czechoslovakia by troops of the Warsaw Pact.

The Prague housecleaning which began with the ouster of Mamula continued through the spring and summer and resulted in removal of some 150 Czechoslovak nationals who worked directly for Soviet advisers in the Ministry of the Interior. Care was taken not to interrupt the flow of intelligence made available to the Soviets, but merely to isolate the advisers from their Czech contacts. At the same time a large number of Czechoslovak officers with known conservative leanings were ousted from higher commands. The [so-called] merit system, which excluded party membership or loyalty to the Soviet Union as requisites for promotion to high positions, was strengthened.

(The Soviet Decision to Invade Czechoslovakia, Advanced Research Paper, Naval War College, Robert M. Guth, 1975, pp. 9-12) (IMG)

Through Dubcek, the intelligentsia of Czechoslovakia rose to higher ranks, and the blue-collar industrial workers' element in the Party lost the battle for the membership composition. A CIA document confirmed that whereas Dubcek represented the intelligentsia and bourgeois reformers, the industrial blue-collar workers in Czechoslovakia supported the Novotny faction, the faction opposed to Dubcek. The document stated:

The conservative tactic is aimed particularly at compounding workers' fears that reforms will mean loss of jobs, rising prices, and a general drop in the standards of living. An attempt is being made to alienate industrial workers from intellectuals and from "radical economic reformers," and by implication from Dubcek, who has the support of the reformers.

Dubcek has rallied significant support from other sources. Association of writers, journalists, and farmers have pledged their aid. The chairman of the parliament and the key party boss of the city of Prague have deserted Novotny. Dubcek probably can count on most of the party in Slovakia and Moravia, but the extent of his support in Bohemia is unclear. He has taken steps to control the armed forces and the secret police.

Novotny's strength, in turn, lies among ideological conservatives, industrial workers, and the government and party bureaucrats at regional district levels.

(CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN, CIA, February 29, 1968, p. 6) (IMG)

Beyond the comprador-minded intelligentsia, the corrupt politicians, and the agents of Anglo-American finance capital in Czechoslovakia, the Dubcek gang had no other socio-economic base. Hence, Dubcek decided to make the intelligentsia the dominant element in the Party. By May 1968, the

intelligentsia formed the largest group in the Party. Since the and thus decisively overthrew the dictatorship of the proletariat in Czechoslovakia, establishing the dictatorship of the comprador bourgeoisie:

Since the Party leadership was worried about the constant tendency to deterioration of the social composition of the membership from the class point of view, the CC of the CPC in May 1959 decided that the Party organizations had to carefully select new candidates and attract among them 60 per cent of workers and 20 per cent of collective farmers or 80 per cent of workers and farmers plus 20 per cent of "other working people. The main Party organ then claimed that "workers represented half of the membership of the Party and out of the total number of workers engaged in production almost every fifth is a member of the Party." But it was admitted that if only workers actually engaged in production were counted, the half would shrink to 36 per cent and in addition 9.6 per cent workers, members of the party, were pensioners. Till 1967 a further deterioration would take place: "If in 1947 workers formed 50 per cent of the Party membership, then in 1967 the number of active manual workers represented only 26.4 per cent." And till 1969 the number of retired workers went up to 15-9 per cent.

At the end of May 1968, the CPC had 1,687,565 members. It represented 12 per cent of the Czechoslovak population and 17 per cent of persons older than eighteen years. *The intelligentsia formed the largest group – 40 per cent of economically active members.* Almost 34 per cent of the intelligentsia was organized in the CPC, and among them up to 40 per cent of teachers were represented.

(Fools and Heroes: The Changing Role of Communist Intellectuals in Czechoslovakia, Peter Hruby, 1980, p. 142) (IMG)

Via the intelligentsia, the corrupt bureaucrats controlled the Czechoslovak state and linked the comprador regime of Czechoslovakia to Anglo-American and West German finance capital. The pace of the Titoization program in Czechoslovakia in 1968 was far higher than the pace of the Titoization program in the Soviet Union in 1956. That is because the influence of the proletariat over the Czechoslovak means of violence was far lower in 1968 than the influence of the proletariat over the Soviet means of violence in 1955-1956. In the Soviet Union, only in 1956, when the white-collar elements gained a membership composition above 50%, did the forces of Titoist counter-revolution gain the margin over the proletarian forces throughout the entire state apparatus and not just the Party. By contrast, in Czechoslovakia, the Titoist counter-revolutionary forces did not so badly need the white-collar elements to be more than 50% of the Party membership and could achieve their objectives at a far higher base even without the white-collar elements (which formed the largest percentage in the Party) reaching above the 50%. In Czechoslovakia, the Titoist agents representing the white-collar elements in the Party had already ascended to dominance over enough of the Czechoslovak means of violence, the Czechoslovak military and intelligence bodies, to quickly pursue the Titoization of Czechoslovakia from the anti-imperialist camp. Only a few months more of Titoization in Czechoslovakia could pass and the Czechoslovak people would have found themselves in NATO or Yugoslavia. Had the Titoist agents not had the upper hand over the Czechoslovak means of violence, then there would have been no need for Warsaw Pact deployment of troops, and the Czechoslovak communists would have been able to resolve that land's Titoism problem for years to come. Yet, the very fact that the Warsaw Pact deployed its troops, coupled with the very rapid pace of Titoization in that country, all serve to reinforce the thesis that in Czechoslovakia back then, the Titoist agents of the comprador bourgeoisie already had gained the upper hand in the military and intelligence bodies, rendering the Czechoslovak state into a comprador bourgeois state. Only as a result of Warsaw Pact intervention was this pace of Titoization 'reforms' kept in check and even then only partially – Dubcek's group retained the white-collar majority, Dubcek continued as Party leader until a year later, Egypt was military and economically defunded by the Dubcekite Czechoslovakia in 1969, and Husak, a Slovak separatist, became leader after Dubcek. The fact that Titoization went on even after Warsaw Pact intervention is proof of how vigorous the pace of the Titoists in Czechoslovakia had become, and is demonstrative of the fact that the counter-revolutionary situation in Czechoslovakia resembled more so that of Yugoslavia in early 1948 and was much more severe than that of the Soviet Union in 1956. The communist faction of the Red Army and the of the CPSU agreed that they who controlled the means of violence in Czechoslovakia were highly untrustworthy:

The concern that Soviet leaders had about the proposed nuclear weapons sites in Czechoslovakia—and about Czechoslovakia's policy more generally—increased still further when it turned out that Prchlik, rather than being fired ignominiously, was merely reassigned to other military-related duties. In his new capacity, the general was even able to continue working on drafts of the national security Action Program, an arrangement that infuriated Soviet officials when they found out about it. Soviet leaders were equally dismayed that neither the KSC nor the Czechoslovak defense ministry would formally repudiate any of Prchlik's comments until 15 August, a month after the general's news conference. In the meantime, Prchlik received an outpouring of public admiration and expressions of support from many of his colleagues and subordinates in the Czechoslovak Defense Ministry. Needless to say, these reactions produced even greater Soviet consternation and led to serious doubts in Moscow about Czechoslovakia's military alignment.

Thus, well before the invasion in August 1968, Soviet Army commanders had lost all confidence in their Czechoslovak counterparts and had become convinced that the risks of deploying nuclear warheads on Czechoslovak soil would be too great unless the storage sites were converted into larger bases for Soviet forces.

(THE PRAGUE SPRING AND THE SOVIET INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA: New Interpretations, COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN, Issue 3, Wilson Center, Mark Kramer, Fall 1993, p. 10) (IMG)

With the rise to power of the intelligentsia and the Titoist faction of the Czechoslovak 'Communist' Party, there came a further purge of the communist elements of the Czechoslovak military and intelligence and the decline in the influence of Eurasian intelligence services:

The result of these changes following the defection of Sejna was that the Soviet military lost its eyes in Czechoslovakia and, worse, lost its influence in the selection of senior military leaders. This was tantamount to shifting the Czechoslovak army from its previous position as the most reliable element in the Warsaw pact to the least reliable. (...). The effective loss of contact in the security field must have resulted in both alarmist reporting by the advisers and severe distortions in the perspective with which the Soviet political and security leadership viewed developments in Czechoslovakia. At a seminar on the Czechoslovak reform movement held at the University of Reading in 1971, Pavel Tigrid, the Paris-based Czechoslovak emigre journalist and publisher, pointed out that

the Soviets used to get accurate information from Czechoslovakia when Soviet liaison officers were directly connected with the Ministry of the Interior, the security and they lost this control with the personnel the army, and changes and simply did not have adequate information on what was going on.

According to a former Czechoslovak intelligence official who was there at the time, the advisers replaced their sources with new ones, hastily recruited and unvetted, selected from the ousted ultraconservatives who, of course, had a built-in bias.

(...). Marshal Yakubovsky, Commander in Chief of Warsaw Pact forces, must have been alarmed at the Czechoslovak situation in 1968. When he came to Prague to explore the security repercussions of General Sejna's defection to the West he found not only the problems created by the presumed compromise of key Czechoslovak and Warsaw Pact secrets to Western intelligence but a situation in which top military and security leaders, known and trusted by their Soviet associates and counterparts, were being replaced with known liberals or politically untested unknowns.

(The Soviet Decision to Invade Czechoslovakia, Advanced Research Paper, Naval War College, Robert M. Guth, 1975, pp. 12-18) (IMG)

On the other hand, the Yugoslav agent Dubcek and his Titoist comrades promoted the influence of the Yugoslav secret service in Czechoslovakia. The fact that Dubcek's Titoist clique was backed by Yugoslavia's regime was indeed a fact that fostered the prospect of a 'Little Entente', a Titoist-dominated 'Federation', against the Eurasians, the paper published by the US Naval War College admitted. The document stated:

Support for Prague also came from Marshal Tito, the one Eastern European leader who had broken from Soviet domination and survived both the break and the subsequent introduction of many of the measures for which Dubcek was fighting. Both Ceausescu and Tito visited Prague in August 1968, just a few days before the invasion. Tito was in Czechoslovakia on August 9 and 10 and Ceausescu on August 15. Both were received with enthusiasm; Tito's welcome is described as "tumultuous" and "triumphant." The contrast of their reception to that of Ulbricht on August 12 was marked and ominous. Also ominous were references to a revival of the Little Entente, which Rockingham Gill suggests would have been "directed, not against the imperial pretensions of Budapest like the first Little Entente, but against the hegemony of Moscow." The prospect of an alliance of Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia, heretics in the middle of the Warsaw Pact, must have produced violent reactions in Moscow. (The Soviet Decision to Invade Czechoslovakia, Advanced Research Paper, Naval War College, Robert M. Guth, 1975, p. 30) (IMG)

The Yugoslav agent Dubcek was moving Czechoslovakia into Yugoslavia's sphere of influence:

There is little doubt that, had the conservatives been nullified and Czechoslovakia able to continue with an independent foreign policy, some closer relationship to the maverick Yugoslavs and recalcitrant Rumanians would have taken place. (The Soviet Decision to Invade Czechoslovakia, Advanced Research Paper, Naval War College, Robert M. Guth, 1975, p. 38) (IMG)

Furthermore, Otto Klieka – regarded as an obstacle to relations with the West German regime – was removed from his position as deputy foreign minister and was demoted to be the ambassador to the United Arab Republic (UAR). Being an ambassador to the UAR was no doubt important, but certainly was a demotion. The CIA reported:

On 14 January Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs Otto Klieka, through to be a staunch anti-German, was named Czechoslovak Ambassador to Cairo. Klieka, an intelligent and capable diplomat, spent some five years in Nazi concentration camps, and later became known as an expert on Germany in the foreign ministry. Since he is a dedicated Communist and a Novotny man, he may be one of those hardline leaders opposing rapprochement with Bonn. Klieka's wife, Karla, is known to be outspokenly anti-German. (EASTERN EUROPEAN INTELLIGENCER, CIA, January 15, 1968, p. 2) (IMG)

The Titoist regime in Czechoslovakia, following the footsteps of the Gestapo agent Tito, was moving Czechoslovakia towards subjugation by West German finance capital. American finance capital, the ally of West German finance capital, of course encouraged this process; the US encouraged the West Germans (FRG) to provide tied 'aid' to Czechoslovakia:

With regard possibility West European countries, including FRG, extending financial assistance to Czechs, we would encourage such action.

(Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany, Washington, April 27, 1968, 0045Z., 154242. Ref: Bonn 11211. Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 CZECH. Confidential. Drafted by Batjer; cleared by Lisle, L, and E; and approved by Stoessel. Repeated to Prague, London, Paris, Moscow, Warsaw, Sofia, Budapest, Bucharest, Belgrade, Brussels for Petrow, USNATO, and Berlin. Washington, July 23, 1968.) (IMG)

Dubcek and his Titoist comrades in the Party pursued precisely what the US Department of State called for. Regarding Czechoslovakia's cooperation with the US-led camp, especially with West Germany, the Vienna Domestic Service reported:

The second point concerns economic cooperation. On this issue there are also certain fears that Prague might orient itself more to the we know that last week there was talk about a Western loan for Czechoslovakia. The amount was about 400 million dollars. Here in Prague, official sources do not want to talk about this. However, according to unofficial reports, the Soviet Union said to be very much interested in the further course of these talks. It had been intended that the Soviets grant such a loan to the Czechs, but so far they have not evidenced any reaction. Should the Soviet Union continue to leave this matter unsettled, Czechoslovakia would be forced to make use of this Western loan, however, carries 7-percent interest, very expensive for Czechoslovakia. But Czechoslovakia would have to swallow the bitter pill, since these million dollars would be the least needed for an upswing in the Czechoslovak economy. (MACHER REPORTS ON ULBRICHT'S PRAGUE VISIT, Vienna Domestic Service in German, 11:24 GMT, August 13, 1968. In: Federal Broadcasts Information Service (FBIS), CIA, August 14, 1968, p. 6) (IMG)

The cooperation with the West Germans of course came with Czechoslovakia liberalizing its border – rendering itself defenseless against NATO invasion. Karen Dawisha of the CIA's Brookings Institute confirmed that under the Dubcek faction in 1968, there came:

the official policy of removing the barbed wire along the Czech-Austrian border. (The Kremlin and the Prague Spring, Karen Dawisha, 1984, p. 205) (IMG)

Alongside Austrian tourists, Austrian 'tourists' entered Czechoslovakia. The Vienna Domestic Service reported:

During the first half of 1968, 166,000 Austrian tourists visited Czechoslovakia. Compared to the same period of 1967, this means an increase of 20,000 tourists. (MACHER REPORTS ON ULBRICHT'S PRAGUE VISIT, Vienna Domestic Service in German, 11:24 GMT, August 13, 1968. In: Federal Broadcasts Information Service (FBIS), CIA, August 14, 1968, p. 7) (IMG)

Ladislav Bittman, a Czechoslovak intelligence officer who defected to the West and provided intelligence to the Western secret services wrote:

A wave of tourists were flooding the country [in 1968], as they had thronged on the eve of the Munich agreement [in 1938]. (The Deception game: Czechoslovak Intelligence in Soviet Political Warfare, Ladislav Bittman, 1972, p. 195) (IMG)

Furthermore, in the words of a document published by the CIA's 'Woodrow Wilson Center' (also known as the George Kennan Institute):

since the early spring of 1968 ... it was announced that Czechoslovak border guards had dismantled a series of barbedwire and electrical fences along the border with West Germany. (THE PRAGUE SPRING AND THE SOVIET INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA: New Interpretations, COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN, Issue 3, Wilson Center, Mark Kramer, Fall 1993, p. 10) (IMG)

Fascist aggression by the cross-border infiltration of undercover terrorists – history was repeating itself. The Titoist ruling elites in Czechoslovakia opened up the country for a NATO aggression by cross-border infiltration of NATO terrorists. In a critically important memorandum for the US State Department and NATO, George McGhee – a top US intelligence operative, military commander, oil businessman, and at the time, the US ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany – wrote:

It is inevitable, of course, **to recall the Hungarian experience**. A major difference in the case of Czechoslovakia, however, is the presence of substantial US forces in Germany. This means that, contrary to the Hungarian case, we could in theory signal our support for the Czech Government by moving our troops closer to the Czech border or, indeed, **cross the border** to assist the Czechs in warding off a Soviet attack. I cannot, of course, on the basis of my responsibilities in Germany, make any significant contribution to whether this is desirable per se. Not only Germany but NATO would be deeply involved. (11943. Subj: Czechoslovakia. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State, Department of State, Central Files, POL CZECH. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to USNATO, Prague, Munich, USEUCOM, USAREUR, and USAFE, George C. McGhee, Bonn, May 10, 1968. Bold added.) (IMG)

During the ‘Hungarian experience’ of 1956, the Panzerwaffe troops stationed in Yugoslavia were infiltrated across the border into Hungary in order to assist the Horthyite and Nazi Arrow Cross troops to fight off the advancing Red Army troops (see C20S13). The American imperialists were advocating an aggression against Czechoslovakia by crossing the border. In this midst, the Dubcekite policy of liberalizing the borders with the West Germans and the Austrians was nothing short of high treason. Another US military and intelligence document written by US National Security Council (NSC) staff to the US president Johnson’s Special Assistant Walt Rostow, had the following excerpts for the invasion planning:

—Forces for possible intervention in Czechoslovakia could involve 1 U.S. brigade, 2 French divisions, and 2 FRG divisions.

—Employment of anything more than 1 brigade ought to be accompanied by NATO mobilization, which would require six months to reach planned force levels.

(Memorandum From Robert Ginsburgh of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow), Washington, July 23, 1968. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Czechoslovakia, Memos, Vol. 2. Top Secret) (IMG)

As support for the increased potential of a covert Atlantic invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Dubcek regime decided to reduce the troop count of the Czechoslovak military:

The Czechoslovak Army is being reduced by 20,000 troops.... [T]he reduction would involve only support personnel and would not affect the number of tactical units. A reduction in the size of the 195,000-man armed forces was reportedly planned by the Czechoslovak Government prior to the intervention by Warsaw Pact forces, but the size of the cut planned then is not known. (CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN, CIA, November 14, 1968, p. 5) (IMG)

Note that the strengthening of the Czechoslovak military would not have helped Dubcek against a Red Army intervention since the main part of troops of the Dubcek group were not the Czechoslovak military units but were rather the NATO terrorists. The Eurasians were concerned about the cross-border infiltration of fascist terrorists via Austria and West Germany:

Soviet concerns about the security of the depots had been growing rapidly since the early spring of 1968, when it was announced that Czechoslovak border guards had dismantled a series of barbed-wire and electrical fences along the border with West Germany. These concerns gave rise by mid-1968 to “deep anxiety and fear” in Moscow about the “laxity of those responsible for Czechoslovakia’s western frontiers.” From then on, Soviet leaders were determined to rectify “the absolutely abnormal and dangerous situation on Czechoslovakia’s borders with the FRG and Austria,” which was enabling “imperialist spies and subversive elements to carry out subversive activities in a region where largescale defense forces of the Warsaw Pact governments are deployed.” (THE PRAGUE SPRING AND THE SOVIET INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA: New Interpretations, COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN, Issue 3, Wilson Center, Mark Kramer, Fall 1993, p. 10) (IMG)

The Zionist agents of the American secret service, having risen to important positions in the leadership of the student/intelligentsia activist movements in Czechoslovakia, provided information to the US spy den (embassy) that they would launch a colour-revolutionary uprising of the intelligentsia in Czechoslovakia in support of the pro-Zionist tendency headed by Dubcek, giving the pro-Zionist tendency in the Czechoslovak government greater leverage. The CIA reported:

Representatives from the Student Parliament of the Philosophical Faculty at Charles University in Prague on 20 June petitioned the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to restore diplomatic relations with Israel. Students parading outside the ministry carried placards which claimed that over 13,000 people had signed the petition. The students also tipped off the US Embassy that they would take this action. The students’ petition again illustrates the popular feeling that the present government should undo the work of the Novotny regime, which broke relations with Israel after the June 1967 War. The Foreign Ministry has modified its stance since January, declaring it recognizes and respects the existence of all Middle East states, including Israel....

(Eastern European Intelligencer, CIA, June 21, 1968, p. 3) (IMG)

Media outlets and intelligence circles in Moscow highlighted the drastic increase in the pro-Zionist sympathies in the Czechoslovak regime. At the same time, the economy was being decentralized even further, and thus the Czechoslovak economy was being sabotaged. This had a negative influence on Czechoslovak relations with the UAR, since socialist Czechoslovakia – when dominated by the communist faction and at the height of Anglo-American and Moscow Titoist sanctions on Czechoslovakia – had provided military support to the UAR. As mentioned before, so vigorous was the Dubcekite tides in Czechoslovakia that well until 1969, some reactionary Titoization ‘reforms’ were taking place, even after the Warsaw Pact intervention. Till, the last days of his rule, Dubcek, the agent of Tito, ensured that maximum damage is inflicted upon the Gamal Abdel-Nasser faction. Richard Nyrop, a political officer of the US State Department in Pakistan, wrote:

The turning point for Egypt came on April 14, 1969, when Czechoslovakia, a heavy supplier of arms to Egypt, announced that its arms shipments would be reduced and that there would be no further arms contracts, concluding with a warning to the Arab states against any moves toward a new war. (Area Handbook for Egypt, Richard F. Nyrop, 1976, p. 46) (IMG)

The halt occurred in 1969 when Yugoslav agent Dubcek and his Titoist friends had not yet been fully ousted despite the Warsaw Pact intervention. In the sphere of political economy, the usual counter-revolutionary pro-bureaucracy policies were implemented. In order to create a dual bureaucracy of the Party and the government both controlling the same fields, the role of the Party was reduced and the role of the government was elevated:

The role of the party in the process of government was reduced, and the National Assembly was directed to assume its constitutional role as the "supreme organ of state power." (NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 18: CZECHOSLOVAKIA: COUNTRY PROFILE, CIA, May 1974, p. 12) (IMG)

Although the intelligentsia dominated the Party, there still existed a contingent of proletarians and kolkhozniks in the Party. The percentage membership of proletarians in communist party cadres was usually more than the percentage composition of the government ministries by proletarians. In the event of continued domination of the Party over the bureaucracy of the economic bodies, such a proletarian and kolkhoznik contingent in the Party could influence the bureaucracy of the economic bodies and to slow down the Dubcekite promotion of the corrupt bureaucrats. Hence, the Dubcek group aimed to weaken the Party, as a means of further weakening the hold of the proletariat and the kolkhozniks over the economy, even though the Party was run by the pro-Dubcekite intelligentsia as the largest membership percentage. Directly correlated with such an anti-Party trend was the project to proliferate bureaucracy and chaos through economic decentralization:

Plans were made to establish a decentralized and market-oriented economy, akin in spirit if not in detail to the Yugoslav model. (NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 18: CZECHOSLOVAKIA: COUNTRY PROFILE, CIA, May 1974, p. 12) (IMG)

The notorious Slovak separatist Gustav Husak (see C15S8) became the deputy head of the country. And:

Gustav Husak was called out of political obscurity to lead a drive to federalize the state. And while the Dubcek regime repeatedly reaffirmed its basic loyalty to Moscow, it delighted its prideful domestic constituency by simultaneously serving notice that Czechoslovakia would thenceforth maintain a less subservient stance. (NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 18: CZECHOSLOVAKIA: COUNTRY PROFILE, CIA, May 1974, p. 12) (IMG)

In this midst, it should become increasingly clear how dangerous the strategic reorientation of Czechoslovakia away from the camp of the anti-colonial national bourgeoisie, the proletariat, and the kolkhozniks onto the camp of the bureaucrats, finance capital, mercantile capital, kulaks, etc. would have been. It is no slander to say that the agenda of the Dubcek group was to subordinate the Czechoslovak homeland to the likes of the Yugoslav-harboured Panzerwaffe troops as had happened in Hungary in 1956. The Titoization agenda of the Dubcek group was paving the way towards a Greater Yugoslav Empire ('Little Entente') subordinate to the West German Nazis

the threat of a Little Entente independent of the Soviet political and eventually military sphere of influence, or the threat of a total loss of political influence in Czechoslovakia's internal affairs in connection with predictable changes resulting from the 14th Party Congress.

Or it was a combination of these two threats. The more fundamental cause of the decision was, of course, the perceived loss of Czechoslovakia as a political or military ally, due to the forces of an uncontrolled liberalization that would rapidly drive the country into the hands of the revenge-seeking West Germans. (The Soviet Decision to Invade Czechoslovakia, Advanced Research Paper, Naval War College, Robert M. Guth, 1975, p. 43) (IMG)

No, the socialist and progressive forces in Eastern Europe could not stand by and watch as Czechoslovakia was being converted into another Kosovo. The presence of the Eurasian military and intelligence services in Czechoslovakia was of vital importance for preventing the full seizure of Czechoslovakia by the army of rapists and assassins serving Tito's fascist secret service. It was also vitally necessary to support the presence of the Eurasian army in Czechoslovakia – in a strictly legal and non-aggressor manner – so to deter a covert invasion by hordes of West German hooligans. It was unacceptable to allow the Mossad to influence Czechoslovakia, turning this major center of arms for into a center of arms for the IDF terrorists under the command of the Moshe Dayan faction. The US State Department's high command certainly agreed that Eurasian hesitation on intervention in Czechoslovakia helped US objectives in Eastern Europe and the Middle East:

On the other hand, if the Soviets hesitate and withdraw, allowing the process of liberalization to proceed in Eastern Europe, the political atmosphere should improve fundamentally, in ways most favorable to us. Poland would almost surely follow the Czech example. Ulbricht would be isolated. New possibilities for a settlement in Europe would be opened. We could hope for a toning down of Soviet imperialism in the Middle East and elsewhere. The Soviet leaders responsible for the failure of Soviet policy in Eastern Europe might well be thrown out, as Khrushchev was, to be replaced by leaders who would at least be weaker for a time than the present group. (Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Rostow) to Secretary of State Rusk, SUBJECT: Deterrent action with regard to Czechoslovakia, Washington, July 20, 1968. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CZECH-USSR. Secret; Exdis. The source text bears no drafting information but is initialed by Rostow. A copy of this memorandum was sent to the White House. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, State Department, Vol. 14). In: 'Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968', Vol. 17, Eastern Europe, US Department of State) (IMG)

As can be seen, to hesitate was unacceptable. On the other hand the events in Czechoslovakia were going to impact the course of events in the Middle East as well:

The possibility of Russian military intervention in Czechoslovakia is a matter of basic concern to the United States. Ambassador Thompson and others think the risk is increasing. Such an event could well torpedo the NPT and set back the trend towards détente in Europe. Its effect on our relations with the Soviet Union would probably reduce the chance for a peaceful settlement in the Middle East and Viet-Nam.... On net, Soviet armed intervention in Czechoslovakia would probably change the political atmosphere fundamentally in ways that could harm our interests. (Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Rostow) to Secretary of State Rusk, SUBJECT: Deterrent action with regard to Czechoslovakia, Washington, July 20, 1968. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CZECH-USSR. Secret; Exdis. The source text bears no drafting information but is initialed by Rostow. A copy of this memorandum was sent to the White House. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Agency File, State Department, Vol. 14). In: 'Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968', Vol. 17, Eastern Europe, US Department of State) (IMG)

Although Titoist influence was dramatically increasing in Czechoslovakia, it was not yet so strong as to be able to fully hand that country over to the Atlantic camp. This allowed room for the communist anti-Titoist elements in Czechoslovakia on the one hand, and Eurasian communist anti-Titoist elements on the other, to pressure Dubcek's group into accepting Warsaw Pact military 'exercises' in Czechoslovakia:

shortly thereafter Soviet pressures to permit stationing of troops in Czechoslovak territory became intense to the point where Dubcek had to agree to permit maneuvers on Czechoslovak soil as the lesser of two evils. Protestations by Defense Minister General Dzur that

these were long-scheduled and purely staff or communications exercises were contradicted by the sudden arrival in Prague of Grechko with a large party of Red Army generals and marshals. Not long after their departure on May 22, well before the announced dates for the exercises, June 20-30, Soviet, Polish, East German and Hungarian troops were crossing the Czechoslovak borders in sizable numbers. In command was the Commander in Chief of Warsaw Pact forces, Yakubovsky. He evidently had difficulty including the Czechoslovak military forces in the "joint military exercises." According to one later commentator, "Czechoslovak officers were not told what was going on, Czechoslovak journalists were not admitted to press conferences and even the Prime Minister, Mr. Cernik, was told he could contact Yakubovsky only through Moscow. In fact, Czechoslovak officials never learned how many troops were in their country or exactly what was their disposition. Well after the official closing date for the Warsaw Pact maneuvers, reports of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia were so frequent that Dubcek refused to meet with Soviet leaders in late July until the troops had all cleared out. (The Soviet Decision to Invade Czechoslovakia, Advanced Research Paper, Naval War College, Robert M. Guth, 1975, pp. 20-21) (IMG) Indeed, judging by the location and scale of Soviet troop movements during the crisis, the Pact's "exercises" seem to have been intended, in part, to protect the three sites chosen as nuclear weapons depots. (THE PRAGUE SPRING AND THE SOVIET INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA: New Interpretations, COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN, Issue 3, Wilson Center, Mark Kramer, Fall 1993, p. 10) (IMG)

Of course, the exercise of the Warsaw Pact troops were there to establish the Eurasian intelligence and military presence in Czechoslovakia as a counter-weight to Dubcekite-approved imperialist secret service presence, and to counteract the political leverage of the Titoist commanders whom Dubcek's group had installed at the helm of the Czechoslovak military. The exercise was basically an excuse which assisted in the weakening of the Dubcek faction's leverage in negotiations vis-à-vis the Eurasians:

The USSR's full withdrawal [was] accomplished at a snail's pace.... It is generally accepted that their presence was a threat and a form of pressure and at the same time that it served as a rehearsal and as a cover for the subsequent invasion. (The Soviet Decision to Invade Czechoslovakia, Advanced Research Paper, Naval War College, Robert M. Guth, 1975, pp. 21-22) (IMG)

During the first meetings, Dubcek and a Titoist renegade ironically named 'Svoboda' ferociously stood against the Eurasian call for stationing troops in Czechoslovakia. However, as the US Embassy in Czechoslovakia stated, it was possible that during the later meetings, some concessions were secretly given to the Eurasians with regards to Red Army presence in Czechoslovakia. In fact, publicly, Dubcek and Co. agreed to give concessions to the Eurasians regarding censorship against Czechoslovakia's Titoist media (though Dubcek ended up breaking his promises). The following are excerpts of a report from the US Embassy in Czechoslovakia:

1. Dubcek regime can take considerable credit for saving its skin at Cierna and for staring down the Soviet threat of force. We understand this is what actually happened at first meetings, when Dubcek stood up against personal attack and Svoboda said he would resign if Soviets insisted on troop stationing in Czechoslovakia. Czechs also seem to have essentially preserved their ability to pursue their own domestic program.

2. Czechs however paid heavy verbal price in language of Bratislava Declaration (see below), which if nothing else clearly implies that Czechs will hew closely to Soviet foreign policy line. They also agreed at Cierna to hold down anti-Soviet material in media and reportedly agreed to restrict emergence of new political groups; both concessions spell trouble for Dubcek group's relations with progressive domestic allies. Additional concessions may have been made and not yet brought to light, e.g. on Soviet military presence here or on personnel adjustments (either removal of [Dubcekite] [pseudo-]progressives or retention of others).

(Telegram From the Embassy in Czechoslovakia to the Department of State, Subj: Assessment of Czech-Soviet confrontation, Prague, August 4, 1968, 1130Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CZECH. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Belgrade, Berlin, Bonn, Bucharest, Budapest, Moscow, Munich, USNATO, Sofia, Warsaw, and USUN. In: 'Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968', Vol. 17, Eastern Europe, US Department of State) (IMG)

Since Dubcek and his Titoist allies in Czechoslovakia broke their deal which had entailed a struggle against Titoists in the state and media, Brezhnev had a conversation with Dubcek. Remarkably, regarding what the Eurasians were to do towards the situation in Czechoslovakia, Dubcek responded as shown below:

DUBČEK. Cde. Brezhnev, you should resort to all the measures that your CC Politburo believes are appropriate.

BREZHNEV. But if that's how you're going to answer me, I must say to you, Sasha, that this is a flippant statement.

DUBČEK. I'm not able to answer in any other way. We're working very hard to carry out the agreement. But in these conditions over the last week to ten days we haven't yet fully coped with it. We're not able to do more than what we've been doing. This is a large matter to deal with, and we're not able to complete all our work in just 10-15 days. How could it all be done in such a short time? I'm not able to take responsibility upon myself for doing everything in just five to seven days; this is a complex process, which has encompassed the whole party, the whole country, and the whole nation. And the party must keep control of this process, bringing the nation along with it in the construction of socialism. In this we see our duty, and in this we see our obligation, but it's impossible to do this in as short a time as you are suggesting, Cde. Brezhnev. With full responsibility I am telling you that if you don't believe me, if you believe we are deceiving you, then you should take the measures that your Politburo believes are necessary.

(DOCUMENT No. 81: Transcript of Leonid Brezhnev's Telephone Conversation with Alexander Dubček, August 13, 1968. Source: APRF, Prot. No. 38; Vondrová & Navrátil, vol. 2, pp. 172-181. In: "The Prague Spring '68", The Prague Spring Foundation. In: NSA Archives) (IMG)

In other words, Dubcek was telling the Eurasians that they could send their troops to Czechoslovakia if they so desire. Since Dubcek had already come under Red Army pressure due to Warsaw Pact 'exercises' in Czechoslovakia, he was giving all these concessions to Eurasians.

During that time period, Eurasian diplomat Valentin Falin headed the 2nd European (British) Department of the Eurasian Foreign Ministry. According to Valentin Falin, on August 16, Dubcek himself asked Brezhnev to send Soviet troops into Czechoslovakia:

Often Leonid Ilyich would come to us in a small room near his office and ask ironically: "Still doing magic?" We insisted that the costs of military intervention would be greater than the profits. The answer was usually: "You don't know everything." Indeed, we did not know, for example, that on August 16, that is, four days before our invasion of the Czechoslovak SSR, Dubcek called Brezhnev and asked him to send in Soviet troops. No matter how hard the Czechs try to silence this fact, the recording of the phone conversation is

stored in the archive. (Interview with Ambassador Valentin Falin, Ambassador of the Soviet Union, No. 8 (907), Society and Science, Special project, Itogi Magazine) (IMG)

Falin presents Dubcek's remarks in such a manner that as though Dubcek willingly told the Eurasians to intervene. Of course, in reality, Dubcek would only have invited Eurasian intervention, if politically encircled to the point that he would be compelled to concede and make such a suggestion. The most important factor in the political encirclement and cooptation of Dubcek had been the brief Red Army presence under the pretext of 'exercise' in Czechoslovakia. Had Dubcek not been politically encircled, he would not have made any such concessions. Since Valentin Falin was speaking as a former Eurasian foreign ministry official (albeit he was arrested during Stalin era on imperialist intelligence activity charges and was released when Beria gang took over), his remarks of course cannot be so easily cited as a Western confession. Nonetheless, in terms of the logic of the story, his remarks certainly would make sense so long as one also adds the point that Dubcek was coopted to make such concessions and that he did not make such a suggestion on his own free-enough will.

As mentioned previously several times, the communist faction in the CPSU and the Red Army utilized its cooptee Brezhnev as a vehicle for anti-Titoist communist influence. The strategy of coopting Malenkov against Beria, coopting Khrushchev against Malenkov, and coopting Brezhnev against Khrushchev, was the Stalin-era strategy that was continued by the many comrades of Stalin after his death. After the death of Stalin, coopting Malenkov against Beria and Khrushchev against Malenkov was spearheaded by Genreal Konev, an old comrade of Stalin and a target of Beria and the Doctors' Plot. One of the most prominent figures in this midst was General Shtemenko, also an old comrade of Stalin and a target of the Doctors' Plot. Shtemenko put his support behind Brezhnev to coopt the latter to promote the communist elements in the armed forces. With the rise of Brezhnev's group, Shtemenko became the leader of the Warsaw Pact forces shortly prior to the intervention in Czechoslovakia:

The question of Stalin's place in Soviet history had been fiercely argued since his death, with his contribution clearly receiving more favorable appraisal after Khrushchev was ousted. In June 1968 a book was published entitled *The General Staff During the War*, by General Sergei Shtemenko, who praised Stalin's wartime leadership. In a review of the book, *Krasnaya Zvezda* commented that the General Staff had not been so unprepared for the Nazi invasion as some historians believed. The attack had not thrown the General Staff into disarray, thanks primarily to Stalin, who had remained in the Kremlin throughout, refusing to evacuate the Staff headquarters to underground shelters in Kirovskaya Metro. Shtemenko, who had been demoted by Khrushchev for his loyalty to Stalin, was soon to regain some of his former prominence. He was to become the chief of staff of the Warsaw Pact only three weeks before the invasion of Czechoslovakia. (The Kremlin and the Prague Spring, Karen Dawisha, 1984, p. 205) (IMG)

Shtemenko indeed led the intervention. On August 20, 1968, the Warsaw Pact deployed its troops to Czechoslovakia. Since the intervention was upon the invitation – after the partial cooptation – of the Czechoslovak leadership, it was not an invasion according to international law. In the end, the purpose of abiding by international law is not really a communist belief in its sacredness but rather an attempt to showcase one's law-abiding behaviour while exposing the imperialist violations of international law. The Stalin-era USSR intervened in the Baltic areas and overthrew their regimes through such a cooptation-for-invitation strategy. Military intervention should have happened in Czechoslovakia, but it was necessary to do so using loopholes in international law.

Moreover, although from a "bird's eye view," looking at the troop movements from the top, the intervention superficially appeared as an invasion, it did not appear like an invasion at all, on-the-ground. The August 1968 intervention was a mere troop deployment into Czechoslovakia for the purpose of establishing a powerful counter-weight against Anglo-American imperialist secret service and terrorist presence in that territory. In an intelligence report to Washington, US ambassador to Czechoslovakia, Jacob Beam, noted the:

calm determined attitude of population and avoidance of anti-Soviet excesses.... (Telegram from the Embassy in Czechoslovakia to the Department of State, 'Subj: Czechoslovak situation', Jacob D. Beam, Embassy, Prague, August 24, 1968, 1600Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-1 COMBLOC-CZECH. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to Bonn, London, Paris, Moscow, Munich, USNATO, and USUN. In: 'Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968', Vol. 17, Eastern Europe, US Department of State) (IMG)

Historical experience has shown time and time again that when proletarians hold anti-socialist views, in practice, they 'fight' against socialism like cowardly 'chickens', while creating splits in the anti-socialist camp by acting like 'lions' in the face of capitalism and wrongly accusing the bourgeoisie of not being anti-socialist 'enough'. In practice, those proletarians influenced by anti-socialist propaganda end up not fighting against socialism with much vigour. Such was why, during the Great Patriotic War, the Red Army had an easier time taking over the proletarian-populated Prussian northeast of Germany while not being able to take over the petit-bougerois agrarian southeast of Germany even though the Red Army was geographically proximate to the agrarian petit-bourgeois southeast. In Germany, the proletarians were under the heavy propaganda bombardment of the Nazis and although the pro-communist attitudes were fairly strong among the proletarians of Nazi Germany, inevitably a large contingent of those proletarians would have held Nazi anti-communist views. Yet, the Red Army had an easier time taking over the industrialized proletarian zones. The Czechian proletarians had a reputation for being staunchly pro-Soviet, and felt alienated by the Dubcekite reforms. There is not even the slightest shred of evidence that the Czechian proletarians were opposed to the Red Army. The calm of the population and the avoidance of anti-Soviet activity in Czechoslovakia can be explained by the proletarian-ness of the population there.

Remarkably, Jacob Beam, the head of the US intelligence station in Prague, acknowledged that the Warsaw Pact and Eurasian military presence in Czechoslovakia did not have the characteristic appearances that a military coup or an invasion-and-occupation would have, nor was there much of an active physical resistance against the Eurasian and Warsaw Pact military presence. Jacob Beam wrote:

1. As occupation goes into fourth day, following is situation as viewed from here.
2. This is bizarre kind of occupation. Although occupying forces have taken over key points they have not established martial law (except in some provincial cities), have not imposed military government, and have not yet installed puppet government. Legally constituted government claims to be still in being: 22 out of about 30 Ministers attended Cabinet meeting yesterday, apparently in Hradcany Castle. National Assembly claims to be in continuing session in its own building. Communist Party organs not only continuing to operate but managed to convene Party Congress under noses of occupying forces despite fact that Congress severely complicates Soviets' problems in installing compliant regime. Several district and regional committees have announced they will respect new CC elected by Congress. (...).
4. Population in Prague has conducted itself very well. (...). Actions of population and slogans (including many which equate Soviets with Fascists) are highly provocative, but with few exceptions people have been able to avoid provoking extreme reaction by occupiers. Widespread calls for neutrality represents wishful thinking which could embarrass reformist leaders seeking realistic solution.

Cancellation of mass demonstration late Thursday afternoon with enforcement by young Czechs is best example of self-discipline practiced by population. Silent clearing of streets during general strike at noon yesterday also impressive.

5. Public transportation in Prague is reduced and few private cars are in circulation, probably because of gasoline unavailability (gas stations no longer operating). Most shops remained closed through yesterday but are beginning to open this morning. Prague factories were open yesterday but did not seem to be working. Food still available in limited supplies, for which long queues wait, but we have seen little evidence of obvious hoarding.

6. Scene [Serene?] attitude of Soviets perplexing in many respects. Except for resistance and firing first day in vicinity Prague Radio building (Embtel 3054)³ they have not used much muscle and sporadic apparently aimless firing may primarily be intended as reminder of military presence. At beginning Prague populace inclined to talk to soldiers asking them why they were here but this has stopped and silent contempt treatment may be making troops edgy.

7. Czechoslovakia presents remarkable demonstration of a country running itself without an effective central government. Main direction so far being provided by strong party elements controlling clandestine radios. Interesting Soviets have not used their own means of issuing proclamations and their decisions, which have to be heeded, such as curfew, are carried on resistance radios. In some other cities, notably Pilsen which has been observed, accommodations of mutual non-interference have been worked out between commanders and local party chiefs. Lacking a Quisling administration Soviets were obviously unprepared to take over the country and had not called forward conventional instruments of occupation such as a pervasive secret police and military government commands.

(Telegram from the Embassy in Czechoslovakia to the Department of State, 'Subj: Czechoslovak situation', Jacob D. Beam, Embassy, Prague, August 24, 1968, 1600Z. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-1 COMBLOC-CZECH. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to Bonn, London, Paris, Moscow, Munich, USNATO, and USUN. In: 'Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968', Vol. 17, Eastern Europe, US Department of State) (IMG)

The military intervention into Czechoslovakia was not really an invasion, nor a coup. It did not even immediately topple the Dubcek group.

Years of Titoization in Eastern Europe had resulted in East Germany being almost alone, among the Eastern European countries outside Eurasia, in enthusiastically favoring a Warsaw Pact and Eurasian military intervention into Titoist-dominated Czechoslovakia:

With the exception of East Germany, no Eastern European country appears to favor Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia. The Yugoslav counselor in Warsaw reports that the Polish leadership is adamantly opposed to military intervention, while the Turkish foreign minister has said that visiting Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter told him that the Hungarian Government opposes armed intervention in Czechoslovakia. (CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN, CIA, July 25, 1968, p. 2) (IMG)

People's Democratic Albania, at the time officially in an 'alliance' with China's Trotskyite terror regime, would not have possibly spoken out in support of the intervention in Czechoslovakia. Since the Chinese regime's Titoists 'opposed' Dubcek and Co. in words but not in deeds, Albania, under Chinese regime influence, followed China publicly. It therefore joined the Chinese regime in denouncing the supposed 'Soviet social-fascist' and 'Soviet social-imperialist' 'invasion and occupation' of Yugoslav satellite Czechoslovakia.

Hoxha himself believed in at least some of the nonsense that the Albanian government parroted from Chinese regime propaganda. Although Hoxha was a communist, he had a poor understanding of some of the concepts of the historical materialist science and dialectics, and thus apparently misunderstood the situation in Czechoslovakia. Hoxha therefore publicly took an anti-communist stance on this issue, and officially supported the Chinese regime's line and hence also the Yugoslav regime's line on the matter, even after the Sino-Albanian 'split'. Although a seriously erroneous line adopted by the Albanian leader, this is not large enough to cause a leap from quantity to quality to transition him from being a communist to a non-/anti-communist, because this pro-Titoist deviation that Hoxha publicly endorsed as result of his apparent misunderstandings, could only be an exceptional deviation from his general anti-Titoist course. On the other hand, Ulbricht took a more correct line on this matter.

Also worth mentioning is the fact that the UAR and Abdel-Nasser himself personally took a stand against the pro-Zionist Dubcek regime and supported the Warsaw Pact intervention. Abdel-Nasser, as mentioned elsewhere in C21S2.1, criticized Tito for the latter's 'reckless' stance on Yugoslavia. Gromyko, in a conversation with Abdel-Nasser thanked him for his stance:

I take the opportunity to confess to your honor what we have said officially, that the leadership in Moscow and the Soviet government highly appreciated your position regarding the events in Czechoslovakia last August, and we considered the position of the socialist countries to be good. (Minutes of President Gamal Abdel Nasser's talks with Andrei Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Cairo, El-Qubba Palace, December 23, 1968, p. 17)

Dubcek's Titoist deputy Gustav Husak was encircled by anti-Titoist agents in a variety of ways, which meant that for his own political survival, he had to take a stand against his own Titoist brethren. Speaking in the usual anti-Eurasian propagandistic manner, the CIA sheds light on the nature of Husak's politics:

The failure of the Soviets to install Novotny or a trusted agent like Indra does not detract from the completeness of their victory. Husak – a man once jailed for nationalism, a man who had preceded even Dubcek on the liberal road, a man with a reputation for independence – is, like Kadar in Hungary and Gomulka in Poland before him, well suited for Soviet control. He has been, as he said at the September Plenum, an involuntary student of history. He will carry out the essential Soviet orders as long as the prerequisites exist. The Soviets have seen to it that they do. (Czechoslovakia: The Problem of Soviet Control (Reference Title: ESAU XLIV), Intelligence Memorandum, January 16, 1970, p. VI) (IMG)

Husak did not carry out the 'orders' of the Eurasians because, as Jacob Beam had stated, the Eurasians did not treat the Czechoslovak Party as though it was a branch of their own military. However, insofar as the above CIA quote means that Husak was compelled to carry out the plans of some of his own anti-Titoist opponents, the US intelligence document quote is correct. Husak turned against Dubcek kind of like how the Anglo-Yugoslav agent and fascist colour-revolutionary Janos Kadar turned 'against' Imre Nagy and opportunistically denounced Yugoslavia.

Thus, the CIA also stated:

Another leader who has emerged in the wake of the invasion is Gustav Husak, an aggressive, outspoken individual who heads the Slovak party. Husak spent most of the 1950s in jail on charges of "bourgeois nationalism," and after his release was politically inactive until this year. When Dubcek took over, however, Husak was one of the first to raise his voice in support of liberal reforms. In the present

situation, Husak has become a centrist.... (CZECHOSLOVAK LEADERSHIP FACES UNCERTAIN FUTURE: Weekly Summary: Special Report, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, November 29, 1968, p. 7) (IMG)

Remember that Huask had been arrested by the Soviet-backed Czechoslovak counter-intelligence service on the correct charges of being a Slovak separatist. The CIA too reported that they were Slovak separatists:

Separatism in Slovakia has resulted from the opposition of the Slovak Communist leaders Husak, Clementis, Novomesky, Okali, [and] Smidke.... (Crisis in the Czechoslovak Communist Party, CIA, December 10, 1951, p. 2) (IMG)

Hindered by the increasing attacks of Slansky and his followers (Geminder, Frank and Koehler), and almost paralyzed in its activities by the dangerously growing Slovak separatism of the Husak group.... (Crisis in the Czechoslovak Communist Party, CIA, December 10, 1951, p. 2) (IMG)

Vladimir Clementis was a prominent Mossad spy in Czechoslovakia. Husak was linked to Clementis through their joint struggle for the partition of Czechoslovakia. Yet, as further evidence of how bad the situation was, Huask, who had been elevated to deputy leadership by Dubcek himself, was supported by the communist agents to replace Dubcek. Undoubtedly, coopting Husak against Dubcek was useful and a correct strategy, but surely from a communist perspective, it was annoying that not a communist hero like Novotny but a Mossad-linked Yugoslav-backed Dubcek agent and Slovak separatist was becoming the leader of 'socialist' Czechoslovakia. Huask was not one man standing on aid but had an entire Dubcekite faction behind him, opposing him insofar as he was coopted by the communists and supporting him insofar as he showed his true Titoist face.

What characterized the Husak leadership was that only partial de-Titoization was to occur, as opposed to full de-Titoization, because full de-Titoization meant the purge of Husak as well, and Husak had been a Titoist Slovak separatist linked to the Mossad agent Clementis. Gustav Husak – an ally of Yugoslavia, and a Mossad-linked Slovak separatist – opportunistically presented himself as a lesser-Dubcekite and thereby was able to replace Dubcek. He did nonetheless implement some anti-Titoist reforms in Czechoslovakia. The US intelligence stated:

Despite the apparent urgency of the need to correct the "distortions" of the Dubcek era, Husak sought to establish a relatively moderate regime, one which would gradually win both popular [read: intelligentsia's] acceptance and support by turning back the clock as gently and selectively as possible. In this, he was hampered to some degree by his own authoritarian bent, a trait which was reflected in his willingness to employ firm and occasionally brutal methods in suppressing the open manifestations of dissent which marred his early months in office. More important, however, his room for maneuver – never very great – shrank markedly as the forced exodus of liberals from public life gradually deemed him the traditional centrist option of playing both ends of the political spectrum against each other. Husak's problems of this score were compounded by the Soviets who, suspicious about his reformist past and true intentions with respect to the future, not only withheld the support he needed to consolidate his domestic position but also actively sought to prevent him from becoming too powerful by giving measured encouragement to his hardline critics. In keeping with this strategy, flattering attention was paid to prominent conservatives, especially to those like Alois Indra and Vasil Bilak who were potential contenders for party leadership, and their willing cooperation was enlisted in keeping a close watch on Husak and in prodding him to further rapid compliance with Soviet wishes.

Because of these pressures, Husak was forced into a series of damaging political retreats. He yielded to his opponents on some key cadre appointments. Bit by bit, he backed away from his early positions on a number of vital issues, including his initial and highly popular contention that the 1968 intervention had been both uninvited and unneeded, his promise that there would be no massive purge of the party membership, and his advocacy of a policy of "reconciliation" with the deposed liberal community. Indeed, as he shifted toward a more orthodox and conservative posture, his policies at times became indistinguishable from those of his hardline rivals.

But Husak's retreat never became a rout. A tough and battle-scarred master of the art of political survival, he yielded just enough to steal his conservative opponents' thunder and to bolster his standing with Moscow. By so doing, he was able to prevent his rivals from converting the party purge of 1970 into a witchhunt that would have deprived the organization of its mass character and reduced it to an elite core of hardliners. He also managed to stave off demands for Stalinist-style political trials and for a wholesale purge of technicians, managers, and other members of the technical intelligentsia.

(NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 18: CZECHOSLOVAKIA: COUNTRY PROFILE, CIA, May 1974, p. 15) (IMG)

The new KSC leadership launched a purge of the intelligentsia. Encircled by communist anti-Titoist elements, Husak partially supported these purges. The US State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research reported:

intellectuals in the cultural-educational sectors and in the mass media were among the hardest hit in the series of purges undertaken by the Husak leadership since April 1969. (World Strength of the Communist Party Organizations, Issue 23, United States Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, May 1971, p. 66) (IMG)

Although conditions improved during the Husak years, they were far, far from enough. Husak the Slovak separatist saboteur was reflective of his own Party's membership composition which was white-collar majority, but a weaker-than-before majority:

On January 1, 1970, workers comprised 26.1% of the party membership, the lowest in the post-World War II period; 5.2% were collective farmers. (In 1946 workers comprised 58% and farmers 13% of the party membership.) The majority of the party is now made up of white-collar workers (party functionaries, technicians, intellectuals). (World Strength of the Communist Party Organizations, Issue 23, United States Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, May 1971, pp. 65-66) (IMG)

C22S10. Struggles in Poland, the Ouster of the Gomulka Group *** IMG-All-{Poland}

The rise to power of the Brezhnevians in Eurasia created pressures against the Titoist intelligence network in Poland, leading to the mounting of opposition to the Gomulka faction:

Poland: A purge of middle echelon officials is gathering momentum.

Dismissal of a deputy minister of foreign trade and the head of the nuclear energy program probably signals further shifts on this level. Numerous lesser ranking party and government officials have already been fired, A number of working level officials reportedly have not been seen at their regular duties. Trade union functionaries, dissident writers, and academicians have also lost their jobs.

Most of the victims are ... veteran officials who have long been under fire by the party's hardline elements. They probably will be replaced by hard-liner appointees.

New voices are being raised at party meetings and in the press for additional "unmasking" of the "enemies of Poland." The prodding is beginning to take on aspects of a directed campaign and includes hints that some in the upper reaches of the leadership will also be affected. The creation of such a charged atmosphere adds weight to reports of imminent changes in the top levels of the government at a parliamentary session next week.

The situation in Poland, and perhaps even some of the planned changes, may have been discussed at a meeting on 2 April between the Polish ambassador in Moscow and Brezhnev's trouble shooter, Kirilenko,

The purge is being carried out in party leader Gomulka's name, but it appears certain that he is no longer in control of the party elements conducting it. If the process affects Gomulka's supporters, he might become so weakened that he would be little more than a figurehead. (CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN, CIA, April 5, 1968, p. 7) (IMG)

Anti-Zionist rhetoric was on the rise in Poland, and the surge in anti-Titoist activity led even Gomulka to officially denounce 'revisionism' even though he himself officially was a revisionist as well:

After they raised the issue of "Zionist" disloyalty, the hard liners played on Gomulka's [official denunciation] of "alien revisionistic" elements. He has been susceptible to this canard, although anti-Semitism as such is not part of Gomulka's make-up – his wife is Jewish. (POLISH COMMUNIST PARTY MOVES TO THE RIGHT, Weekly Summary: Special Report, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, November 1, 1968, p. 6) (IMG)

A number of the targets of the anti-Titoist purges in Poland were Yiddish in national origin. This however did not mean a hostility of the communist anti-Titoist faction towards the Yiddish proletarians. Rather, it entailed the hostility of the communist faction towards the white-collar elements and Titoist agents some of whom turned out to be Yiddish. Because some of them were Yiddish, the Anglo-American media accused the anti-Titoist purges in Poland of being 'anti-Semitic' in nature. No surprise. However, against this slander, the CIA makes an important confession here:

Moczar's forces acquired their anti-Semitic image by exploiting the role of Jews in the Polish Communist movement and the latent anti-Semitism of the Polish people. The campaign they unleashed in the fall of 1967 was **not aimed at all of Poland's 30,000 Jews**, the remnant of the prewar Jewish population of over 3 million. Rather, it was aimed at removing from party, state, and cultural organizations **those influential Jews who** were prominent during the Stalinist period and **had managed to survive by supporting Gomulka's return in 1956**. (POLISH COMMUNIST PARTY MOVES TO THE RIGHT, Weekly Summary: Special Report, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, November 1, 1968, p. 6. Bold added.) (IMG)

The Anglo-American media, which supported the rise of the Gestapo spy Spsychalski and the virulent anti-Semite Gomulka, was in no position to call such purges 'anti-Semitic'. Amongst the Yiddish people, there existed reactionary elements, such as the intelligentsia. The counter-revolutionary Yiddish intelligentsia, the enemies of the Yiddish proletarians, were the natural allies of the Gestapo spy Spsychalski and his henchman Gomulka. It was time, high time, to purge off the intelligentsia, both the Yiddish intellectuals and the Polish intellectuals.

Secondly, as the CIA pointed out, the Moczarists acquired their reputation in the West as 'anti-Semites' when they unleashed the campaign against the Titoist elements among the Yiddish people. Moczar and his gang were indeed anti-Semites, as incontrovertibly evidence by their active and comprehensive promotion of the intelligence presence of the Home Army (AK) pogromists in Poland since as early as the 1950s. When the Moczar gang was actively promoting the MI6-backed AK pogromists in the Polish state security bodies, when the AK pogromists were savagely spilling Yiddish blood in schools, in different neighbourhoods, when the MI6-backed AK operatives were sending letters to the Yiddish households in Poland threatening the Yiddish citizens and their children with total incineration unless those Yiddish families would leave Poland – during such a time, the Anglo-American media outlets were more than deafeningly silent, hardly speaking a word to denounce the atrocities, and only further praising the 'brave' anti-Soviet 'warriors', the AK 'anti-Nazi' 'freedom-fighters'. As soon as the Moczar group was coopted by the communists, as soon as the Moczar group was encircled by communist agents and compelled into action against the Gestapo spy Spsychalski and his henchman Gomulka, only then did the Anglo-American media began to highlight the virulent anti-Semitism of the Moczar group. Even then, in the late 1960s, having been coopted by the communist agents, the Moczar group was forced to drastically reduce its targeting of the Yiddish proletarians and focused mostly on the Yiddish Titoist bureaucrats and intellectuals.

Of course, added to the Anglo-American media was of course the CIA-backed MI6-backed media outlets, the mainstream media, in Israel. Even now, Israel refused to loudly condemn the Home Army terrorists, mainly because the Home Army was backed by the Anglo-American imperialist allies of the Israeli regime. Israeli condemnation of the Home Army has been limited to people like the Yad Vashem Holocaust researcher Yehuda Bauer and other Mapam-linked activists, and Bauer himself condemned the 'collaborationist' policy of the Israeli government on the historiography of the AK terrorists. Back in the 1960s, when the erosion of the influence of the Gomulka gang was occurring, the anti-Titoist purges were condemned as 'anti-Semitic' by the Zionist organizations. This is not surprising in light of the fact that the Zionist agents of the American secret service, the agents of the American imperialist enemies of the Yiddish proletarians, were themselves collaborators with such anti-Semitic terrorist Gestapo spies as Spsychalski. A case in point was the Mossad operative Yitzhak Zuckerman, who, as may be recalled from C16S2, had collaborated with Spsychalski:

As far as I'm concerned, all Spsychalski's later sins in general issues and Jewish matters cannot obscure his sympathy toward us in this case. (A Surplus of Memory: Chronicle of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, Yitzhak Zuckerman, 1993, pp. 665-668) (IMG)

The purges against the Titoists in Poland were partially successful:

Over the years, Moczar's faction became more cohesive and managed to remove [Titoist] Jews from the public security apparatus and, more recently, from the public media. Moczar's control of these sectors ... enabled the hard-line faction to exploit ... various problems, incidents, and crises. (POLISH COMMUNIST PARTY MOVES TO THE RIGHT, Weekly Summary: Special Report, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, November 1, 1968, p. 6) (IMG)

Anti-Titoist and anti-Zionist purges therefore occurred in the military:

Moczar called into question the loyalty of one of the key sectors of Gomulka's system, the military establishment. He exposed the widespread dissent among the military caused by the party leader's strongly [officially] pro-Soviet and pro-Arab policies. Many officers apparently questioned the value of the Polish-Soviet military alliance in the light of the crushing defeat of Moscow's clients in the Middle East. Moczar's campaign, at that time conducted strictly out of public view, ultimately resulted in the removal from key positions of several generals, mainly Jews, and in reported shifts of scores of lesser ranking officers. (POLISH COMMUNIST PARTY MOVES TO THE RIGHT, Weekly Summary: Special Report, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, November 1, 1968, p. 8) (IMG)

So much for the 'anti-Semitism' of the anti-Titoist campaign, the campaign was so threatening that it led Gestapo spies such as Blanka Kaczorowska felt it necessary to escape. The Gestapo spy Kaczorowska, who had been arrested during the Bierut era, had been released after the 1956 colour

revolution, had been successfully able to infiltrate the ranks of the Polish intelligence service, and had been elevated to the position of controlling sensitive economic sectors such as CIECh. The purges against the Titoist faction in the late 1960s were so strong that Blanka Kaczorowska had to escape to France:

Naturally, I was curious to see what happened to Blanka Kaczorowska from the moment she decided to emigrate to France in 1968 to the events of the spring of 1984, when her presence in Lailly-en-Val was discovered. (Married to Betrayal: Blanka Kaczorowska and Ludwik Kalkstein, Focus Historia, Witold Pronobis, 2010) (IMG)

Note especially that she emigrated to France in particular. Many imperialist-fascist spies who defected to the 'West' usually settled in France. There are secret service reasons for this. During the Cold War and even much beyond then, the fact that the American imperialists were able to turn France into not a colony but a satellite of the USA meant that imperialist France was forced to submit also to West German imperialism because the US preferred a German-dominated Europe as a bulwark against Soviet and Eurasian influence. This in turn led the French imperialists to covertly ally with the Soviets/Eurasians as means of reducing Anglo-American-German imperialist influence. The deployment of Anglo-American and West German agents into France assisted the CIA in continuing the secret service occupation of that country, for these agents served as the troops and intelligence officers occupying France. Such an occupation increased the Anglo-American and West German lobby and pressure over France, helping to prevent France from pursuing with as great a vigour its desired strategic partnership with the Soviets/Eurasians.

Anyways, from Blanka Kaczorowska to Marian Spychalski, the Gestapo spies one after another were losing their positions. The Polish intelligentsia intuitively felt threatened by a surge of anti-Titoist, anti-Nazi, and anti-Zionist tendencies in the Polish state. The Polish intelligentsia saw themselves as 'anti-Nazi' but like most intellectuals, they had a very poor understanding of the world and refused to see the truth right in front of them. Therefore, they ended up fighting on the same side as the Nazis. The Polish intelligentsia thus launched a colour revolution to compromise the anti-Titoist drive ostensibly 'led by' Moczar:

By the beginning of the year, Moczar was stalemated and the spontaneous student demonstrations from 8 through 23 March must have come as a Godsend. The students, who initially sought redress of genuine academic grievances, were emboldened to widen their demands into the political sphere by events in Czechoslovakia and by the stalwart resistance of dissident intellectuals to regime dictates a month earlier. (POLISH COMMUNIST PARTY MOVES TO THE RIGHT, Weekly Summary: Special Report, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, November 1, 1968, p. 8) (IMG)

Moczar, the agent of the Home Army, was an agent of the MI6, for the Home Army was an MI6 network. The MI6 agent Moczar covertly supported the colour revolution of the intelligentsia as a whole by launching terrorist attacks against its individual members. That Moczar publicly and overtly denounced the Titoist faction does not change the fact that he was on their side in the more covert levels. Indeed, he supported Gomulka by using the police force to launch terrorist attacks on the students so that the students would be provoked into expanding their uprising against the Polish state. And through rallying the young pro-revisionist and pro-Titoist intelligentsia, the communist elements encircling and coopting the MI6 agent Moczar would have been duly compromised, allowing Moczar greater room for maneuver in the favour of the Titoist faction. Thus, by provoking the students into a colour revolutionary uprising, the British agent Moczar was supporting Gomulka and the Titoist faction on the more covert level, helping them to temporarily partially break the anti-Titoist encirclement:

There is abundant evidence that Moczar's use of excessive police force as well as provocateurs among the students was the key to the rapid widening of student resistance. By the end of March, the party was faced with student calls to divest itself of its monopoly of power. The quick end of the demonstrations appears to have been less the result of Moczar's repression than of the student leaders' realization that their movement lacked worker support and was being exploited in the intraparty struggle. (POLISH COMMUNIST PARTY MOVES TO THE RIGHT, Weekly Summary: Special Report, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, November 1, 1968, p. 8) (IMG)

While Moczar was covertly on the side of the intelligentsia's pro-Titoist colour revolution in March 1968, the Moczar faction's agents - if not Moczar himself - were overtly engaged in launching an intra-Party counter-demonstration against the Titoist faction, and hence indirectly against the colour revolution of the intelligentsia. The Moczarist-linked counter-demonstrators within the Polish Party began chanting for Gierek. Gierek, as may be recalled, had been the representative of the Party in the industrialized Katowice area. There, Gierek had amassed around himself technocrats, bureaucrats, and intellectuals, but because he was stationed in an industrialized area, he had come under the pressure of the agents of the proletariat in the industrial zone as well, a factor that coopted Gierek, the agent of the white-collar elements, to be also of some service to the blue-collar contingent. Hence, Gierek was a 'lesser Titoist' when compared to Gomulka, and a Titoist by communist standards. In the 'Salami Tactics' field, Gierek was to be coopted and supported by the communists against Gomulka. Hence, the reason why the Moczarist-backed counter-demonstrators chanted Gierek's name instead of Moczar was that, at the time, installing Moczar at the helm was not feasible, whereas installing Gierek - a lesser-Gomulka allied to Gomulka - was more feasible. By chanting Gierek's name, the Moczarists sought to widen the narrow wedge between Gierek and Gomulka so to pit Gierek more overtly against Gomulka as replacement for Party leader:

[Rolicki:] You mean the memorable rally in the Congress Hall on March 19, when the hall, chanting your name, indicated you as Gomulka's successor. Did this demonstration take place with your permission?

[Gierek:] Believe me, this was a clear provocation. I suspect Moczar of being behind it. This room was overwhelmingly influenced by him and "cooking me" [for replacing Gomulka as leader] in such a primitive way was absolutely so for the partisans.

(The Interrupted Decade, Edward Gierek, Interviewer: Rolicki Janusz, 1990, pp. 56-57) (IMG)

In addition to his covert alliance with Gomulka, Gierek was indeed overtly allied to Gomulka at the time too. This is why, rather than join the Moczarists, Gierek supported Gomulka:

[Rolicki:] Was March 1968 aimed against Gomulka?

[Gierek:] Undoubtedly yes, that is why I was the first to support Wiesław at the great rally in Katowice, for which Moczar always held a grudge against me.

(The Interrupted Decade, Edward Gierek, Interviewer: Rolicki Janusz, 1990, p. 68) (IMG)

Note that 'Wiesław' was the pseudonym of Władysław Gomulka during the Polish People's Liberation War and his nickname after the War.

The Moczarists actually succeeded in elevating the position of Gierek against Gomulka, even though Gierek himself covertly and somewhat overtly was on the side of Gomulka:

What is clear is that Gierek's influence on the national level has significantly increased since the "March events," and that, in braking Moczar's drive to power, Gomulka has had to make major compromises with Gierek's forces. (POLISH COMMUNIST PARTY MOVES TO THE RIGHT, Weekly Summary: Special Report, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, November 1, 1968, p. 11) (IMG)

Therefore, while Gierek did not belong to Moczar's immediately surrounding agents, the mere attempt to pit of Gierek's faction on the overt level against Gomulka's inner circle compelled Gomulka to promote a slightly lesser Titoist line. This increased Moczarist influence and hence it increased the influence of the communist agents encircling and coopting Moczar. In late March, therefore, the Moczarists won in widening Gierek's wedge with Gomulka and got Gierek to partially denounce Zionism even though the colour revolution of the intelligentsia helped Gierek to move away from anti-Zionist speeches as well:

Gierek's decision to take the plunge into the factional struggle probably accounts for his strong speech in late March when he appeared to endorse Moczar's ... positions, including the attack on "Zionism." In retrospect, however, it is clear that the speech was an effort to tap many of the same forces of frustrated ambition within the party that had answered Moczar's call. In all of his subsequent public statements, Gierek has ignored the "Zionist" issue.... (POLISH COMMUNIST PARTY MOVES TO THE RIGHT, Weekly Summary: Special Report, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, November 1, 1968, p. 9) (IMG)

Gomulka's sympathies definitely lied with the colour revolutionary intelligentsia, but, as the head of the Party, he also was under pressure to denounce the revisionists, even though he himself was a revisionist:

Gomulka's ... major speech on 19 March ... absolved the students of blame, but he endorsed the line that "revisionists" were responsible for the outbursts. (POLISH COMMUNIST PARTY MOVES TO THE RIGHT, Weekly Summary: Special Report, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, November 1, 1968, p. 8) (IMG)

The speech demonstrated in many ways, the erosion of Gomulka's authority. The Moczar-controlled press characterized it as a "report of the politburo delivered by Gomulka," an unprecedentedly slighting reference and a clear indication that one-man rule had already been transformed into collective leadership. More importantly, however, Gomulka failed to prevent the subsequent widespread purges of prominent Jews and liberals from nearly all the major spheres of national life. (POLISH COMMUNIST PARTY MOVES TO THE RIGHT, Weekly Summary: Special Report, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, November 1, 1968, pp. 8-9) (IMG)

Nevertheless, 'thanks' to the colour revolutionary uprising of the intelligentsia and Moczar's covert support for it, the purges of the Titoists in Poland was slowed down and almost halted for the while:

Moczar probably estimated that conditions were not yet ripe for a major onslaught on Gomulka.... Although the hard-line faction gained some significant posts in the months to follow, especially that of ambassador to Moscow, the removal of Jews and Gomulka supporters from the bureaucracy was generally limited to those in the middle and lower echelons. (POLISH COMMUNIST PARTY MOVES TO THE RIGHT, Weekly Summary: Special Report, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, November 1, 1968, p. 8) (IMG)

On the net, Titoist influence in Poland relatively declined as a result of these purges, but the colour revolution of the intelligentsia, covertly sponsored by the Moczar gang through provocative terror, helped Moczar compromise the overt anti-Titoist campaign which the communist agents had made him to engage in. Hence, the Gomulka faction still retained some significant influence:

Although Moczar was able to force the removal of many of Gomulka's followers, he was generally prevented by Gomulka and Gierek from placing his own men in the vacated positions. In mid-April, Gomulka's close associate, former defense minister Spsychalski, was shifted to the ceremonial post of head of state, but the other governmental changes neither enhanced Moczar's position nor adversely affected Gomulka's. In the Foreign Ministry, where an entrenched group of Jewish moderates was susceptible to hard-line attack, the situation is yet unresolved, but Moczar's forces have been so far denied a decisive voice in the implementation of policy .

These stalemates apparently impelled Moczar to try for the first time to force changes in the party leadership. Drawing on his strength in the middle and lower echelons of the party organization, he evidently attempted to convene an early central committee plenum. Gomulka, who could still rely on his politburo colleagues but was less confident of his support in the central committee, reportedly resisted these efforts in order to consolidate his forces. When the plenum was finally held in early July, Moczar's gains were substantial but not yet enough to give him control of the party.

Moczar was appointed to the junior (nonvoting) policy making post of candidate politburo member, but the pro-Gomulka majority was maintained by the simultaneous promotion of candidate politburo member Jaszczuk to full membership in place of ailing former head of state Ochab. Similarly, the luster was taken off Moczar's appointment to the party secretariat, where he assumed outgoing party secretary Wicha's security functions, by the dilution of his control over the Interior Ministry, where he was replaced by the deputy minister who reportedly was the least responsive to him. Moreover, the new interior minister is said to be related by marriage to Gierek. If true, this suggests that once again, in return for support, Gomulka had struck a compromise with Gierek's followers.

(POLISH COMMUNIST PARTY MOVES TO THE RIGHT, Weekly Summary: Special Report, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, November 1, 1968, p. 11) (IMG)

It is worth mentioning some more details about Gierek's line. Recall that as was mentioned before, Edward Gierek's social base lied in the white collar elements:

Edward Gierek ... draws his strength from his ... administration of Poland's major industrial center, the province of Katowice. Gierek has grouped around him discontented "technocrats," young party bureaucrats, and ideologically unassailable elements seeking economic and social reform. (POLISH COMMUNIST PARTY MOVES TO THE RIGHT, Weekly Summary: Special Report, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, November 1, 1968, p. 4) (IMG)

At the same time, his position in one of Poland's major industrial centers inevitably put upon him the pressure of the Polish proletarians living in that industrialized zone. In other words, this representative of the white collar elements was also significantly under the pressure of, and coopted by, the agents of the proletariat emanating from the Katowice zone. This led Gierek to adopt the line of a 'compromise candidate', the midpoint politician serving as the agent of the bureaucrats but also to a large extent coopted to serve the proletariat. Gierek was a Titoist on the covert level, and a midpoint politician on the overt level. It is worth reminding that in the covert level, in the level of the true cores and essences of things, there lies no midpoint between anti-Zionism and pro-Zionism, no midpoint between anti-Titoism and Titoism, no midpoint between the pro-imperialist and reactionary line and the anti-imperialist and progressive line, no gray zone between the black and white, no third side between the good and the evil. However, in the overt level, in the level of lies, appearances, and superficial matters, of course there are these 'neutrals', 'midpoints', and 'compromise politicians' – and Gierek was one of them. Gierek's semi-Titoist line was not really a case of a 'third opinion' in between the Titoist and anti-Titoist

factions, but was rather a case of a Titoist agent of the white-collar contingent being under the pressure of the proletarians in the industrial Katowice region, hence being coopted by the communist agents of the proletariat.

Such was why in 1954, a few months after the purge of Beria, when the camp of the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies were fluctuating in their level of orientation towards Titoism vs. communism, Gierek became a member of the Central Committee, upon the request of Bierut. Bierut would have wanted communist revolutionaries to fill up the Central Committee, but in the face of Titoist opposition and Kremlin Titoists, he had to compromise at times. Gierek the vacillator precisely embodied the fluctuations of 1954 and the compromise that the communist faction in the Party had to make in the face of the Titoist faction:

[Rolicki:] When did you become a party activist at the central level?

[Gierek:] In 1954, more or less at the beginning of the year, I remember, it was winter, Bierut himself called me. Immediately, when the secretary said: "Comrade Bierut will speak," I knew that this was something important, because he was not in the habit of calling ordinary voivodship secretaries, and indeed - he informed me that by the decision of the Politburo I was appointed the head of the Economic Department Of the Central Committee of the party. I tried to dissuade him from this decision, but soon realized it was pointless, and so faced another move in my life.

[Rolicki:] Family matters have always played an important role in your life. From this point of view, the new promotion was probably not desired by the Lord, it must have caused a real family earthquake.

[Gierek:] You guessed it. After ten days I had to come to Warsaw, and after two months I received a devastated apartment, requiring a major renovation, for which the loan was refused. From this I concluded that not everyone liked my transfer to Warsaw. Today I believe that I was a compromise candidate. It was already a period of collapse of the Stalinist system in its classic form, after the escape of Światło, the political situation in the country became very complicated. As the head of the Department of Economics, I was reporting directly to Bierut, who usually called me once a week to discuss the main economic matters.

(The Interrupted Decade, Edward Gierek, Interviewer: Rolicki Janusz, 1990, p. 40) (IMG)

After the 20th CPSU congress, there was an informal bloc in the Polish Party, called the Natolin group, which contrary to how they are presented in the media, actually endorsed the Titoization program, denounced Stalin, denounced the anti-Titoist purges in Poland, and supported Gomulka's rise to power. There was on the other hand, the Puławy group which was even more militantly Titoist and which denounced the Natolin group as 'Stalinist'. And Gierek lied in between these factions:

I was a relatively new man in Warsaw, not related to the old guard. For Ochab, my neutrality in the ongoing dispute between the "Natolin" and "Puławy" factions was also valuable. (The Interrupted Decade, Edward Gierek, Interviewer: Rolicki Janusz, 1990, pp. 44-45) (IMG)

As maybe recalled from C20S15, Gierek had actually supported the anti-Stalin slanders and Khrushchev's line. He harboured anti-Soviet views. Yet, Gierek had also been promoted by the comrade of Stalin, Bierut, for Gierek was a man to be coopted against the people much worse than him. Furthermore, in the 1960s, in terms of the overt-level official stance:

Both Moczar and Gierek are trying to wrest control of the party from a leadership they consider anachronistic. Each has used the recent anti-Semitic [read: anti-Zionist and anti-Titoist] purges to his own advantage. The two seem also to stand for many of the same things: clearing deadwood from party ranks, better communication between the rulers and the ruled, recognition of public opinion by the authorities, more decisiveness and consistency in policy, and strong party control of all spheres of national life. (POLISH COMMUNIST PARTY MOVES TO THE RIGHT, Weekly Summary: Special Report, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, November 1, 1968, p. 4) (IMG)

Further comparing and contrasting Moczar and Gierek, the CIA further stated:

Nationalism is one of the basic ingredients of Moczar's campaign but is less prominent in Gierek's movement. (...). Though more subtly, Gierek too has evoked the pride of national achievement in the postwar period. The implications of this veiled chauvinism for Polish-Soviet relations are not clear.

Both men have tried to establish their credentials with Moscow. Moczar, however, publicly attacks the "Muscovite" wing of the party, which returned to Poland on the heels of the Red Army, although he also pledges loyalty to the alliance with the USSR. They both espouse a viewpoint that realistically accepts the alliance with Moscow, but at the same time they try to demonstrate that Gomulka's fawning support for Soviet foreign policy needlessly demeans Poland abroad and causes unnecessary problems at home.

(POLISH COMMUNIST PARTY MOVES TO THE RIGHT, Weekly Summary: Special Report, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, November 1, 1968, p. 5) (IMG)

Recall from C20S15 that the Polish proletarians had launched the Poznan uprising against the Titoization agenda pursued in 1956. It is true that the spontaneous character of the Poznan uprising, and the lack of a socialist party leadership of the uprising, created the risk of it being exploited by the imperialists, and to some extent it was exploited. However, it is a fact that overall, the progressive forces held the upper hand in the uprising of the anti-Titoist Polish proletarians, leading to the weakening of the pace of Titoization, thus undermining imperialism. A similar event occurred in the year 1970. In December 1970, the proletarians of Poland rose up not against the Party, socialism, Sovietism, communism, alliance with Eurasia, etc. but against the Gomulka group. The CIA also admitted:



The image of a fallen from among the demonstrators of December 1970 – said to be an 18-year old proletarian named 'Zbyszek Godlewski', he was murdered by the Gomulka gang's fascist agents in the Polish secret service. Photo source: Andrzej Wajda (1981-07-10). "Uzupełniam swój życiorys". Tygodnik Solidarność (2): 11.

The workers' disturbances had no anti-Soviet coloration. Neither the party nor the [fake] socialist system was the main target of attack. The agitation was limited to the skilled workers, who felt they had the most to lose from Gomulka's price increases and changes in work rules. The peasantry, unaffected by Gomulka's proposed measures, was quiet. Intellectuals and the youth also were inactive. Finally, the powerful Roman Catholic Church kept its peace; it merely counseled non-violence. (POLAND UNDER NEW MANAGEMENT: INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, April 28, 1972, p. 2) (IMG)

As far as I am aware, the uprising was spontaneous. However, some have argued, possibly correctly, that the workers were agitated into such an uprising by undercover communist agents aiming to oust the Gomulka group. The bestially Sadistic gang of Gomulka savagely massacred the Polish proletarians, but the bloody sacrifices of the Polish proletarians did bear fruition in improving the conditions of the proletarians. The protests bogged down the fascist security forces aligned with Gomulka's terror network, giving the proletarian agents within the Polish state apparatus more room for maneuver against the Titoist faction. The proletarian mass demonstrations are known to have been a direct immediate cause of Gomulka's ouster and replacement by the more proletarian-coopted Gierek. With the support of the communist faction in Eurasia, Gierek was installed as the General-Secretary of the Party:

Since Polish party first secretary Edward Gierek took power from Wladyslaw Gomulka on 20 December 1970, a new style of rule has appeared in Poland. (POLAND UNDER NEW MANAGEMENT: INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, April 28, 1972, p. 2) (IMG)

Gierek, being the overt rival but covert ally of Gomulka, partially revealed his covert face again and rushed to slow down the purge of the Gomulka group:

I was aware that I was losing the crowd's applause while protecting Gomulka. However, I preferred to cut myself off from his methods, not accountable to him personally. I was forced to do so, on the one hand, by a sense of decency, for I was unable to sit for fourteen years in the party leadership of the country, never mind whether it was formal or real periods, to pretend that I was born yesterday; (...). Besides, by doing Gomulka a judgment, not even a formal one, but only the press, I would lead to the dismantling of socialism. (The Interrupted Decade, Edward Gierek, Interviewer: Rolicki Janusz, 1990, pp. 91-92) (IMG)

Pay attention to the last sentence from Gierek quote: through a negative judgement of Gomulka in the media – let alone in the court – the way would be paved for the dismantlement of socialism, Gierek argued. Now, to be sure, sometimes one would need to publicly speak in 'defense' of one's enemies for strategic purposes of eventually eliminating those enemies, but Gierek, being the covert and semi-overt ally of Gomulka, bore no such intentions.

Nonetheless, the tide was against Gomulka and he was being ousted. Gomulka certainly did not get the chance to commit crimes as large in absolute terms as those of Hitler, because the material conditions that encircled Gomulka limited him far more than the material conditions that encircled Hitler. However, to the extent that he could continue the path of the Nazis, Gomulka spared no effort. Outwardly, much like the Anglo-Americans, he spoke out 'against' fascism all the while pursuing fascist objectives. Gomulka had harbored and elevated the mortal enemies of the Polish nation; he actively promoted and supported the Home Army terrorists who had murdered the Yiddish citizens and the kolkhoznik Polish peasants, and who had allied with the very same UPA that carried out the anti-Polish genocide in Wolyn; Gomulka collaborated with the Nazi secret service, and had knowing harbored and promoted the Gestapo spy and CIA-Mossad agent Spychalski; he was responsible for expelling Yiddish proletarians from Poland to be sent as cannon-fodder for Moshe Dayan and Ariel Sharon. Gomulka had promoted the Moczar group and allied with them covertly to the end, the same Moczar group that terrorized the Polish students in order to foment colour revolutions to save Gomulka's gang. Gomulka had the blood of the Polish people in his hands. Historical circumstances, fortunately, prevented Gomulka from establishing a full-on fascist regime like the one in Yugoslavia, but the Gomulka group certainly got close to such a target.

Poland's top Hitlerite was finally ousted in the glorious day of December 20, 1970. For the first time after so many years of suffering and terror, the Polish proletarians could celebrate a Christmas devoid of a General-Secretary Gomulka – at least, at last. He was gone for good, and by 1982, he died. Upon his ouster, Titoist influence in Poland decreased, communist influence increased, and the Brezhnev phenomenon partially extended to Poland. Since on the overt level, the new General-Secretary Edward Gierek marked a compromise between the Gomulka group and the Moczar group, there was an effort to partially satisfy the parasitic class forces and to partially satisfy the workers and peasants. The situation in Poland began to improve mildly but nonetheless considerably. Whereas the Anglo-German agent Gomulka had relied entirely on the parasitic class forces inside Polish society,;

Gierek has grasped political power, obtained the cooperation of nearly all strata of the population.... (POLAND UNDER NEW MANAGEMENT: INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, April 28, 1972, p. 1) (IMG)

Gierek was a midpoint politician who was compelled to reduce Titoist influence, but did try to ensure that the intelligentsia retain some of their influence:

Gierek has also struck an acceptable relationship with the intellectuals, students, and middle class. Initially, this relationship was ambiguous. These interest groups had fewer economic grievances than the workers, but Gierek must have understood from the beginning that he would need them to mobilize the population at large and to balance the ... influence of the workers on his regime. (...). Most Polish intellectuals, particularly of the older generation, seem inclined to accept the terms of this softer cultural policy. It has permitted many previously banned authors to reappear in print. It also has allowed more foreign travel for intellectuals. (POLAND UNDER NEW MANAGEMENT: INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, April 28, 1972, p. 4) (IMG)

Demonstrating his semi-covert Titoism, Gierek continued to surrender Poland to the Vatican mafia:

Gierek's big policy departure ... has been his willingness to reach an accommodation with the Church. Three days after taking office, the new government offered to "normalize" church-state relations, which for decades have alternated between truces and crises. A meeting in early March 1971 between Poland's Primate, Stefan Cardinal Wyszyński, and Premier Jaroszewicz began a dialogue that has since been extended to negotiations between the government and the Vatican. In June 1971 legislation was passed granting the Polish church legal title to former German church property in the territories gained by Poland after World War II. (POLAND UNDER NEW MANAGEMENT: INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, April 28, 1972, p. 5) (IMG)

At first, I considered the possibility that the Polish government may have decided to make such a deal with the Catholic Church as means of coopting it, so to minimize its role under the cover of expanding it. However, upon checking other sources, I saw only minimal evidence of cooptation, and

overall, the role of the Church seems to have genuinely expanded. This once again would reinforce the view that Gierek was a midpoint politician on the overt level and a Titoist renegade on the covert level.

The policy pursued by Gierek was not a genuinely 'big' departure from Gomulka team's policy line, contrary to how CIA-sponsored propaganda presents it. Gomulka team's approach to the Catholic Church was one of sabotaging the efforts against the Catholic Church, via a pincer approach: on the one hand, Gomulka's team had promoted the Vatican mafia and made it more popular via terrorizing the Catholic Church, and on the other hand he showed liberality and capitulation to the Catholic Church. Every once in a while, Gomulka would be forced to concede to anti-Titoist elements and to pursue a genuinely anti-Vatican policy line.

In economic planning, heavy industry gained slightly greater emphasis in the initial years and some snail-pace measures towards collectivization were undertaken. Kazimierz Poznanski, a Polish scholar and 'former' fellow at the Wilson Center think tank, wrote:

To conclude, in political terms, Gierek's expansionary programme of 'renewal' was an attempt to create a new and dynamic political equilibrium that would synthesize and reorient frequently conflicting forces within Poland's party and state administration. For the party's traditionalists, Gierek offered an ambitious investment programme, a return to collectivization of agriculture, and the rejection of genuine market-based economic reforms. For the upward-moving generation of industrial bureaucrats and state administrators, he provided increased access to sophisticated technology and fewer party/political checks on their exercise of discretion over its selection. ('Poland's Protracted Transition: Institutional Change and Economic Growth 1970-1994', Cambridge University Press, Kazimierz Poznanski, 1996, pp. 63-64) (IMG)

Thus, the Gierek era in its earlier years saw a growth in the economy, especially in heavy industry:

Growth goals for 1971 generally were met or exceeded throughout the economy. Investment grew by 9% and industrial output by 8%, as shown in Table 1. There were no major shifts within industry. The largest gains in output came in machine building, nonferrous metals, and electronics — the only above average increase within light industry was in the clothing industry. There was a healthy growth in agricultural production.... (POLAND: GOMULKA'S ECONOMY IN GIREEK'S HANDS: INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, p. 4) (IMG)

Overall, the situation definitely improved in Poland but only mildly.

Note that the Gierek era marked a slight shift away from the politically authoritarian terroristic, economically liberal, and foreign-policy-wise Trotskyite character of the Gomulka era. It implied a shift of Poland slightly towards Eurasia and away from the US-led camp. Polish anti-communists present the Gierek era as better than the Gomulka era, because Gierek era was supposedly more 'pro-Western' than the Gomulka era — when in fact it was less pro-Anglo-American, which is why the CIA's 'Solidarity' movement launched the colour revolution to depose Gierek. While Gierek's covert Titoism was appreciated by the counter-revolutionary networks, his overt semi-anti-Titoism was problematic from the CIA's lens. The 1980 ouster of Gierek helped oust along with him the communist agents that were partially encircling and coopting him.

C22S11. The 1981 Military Coup in Poland

The PZPR had been influenced by bureaucrats and intellectuals. Yet, a significantly large percentage of the PZPR was made up of proletarians (particularly blue-collar elements). The continued dominance of the PZPR over the state apparatus would have allowed the blue-collar contingent in the PZPR to vote for and promote proletarian agents in the state apparatus. Anglo-American finance capital and the bureaucrats in the Polish state opposed such proletarian influence. To this end, the bureaucrats in the Polish state aimed to overthrow the PZPR. In 1980-1981, the Polish General Jaruzelski spearheaded the efforts to overthrow the PZPR and reduce Soviet influence.

Jaruzelski had been an agent of the Berling network, established by Beria and the latter's henchman Merkulov so to increase the influence of the MI6 agent General Anders. Sergo Beria recalled:

The formation of a Polish army in the USSR was approved, but Stalin was extremely reluctant when it came to equipping this army. My father showed no surprise at this attitude. He had even expected it. Eventually, since this army seemed destined never to be used, my father interceded for it to be allowed to leave the USSR in spring 1942. (...). Merkulov nevertheless asked Anders to leave behind a group of officers whom my father planned to introduce into the Polish Communist army led by Berling. ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 73) (IMG)

Jaruzelski's political fortunes had risen 'thanks' to the 1956 colour revolution of the intelligentsia, which increased the influence of Poland's fascist military generals led by Spychalski at the expense of the PZPR. Andrew Michta — a prestigious US military scholar at the US Naval War College, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Hoover Institute and Harvard University — wrote:

Spychalski was on his way out, while Jaruzelski and his group of former junior line officers in the Berling army positioned themselves to move to center stage. ('Red Eagle: The Army in Polish Politics, 1944-1988', Andrew A. Michta, p. 56) (IMG)

More important, the 1956 crisis made the military into an active, if indirect, participant in party politics on the highest level. The army's role in the upheaval and the period of "re-Polonization" of the armed forces under Spychalski laid the foundations upon which Wojciech Jaruzelski would erect the edifice of his political power in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. ('Red Eagle: The Army in Polish Politics, 1944-1988', Andrew A. Michta, p. 56) (IMG)

Representing the bureaucrats and kulaks, Jaruzelski launched a military coup overthrowing the PZPR, much to the dismay of the Soviets, and increasing the influence of the Catholic Church over the state. The Jaruzelski gang brought 'moderate' (i.e. decentralization) reforms that were ostensibly aimed at giving the workers a greater voice in managing the enterprise but actually directly repressed the workers and installed the corrupt bureaucrats in charge. Instead of the PZPR was installed a new military junta 'party' called PRON, made up of fascist commanders and liberal intellectuals. The CIA reported:

Pressure is mounting from party hardliners and the Soviets to restore to the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR) the traditional power and authority it has lost during the last three years. The abolition of martial law has removed any legal pretext for keeping the party from exercising its constitutionally guaranteed right to lead the state. (STATUS OF THE POLISH UNITED WORKERS' PARTY: An Intelligence Assessment, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, October 1983, p. I. Bold added)

The party suffered a severe political decline during the last three years, losing by its own admission more than 25 percent of its membership since August 1980 and being relegated under martial law to a secondary role in political and economic decision making.

There has been growing pressure from hardliners, party bureaucrats, **and the Soviets, however, to restore the party and, in particular, to return sole power to its civilian apparatus.** (...).

Jaruzelski's **selection** as party leader in October 1981 (see box) and the **subsequent imposition of martial law in December accelerated the party's decline, especially at the lowest levels where, for all practical purposes, the party ceased to function.** Although some hardliners probably expected that the party would quickly regain its political primacy under martial law, **military men instead moved into many key political and economic posts, ignored the party apparatus, and took over many party supervisory, decision-making, and inspection functions at all levels.**

Jaruzelski, in our assessment, ignored the party immediately after the imposition of martial law largely because of his preoccupation with the task of reasserting control. This required heavy reliance on the security apparatus and, of course, the Army – Jaruzelski's political power base. Jaruzelski also appears to have ignored the party out of deep distrust for its ability to run the country. The depth of this feeling among military men was such that Gen. Mieczyslaw Debicki, appointed governor of the city of Warsaw in called the party a "pigsty." Jaruzelski considered disbanding the party and building a new organization, **rejecting the idea only out of a calculation that Moscow would not tolerate such a move.** After the imposition of martial law, Jaruzelski relegated the party in his speeches to a secondary position, paying only lip-service to its "leading role" in society. He showed little interest in the details of PZPR activity and gave subordinates considerable autonomy in developing socioeconomic policies outside of normal party channels.

(...). As the pressures of long-delayed political and economic business have compelled Jaruzelski to give greater attention to the party, his actions suggest that **he is sympathetic to the moderate** viewpoint that the PZPR needs to improve its governing style dramatically before it can successfully resume its "leading role" in society. Party moderates have said that Poland can recover from its crisis only by "creative application" of Marxism-Leninism that involves not only political and economic reforms but also a more limited role for the party apparatus. Complaining that the distinction between the party and government bureaucracies had virtually disappeared under Gierek, some moderates have argued in the Polish press that the party should shed its traditional involvement in every aspect of policymaking and implementation **and allow government experts [read: bureaucrats] responsibility for the day-to-day running of the country, especially the economy.** In line with this view, Jaruzelski has publicly advocated upgrading the qualifications of party officials and bureaucrats, providing for broader discussion of policy options, and giving **the government [read: bureaucrats] instead of the party** a larger role in making lower level decisions and implementing policy. (...).

We believe that Jaruzelski has taken the advice of his moderate advisers that the party can adopt well-considered policies only by being better informed on popular attitudes and allowing broader discussion of policy options. He has tried, for instance, to improve party reporting of the populace's attitudes by having reports from local organizations sent directly to him rather than through the intervening bureaucratic layers, where information in the past has been altered to reflect favorably on the apparatus.

Jaruzelski, according to his public remarks, **also wants the PZPR to take into account during its policy debates the viewpoints of Poland's semiautonomous political parties – the United Peasant Party, the Democratic Party, and the Catholic lay organization, Pax.** A joint meeting of the Communist and Peasant Parties in January 1983-the first since 1957-was clearly intended as an example of the consultative process he favors; although the session did not allow the Peasant Party to have significant impact on regime policy. Jaruzelski, also advocated in 1982 that other social groups hold 30 percent of the seats in the parliament after the 1984 national elections. **Moreover, Jaruzelski has privately argued that, while the PZPR should have the largest number of parliamentary seats, it should not have an absolute majority. This would force it to take into account the interests of the Catholic, peasant, and democratic groups.** Thus far, Jaruzelski has not followed through on these privately expressed views [but he did later].

Jaruzelski has sought to give his new mass organization, the **Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth (PRON), some inspection and legislative functions formerly monopolized by the party.** Parliamentary legislation according the PRON constitutional status indicates the body will replace the party-dominated National Unity Front **in proposing lists of candidates for parliamentary elections.** (...). Jaruzelski has also publicly advocated greater participation of local self-governing bodies – the municipal equivalents of worker self-management bodies – in the formulation and implementation of local decisions.

Jaruzelski has sought to lessen the day-to-day involvement of party bureaucrats in running the economy through continued public support for economic reform. As outlined in the Polish press in mid-1983, **the reform is aimed at stimulating efficiency and growth by granting enterprises new freedom to make decisions on production, investment, and hiring. Workers would have a voice – although still strictly limited – in enterprise decisions through government-sponsored workers' councils and trade unions.** While there would still be central control of prices and, according to US Embassy reporting, provincial party officials would set general guidelines for economic policy, the close supervisory role of the party apparatus would be severely curtailed.

Jaruzelski founded the PRON in the first months of martial law to promote support for his policies and to serve as a surrogate for Solidarity in a dialogue with society. The PRON, **while ostensibly representing "society," nonetheless, according to the Polish press, has numerous military men among its members.** Despite the expansion of the PRON's national leadership to include **non-party intellectuals and artists,** the Church's refusal to participate appears to have severely limited movement's support.

(STATUS OF THE POLISH UNITED WORKERS' PARTY: An Intelligence Assessment, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, October 1983, p. 5. Bold added.) (IMG)

What remained of socialism in Poland had been mostly abolished by 1981-1983. The economy was decentralized, a military dictatorship had been established, the influence of Moscow's communist faction in Poland was declining, while the influence of the MI6-backed Vatican agents was increasing. The Polish proletarians were against the military junta regime. Yet, the Polish Solidarity, led by the TKK central leadership, was the notorious CIA front established for the purpose of misleading Poland's proletarians ostensibly into confrontations 'against' the Jaruzelski regime but actually into confrontation with the Soviets. The Solidarity, which shared Jaruzelski's views in support of economic decentralization and marketization and worker 'self-management', did not really represent the Polish proletarians. The CIA reported:

Poland's economic problems are the focal issue in the national debate. The Jaruzelski regime is unable to secure improved economic performance without popular support for its programs, yet popular support will prove elusive without first some improvements in living conditions. Solidarity bases its continued existence on the failure of the regime to solve Poland's economic crisis or to expand workers' rights. **The regime, Polish workers, and opposition leaders have different perspective on the problem, so a consensus on solutions**

will be hard to find. (POLAND: NATIONAL RECONCILIATION REMAINS AN ELUSIVE GOAL, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, December 18, 1986, pp. 5-6. Bold added.)

The opposition has made economic reform the most important plank of its platform. **Solidarity probably would lend its backing to wage controls and price reforms aimed at balancing supply and demand on domestic markets only if the regime made significant concessions in the area of workers rights. Specifically, the opposition seeks the right to re-establish independent trade unions and give workers greater input in management.** (...). Without some guarantee of union pluralism – which we do not expect – Solidarity will continue to be critical of the reforms and cite any austerity measures as further evidence of the regime's inability to manage the economy. The reform program has not gained acceptance among workers. They resist change because they equate reform with wage controls, price hikes, and possible unemployment. (POLAND: NATIONAL RECONCILIATION REMAINS AN ELUSIVE GOAL, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, December 18, 1986, pp. 5-6. Bold added.) (IMG)

In reality, the Kautskyite and Trotskyite agents in charge of Solidarity were fighting on the same side as the Jaruzelski regime. Again, the Solidarity, a CIA front, aimed to mislead the Polish proletarians ostensibly into confrontations against the Jaruzelski regime but actually against what remained of the communist forces in Poland. Historical experience shows that usually the proletarians do not fall into such fratricidal traps. When they do superficially appear to be launching an uprising 'against' the anti-imperialist state, the uprising ends up actually against the comprador agents. The 1956 Poznan uprising and the 1970 uprising were cases in point. In the 1980s, Poland's proletarians, strongly antagonistic to the Jaruzelski regime, nonetheless intuited that they shall not fall into such a fratricidal trap laid before them by Solidarity and regarded such Solidarity-led protests as counter-productive:

Because of these operating restraints and internal disputes, a visible TKK [Solidarity's central leadership] strategy for challenging the regime has so far not yet emerged. There is every reason to believe that the overwhelming majority of the 10-million-strong membership remains sympathetic to the union and its ideals. But at least so far, the bulk of the blue-collar workers have generally opted for passive resistance as an expression of opposition in part because they believe street demonstrations to be counterproductive.

There are two reasons why the underground appeals have not attracted as much support as the union's former membership might have suggested. First, the industrial workers lined up behind the strikes and the union in 1980-81 because they believed they could extract significant wage and other economic concessions from the regime. They gradually came to realize that most of the wage increases were not covered by consumer goods and that future strikes for economic benefits would be meaningless.

(POLAND S PROSPECTS OVER THE NEXT 12 TO 18 MONTHS: Special National Intelligence Estimate: Memorandum to Holders, CIA, Directorate of Central Intelligence, September 1, 1982, p. 8) (IMG)

Though the aim of the CIA and Solidarity was to mobilize the workers into fratricide, the role of Solidarity ended up being the neutralization of the attempts of the Polish proletarians towards confrontations with the anti-Soviet Jaruzelski regime. That is, Solidarity prevented a proletarian uprising against the Titoist fascist faction of Jaruzelski. The latter gradually liberalized the Polish economy and Catholicized the Polish state, eventually transitioning Poland into an officially anti-communist NATO-aligned state. The '1989 overthrow' of the Polish state actually happened during the 1981 coup; in 1989, there rather simply occurred a mere reform of the Titoist military dictatorship into a more blatantly anti-communist state.

Chapter 23

C23S1. People's Democratic Development in Romania / Resisting Titoization / On Zionist Migration *** IMG-All-{Romania}

The Workers' Party of Romania was compositionally proletarianized, i.e. the blue-collar elements held the largest percentage in the Party. This established a powerful backbone assisting Romania's communist faction led by Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej against the aggressive Titoization campaign launched by the Kremlin Titoist assassins and the latter's henchpeople in Romania. The Federal Research Division of the US Library of Congress reported:

During the early years of full Communist control, the party considered itself the vanguard of the working class and made a sustained effort to recruit workers. By the end of 1950, the party reported that 64 percent of leading party positions and 40 percent of higher government posts were filled by members of the working class. Efforts to recruit workers into the party, however, consistently fell short of goals.

By 1965, when the name Romanian Communist Party was officially adopted, membership had reached 1,450,000--about 8 percent of the country's population. Membership composition at that time was 44 percent workers, 34 percent peasants, 10 per cent intelligentsia, and 12 percent other categories.

(Romania: A Country Study, Federal Research Division of the US Library of Congress, Ronald D. Bachman, July 1989) (IMG)

The Kremlin Titoist assassins who had risen to power in 1953 wanted the Peoples' Democracies to remain as backward agrarian societies easy prey to the Anglo-American colonizers. As early as 1953, the Titoist 'New Course' emphasized by the Moscow Titoists inflicted pressure upon the Romanian communists for the latter to slow down the pace of collectivization. In spite of such pressures, the Romanian communists were able to proceed ahead with the collectivization program. Indeed, as confirmed by a publication of the US Information Agency,:

While the new course acknowledged the continuing role of the independent farmers in Rumanian agriculture, the long-standing discrimination in favor of the collective farmers was maintained, though to a lesser degree. The concessions, incentives and advantages offered to peasants in the private sector were always just half those offered to the collective farms, with the agricultural associations holding an intermediate position.

The increased investment fund continued to benefit primarily the so-called socialized sector. Supplementary sums allocated to agriculture in 1953 and 1954 went to provide the collectives with more tractors and machinery, silos and other buildings, and were used in the education of technicians and special cadres for the gostats [state farms] and MTS.

("New Course" in Rumanian Agriculture, Daniel Norman. In: 'Problems of Communism', July-August 1955, Number 4, Vol. 4, United States Information Agency, p. 40) (IMG)

To be sure, the New Course certainly slowed down the pace of collectivization, but it did not stop it. Nonetheless, conflicts between the Romanian communists and the Kremlin Titoists had grown. As may be recalled, Lavrenti Beria and his henchmen had managed to dictatorially force a demotion of the communist leaders in the Peoples' Democracies. Such was the case of Hoxha, Ulbricht, and Rakosi. Such was also the case of Dej. As a result of the New Course, Dej was sharply demoted from leadership of the Party:

When he had to give up the post of secretary general of the Communist Party, it was rumored that Dej would be liquidated because of his [alleged] nationalist leanings. (BACKGROUND OF TOP LEVEL COMMUNIST LEADERS IN RUMANIA, CIA, March 11, 1955, p. 2) (IMG)

Hence,:

Dej is believed to be rather lukewarm about the Soviets. (BACKGROUND OF TOP LEVEL COMMUNIST LEADERS IN RUMANIA, CIA, March 11, 1955, p. 2) (IMG)

In mid-1953, the purge of the Beriites began in the USSR, thus removing a major obstacle for the communists throughout the Peoples' Democracies. The communist faction in Romania was able to proceed ahead again fairly smoothly.

Then came the 20th CPSU Congress in 1956. Romania's communists were uncomfortable with the Titoization agenda launched by Khrushchev and Eurasian Titoists. A paper by the Wilson Center stated:

Based on later statements and extemporaneous confessions, especially on what was revealed during the November-December 1961 CC Plenum, the members of the Romanian delegation to the Twentieth Congress were spending their evenings ... trying to figure out what was going on at the top of the Soviet party.

In short, after the Twentieth CPSU Congress, the Romanian communist leaders were ... outraged; their entire world was falling apart once their former idol had been attacked as a criminal, a paranoid monster and a military non-entity. Whatever his sentiments toward Khrushchev before February 1956, it is obvious that from that moment on, Gheorghiu-Dej deeply distrusted the Soviet First Secretary. For him, as for Thorez, Novotny, or Ulbricht, the disbandment of Stalin's myth was a major strategic and ideological blunder, a godsend for the imperialist propaganda and a concession to Titoist "rotten revisionism."

(Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers' Party: From De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism, Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 37, Vladimir Tismăneanu, May 2002, p. 15) (IMG)

The Romanian delegation at the Twentieth Congress was headed by Gheorghiu-Dej, and included, Politburo members Miron Constantinescu, Iosif Chişinevski and Petre Borilă. Obviously, the delegation had no idea that such a bombshell like Khrushchev's anti-Stalin attack had been prepared. It is not hard to imagine that Gheorghiu-Dej, undoubtedly a genuine Stalin worshipper, must have been less than enthusiastic about the severe criticism of the former Soviet leader. According to Miron Constantinescu, Gheorghiu-Dej was profoundly upset by the revelations in Khrushchev's Secret Speech. In Gheorghiu-Dej's view, by denouncing the idol of world communism, Khrushchev was committing a historical blunder. In this respect, the Romanian leader shared ... Maurice Thorez's contempt for Khrushchev's "sensationalism." Actually this frustration with the Soviet leader's anti-Stalin initiative can be considered the first step in the development of the Romanian-Soviet dispute. (Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers' Party: From De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism, Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 37, Vladimir Tismăneanu, May 2002, p. 14) (IMG)

The Romanian delegation to the 20th CPSU congress obviously had to present a report of what they observed and felt compelled to mention the 'revelations' of the Eurasian 'comrades'. To minimize the effects of this, like most of the other communist leaders in the bloc, Gheorghiu-Dej played the scorched earth strategy and tried to delay the spread of the lies promoted by the Khrushchevians. Not all communists were able to contain this Khrushchevian tide, and not all were able to delay the spread of the lies in their respective parties. Romanian communists were able to do this because they had a strong base in the Party and the state apparatus as well among the Romanian people. In terms of the tactical details of how the process was systematically delayed, the Wilson Center document provides the following:

After having read the full text of Nikita Khrushchev's Secret Speech, the Romanian participants at the Twentieth Congress had to determine how to discuss these documents with the rest of the RWP's leadership. Since the new line adopted at Kremlin personally threatened him, Gheorghiu-Dej had to procrastinate the debates that threatened to develop in the party leadership. Therefore, he invoked the crisis in the Greek Communist Party and his one-month involvement in that party's struggle, alleging that he had no way to direct the RWP's inner party discussions regarding the lessons of the Twentieth Congress. In fact, he was playing for time, cajoling different Politburo members, assessing their attitudes, and calculating the optimal strategy for the imminent discussions. In this, he counted primarily on support from Gheorghe Apostol, Chivu Stoica, Alexandru Moghioroş, Gheorghe Borilă, Emil Bodnăraş, Alexandru Drăghici, and, he had reasons to hope, Nicolae Ceauşescu. (...).

Eventually, in March-April 1956, a series of CC meetings were summoned in order to inform the top apparatus on the Twentieth Congress. These well-orchestrated sessions were meant to be a kind of purifying ritual in which every member of the communist supreme echelon was asked to engage in the notorious Leninist practice of criticism and self-criticism. At the March 23-25 Plenum, Gheorghiu-Dej presented a Politburo report (Dare de Seamă) in which he criticized Stalin and especially the practice of personality cult.

(Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers' Party: From De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism, Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 37, Vladimir Tismăneanu, May 2002, pp. 15-16) (IMG)

I am not sure about Apostol, Borilă, and Drăghici, but I know that the true sympathies of all the other top ranking members who overtly sided with Dej, covertly lied with the Moscow Titoists. The reason why those officials sided with Dej, however, was that most of them had very close organizational contacts with the working class institutions and the communist elements in the army, hence causing them to be sufficiently encircled and coopted by proletarian elements. As such, these officials were coopted to side with Dej. One person on whom Dej could count on at least to some extent was Gheorghe Apostol. He was a leading figure in the trade union movement, a Dej faction stronghold, and stood against the CIA-Mossad faction of the Pauker-Luca group:

Gheorghe Apostol, at present first secretary of the Rumanian Communist Party, comes from the trade union movement. He is a rather energetic person and very ambitious and for this reason is feared many top-level Party functionaries. (BACKGROUND OF TOP LEVEL COMMUNIST LEADERS IN RUMANIA, CIA, March 11, 1955, p. 2) (IMG)

As is so often the case, the victors were unable to divide the spoils and bitter factionalism soon developed. Teohari Georgescu was promptly shelved by his three powerful colleagues who were themselves shortly at odds with one another. Luca attacked the General Confederation of Workers which was directed by Gheorghe Apostol and is the exclusive domain of Gheorghiu-Dej and his supporters. In retaliation Gheorghiu-Dej commenced a campaign against the Hungarian Popular Union, the principal support [base] of Luca. (RECENT PURGES IN RUMANIAN COMMUNIST PARTY, CIA, August 12, 1952, p. 2) (IMG)

It is not completely clear to me if Apostol was a communist loyalist or if he was a communist-coopted Titoist, as the data about him sends mixed signals. What is clear is that, whether out of cooptation or out of genuine belief, he shared many of the stances of Dej.

Another person on whom Dej could rely on in the overt level – but not at all on the covert level – to combat Titoization was the communist-coopted Titoist agent Emil Bodnaras. It is worth examining his case in some details. During the 1930s, Bodnaras had been an adventurer and a terrorist who was released around the same time as when Antonescu's group rose to power in Romania in 1940:

Between 1933 and 1935, he plotted against the life of King Carol II. He was arrested and detained in prison until 1940. (BACKGROUND OF TOP LEVEL COMMUNIST LEADERS IN RUMANIA, CIA, March 11, 1955, p. 3) (IMG)

In 1944, he had returned to Romania with the Red Army:

After his release, he went to Moscow where he attended courses at the Soviet Military Academy. In 1944, he returned to Rumania as a general of the Red Army. (BACKGROUND OF TOP LEVEL COMMUNIST LEADERS IN RUMANIA, CIA, March 11, 1955, p. 3) (IMG)

At the time, the main figure of the Red Army in Romania was General Tolbukhin, who was an agent of the MI6 agent Beria. Back then, since Romania had switched sides during the Great Patriotic War, much of the Romanian military was dominated by MI6 agents loyal to Antonescu, Radescu, and King Mihai. The Beria agent General Tolbukhin had favorable relations with these MI6-linked anti-Soviet Romanian generals. Sergo Beria recalled in his biography of his father:

So long as he was commander-in-chief of our forces in Romania, Tolbukhin applied the policy advocated by my father, who counted on support from certain Romanian officers (Romania had an excellent officer corps). Tolbukhin had established contacts among these men. (...). But the Romanian Communists found nothing more intelligent than to complain to Stalin that 'reactionary anti-Soviet military men connected with Britain are coming to power.' They were, of course, unaware that my father was behind this policy. He was shaken by Tolbukhin's death because this meant he now had nobody to put his policy into practice. The task was going to be difficult in Romania, whereas the Communists, few in numbers, were fanatical. I think my father had some hope of the Minister of Finance, V. Luka, who later fell victim to the purges. (Beria: Inside Stalin's Kremlin, Sergo Beria, p. 196) (IMG)

Emil Bodnaras was popular among such Romanian army staff:

Bodnaras is very popular in the Rumanian Army because of the reforms decreed by him. (BACKGROUND OF TOP LEVEL COMMUNIST LEADERS IN RUMANIA, CIA, March 11, 1955, p. 3) (IMG)

The Romanian army had by then been purged just enough so that the MI6 agents in it would not be able to launch a coup, but still there was a way to go with the purges in the Romanian army. The high command of the Romanian army had come under the influence of communist and communist-coopted generals but the middle ranks of the Romanian army were not necessarily so communist loyalist. The middle-rank generals were numerically larger but politically weaker, which is likely the reason that Bodnaras was popular among many generals but was not able to launch a coup.

At some point, Bodnaras definitely was able to establish positive relations with the Titoist infiltrators in the Kremlin. Certainly, by 1955, the Titoists had risen to power in the Kremlin; as such, Bodnaras's relations with Moscow began to improve back then:

Bodnaras maintains relatively good connection with the Soviets. (BACKGROUND OF TOP LEVEL COMMUNIST LEADERS IN RUMANIA, CIA, March 11, 1955, p. 3) (IMG)

Bodnaras was regarded as one of the people aligned with the CIA-Mossad agent Ana Pauker. He :

[Bodnaras's] closest assistants and friends are General Ion Cambrea, Colonel Tudor Sepianu and General Nicolae Fulga. It is believed that the strength of this group in conjunction with Dej's authority has so far saved Ana Pauker's life. (BACKGROUND OF TOP LEVEL COMMUNIST LEADERS IN RUMANIA, CIA, March 11, 1955, p. 3) (IMG)

In fact, the ties of Bodnaras with Pauker go back to 1920:

As a Communist [Bodnaras] went to Bucharest in 1920 and there got in touch with Pauker.... (BACKGROUND OF TOP LEVEL COMMUNIST LEADERS IN RUMANIA, CIA, March 11, 1955, pp. 2-3) (IMG)

At the time, Bodnaras was also the defense minister:

Emil Bodnaras, Minister of National Defense and a vice president of the Council of Ministers, is believed to rank only after Chisinevski.... (BACKGROUND OF TOP LEVEL COMMUNIST LEADERS IN RUMANIA, CIA, March 11, 1955, pp. 2-3) (IMG)

Bodnaras, while undoubtedly a suspicious element in the Romanian government, was on the liberal side of the spectrum and thus on the overt level opposed the Trotskyite Chisinevski. Bodnaras had of course been a Trotskyite adventurer in the 1930s, planning a supposed 'assassination' against the King, but like most Trotskyite left-opportunists, he adopted a liberal right-opportunist line later in his life. On the overt level, therefore, he was useful in undermining Chisinevski's group. This is why the CIA stated:

Chisinevski also dislikes Bodnaras, the Rumanian Minister of National Defense, whom he fears because of his great popularity with the Army. (BACKGROUND OF TOP LEVEL COMMUNIST LEADERS IN RUMANIA, CIA, March 11, 1955, p. 2) (IMG)

The 'hatred' of Chisinevski and Bodnaras was unlikely to be real on the covert level, but it did exist on the overt level, in outwardly pretensions. On the overt level therefore, team Bodnaras was a factor that kept team Chisinevski in check.

Anyways, like the rest of the communist parties in the bloc, the Romanian communists reaffirmed their communist anti-Titoism and 'Stalinism' under the cover of 'de-Stalinizing' and Titoizing. According to a document written by the CIA front think tank Wilson Center,:

As for the manifestations of Stalinism in his own party, Gheorghiu-Dej spoke about Romanian Stalinists without mentioning names, but insisted that the RWP had expelled them in 1952, and, therefore, implied that the only Stalinists in Romania had been the demoted Pauker, Luca and Georgescu and, he, Gheorghiu-Dej, deserved credit for having courageously started a de-Stalinization avant la lettre, long before the Twentieth Congress. Also, he emphasized that that the Second Congress of the RWP marked a new phase by the fact that collective leadership was established and democratic centralism was truly governing inner party life. Simply put, Gheorghiu-Dej's game was to invoke the struggle against the expelled [Pauker] faction as an argument for his group's "presciently correct" political

behavior. Compared to other East European parties, Gheorghiu-Dej maintained, the RWP leadership managed to avoid the worst excesses associated with Stalin's cult. Whatever needed to be rectified had basically been done as a result of the anti-Pauker purges. (Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers' Party: From De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism, Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 37, Vladimir Tismăneanu, May 2002, pp. 15-16) (IMG)

Hence, the result of the Politburo discussions was as follows:

The heated Politburo discussions of March-April of 1956 resulted in the decision to keep under strict control the mass party discussions on Khrushchev's de-Stalinization. Official explanations highlighted the righteousness of the party line and any attempt to question it resulted in immediate sanctions. All Politburo members were instructed to oppose revisionism and "liberal-anarchic" tendencies. Leonte Răutu was in charge with directing the propaganda efforts meant to conceal the genuine implications of Khrushchev's de-Stalinization campaign. (Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers' Party: From De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism, Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 37, Vladimir Tismăneanu, May 2002, p. 18) (IMG)

The fact that the Romanian communists pretended to be anti-Stalinists does not mean that they actually were such. Romania's communists led by Dej opposed the anti-Stalin slanders of Khrushchev. It is worth reminding that when the junk of the 'Lenin Testament' attacked Stalin as 'rude', Stalin picked up the slander against himself, 'accepted' it, but reinterpreted it around in such a manner to actually help him pursue his 'rude' objectives (see C5S1). Stalin used an anti-Stalinist colouring so to push ahead with his 'Stalinist' agenda. Enver Hoxha as well as the Czechoslovak communists all overtly supported the 'anti-Stalin' nonsense, and used this as a cover with which to continue their 'Stalinist' activity. Dej was doing a similar thing through such fake 'anti-Stalinism'. Thus, in the words of the CIA even as late as 1964,:

Dej ... has given only lip service to Khrushchev's de-Stalinization program.... (RUMANIA'S POSITION IN THE SOVIET BLOC, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), May 15, 1964, p. 1) (IMG)

Even as late as 1961, which was the time of the second wave of Titoization launched by the Moscow-based Titoists, the Romanian communists rightly claimed to have restored collective leadership in the Romanian Workers' Party by purging Pauker and her immediate associates. Paul Lendvai, a Zionist Hungarian defector to Austria and a journalist who participated in the CIA-backed MI6-backed colour revolution in Hungary, wrote:

At the Central Committee plenum in November-December 1961, Gheorghiu-Dej coped easily with the repercussions of Khrushchev's second de-Stalinization campaign. The Party leader, who since March 1961 had also been President of the republic, asserted that he had been a helpless prisoner of the Pauker group and, by purging them, had restored "collective leadership." (Anti-Semitism without Jews: Communist Eastern Europe, Paul Lendvai, January 1, 1971, p. 337) (IMG)

Enver Hoxha (see Hoxha's 'The Titoites' and 'The Khrushchevites') used to mention that Gheorghiu-Dej was a favorite of the Stalin-era Soviet officials. This makes sense because the Stalin-era Soviets had a Chekist mentality, and Dej embodied the Chekist mentality, for not only was he a purger, but he also was good at camouflaging. Partially for the same reason, Hoxha disliked Dej – Hoxha despised camouflaging, even though Hoxha himself engaged in it at times. The camouflaging skills were manifested by 1956, when, whereas Mao proved to be a boss at being a fake 'anti-revisionist', Dej proved to be excellent at being a fake 'revisionist', a 'Stalinist' camouflaged as 'anti-Stalinist'. Dej also rigidly adhered to historical materialist step-by-step methods instead of rushing. The dialectical concept of the 'negation of negation' is manifested in his entire record of policies, strategies and tactics. The Stalin-era Soviet officials therefore naturally saw much similarity between themselves and the Dej faction in Romania. And of course, as has been mentioned in C15S1, Dej had excellent relations with the Stalin-era Soviet Politburo.

To maximize pressure for Titoization and to install Titoists at the helm of Romania, the Eurasian Titoists joined the Anglo-American imperialists in the blockade against People's Democratic Romania, and imposed economic sanctions on People's Democratic Romania:

No Soviet credit is known to have been extended to Rumania after 1956.... Credits from the more developed East European countries also had been small. (RUMANIA'S POSITION IN THE SOVIET BLOC, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), May 15, 1964, p. 2) (IMG)

The economic sanctions on Romanian heavy industry had already been partially imposed, 'thanks' to the 'New Course' campaign to pressure the Romanians to prioritize the consumer goods sector. However, they became more severe after the official declaration of Titoization in 1956. The Romanian communists responded much like many of the rest of the freedom forces around the world, by courting China's left-deviationist regime in order to keep the Khrushchevian right-deviation in check:

Gheorghiu-Dej began to court the Chinese; indeed, after 1956, the Romanian communists had more in common in their treatment of the Stalin issue and de-Stalinization with Mao's China and Hoxha's Albania than with Gomulka's Poland. (Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers' Party: From De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism, Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 37, Vladimir Tismăneanu, May 2002, pp. 14-15) (IMG)

In spite of these measures, the Romanian communists obviously could not fully avoid the inevitable wave of Titoization striking Fortress Romania. The effects of this mighty wave was reflected in Romania's policies towards Israel and Yugoslavia. The Dej faction, despite taking some hits, was able to skillfully block this wave from achieving its big goals. Having purged Ana Pauker and a number of her associates, the communist forces in Romania had enough strength to block and minimize the Zionist migration until the late 1950s. The Israel Defense Magazine, an Israeli magazine on military and intelligence affairs, stated:

During the 1950s, Romanian authorities denied departure approvals to Jews possessing higher education or in-demand qualifications. In those years, the stream of immigrants coming out of Romania was not overly regular or continuous, and immigration often stopped and resumed, for various reasons. ('Romanian-Styled Capitalism', Israel Defense, Issue 11 of the magazine, February 17, 2013) (IMG)

However, the Titoization line promoted by the 20th congress of the CPSU assisted in the release of Zionist leaders in Romania:

A considerable part of Rumanian Jewry ... had left by 1951. For next seven years virtually no exit permits were issued. (...). It was an indication of the unrest and embitterment in the Jewish community that even after Stalin's death in 1954 scores of Zionist leaders were sentenced to long prison terms at secret trials. They were released only during the period of the relative thaw after the Twentieth Soviet Party Congress in 1956. (Anti-Semitism without Jews: Communist Eastern Europe, Paul Lendvai, January 1, 1971, p. 342) (IMG)

As can be seen, the Titoization agenda of the Kremlin Titoists headed by Khrushchev was a score in favor of the Israeli regime. Nonetheless, Romania was able to resist this as well. Years of Stalin-era Soviet assistance had strengthened the communist intelligence agents' presence in that country. Hence, the Romanian People's Democracy had a relatively robust counter-intelligence apparatus that assisted it in surveiling the Israeli employees

in Romania, and to impose a freeze on the 'reunion' of Jews in Romania with their respective families in Israel. Indeed, the Israeli intelligence document from the Mossad station in Bucharest stated:

Summary

The East European division informs the Israel legation in Bucharest that they have complained to Chitic about the following:

- 1) The delay in authorising the arrival of the minister, Harel.
 - 2) The following of and spying on the Israeli employees in Bucharest, which interferes with their regular legal activities and which is in contradiction of the Romanians' repeatedly expressed desire for proper and normal relations.
 - 3) The freeze imposed on the reunion of families. Despite the many promises, the government of Romania ignores this humanitarian problem. This inflexible attitude can no longer be ignored and causes growing discontent both in Israel and abroad.
- (Coded Tel. 368, Outg.:130.23/3123/16', East European Division (Jerusalem) to the Israel Legation in Bucharest', February 19, 1957. In: 'DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL', State of Israel Archives, Vol. 12: The Sinai Campaign: The Political Struggle, October 1956 – March 1957, Edited by Nana Sagi, General editor: Yemima Rosenthal, Companion Volume, 2009, pp. 409-410) (IMG{PD – Post-1953 Migration to Israel})

It deserves to be said that Israeli employees do not deserve to be spied on just because of their Israeli background, as that constitutes anti-Israeli chauvinist 'ethnic profiling'. However, it is a fact that Romania was not a destination of Israeli citizens' migration, and many Israelis who worked in Romania were not there to live for the long-term as citizens of Romania, but were rather working there for commercial relations or diplomatic relations between the two countries. I therefore speculate that in the above report, 'the Israeli employees' spoken of were the employees in the commercial/diplomatic organizations and were planning to stay in Romania for only the short-term. I doubt that they were migrants to live and work under a socialist system for the rest of their lives. Certainly, the employees in the commercial and diplomatic bodies subservient to hostile anti-socialist states were the kinds of employees to be carefully monitored, and this was not just limited to Israel but all of the allies of the United States and Britain.

The reason why Romania was able to bloc Zionist migration was that, during the Stalin era, the USSR had assisted communist loyalist intelligence agents to permeate the apparatus of Romania, thus making CIA-Mossad infiltration difficult. Indeed, an Israeli intelligence document sent from the Mossad station in Bucharest stated that the continued existence of the 'old Stalinist officials' was a key reason why Zionist mass migration was not happening:

Summary

Since the Romanians have not permitted any emigration for two months and in light of recent developments in Poland and Hungary, the Israeli minister proposes that he request a meeting with [deputy Foreign Minister] Rudencu and present him with a demand for mass emigration. In addition, he would try to put this claim to government members and in talks with the Russians.

The main reason for this state of affairs in Romania is its complete subordination to the [Stalin-era] Soviet Union, the intransigent political line and the old Stalinist officials. However, even if current conditions are unfavorable, the issue must still be broached.

(Coded Tel. 681, Inc.:130.09/2297/4, 'Israel Legation in Bucharest to the East European Division', December 27, 1956. In: 'DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL', State of Israel Archives, Vol. 12: The Sinai Campaign: The Political Struggle, October 1956 – March 1957, Edited by Nana Sagi, General editor: Yemima Rosenthal, Companion Volume, 2009, p. 215) (IMG{PD – Post-1953 Migration to Israel})

Contrary to the statement of the above excerpt, however, Romania was not 'subordinated' to – as in, colonized by – the Stalin-era USSR. It was however dominated by communists that operated as faithful comrades sharing the views of the communists in the USSR and who were thoroughly aligned with the Soviet comrades. Obviously, this was troubling for the Moscow Titoists, which is why new plots were hatched against People's Democratic Romania.

As always, the communist revolutionary blue-collar faction of the Party faced the pincer assault of the left-opportunists and right-opportunists. The wave of Titoization launched by the Moscow-based Titoists caused the full activation and mobilization of the this pincer assault. Back in 1956, the leading left-deviationist in Romania was the vengefully anti-Romanian Iosif Chişinevschi, who showed 'zeal' in 'supporting' the Stalin-era USSR. Chişinevschi, as confirmed by the CIA media 'Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty' was a Pauker agent:

Chişinevschi, once a Pauker protege, was a Bessarabian Jew whose command of Romanian was comparable with Luca's, only the accent was Russian rather than Hungarian. ('Stalinism With a Human Face?', Part 3: No 'Nice Jewish Girl', Michael Shafir. In: East European Perspectives, Vol. 3, No. 13, RFE/RL, July 11, 2001) (IMG)

Pauker, as was shown in C15S1, although from a Jewish background, betrayed millions of Yiddish proletarians by pursuing Trotskyite left-sectarian policies aimed at undermining the communist efforts against the Nazis. Chişinevschi was a 'Bessarabian Jew' of the Pauker type, and belonged to her camp. Chişinevschi's vengefully anti-Romanian show of zeal in 'favor' of the USSR was merely the usual Trotskyite diversionary weapon of driving a wedge between the Soviet and Romanian peoples. The CIA reported:

Chişinevschi hated the Rumanians and was waiting for the day of revenge. (BACKGROUND OF TOP LEVEL COMMUNIST LEADERS IN RUMANIA, CIA, March 11, 1955, p. 1) (IMG)

On the other hand, according to the Wilson Center document,:

Iosif Chişinevschi represented the pillar of the Soviet influence in the Romanian Communist Party. Born in 1905 in Bessarabia, Iosif Roitman, later on Chişinevschi after his wife's name, played a fundamental role in the Bolshevization, respectively Stalinization, of the RCP in the underground years. Unlike Leonte Răutu, his main disciple after 23 August 1944, Chişinevschi was self-taught: born in a poor family, he entered in the communist movement since his early youth and did not finish high school. However, in his case, the cultural void was compensated by a terrible confidence in the educative virtues of the clandestine communist sect. Ignoring and detesting the real intellectual problems, unaware of the theoretical debates of the Marxist left, Chişinevschi venerated the Stalinist ideological surrogate. (...). The history of the Romanian culture and the drama in the past of this country were not at all his concern.

For Chişinevschi, the attitude toward the USSR was the most important criterion of Leninist orthodoxy.

(Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers' Party: From De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism, Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 37, Vladimir Tismăneanu, May 2002, pp. 24-26) (IMG)

Again, Chișinevschi was never a real supporter of the Stalin-era USSR, but, being a Trotskyite left-deviationist, he certainly posed as such for Trotskyite wedge-driving and opportunistic camouflage purposes. In implementing his Trotskyite pseudo-'Stalinist' terror, Chisinevschi was infamous, for he spared no brutality. He first became a chief of the Romanian counter-intelligence sector:

In 1950, Chisinevschi joined the Rumanian Government as chief of the Rumanian Security Police. (BACKGROUND OF TOP LEVEL COMMUNIST LEADERS IN RUMANIA, CIA, March 11, 1955, pp. 1-2) (IMG)

He used to:

humiliate [others] in a ... cruel manner ... in the name of the [communist] cause. (Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers' Party: From De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism, Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 37, Vladimir Tismăneanu, May 2002, pp. 24-26) (IMG)

Even by 1956,:

Chișinevschi [was] by far the most detested party leader.... (Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers' Party: From De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism, Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 37, Vladimir Tismăneanu, May 2002, p. 24) (IMG)

However, Chisinevschi was:

hoping to cover his own past, full of crimes and abuses. (Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers' Party: From De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism, Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 37, Vladimir Tismăneanu, May 2002, pp. 24-26) (IMG)

The Trotskyite diversionary Chișinevschi sought to terrorize, not in order to suppress dissent of course, but to provoke more of it and then redirect resentment towards Dej and other communists in the Party by presenting them as responsible for the terror he had committed. For his conspiratorial agenda, Chișinevschi had his own network of agents:

Iosif Chișinevschi has been Vice President of the Rumanian Government and representative of the Rumanian Communist Party with the Cominform since 1952. He is generally called the "eminence grise" of the country and is believed to pull all the political strings, although he likes to stay in the background. (BACKGROUND OF TOP LEVEL COMMUNIST LEADERS IN RUMANIA, CIA, March 11, 1955, p. 1) (IMG)

In order to survive the anti-Pauker purges, Chisinevschi had opportunistically turned against his covert boss, Ana Pauker, and thus saw a promotion in official rank when she was purged:

In 1952, [Chisinevschi] became Vice President of the Rumanian Council of Ministers. (BACKGROUND OF TOP LEVEL COMMUNIST LEADERS IN RUMANIA, CIA, March 11, 1955, pp. 1-2) (IMG)

Of course, through the purge of Pauker, Chisinevschi's network of influence had weakened, but his official rank did increase through his participation in the anti-Pauker purge. Dej's faction had promoted Chisinevschi against the Mossad spy Ana Pauker and her group but that did not mean that Dej had any good relations with Chisinevschi:

Gheorghiu Dej is not on good terms with Chisinevschi on whom Dej looks down because Chisinevschi was not one of the founders of the Rumanian Communist Party. The antipathy between the two is mutual. (BACKGROUND OF TOP LEVEL COMMUNIST LEADERS IN RUMANIA, CIA, March 11, 1955, p. 2) (IMG)

Chisinevschi, a Pauker agent, had opportunistically denounced his own boss so to survive the purges. Parallel with Khrushchev and Tito who used to praise Stalin to the heavens and then denounce him to mud, Chisinevschi the 'Stalinist' pursued such an agenda, actively and ferociously pursued an anti-Stalinist line, and began to pursue Khrushchev-style Titoization:

Once the Soviet leaders decided to denounce Stalin, Chișinevschi followed the new line with the same zeal he had once applied Stalin's directives. (Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers' Party: From De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism, Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 37, Vladimir Tismăneanu, May 2002, pp. 24-26) (IMG)

Thus,:

After the Twentieth Congress [Chisinevschi] started immediately to spread insidious critical allusions to Gheorghiu-Dej.... (Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers' Party: From De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism, Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 37, Vladimir Tismăneanu, May 2002, pp. 24-26) (IMG)

On the other hand, the Dej faction – which as documented before, had its base on the communist blue-collar workers in the Party – was targeted by the right-deviationist elements headed by Constantinescu, who, like most revisionists of the liberal right-deviationist type, had his social base in the intelligentsia:

The other member of the Central Committee that confronted Gheorghiu-Dej was Miron Constantinescu, one of the very few authentic intellectuals accepted in the hegemonic group of Romanian communism. Partner rather than accomplice for Gheorghiu-Dej, he saw in the de-Stalinization process started by Khrushchev the chance of a lifetime. After 1954, Miron Constantinescu began to intensely cultivate his image as a fighter for liberalization in the party. He initiated a series of meetings with some of the outstanding intellectuals of the interwar period, especially after he was appointed Minister of Education and Culture on 18 November 1956. No less significant was his meeting in February 1956 in Moscow with the leader of Italian communism, Palmiro Togliatti, whose heretical opinions would be disclosed in the following months. (Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers' Party: From De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism, Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 37, Vladimir Tismăneanu, May 2002, p. 26) (IMG)

Like Chisinevschi, Constantinescu had been close to the CIA-Mossad agent Ana Pauker. However, once it became clear that she was about to be purged, he overtly distanced himself from her:

Miron Constantinescu was at one time fairly close to Ana Pauker, but he was cautious enough to keep a certain distance and maintain his independence of her. He was thus able to get out from under the crash very cleverly. (HARMONY AMONG LEADING COMMUNISTS IN RUMANIA, CIA, January 28, 1953, p. 1) (IMG)

It must be remembered that although the CIA-Mossad agent Pauker herself was removed from power, she still retained a network within the Party:

Pauker's influence on the other Communist leaders in the country is still so great, however, that her word may still have some weight in the decisions of the Party. (BACKGROUND OF TOP LEVEL COMMUNIST LEADERS IN RUMANIA, CIA, March 11, 1955, p.3) (IMG)

Constantinescu was a successor to Pauker. In his struggle against the communist faction and the blue-collar elements.:

Constantinescu believed that he could also count on the support of intellectuals within the party, as well as among some major cultural figures that had been thrown to the periphery of social life after the communist takeover. (Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers' Party: From De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism, Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 37, Vladimir Tismăneanu, May 2002, pp. 16-18) (IMG)

The Trotskyite left-deviationist group of Chişinevschi represented the corrupt bureaucrats in the Party, and the liberal right-deviationist group of Constantinescu the ally of Mossad agent Pauker, represented the intelligentsia in the Party. Team Chişinevschi and team Constantinescu banded together to launch a pincer assault on the Gheorghiu-Dej faction, which had its base in the communist blue-collar worker elements of the Party:

The ... alliance between Chişinevschi and Constantinescu in the spring of 1956 had been dictated by pragmatic considerations. At that time, they believed that Gheorghiu-Dej was so compromised as a result of the revelations about Stalinist abuses, that he should be removed from power. In order to obtain a majority of votes within the Politburo, probably encouraged by Khrushchev, they tried to persuade other members of the Politburo to join in their efforts to topple Gheorghiu-Dej. (Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers' Party: From De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism, Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 37, Vladimir Tismăneanu, May 2002, p. 24) (IMG)

In every country, the liberal intelligentsia and the torturers are allies. The alliance of the Chişinevschi and Constantinescu teams is a local case in point demonstrating the worldwide alliance, an alliance naturally emanating from the alliance of the intelligentsia and the corrupt bureaucrats, for the corrupt bureaucrats in the intelligence services are the pool from among whom torturers arise.

One of the covert allies that Chisinevschi had was Moghioros:

On the other hand, Chisinevschi is on good terms with Alexandry Moghioros, a Vice President of the Council of Ministers. (BACKGROUND OF TOP LEVEL COMMUNIST LEADERS IN RUMANIA, CIA, March 11, 1955, p. 2) (IMG)

However, according to Vladimir Tismăneanu, Moghioros – probably feeling that he had no chance against the Dej faction at the time – decided to overtly denounce his own covert ally. Referring to the Chişinevschi-Constantinescu alliance, Tismăneanu wrote:

Although they were successful in drawing Pîrvulescu, the president of the Party Control Commission, into the conspiracy, they did not manage to win over Alexandru Moghioroş, who informed Gheorghiu-Dej about the plot. (Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers' Party: From De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism, Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 37, Vladimir Tismăneanu, May 2002, p. 24) (IMG)

He adds:

Actually, Miron Constantinescu's attempt to enroll Moghioroş on his side backfired: Moghioroş, who had earlier betrayed Vasile Luca and Ana Pauker, went immediately to Gheorghiu-Dej to inform him about the formation of an "anti-party platform." Iosif Chişinevschi went to the less astute Pîrvulescu, who, anyway, despised Gheorghiu-Dej, and tried to attract his assistance in this effort to blame the First Secretary for the abuses. Pîrvulescu either did not understand that Chişinevschi's suggested action amounted in fact to Gheorghiu-Dej's ouster, or pretended that he did not get the message clearly. His failure to inform on Chişinevschi's courting and invitation to "discuss the past in the light of the Twentieth Congress Leninist course" greatly cost him. (Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers' Party: From De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism, Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 37, Vladimir Tismăneanu, May 2002, pp. 16-18) (IMG)

The Chisinevschi-Constantinescu group thus launched their pincer attack. One of them attacked the 'Stalinists' from the left and the other attacked them from the right:

At this Plenum, Iosif Chişinevschi and Miron Constantinescu, both members of the delegation to the Twentieth Congress, and each for very different reasons, challenged Gheorghiu-Dej's authority, so that the meeting was transformed in a real debate, as there was no other since the purge of the right-wing deviators. This is the reason why from the documents of this Plenum only Gheorghiu-Dej's Report on the Twentieth Congress was published (and even that one in a sanitized version). Constantinescu, supported by Chişinevschi, argued for the "regeneration" of the party in the spirit of the anti-Stalinist line promoted by Khrushchev. They invoked the slogan of the Twentieth Congress about the "restoration of Leninist norms of internal party life" in order to weaken Gheorghiu-Dej's position and restructure the party's leadership. Also, Miron Constantinescu criticized the Securitate, including the fact that secret police operated within Ministries without consultations with top officials, even if those, as it was his case, served on the Politburo.

In Leninist parlance, this was an overall attack, and Gheorghiu-Dej did not miss the point. To Constantinescu's and Chişinevschi's criticism, Gheorghiu-Dej, who was able to combine a seductive personal affability with the icy requests of the Stalinist logic, opposed the theory that the personality cult had indeed existed within the RWP, with abominable and tragic consequences, but all this had come to an end with the elimination of the factionalist villains, the arch-opportunists Pauker, Luca, Teohari. After 1952, Gheorghiu-Dej and his supporters claimed, "collective leadership was re-installed." Later, at the Central Committee Plenum in November 1961, Gheorghiu-Dej maintained, seconded by a cohort of sycophants, that normal party life had started only after 1952, and this was due primarily to the great Leninist militant, Gheorghiu-Dej himself.

It is worth emphasizing that the two main opponents of Gheorghiu-Dej attacked him for very different reasons. In the case of Chişinevschi, it was about his enduring opportunism, his unsurpassed chameleon-type of political conduct materialized in his will to associate himself with the group that was most probable to win the battle. A true follower of Moscow's line, whatever its twist or turn, he grasped an opportunity to undermine Gheorghiu-Dej and re-compose for himself the image of a fighter for intraparty democracy. As Khrushchev seemed to run the show in Moscow, Chişinevschi thought, it was likely that a critical re-assessment of the Stalinist purges in Romania was inevitable. Miron Constantinescu, at his turn, thought that he was the one destined to promote a new political course in Romania, and hoped that he could overthrow Gheorghiu-Dej. Actually, at the next Politburo meeting, he attacked Gheorghiu-Dej directly, saying that, although he acknowledged the merits of the First Secretary, he wanted to underline his defects, considering that the hitherto completely uncritical attitude towards Gheorghiu-Dej was a mistaken, non-Leninist position. (...). Gheorghiu-Dej's main confidants and supporters at that moment were Gheorghe Apostol, Emil Bodnăraş, Alexandru Moghioroş, and Petre Borilă.

(Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers' Party: From De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism, Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 37, Vladimir Tismăneanu, May 2002, pp. 16-18) (IMG)

Further emphasizing the fact that on the overt level, the two allies Constantinescu and Chişinevschi were on different sides of the political spectrum, the Wilson Center document stated:

With regard to this episode, mention should be made of Gheorghiu-Dej's anti-intellectual sentiments, which may explain the particular bitterness and violence of the purge that followed the internal party debates in 1956. No doubt, Miron Constantinescu ... internalized the lessons of the Twentieth CPSU Congress.... Gheorghiu-Dej used Constantinescu's uninspired alliance with Iosif Chişinevschi – by far the most detested party leader – as an argument against the “group.” The two communist leaders were, actually, very different in intellectual background, in the way they understood the relationship with the policy promoted by Moscow, and in the significance they attributed to de-Stalinization. (Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers' Party: From De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism, Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 37, Vladimir Tismăneanu, May 2002, p. 24) (IMG)

While the pincer assault against the Dej faction was being spearheaded by the Constantinescu-Chişinevschi bloc, there also came the Red Army intervention in Hungary, a factor which would contribute to the demise of the Constantinescu-Chişinevschi bloc. Like Hoxha, Dej was thanked for pressuring the Moscow Titoists into accepting Red Army intervention into Hungary:

After the crushing of the Hungarian [colour] revolution, Dej appeared to the most conservative among the Kremlin leaders as a trustworthy comrade. (Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers' Party: From De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism, Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 37, Vladimir Tismăneanu, May 2002, pp. 21) (IMG)

The events of Hungary's colour revolution elevated the position of the communist faction throughout the bloc, after having suffered a wave of Titoization. This elevation of the communist faction was observed not only in Hungary itself but also in Albania, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia. The case of the Romanian communists was no different:

The Hungarian uprising and the Polish crisis in the autumn of 1956 placed Gheorghiu-Dej in an advantageous position in his behind-the-scenes confrontation with the Khrushchev leadership. (Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers' Party: From De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism, Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 37, Vladimir Tismăneanu, May 2002, pp. 23-24) (IMG)

As mentioned, the rollback of the fascist forces in Hungary in 1956

On the other hand, as a result of the discrediting of Titoization after Hungary's colour revolution,:

Miron Constantinescu, the head of the State Planning Committee, was appointed Minister of Education on 18 November 1956, a decision that covered a degradation of his status. (Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers' Party: From De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism, Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 37, Vladimir Tismăneanu, May 2002, pp. 21) (IMG)

Due to Eurasian Titoist pressures and Anglo-American sanctions, the communists could not purge the Pauker agent Chisinevschi just yet, but he was gradually demoted over time:

After March 1956, in spite of his renewed declarations of faith to Gheorghiu-Dej, there was no chance for Chişinevschi's political survival; Gheorghiu-Dej surpassed him in ability and duplicity. In June 1957, he was excluded from the Politburo, and in 1960 the Third Congress of the RWP did not reelect him in the Central Committee. (...). Gheorghiu-Dej, Ceauşescu, Maurer, Răutu, Borilă, Moghioroş, Sencovici, Valter Roman, all accused the one whom they had once celebrated as the “brain of the party,” then only the director of the Printing Combinat “Casa Scînteii.” (Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers' Party: From De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism, Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 37, Vladimir Tismăneanu, May 2002, pp. 24-26) (IMG)

Parallel with the decline of the Pauker agent Chisinevschi was the decline of his ally, the Pauker agent Constantinescu:

Associated with the tendencies for liberalization inside the party, caught in the traps of Gheorghiu-Dej and Răutu, Constantinescu was ousted from the Politburo at the June Plenum in 1957 together with Chişinevschi for their “attempt to orient the party towards the liberalist and revisionist anarchy.” (Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers' Party: From De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism, Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 37, Vladimir Tismăneanu, May 2002, p. 26) (IMG)

Pîrvulescu too, another member of the Chisinevschi-Constantinescu group, was demoted:

At the June 1957 Central Committee Plenum, Pîrvulescu was severely criticized, at the Third RWP Congress in 1960 he lost his Politburo seat, and at the November-December 1961 Plenum he was criticized for political myopia and opportunism. (Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers' Party: From De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism, Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 37, Vladimir Tismăneanu, May 2002, pp. 16-18) (IMG)

Nevertheless, the effects of the failed attempt of Chişinevschi-Constantinescu faction to question Gheorghiu-Dej's responsibility for the Stalinist's period misdeeds were felt once again: Constantin Pîrvulescu, one of the party old-timers, lost his place in the Politburo and the Central Committee, as well as his position as chairman of the Party Control Commission (he was replaced by the veteran hard-liner Cominternist, Dumitru Coliu). Clearly, Pîrvulescu's expulsion was related to his attitude toward the Chişinevschi-Constantinescu actions against Gheorghiu-Dej. (Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers' Party: From De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism, Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 37, Vladimir Tismăneanu, May 2002, pp. 33-34) (IMG)

In short,:

The Plenum of the CC of the RWP on 28-29 June and 1-3 July 1957 played a crucial role in the restructuring of RWP's Politburo and the expulsion of the so-called “factionalist group” Chişinevschi-Constantinescu. (Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers' Party: From De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism, Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 37, Vladimir Tismăneanu, May 2002, pp. 23-24) (IMG)

The Dej faction coopted Maurer to replace and help purge the Chisinevschi-Constantinescu group. Stoica too was demoted:

Ion Gheorghe Maurer, at the moment nominal chief of state, took his place in the Politburo. One year later, Maurer replaced the notoriously mediocre Chivu Stoica as chairman of the Council of Ministers, a position he held until his retirement in 1974. (Gheorghiu-

Dej and the Romanian Workers' Party: From De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism, Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 37, Vladimir Tismăneanu, May 2002, pp. 33-34) (IMG)

Never really a communist loyalist, Maurer was coopted by the Dej faction. Maurer later came out as a Titoist agent as well.

At the same time, there was a partial rehabilitation of Stalin. In its historical context, the attack on the personality of Stalin marked the ground zero of propaganda in favor of Titoization, because the plan was that through attacking the personality of the teacher, the teachings of the teacher were to be discredited. By contrast, the loyal comrades of the teacher operated in the reverse way, namely that they first defended the teachings and then later on went for the defense of the personality of the teacher. This makes sense from a historical materialist lens because while anti-Stalin slanders did help in denouncing Stalin's decisions as the 'decisions of an evil dictator', the defense of Stalin's personality in itself could not mark the ground zero of anti-Titoist and anti-revisionist resistance. The reactionary policy implications of the 1956 Titoization speech were to be resisted first. Romania, like some other Peoples' Democracies in which the communist faction was strong enough, successfully resisted much of the Titoization, and thereupon proceeded to defend Stalin as a person in 1957. The Titoist forces in Romania were weak enough that not just Titoist infiltrator Ceausescu but even the Chisinevski agent Moghioros felt compelled to defend the legacy, line, and personality of Stalin in 1958:

One of the most interesting speeches delivered to the Plenum was that of Ceaușescu.... Therefore, Ceaușescu's speech deserves a closer analysis.... Although he [stated] that there were some mistakes in Stalin's activity, Ceaușescu stated that one should be aware of Stalin's major merits, and that his works were worth studying. Ceaușescu further [officially] expressed admiration for Stalin when he bluntly declared: "Actually, we did not proceed like others, who threw away from their homes Stalin's works." This was a direct reference to Miron Constantinescu who had expressed doubts regarding many of Stalin's theses. However, Ceaușescu was not alone in praising Stalin's legacy: in their speeches, both Răutu and Moghioroș referred to conversations they had with workers and, respectively, old-time members of the party who allegedly had asked them not to exaggerate Stalin's mistakes. (Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers' Party: From De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism, Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 37, Vladimir Tismăneanu, May 2002, pp. 27-29) (IMG)

The year 1958 gave the Dej faction another opportunity for further undermining the Chisinevski-Constantinescu group, because, given pressures from communist elements, there came about an assault from Moscow and even from Khrushchev himself on the Yugoslav regime. Khrushchev did this because he had to concede to pressure. Romania joined in with the attack:

When, in the summer of 1958, ... the Soviets criticized the Yugoslav Communist League's new program as "revisionist," the Romanians completely endorsed the Kremlin's stance. At least officially, the relations between the RWP and the CPSU top leaders had never been warmer. Based on documents from the RCP archives, it appears that this was far from being the complete truth: on various occasions, in private discussions, Gheorghiu-Dej insisted that his party had matured and that relations between socialist countries should be governed by the principles of complete equality and national independence. (Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers' Party: From De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism, Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 37, Vladimir Tismăneanu, May 2002, pp. 32-33) (IMG)

The renewed attack on Titoism afforded the Romanian communists the leverage they needed for further demoting the Pauker agents Chisinevski and Constantinescu and their network. Chisinevski and Constantinescu both had bases throughout the Party and state apparatus, because they had the support of the terrorist bureaucrats and liberal intellectuals. As such, there began a purge of people whom the Romanian communists accused as associated of the Chisinevski-Constantinescu group:

in June 1957, Constantinescu was accused of many sins ... and, through a typically Stalinist stroke, Gheorghiu-Dej associated him with one of the most compromised and hated Stalinist personalities, Iosif Chișinevski, removing both from their posts. In 1958-59, thousands of party members experienced again the frightful moments of terror from Stalin's years. At Gheorghiu-Dej's order, the Party Control Committee headed by Dumitru Coliu-Ion Vințe (Vincze Janos), started a new wave of ... interrogations that encouraged denouncement and speculated the lowest instincts of upgrading. People who thought that Stalinism was dead in 1956 faced it once again in the years after the Hungarian Revolution. (Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers' Party: From De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism, Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 37, Vladimir Tismăneanu, May 2002, pp. 22) (IMG)

I of course cannot independently verify if all of those people purged were guilty, but there is no doubt that the intelligence network of Chisinevski's gang had to be purged off and that Chisinevski could not have lasted that long in the Party without having thousands of torturers, bureaucrats, and renegades as his support base. A much-despised traitor like him did not stand on air, after all. Plus, one must remember that the Pauker network in the Romanian Party had not been fully purged and that a large portion of the Pauker network would have backed the Pauker agent Chisinevski. Thanks to the partial denunciation of the Yugoslav regime in 1958, great advances were made in Romania against the network of the Israeli agent Ana Pauker.

The Eurasian Titoists knew that the Red Army was still under a significant though not dominant influence of the comrades of Stalin. The stationing of Red Army in Romania provided for the communist and progressive elements remaining in the Red Army to help that People's Democracy in the face of much larger swathes of intelligence operatives from the CIA, MI6, and Mossad, swathes of operatives whose infiltration Romania could not resist as much alone. The Eurasian Titoists therefore decided to leave Romania almost alone in the face of such a massive intelligence war, and through new waves of Titoization, increased the leverage of Titoist agents who sought to rehabilitate the CIA agent Ana Pauker:

in July 1958, Khrushchev made the unexpected decision to withdraw the Soviet troops that were stationed in Romania. (Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers' Party: From De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism, Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 37, Vladimir Tismăneanu, May 2002, p. 31) (IMG)

It was however only after the withdrawal of the Soviet troops in 1958 and in the wake of the Twenty-second Soviet Party Congress in 1961, that the long forgotten Pauker affair became a political factor of prime importance. (Anti-Semitism without Jews: Communist Eastern Europe, Paul Lendvai, January 1, 1971, p. 337) (IMG)

It was no coincidence that in that same year, in 1958, the imperialist media assisted the Kremlin Titoists by trying to isolate Romania from its Arab allies. Hence in 1958, Western media launched a massive propaganda campaign, claiming that there was Zionist mass migration from Romania:

Western sources reported that over a hundred thousand Jews had registered for emigration. (Anti-Semitism without Jews: Communist Eastern Europe, Paul Lendvai, January 1, 1971, p. 343) (IMG)

While a few were able to lobby for emigration permits for Romania during that period, the evidence leaves no doubt that the 'mass migration' of Jews and 'Jews' from Romania was a myth promoted by the media outlets owned by the imperialist-fascist secret services. The accusations of the reactionary media could not possibly be correct, because in fact, in addition to an outright ban of the choosing of Israel as a destination for migration, the Romanian authorities had also placed additional restrictions on Jewish/'Jewish' migration to outside of Romania in general and not just to Israel. The reason for this was that even migration to a Western European country could be exploited by the Mossad as a covert means of having those Jews and 'Jews' to eventually end up in Israel. In fact, regarding this question of Zionist mass migration from Romania, there was:

a secret document sent by the director of the Eastern-European desk at the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the office of Minister Golda Meir on December 25, 1958, so that she may present the report to the government.... ('Romanian-Styled Capitalism', Israel Defense, Issue 11 of the magazine, February 17, 2013) (IMG)

The December 1958 document, which demonstrates how the Romanian People's Democracy sought to sabotage the 'Aliyah' plans of the Mossad and its Titoist-Zionist fifth column in Romania, was as follows:

"On December 17, the Israeli Consul in Bucharest received notice to the effect that henceforth, immigration applicants should no longer report to the Consulate to receive their visas. Instead, the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs would send their passports en masse and ask the Consulate to stamp the passports with the visas.

Additionally, the Romanian government will assume responsibility for arranging the medical examinations as well as for obtaining the laissez-passer documents and for organizing transport. The official explanation was that the new arrangements were intended to make life easier for the immigrants and save them a lot of running around between the consulates, as well as to eliminate the risk that owing to the need to obtain various visas, etc., the validity of the passport might expire in the meantime.

The Israeli Consul immediately protested the new 'arrangement', claiming that a state wishing to absorb new immigrants must not be denied the option of seeing the potential immigrants, examining, directing and guiding them. The head of the Consular Department at the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs claimed that the decision had been made by a higher echelon, and that she has no authority to challenge it."

('Romanian-Styled Capitalism', Israel Defense, Issue 11 of the magazine, February 17, 2013) (IMG)

So much for Gheorghiu-Dej's fake 'friendship' with Tito, the Romanians had blocked Jewish/'Jewish' migration 'even' to Yugoslavia, the country that, under Tito's fascist regime, had been a major hub for numerous CIA-Mossad stations. Israeli suggestions of a direct travel to Israel were again flatly rejected. The Israel Defense Magazine, an Israeli magazine on military and intelligence affairs, continued:

The same document [cited above] went on to say that the Romanian authorities began marking all of the immigrants' passports with only one departure station – the train station out of which trains departed for Hungary, so as to revoke the option of transporting the immigrants through Yugoslavia or any option of transporting them by air. Israel's suggestion to organize a direct transport service, by boat, from Constanța (a Romanian seaport on the coast of the Black Sea) was flatly rejected. ('Romanian-Styled Capitalism', Israel Defense, Issue 11 of the magazine, February 17, 2013) (IMG)

Migration to Hungary would have meant migration to an area under the influence of the Red Army and the communist agents it had promoted in the Hungarian state apparatus. That would have made the Mossad's 'Aliyah' activities much harder. The Romanians aimed to retain their correct diplomatic relations with Israel, and expressed their opposition to the Zionist migration through a combination of flat rejection, severe restrictions, excuses, as well as suggestions that are ostensibly meant to 'help' Zionist migration but are actually creating more trouble. The same strategy had been pursued by the Peoples' Democracies for years, as can be seen in C16S2, and has been documented throughout the numerous pages of the documents of the Israel State Archives. The countries of the socialist camp aimed to overthrow the Israeli regime but their opposition to it was not the same kind of opposition of many in the Arab countries; it was an attempt to overthrow the Israeli regime so to install a new Israeli state, Arab-friendly and socialist; it was not a "Destroy the Zionist Entity!" kind of campaign of opposition to Israel. That is the communist factions in the Peoples' Democracies kept expressing a desire for good relations with Israel and provided suggestions to 'help' the 'Aliyah' process when in fact those suggestions were more trouble than 'help'. Out of a desire of not losing contact with the people of Israel, the Romanians were keen to, as much as possible, not give the Israeli regime the excuse to bash Romania for its anti-Zionist policy.

Furthermore, throughout the 1950s, there were Romanian political-cultural campaigns against Zionism:

During that period, [i.e. until the 1950s] the Romanians went as far as holding anti-Zionist rallies at work places, where they encouraged the participants to protest against Jewish immigration and influence those who wished to immigrate to Israel to withdraw their applications. Those who reconsidered were asked to sign letters that were subsequently published in the Romanian press, in which they described "how they had been deceived" and "the dire situation that awaited them in Israel." ('Romanian-Styled Capitalism', Israel Defense, Issue 11 of the magazine, February 17, 2013) (IMG)

The evidence therefore indicates that the CIA-Mossad sensationalist accusations against Romania were baseless. There certainly must have been some scattered, illegal, and low levels of Zionist migration in 1958, but no 'mass migration'. Hence, the Romanian government denied the accusations of CIA-MI6-Mossad media:

On February 25, 1959, the Rumanian Government issued a statement accusing "Israeli and imperialist circles of unleashing a diversionist campaign trumpeting abroad the crude invention that there was a mass migration of Jews to Israel." It denied any suggestion of a "mass migration," assured the Arab nations of Rumanian sympathy, deplored the fact that they had been led astray by a slanderous campaign, and accused the Israeli Embassy in Bucharest of spreading Zionist slogans among Rumanian Jews. (Anti-Semitism without Jews: Communist Eastern Europe, Paul Lendvai, January 1, 1971, p. 343) (IMG)

In 1959, and in response to the lies by the Zionist media, another wave of arrests by People's Democratic Romania against Zionist centers was thus launched:

The regime replied with a mixture of propaganda barrage and a wave of arrests. Dozens of Jews [whom Romanian authorities claimed to be Zionist Jews] were arrested and tried in 1959 on charges of espionage and treason. Within eighteen months three Israeli diplomats were expelled because of "abuse of diplomatic privileges." (Anti-Semitism without Jews: Communist Eastern Europe, Paul Lendvai, January 1, 1971, p. 343) (IMG)

So why would the Mossad media propagate the myth that Romania allowed for Zionist mass migration? The answer is very obvious: to drive a wedge between the Arab nation and People's Democratic Romania. Indeed, such false reports of Zionist mass migration in 1958 resulted in:

Arab protests... (Anti-Semitism without Jews: Communist Eastern Europe, Paul Lendvai, January 1, 1971, p. 343) (IMG)

Romania was aiming to retain friendly relations with Israel as a country without allowing such diplomatic relations to strengthen the CIA-backed pro-fascist tendency in Israel; the Mossad misused the desire for good relations with Israel as a country in order to portray Romania as a hub for promoting Zionist mass migration. Romania was partially isolated from its Arab allies. Not all Arab states would have doubted Romania's anti-Zionist policy line, but the CIA-Mossad media exaggerations certainly increased pressure on Romania's Arab allies to reduce relations with Romania. One person with much knowledge of the Mossad presence in Romania is:

Historian and researcher Shlomo Leibowitz, another one of the founders of "Nativ" who also served as the head of the Eastern-European desk at the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs for many years, recounts that direct negotiations only began in May 1965. Until then, negotiations had been indirect and covert. ('Romanian-Styled Capitalism', Israel Defense, Issue 11 of the magazine, February 17, 2013) (IMG)

The Mossad official and historian Shlomo Leibowitz stated:

the ambassadors of the Arab countries reported together to the government offices and threatened to leave Romania. ('Romanian-Styled Capitalism', Israel Defense, Issue 11 of the magazine, February 17, 2013) (IMG)

Bendor, the head of the Israeli legation in Romania, reported on his meeting with the Romanian Prime Minister Chivu Stoica in 1960. The following Israeli intelligence document sent from the Israeli legation in Romania to Tel Aviv states:

Bendor reports on his meeting with the Rumanian Prime Minister, who made the following declaration: (...). The Israeli press has also raised the Arab world against Rumania. ('Sh. Bendor (Bucharest) to Y. Shimoni, March 6, 1960. Coded Tel.: 722; Inc.: 130.09/2298/1. In: DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL, State of Israel Archives, Vol. 14, 1960, Edited by Baruch Gilead, Companion Volume, pp. 447-448) (IMG)

Romania was not getting economic, political and military aid from Eurasia, the Titoization waves were being launched by the Eurasian Titoists, and a wedge was being driven between Romania and its Arab allies. These factors weakened the communist faction in Romania, leaving them with fewer funds to wage the secret service conflict against imperialist-fascist intelligence penetration into Romania. This increased the influence of the Titoist faction in the Romanian state, thus allowing for the countries of the US-led camp to begin expanding their economic influence in Romania:

No Soviet credit is known to have been extended to Rumania after 1956, although one probably was promised for the proposed Galati steel combine. Credits from the more developed East European countries also had been small. On the other hand, several West European countries began to expand their markets in Rumania in 1959 by extending small credits for industrial plants – the first provided by the free world in a decade. (RUMANIA'S POSITION IN THE SOVIET BLOC, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), May 15, 1964, p. 2) (IMG)

A larger share of Romania's economy was taken as captive by the imperialists. Naturally, with the increased influence of the front companies of American finance capital, British finance capital, and German finance capital in Romania, imperialist-fascist secret service penetration into Romania increased. The slight increase in the lobbying power of the Anglo-American finance capital in Romania meant a slight increase in the strength of the lobby for Zionist migration. Khrushchev, who had pursued a Cold War against the United Arab Republic (UAR) (see C21S2.1), wanted the communistic-minded Ashkenazim and Sfaradim of Romania to no longer be the loyal citizens of a People's Democracy but to become the cannon-fodder of Moshe Dayan and Ariel Sharon:

When Nikita Khrushchev visited Romania in the late 1950s, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, the leader of the Romanian Communist Party and ruler of Romania until 1965, told him about Israel's proposal - Jews for goods. Khrushchev approved the proposal.... ('Romanian-Styled Capitalism', Israel Defense, Issue 11 of the magazine, February 17, 2013) (IMG)

In this midst, with Khrushchev blocking economic aid to Romania and favouring Zionist mass migration as his suggested 'solution' for Romania's economic problems, and with Anglo-American-German finance capital's influence in Romania increased, the Titoist faction saw an increase in its strength in Romania. As a result of such increased lobbying power of Titoist pro-Zionist lobby, the mass migration of Romania's Ashkenazi and Sfaradi citizens began:

According to Leibowitz, following that incident, the Jews received, over a certain period, visas to various countries in Europe. ('Romanian-Styled Capitalism', Israel Defense, Issue 11 of the magazine, February 17, 2013) (IMG)

Jewish families were granted exit permits provided they gave as their destination any country other than Israel. While most of them proceeded there from Vienna, the Rumanians could in good faith assure the Arab governments that they were not encouraging emigration to Israel. (Anti-Semitism without Jews: Communist Eastern Europe, Paul Lendvai, January 1, 1971, p. 344) (IMG)

Of course, many of those Jews would have ended up travelling from Europe onto Israel eventually. Leibowitz stated:

"They [the Romanian Jews] were flown all over Europe, and from there they travelled to Israel." ('Romanian-Styled Capitalism', Israel Defense, Issue 11 of the magazine, February 17, 2013) (IMG)

In a report to Tel Aviv, the Mossad station in Bucharest, the head of which was Bendor, reported:

Bendor reports that the Rumanian authorities have begun to issue emigration permits to Jews for various countries, but not for Israel. Those who apply for a permit to another country can expect a positive answer within a month, the permit being valid for six months from the date of issue. A number of Jews have already applied for emigration permits to countries like France, Switzerland, Austria, Britain and West Germany. In all cases investigated by the Legation, these people said that their final destination was Israel. Several Jews have requested the Legation to help them in obtaining visas for the countries named, and foreign diplomats have been asking the Legation staff for guidelines. Most of the applicants will not be granted visas without the Legation's help. ('Sh. Bendor (Bucharest) to Y. Shimoni and M. Carmil', January 6, 1960. Coded Tel. 545; Inc.: 130.09/2298/1. In: DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL, State of Israel Archives, Vol. 14, 1960, Edited by Baruch Gilead, Companion Volume, p. 442) (IMG)

To those who criticize Romania for being unable to stop Zionist migration and the lobbying of the CIA-Mossad agents in the Romanian government, it is worth reminding that Egypt during the Abdel-Nasser era, and Syria during the Hafez Al-Assad era in the 1990s, both had a problem of Zionist mass migration as well. Syria during the 1990s was under immense pressure as well. This does not 'prove' 'Zionist-collaborationism' by the dominant factions of those governments; it only proves the presence of a significantly powerful imperialist lobby that allowed for such Zionist-collaborationism.

That the migration policy line was liberalized was ‘thanks’ to CIA-Mossad pressures and increased lobbying, but that the direct migration to Israel was still not allowed reflected the power of the communist faction in creating additional costs for the Mossad in their migration projects. Waves of relatively large mass migration to Israel did begin from that point onwards, albeit the communists in Romania did everything they could to hamper that process. Recall that the influence of ‘the old Stalinist officials’ was cited by the Mossad as the factor for why ‘the Romanians [had] not permitted any emigration’, and, that as shown in C16S2, it was the Dej faction which campaigned against Zionist migration. Recall further that even as late as 1958, the Romanians ‘revoke[d] the option of transporting the immigrants through Yugoslavia or any option of transporting them by air’ – because they knew that Yugoslavia was the center of the Mossad in Eastern Europe – and that ‘Israel’s suggestion to organize a direct transport service, by boat, from Constanța (a Romanian seaport on the coast of the Black Sea) was flatly rejected.’ In fact, the communist faction’s opposition to Zionist influence was the reason that until 1965, the Mossad had to ensure that its operations in Romania was covert, and covert operations are always costlier:

Historian and researcher Shlomo Leibowitz, another one of the founders of "Nativ" who also served as the head of the Eastern-European desk at the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs for many years, recounts that direct negotiations only began in May 1965. Until then, negotiations had been indirect and covert. (‘Romanian-Styled Capitalism’, Israel Defense, Issue 11 of the magazine, February 17, 2013) (IMG)

May 1965 was approximately two months after the murder of Gheorghiu-Dej, a phenomenon that would be explored in further detail later. Regarding the annual number of Jews and ‘Jews’ migrating to Israel, Mossad official Leibowitz also stated:

“(…). There were ups and downs, it ranged between about 40,000 people annually and only 54 people that were allowed to leave. It was like that all the time. It was never even.

"Shaike had to iron out the difficulties every month to six weeks, by re-discussing the terms. There were never any written agreements.

In the end, there was some kind of paper that no one could understand – it lacked any substance. (…).”

(‘Romanian-Styled Capitalism’, Israel Defense, Issue 11 of the magazine, February 17, 2013) (IMG)

Shaike, as may be remembered by the reader from C16S2, was among the most important Mossad operatives who founded ‘Nativ’. Mossad official Leibowitz also stated:

"No Jews had ever left Romania without payment. (…).” (‘Romanian-Styled Capitalism’, Israel Defense, Issue 11 of the magazine, February 17, 2013) (IMG)

Romania accepted a lot of money for the release of the Jews in its territory. (‘Romanian-Styled Capitalism’, Israel Defense, Issue 11 of the magazine, February 17, 2013) (IMG)

The Mossad’s financial payments for Zionist migration worked like a bribe of local officials. Through providing these financial payments to the local Mossad agent that had infiltrated the ranks of the Romanian government, the Mossad was able to on the one hand get its means of promoting the mass migration, and on the other hand to provide financial backing for the Israeli intelligence infiltrators’ network in the Romanian state. This is likely why Romanian Prime Minister Chivu Stoika stated to Israeli diplomat Bendor that there was no agreement between Israel and Romania with regards to migration to Israel, implying that any Zionist migration promoted by Romanian state officials must have been a crime of local employees:

Bendor reports on his meeting with the Rumanian Prime Minister, who made the following declaration: (…). There is no agreement between Israel and Rumania, and thus no room for cooperation between with regard to emigration. The local employees have broken the law and have confessed to their crimes. (‘Sh. Bendor (Bucharest) to Y. Shimoni, March 6, 1960. Coded Tel.: 722; Inc.: 130.09/2298/1. In: DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL, State of Israel Archives, Vol. 14, 1960, Edited by Baruch Gilead, Companion Volume, pp. 447-448) (IMG)

The strong resistance of the communist faction against Zionist migration is the reason why the Israeli intelligence had to pay very much to win its intelligence war:

Romania accepted a lot of money for the release of the Jews in its territory. (‘Romanian-Styled Capitalism’, Israel Defense, Issue 11 of the magazine, February 17, 2013) (IMG)

The sanctions relatively weakened the Romanian economy, which relatively valued the Dollars, Shekels, etc. and devalued the Romanian currency. This meant that as a result of the sanctions policy, the CIA and Mossad had to pay less by American-Israeli standards whereas the CIA and Mossad payments were regarded as more by the standards of the local Romanian officials. Overall, though, the CIA and Mossad achieved their objectives in Romania at great cost, thanks to communist resistance.

The fact that treasonous Romanian officials accepted money from Israel for helping Zionist migration was of course a bad thing, but the fact of the high costs to be paid by the Mossad is an indication that the strength of such corrupt Romanian officials daring to commit such pro-Zionist betrayals was low, because the existence of revolutionary forces in Romania, belong to the Dej faction, was still strong enough to increase the risk of facing punishment for committing such a crime. As such, the fact that the Israelis had to bear large costs for their subversive activities is a positive sign, for it is a sign of the relative strength of the communist faction in Romania, even in the face of sanctions and sabotage. Clearly, people who condemn People’s Democratic Romania for the fact of Zionist migration from there hugely exaggerate the extent and intensity of the migration, because even in such a phase, when Romania was under the most intense of pressures, Zionist migration was low as Bendor remarked; when Romania was under less pressure, the Zionist mass migration did not exist.

Furthermore, thanks to the Romanian government’s sabotage of the Mossad plans, the rate of migration remained very small even as late as May 1960, when Romania was facing an extremely intense level of foreign pressure. The low rate of migration in fact led the head of the Mossad station Bendor to suggest to Tel Aviv that the Romanian intelligentsia, the stratum which had bourgeois and feudal familial origins and which served as the base for Titoism, to be rallied against the Romanian state:

Bendor remarks that at the present rate of emigration the exodus of Rumania’s Jews will take some fifty years. Efforts should be made to increase the rate and to rescue the maximum number of Jews as long as the present liberal policy lasts. The ban on publicity should be re-examined. Pressure must not be relaxed at any possible point. “Pressure groups” of well known artists and scientists should be organized to persuade the Rumanian authorities to issue emigration permits to all who have applied. These groups should be supplied with instances of people whose applications had been rejected, but no names should be mentioned for obvious reasons. Israel, says Bendor, will be sinning against thousands of Jews if it does not exploit all possible ways to help them emigrate. (‘Sh. Bendor (Bucharest)

to Y.L. Gideon, May 11, 1960. Coded Tel. 8; Inc.: 130.09/2298/2. In: DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL, State of Israel Archives, Vol. 14, 1960, Edited by Baruch Gilead, Companion Volume, p. 449) (IMG)

The Israelis were not going to have much success in this regard, because:

Domestically, the post-1958 repressions ensured ... the widespread conformity among the intelligentsia. (Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers' Party: From De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism, Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 37, Vladimir Tismăneanu, May 2002, pp. 31-32) (IMG)

The Romanian Foreign Ministry upheld the policy of opposing Mossad agitation for 'Aliyah' in the synagogues and warned the Israeli 'diplomats' against Zionist agitation:

Bendor reports on his meeting with E. Majințescu (spelling uncertain), one of the Rumanian Deputy Ministers of Foreign Affairs. The latter protested against the activities of the Legation's staff who create the impression among the hundreds of applicants that the Legation played a role in the implementation of Rumania's policy of the reunification of families. He requests that this activity be stopped, as it goes beyond accepted diplomatic usage. He also protested against the staff's visits to synagogues being exploited for propaganda for emigration, against the distribution of money among inimical circles, and against other activities contrary to diplomatic usage. The administrative body of the Jewish community has received complaints from Jewish citizens about these actions, and has therefore decided to designate one synagogue for the visits of the Legation's staff, who are requested to refrain from visiting other synagogues.

Bendor replied that the Legation is open to all, and the applicants are advised that the decision in their case rests with the Rumanian government. As to visits to synagogues, Bendor rejected the accusations and stressed that the bounds imposed on the Legation's staff contravened diplomatic usage. Following further discussion, it was agreed that the designation of one synagogue for the visits of the Legation's staff should be considered as a wish expressed by the directive body of the Jewish communities in Rumania, and that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs recommends that the Legation's staff honour that request.

('Sh. Bendor (Bucharest) to Y.L. Gideon, July 19, 1960. Coded Tel. 196; Inc.: 130.09/2298/2. In: DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL, State of Israel Archives, Vol. 14, 1960, Edited by Baruch Gilead, Companion Volume, pp. 450-451) (IMG)

It must be noted that the Israeli legation in Romania was a Nativ front, and that the Nativ was a branch of the Mossad:

The entire Israeli embassy in Bucharest was a "Nativ" station. ('Romanian-Styled Capitalism', Israel Defense, Issue 11 of the magazine, February 17, 2013) (IMG)

The following is another case of the Romanian Foreign Ministry officials denouncing Israeli agitation:

Bendor reports on his leave-taking meeting with Dumitrescu, one of the Rumanian Deputy Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

The Deputy Minister utilized the meeting for accusing the Legation's staff of espionage, of Zionist propaganda, of illicit trading in currency and jewelry, and of using their trips and visits to the synagogues for these purposes. He based himself on Prime Minister Stoica warning and pointed to possible grave results if these acts were not sopped. He also repeated the recommendation about visits to synagogues. Bendor categorically rejected these accusations.

('Israel Legation in Bucharest to A. Dagan and Sh. Avigur, December 29, 1960, Coded Tel. 594; Inc.: 130.09/2298/3. In: DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL, State of Israel Archives, Vol. 14, 1960, Edited by Baruch Gilead, Companion Volume, p. 455) (IMG)

The Israeli document continues:

Bendor remarks that Dumitrescu's outburst was puzzling on several points: Why did he deliver such a grave warning on the eve of Bendor's termination of service in Bucharest? What is the reason for such anger at Israel? What exactly are they angry about – is it about the refusal to follow their recommendation about visits to synagogues? Why do they hurl baseless accusations at the Legation's staff? Are they preparing the ground for renewed restrictions on the Legation (travelling visits, blockading the Legation)? Are they about to expel some official? Will they renew their attempts to prevent contacts between the Jews and the Legation staff?

Bendor recommends as follows: His replacement should be dispatched to Bucharest as soon as possible. The possibility should be considered that someone from the Legation would be expelled even before Bendor left the country? Plans should be made for helping the Jews in case their contacts with the Legation are severed. The policy of visits to the synagogues and travel outside Bucharest should be reviewed. Bendor concludes with saying that his impression is that the Rumanians' manifestations of anger will not stop the emigration.

('Sh. Bendor (Bucharest) to A. Dagan, December 29, 1960. Coded Tel. 597; Inc.: 130.09/2298/3. In: DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL, State of Israel Archives, Vol. 14, 1960, Edited by Baruch Gilead, Companion Volume, pp. 455-456) (IMG)

The Romanian Prime Minister Chivu Stoica had also warned against Israeli agitations:

Bendor reports on his meeting with the Rumanian Prime Minister, who made the following declaration: (...). Staff of the Israel Legation distribute money and gather information, perhaps to pass it on to foreign [intelligence] services. The distribution of money by the [Israeli] Legation and chauvinist propaganda have brought most of the Jews to sell off their movables and stop working. Just as the government has not tolerated antisemitism in its country, so will it not tolerate chauvinist Zionist propaganda. ('Sh. Bendor (Bucharest) to Y. Shimoni, March 6, 1960. Coded Tel.: 722; Inc.: 130.09/2298/1. In: DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL, State of Israel Archives, Vol. 14, 1960, Edited by Baruch Gilead, Companion Volume, pp. 447-448) (IMG)

Prime Minister Stoica specifically remarked:

"Let the people return to their work and resume their regular lives." ('Sh. Bendor (Bucharest) to Y. Shimoni, March 6, 1960. Coded Tel.: 722; Inc.: 130.09/2298/1. In: DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL, State of Israel Archives, Vol. 14, 1960, Edited by Baruch Gilead, Companion Volume, pp. 447-448) (IMG)

He further declared that:

The emigres from Rumania are members of the bourgeoisie and the World Jewish Congress exploits them for imperialistic ends and for propaganda against Rumania. ('Sh. Bendor (Bucharest) to Y. Shimoni, March 6, 1960. Coded Tel.: 722; Inc.: 130.09/2298/1. In: DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL, State of Israel Archives, Vol. 14, 1960, Edited by Baruch Gilead, Companion Volume, pp. 447-448) (IMG)

Stoica was not an anti-Zionist at heart, but he was sufficiently encircled by communist officials so to be coopted into an 'anti-Zionist'.

Again, the Romanians opposed Israeli agitation not just in words but also in deeds. As admitted in an Israeli Foreign Ministry document, the Israeli Legation in Romania was severely limited in the travel of its agents to the synagogues:

Y. L. Gideon reports on the meeting of the Minister of Foreign Affairs with Manu, Rumania's Minister to Israel. Mrs. Meir expressed [that] ... she viewed with the utmost seriousness the limitation imposed on the Legation staff's visits to synagogues.... ('Y.L. Gideon (Jerusalem) to the Israel Legation in Bucharest', August 18, 1960. Coded Tel. 247; Inc.: 130.09/2297/10. In: DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL, State of Israel Archives, Vol. 14, 1960, Edited by Baruch Gilead, Companion Volume, p. 451) (IMG)

As mentioned, the Moscow Titoists wanted the Peoples' Democracies to remain as backward agrarian societies so that the Atlantic camp would find it easier to conquer them. The 20th CPSU Congress increased pressure on the Romanian communists with regards to industrialization and collectivization. Nonetheless, given the high strength of the blue-collar elements in Romania, the Romanian communists were able to resist. Khrushchev vigorously pushed for a de-emphasis on heavy industry. People's Democratic Romania resisted the Eurasian Titoist line on this matter:

The importance of the 3rd RWP Congress resides, however, in the launch of the long-term economic program (extending to the year 1965), which focused on the sweeping industrialization of the country, with a special emphasis on metallurgical and machine-building industries. The congress discussed the results of the previous Five-Year Plan and approved the draft of the new Six-Year Plan, and the key priority that stayed at its core: the project of the huge steel plant to be erected in Galați. With regard to the agriculture, Gheorghiu-Dej stated in his report to the congress that 680,000 peasant families, owning 1.8 million hectares, were not yet included into the socialist sector; however, the Romanian communist leader affirmed that the collectivization of Romanian agriculture would be completed in 1965. (...). At the same time, the congress approved the strategy of an unprecedented mass-mobilization for the fulfillment of the economic objectives of the party. In fact, communist Romania's economic policy constituted the starting point of the violent polemic between Bucharest and Moscow, which reached its climax in April 1964, with the Romanians publishing a bold "Declaration" regarding the crisis within world communism and proudly defying the Soviet claim to supremacy within the bloc. For the Romanians, developing their own industrial potential in addition to the agricultural sector was a matter of dignity. (Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers' Party: From De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism, Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 37, Vladimir Tismăneanu, May 2002, pp. 34-35) (IMG)

The CIA too stated:

Rumania's determination to assert its national economic interests was not revealed fully until 1963, when the leadership successfully opposed efforts to broaden the powers of the Moscow-sponsored Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA) and disregarded Soviet opposition to the building of the Galati steel plant.

The USSR and some East European regimes, trying to initiate a "new stage" in bloc economic cooperation, had proposed closer coordination of national plans, more joint investment projects, and more extensive product specialization in manufacturing. Moreover, Khrushchev had proposed formation of a joint planning staff for CEMA. The Rumanians feared that a CEMA with greater authority would make decisions which would hamper Rumanian industrialization. Bucharest consequently opposed any change in the organization that would limit Rumanian economic sovereignty.

Other satellites probably were also opposed to the Khrushchev proposal for a CEMA planning staff, but Rumania alone was publicly hostile. Rumania, in addition, refused to accept some new forms of cooperation which were supported by other satellites.

(RUMANIA'S POSITION IN THE SOVIET BLOC, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), May 15, 1964, p. 2) (IMG)

In spite of the campaign of lies, sabotage, and siege by the Eurasian Titoists, the Yugoslav regime, many NATO member states, and Israel:

In recent years, Rumania has enjoyed political stability and has maintained the highest economic growth rate of the bloc. Progress in industrialization and in the socialization [collectivization] of land – 83.7 percent of arable land is now in the socialist sector – has been continuous in spite of the continuing in spite of the continuing low standard of living and ... poor quality of goods. (Rumanian Regime Reorganization. In: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN, CIA, March 22, 1961, p. 7) (IMG)

There were indications of an increased living standard for the population, the industrial base was expanding, and the collectivization campaigns were continuing. The main tasks were summed up in the strategic goal completing the building of the material and technical base of the socialist formation. (Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers' Party: From De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism, Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 37, Vladimir Tismăneanu, May 2002, pp. 31-32) (IMG)

By 1964, Romania publicly declared that it would not allow Eurasian Titoist subjugation of the Romanian communists:

The Rumanian regime's now more definitive declaration of its right and intention to act independently in the Communist world came in the form of a resolution adopted by an extended session of the party central committee which met from 15 to 22 April. Bucharest specifically stated that it would not participate in any supranational Communist economic or political organizations, which it considered infringements on the sovereignty of socialist states. It also instated that "there can be no parties which are 'superior' and parties that are 'subordinate'" and that "nobody can decide what is and what is not correct for other countries and parties." (RUMANIA'S POSITION IN THE SOVIET BLOC, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), May 15, 1964, pp. 3-4) (IMG)

the ... Romanian communist leadership proved to be extremely successful in constructing a platform for anti-de-Stalinization around the concepts of industrialization, autonomy, sovereignty, and national pride. The point for Gheorghiu-Dej was to maintain close relations with the Soviet leaders without emulating their efforts to demolish Stalin's myth. The struggle against the "personality cult" amounted for the Romanians to emphasizing their impeccable internationalist credentials while fostering the image of the leading party nucleus as a stronghold of Leninist orthodoxy. The two main events that took place at the beginning of the 1960s, the Third Congress of the RWP (20-28 June 1960), and the Plenum of the Central Committee (30 November - 5 December 1961) emphasized the focus on rapid industrialization, which would create the basis of the mass support for party's policy and, respectively, strengthen the patriotic, "anti-hegemonic" claims of the Dej team. (Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers' Party: From De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism, Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 37, Vladimir Tismăneanu, May 2002, p. 32) (IMG)

Throughout the 1950s and the 1960s, Romania did increase trade ties with the US-led camp, a behaviour that led Western observers to compare Romania's commercial relations to Yugoslavia's commercial relations. Nonetheless, it was clear that Dej-era Romania did not really go as far as Yugoslavia did in this respect, never allowed the volume of trade to become so large as to make it very dependent on Anglo-American trade vs. embargo. The CIA reported:

Although the Rumanian regime in its relations with the Soviet bloc seems to have moved into a position not unlike that of Yugoslavia, it remains ideologically conservative, especially in regard to its domestic policies. There is no evidence of ideological deviation toward the more decentralized Yugoslav economic system, about aspects of which the Czechs and even the Bulgarians have permitted on some public discussion. On the contrary, the Rumanian economic system continues to be characterized by detailed central planning and nearly complete socialization of agriculture. (RUMANIA'S POSITION IN THE SOVIET BLOC, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), May 15, 1964, p. 4) (IMG)

It is also worth mentioning that increased trade ties with USA during the early 1960s could, if properly managed, be beneficial to the cause of socialism and be devoid of US 'trickery' against Romania, because back then, the Kennedy faction, the agents of the American proletariat disguised as the liberal apologists of American imperialism, had gained a significantly high influence over the US Army, US State Department, and major US security agencies. The Kennedy faction had gone so far as to stage military coups against several CIA puppet regimes and had provided plenty of arms to the states hostile to American imperialism. Therefore, good trade relations with the United States were not necessarily so counterproductive to socialism at the time, and were not necessarily going to lead to a huge abuse of trade relations by the US side, although it was important to retain high vigilance against the CIA attempts to use such trade for its malicious agenda.

Furthermore, Romania boosted ties with China, North Korea, and Albania. Under the pressure of the Eurasian Titoists, many communists in the bloc, such as Ulbricht and Dej had partaken in the denunciation of Albania. Hence, it is true that Dej overtly took a stance against Albania in the early 1960s, but:

during the preparations of the 1964 Declaration, Gheorghiu-Dej confessed to his associates that he had been practically compelled by Khrushchev to take this anti-Albanian (and implicitly anti-Chinese stand). (Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers' Party: From De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism, Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 37, Vladimir Tismăneanu, May 2002, pp. 34-35) (IMG)

Therefore, in 1963, relations with People's Democratic Albania were restored, and Romania resisted pressures to partake in activities hostile to China:

Since March 1963, when Rumania sent its ambassador back to Albania after having withdrawn him in late 1961 as had other Soviet bloc states, Rumania has been more reticent than any other Eastern European country – except Albania – in support for Moscow against Peiping. Bucharest ... is apparently even more concerned than Poland or Hungary over the probable effects on its bargaining position with the USSR should Khrushchev carry the dispute with China to a final break.

In recent months, Rumania has printed numerous articles agreeing with Moscow's peaceful coexistence line, but has done little to criticize Peiping for not adhering to this line. It has also failed to support Moscow's plans for dealing with the Chinese. Dej has absented himself from meetings particularly concerned with the dispute, such as occurred during the East German party congress in January 1963, the celebration of German party chief Ulbricht's birthday the following June, and Khrushchev's 70th birthday gathering a month ago.

In February and March 1964, the Rumanian party attempted to prevent the dispute from moving further toward a formal split by making a mediation effort, which included sending a delegation of its leaders to Communist China, North Korea, and the USSR. When this effort failed, the Rumanians made public the details of their attempt and recommended that the international movement form a commission that would include the Soviet and Chinese parties to induce the two major parties to ease tensions.

(RUMANIA'S POSITION IN THE SOVIET BLOC, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), May 15, 1964, p. 6) (IMG)

The counteracting of Titoist pressures in Romania by the communist faction's partially successful efforts to strategically realign Romania with the Sino-Albanian-Korean bloc assisted that country in resisting pressures for Titoization, hence why Romania was able to continue to operate as a socialist state and an economy growing, socializing, and collectivizing.

In my humble opinion, the Romanian communists performed far better than all the other communists in the countries of People's Democracy, and I certainly sympathize with Stalin-era Soviet officials for whom Dej was a favorite and who were happy that the Cominform was based in Romania. The Romanian communists combatted the different deviations, remained pragmatic, and yet simultaneously struggled against revisionism under the cover of being 'revisionists' themselves. They struggled against the Khrushchevians and used their cover of 'sympathies' with Khrushchev as a means of access to the communist anti-Titoist opponents of Khrushchev in the USSR, so to receive the assistance of the communist faction and to more vigorously confront Khrushchev. They posed as friends to Tito's gang, and yet refused to seriously collaborate with that fascist butcher. Romania also industrialized very rapidly, the Party was compositionally proletarianized, i.e. filled with numerous blue-collar elements, and many Titoist agents and Zionist agents were purged. In the end, the Romanian communists advanced greatly towards socialism and the dictatorship of the proletariat. Romania transitioned from a first-stage People's Democracy, a proletarian-led bourgeois-democracy, to a second-stage People's Democracy, a workers' state, even though the bourgeois parties continued to operate in Romania; there is no evidence that the bourgeois parties in Romania had a role much more than the symbolic role; they did have some material influence to be sure, but one cannot exaggerate the extent of such a thin level of material influence. The Party of the proletariat was the real and main party in Romania, and unlike some of the other ruling parties that emerged as the parties of the revisionist intelligentsia and the corrupt bureaucrats, the Party in Romania was compositionally proletarianized and remained socialist.

C23S2. Setting Romania on the Path of Titoization *** IMG-All-{Romania}

Rightist circles present communism as a 'disease'; certainly, being a communist does tend to shorten one's life. Dimitrov died when he was 67, Bierut when 64, Thorez when 64, Gottwald when 57, and Choibalsan when 57, not to mention Zhdanov who was proven to have been murdered when 52. During the Slansky trials, it was said that a freemason killer-doctor working for Slansky had plotted to shorten Gottwald's life; during the Doctors' Plot case, suspicion was raised regarding the potential role of the doctors in the shortening of the lives of Dimitrov, Thorez, and Choibalsan; and during the Kostov trials, there was much discussion regarding Tito's plot to assassinate Dimitrov via Yugoslav agent Kostov. And finally, there comes the case of Dej, who died at the age of 64. Dej was vigilant of assassination plots against him. Referring to the assassination plots of the General-Secretaries of the communist parties, Gheorghe Apostol, a prominent official in the Dej government, recalled:

Dej ... knew that ... the leaders of the parties in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, [and] Mongolia ... were eliminated. (Duplicates: A History of the Intelligence and Security Services of the Communist Regime in Romania (1965-1989), Cristian Troncota, 2003, pp. 28-29. Citing: Gheorghe Apostol's interview with journalist Adriana Oprea Popescu) (IMG)

What is notable about Bierut is that he died when he was in Moscow, and Gottwald died one week after Stalin died after having attended Stalin's funeral. These raised the widespread suspicion that they were murdered by the Eurasian Titoists. Hoxha pointed to this fact in his memoirs 'The Khrushchevites'. Dej too was vigilant of this matter. Nonetheless, according to Cristian Troncota – an intelligence official from the Ceausescu era, who also became a security official in post-1989 Romania – Dej was irradiated in Moscow:

The fact that Gheorgiu-Dej was irradiated in Moscow in June 1963 was also confirmed by a former security officer who wanted to remain anonymous. The argument is shocking, namely, that three of the four officers who provided Dej's personal guard also died of cancer. The sure survivor was the memorialist, who on that mission to Moscow had received protective duties only outside the buildings where Dej had passed. (Duplicates: A History of the Intelligence and Security Services of the Communist Regime in Romania (1965-1989), Cristian Troncota, 2003, pp. 28-29) (IMG)

Having attended Stalin's funeral, Gottwald had returned to Czechoslovakia and there he died. Dej's death reminisces the death of Gottwald. The death of Dej promoted in rank Ceausescu – of all people. Ceausescu was a Titoist agent and a foe of Gheorghiu-Dej, having masqueraded for years as a communist comrade of Dej. The rise of team Ceausescu in the Party led to a gradual rise in the influence of the white-collar elements over the Party. As early as 1968, Ceausescu himself proudly declared:

It is gratifying that among the party there are almost 300,000 intellectuals, a huge force, which far exceeds the total number of intellectuals that the whole of Romania had before the war. I also point out that in some areas, almost 40 percent of the total category of intellectuals, and sometimes even more, are party members. We can be satisfied with the way the party's activity is carried out among the intellectuals and with their contribution to the implementation of the party's policy. (Speech at the Party Assembly at Bucharest, Nicolae Ceausescu, April 26, 1968, pp. 9-10) (IMG)

The CIA too stated that since 1965,:

Young professionals and white-collar workers have nevertheless found admission to the party ranks considerably easier, giving the party new sources of fresh ideas, energy, and strong political support. ('NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 22; RUMANIA; GENERAL SURVEY', CIA, July 1970, p. 92) (IMG)

Major steps in the path of Titoization were taken in Romania. Naturally, it occurred in all sectors and fields, be it in the sphere of political economy – in favor of decentralization and selling the country to the IMF – or in the strategic orientation in favor of Yugoslavia, West Germany, America, the Israeli secret service, and the Dubcek group, and against Eurasia/USSR and the Warsaw Pact.

The Ceausescu agenda was to strengthen the corrupt bureaucrats at the expense of the proletariat. Hence, the Ceausescu faction embarked upon a program of decentralization. In an interview with Marie Rose Pineau of the French Communist Party's (PCF's) L'Humanite journal, Ceausescu admitted that he sought to give greater autonomy to the local enterprises:

if a complete picture of our future concerns has to be given reference to, the development of socialist democracy is a must. Parallel to strengthening and improving economic and social management based on central planning we are concerning ourselves with extending the powers and the autonomy of the economic and administrative units; ('Interview granted by President Nicolae Ceausescu to L'Humanite', Interview by: Marie Rose Pineau (Secretary General of the "L'Humanite" Editorial board), in: Agerpres: Romanian News Agency, From: 'Documents, articles and information on Rumania', No. 17, May 26, 1970, p. 11) (IMG)

The Federal Research Division of the US Library of Congress corroborated:

In 1969 the regime launched an ephemeral economic reform that promised to increase efficiency and boost incentives by decentralizing economic control, allowing private enterprise greater freedom, and increasing supplies of consumer goods. (Romania: A Country Study, Federal Research Division of the US Library of Congress, Ronald D. Bachman, July 1989) (IMG)

In another interview, this time with the Yugoslav regime agent Gavro Altaian who was the chief of the Tito regime journal 'Komunist' and published by Ceausescu government's Agerpres Romanian News Agency, Ceausescu provided some greater details on the decentralization of industry. 'ANSWER' is Ceausescu's response and 'QUESTION' is Gavro's question. An excerpt of the interview is as follows:

ANSWER: As I have also pointed out at the Tenth Congress, Romania lays special stress on the organization of a modern industry, based on new technique. We also pay special attention to agriculture as it is one of the basic branches of our economy. We may say that we have obtained satisfactory results on these lines, the present Five-year Plan is being implemented in good conditions.

The growth of industry, of our economy as a whole, posed the problem of improving the managerial and planning patterns for economic activity. On proceeding to the implementation of these tasks, we set out from the necessity of a most rational tie-in of plan-based national and single management of economy, and broad autonomy and independence of the economic units. A set of measures have been taken on this line, while other measures are under way of being made final. These measures refer to more powers to the enterprises, to the setting up of economic centrals or combines to have extensive powers in the matter of planning and management of economic activity of the group of component enterprises. We work for the decentralization of some tasks, improved planning and improved financial activity, increased responsibility of enterprises and of centrals, relieving economic ministries of certain duties.

The results are generally positive, although the activity of the centrals has just started; they were inaugurated less than a year ago. We want to lay more stress within the centrals, on streamlining the enterprises to a large-scale production, to an ample development of cooperation both on a national level and with other states. The organization of centrals or combines, of large economic complexes will create favourable conditions for a broader specialization and cooperation on a national as well as international level, it will ensure the possibility for a faster introduction of modern technique into production, the general improvement of the quality of the entire economic activity.

QUESTION: In the Report delivered to Congress, you said that the Romanian Communist Party proceeds in its activity from the premise that "parallel to the growth of the productive forces the constant improvement of the relations of production must be ensured. In this respect, you have emphasized the necessity of collective management of economic enterprises and of the direct participation of the

working people in the conduct of economic activity, and you have insisted upon the development of socialist democracy and the combating of bureaucracy by control performed by the masses over the activity of all bodies of power. Please, refer to these questions.

ANSWER: We have proceeded to the organization and improvement of collective leadership! We have set up management boards in enterprises and council boards in the centrals and combines, which have the task of running the entire activity of the respective units. We have drawn into the managerial bodies of enterprises, which include executives and the finest experts, also exponents of trade unions and representatives of the employees designated at the general meetings of the working people. We have introduced the principle of collective work also in the leadership of ministries, to the effect that a deliberative character has been assigned to their leading bodies, they take decisions on the main problems of economic development.

Within the enterprises, we have assigned an important role to the employees' general meetings - which have to analyse the economic activity of the respective units, to exercise mass control over the work going on in the enterprise for the development of production and, at the same time, to mobilize the efforts of the entire collective for perfecting economic activity. Of course, we are only at the beginning, but experience will help us to steadily improve activity in this respect, I want to add that, in this field, we studied in beforehand the experience of other socialist countries and we continue to study it, we take into account everything that appears to be good in one country or another, e thus strive to constantly improve activity in economy. As to the future, the management of economic activity - the same as in all fields - will proceed upon a more and more democratic basis, with the broad participation of the collectives of working people; e will create a good background to enable broad discussion of the problems of our society's advancement, with a view to seeking out the most suitable ways and means of building socialism.

(‘Interview Granted by NICOLAE CEAUSESCU, General Secretary of the Romanian Communist Party, President of the State Council, to the Yugoslav "Komunist" Journal's Chief Editor Gavro Altaian', November 21, 1969, No. 16, Agerpres: Romanian News Agency, From: ‘Documents, articles and information on Rumania’, pp. 8-10) (IMG)

CIA further explains the decentralization process:

A major feature of the decentralization is the establishment of about 200 economic units — industrial centrals, combines, and groups -- between the ministerial and enterprise level, similar to those in East Germany and Poland [and the USSR]. These units have replaced and taken over the functions of many of the general directorates of the ministries. They have broad control over groups of enterprises and over many of the planning and management functions previously exercised by the ministries. Typically, one of the new units directs several enterprises grouped by product -- vertically, horizontally, or territorially. Many Romanian officials have been moved from the ministries to the new centrals and even to enterprises and agricultural units. (ROMANIA AND THE UNITED STATES: THE COMMAND ECONOMY LOOKS FURTHER WEST: Intelligence Memorandum, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, March 1972, p. 4) (IMG)

The new “Centrals” had so much power that they could conduct foreign trade; they therefore had the power to engage in international markets and commodity production:

The Romanian foreign trade conference held in early 1971 has resulted in some changes in the conduct of foreign trade. Industrial centrals and even certain large enterprises appear to have acquired some additional responsibility for foreign sales and purchases, and producers are to be paid for export shipments only when the Foreign Trade Bank has received payment from abroad. Also, Ceausescu re-emphasized in a recent speech that imports will require greater justification than in the past, and approval of import applications has become increasingly contingent upon a firm's ability to offset imports with exports. (ROMANIA AND THE UNITED STATES: THE COMMAND ECONOMY LOOKS FURTHER WEST: Intelligence Memorandum, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, March 1972, p. 4) (IMG)

The corrupt bureaucratic class which Ceausescu promoted was also naturally allied to parasitic finance capital. In some cases, American finance capital would be indirectly involved in the takeover of a country, through ‘industrial’ front companies. In this case, however, the involvement was somewhat more direct. The Romanian government opened up Romania to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the front bank of the CIA. The IMF reported:

Romania joined the IMF in 1972.... (‘HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND: Tearing Down Walls: The international Monetary Fund 1990-1999’, Author: The International Monetary Fund (IMF), James Boughton, 2012, Chapter II- 6-- The Death of Central Planning and the Birth of Markets, p. 255) (IMG)

The opening up of Romania's economy to the IMF allowed for greater influence over Romania by US intelligence, but it also served to smoothen the ties between the corrupt bureaucratic class in Romania and American finance capital, two reactionary class allies.

To transition Romania into a dictatorship of the comprador bourgeoisie, however, the Ceausescu faction needed to ensure that the comprador bourgeoisie, the corrupt bureaucratic class especially, would secure control over the means of violence, and that the agents of the proletariat lose their influence over the means of violence. As such, one of the first things that Ceausescu did, even well before the economic decentralization, was to criminalize the counter-intelligence measures undertaken by the Dej faction and to decriminalize the Trotskyite and Titoist ‘victims’ of the Dej faction. In particular, Ceausescu embarked upon the path of rehabilitating Patrascanu and Vasile Luca. Hence, reporting on the ‘findings’ of a committee on the rehabilitation of the ‘victims’ of the Dej era, Ceausescu declared:

For the way they fulfilled their entrusted task, the plenary of the Central Committee expressed thanks to the comrades in the commission, to all the activists who worked for the restoration of the truth. Now it is beyond any doubt that **the arrest and conviction of Patrascanu have no justification**, that in fact a hideous framing took place, that Patrascanu is the victim of an inflicted assassination.

It is worth noting that this happened in 1954, **when [as] in other socialist countries, in the Soviet Union, the disclosure of such illegalities and the rehabilitation of their victims had begun**. That is why it is even more incomprehensible why exactly then there was this rush to try him and execute him after two days, in a hasty manner, by shooting him in the back. (...).

From the study of other cases and trials, including the trial of [Vasile] Luca, the trial of Canal and others, the unfoundedness of many accusations and convictions ... becomes evident. All these are acts that our party condemns and condemns with full determination. However, **they also serve to drastically accuse and condemn those who initiated and committed them**. The [findings] accuse and condemn Alexandru Draghici, as organizer and perpetrator of these criminal actions against the party and state assets, and **accuse and**

condemn Gheorghiu-Dej, who initiated and patronized these actions. (Speech at the Party Assembly at Bucharest, Nicolae Ceausescu, April 26, 1968, pp. 16-17. Bold added) (IMG)

The Dej-era Romanian counter-intelligence chief Draghici was either a 'Dejite' communist loyalist or a communist-coopted Titoist engaged in anti-Titoist purges. If a communist, then he surely was going to be a target of the Ceausescu faction purges; if Draghici was a communist-coopted Titoist, the Ceausescu faction still had a reason to demote him, for Draghici's name was closely associated with the 'Dejite' purges and, to the average observer, it would have made little sense to condemn Draghici-era purges but not to demote Draghici.

As may be recalled from C15S1, Patrascanu was correctly regarded by the Romanian communists as Romania's Tito. The CIA too had confirmed that Patrascanu was the Romanian Tito:

Patrascanu, formerly Minister of Justice, headed the intellectual group and adhered to a strict [read: Trotskyite] interpretation of Leninist Socialism. He became more and more critical of the Soviet spoliation of Rumania; he was, indeed, a Rumanian Tito before the advent of Titoism. Toward the end of 1947 he and his adherents were stripped of all political power and his ultimate fate is uncertain. (RECENT PURGES IN RUMANIAN COMMUNIST PARTY, CIA, August 12, 1952, p. 1) (IMG)

By decriminalizing the venomous life and legacy of Patrascanu, the Ceausescu faction was decriminalizing Trotskyism-Titoism. Ceausescu could not so actively push for the rehabilitation of Ana Pauker herself, because Ana Pauker, having opportunistically defected to the anti-Patrascanu camp when Patrascanu's fortunes went down, had loudly denounced Patrascanu. Therefore, instead, the Ceausescu faction rehabilitated Vasile Luca, the close agent of Ana Pauker:

It is because Ana Pauker aspired to real influence within the Rumanian Central Committee that she was eliminated. She tried to form her own group with Luca and Georgescu in the Politburo. (...). The ambitious Luca and Georgescu wished to use Pauker's popularity [among revisionists] but were easily broken by Gheorghie Gheorghiu-Dej.... (INTERPRETATION OF PURGE OF ANA PAUKER, CIA, September 11, 1952, pp. 1-2) (IMG)

Dej's most dangerous antagonist was Vasile Luca.... (BACKGROUND OF TOP LEVEL COMMUNIST LEADERS IN RUMANIA, CIA, March 11, 1955, p. 2) (IMG)

As was extensively documented in C15S1, CIA-Mossad agent Ana Pauker had 'formerly' been a Trotskyite pro-Nazi anti-Semitic traitor to the Yiddish people during the Romania freedom-fighters' anti-Nazi struggle. For her intelligence activities for the CIA and Mossad, and for her Trotskyism, Ana Pauker was purged by the Dej faction.

Ceausescu himself drew a parallel between his own 'rehabilitations' of Dej-era 'victims' and the 'rehabilitation' of Stalin-era 'victims' after the death of Stalin, when Ceausescu said: 'in 1954, [as] in other socialist countries, in the Soviet Union, the disclosure of such illegalities and the rehabilitation of their victims had begun.' Like anti-Stalin denunciations after Stalin's death by the Kremlin Titoists, Ceausescu condemned Gheorghiu-Dej, who, according to Ceausescu, 'initiated and patronized' 'these criminal actions against the party and state assets'.

The decriminalization of Luca, henchman of a CIA-Mossad agent Ana Pauker, means more than its face-value meaning. The criminalization of Draghici and Dej means more than just historiographical revisionism. This Titoization speech by Ceausescu was a pretext for promoting the agents demoted by the Dej faction and demoting the agents promoted by the Dej faction. Such was why Draghici and Apostol, two statesmen who were either communist loyalists or communist-coopted politicians, were sharply demoted by the Ceausescu group. And such was why the CIA and Mossad were able to take over the Romanian intelligence service, with the help of the Ceausescu group. Just as how Khrushchev's 'Secret Speech' against the Stalin faction was a means of purging the communist agents in the Eurasian state apparatus and elevating Anglo-American intelligence agents throughout Eurasia and the Peoples' Democracies, so too did Ceausescu's criminalization of the 'Dejites' and decriminalization of the Pauker agents and Patrascanu result in the elevation of the CIA-Mossad agents in the Romanian intelligence service and in the strategic partnership of Romania with Titoist Yugoslavia against the socialist forces.

Ceausescu was elevating his ally Constantinescu, who was in turn an agent of Pauker. Constantinescu, as will be recalled, was also an enemy of the Dej faction, was an ally of the Trotskyite renegade Chişinevschi, and represented the intelligentsia in Romania. During the years of the Dej era, Ceausescu had disguised himself as a staunch 'enemy' of Titoism, and had denounced the Constantinescu-Chişinevschi group. By the late 1960s, he came out in support of them, elevating Paukerism and the intelligentsia. As the document from the CIA front Wilson Center stated:

It was only after 1965, in the context of the struggle against Gheorghiu-Dej's phantom, that Ceausescu made use of Constantinescu's services. He was again on the list of the nomenklatura, first as Deputy Minister, then as Minister of Education, as Secretary of the Central Committee, candidate member of the Political Executive Committee and, towards the end of his life, president of the Grand National Assembly. (Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers' Party: From De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism, Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 37, Vladimir Tismăneanu, May 2002, pp. 26-27) (IMG)

With regards to the retaliation against Chişinevschi and Constantinescu, Ceausescu put it clearly: they constituted anti-party elements who exaggerated some shortcomings of the party's activity, misrepresented the activity of the party and its leadership, focused on facts isolated from their context and tried to link all these problems with Gheorghiu-Dej's figure, in order to make him the sole responsible person for the terror unleashed within the party and throughout the country during the entire period that followed the communist takeover. (Gheorghiu-Dej and the Romanian Workers' Party: From De-Sovietization to the Emergence of National Communism, Wilson Center, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 37, Vladimir Tismăneanu, May 2002, pp. 27-29) (IMG)

The well-known CIA-Mossad front 'American-Jewish Joint Distribution Committee' (Joint) was in fact invited by the Ceausescu regime to set up its intelligence bases in Romania. The World Jewish Congress, another top CIA-Mossad front, could also establish closer ties with the Romanian Jews since Ceausescu's rise to power. Praising the Ceausescu regime for 'supporting' 'the Jews', Paul Lendvai, a Zionist Hungarian defector to Austria and a journalist participant in the 1956 pogromist 'revolution' in Hungary, wrote:

The [Romanian] Jews ... alone in the Communist world have been allowed since 1965 to have close relations with the World Jewish Congress and outside Jewish communities. In 1967 the Joint was invited by the Rumanian Government to resume its welfare activities. In view of the official Soviet-sponsored myth that the Joint is an espionage agency, this was an action of some political significance. (Anti-Semitism without Jews: Communist Eastern Europe, Paul Lendvai, January 1, 1971, p. 327) (IMG)

The fact that the Ceausescu group invited the CIA and Mossad to establish spy bases in Romania and to promote Zionist migration is no coincidence. The Ceausescu faction used the Yiddish sons and daughters of Romania to stockpile cannon-fodder for Moshe Dayan and Ariel Sharon. In exchange, the Romanian regime received CIA-Mossad financial support as a bulwark against Eurasian influence. Note also that the Romanian government's

intelligence service was by then under the heavy influence of the CIA and Mossad, and of this Ceausescu approved. Ion Mihai Pacepa, the long-time chief of the Romanian foreign intelligence service during the Ceausescu era who migrated to the 'Atlantic' zone in 1978, admitted:

Emigration provided Ceausescu with political gain, and he soon decided to use it for financial profit as well, in a highly confidential operation kept so secret that at his direction it was handled only through the [Romanian intelligence service, known as the] DIE.

The DIE initiated discreet contacts in Israel and West Germany and cautiously suggested that, if Rumania could be reimbursed in hard currency for the social and education expenses incurred for the ethnic German and Jewish émigrés seeking to leave Rumania, the emigration process might be accelerated.

Secret unwritten agreements were made with the Israeli foreign intelligence service and with the West German Ministry of Interior. The Israelis and the West Germans paid thousands of dollars for each Rumanian Jew and ethnic German granted an exit visa, in some cases as much as \$50,000 per person, depending on his or her level of education and profession.

Over the years, many hundreds of millions of dollars were secretly paid to Rumania, along with low-interest credits issued through the DIE as bonuses for increasing the emigration quotas. For reasons of secrecy, most of the payments were made in cash and only in US dollars.

(THE DEFECTOR'S STORY, Washingtonian, Ion Mihai Pacepa, p. 6. In: CIA Archives. Bold added) (IMG)

Enver Hoxha made note of Ceausescu's activity in support of the Israeli regime and Ceausescu's suspiciously cordial meetings with Israeli regime officials. Hoxha wrote:

Undoubtedly, Ceausescu has undertaken this role and will try to carry it out, because, like all his other attempts at mediation, it might bring him some economic advantage. However, I think that the greatest aid which he is trying to give Israel at these moments and in this situation is to somewhat reduce the indignation of international public opinion towards the criminal anti-Arab and anti-Palestinian policy of Tel Aviv.

This is not the first time that Ceausescu has come out on the side of Israel and he frequently has cordial meetings and talks with the heads of Tel Aviv. Next to Washington, the capital city to which the heads of the Israeli government go most frequently, is Bucharest. The heads of a number of Arab countries go there, too. It is regrettable, however, that Arafat and some others in the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization have illusions about these meetings.

(‘CEAUSESCU, THE ARABS AND ISRAEL’, Enver Hoxha, August 17, 1983. In: ‘The Reflections on the Middle East’) (IMG)

Indeed, as Hoxha mentioned, this was not the first time in which Ceausescu was coming out on the side of the Israeli regime. Ceausescu had held cordial meeting with Mossad representatives such as the Donald Robinson, the president of the JDC/Joint, and had expressed support for Zionist mass migration:

President Nicolae Ceausescu of Rumania assured Donald M. Robinson, president of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, that any Jew wishing to leave Rumania for family reunion in Israel or any other country would be able to do so, it was reported here today.

The Rumanian leader made the statement during an audience last Friday morning with Robinson, Ralph.

Goldman, JDC executive vice president, and Chief Rabbi Moses Rosen, president of the Federation of Jewish Communities of Rumania. Stefan Andrei, Rumanian Foreign Minister, was also present.

The JDC leaders were in Bucharest for the dedication of the new Olteniei Home for the Aged, a 220-bed facility, and also nursing cases. The home was named The Amalia and Rabbi Moses Rosen Home in honor of the Chief Rabbi's 40 years of service and leadership to the community. Amalia is the rabbi's wife.

Calling the meeting "historic." Robinson said "It was the first time a President of an East European country met with the president of the Joint Distribution Committee for a face-to-face talk on the condition of the Jewish Community and the work of the JDC in that country." The JDC, Robinson said, "spends close to \$3.5 million for a variety of social assistance programs aiding over 10,000 of the 40,000 Jews estimated to reside in Rumania.

Ceausescu was very much interested in the "most favored nation" status for his country, Robinson said. He assured Ceausescu that he would present his personal feelings to leaders of the American Jewish community that it should be continued.

(Special to the JTA Ceausescu Says Rumania's Jews Able to Leave for Family Reunion, Jewish Telegraphic Agency, July 10, 1979) (IMG)

The JDC was cooperating with Romania's regime-owned 'Federation of Jewish Communities in Romania' (FEDROM) since as early as 1969. In its history timeline, the JDC wrote:

1969: [JDC] Partners with Federation of Jewish Communities in Romania (FEDROM)

In partnership with the Federation of Jewish Communities in Romania (FEDROM), JDC provides financial and professional support for a network of Jewish institutional and social welfare services in Romania. An extensive social welfare system is established to assist elderly Holocaust survivors. This care includes cash assistance, medical care, home care, food, and support for old age homes.

(History Timeline, JDC Archives, JDC) (IMG)

The JDC, with its history of pro-Axis activities, was in no position to claim to be the friend of the Holocaust victims. Obviously whenever the JDC speaks of 'social welfare', 'humanitarian aid', etc., it is almost always a cover for espionage and fascist subversion on behalf of the CIA.

If the decriminalization of Luca was a pretext for the re-promotion of the CIA-Mossad agents in the Romanian intelligence service, the decriminalization of Patrascanu was a pretext for increased Romanian ties to fascist Yugoslavia. In an interview with the Yugoslav regime media 'Komunist', Ceausescu said:

All along their historical development, they helped each other in order to ensure their independent development. Under the new conditions, when socialism is being built both in Romania and Yugoslavia, – passing over the moments which for a period had cast a shadow on our collaboration – the relations between Romania and Yugoslavia have witnessed a strong development.

We reckon that today the relations between our countries and parties are of the best, that both on an economic, scientific and cultural level as well as **in international life, Romania and Yugoslavia promote broad cooperation, making their active contribution to the solving of the problems of world peace and progress.**

(‘Interview Granted by NICOLAE CEAUȘESCU, General Secretary of the Romanian Communist Party, President of the State Council, to the Yugoslav "Komunist" Journal’s Chief Editor Gavro Altaian’, November 21, 1969, No. 16, Agerpres: Romanian News Agency, From: ‘Documents, articles and information on Rumania’, p. 11. Bold added.) (IMG)

Ceausescu spoke of Romanian-Yugoslav cooperation ‘in international life’ for ‘solving ... the problems of world peace and progress’. That was not mere default diplomatic talk. Whether out of naivete or out of malicious intent, some would draw ‘equivalence’ between Dej-era post-1956 Yugoslav-Romanian diplomatic relations and the Ceausescu-era Yugoslav-Romanian alliance, arguing that on that issue, the Ceausescu faction ‘continued’ the project ‘initiated’ by the Dej faction. Such an ‘analogy’ is baseless. It is a slander against the Dej legacy, and a red-washing of the Ceausescu group. The Dej-era Romanian ‘friendship’ with the Tito regime bore a ‘Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact’ spirit, in that the communist faction of People’s Democratic Romania engaged in some verbal and symbolic ‘collaboration’ with fascist Yugoslavia, while not practically and materially conceding to the Titoists. The Ceausescu-era Romanian regime friendship with fascist Yugoslavia was a real alliance against the socialist and progressive forces, a joint lifting of a dagger against the back of the liberationist forces of mankind.

A case in point of Romanian-Yugoslav cooperation ‘in international life’ for ‘solving ... the problems of world peace and progress’ was Ceausescu’s support for the reactionary Dubcek group. Although the Czechoslovak proletarians supported the Novotny faction against the Dubcek faction (see C22S9), the liar and propagandist Nicolae Ceausescu swept such a fact under the rug and falsely claimed that the Czechoslovak people support the ‘leadership of the party and the state’ in Czechoslovakia, and implied that such a leadership in Czechoslovakia aimed ‘to ensure the triumph of socialism’. On this basis, as a supporter of the Dubcek faction, Ceausescu condemned the Warsaw Pact intervention in 1968:

Dear comrades. The Plenary of the Central Committee of the Party, the State Council, the Government, the representatives of the management of public organizations, trade unions, youth, women's, creative unions, unanimously decided to express their full solidarity with the Czechoslovak people, with the Czechoslovak Communist Party! (applause, cheers).

Dear comrades. Citizens of the Country of Romania. The penetration of the troops of the 5 socialist countries into Czechoslovakia is a big mistake and a serious danger for peace in Europe, for the fate of socialism in the world! It is unthinkable in today's world, when peoples rise up to fight to defend their national independence, for equal rights, that a socialist state, that socialist states violate the freedom and independence of another state (applause). There is no justification and no reason can be accepted to admit, for a moment, only the idea of military intervention in the affairs of a socialist state. (applause).

Our party and state delegation that visited Czechoslovakia last week became convinced that the **Czechoslovak people, that the Czechoslovak Communist Party, the Czechoslovak working class, old people, women, young people, unanimously support the leadership of the party and the state** to ensure the triumph of socialism in Czechoslovakia (applause).

The problem of choosing the paths of socialist construction is a problem for every party, every state, every people. No one can become an advisor, a guide of the way socialism should be built! It is the business of every people, and we believe that in order to establish the relations between the socialist countries, between the communist parties, on a truly Marxist-Leninist basis, we must once and for all put an end to interference in the affairs of other states, other parties! (applause)

We are determined to act with all our strength, with all our responsibility, to contribute to finding ways to resolve this situation created by the penetration of foreign troops into Czechoslovakia as quickly as possible, so that the Czechoslovak people can and carry out the activity in silence. We are firmly determined to act so that together with the other socialist countries, with the other communist and labor parties, we contribute to the elimination of differences, to the strengthening of the unity of the socialist countries, of the communist parties, because we are convinced that this is the only way to serve the interests of the people, the interests of socialism in worldwide! (applause)

(Ceausescu Speech on August 21, 1968. Bold added.)

Again, Ceausescu was not just one man but represented an entire faction that had risen to prominence in the command of Romania’s means of violence, through the criminalization of the ‘Dejite’ communists in the Romanian counter-intelligence and the decriminalization of the Titoists, through the changes in the Romanian intelligence service, through the elevation of the bureaucratic oligarchs via decentralization at the expense of the proletariat’s hold over the state, and through the elevation of the intelligentsia in the Party. Fortunately for the communists in Romania, the communist faction had resurged in the Red Army and the CPSU. The Brezhnevian tide had occurred in Eurasia, paving the way for a measure of communist resurgence. Against the Titoist agenda of the Ceausescu faction that dominated the Romanian regime, the Red Army mobilized its forces along the Romanian border. Anatoly Dobrynin, the then Eurasian ambassador to the United States, recalled how the Red Army mobilized in the border against Ceausescu-era Romania:

But nervousness persisted. On August 28 Rusk summoned me urgently to say he had learned of an unusually active movement of Soviet troops along the Romanian borders within twenty-four hours. There had already been speculation in the West about the possibility of a Soviet invasion of Romania, based largely on its refusal to take part in the joint action with other Warsaw Treaty states against Czechoslovakia. Indeed, Moscow was highly irritated with Romania's leader Nicolae Ceausescu, and Soviet troops engaged in demonstrative tactical movements near the Romanian border. But Moscow was not really thinking of invading Romania, because it never doubted the stability of the communist regime there. (‘In Confidence’, New York Times Books, Anatoly Dobrynin, 1995, p. 187) (IMG)

The goal of the communist faction of the Red Army was to menace the comprador Romanian regime and to feed the Romanian communists the excuse to promote a line of pro-communist dovish-ness and capitulation to the Red Army. The presence of a menacing military force along the border is a technique of feeding the capitulationists of the target country the excuse for lobbying for the promotion of dovish policy – in this case, a dovish and capitulationist policy in favour of the communist faction of the Red Army, and at the expense of the Titoist Ceausescu clique. Obviously, threats, as in contrast to action, can only work so far, and the Ceausescu clique, while undoubtedly weakened, was not overthrown.

In the late 1970s, Ceausescu demonstrated his pro-Atlantic orientation. In his memoirs, the prominent Soviet Red Army General Kraskovsky Makarovich recalled how in the late 1970s, he was:

a little confused by the large number of portraits of N. Ceausescu and his attraction to the West. (In the Service of the Unique Motherland: Memoirs, Kraskovsky Voltaire Makarovich. From: militera.lib.ru) (IMG)

In addition to standing with the Dubcek group in Czechoslovakia, Ceausescu sided with the Al-Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan by condemning the Soviet intervention there. Referring to Ceausescu, an article published by Russia’s Sputnik stated:

He condemned the suppression of the Prague Spring and the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, maintained diplomatic relations with Israel and Pinochet, while the USSR and its allies broke them off, and took a neutral position in the conflict between the USSR and China (during the armed clashes on Damansky Island). (30 Years of the Velvet Revolution in Romania: Ceausescu's Main Mistake, Sputnik, Rostislav Ishchenko, December 15, 2019) (IMG)

By the time of the Iran-Iraq War, the Romanian regime joined the CIA and MI6 in providing arms to the Iraqi regime in its fascist war on Iran. The Islamic Revolution Documents Center (IRDC), which is an official center for Iranian archives and government historical research, listed Yugoslavia, Romania, and China as sponsors of Saddam during the Iran-Iraq War:

In addition to the above list, countries such as Switzerland, Sweden, Poland, Yugoslavia, China, Romania, Italy, Singapore, etc. should also be added to the list of Saddam's supporters. (The 80 Countries that Armed Saddam in the War against Iran, Islamic Revolution Documents Center (IRDC), September 22, 2015) (IMG{Titoist-Saddamite Connection})

Referring specifically to the race to arm Saddamite Iraq, the CIA stated:

Romania, in particular, has taken advantage of this opportunity by providing more than \$850 million in primary support equipment and ammunition. (IRAN-IRAQ: ARMS PROCUREMENT PATTERNS AFTER TWO YEARS OF WAR, CIA, December 3, 1982, p. 30) (IMG{Titoist-Saddamite Connection})

The regime of Romania also had extensive intelligence cooperation with Saddam's group even in the 1970s when Saddam's faction had not decisively defeated the revolutionary Ba'ath faction of Ahmad Hasan Al-Bakr in Iraq. Examining the topic of Ceausescu regime's cooperation with Saddam in the field of intelligence and terrorist special operations is beyond the scope of this work, however. The Romanian regime's military support for fascist Iraq against the Islamic Republic of Iran comes as not a surprise in the slightest.

In the 1980s, Romania's government was requested by the CIA front bank, the IMF, to pay its debt through imposing austerity measures on its population. The Ceausescu regime, which had the funds to arm Saddam's gang but which somehow allegedly 'did not' have the funds to feed its own people, imposed austerity measures on behalf of the IMF. In the words of a Sputnik article,:

Ceausescu launched a campaign for early repayment of Western loans. By the time of his overthrow, Romania, at the cost of a significant decade of tension and a decline in the standard of living of the broad masses, had fully paid off its debts. (30 Years of the Velvet Revolution in Romania: Ceausescu's Main Mistake, Sputnik, Rostislav Ishchenko, December 15, 2019) (IMG)

I hope that the reader has by now understood why I cited the Russian Federation's Sputnik, because (1) it is an 'Eastern bloc' media, and hence could not be CIA propaganda mouthpiece supporting a CIA colour revolution, (2) there was no Romanian state-owned anti-imperialist media outlet at the time of the 'ouster' of Ceausescu, and (3) at the time of Ceausescu, the Eurasian media was under Gorbachev's influence and so citing Eurasian media would not be regarded as reliable, whereas Putin-era Russian state is more under the influence of the anti-imperialist forces than the Gorbachev-era Eurasian state in 1989-1990 was.

The Ceausescu clique were agents of Anglo-American and West German imperialism, the agents of the corrupt Romanian bureaucratic oligarchs and the reactionary Romanian intelligentsia. Why, then, – some would ask – did the imperialist intelligence services launch a colour revolution to 'execute' Ceausescu and overthrow the Romanian regime? As will be seen, the only provenly correct presupposition of this question asked is that the imperialist intelligence services launched an anti-communist colour revolution in 1989 in Romania. The rest of the presupposed 'facts' in the question are either outright wrong or are problematic.

By the late 1980s, CIA colour revolutions had successfully ousted several of the Eastern European states: Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Bulgaria. The situation with Romania, a country that was hostile to Eurasia on all fronts, was quite different than the Eurasian-aligned Eastern European states. Romania was a truly unique case in these waves of imperialist-fascist secret services' colour revolutions that swept Eastern Europe. Romania's intelligence service, a comprador secret service, launched waves of terror attacks at Romanian civilians in order to provoke some of them into a colour revolutionary uprising. In the meantime, as is well known, the CIA was engaged in propaganda and agitation for summoning the intelligentsia into a colour revolution. The question is: considering all these services that Ceausescu, his entourage, and the Romanian intelligence service provided by the imperialist-fascist secret services all those years, against whom, then, were the imperialist-fascist secret services launching the colour revolution? What was there about the Romanian state that antagonized the CIA, Mossad, BND, etc.? Was Ceausescu 'another Saddam', a former imperialist agent defecting to the anti-imperialist camp?

Ceausescu was not a defector to the anti-imperialist camp, and the colour revolution was launched neither against him, nor against his entourage, nor against the Securitate, nor against the corrupt comprador bourgeois government that they headed. Rather, in what marked the remarkable uniqueness of the imperialist-fascist colour revolution in Romania, the colour revolution was launched against communist symbolism. It would have been awkward for those Titoist renegades preaching 'communism' and 'anti-imperialism' to go ahead and allow their country to be directly under the jackboots of NATO. It would have been awkward for the corrupt intelligence service bureaucrats whom Ceausescu and Co. had fostered to be openly billionaires and millionaires running the show in Romania. At the same time, it would have been awkward for NATO to openly cooperate with a government that still held 'communism' as its official ideology even though that comprador bourgeois state had betrayed communism decades prior. It would have appeared awkward for the CIA to be ousting all these ostensibly 'Stalinist' governments in Eastern Europe but to allow only Romania to stay there alone as the island of 'Stalinism'. There are volumes of evidence showing that the colour revolutionary upheaval that the imperialists launched in collaboration with the Romanian intelligence service did not target Romania's military and intelligence service, the Titoist party and state apparatus, the fake 'communist' elites, etc. As a matter of fact, the fake 'communists' and corrupt Titoist oligarchs in Romania, were behind the operation that replaced Ceausescu with Ionescu. The Russian Federation's Sputnik article stated:

Even then, many doubted the spontaneity of the uprising that cost Ceausescu his life. Now, virtually none of the responsible politicians or political experts doubt that a well-prepared coup d'etat took place in Romania, **organized by people from the party and state elite, including those from Ceausescu's inner circle**. (30 Years of the Velvet Revolution in Romania: Ceausescu's Main Mistake, Sputnik, Rostislav Ishchenko, December 15, 2019. Bold added.) (IMG)

It thus becomes clear that the corrupt Titoist oligarchs were not the target of the colour revolution. On the other hand, the imperialist-fascist colour revolution not only did not target the Titoist pseudo-communist oligarchs, it also actually elevated them.

At times, imperialist secret service networks demote some of their agents so that in the future, if the imperialist agents at the helm of the pro-imperialist state would no longer have a stable government, the demoted agents can lead the 'revolt' against the ruling imperialist agents and thus serve as Plan B, as stay-behind agents, for the imperialists. By the accounts of all sides of the political and historical debate, Ion Iliescu, a prominent member of the Romanian 'Communist' Party's Central Committee, had been a Ceausescu agent and collaborator. However, in the 1970s, Ceausescu decided to

demote him to a much lower level of the Romanian government. Years later, he did come out as NATO's 'Plan B' 'resistance' official. He, a 'former' Ceausescu agent, led the colour revolution that replaced Ceausescu as head of state, became the corrupt President of Romania, got his country to be controlled directly by NATO, and boosted his Titoist oligarchic cronies from the former 'socialist' Romanian state apparatus. Russia Today reported:

On this day, the capital of Romania turned into an arena of fierce clashes. Part of the army units went over to the side of the rebels. The rebels were supported by Ceausescu's former ally Ion Iliescu, who became president of post-socialist Romania in 1990. ("Carte blanche for any cruelty": how the Ceausescu regime was overthrown in Romania, Russia Today (RT), Alexei Zekvasin, December 16, 2017) (IMG)

The intelligence apparatus of Ceausescu-era Romania, a front for the CIA, Mossad and the BND, is now openly a network of old billionaires participating in Anglo-American imperialist aggressions in the Middle East. The openly comprador capitalist regime in Romania is dominated by the very same apparatus that Ceausescu fostered. The Balkan Insight – an institution funded by the European Union and other Western organizations – reported:

Even the premise that the revolution was contemporary Romania's proudest hour, once an article of faith, is now fiercely disputed. Trials against the perpetrators of the violence that followed Ceausescu's fall on 22 December – which accounted for the lion's share of victims – have been shut down again and again, despite tireless efforts by victims' associations to bring them to justice. The associations and contemporary historians contend that it was largely the Securitate, the Communist police state's cruel enforcers, who shot at civilian demonstrators and army units between December 22–25, killing 940 persons across the country.

Notwithstanding numerous elections and EU membership since 2007, the real winners of Romania's transition to democracy are the security elite – the former members of the Securitate, and their successor generation, who protect their elders' fortunes as they make their own.

(...). Today, nine security services, the heirs of the Securitate colossus, operate behind the scenes in Romania, or, in some cases, openly – to manipulate politics and enrich their members at the expense of ordinary Romanians. The country's main domestic security agency, the SRI, operates with a budget larger than that of Germany's equivalent, the Verfassungsschutz, and nearly 2.5 times that of the equivalent in the Netherlands, the EU country closest to Romania in population. It is estimated to employ 12,000 people – the official numbers are undisclosed, and my requests for an interview were refused – six times more than the 17-million populous Netherlands. Despite a change of generations, Romania's security services are not only lavishly bankrolled but largely unchecked by other government agencies. Although much progress has been made, Romania still has a long way to go to internalize the rule of law.

(Long Shadow: How Romania's Securitate Turned the Revolution into Riches, Balkan Insight, February 3, 2021) (IMG)

Denouncing NATO's agenda, a prominent political science academic from the 'Academy of Sciences of the USSR' and Russia's prestigious 'Institute of Scientific Information on Social Sciences of the Russian Academy of Sciences' noted how Ceausescu's secret service, 'which had already' 'changed its orientation', was responsible for 'the implementation of the dark plan' to get the public to believe the propaganda of the colour revolution:

It should also be recalled that it was in Romania in these December days that a disgusting spectacle was first played out, similar to what the West will later cynically play out in Kosovo, ungodly exaggerating the number of victims of "ethnic cleansing" in order to justify NATO's military intervention. And during Ceausescu's farcical "trial", he was found guilty of the deaths of 60,000 people in Timisoara, a city in western Romania. The mixed Romanian-Hungarian population made it possible to provoke violent ethnic clashes here, but there was no question of any "tens of thousands". The 100 bodies that were presented to the press and the public were taken from the anatomical theater of the Medical Institute. Ion Iliescu and Petra Roman needed strong arguments to get the public to accept Ceausescu's execution, and **the Securitate, which had already "changed its orientation", took over the implementation of the dark plan.** And although two weeks later the truth became known to the Western media, this does not prevent them, as was the case with [their lies against] Russia as well, from spreading the myth of a spontaneous democratic revolution to this day. (Russia and the Last Wars of the Twentieth Century (1989-2000), Ksenia Grigorievna Myalo, Moscow, 2002. From: militera.lib.ru. Bold added.) (IMG)

The colour revolution was aimed towards strengthening the reactionary core of the Romanian regime apparatus at the expense of the 'socialist' façade of the Titoist Romanian regime; until 1989, the 'socialist' façade was an asset, for it allowed infiltration by the CIA and MI6 into the Warsaw Pact; from 1989 onwards, it was a liability, for it served as a cosmetic obstacle against expanded cooperation with NATO and the IMF, against further privatization and proliferation of the bureaucratic oligarchic mafia, etc.

Ceausescu's Titoist secret service ran the show then in Titoist Romania, the Romanian government that was comprador at heart but 'socialist' in appearance, and now in the blatantly comprador capitalist state that has taken off the mask of 'socialism'. Clearly, the colour revolution was not aimed at ousting the corrupt Titoist oligarchy and the intelligence service mafia. The colour revolution was aimed not at the Romanian regime apparatus, but was aimed solely at 'communist' symbolism of the Romanian state. Communist symbolism is an obstacle to cooperation with NATO. Ceausescu, while a Titoist, was nonetheless regarded as a symbol of 'communism' and 'Stalinism' by many. Insofar as Ceausescu was a Titoist, he was to continue his rule, as a result of the colour revolution, but insofar as he was a symbol of 'communism', the imperialist-fascist secret services were to oust him.

According to the mainstream Romanian state media at the time, Nicolae Ceausescu and his wife Elena were arrested, summarily tried and filmed while being 'executed'. The videos 'documenting' the 'execution' were released by the state media. The 'execution' did not happen.

For start, the videos of Ceausescu being 'executed' turned out to be fake, and according to forensic specialists, the bodies shown in the video – allegedly the bodies of the Ceausescus – were dead long before the 'execution'. Furthermore, one forensic specialist Guy Nicholas said that it was not clear if the Ceausescus had died hours prior. The following are excerpts of an AP News report on this matter:

BORDEAUX, France (AP) _ A Romanian government videotape purporting to show the execution of Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceausescu and his wife, Elena, is faked in part, forensic experts here believe.

After examining a 90-minute tape shown last week on French television, the scientists doubt the official claim that the couple was killed by firing squad. Instead, they say the couple was apparently killed hours earlier with gunshots to the head.

Dr. Loic le Ribault, director of a private criminal science laboratory in Bordeaux, said Sunday that the only signs of fatal wounds on the bodies were in the right temples, indicating the Ceausescus had been shot in the head.

In the tape, the Ceausescus, hands tied behind their backs, appear in the video to have been gunned down with automatic weapons. But the camera angle is too low and the lens is obscured by gunsmoke, preventing a clear look at the couple being shot, experts say.

Later footage shows a medic checking Mrs. Ceausescu for signs of life as she lies in a stream of blood pouring from a wound in her head.

Le Ribault and others say the state of the bodies show the [bodies that were believed to be the] Ceausescus died hours before the medic checked them. The corpses were stiff with rigor mortis, and there was virtually no sign of blood on Nicolae Ceausescu.

Also, the bullet holes on the brick wall behind the couple are too low for a firing squad theoretically aiming at the chest, le Ribault said. "It's technically impossible that this film was made immediately after the death of the Ceausescus," said le Ribault. "The fusilade ... is a simulation made solely for the camera."

(...). Guy Nicolas, another forensic scientist working for the French criminal courts, said the evidence of a prior execution is not conclusive.

"I don't think we can draw any definitive conclusions from such mediocre images," he said.

(Ceausescu Execution Video Faked, Experts Say, AP News, April 30, 1990) (IMG)

As stated in the above, there is no evidence that Ceausescu and his wife were executed on the hour of the 'execution', nor any evidence that it happened prior to the hour of execution. Ruxandra Cesereanu, a Romanian historian and journalist, did a review of a number of documents regarding the circumstances of the 'execution' of Ceausescu. While Ruxandra Cesereanu stated in the beginning of her document that Ceausescu was 'executed' in 1989, she nonetheless also provided materials that, contrary to her intentions, indicate that there was no evidence that the man and woman executed were Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu. She wrote:

In Dupa executie a nins, Viorel Domenico interviews the military who got the mission to execute Ceausescu. According to their testimonies and to those of some other actors in the garrison, Elena and Nicolae Ceausescu were shot by tens of bullets, their bodies being riddled (as in an extreme release). They were shot before the order was given; but not only by those who were part of the commando, it was a chaotic outbreak of all those who had guns and who, not being among the ones who were assigned the execution mission, were only spectators. In Dupa executie a nins one can read a series of morbid details about Ceausescu couple's death. For instance, one soldier declares that near the execution wall he picked a bone piece of Elena Ceausescu's skull, in order to keep it. Some other tells about the garrison dog which ate Elena Ceausescu's brain from the pavement. Many soldiers took out bullets from the execution wall as a souvenir; some even dipped a handkerchief in Ceausescu's blood (p. 165, 167).

In Procesul Ceausescu [Ceausescu Trial] (1996), Ardeleanu, Savaliuc and Baiu record some witnesses' statements supporting the idea that the bodies of the two Ceausescus were riddled by tens or even hundreds of bullets and that during the autopsy, Ceausescu's corpse was even mutilated.

(CEAUSESCU'S TRIAL AND EXECUTION, Ruxandra Cesereanu, Metabasis, May 2009, No. 7, p. 4) (IMG)

The bodies were 'riddled' and the alleged body of Elena was torn apart, the skull turned into several shred, and the brain eaten by a dog. Their faces became undetectable, the bodies were mutilated, and the murder and burying happened really quickly in an unfair, unjust manner. There is no evidence that Ceausescu and his wife were executed on the hour of their official 'execution', nor is there any evidence that the 'execution' happened prior to the filming, nor is there any proof that the bodies of the dead were actually the bodies of the Ceausescus. On the other hand, there is every indication that the entire execution of Ceausescus was faked. Why would the murder of the Ceausescus be faked? One can speculate.

This is an old secret service method. For a spy, one way to live on is to 'die'. In the initial years after World War II, it was said that Dr. Mengele was dead. Later it turned out that he was alive and 'well', having escaped via a ratline provided by the CIA and MI6. The public was told that Vice Fuhrer Bormann was dead, but years later it was revealed that he was alive and that he escaped Europe via a ratline provided by the CIA and MI6. As was mentioned before in C15S8, during the purge against the Slansky ring, Jan Bojko, a prominent agent of the Slansky faction, aimed to escape to Yugoslavia by exploiting the false rumours of his 'death':

Bojko was a close collaborator of Gen. Bredich Reicin, executed during the purge of the Slansky group. Bojko, a Slovak, generally believed dead, had actually been concealed by Slansky's followers and was detected trying to reach Austria on the way to Yugoslavia with important documents.

His capture revealed a conspiracy involving the highest circles of Communist leadership and increased Soviet suspicion with regard to Czechoslovak unwillingness to purge unreliable elements. Soviet authorities have placed the responsibility on Dr. Stefan Reiss, a former Minister of Justice, a Hungarian Jew by birth, but considered a Slovak. He is a protégé of President Zapotocky.

(Investigation of Czechoslovak leaders, CIA, February 15, 1954, p. 1) (IMG)

In an operation coordinated by the CIA, SAVAK, and Saddam's Mukhaberat, the MEK Rajavist operative Masoud Keshmiri infiltrated the highest ranks of Iranian intelligence, and then planted a bomb killing the Islamic Republic's President, Prime Minister, and many other officials. MEK agents within Iranian state apparatus then presented Keshmiri as one of the victims of the MEK bombings, fabricated his fake corpse, prepared the coffins, shed fake tears in grief for him, dug his grave, and placed the fake corpse inside the grave – all of this was so to give him the time and chance to escape to Iraq. The Iranian government later found out that the 'dead' Keshmiri was behind the explosion, and went on a hunt for the numerous imperialist agents who had assisted Keshmiri by presenting him as 'dead'; Iranian government efforts failed since the MEK launched another wave of terror operations to prevent the capture of those who had deliberately presented Keshmiri as dead. There are numerous other cases in which agents 'die' so that they can continue to live, and cases in which entire intelligence services are 'abolished' so that they can continue to operate as before.

I readily admit that I have no proof that the Ceausescus escaped through their 'death', but I theorize that this was the case. Accounting for the strong evidence of the fake character of the 'evidence' of the Ceausescus' death, and in light of the continued rule of the Ceausescu faction in Romania even after 1989, there is little reason to believe otherwise. Much as how there was continuity in the rule of the Ceausescuist faction over Romania even long after 1989, as exemplified by the oligarchs and the elites of the security bodies, there was reason to believe in the continuity of the biological life of Ceausescu himself as well. And such a belief is reinforced by the fact that the 'documentary' 'evidence' of Ceausescu 'execution' each turned out to be faker than the other. In this probable conspiracy, Ion Iliescu's group must have been an accomplice, as they were directly involved in the fake 'execution' video, and the other circumstances of the 'death'.

Anyways, the colour revolution ousted the pseudo-communist coloration of the Romanian state, while actually prolonging its core comprador bourgeois essence. The task of communists in 1989 in Romania was to do the opposite of whatever the CIA wanted: (1) to oppose all the colour revolutionary plots, (2) to support the 'communist' symbolism of the Romanian regime, because although doing so would not have directly benefited

the working class, it would have been indirectly beneficial because it would have caused more trouble for the CIA, (3) to oppose the covert face of Ceausescu as the imperialist agent he was, (4) to support Ceausescu's overt existence as the official leader of Romania, just to hamper the CIA efforts aimed at ousting the 'communist' symbolism for smoother collaboration with Romania's regime.

C23S3. Class Struggles in the People's Republic of Korea in the era of Titoization *** IMG-All-{Korea}

Throughout its history, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) pursued the correct policy of laying emphasis on heavy industry over light industry:

The industrial sector has benefited from Kim's policies. Over 50 percent of state investment went to the industrial sector during most of the 1950s and 1960s, and new industrial plants and equipment accounted for 49 percent of state investment during the Six-year Plan. As a result, industry's share of the combined total of gross agricultural and industrial output (see Glossary) climbed to well over 90 percent in 1980.

At the start of the 1980s the country had a variety of industries, ranging from mining to textile manufacturing, located in nine major industrial centers. The government also had expanded the transportation and communications networks and increased the utilization of domestic energy resources. Per capita supplies of many industrial items were comparable to those of many of the world's middle-income countries, if not to the most technologically advanced nations.

(...). Like the Soviet Union, North Korea concentrated on heavy industry first, while investing only modestly in the light and consumer industries.

(‘North Korea: a Country Study’, Headquarters of the US Department of the Army, Frederica M. Bunge, 1981, p. 119) (IMG)

Nonetheless, there were brief periods in time when the DPRK was forced to prioritize light industry. By the early 1960s, pressure and stabs in the back by the Moscow Titoists was enough to push the DPRK to enact a series of economic policy changes of a revisionist and counterproductive character. The Moscow Titoists did not just defund revisionist China and People's Democratic Albania in 1960-1961, but also defunded the DPRK, and used these funding and defunding mechanism as a carrot-and-stick means with which to lobby for DPRK's shift away from heavy industry and onto light industry / consumer goods. First, through imposing sanctions on North Korea, the Moscow Titoists sought to push North Korea towards the US-led camp ("Free World"). The CIA reported:

In an apparent effort to find alternate sources of supply for goods formerly obtained from the Soviet bloc, Pyongyang embarked during 1963 on a vigorous but so far largely unsuccessful program of trade expansion in the free world. Recent trade agreements with Western suppliers involve some items formerly purchased from the USSR and the European satellites. Pyongyang apparently also desires to develop new sources of capital goods to aid industrial expansion. (‘NORTH KOREA, COMMUNIST CHINA'S INDEPENDENT ALLY’, Special Report, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), March 6, 1964, p. 4) (IMG)

In conditions of economic distress, it would make sense to emphasize heavy industry even more, as Kim Il Sung and his faction would have desired. However, the sanctions imposed by the Moscow Titoists and the Westwards shift of North Korean trade weakened the leverage power of the faction headed by Kim Il Sung, and thus the vacuum was filled by the counter-revolutionary faction in the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK). Hence, the sanctions by Moscow Titoists boosted the lobbying power of the counter-revolutionary anti-Kim faction in the DPRK, allowing for the emphasis on light industry over heavy industry. The CIA reported:

Pyongyang's decision to concentrate on consumer production during 1964 was a drastic shift from its past emphasis on development of heavy industry. During 1963, however, the rate of North Korean industrial development had already begun to slacken. According to statistics released by Pyongyang, the increase in gross value of industrial output for 1963 was only 8 percent. This compares with the 11 percent planned, and 20 percent claimed, for 1962.

The shortfall probably resulted in part from problems in the allocation of manpower. However, it may also have reflected a partial disruption in the flow of Soviet assistance. For example, Moscow has reportedly been stalling on delivery of equipment for key Korean thermal power projects.

Pyongyang has implicitly accused the Soviet Union of using economic aid as a weapon for imposing its political views, and has also publicly rejected the concept of an international division of labor as espoused by the bloc's Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. Pyongyang has labeled it a Russian scheme to perpetuate the backward economic status of some bloc countries and make them mere economic appendages of the USSR. Late in 1962, Pyongyang publicly adopted a policy of economic self-reliance and announced that it was planning to build a self-sufficient economy.

(‘NORTH KOREA, COMMUNIST CHINA'S INDEPENDENT ALLY’, Special Report, CIA, Office of Current Intelligence (OCI), March 6, 1964, p. 3) (IMG)

While the Koreans pursued the correct policy of laying emphasis on the development of heavy industry, they also began a series of policies that were problematic, populist, and left-deviationist, but which they partially mitigated later on. It was called the Tae'an Work System, which ended the efficient and speedy system of one-man management of enterprises, which had been advocated by Lenin, in favour of a kind of a management by technicians, the Party, and the workers in the factory. As always, these kinds of solutions appear beautiful because of their 'democratic' aura and the involvement of the party of the workers and kolkhozniks in the management, but in practice they are demagogical and left-deviationist. A report sponsored by the Headquarters of the US Department of the Army stated:

According to official claims, all management decisions were arrived at by consensus among the members of the party committee. (...).

The Tae'an Work System was a departure from the previous "one-man management system" inherited from the Soviet Union. The purpose of the change was to reinforce the "mass line" (see Glossary) by allowing the workers' active participation in management, in order to inspire increased production and newer and better technology. (‘North Korea: a Country Study’, Headquarters of the US Department of the Army, Frederica M. Bunge, 1981, p. 131) (IMG)

Indeed, emphasizing the Maoist revisionist concept of the mass line in the management of the economy, the North Korean government media stated:

The Tae'an work system created by Kim Il Sung, as a system enabling the masses of the people to give full play to their responsibility and role as the masters of the state and society by combining the Party's monolithic leadership and the revolutionary mass line, is the application of the fundamental principle of the socialist state in its activities. This system is significant not only as a socialist economic

management system but also as a political mode by which to manage socialist society as a whole. (Kim Il Sung: Condensed Biography, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Pyongyang, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 2001, p. 224) (IMG)

Unsurprisingly, the establishment of the revisionist 'mass line' in running the state enterprises did not solve the problems, for worker self-administration was a smokescreen for decentralization and hence chaos and bureaucracy. Fortunately, during the mid-to-late-1960s, when Kim Il Sung's faction in the Workers' Party of Korea began to gain greater strength, some steps were reportedly taken against the Maoist revisionist mass line. At least according to official North Korean government media:

At the Ninth Plenary Meeting of the Fourth Party Central Committee [Kim Il Sung] took steps to abolish the trade unions' old patterns of collective bargaining with factory management and performing the function of supervision and control over the operations of enterprises, and to make them act entirely as organizations of ideological education. He also saw that a new work system was established accordingly. (Kim Il Sung: Condensed Biography, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Pyongyang, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 2001, p. 233) (IMG)

Such a move against the 'mass line' or worker self-administration in state enterprises was a step in the correct direction. However, unfortunately, there was continuity in the fact of state enterprises being run by a collective body of the party committee and the engineers and managers. North Korean government media admitted:

The Taean work system is the supreme economic management system suited to the intrinsic nature of the socialist system, a system by which factories and enterprises conduct all their management activities under the collective guidance of their respective Party committees. In this system, the economic task in hand is fulfilled by giving priority to political work and rousing the producer masses, the higher echelons are responsible for helping their subordinate units, and the economy is managed and run in a scientific and rational way. (Kim Il Sung: Condensed Biography, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Pyongyang, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 2001, p. 224) (IMG)

The establishment of a collective body for management led to inefficiency in the management of enterprises. Multi-person-management is objectively less efficient than one-person management. Again, unsurprisingly, this Taean management system which went against the one-person management principle did not really solve the management problems:

Ideally, the Taean Work System should have solved North Korea's management problems once and for all, but repeated references in the press and in Kim's own speeches to difficulties in the "normalization" and "regularization" of industry told a different story. Kim especially criticized the management of materials supply work, equipment maintenance, labor administration, and finance. In 1973 he even went so far as to say "economic guidance functionaries have not made one single definite regulation to administer properly the independent accounting system." As a result, inefficient practices were not penalized and may have been rewarded. The typical response to these malpractices was to launch a campaign to straighten out production and management. ('North Korea: a Country Study', Headquarters of the US Department of the Army, Frederica M. Bunge, 1981, p. 133) (IMG)

According to the report by the US Department of the Army, the North Korean government, in its drive to resolve the problems which the Taean work system was unable to resolve, established another parallel bureaucracy throughout Korea: the special planning departments, which were meant to check the activity of the Taean management. In other words, more bureaucracy was established to counter the negative effects of the Taean system. According to the report:

One measure of the [political] success of the Taean Work System has been its longevity. Only one major organizational change has occurred since its inception. In 1964 the government established special planning departments at the provincial, city, and county agencies, which were responsible directly to the State Planning Committee as well to the local agency where they were based. The government was apparently afraid that some of the problems that had characterized the "one-man management" system were also threatening the Taean Work System. The planning departments were supposed to check the tendency of local agencies to misrepresent their achievements to superior agencies and their hesitancy to risk innovations. Kim praised the accomplishments of the revised system in his report to the Fifth party Congress in 1970 and maintained its importance again ten years later in his report to the Sixth congress. ('North Korea: a Country Study', Headquarters of the US Department of the Army, Frederica M. Bunge, 1981, p. 133) (IMG)

The Taean system emerged as a Titoist-Maoist deviation in economic policy, but was later partially mitigated.

In sum, DPRK pursued a communist line with regards to the question of heavy industry vs. light industry, but pursued an erroneous line with regards to management of enterprises. Of course, the effect of the WPK's revisionist line on the management of enterprises should not be exaggerated. The correct policy of emphasis on heavy industry had a positive impact of a much greater magnitude than the magnitude of the negative effects of the Taean system. Over the years, the heavy industry created the backbone for North Korea's conventional and nuclear weapons program, not only for self-defense but for directly assisting anti-imperialist forces. The heavy industry also created the backbone that paved the way for infrastructure developments, healthcare, education, etc. Such industrialization also enlarged the proletarian class and assisted the mechanization and collectivization of agriculture. The rise of the proletarians and kolkhozniks made it harder for Anglo-American imperialism to penetrate Korea, and helped keep the bureaucrats in Korea in check. By contrast, the Taean system had the effect of promoting decentralization, bureaucratic chaos, officials' corruption, and inefficiency in production, all of which was bad; but in the specific context of North Korea, because of the many other programs, the negative effects of the Taean system were not so big as to stop the general tide of economic development resultant from heavy industry and centralized industrialization. As well, the Taean system was a pro-decentralization deviation from an economy known to be generally very centralized. Therefore, corruption and bureaucracy did not grow much and economic chaos did not greatly ensue in that land.

In countries in the path of centralized industrialization and collectivization, a large population of the proletarians are former peasants. Among these proletarians, some of the vestiges of feudal thinking would remain. At times, this takes the form of the cult of personality around the main leader – a supposed God solves all problems whereas the peasant has to bother himself/herself only with his/her farm. If Kim Il-Sung supported a cult of personality around himself, he sure erred greatly and vacillated away from socialism. I have not seen Kim Il-Sung ever promote a cult of personality around himself, though people in his family and throughout the North Korean state, perhaps or perhaps not at Kim Il-Sung's connivance, did foster such a cult of personality. And these individuals had an obvious social base. Some were careerist bureaucrats playing the usual game of praising to heavens and then denouncing 'the leader' to mud, the way that Khrushchev and Tito had done to Stalin. The forming of a cult of personality also had a base in the ordinary masses of Korean society, however, and was rooted in the continued existence of agrarian petit-bourgeois attitudes in Korea

even after the proletarianization of a large segment of these peasants. Take a look at the membership composition of the Korean Party. In 1956, Kim said:

The present composition of our Party ranks is workers—22.6 per cent, poor peasants—56.8 per cent, middle peasants—3.7 per cent, office employees—13 per cent and others—3.9 per cent. Compared with the time of the Second Party Congress, the number of workers has increased by 2.4 per cent and poor peasants, by 3.7 per cent, altogether amounting to 79.4 per cent of the total membership.

The majority (51.7 per cent) of the present Party membership are those who have joined the Party since the outbreak of the Fatherland Liberation War. Not only that, while the Party has many members who have a strong Party spirit and a high level of work qualifications, quite a few members are still below the mark in their political tempering.

(REPORT TO THE THIRD CONGRESS OF THE WORKERS' PARTY OF KOREA ON THE WORK OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE, Workers' Party of Korea, Kim Il Sung, April 23, 1956. In: Kim Il Sung Works – Jan-Dec 1956, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Pyongyang, DPRK, 1982, p. 242) (IMG)

Over time, the proportion of the proletarians in the WPK grew:

The proportion of workers in the entire Party membership has risen from 17.3 per cent at the time of the Third Party Congress to 30 per cent today.

This growth of our Party reflects the increase of the revolutionary force of our country's working masses....

(REPORT TO THE FOURTH CONGRESS OF THE WORKERS' PARTY OF KOREA ON THE WORK OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE, Workers' Party of Korea, Kim Il Sung, September 11, 1961. In: Kim Il Sung Works – Jan-Dec 1961, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Pyongyang, DPRK, 1983, pp. 230-231) (IMG)

The increase in the hold of the proletariat and the kolkhozniks over the Party, as a replacement for the petit-bourgeois contingent in the Party, undoubtedly strengthened the Korean communist faction in the confrontation with the Titoists at home and abroad. However, although a peasant's class-behaviour would radically shift as a result of the transformation of such a peasant into a proletarian or kolkhoznik, vestiges of petit-bourgeois thinking continue amongst them, as Stalin had pointed out. The continued existence of petit-bourgeois mentality was reflected in the strength of the tendency to form a cult of personality around Kim Il-Sung. Though the significant level of state power exercised by the proletariat and kolkhozniks in North Korea nullified many of the negative trends generated by the reactionary culture of hereditary leadership and thus – contrary to bourgeois media narratives – prevented the rise of a real monarchical tyranny in the East Asian state, it remains a fact that the culture of hereditary leadership, inspired by royalist political culture, persisted, fed the imperialists with anti-socialist propaganda weapons, and yielded its negative cultural impact. The culture of hereditary leadership was not material enough a factor to yield tyranny. Nor was it a factor so material as to nullify the state power of the proletariat in North Korea, but undermined it nevertheless. The abating of Anglo-American imperialist encirclement and concurrent with it the increased influence of the proletariat and kolhozniks over the North Korean state shall undermine the parasitic class tendencies that generate the culture of hereditary leadership, paving the way for the latter's abolition.

There is not enough data for the time period after 1961 concerning the membership composition but it is a fact that a larger portion of the society became proletarians and kolkhozniks and this must have inevitably influenced the membership composition of the Party as well. In the absence of data on the level of the influence of the proletariat over the Party, it cannot be so easily determined whether or not the DPRK did become a dictatorship of the proletariat. Note that like most Peoples' Democracies, North Korea was to go into two stages, the proletarian-led progressive bourgeois-democratic stage, and the dictatorship of the proletariat stage. North Korea certainly made steps towards transitioning from the proletarian-led progressive bourgeois-democratic stage onto the dictatorship of the proletariat stage, but it is not completely clear (at least to me) as to how far they went.

C23S4. The Titoist-Imperialist Cooperation in Afghanistan *** IMG-All-{Afghanistan War}

Progressive classes elevate in strength concurrent with the development of the productive forces. Afghanistan was a mountainous country in which the development of the productive forces was difficult, a factor leading to the delay in the rise of the progressive classes. The feudal elites had a high influence over that country, and the majority of the population there was petit-bourgeois. The petit-bourgeoisie were unwilling to take the risk of grand projects in the struggle against imperialism and were thus materially dominated by the reactionary classes, a material domination that translated to ideational (ideological) domination through religious fundamentalism.

A communist revolution in Afghanistan in 1978-1979 was impossible. The anti-communists do not lie when they say that what is referred to as the 1978 'Communist Revolution' in Afghanistan was not really a communist revolution but a coup d'états without popular involvement. A new junta, after the coup d'états, can quickly establish itself as a popularly-backed government. Indeed, there have been numerous progressive coups that brought to power little-known juntas and these progressive juntas quickly became popular due to their revolutionary and progressive measures. The 1978 coup was undoubtedly progressive. The new government was, in the broad definition, progressive as well. It was led by the 'People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan' (PDPA), an amalgam of a number of other parties, the two main of which were the Khalq Party and the Parcham Party.

The Parcham advocated the smuggling of communist ideas into Afghanistan using the cover of 'Islamic socialism' and progressive bourgeois-democracy, rather than a leap to socialism. Once enough industrialization and the proletarianization occurs in Afghan society, the Party can then proceed to drop the 'Islamic' in 'Islamic socialism' and to pursue a scientific socialist line. The Parcham was very pro-Soviet. To the Parcham party belonged Babrak Karmal and Mohammad Najibullah.

The other sub-party in the PDPA was the Khalq Party, a left-deviationist grouping that branded itself as 'anti-revisionist'. This Maoist 'Khalqi' grouping aggressively pushed for a Trotskyite leap to 'socialism', and benefited Al-Qaeda on all fronts. As the Khalq, not the Parcham, came to dominate the PDPA right from the start, it was inevitable that Al-Qaeda would grow in Afghanistan. The Khalq party was able to pursue such a reactionary line which it pursued, because the reactionary forces in Afghanistan were strong and pervasive. The upper hand of the Khalq over the Parcham was itself the reflection of such a mighty presence of the reactionary classes.

Led by the Khalq, the new junta described itself as 'communist' and discard the Islamist and patriotic cover which the Parcham party had spent years to cultivate:

The US Embassy in Kabul believes that, in revealing themselves as Communists and in discarding their Islamic nationalist cover, the coup leaders may have made a serious miscalculation in a deeply religious and traditionalist country. (Afghanistan: New Government.

In: NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN, CIA, May 1, 1978, p. 1) (IMG)

There was no more green coloring in the Afghan flag:

PDPA set out to change Afghanistan quickly. To symbolize their intent, the party leaders eliminated the time-honored green flag associated with Islam and substituted a red flag of the future. (Tribalism Versus Communism in Afghanistan: The Cultural Roots of Instability: An Intelligence Assessment, Foreign Assessment Center, CIA, Information as of October 16, 1979, Written on January 1980, p. 8. In: "MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM STANSFIELD TURNER", January 3, 1980) (IMG)

Once the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan occurred, the red-and-blond flag was replaced by black, red, and green again.

When the Bolsheviks launched their revolutions throughout the predominantly Muslim areas of the Russian Empire, they made sure to antagonize Islam as little as possible and permitted the temporary existence of the 'Islamic socialist' eclectic current in the predominantly-Muslim SSRs, and used such an eclectic current as a means of smuggling socialism into the minds of the conservative Muslim population. The RAND Corporation actually did a useful study of this matter, contrasting Bolshevik policy with Khalqi policy, and examining the many anti-Islamic measures committed by the Khalqis which resulted in an uprising against the Afghan state. The document has been cited extensively in C4S1 in this book. Some of the policies mentioned in this section have been documented by the RAND report. See the following for more details: 'THE SOVIET UNION AND MUSLIM GUERRILLA WAR, 1920-1981: LESSONS FOR AFGHANISTAN: A RAND NOTE', N-1707/1, The RAND Corporation, Alexandre Bennigsen, August 1981.

The development of the productive forces, the class struggles in the sphere of political economy, and struggles for cultural change have to be developed in parallel with each other. Therefore, during its first two years of existence, at the very least, Afghanistan needed to go through a period of New Economic Policy (NEP), some level of political pluralism such that the leadership of the communist party was recognized, and a higher level of religious tolerance. A few years later, concurrent with the shift away from the NEP, Afghanistan could have gone forward and unified the political system into a democratic centralist single-party state, hence to dissolve parties; and in this process, the correct policy would have been a campaign against religion through persuasion, and a crackdown on reactionary elements among religious clerics. In the initial years, Islam and socialism should be portrayed as completely compatible. None of these steps occurred in Afghanistan.

In the Khalq party too there were factional disputes. There was the more pro-Soviet Taraki faction, and there was the Titoist faction led by Hafizullah Amin. Despite the general problems existing in the Khalq party, many progressive reforms were pursued by the faction of Mohammad Taraki:

Taraki, in his role as party elder statesman, decreed the party's major reforms: education was to be secularized and females admitted to all schools throughout the country; the estates belonging to lay and religious families were to be confiscated and the land redistributed to peasant farmers; (Tribalism Versus Communism in Afghanistan: The Cultural Roots of Instability: An Intelligence Assessment, Foreign Assessment Center, CIA, Information as of October 16, 1979, Written on January 1980, p. 8. In: "MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM STANSFIELD TURNER", January 3, 1980) (IMG)

These progressive measures however were not enough to turn the tide against the Trotskyite policy in Afghanistan. Note the similarity of the PDPA's Trotskyite policy with that of Tito during the Yugoslav People's Liberation War, when Tito promoted the red flags thus pursuing a sectarian policy that undermined the popular front policies promoted by the Comintern and drove a wedge between the YCP from its potential bourgeois anti-fascist allies (see C12S1). The Trotskyite elements of the Party were centered around Hafizullah Amin, the brutal head of the security services, who terrorized the Afghan masses so to provoke them into an anti-state rebellion:

Amin, the party strongman, sent military contingents – some with Soviet advisers – party loyalists, and dedicated cadres of young people to the provinces to see that the reforms were enacted. In a land where "no government has ever tried to govern the countryside directly," the vast majority of the population saw a threat to their way of life.

In their efforts to demonstrate their revolutionary authenticity and establish control, the Communists overstepped the limits by which Afghan governments traditionally had legitimated their rule. Although Amin shared his ruthlessness with past rulers, he sought – in contrast to his predecessors – to eliminate, rather than to compromise with, the old elite, to enhance the prestige of the Army over the fighting habits of the tribes, and to diminish the stature of Islam. He ended by affronting the Afghans' pride of national independence by relying on thousands of hated Soviet civilian and military advisers. Although it retreated somewhat (to save face and concentrate on fighting, the regime declared that land and educational reforms had been achieved), the regime brought upon itself tribal wrath and civil war.

(Tribalism Versus Communism in Afghanistan: The Cultural Roots of Instability: An Intelligence Assessment, Foreign Assessment Center, CIA, Information as of October 16, 1979, Written on January 1980, p. 8. In: "MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM STANSFIELD TURNER", January 3, 1980) (IMG)

While reliance on Eurasian civilian and military advisors was useful for Afghanistan's development and for Soviet spying on the Amin faction, poking these advisors onto the people's eyes simply antagonized the tribal nationalist population, thus further undermining the Afghan government. And that was the point, for by promoting anti-Sovietism through such Trotskyism, the Amin faction was helping to weaken the Soviet intelligence presence hence to weaken the presence of those spying on him and his gang. Similarly, the cruelty and terroristic behaviour shown by Amin was further counter-productive, fueling the flames of the insurgency in Afghanistan. By provoking the masses into a rebellion against the Soviet-backed Taraki faction, Hafizullah Amin systematically undermined the Afghan government and ceased power:

Amin, while working in Taraki's shadow, slowly stripped him of his real power. (Tribalism Versus Communism in Afghanistan: The Cultural Roots of Instability: An Intelligence Assessment, Foreign Assessment Center, CIA, Information as of October 16, 1979, Written on January 1980, p. 7. In: "MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM STANSFIELD TURNER", January 3, 1980) (IMG)

Such terrorist and Trotskyite activity by Amin – who sought to shift the blame on Taraki – also annoyed the Soviets:

The Soviets are known to believe that Amin's ruthless and hasty implementation of Marxist "reforms" in Afghanistan was a major mistake, provoking the country-wide insurgency. Most of these reform programs have been halted by the expediency of declaring them "completed." Since the inauguration of the new Amin government, the emphasis has been on "legality, security and justice" and the drafting of a constitution. In this connection, Amin has tried to shift the blame to Taraki for the large numbers of political arrests and executions in the preceding months. However, Amin is widely regarded to have been the strong man in the Taraki regime and the one responsible for its ruthless policies. (SUBJECT: Internal Situation in Afghanistan, Briefing Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Mark) to Secretary of State Vance, Washington, December 16, 1979. In: "FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1977-1980", Vol. XII, US Department of State, pp. 245-246) (IMG)

While masking his regime as legalistic and constitutional, Amin – just like Tito – continued his terrorist and torturous activities, savagely eliminating critics, and covertly attacking the Soviets:

Amin was a ruthless, dedicated man who liked to be firmly in charge. After the coup, he steadily eliminated competitors and rival centers of power, even risking an extreme reduction of support for the Khalq in the party and military; alleged enemies of the regime were jailed and tortured in ever-larger numbers. With the purging of Taraki and his closest aides – most of whom had already been stripped of their power – Amin surrounded himself with trusted subordinates and placed members of his family in key military and internal security positions. Like many Afghans, he was suspicious and distrustful of the motives of others, including Soviet backers. His absorption in consolidating his own power and his independence finally cost him the support of the Soviets. (Tribalism Versus Communism in Afghanistan: The Cultural Roots of Instability: An Intelligence Assessment, Foreign Assessment Center, CIA, Information as of October 16, 1979, Written on January 1980, p. 8. In: “MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM STANSFIELD TURNER”, January 3, 1980) (IMG)

Another US intelligence document further details the purge of pro-Soviet communists and progressives in Afghanistan:

Of fundamental interest to us will be whether the U.S. can woo, to any degree, Afghanistan away from Moscow’s orbit and can discourage any inclination by Amin to be irredentist....

3. Though Hafizullah Amin has [officially] welcomed the massive support of the Soviets, I believe him nonetheless to be a nationalist – and the only strong Khalqi leader around. Amin ... is also ruthless; otherwise he would not be where he is.

While in part one of this message, I expressed concern that the Soviets may now have a commanding influence in this country, I believe also it would be a mistake to characterize Amin as a Soviet toady. We have lots of evidence that he wants to run his own show, and that Moscow is less than ecstatic over the successive purges which have caused division in and depleted the ranks of the “progressive forces.” (...). Last week, when I asked the [Titoist] Hungarian Ambassador about Moscow’s alleged unhappiness over the purges of Taraki and Watanjar, and the reported coolness between Amin and Moscow, he cautioned against reading too much into this. He said, “As long as Afghanistan does not change its basic policies (read Communism and a pro-Moscow foreign policy), Moscow doesn’t care who is in charge.” From Moscow’s and Amin’s behavior since September 14, I think the Ambassador may be right.

6. This is not to say that the Amin-Soviet relationship has been or will be an easy one. Before Sept 14, there was tugging and pulling on both sides—and now there may be distrust. A few days ago, an Asian Ambassador here aptly described the situation when he said: “They are like a husband and wife who don’t much care for each other but nightly keep climbing into the same bed, because each has compelling needs and no options.”

(Subj: The Position of Amin and Afghanistan’s Independence: Part Two of Two. Ref: Kabul 7326, Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State, Kabul, October 9, 1979, 0835Z 7392. In: “FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1977–1980”, Vol. XII, US Department of State, pp. 203-204) (IMG)

While Hafizullah Amin was up against the Soviets, he was keen on being on CIA payroll (receiving “material assistance” from US imperialists). Indeed, the following excerpt from a document by US ambassador Archer Blood shows that Amin sought to re-orient Afghanistan’s strategic orientation towards a pro-US direction. The following

3. U.S.-Afghan relations. I had forty minutes alone with President Hafizullah Amin on the morning of Oct. 27. After the photographs were taken, we got down speedily to business. Following the talking points proposed in reftel, I mentioned those recent areas (Ariana DC– 10, narcotics control, etc.) where we had found we could work cooperatively with the DRA in our mutual interest and with a view to improving our bilateral relationship. Amin did not comment on any of the examples I cited, but merely nodded his assent. He then went on, with considerable eloquence, to stress his personal commitment to improving U.S.-Afghan relations, expressing his affection for the U.S. acquired during his residence in our country. Amin made a particular point of drawing my attention to the DRA’s forbearance in refraining from public attacks on the U.S. Even when Afghanistan is attacked by VOA, he said, we have deliberately resisted the temptation to respond in kind. The DRA does not want to do anything to “blacken the name or fame of the U.S.” He said that each country must act in its own interest but was confident that the U.S. and Afghanistan could continue to find ways and means that could serve their own interests but be of mutual benefit.

(...). 5. Development assistance. Amin made a strong pitch for U.S. “material assistance.” Afghanistan, he said, is in desperate need of foreign aid. Even a small portion of the development assistance which the U.S. provides worldwide would be of very great help to Afghanistan. The DRA would be grateful for any assistance, no matter how small. Amin said he would be happy to publicize U.S. aid to Afghanistan, adding that he would like to see more buildings in Afghanistan with plaques denoting that they had been built through U.S. aid. He allowed as how “your philosophy” can make it difficult for the U.S. to help in some areas and “our philosophy” makes it difficult for Afghanistan to accept some kinds of aid. Still, he said, we could doubtless find areas where we could work together.

(...). 12. Impressions. The man is impressive. His survival to date is by itself impressive, as is the air of quiet self-confidence he exudes. Clearly, he is aware of the mortality rate of Afghan leaders; several times he said “even if I am killed tomorrow.” He masks his ruthlessness and toughness quite well by his soft-spoken manner. In remarkable contrast to his turgid public speeches, his private discourse is refreshingly free from Marxist cant and cliché’s. His English is quite good and very easy to understand. Only once did he seem to have difficulty in expressing himself and that was when, perhaps in an attempt to convey great sincerity, he was declaiming how he could never sacrifice Afghan independence to any foreign demands, including from the Soviets.

14. I think he wants an improvement in U.S.-Afghan relations. His reasons could be varied: Soviet coaching; a long-range hedge against over-dependence on the Soviet Union; concern over the trouble which open U.S. animosity can create for his regime; conversely, an interest in bringing about the doubts and confusion which friendlier U.S. relations could sow among the supporters of the insurgency, the Pakistanis, Iranians and Saudis; a genuinely felt need for economic assistance.

(7726. Subj: Meeting With President Amin. Ref: Kabul 7645.2, Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State, Kabul, October 28, 1979, 0728Z. In: “FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1977–1980”, Vol. XII, US Department of State, pp. 218-221) (IMG)

The evidence presented shows that Hafizullah Amin was striving to establish – and had much success in establishing – a Titoist regime in Afghanistan, a fascist dictatorship masked as socialist and backed by American intelligence. It is a well-known fact that Taraki had invited the Red Army into

Afghanistan in order to help combat the Amin gang and the Al-Qaeda terrorists. The Red Army eventually utilized this invitation as a pretext to deploy troops into Afghanistan so to force the demotion and eventual execution of Amin and to combat the Al-Qaeda. The Red Army brought with itself the Parcham faction, and installed them into the primary leading cadres of the new Afghan government in cooperation with the Taraki loyalists.

C23S5.1. Titoism in China / Mao Zedong, a Titoist agent of Anglo-American imperialism / Ties to American agent Anna Louise Strong / The Purge of the Kao Kang faction / The Deng faction, fascist agents of Anglo-American Imperialism *** IMG-All-{China}

Years of colonial terror against China had left that country economically underdeveloped, resulting in the predominance of the agrarian petit-bourgeoisie in the Chinese population. Unlike the proletarians, who have nothing to lose except their 'chains' in the struggle against finance capital, the petit-bourgeoisie have small business which they may lose. At the same time, unlike the national bourgeoisie and the cooperative peasants who have big businesses with which they can take the risk of engaging in a struggle against finance capital, the petit-bourgeoisie do not have such big businesses and therefore cannot afford to take major risks in the struggle against finance capital. The inability of the petit-bourgeoisie to wage a struggle against imperialism results in the areas populated by the petit-bourgeoisie to become easy prey to material domination by finance capital. Such material domination can take the form of direct military and political control, or through indirect secret service influence via the dominance of the pseudo-progressive agents of comprador forces allied to imperialism – the corrupt bureaucrats, counter-revolutionary intelligentsia, etc. all disguised as 'anti-imperialists'. China since the mid-1950s was dominated by precisely these pseudo-progressive and pseudo-communist elements pursuing a reactionary line under the cover of pursuing a 'progressive', 'communist', or 'socialist' line; the pseudo-communist agency for imperialism took the form of both Trotskyite-style left-opportunism and liberal right-opportunism, depending on the context, time period, and location. Either way, however, the fact that since the mid-1950s and until 1989-1990, China was a major hub of opportunism, left- and right-, is irrefutable.

In a predominantly-peasant country, the efforts of the communists must be directed towards the elevation of the proletariat in the communist Party, the subsequent elevation of the Party's proletarian agents over the revolutionary means of violence, and the subordination of petit-bourgeois agents by the Party's proletarian agents. Such was the strategy pursued in the Korean and Vietnamese peoples' liberation war and in the communist-led popular struggles for the liberation of Eastern Europe. By contrast, in China, the Party was too open to the membership of peasants, thus allowing petit-bourgeois agents – rather than proletarian or agrarian cooperativist agents – to take the leadership of the military, resulting in a total disaster.

In a 1949 letter to Mao, Stalin predicted the rise of bourgeois-nationalist pro-US elements in the CPC:

As far as I know in the CPC there is a thin layer of the proletariat and the nationalist sentiments are very strong and if you will not conduct genuinely Marxist-Leninist class policies and not conduct struggle against bourgeois nationalism, ... China may become a dangerous toy in the hands of American imperialists. (J.V. Stalin, Sochinenia, Tom 18, Informatsionno-izdatelskii tsentr 'Soyuz', Tver, 2006, pp. 531- 533. Revolutionary Democracy) (IMG)

It should come as no surprise that Stalin was vigorously pushing for the industrialization and collectivization of China. He was aware of the great potential that existed in China, but also was very wary that China might become an epi-center of fascist subversion by Anglo-American intelligence. Industrialization increases the population of the proletariat. Collectivization would bring kolkhozniks and would sharply reduce petit-bourgeois tendencies.

Yet, the struggle against Titoist subversion and the petit-bourgeois currents could not be regarded as disconnected from the struggle against the Mao group itself, for Mao was a Titoist ally of the United States in the struggle against the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies. This was indeed the correct attitude of Stalin and many of the communist officials in the camp of the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies towards Mao Zedong and his gang. Mao admitted this fact several times. For start, Mao himself admitted that Stalin regarded China's leadership as having a Titoist character:

when fighting did erupt, he took us ... half sceptically. When we won the war, Stalin suspected that ours was a victory of the Tito type, and in 1949 and 1950 the pressure on us was very strong indeed. (ON THE TEN MAJOR RELATIONSHIPS: Speech at an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, Mao Zedong, April 25, 1956) (IMG)

While slandering Stalin with regards to his policy line on China, Mao further admitted that Stalin regarded Mao as a Titoist counter-revolutionary and China as another Yugoslavia:

They [i.e. the Soviets] did not permit China to make revolution: that was in 1945. Stalin wanted to prevent China from making a revolution, saying that we should not have a civil war and should cooperate with Chiang Kai-shek, otherwise the Chinese nation would perish. But we did not do what he said. The revolution was victorious. After the victory of the revolution he next suspected China of being a Yugoslavia, and that I would become a second Tito. Later, when I went to Moscow to sign the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance, we had to go through another struggle. (Speech at the Tenth Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee of the CPC (Sept. 24, 1962), CMTTP, p. 191. (Most of this passage is also in TMT, pp. 146-7.). In: Mao's Evaluation of Stalin, massline.org. Note: the website 'massline' is a Maoist organization.) (IMG)

Mao's own speeches made it absolutely clear that Stalin regarded Mao as bearing a similar character to that of Tito. Hence, this fact has already been confirmed and cannot be doubted. This fact has also been reinforced by a primary source released by the think tank Wilson Center, presenting excerpts of Mao's conversation with the Yugoslav regime intelligence agents. In this conversation, Mao admitted that Stalin:

regarded me [i.e. Mao] as a half-hearted Tito or semi-Titoist. Not only in the Soviet Union but also in other socialist countries and some non-socialist countries were there some people who had suspected whether China's was a real revolution. (Mao's Conversation with a Yugoslavian Communist Union Delegation, Beijing, September 1956, Wilson Center, p. 3) (IMG)

Stalin ... regarded me as a half-hearted Tito. (Mao's Conversation with a Yugoslavian Communist Union Delegation, Beijing, September 1956, Wilson Center, p. 3) (IMG)

The Chinese people's revolutionary struggle was real, but Mao Zedong was never a loyal member of the Chinese revolution. He took leadership of the Chinese revolution in order to mislead it – somewhat like how the Yugoslav people's struggle against the fascists was real but Tito's leadership of such Yugoslav struggle was for the purpose of leading the struggle into the wrong and pro-fascist path.

Stalin was correct to regard Mao as a Titoist because that is exactly what Mao was. Mao did not hide this fact. On the contrary, he denounced Stalin's line regarding Yugoslavia's fascist regime and made it clear that he sided with the Yugoslav fascists. Regarding the break with Yugoslavia, Mao Zedong clarified his views:

My comrades, let me advise you that you should also watch out for this potential. Your industry is much modernized and has experienced a more rapid growth; Stalin made you suffer and hence, justice is on your side. All of this, though, may become your [mental] burden. (Mao's Conversation with a Yugoslavian Communist Union Delegation, Beijing, September 1956, Wilson Center, p. 5) (IMG)

Mao added:

Khrushchev already corrected the mistake concerning Yugoslavia. (Mao's Conversation with a Yugoslavian Communist Union Delegation, Beijing, September 1956, Wilson Center, p. 6) (IMG)

Mao made it clear that he had sided with Tito during the 1948 Split. Enver Hoxha too testified:

At first, Mao Tsetung said that Tito was not wrong, but it was Stalin who had been wrong about Tito. (Imperialism and the Revolution, Enver Hoxha)

The US military confirmed:

That China's Balkan policy has been essentially a derivative of the Sino-Soviet relationship is most clearly attested in the case of Yugoslavia. From 1948 to 1953 Peking followed Moscow's lead in exorcising the enemy of socialism embodied in Belgrade, even failing to acknowledge Yugoslavia's early diplomatic recognition of the PRC in 1949. Then, as Soviet-Yugoslav relations improved following Stalin's death, the Chinese discovered unsuspected virtues in Tito's brand of socialism. (THE SOVIET THEATER NUCLEAR OFFENSIVE, Office of Director of Defense Research and Engineering & Defense Nuclear Agency, US Air Force, Joseph Douglass, Jr., p. 63) (IMG)

Hoxha also wrote:

Mao Tsetung ... expressed his great desire to meet Tito. Tito himself declared recently: "I was invited to China when Mao Tsetung was alive. During the visit of the Chairman of the Federal Executive Veche, Djemal Myedich, to China, at that time, Mao Tsetung expressed to him his desire that I should visit China. Chairman Hua Kuofeng also told me that, five years ago, Mao Tsetung said that he should have invited me for a visit, stressing that in 1948, too, Yugoslavia was in the right, a thing which he (Mao Tsetung) had declared even then, to a narrow circle. But, taking into consideration the relations between China and the Soviet Union at that time, this was not said publicly". (From Tito's speech at the meeting of activists of the SR of Slovenia, September 8, 1978). (Imperialism and the Revolution, Enver Hoxha)

After the murder of Stalin, Anna Louise Strong, the promoter of Titoism and Maoism, was rehabilitated by the Moscow Titoists, as part of the Khrushchev group's attempt to strengthen Titoism-Maoism:

Soviet reversal of charges against Anna Louise Strong seen as gesture to Peiping: Moscow's recent reversal of the charges of espionage made against Anna Louise Strong in 1949 appears to be a gesture to the Chinese [Maoist] [pseuo-]Communists, whose cause she vociferously championed for years.

Miss Strong had frequently proclaimed Peiping's independence from Moscow and had advanced the "Yenan way" as the pattern for colonial Asia. She was arrested and expelled from the USSR in 1949 while attempting to return to North China after a visit to Tito. Prague radio hinted at the time that she was a Yugoslav spy – peculiarly sensitive charge in view of her planned trip to rejoin the Chinese Communists as they made their final push for victory in China.

Miss Strong's exoneration at this time may be intended to show that Moscow is sensitive to Peiping's feeling of independence. It ... may also have been published during the negotiations now being carried on in Moscow between Yugoslavia and Peiping to show that the USSR has no fear of Titoism in China.

(SOVIET REVERSAL OF CHARGES AGAINST ANNA LOUISE STRONG SEEN AS GESTURE TO PEIPING, CIA, p. 1) (IMG)

As confirmed by the renegade Chairman, Stalin enjoyed overwhelming popularity in China. This, Mao noted, was why he could not publicly denounce Stalin the way that Tito did. As he admitted:

You [Yugoslavs] wholeheartedly support Khrushchev's campaign to criticize Stalin, but we [the Chinese leaders] cannot do the same because our people would dislike it. (Mao's Conversation with a Yugoslavian Communist Union Delegation, Beijing, September 1956, Wilson Center, p. 3) (IMG)

Tito was an Anglo-American spy and a fascist terrorist. This fact was the reason behind Stalin's struggle to overthrow the Yugoslav regime and to encircle Tito's gang. For Stalin and communists aware of the crimes of Tito, to state that Mao was China's Tito had very serious implications. Take a look at the cases of the other Titoists. The Czechoslovak Tito, Slansky, was rightly accused of being an MI6-Mossad-UDB agent and was purged. The Bulgarian Tito, Kostov, was rightly accused of being an CIA-MI6-UDB agent and was purged. The Hungarian Tito, Rajk, was accused of being a Nazi agent and a CIA-MI6 agent and was purged. The Albanian Tito, Xoxe, was accused of being a CIA-MI6-UDB agent and was purged. The Romanian Tito, Patrascanu, was purged. They were executed. All of these happened with the approval of Stalin himself. The question then becomes: was Mao the Chinese Tito? Was he an Anglo-American agent and a terrorist hostile to the freedom movements?

For start, Mao made it clear that he had sympathized with Tito's gang in the struggle against the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies. Some may believe that Mao's praise for Tito was merely a series of diplomatic gestures aimed at buying time, or that Mao was under severe pressure from the Khrushchev gang to start embracing Yugoslavia even against his own will. This was indeed the case for some of the communist officials in the bloc, but it certainly does not apply to Mao and his group, for as Stalin rightly assessed, Mao was a Titoist, Mao and his group were allies of Anglo-American intelligence in the struggle against the socialist forces, and China did eventually become another Yugoslavia.

Stalin, the officials of the Peoples' Democracies, and the Yugoslav officials were by no means the only ones aware of Mao's Titoist character. Josephine Adams, a close Browderist friend of Earl Browder, stated that Browder had worked on Mao since as early as the Great Patriotic War, during the tenure of Mao and his group in Yan'an. Browder accurately believed that Mao was a bourgeois-nationalist and a Titoist that would seek to make China separate from the camp of the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies. Josephine Adams briefed the US Congress by stating:

Browder was on very good terms at that time with Mao Tse-tung. He had been interested in China in the past. And, of course, I may say for Browder the first rebellion against Stalin started with him. Tito came later. It was really instigated by Browder and went around the world. That I know, because I watched it happen. He was way ahead of the others. He had insight enough to know. I am bringing this in – it is extraneous, but I believe it has a connection here. Because he thought Mao Tse-tung was going to be the kind of Communist that Tito became, and he was very interested in him. In other words, he thought he would work out some kind of national movement in China

that was not as much associated with the Soviet Union. And he was watching him with great interest for that reason. (SCOPE OF SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES, Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, Washington DC, February 26, 1957) (IMG)

Mao Zedong remained hostile to the strategic relations and foreign policy line of the Stalin-era USSR. In 1964, he basically admitted that he opposed the Stalin-era USSR's foreign policy and regarded it as social-imperialist in character:

The places occupied by the Soviet Union are very many. In accordance with the Yalta Agreement, the Soviet Union, under the pretext of assuring the independence of Mongolia, actually placed that country under its domination. Mongolia covers an area much greater than that of the Kurile Islands. (...). They annexed a part of Rumania. They cut off a part of East Germany.... They cut off a part of Poland and included it in Russia, and as compensation gave Poland a part of East Germany. The same happened in Finland. They cut off everything that was possible to cut off. (Interview With The Japanese Socialists On The Theory Of The Intermediate Zone, Japanese journal Sekat Shuho, August 11, 1964, MIA) (IMG)

In that same interview, Mao seems to have praised the invasion of the United States and the rape of Vietnam and other East Asian countries by the 'Japanese people':

The Japanese people are a great people. They waged war with the United States, with England and France. They carried out the attack on Pearl Harbor; they occupied Vietnam, the Philippines, Thailand, Malaya, Indonesia. Their advance reached the eastern part of India. (Interview With The Japanese Socialists On The Theory Of The Intermediate Zone, Japanese journal Sekat Shuho, August 11, 1964, MIA) (IMG)

Was Mao supporting the colonization of the East Asian countries by Japan or was he insulting the 'Japanese people' by attributing to them such barbarity? Both? I will let the reader decide. Many years prior, so much for Mao's supposed struggle 'against' Japanese fascism, Mao had aimed to prioritize waging war against the KMT instead of fighting fascist Japan. When Chang Hsueh-Liang (Zhang Xueliang) launched a military coup to coopt Chiang Kai-Shek to abandon the conflict with the CCP and to wage war on fascist Japan, the USSR, Stalin himself included, supported the effort to coopt the KMT for the fight against Japan. Mao, on the other hand, was advocating the killing of Chiang Kai-Shek which would have provoked the prolonging of the KMT-CCP conflict, thus benefiting fascist Japan. Mao was deeply angered at Stalin for that move. This interesting episode in Mao's relations with Stalin in the 1930s and Mao's stance on the fight against fascist Japan is something worthy of further research through the archives.

Anyways, in a conversation with Yugoslav officials, Mao also said:

Before I met with Stalin, I did not have much good feeling about him. I disliked reading his works, and I have read only "On the Basis of Leninism," a long article criticizing Trotsky, and "Be Carried Away by Success," etc. I disliked even more his articles on the Chinese revolution. He was very different from Lenin: Lenin shared his heart with others and treated others as equals whereas Stalin liked to stand above every one else and order others around. (...). After I met with him, I became even more disgusted: I quarreled a lot with him in Moscow. Stalin was excitable by temperament. When he became agitated, he would spell out nasty things. (Mao's Conversation with a Yugoslavian Communist Union Delegation, Beijing, September 1956, Wilson Center, p. 5) (IMG)

Hence, as can be seen, Mao was someone that could be trusted by the imperialists in the efforts to contain the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies for he was hostile to what he portrayed as Stalin-era Soviet 'imperialism' and 'chauvinism'. One person who promoted Mao's group against the USSR was the US intelligence operative Anna Louise Strong. Anna Strong had been famously arrested in the Stalin-era USSR on charge of being an 'American agent'. The media of People's Czechoslovakia indicated that Anna Strong was a Tito agent:

She was arrested [by] the USSR in 1949 while attempting to return to North China after a visit to Tito. Prague radio hinted at the time that she was a Yugoslav spy.... (SOVIET REVERSAL OF CHARGES AGAINST ANNA LOUISE STRONG SEEN AS GESTURE TO PEIPING, CIA, p. 1) (IMG)

Remarkably, staff members in the CIA stated that Strong's Titoist/revisionist anti-Soviet propaganda made her:

a running-dog of American imperialism.... (INTELLIGENCE HIGHLIGHTS NO. 40 16 FEBRUARY - 23 FEBRUARY 1949, CIA, p. 14) (IMG)

There was no quotation marks around that phrase, nor could the quote be semi-sarcastic when one examines the context of the quote. In that excerpt, it was made clear that Anna Strong spread lies against the USSR. Anna Louise Strong promoted propaganda against the USSR and that CIA reference to her as 'a running-dog of American imperialism' came in that context. Anyways, long before her arrest, Anna Strong promoted the concept of the Yan'an Way – the Maoist way – and sought to encourage China to separate from the camp of the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies:

Miss Strong had frequently proclaimed Peiping's independence from Moscow and had advanced the "Yenan way" as the pattern for colonial Asia. (SOVIET REVERSAL OF CHARGES AGAINST ANNA LOUISE STRONG SEEN AS GESTURE TO PEIPING, CIA, p. 1) (IMG)

For further context on Yan'an, it is worth mentioning that during the Second World War,:

In July of 1944, one month after D-day in Europe, the U.S. Observer Group, including the OSS (the World War II precursor to the CIA), U.S. military personnel, and China Hands like John Service, flew into Yan 'an [where Mao was]. At that moment the interests of the Americans and Mao Zedong coincided; (The China Mirage: The Hidden History of American Disaster in Asia, James Bradley)

Officially, Anna Strong was portrayed as an American journalist and a communist sympathizer before being arrested by the Soviets as an American spy. During her visit to China, she spread lies and vicious slanders against the Soviets, lies that have been debunked in C18S2. In the document in which Strong was referred as the 'running-dog of American imperialism', the CIA made the following reports summarizing Strong's reports on Sino-Soviet relations:

According to Miss Strong, the Chinese Communists "acquired an empire in Manchuria" almost solely through their own efforts; while Soviet forces did capture the cities, that contribution was nullified by the fact that they installed his (CHIANG Kai-shek's) appointees ... and protected them there for months." Not content with mere obstructionism, the USSR attempted to sabotage the province economically: Manchuria was blockaded on three sides.... Not only no arms came over, but no even peaceful trade." As if that were not bad enough: "What help did Lin Piao get from the Russians? According to Lin Piao: 'No troops, no weapons, no advisors, nothing!'" Even more scandalous if not downright counterrevolutionary: "From the Russian-protected cities Chiang's officials instigated a civil war against the farmers of the countryside.... They (the Soviets) saved these officials from the Manchurian people." (In fact, the Soviet

withdrawal was so managed as to allow the Chinese Communists to occupy Manchuria to ‘capture’ enormous quantities of Japanese materiel. (...) Miss Strong’s version is false.... (INTELLIGENCE HIGHLIGHTS NO. 40 16 FEBRUARY - 23 FEBRUARY 1949, CIA, p. 13) (IMG)

The CIA continues:

Miss Strong’s book makes Soviet designs in the border areas appear particularly nefarious, in that, by her account, the USSR did not assist, in fact impeded the Chinese communists in those regions. In Miss Strong’s reports, the Soviets refused to cooperate even in the operation of the Manchurian railway network in which the USSR is a treaty partner. Miss Strong, asking a group of Chinese railway workers why they did not get lubricants and spare parts from the USSR, learned that “‘We didn’t even ask. We knew they would refuse.’” In addition to the above, which might be construed by a hostile reader as indicating that the workers’ fatherland is both ungracious and pauperized, Miss Strong’s account goes so far as to reflect unfavorably on Soviet economic theory itself. She writes of the moderate Chinese Communist land reform that “‘every family felt the stimulus of free enterprise, knowing that there was freedom at last to advance...’” Still worse, after the Chinese Communist refusal to admit their debt to the Soviet economy, either in fact or in theory, it appears that they would not even grant the supremacy of Soviet military strategy. The Chinese Communist victories have “‘come from a unique organization of the armed forces and a remarkably realistic strategy worked out by Mao Tse-tung...’” Most incredible of all, the Chinese Communists were not always meticulous in acknowledging their obligation to their own spiritual ancestors. At a ceremony celebrating the founding of the Chinese republic there “‘were no pictures of Marx, Lenin, Stalin...’” And to Mao himself Miss Strong attributes a remark which is highly suspect: “‘The fight is between a democracy and anti-democracy, not between Soviet and anti-Soviet.’” (INTELLIGENCE HIGHLIGHTS NO. 40 16 FEBRUARY - 23 FEBRUARY 1949, CIA, p. 14) (IMG)

Another person who could correctly observe that China was on the same path as that of Yugoslavia was the ‘Iranian Tito’ and CIA agent Khalil Maleki who later participated in the 1953 coup (see C17S7). Homa Katouzian, a top scholar on Khalil Maleki, remarked (note: the square brackets in the following quote were by Katouzian):

as early as 1949, Maleki wrote:

I am not concerned with the details of Tito's policies, nor even his major policies which may well be open to criticism and about which I know very little. [I am only concerned with the view] that having regard to one's national self-interest is not in conflict with healthy and proper international relations.

The special reference to the Balkan countries in the above quotation was not accidental, for, surprisingly, Maleki also predicted a rift between Russia and China, despite the apparently solid bond that existed between them at the time, and for many years to come:

The movement that ... Mao Tse-tung now continues, will not in the end remain a satellite of the Soviet Union. Indeed it can be confidently predicted that similar developments to those of Yugoslavia will also take place in China. The forms which these developments will take will doubtless be different from what happened in Yugoslavia. But their substance would be similar resistance against [Soviet] pressures and expansionist behaviour.

(Khalil Maleki: *The Human Face of Iranian Socialism*, Homa Katouzian, 2018) (IMG)

Among most intelligence circles both in the imperialist camp and in the anti-imperialist camp, it was a well-known fact that Mao’s group would eventually follow the path of Tito’s group although the forms by which Mao’s group presented themselves was going to be different and was going to be in a fake ‘anti-revisionist’ clothing.

One of the key slanders launched by Mao against Stalin-era USSR was as follows;

They [i.e. the Soviets] did not permit China to make revolution: that was in 1945. Stalin wanted to prevent China from making a revolution, saying that we should not have a civil war and should cooperate with Chiang Kai-shek, otherwise the Chinese nation would perish. But we did not do what he said. (Speech at the Tenth Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee of the CPC (Sept. 24, 1962), CMTTP, p. 191. (Most of this passage is also in TMT, pp. 146-7.). In: Mao’s Evaluation of Stalin, massline.org. Note: the website ‘massline’ is a Maoist organization.) (IMG)

In spite of the generous assistance which the USSR had provided the Chinese communists (see C18S1), Mao Zedong slandered Stalin by asserting:

At the time of the War of Liberation, Stalin first enjoined us not to press on with the revolution, maintaining that if civil war flared up, the Chinese nation would run the risk of destroying itself. (ON THE TEN MAJOR RELATIONSHIPS: Speech at an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, Mao Zedong, April 25, 1956) (IMG)

To the Yugoslav officials, Mao also said:

Stalin met with [Winston] Churchill and [Franklin D.] Roosevelt and decided to give the whole of China to America and Jiang Jieshi. In terms of material and moral support, especially moral support, Stalin hardly gave any to us.... (Mao’s Conversation with a Yugoslavian Communist Union Delegation, Beijing, September 1956, Wilson Center, p. 3) (IMG)

In 1964, Mao once again condemned Stalin, this time under the cover of ‘comradely criticism’ of Stalin:

Stalin ... made mistakes in dealing with Chinese problems, and they were no small mistakes. We are a great country of several hundred millions, and he opposed our revolution, and our seizure of power. We prepared for many years in order to seize power in the whole country, the whole of the Anti-Japanese War constituted a preparation. (TALK ON QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY, Mao Zedong, August 18, 1964. In: SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG, Vol. 9: years 1963-1971, 1st edition: 1994, p. 130) (IMG)

Those are interesting slanders launched by the man who said that China could industrialize only through ‘foreign capital’, particularly American investments and even including ‘the most conservative American businessman’:

Even the most conservative American businessman can find nothing in our program to take exception to.

China must industrialize. This can be done – in China – only by free enterprise and with the aid of foreign capital. Chinese and American interests are correlated and similar. They fit together, economically and politically. We can and must work together.

(Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Service) of a Conversation With Mao Tse-tung, Yenan, August 23, 1944. In: ‘Subject: Interview with Mao Tse-tung’. Report by the Second Secretary of Embassy in China (Service), No. 15, Yenan, To: Commanding General, Fwd. Ech. USAF-CBI, APO 879, August 27, 1944. In: FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: DIPLOMATIC PAPERS, 1944, CHINA, Vol. 6, 893.00/9-2844) (IMG)

Regardless of whether or not US economic involvement in China after the Great Patriotic War and during China's early NEP period was going to be beneficial to China, the remarks of Mao about Stalin allegedly seeking to give China to the United States are hypocritical. Mao also accused Stalin of not having faith in the Chinese people:

You [Russians] have never had faith in the Chinese people, and Stalin was among the worst. (Mao Zedong and Pavel Iudin, 22 July 1958 in Westad, ed., *Brothers in Arms*, pp. 348, 352, and *CWIHP Bulletin* 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), pp. 155-159., Cited in: Wilson Center, *One Finger's Worth of Historical Facts*, p. 11) (IMG)

Mao's remarks are reminiscent of the remarks of his supporters who claim that those who condemn the Mao-era and Deng-era Chinese regime are 'Sinophobe' 'racists', 'orientalists' distrusting the people of China.

Later on, when Mao went to Moscow, Stalin did not receive Mao. In an interview with Feliks Chuev, Molotov said that Mao after having arrived in Moscow:

talked about meeting Stalin and when it would be convenient. (Molotov Remembers, Feliks Chuev, p. 81) (IMG)

Due to the disrespectful behaviour of Mao behind Stalin's back, the Soviet leader did not receive Mao:

Stalin hadn't received him for some days after he arrived. Stalin told me, "Go and see what sort of fellow he is." (Molotov Remembers, Feliks Chuev, p. 81) (IMG)

Mao himself stated:

Stalin ... was not willing to sign a treaty. After two months of negotiations he at last signed. When did Stalin begin to have confidence in us? (Speech at the Tenth Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee of the CPC (Sept. 24, 1962), CMTTP, p. 191. (Most of this passage is also in TMT, pp. 146-7.). In: *Mao's Evaluation of Stalin*, massline.org) (IMG)

Later, when I went to Moscow to sign the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance, we had to go through another struggle. (Speech at the Tenth Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee of the CPC (Sept. 24, 1962), CMTTP, p. 191. (Most of this passage is also in TMT, pp. 146-7.). In: *Mao's Evaluation of Stalin*, massline.org. Note: the website 'massline' is a Maoist organization.) (IMG)

It was Washington's goal to liquidate communists and to replace them with Titoists. China's ruling clique pursued such an agenda of American imperialism so as to stabilize the influence of the Titoist faction in China. Within China, the clash intensified between the communist faction headed by Kao Kang and Rao Shushi and the Titoist faction led by Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi, and Deng Xiaoping. Mao himself admitted:

Some people opposed Lenin, saying that he was a dictator. Lenin's reply was straightforward: better that I should be a dictator than you! Stalin was very fond of Kao Kang and made him a special present of a motor car. Kao Kang sent Stalin a congratulatory telegram every 15 August. (Talks at the Chengtu Conference, Mao Zedong, March 1958) (IMG)

Mao told the Soviet Ambassador Pavel Yudin in 1954, that:

The basic content of the letter [to Stalin] was that apart from Gao Gang [alternative name for Kao Kang] himself, there wasn't a single good comrade in the Central Committee. Of course, Gao Gang was leading Kovalev when he characterized some members of the CC as pro-American in inclination and the others as anti-Soviet. It is clear that Gao Gang has had intentions of that sort for a long time. (From the Journal of Ambassador Pavel Yudin: Memorandum of Conversation with Mao Zedong, March 26, 1954) (IMG)

Kao Kang correctly noted to Stalin that the Central Committee of the CPC were Titoists. Mao accused Kao Kang of being a Soviet agent:

Are there such people in our country who provide foreigners with information behind the back of the Central Committee? I think there are. Kao Kang is a case in point. Many facts have proved this. (Speech at the Second Plenary Session of the Eight Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, November 15, 1956, Mao Zedong) (IMG)

In terms of the intra-Party power struggles in China, Mao Zedong's Cultural Revolution was famously launched and directed ostensibly 'against' Chinese revisionists Zhou Enlai and Liu Shaoqi – ostensibly. Kao and Rao sought to purge those whom Mao himself agreed were the main figureheads of Chinese Revisionism: Liu and Zhou. Yet, Mao's record shows that he rushed to defend those right-deviationists. Kao and Rao were planning to form an overt-level 'alliance' with Mao Zedong to combat Zhou Enlai and Liu Shaoqi. Understanding this, Mao sided with Zhou and Liu. According to the memorandum recording the conversation of the Soviet Ambassador with Mao:

Typical was this: having returned from Moscow Gao Gang did not go home, but immediately headed for the Beijing Hotel, where party workers who had come from the provinces on business were staying, and began to work on them. The Gao Gang-Rao Shushi anti-party group adopted this tactic for its underground activity: to avow support for Mao Zedong and Lin Biao, but struggling in the first instance against Liu Shaoqi and then against Zhou Enlai. "But of course," Mao remarked, "it's not a matter of names, but of the party and its unity." To my response that this was the usual tactic of factionalists, that to act openly against Mao was beyond their power, Mao replied that by hiding behind his name the factionalists had deceived many comrades and that was precisely why he (Mao Zedong) must swiftly and clearly state his point of view and show where he stood, otherwise "an epidemic of factionalism would quickly spread inside the party." When the Gao Gang affair was revealed, the majority of party members correctly understood the actions of the CC, but some of them could fairly charge it with sluggishness. In this connection Mao Zedong, half in jest, said, "Mao Zedong proposed Gao Gang for membership in the Politburo, and he named him as deputy chairman of the central government. Now the comrades are having to approve all sorts of measures in relation to the Gao Gang affair, and they are asking why the CC overlooked this matter. Mao replies that evidently it was because he was blind. Then the comrades ask how Mao can work if he has gone blind—to which Mao replies that he has now recovered his sight." (From the Journal of Ambassador Pavel Yudin: Memorandum of Conversation with Mao Zedong, March 26, 1954) (IMG)

When the Stalin faction was still dominant over the Soviet state, the USSR was able to strengthen the Kao Kang faction, whose social base was the industrial and hence proletarianized areas in China's north, to encircle and co-opt Mao Zedong into supporting Kao Kang's rise. With the decline of the Stalin faction, Mao 'recovered his sight' and was able to take action against his long-time foe.

Kao and Rao were purged. Officially, they were said to have committed suicide.

However, according to a Red Guard pamphlet during China's Cultural Revolution, Kao Kang:

was put to death... (Politics and Purges in China: Rectification and the Decline of Party Norms, 1950-1965, Frederick Teiwes, p. 526) (IMG)

Subsequently, Mao rewarded Liu Shaoqi with more power:

In the reorganization of the party structure at the Eighth Party Congress in September 1956, Mao Tse-tung delegated a substantial amount of political power to Liu (as the senior Vice-chairman of the newly established Standing Committee of the Politburo) and to Teng (as head of the Secretariat charged with "attending to the daily work of the Central Committee"). (FACTIONALISM IN THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE: MAO'S OPPOSITION SINCE 1949 (Reference Title: POLO XXVIII), CIA, p. II) (IMG)

Hence, the high-ranking Chinese 'Stalinists' were murderously eliminated after Stalin's death, and the Chinese Titoists headed by Mao, Liu, Zhou, and Deng emerged victorious. China was on the road of joining American Imperialism. In the absence of a strong Soviet support for the Chinese communists, the Titoization of China, at the time a predominantly agrarian petit-bourgeois country, was not very difficult.

In 1956, when Khrushchev had already given his infamous 'Secret Speech', Mao said:

During [Stalin's] time people's minds were so tightly controlled that even the feudalist control had been surpassed. While some enlightened feudal lords or emperors would accept criticism, [Stalin] would tolerate none. (Mao's Conversation with a Yugoslavian Communist Union Delegation, Beijing, September 1956, Wilson Center, p. 6) (IMG)

After the Sino-Russian Split, in order to contrast himself with his new Russian enemies led by Khrushchev, Mao opportunistically went so far as to adopt the banner of defending Stalin's legacy. To be fair, Mao did defend Stalin on some minor issues – but so did Khrushchev in his Secret Speech. Khrushchev defended Stalin on the anti-Trotsky campaign:

We must affirm that the party had fought a serious fight against the Trotskyites, rightists and bourgeois nationalists, and that it disarmed ideologically all the enemies of Leninism. This ideological fight was carried on successfully, as a result of which the party became strengthened and tempered. Here Stalin played a positive role. (The Crimes Of The Stalin Era, Special Report To The 20th Congress Of The Communist Party Of The Soviet Union, Nikita Khrushchev, p. 13, underline added)

The two leaders denounced Stalin as a dictatorial figure. In his famous piece to supposedly 'defend' Stalin, Mao said:

Stalin ... failed to rely upon the working class and the masses in the struggle against the forces of capitalism.... (On Khrushchov's Phoney Communism and its Historical Lessons for the World, Mao Zedong, July 1964, MIA) (IMG)

Mao completely distorted the picture, promoted strawman's fallacy, and denounced his opponents as 'dogmatic':

There are two kinds of Chinese: one kind is a dogmatist who completely accepts Stalin's line; the other opposes dogmatism, thus refusing to obey [Stalin's] instructions. (Mao's Conversation with a Yugoslavian Communist Union Delegation, Beijing, September 1956, Wilson Center, p. 3) (IMG)

Yet, as Mao admitted years prior to the Sino-Eurasian split, the Chairman's praise for Stalin was fake, and in reality, he never believed in his praise for the Soviet leader:

I have written altogether three pieces praising Stalin. The first was written in Yanan to celebrate his sixtieth birthday [21 December 1939—ed.], the second was the congratulatory speech [I delivered] in Moscow [in December 1949], and the third was an article requested by Pravda after his death [March 1953—ed.]. (...) When I was in Moscow to celebrate his birthday, what else could I have done if I had chosen not to congratulate him? Could I have cursed him instead? After his death the Soviet Union needed our support and we also wanted to support the Soviet Union. Consequently, I wrote that piece to praise his virtues and achievements. That piece was not for Stalin; it was for the Soviet Communist Party. As for the piece I did in Yanan, I had to ignore my personal feelings and treat him as the leader of a socialist country. Therefore, that piece was rather vigorous whereas the other two came out of [political] need, not my heart, nor at my will. Human life is just as contradictory as this: your emotion tells you not to write these pieces, but your rationality compels you to do so. (Mao's Conversation with a Yugoslavian Communist Union Delegation, Beijing, September 1956, Wilson Center, pp. 5-6) (IMG)

In 1956, Mao had said:

Some people have asserted in the past that China has no intention to be friends with other countries [of the Eastern Bloc], but wants to split with the Soviet Union, thus becoming a troublemaker. Now, however, this kind of people shrinks to only a handful in the socialist countries; (Mao's Conversation with a Yugoslavian Communist Union Delegation, Beijing, September 1956, Wilson Center, p. 4) (IMG)

Mao in fact did split with China's northern neighbour, contrary to Mao's earlier promisory remarks. What was the reason for this split? The narrative that Mao split with Khrushchev over Khrushchev's revisionism is a hoax. Mao actually agreed with Khrushchev on all the key questions of revisionism. For start, they were both strategically aligned and supportive of the Anglo-American agent Tito and the Yugoslav regime. On the economy and foreign policy, their position were very similar to each other's.

What follows is a documentation of the Mao clique's collaboration with Anglo-American imperialism and the Deng faction's expansion of such imperialist-collaborationism.

Mao's group was in cahoots with the Iranian regime, the regime of the SAVAK, the regime of the Shah. The martyr Bizhan Jazani, the founder and one of the primary theorists of the Organization of Iranian People's Fedai Guerrillas (OIPFG) and a former Tudeh Party activist, wrote:

After the establishment of relations between China and Iran, after the telling [as in: signifying something beyond the superficial] trips of the members of [Iran's] Royal Family to China and the observation of their welcoming, and in short after People's China outpaced the USSR in flirting with the horrific dictatorship of Iran, [the Maoists] tried to justify the new policy of China in the region by promoting the concept of 'the grave dangers of social-imperialism'.

When China announced that the menace of 'social-imperialism' is greater than imperialism and presented 'social-imperialism' as the number one threat to the world, when [China] ... calls for closer relations between Iran and Pakistan, when Chinese aid to Yemen, the Zofar movement, and the Eritrean movement ceases and in correlation with it, the Iranian armed forces take on the role of the gendarmerie in revolutionary Zofar at the behest of the imperialists, the apologists of China are faced with the task of choosing in between the anti-imperialist popular struggle and the continued acceptance of this incorrect policy line [promoted by China].

The government of China, for the purpose of its own interests and rivalry with the Soviet Union, a rivalry that has reached the point of enmity, seeks to reduce Soviet influence in the region via an alliance with the imperialists and their [comprador] allies. Now, under such a policy, what are the tasks of the peoples of the region? Are we under the yoke of 'social-imperialism' or are we under the yoke of America, England, and the others?

(A Struggle against the Shah's Dictatorship as the Major Imperialist Force and the Gendarme of the Region, Bizhan Jazani, Date: some time between 1971 to 1975, p. 79) (IMG)

In a 1972 conversation with Kissinger and Nixon, the Shah noted that Mao Zedong wanted a stronger Iranian regime and that Maoist China was a 'reliable friend' of the Iranian regime as shown in Pakistan (in which China, Iran, and USA collaborated against Bengalis and Indians):

"So you ascribe your success to staying ahead of the discontent?" the President asked. The Shah said "yes. Our farmers own their own land. As for the universities, we just put subversives into jail." The Shah even thought Mao wanted a strong Iran; he had the impression that the PRC preferred to have good ties with Iran. The Chinese were reliable friends, as they proved in Pakistan. The Empress was going to visit Peking. (Memorandum of Conversation, Tehran, May 31, 1972, Participants: Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, Richard Nixon, Henry Kissinger. In: 'FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1969-1976', Vol. E-4, DOCUMENTS ON IRAN AND IRAQ, 1969-1972) (IMG)

For what it is worth, a memorandum of conversation between Ruhollah Khomeini and Arafat confirms the Chinese regime's support for the Shah. In this conversation, Ruhollah Khomeini told Arafat:

The Shah too relied on the United States, Britain, China, Israel, etc. But such a support could not possibly be strong. The only thing that can be so strong that one can rely upon it is Allah. God is the fulcrum. And I always advise him [i.e. Yasser Arafat] and my nation and his nation, to always keep God in mind.... Do not trust in material things, but trust in the divine. (Memorandum of Conversation with Yasser Arafat on the Victory of the Islamic Revolution and the Situation in Palestine, February 17, 1979) (IMG)

The Chinese regime's collaboration with the Iranian regime for support for Pakistan against India goes back to China's own history of strategic partnership with the ultra-reactionary pseudo-Islamic fascist government of Pakistan back in the 1960s:

In a report to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on Sino-Pakistani relations on February 14, 1964, Mr. Suslov said: "The leadership apparatus of China, in addition to deteriorating its relations with India to an extraordinary level, has reached a point which, as you are aware, while not being a member of any official military pact, is practically an ally of Pakistan, a member state SEATO and CENTO, military pacts that pose a danger to the peace and security of the nations of Asia. The fact is that the leaders of China, by throwing away "all the revolutionary statements" of their own, have gone down a road which cannot be reconciled with the principled approach of the united front of the socialist countries in the struggle against the imperialist blocs. What can be said? The methods of the Chinese leaders about choosing their friend and ally is very strange. A question must be asked:

How can they dishonor and tarnish the socialist countries and the communist parties, and at the same time to flatter the reactionary regime of Pakistan right in front of the whole world? It is really incomprehensible. Would there be anyone who would believe that close relations with Pakistan is rooted in the interests of the progress and the development of the revolutionary struggles of the nations of Asia against imperialism, about which the Chinese leaders have stirred up controversy?"

(Suslov's Report, Persian translation, p. 27)

Indeed, what can be said! We ask, in particular, Mr. Suslov and the Central Committee of the Tudeh Party, which justifies Soviet policy: does anyone believe that approaching the Shah's regime and providing military and economic assistance to the Iranian government and political and propaganda support for the monarchy results in the advancement of the interests and the development of the struggle of the Asian nations against imperialism?!

(The Problems Facing the Iranian People's Anti-Colonial and Liberation Movement & the Most Critical Tasks of Iran's Communists in the Current Conditions, Bizhan Jazani, Autumn 1967. Reprinted by the: The Organization for the Unity of the Iranian People's Fedayeen, Winter 2003, pp. 13-14) (IMG)

During that time period, China had gone to war against India in order to overthrow the anti-imperialist government of the Nehru faction. Such hostile behaviour by the Chinese regime, the alliance with ultra-reactionary Pakistan and the hostility to the progressive bourgeois-democratic India, are cases in point demonstrating the criminal and pro-imperialist collaborationist character of Chinese strategic relations. **China's alliance with Pakistan in the 1960s was an alliance with American imperialism.** China's excuse for aggressing India was that India maintained relations with the Dalai Lama. The fact that India had diplomatic relations and diplomatically courted the Dalai Lama is not a legitimate reason for China launching an invasion against it, nor is it any 'proof' that India was behind the colour revolutionary agitations in Tibet in the 1950s. On the contrary, India was the country that advocated China's cause in the UN, lest one forgets. India's cultural and diplomatic relations with the Dalai Lama was an excellent opportunity to crack down on the pro-fascist and feudal forces which the Dalai Lama led in Tibet, for China could utilize India's soft power influence over and relations with the Tibetan religious reactionaries as a channel for intelligence penetration into the Tibetan reactionary forces. This is much like how the Stalin-era USSR rightly exercised its soft power influence and established excellent diplomatic relations with Israel as a channel for supporting the Arab-friendly progressive Israeli generals that had been catapulted into the ranks of the anti-Arab and reactionary Israeli regime. Through diplomatic relations with the Dalai Lama, India was not really 'siding' with the Tibetan rebels against China, just like how the USSR, by having relations with Israel, was not stabbing the Arabs in the back. In any case, by allying with the CIA-backed Pakistan, China allied with the CIA itself since the early 1960s. By the 1970s, China's alliance with American imperialism only became more official. In collaboration with the SAVAK and the CIA, China funded the regime of Yahya Khan, the regime that infamously launched a campaign of mass-slaughter of an estimated 3 million Bengalis and a rape of an estimated 400,000 Bengali women:

Prime Minister Chou: He also told us that he was taking good care of him and protecting him, and that if he didn't do so, some other generals would want to take care of him (Yahya) differently.

Of course we don't want to interfere in others' internal affairs, but Yahya really did not lead his troops in East Pakistan well. Even though we assisted with armaments, we didn't send a single military personnel, what the Soviet Union calls military adviser. We only sent some people to train in the use of the planes and guns we sent, and afterwards brought those people back. At the time of the ceasefire they (the Pakistanis) still had 80,000 troops in East Pakistan. It was not a situation in which they couldn't keep fighting.

(Memorandum of Conversation, Participants: Richard Nixon, Henry Kissinger, NSC Staff John Holdridge and Winswton Lord, Zhou Enlai, Chang Wen-Chin, Chiao Kuan-Hua, February 23, 1972. In: 'Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, China, October 1971 to February 1972, US State Department, pp. 724-725) (IMG)

Bourguiba, a staunch foe of Gamal Abdel-Nasser, hailed the Chinese stance on Pakistan:

Dr. Kissinger: We had a letter from Bourghiba expressing approval of your stand on India/Pakistan.

Prime Minister Chou: Even Bourghiba, who is considered to be a rightist, has supported Pakistan. As Chairman Mao mentioned yesterday, sometimes it is a good thing to be on the right.

(Memorandum of Conversation, Participants: Richard Nixon, Henry Kissinger, NSC Staff John Holdridge and Winswton Lord, Zhou Enlai, Chang Wen-Chin, Chiao Kuan-Hua, February 23, 1972. In: 'Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, China, October 1971 to February 1972, US State Department, p. 729) (IMG)

For what it is worth, Sadeq Tabataba'i, a close relative of Ruhollah Khomeini and an official of the Islamic Republic of Iran, recalled that the SAVAK was promoting the views and ideas of Mao Zedong as early as 1970. The following is an excerpt of his memoirs published in the Islamic Republic's official website on the life of Ruhollah Khomeini:

THE SAVAK IS THE PROPAGATOR OF MAO'S VIEWS

SAVAK did not cease its activities. In 1970, a newspaper called "Parcham e Sorkh" ['Red Flag'] was published promoting Comrade Mao's ideas. In this publication to the differences comrades, it was strongly encouraged in the various and diverse communist organizations. Although the newspaper's affiliation with SAVAK was soon exposed, both through the type of content and through organizations affiliated with the confederation, it showed that the regime was also involved in creating organizations. The term has become popular and communist. The affiliated organizations mentioned above, although they competed and were hostile to each other, knew each other, so they were soon able to find traces of SAVAK in the "Red Flag". Another of SAVAK's activities was an incident that took place during the tenth congress of the Confederation (December 26, 1969 to January 5, 1970) in Karlsruhe. The congress was attended by about 400 representatives of the Confederate affiliates. The Union of Islamic Students Associations has sent a message to the above Congress; And appreciated the organization's struggles in support of the Muslim people of Iran and their struggles under the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini.

(The Socio-Political Memoirs of Dr. Sadeq Tabataba'i, pp. 257-258) (IMG)

The case of the Maoists' espionage for the SAVAK is a very large case to examine and will not be examined here, but will be explored more in another book. However, it is worth mentioning that there have been numerous books written (in Farsi) about the espionage activities of the Maoists for the SAVAK. The espionage activities of the Maoists for the SAVAK goes back back to as early as the mid-1960s. During the 1970s, the SAVAK dispatched its intelligence agents to Lebanon via a Palestinian organization that was not officially self-described 'Maoist' but had very clear and explicit Maoist tendency. One of the major bases of the Maoists was Saddamite Iraq. The numerous Maoist grouplets and terrorist gangs were based in Iraq since the mid-1970s. The Iranian Maoists moved their main base to Iraq by the time of the 1979 revolution, although they cultivated a close alliance with Abu Nidal Organization and Saddam's Mukhaberat long before the 1979 revolution.

One of the most horrifying Maoization programs engineered by the SAVAK is with regards to the 'Shia Socialist' eclectic terrorist organization, the 'Mojahedin e Khalq' (MEK). Not many people are aware that the MEK used to be a secular Maoist organization for a while. In an operation often referred to as 'THE IDEOLOGICAL REVOLUTION', the SAVAK engineered a bloody terrorist campaign in which the MEK for a while became a 'secular' 'Marxist-Leninist' organization of the Maoist type. Through this program, the Maoists and Trotskyites jointly and systematically slaughtered the Shia Islamist anti-Shah warriors in the MEK. One of these Shia Islamist fighters murdered was a man named Sharif Waqefi, after whom the top Iranian university, the 'Sharif Institute of Technology', is named for his martyrdom. Later on in 1979, Mas'ud Rajavi, a SAVAK spy who pretended to oppose the Maoization of the MEK, was dispatched from the SAVAK prison and established another 'Shia socialist' eclectic terror organization, also named the MEK. Rajavi's MEK was parallel to the Maoist MEK. After the Islamic Revolution, the main intelligence base of the Maoists, the 'semi-Maoists', and the Rajavists was fascist Iraq, even though Maoist presence in fascist Iraq goes back to years before 1979.

No, the Maoist espionage for the SAVAK was not an aberration away from 'true Maoism'. It was and remains true Maoism itself. Nor was the SAVAK's extensive sponsorship of Maoism a coincidence. It reflected Mao's and China's collaboration with the Iranian regime.

The expansion of the Sino-American intelligence cooperation goes back to long before 1971. Note that during the 1960s the Kennedy Administration and the Johnson Administration both had many progressive-minded officials affiliated with the Roosevelt faction of the Democratic Party. There is no doubt that the influence of the pro-communist F. D. Roosevelt faction in the Democratic Party served as an obstacle against the Sino-American alliance. The rise of the Nixon-Kissinger group, which was under the minimal pressure of the Roosevelt-Kennedy-type Democrats, facilitated the consolidation of the Sino-American alliance. Had the Nixon-Kissinger group been in power since the early 1960s, the alliance with China would have come much earlier than 1970-1971.

Anyways, 1971 certainly marked a new stage in this process:

the White House in November 1971 set up a "back channel" to China through the Chinese delegation to the United Nations in New York. From that point until May 1973, Kissinger traveled secretly to New York about 20 times for talks with the head of the delegation, Huang Hua, later foreign minister. (INTELLIGENCE TIES ENDURE DESPITE U.S.-CHINA STRAIN, The Washington Post, George Lardner Jr., R. Jeffrey Smith, June 25, 1989) (IMG)

The Chinese and the Americans expanded military and intelligence cooperation with each other as early as 1972:

They usually met, Kissinger wrote in his memoirs, "in a CIA-provided 'safe house' in mid-Manhattan, a seedy apartment whose mirrored walls suggested less prosaic purposes." In the fall of 1972, Chinese military officials in New York, sources said, initiated another important contact, with Michael Pillsbury, a Mandarin-speaking U.N. bureaucrat who soon joined the Rand Corp. to work on highly classified research for the Air Force and Defense Department. He kept up his contacts with approval from the think tank and high-level U.S. officials, a fact that sources say had to be established at one point for skeptical FBI agents who kept watch on the Chinese delegation. Pillsbury met regularly with the Chinese -- a three-star general and his aides -- until 1976, sending a stream of still-classified memos to a select circle of U.S. officials, including Kissinger's office. (INTELLIGENCE TIES ENDURE DESPITE U.S.-CHINA STRAIN, The Washington Post, George Lardner Jr., R. Jeffrey Smith, June 25, 1989) (IMG)

In February 24, 1973, Mao met with Henry Kissinger. Mao made it clear that he supported the US military occupation of Europe:

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but we will do our best to strengthen European defenses and keep our armies in Europe.

Chairman Mao: That would be very good.

(My Meeting with Chairman Mao, Memorandum for The President from Henry A. Kissinger, February 24, 1973. I would like to thank my friend Lorant Szabo for sending me the source for this.) (IMG)

Zhou Enlai ('Chou Enlai') too supported NATO and the US agenda throughout the world including in Chile:

—[Chou] thought we should come closer to Japan on defense matters (i.e., the nuclear umbrella) and indicated he agreed that it was preferable for us to join the Japanese in Siberian development than to leave them alone. I emphasized the importance of keeping the Japanese tied to us and not subjected to too many pressures.

—Chou criticized Allende's rashness in Chile and Che Guevara's adventurism. In response to my comments, he in effect said that the PRC would not cause trouble in Latin America.

—I went over our Soviet strategy in some detail, including our rationale for the agreement which you had used during the Middle East alert. He continually sounded their by now familiar preoccupations.

—Chou strongly supported NATO and our troop presence in Europe. He said he would continue to educate European leaders, beginning with Heath who will visit Peking soon.

(SUBJECT: My Visit to China: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, November 19, 1973. In: 'China, 1973-1976', US State Department, p. 438) (IMG)

China formed an alliance with the US, Japan, and pro-American countries in Europe:

Confirmation and deepening of the close identity between you and the Chinese leaders' strategic perspectives on the international situation. As I pointed out after my February 1973 trip, we have become tacit allies. We share essentially the same views about the Soviet strategy (though the Chinese are firmly convinced of Soviet hegemonial ambitions while we still hold out the possibility that our combination of firmness and negotiation can steer Moscow on a constructive course); the necessity of a strong American world role and defense capability; and the strategic importance of Europe, Japan, the Middle East, and the Near East–South Asia axis. (SUBJECT: My Visit to China: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, November 19, 1973. In: 'China, 1973-1976', US State Department, p. 431) (IMG)

Indeed, Mao seemed basically optimistic about containing the Soviet Union, citing his familiar axis of potential or tacit allies in China, Japan, the United States, Europe and the Near East–South Asia axis. He again stressed the importance of our working closely with these countries—maintaining close ties with Japan; keeping our military presence in Europe; and countering Soviet influence in the Middle East (as we were now doing), Pakistan, Iran, India, the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. I outlined our efforts to support these various countries; offset Soviet influence; maintain a strong national defense; keep forces in Europe; anchor Japan securely, etc. (SUBJECT: My Visit to China: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, November 19, 1973. In: 'China, 1973-1976', US State Department, p. 436) (IMG)

China's regime and the Anglo-American imperialists fostered military relations with each other since the Mao era, not since after Mao's death. The British military provided the arms to Mao-era China in 1975 and the Americans did not veto this deal:

Before leaving office as secretary of state, Kissinger took the first steps toward sharing, persuading President Gerald R. Ford in 1975 not to veto a \$200 million British deal with China for military jet engines and in 1976 secretly approving a U.S. sale of two advanced computers with military applications. (INTELLIGENCE TIES ENDURE DESPITE U.S.-CHINA STRAIN, The Washington Post, George Lardner Jr., R. Jeffrey Smith, June 25, 1989) (IMG)

Mao and his gang were indeed militarily sponsored by the MI6. Not for nothing did Stalin regard Mao as a Titoist, and China as another Yugoslavia.

China and Yugoslavia were allies. Hoxha testified:

Mao Tsetung ... expressed his great desire to meet Tito. Tito himself declared recently: "I was invited to China when Mao Tsetung was alive. During the visit of the Chairman of the Federal Executive Veche, Djemal Myedich, to China, at that time, Mao Tsetung expressed to him his desire that I should visit China. Chairman Hua Kuofeng also told me that, five years ago, Mao Tsetung said that he should have invited me for a visit, stressing that in 1948, too, Yugoslavia was in the right, a thing which he (Mao Tsetung) had declared even then, to a narrow circle. But, taking into consideration the relations between China and the Soviet Union at that time, this was not said publicly". (From Tito's speech at the meeting of activists of the SR of Slovenia, September 8, 1978). (Imperialism and the Revolution, Enver Hoxha)

A document declassified by the US State Department confirmed Hoxha's remarks on the Sino-Yugoslav alliance:

Minister Huang: President Tito is the only survivor of the leaders of the Second World War, who led the people in the fight against fascism. Now he is already 85. President Tito expressed the desire to visit Chairman Mao long ago. Chairman Mao had high regard for President Tito. When the Foreign Minister visited China, in 1975, Chairman Mao passed his high regards to Tito. His name means the same as iron, and Mao described him as strong as iron. So, when President Tito came, we paid him a warm welcome. (SUBJECT: Secretary's Dinner for PRC Foreign Minister Huang: Memorandum of Conversation, New York, September 28, 1977. In: 'Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1977-1980', Vol. XIII, US State Department, p. 248) (IMG)

The alliance between Mao's group and Tito's group goes back to as early as 1956 when Mao explicitly endorsed the Yugoslav regime's efforts against the USSR. However, China and Yugoslavia for a while posed as 'enemies' – until 1968. In 1968, China joined the butcher of Kosovo in condemning the Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia. A document co-written by Colonel Donald W. Bernier – the former Director of Foreign Intelligence Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence in the US Department of the Army – stated:

Chinese-Yugoslav relations remained [ostensibly] hostile until mid-1968 when the Peking government suddenly quieted its anti-Yugoslav propaganda. In early 1969 the Chinese invited Yugoslavia to send representatives to Peking to discuss the restoration of political and economic relations, and in February the two countries concluded a trade agreement. Belgrade sources indicated that the resumption of full diplomatic relations was imminent in mid-1970. Initiated by the Chinese, the reconciliation came at a time when both governments were under renewed pressure from the Soviet Union. (Area Handbook for Yugoslavia, Gordon McDonald, Donald Bernier, September 1970, p. 285) (IMG)

A document by the US Air Force confirmed that China and Yugoslavia cultivated ties for a military alliance:

since 1969 Chinese leaders have come to value Belgrade's tenacious independence. (...). The resumption of Sino-Yugoslav contacts in the spring of 1969 through the medium of trade was clearly prompted by anti-Soviet motives, and the cessation of Chinese polemics and a generally warmer atmosphere soon led to the exchange of ambassadors in June 1970.⁸⁸ Just one year later, the Yugoslav Foreign Minister Mirko Tepavac visited Peking. The process of normalizing Sino-Yugoslav relations has been marked by the exchange of economic and cultural delegations, including the perhaps inevitable table tennis teams. By October 1974 things had improved to the

point where a Yugoslav army delegation led by Lt. General Branko Jokovic, Vice-Chief of the General Staff of the Yugoslav People's Army visited Peking to "enhance cooperation between the armies of Yugoslavia and China and friendship between the two peoples."" A year later, in October 1975, Premier Djemal Bijedic visited China amidst a flurry of publicity. Mao Tse-tung received the premier and even conveyed his regards to Tito. Vice-Premier Teng Hsiao-p'ing's welcome speech lauded Yugoslavia's adherence to a policy of nonalignment.... (THE SOVIET THEATER NUCLEAR OFFENSIVE, Office of Director of Defense Research and Engineering & Defense Nuclear Agency, US Air Force, Joseph Douglass, Jr., p. 63) (IMG)

Some would argue that Mao Zedong was 'forced' by the 'revisionist majority' in the Politburo, Central Committee, etc. to make 'concessions' to the American imperialists, that by the early 1970s, Mao had become a 'puppet' of Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping. This kind of an argument reflects a poor understanding of how being a puppet looks like. First of all, had Mao been opposed to collaboration with American imperialism, then Mao would not have survived until 1976. He would have died a 'natural' death. Such a massive level of collaboration with American imperialism could only possibly occur with the agreement of a large part of the Chinese state apparatus with the CIA, and such a pervasive CIA influence would have annihilated the first alleged 'obstacle' to the CIA-collaborationists: the allegedly 'anti-imperialist' Mao Zedong. This would have taken either the form of Mao resigning due to 'poor health' or 'aging'. Alternatively, it would have taken the form of Mao being given an extra-'exalted' position devoid of any real power. Alternatively, it would have taken the form of Mao dying 'naturally' or in an 'accident'. None of these occurred, and Mao survived politically and physically all the way until 1976; a 4-5 year period (from 1971-1972) is way too long a survival for an anti-imperialist leader so highly encircled by pro-imperialist elements.

A supplementary point to mention is that when a leader disapproves of the other government officials' treasonous collaboration with the enemy, such a leader would often refuse to meet the enemy officials who have arrived to one's country; or if having to meet with these officials, such a leader would deliberately signal his/her unease to the world media through facial expressions that signal unease or anger. Mao showed no such signals. On the contrary, he was extremely happy as demonstrated by Kissinger's memorandum and by the photos. If the 'revisionist majority' were able to 'force' Mao to even signal such a great approval of the treasonous collaboration, then again, the 'revisionist majority' would have certainly been so powerful as to ensure that Mao gets demoted or dies. This point about signals does not prove anything, for signals are not concrete evidence. Nonetheless, the point about signals is useful as a supplementary point for the remarks about how Mao survived for so long until 1976.

Nor could there be any motivation on the side of Deng and Zhou to keep Mao in his official position for the purpose of pursuing their agenda while 'hiding behind' Mao's 'charisma'. Deng and Zhou had no shame in pursuing their agenda out in the open, and Mao by then lacked charisma due to such anti-Chinese crimes as the 'Great Leap Forward' and the 'Cultural Revolution'.

Describing the mood of Mao Zedong in the meeting with Henry Kissinger, Kissinger reported:

Mentally [Mao] was extremely impressive, improving his previous performances. He led the conversation, covered all major international issues with subtlety and incisiveness and an unerring knack at striking the essential chords in a seemingly casual way. By the time he was finished he had sketched their strategic vision comprehensively and laid down the essential elements of their policies region by region. He went from issue to issue in an ostensibly random, but always purposeful, manner. And all of this was done without a single note of his own or prompting by Chou, who once again was clearly deferential in his presence.

The Chairman obviously enjoyed himself. Throughout he employed his earthy phrasing and bawdy humor to illustrate a point or color a tone; the females present laughed easily, almost coquettishly and were again at ease in his presence. After the conversation had gone beyond one and three quarters hours, several on the Chinese side looked at their watches and made tentative moves to close out the meeting, but Mao prolonged the talk and toward the end engaged in exchanges on philosophy.

Indeed one of the striking aspects of the visit was the fact that this time Mao presented the bulk of the Chinese positions while Chou generally stuck to details and asking questions and making comments on our positions. Before, Chou had taken his cue from Mao but made extensive substantive presentations of his own.

The Chairman was vigorously supportive of *you* as I have reported. He praised your strong policies, singling out the recent alert and Middle East policy generally. He found your actions much firmer and steadier than the Cuban missile crisis scenario. (SUBJECT: My Visit to China: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, November 19, 1973. In: 'China, 1973-1976', US State Department, p. 435) (IMG)

Another argument that some seek to push for in order to justify Mao's crimes is that China needed the approval of the US for replacing Taiwan as the legitimate representative of China. Helping the CIA in destroying so many countries just to prove to America that China, a very large country, is more worthy than a small island in the Pacific – there are no words available to describe the pettiness and foolishness of such a 'justification' of the crimes committed by China's government. However, even if in the impossible-case scenario, such a point was legitimate, it is still not so empirically correct, because the issue with regards to China was not and could not have been Mao's main priority. Kissinger recalled:

Mao was both patient and somewhat inscrutable on Taiwan and diplomatic relations. He said that the Taiwan issue "is not an important one; the issue of the overall international situation (i.e., the Soviet Union) is an important one." the PRC would not rush us on this question or that of diplomatic relations, he stated. (SUBJECT: My Visit to China: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for



Left: Mao with Kissinger – as Kissinger correctly described, Mao was exhilarated for his meeting with Kissinger. To the world media, Mao was not facially signalling disapproval of Zhou's or Deng's meetings with the US officials.

National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, November 19, 1973. In: 'China, 1973-1976', US State Department, p. 436) (IMG)

Mao's priority was not Taiwan. Mao's priority was with regards to assisting Anglo-American finance capital, the kulaks, the corrupt bureaucrats, etc. to conquer the world; to this end, he collaborated with American imperialism. The favorable attitude towards the CIA goes back to decades earlier when he sympathized with Tito's cause in the fight against the Soviet Union. The military collaboration with Anglo-American imperialism expanded from the 1960s, since the time of China's alliance with comprador Pakistan and its hostile action against India.

Nor did the Eurasians seek to launch a nuclear strike on China; recall the following excerpt of a CIA document:

In the strongest public threat to use nuclear weapons against China ever made by Khrushchev, he warned that it would be "dangerous" to encroach on Soviet borders "given up-to-date weapons of annihilation" in the Soviet arsenal (speech of 15 September 1964). His policy was thus now to "rattle" nuclear weapons toward China, as he had done in the past to many other countries.

However, Mao and his lieutenants were able, given this clearly marked pattern of Khrushchev's behavior, to distinguish a bluff from a real threat of imminent attack. Chinese perception of the credibility of a Soviet threat was highly context-dependent, keyed to the positioning of Soviet forces. Khrushchev had failed to frighten the Chinese into ceasing their border probes because he had not made his threats sufficiently credible, either by deploying tactical nuclear weapons or by a big conventional buildup of regular forces on the frontier.

(THE CHINESE ASSESSMENT OF THE SOVIET MILITARY THREAT, CIA, April 1975, pp. 5-6) (IMG)

Baseless is the argument that the Soviet 'plan' to launch a nuclear-strike on China 'forced' Mao to collaborate with American imperialism. Lastly and above all, Mao's pro-American views are proven by his hostile attitude towards the Stalin-era USSR and his favorable attitudes towards the CIA-MI6 agent Tito and the latter's fascist gang; such attitudes existed in Mao as early as the 1940s and came fully out in the open by the 1970s; the policies of Mao in the 1970s are mere reflections of Mao's views in the 1940s.

Until the early 1990s, China's regime was dominated by the comprador classes – such as bureaucrats and kulaks – allied to finance capital, the Titoist spies of the American secret service. China was allied to all the CIA-sponsored fascist forces in Latin America, including the Pinochet junta. China was allied to the regimes of Sadat, Mubarak, and Nimeiri, to the South African Apartheid and the Titoist gang of Siad Barre, to NATO and the West Germany dominated by the Nazi BND, and to the MI6. One needs not mention China's invasion of Vietnam and the support for the Khmer Rouge. All of these facts have been confirmed by Fidel Castro. Interestingly, ignorant of Fidel Castro's stance on China's regime, the modern-day apologists for Deng also have acknowledged Fidel Castro as an anti-imperialist. Hence, the remarks of Castro will be presented here as evidence (and after reading this, the apologists for Deng will probably denounce Fidel Castro as 'pro-imperialist' 'Hoxhaist' 'orientalist' 'Sinophobe' and 'CIA agent'). Fidel Castro remarked:

We would not be honest if we denied that the progressive and revolutionary movement itself is in serious trouble. The disgusting betrayal of the cause of internationalism perpetrated by the Chinese leaders, their insane political conduct and their shameless alliance with the imperialist powers have been a severe blow to the progressive forces of the world.

Viet Nam, Angola and Cuba, small countries that gained a solid and recognized prestige in the world for the heroic pages they wrote and still write in their determined, firm and unwavering struggle against imperialism **today suffer brutal attacks, hostility and slander campaign of the treacherous Chinese leadership**. In the case of our own homeland, after almost 20 years of aggression and harassment by the United States, which failed to bring it to its knees, we see today the incredible and infamous fact that **the current Chinese leadership justifies the economic blockade of Cuba and the presence of a Yankee naval base in our territory**.

Between the imperialist cable [news] agencies [such as CNN] and those of China, there is absolutely no difference in their foul and intriguing language, in their perfidious and vicious arguments to attack Cuba. Soviet collaboration, which was so decisive for the consolidation and survival of the Cuban Revolution in its most critical years, when the imperialists seized the sugar markets from us and cut off our supplies of food, medicine, fuel, spare parts and essential raw materials, is vilely maligned [in Chinese regime media]. Together with the decisive economic support received, we Cubans will never forget that the weapons with which we defended ourselves in Girón against the imperialist aggressors were weapons supplied by the Soviets (APPLAUSE). And if the United States could not commit genocide against Cuba, with direct aggression, this is largely due to the solidarity and support of the USSR. The historical facts cannot be so blatantly denied. The human word was devised for more noble ends.

The internationalist policy of Cuba, the unlimited generosity of our people, whose children fought in Angola against South African racists to prevent them from taking away from their people the independence they won with 15 years of heroic struggle, and our solidarity in the fight against the Ethiopian Revolution against foreign aggression, promoted by the United States, the NATO powers and the Arab reaction, **are described by the Chinese leaders in the same crude, vulgar and even worse terms than those of the [official] spokesmen of imperialism, in ways more subtle, less downright liars.**

(...). Ever since **they turned a ridiculous mortal [Mao Zedong] into a god in the People's Republic of China, destroyed the party and its best cadres in the days of the mad adventure of the Cultural Revolution and allowed themselves to be carried away by the petty bourgeois spirit and great-power chauvinism, which led them to betray internationalism and to the conversion of a socialist state into a nepotic satrapy, where the rulers' wives and sons-in-law became members of the Political Bureau, everything was made possible.**

What surprise is there that the Chinese government today supports the fascist and bloodthirsty regime of Pinochet and the repressive and reactionary military governments of Latin America?

What surprise is there that [China's government] collaborated with Mobuto and with NATO interventionist forces? Why be surprised that it joined South Africa against Angola; Somalia in its aggression against the Ethiopian Revolution; [the Sadat-Mubarak regime in] Egypt in its policy of separate peace and surrender; to the conservative and reactionary forces of England [i.e. MI6] and the Federal Republic of Germany; to NATO in Europe; to Yankee imperialism everywhere; and to bet rudely and dangerously [China's role in] the inevitability of a third world war?

But of the crimes of the Chinese leadership, the most reprehensible is its hostility to Viet Nam. Everyone knows that **behind Cambodian extremism is Maoism and the Chinese ruling clique**. No one is unaware that they are behind the provocations against Viet Nam. Nobody ignores that it is they who are behind the artificially-created so-called 'Hoa problem'. A whole great chauvinistic propaganda

campaign is currently being developed in China against the Vietnamese and all economic collaboration has been suspended. In this criminal and unscrupulous way the Vietnamese effort to rebuild the country cruelly devastated by the imperialist war is sabotaged.

These attitudes of the Chinese government remind us of the Yankee arrogance against Cuba. In the first years of the Revolution, the imperialists also tried to bring ships without our authorization to transport Yankee citizens; They promoted the emigration of tens of thousands of Cubans, essentially professionals, specialists, and skilled workers; They launched a colossal smear campaign against Cuba and adopted severe economic blockade measures.

Viet Nam, the homeland of the most modest and consistent Marxist-Leninist of our time, the unforgettable and beloved Ho Chi Minh (applause); Viet Nam, the a thousand times heroic people whose patriotic and revolutionary feats astonished the world, is also today a victim of Chinese aggression and betrayal.

Days ago the cables reported violations of the Viet Nam border by squadrons of Chinese military aircraft. If the criminal hand is not stopped in time, we will witness more serious military provocations and aggressions by China against the heroic Viet Nam. That is why we must offer the people of Viet Nam our most determined solidarity and support (EXTENDED APPLAUSE). Our Party intends to reactivate the Solidarity Committees with Viet Nam against the threats of imperialist aggression, implemented this time, however absurd it may seem, through its new and brand-new allies in the field of counterrevolution.

Contempt for peoples, norms and principles has to have a limit, it has to stop at some point, it has to really meet a resistance in the universal conscience.

Not even Albania, a small socialist country that supported it in the initial days of the division of the revolutionary movement, follows China today. The economic collaboration was also withdrawn from her.

The Chinese people themselves, hardworking, combative, self-sacrificing, heroic and revolutionary, will sooner or later settle accounts with the traitors who have laid down their beautiful internationalist flags at the feet of imperialism.

(SPEECH MADE BY FIDEL CASTRO RUZ, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA, IN THE NATIONAL CENTRAL ACT FOR THE XXV ANNIVERSARY OF THE MONCADA BARREL ASSAULT, HELD IN THE SCHOOL CITY "26 DE JULIO", SANTIAGO DE CUBA, ON JULY 26, 1978 , "YEAR OF THE XI FESTIVAL". (SHORTHAND VERSIONS - COUNCIL OF STATE), Cuba.cu. Bold added.) (IMG)

That China's regime was extensively collaborating with the CIA-backed fascist forces around the world is voluminously backed up and corroborated by CIA-sponsored sources, by the Islamic Republic of Iran, and other sources.

To knowingly and willingly allow the CIA to establish a base for military intelligence-gathering in one's own territory constitutes a form of espionage for the CIA. This Deng Xiaoping and his group pursued wholeheartedly. In collaboration with Joe Biden, the American spy Deng Xiaoping and his group promoted the presence of the CIA bases in China as part of the efforts for gathering military intelligence on the Soviets and on any pro-Soviet opposition force that could exist in Chinese territory:

However, a senior administration official, speaking on condition that he not be identified, said in an interview last week that intelligence-sharing has been part of a substantial U.S. "investment" in China since President Richard M. Nixon's historic 1972 visit opening new ties to the West. The official said both countries had profited from this investment and "it is that which we have to balance against our current, justified outrage" over recent Chinese actions. A number of diplomats, legislators and officials said they think the U.S.-China intelligence connections are relatively secure, barring a full-scale trade embargo or a break in diplomatic relations. "The relationship has been mutually useful," said one retired U.S. diplomat. "Both sides have taken care to isolate that cooperation from the ups and downs" of political ties. Knowledgeable sources, who assert that the United States gains more than China does from the intelligence ties, praise President Bush for his relatively low-key reaction to the executions in China and his emphasis on maintaining the U.S.-China "strategic relationship." They said a less measured response could jeopardize the arrangements. But several congressional sources familiar with the ties contend that they are not important enough to muzzle official U.S. criticism of Beijing's behavior, partly because the United States in recent years has developed alternative sources for some of the information. Sen. Joseph R. Biden Jr. (D-Del.), for example, declined to discuss any aspects of the partnership but said, "Whatever military or intelligence arrangements may or may not exist, they cannot add up to a sufficient rationale for failing to act swiftly and on principle with the Chinese government." It was Biden's 1979 conversation with senior Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping during a visit to Beijing that showed Deng's willingness to permit the U.S.-equipped listening posts to help monitor Soviet compliance with the proposed SALT II arms limitation treaty. Deng, The Washington Post reported at the time, made clear that the monitoring stations would have to be run by the Chinese and that Beijing would share the collected data with Washington. The tapes are analyzed in the United States. White House and State Department spokesmen have declined in recent weeks to comment directly on the status of the listening posts or other intelligence ties. At a news conference June 5, however, Bush characterized U.S. Ambassador James R. Lilley as "one of the best listening posts we have in China." Lilley, an old friend of Bush, was the Central Intelligence Agency station chief in China in the mid-1970s when Bush headed the U.S. liaison office there. Several sources indicated that U.S. experts are working at the stations in tandem with their Chinese counterparts and that there now may be more than two stations. "It depends on how you count them," a longtime intelligence expert said. And a former defense official said, "It may very well be that there are principal stations and lesser stations." The intelligence expert said the Chinese "may be doing the low-tech while we do the high-tech" functions. He added: "They might tell us to get out. We have lost facilities in other countries because of political change. But I think it would be one of the last relationships {with China} to go. It was one of the first to arrive." U.S. intelligence-sharing with China goes back to 1971 when Henry A. Kissinger, then White House national security adviser, secretly flew to Beijing to pave the way for Nixon and showed "internal {U.S.} studies" to Premier Zhou Enlai. (INTELLIGENCE TIES ENDURE DESPITE U.S.-CHINA STRAIN, The Washington Post, George Lardner Jr., R. Jeffrey Smith, June 25, 1989) (IMG)

After the 1979 overthrow of the Iranian regime, the CIA and NATO intelligence bases that existed in Kapkan, Iran, were transferred to China for espionage against the Soviets. In particular, the CIA bases were established in Xinjiang. A Military Review journal based in the Russian Federation stated:

Special mention should be made of the EWS radar located on the outskirts of the town of Korla in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. Very interesting history the appearance of this object. After the overthrow of Shah Mohammad Riza Pahlavi in January 1979, American intelligence stations in Iran were eliminated. In this regard, amid the aggravation of relations between the USSR and the PRC, the Americans secretly proposed to create posts in China to monitor Soviet missile tests conducted in Kazakhstan. In Soviet times, this

Union republic was home to the Sary-Shagan missile defense range and the Baikonur cosmodrome, where, in addition to launching launch vehicles, ballistic missiles and anti-missile systems were tested.

The official agreement between the two governments was concluded in 1982. Initially, the United States offered to place American stations on Chinese territory on lease terms. The Chinese leadership insisted that the joint facilities be managed by the PRC, and the operation was conducted in complete secrecy. CIA stations were based in Korla and Tsitai. Missile launches were tracked using radars and by intercepting radio telemetry signals. After the events in Tiananmen Square in 1989, Sino-American cooperation in this area was curtailed, but the intelligence stations, which now functioned only in the interests of China, continued their work.

(State of the Early rocket warning and space control system in China, Topwar, Military Review, Linnik Sergey, November 14, 2019) (IMG)

The Washington Post stated:

The electronic listening posts, at Qitai and Korla in Xinjiang Autonomous Region, were set up in 1980 after the loss of two in Iran. CIA Director Stansfield Turner nailed down some final details on a secret visit to Beijing, complete with disguise, shortly before leaving office. The stations produce better information than those in Iran did concerning Soviet missile tests at Tyuratam and Saryshagan, the sources said. John Pike, an analyst at the Federation of American Scientists, characterized the Saryshagan weapons research center roughly 700 miles to the northwest as "right across the street, electronically speaking." The Reagan administration, despite initial tensions over Taiwan, extended its cooperation to arms sales and dual-use technology. The sources said that China, meanwhile, began selling the CIA most of the small arms it needed for the Afghan rebels. U.S. officials declined to say whether the Bush administration has been holding up its end of the intelligence-sharing relationship since the Tiananmen Square massacre of students three weeks ago. But a knowledgeable source stated without hesitation that "I don't have a high level of concern" about a possible halt in cooperation because of recent official U.S. criticism. "That's not a front-burner issue between our governments and nothing has happened {so far} to push it there," said the official, who is privy to current intelligence reports on the subject. U.S. intelligence-sharing and military ties with China developed slowly, in part because of the Watergate scandal that engulfed Nixon. (INTELLIGENCE TIES ENDURE DESPITE U.S.-CHINA STRAIN, The Washington Post, George Lardner Jr., R. Jeffrey Smith, June 25, 1989) (IMG)

The espionage relationship between Deng's group and the CIA was of course in continuation of the project initiated by Mao Zedong and his gang for the purpose of promoting CIA interests in China. During their intelligence activities for the United States, the American spy Deng and his fascist group were also sponsored militarily by the United States. The US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency confirmed:

We are now in the seventh year of American military exports to China—exports which began in 1981 as a result of an overall liberalization of U.S. trade policy toward Beijing and continued in 1986 with the signing of a multi-million dollar avionics package to upgrade the Chinese F-8 air defense interceptor.

Until the 1980s China was proscribed by U.S. policy from receiving any military items whatsoever. Americans had spilled blood in combat against Chinese forces in Korea, had fought in part to contain China in a long and bitter war in Vietnam, and were not about to assist militarily a real or potential enemy. By the late 1970s, however, what had begun years earlier with the Sino-Soviet split and the subsequent opening to China under the Nixon Administration, crystallized into a major strategic realignment of China. Beijing not only normalized relations with the United States and other Western nations, but also further distanced itself from Moscow in wide areas of human endeavor-political, economic and military.

These sweeping changes soon impacted strongly on American arms transfer policy. In March 1980, the Department of State issued Munitions Control Newsletter No. 81 (MC81), opening the People's Republic of China for the first time to exports of combat support equipment such as trucks, recovery vehicles, certain cargo/personnel-type aircraft and helicopters, some training and communications equipment, and airborne cameras. The following month, the licensing of civilian goods with possible military use (so-called dual-use items) was facilitated by the creation of a new and unique category, P, for China under commodity control export regulations administered by the Department of Commerce.

The new policy permitted exports at a significantly higher level of technology than those for most other communist countries, although certain important restrictions were established:

Approval is not likely when the potential military application is so significant that the export would present an unacceptable risk regardless of the stated end-use. Of particular concern are technologies that would make a direct and significant contribution to nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, electronic and antisubmarine warfare and intelligence gathering.

In subsequent years, the liberalization process continued, highlighted by the removal of China in 1981 from the list of those countries for which it is U.S. policy to deny approval for munitions list exports....

(Underlying Patterns of American Arms Sales to China, Henry J. Kenny, reprint of an essay originally published by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in its report, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1986, dated April 1987, p. 61) (IMG)

The military and espionage collaboration with the CIA was in part aimed at assisting US intelligence in its war against the Red Army and the central government in Afghanistan. Through this military intelligence cooperation, the American spy Deng actively aided Afghanistan's Al-Qaeda terrorists:

Soviet-U.S. relations worsened in December 1979 when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, on the eve of a projected trip to China by Defense Secretary Harold Brown. Deng had already made his public offer of Chinese-operated listening posts and, sources said, Brown picked up the discussion on his arrival in January 1980. Another goal of Brown's visit was to win what one official described as a

Table 2
Licenses and License Values of
U.S. Commercial Arms Transfers to China

	Licenses Issued (number)	License Value (thousands dollars)
FY1982	28	185
FY1983	47	71,459
FY1984	109	82,994
FY1985	154	286,418
FY1986	<u>163</u>	<u>79,527</u>
TOTAL	501	520,583

(Underlying Patterns of American Arms Sales to China, Henry J. Kenny, reprint of an essay originally published by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in its report, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1986, dated April 1987, p. 63) (IMG)

"significant acceleration" in Chinese shipments of arms and military equipment to the Afghan rebels, shipments that continued to grow under President Ronald Reagan. Washington considered the shipments of Soviet-style arms highly valuable because they afforded "deniability" for what was then a largely covert U.S. operation. Both China and the United States bought small arms for the rebels, sources said. They said the United States initially paid to transport China's supplies of arms to rebel bases in Pakistan, and beginning around 1983, the CIA began purchasing most of its own supplies directly from Beijing. The two governments agreed to establish the seismic monitoring posts as part of an "earthquake prediction" program supervised by the U.S. Geological Survey, but funded largely by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. A 1986 Pentagon budget document said the stations would improve identification of underground Soviet nuclear blasts and estimates of their explosive force. Construction of five primary stations, including one that is closer to the Soviet test site than any other in the world, and four secondary stations began in 1984. The construction was completed by 1987. Tapes are mailed every two weeks from the \$3 million stations to Beijing, where they are copied by the Chinese and carried to the embassy for transport to a research center in Albuquerque under diplomatic seal. (INTELLIGENCE TIES ENDURE DESPITE U.S.-CHINA STRAIN, The Washington Post, George Lardner Jr., R. Jeffrey Smith, June 25, 1989) (IMG)

In 1979, the Deng gang launched the invasion against Vietnam in order to sponsor the Khmer Rouge headed by the Yugoslav agent (see C23S7) Pol Pot. This too was at the instigation of the CIA:

President Carter's National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski has admitted, "I encouraged the Chinese to support Pol Pot. . . . Pol Pot was an abomination. We could never support him but China could." But the U.S. did support Pol Pot covertly, including whitewashing his crimes. As Ben Kiernan points out in an indispensable Yale University Law School monograph entitled "Genocide and Democracy in Cambodia," the CIA in May of 1980 "denied that there had been any executions in the last two years of the Pol Pot regime." In fact, half a million innocent people were killed during that period. Even well after the "killing fields" were unearthed, the U.S. continued to legitimize the Khmer Rouge, voting at the U.N. Geneva Conference in 1981 to defeat an ASEAN proposal that the Khmer Rouge be disarmed. (In the Dock With Pol Pot: Uncle Sam, Los Angeles Times, Robert Scheer, June 24, 1997) (IMG) national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski kept pressing for closer ties and scored a breakthrough on a 1978 visit to Beijing, assuring Deng that the United States would accept Chinese conditions for severing relations with Taiwan. (INTELLIGENCE TIES ENDURE DESPITE U.S.-CHINA STRAIN, The Washington Post, George Lardner Jr., R. Jeffrey Smith, June 25, 1989) (IMG)

The Deng regime invaded Vietnam, thus rolling back communist influence in that country while strengthening the leverage power of the Titoist agents of the CIA. Vietnam's government as a result became heavily influenced by CIA-collaborationist Titoist elements that assisted the American imperialists in the efforts to contain the post-Deng anti-imperialist Chinese government.

China's murderous terror regime also supported all the anti-Arab and anti-Shia forces in the Middle East and North Africa. For example, it is a well-known fact that the Sudanese regime headed by the notorious Mossad spy Ja'afar El-Nimeiri and the Sadat-Mubarak group in Egypt fostered a close alliance with China on all fronts, be they military, economic, political, etc. As Castro had stated, China was supporting 'Egypt in its policy of separate peace and surrender'. China's regime also was a sponsor of Saddam's fascist war against Iran. The Islamic Revolution Documents Center, which is an official archives center of the Islamic Republic of Iran, listed Romania, China, and Yugoslavia as three of the sponsors of Saddam's fascist regime in the war:

In addition to the above list, countries such as Switzerland, Sweden, Poland, Yugoslavia, China, Romania, Italy, Singapore, etc. should also be added to the list of Saddam's supporters. (The 80 Countries that Armed Saddam in the War against Iran, Islamic Revolution Documents Center (IRDC), September 22, 2015) (IMG{Titoist-Saddamite Connection})

The CIA reported:

China is the major new entrant into the Iraqi arms supply sweepstakes. Beijing has signed contracts for fighter aircraft, tanks, artillery, ammunition, and spare parts totaling almost \$3 billion. Several reports indicate that China is committed to supply 2,000 tanks over the next five years, some of which have already arrived. Its equipment is attractive because they are similar to much of Iraq's Soviet-supplied arsenal. This avoids the loss of combat effectiveness that would occur if Western equipment were substituted too rapidly for Soviet items. Arms ordered from Egypt, Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia provide a similar advantage.... (IRAN-IRAQ: ARMS PROCUREMENT PATTERNS AFTER TWO YEARS OF WAR, CIA, December 3, 1982, p. 29) (IMG{Titoist-Saddamite Connection})

Also well-known is the Chinese regime's support for Yugoslavia:

The revisionist leadership of China is loyally carrying out this "will" of Mao Tsetung. Hua Kuo-feng seized the opportunity of Tito's visit to China, and especially of his own visit to Yugoslavia, to eulogize Tito, to present him as a "distinguished Marxist-Leninist", a "great leader" not only of Yugoslavia but also of the international communist movement.

In this way the Chinese leadership also openly endorsed all the attacks of the Titoites on Stalin and the Bolshevik Party, on the Party of Labour of Albania, the international communist movement and Marxism-Leninism. The close political and ideological relations of the Chinese revisionists with the Titoites, "Eurocommunists", like Carrillo and company, the backing they give the anti-Marxist, Trotskyite, anarchist and social-democratic parties and groups, show that the Chinese leaders, inspired and guided by "Mao Tsetung thought", are setting up a common ideological front with the renegades from Marxism-Leninism, against the revolution, against the interests of the peoples' liberation-struggle.

(Imperialism and the Revolution, Enver Hoxha)

A Chinese state media article documented the Chinese regime's hailing of Tito as follows:

Tito's most outstanding characteristic is that he upheld the truth and defied brute force, said President Li Xiannian when he was interviewed by Momcilo Stefanovic of the Yugoslav daily Politika. Li Xiannian also characterized Tito as far-sighted, broad-minded, optimistic and ready to seek truth from facts.

Li described Tito as a great Marxist who made outstanding contributions to the communist movement and the national-liberation movement.

"Tito had profound feelings for the Chinese people. Through his visit to China in 1977, relations between the Parties of China and Yugoslavia were resumed, laying a solid foundation for the steady development of relations between the two countries. Tito was a great friend, and will always live in the hearts of the Chinese people," the President said.

(Li Xiannian Gives Impression of Tito, Beijing Review: A Chinese Weekly of News and Views, Vol. 26, No. 36, September 5, 1983, p. 9) (IMG)

Lest one forgets that Pol Pot had worked for Tito's gang in the 1950s, and that China was sponsoring Pol Pot's group in the 1970s and the 1980s. The Deng faction were the enemies of communism. In a 1988 speech, Deng Xiaoping explicitly said:

None of the works of Karl Marx or of Lenin offers a guide for building socialism in China, and conditions differ from one country to another, each having its own unique experience. (We must emancipate our minds and think independently, Deng Xiaoping, originally: May 18, 1988, published online in China Daily: October 10, 2010) (IMG)

No doubt one should not be dogmatic about applying the scientific ideas of Marx and Lenin but to say that none of the works of those gentlemen offered any guide to the construction of a socialist society in China is to grossly exaggerate, and is an indication of Deng's real intention, namely class struggles in favor of the anti-socialist forces.

Fidel Castro also had remarked in that speech cited above: 'What surprise is there that the Chinese government today supports the fascist and bloodthirsty regime of Pinochet and the repressive and reactionary military governments of Latin America?'. Indeed there is no surprise. There was also military collaboration between the Pinochet junta and the Chinese regime. A research paper by the US State Department confirmed that Dengist China provided military support for Pinochet Junta:

Shortly after the coup, China announced that it would continue to support strongly Chile's sovereignty claim over the Antarctic. In 1982, with Chile's acquiescence, China built a base in the Antarctic inside Chile's officially-claimed territory. There was even an attempt at a joint venture for producing military weapons through a negotiation between NORINCO (China North Industries Cooperation) and FAMAE, the Chilean army's weapons company. The venture did not prosper, but according to our sources, General Pinochet was very much interested in reducing Chile's military dependence on the United States, particularly after an arms embargo established by the Carter administration against Latin American dictatorships known for violating human rights. Not surprisingly, after leaving office General Pinochet twice visited China as Commander in Chief of the Army, invited by his Chinese counterpart. (Chile and China: Building Relations Beyond Trade?, Juan Diego, Asian Pacific Program Universidad Diego Portales - Santiago, Chile, Patricio Navia Adjunct, Center for Latin America and Caribbean Studies New York University; Universidad Diego Portales - Santiago, Chile This paper expands upon remarks delivered at the second session of the China-Latin America Task Force, March 6, 2007. The research of the China-Latin America Task Force financed by: Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs of the United States Department of State) (IMG)

China's social-fascists hailed the settlement of borders between fascist Chile (ruled by the Pinochet junta) and Argentina as a means of containing 'Soviet social-imperialist' designs and Cuban 'infiltration' in the region. China's regime media stated:

The border dispute affects not only the two countries but also peace and security on the South American continent as a whole, and Soviet and Cuban infiltration into southern Africa has made Latin American countries quite uneasy. If armed conflict occurs between Latin American countries, it could present the Soviet social-imperialists with openings to exploit. So the agreement to settle the two countries' border issue through peaceful means is not only welcomed by the people of Argentina and Chile, it is also conducive to maintaining peace and security in this region. (Soviet Strategy in Asia, Beijing Review, No. 3, January 19, 1979, p. 27) (IMG)

Of course, that regime media article did not come out directly hailing the Pinochet junta, but the kind of rhetoric they used did reflect the pro-Pinochet attitudes which they harbored. China's regime also provided funding to Nicaragua's fascist 'Contras':

Nicaraguan contra leader Adolfo Calero has confirmed to us an astonishing development that had long been rumored: Arms purchases from communist China help the guerrilla war against the Marxist regime in Managua.

"We have obtained weapons from the People's Republic of China," Calero told our reporter in Central America, Jon Lee Anderson. "In fact, the SAM-7s [antiaircraft missiles] we got were not Soviet, as everybody thought; they were Chinese."

(Red China Sells Arms to Contras, Washington Post, May 5, 1986) (IMG)

In that speech cited previously, Fidel Castro also stated that China collaborated with South Africa. Castro said: 'What surprise is there that [China's government] collaborated with Mobutu and with NATO interventionist forces? Why be surprised that it joined South Africa against Angola...?' The claim of Chinese collaboration with fascist South Africa is proven by the declassified documents. Denouncing the Chinese collaboration with the Apartheid regime, a modern-day South African newspaper presented the documents on collaboration and commented:

In this case, the weapons were sent from China's state-owned arms company, the military industrial behemoth Norinco [i.e. North Industries Corporation], to the South Africans. From there it was distributed with the complicity of the Chinese state to Pretoria's allies: Unita in Angola and Renamo in Mozambique. The list of weapons paints a morbid picture and in one recorded deal included rocket launchers, AK47s, 20,000 rounds of ammunition, and 200 bombs weighing 250kg each.

To hide the trade from prying eyes, and to allow both parties to keep a discreet distance, a middleman was needed. They found a mutual friend in Mobutu Sese Seko's Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo, DRC). Mobutu a renowned kleptocrat, was an ally of Unita's Jonas Savimbi's, close to Washington and Paris and enjoyed a good relationship with Pretoria's military intelligence.

A classified Foreign Affairs memo dated 2 March 1983 details how the conduit was set up. Zaire, with Mobutu's sign-off and for a fee, provided the end user certificates fraudulently identifying Zaire as the final destination for the weapons. In order to complete the ruse, an Armscor front company registered in Geneva, named Adam Export, was used to obscure South African involvement. Zaire agreed to allow two South Africans, through Adam Export, to act on Zaire's behalf in contracting with Norinco.

(Declassified: Apartheid Profits – China's support for apartheid revealed, The Daily Maverick, Open Secrets, October 31, 2017) (IMG)

The newspaper article cited above provided many documents on such collaboration. Some of these documents have been attached to the end of this book in the 'Screenshots' section. I checked the declassified top secret military intelligence documents from fascist South Africa. The documents largely match the claims made by the South African newspaper article cited above. While the larger part of the documents has been attached in the 'Screenshots' section of this book, a screenshot of the list of the types of weapons supplied by China in this case is provided here.

DESCRIPTION
1 RIFLE AK 47 WITH ACCESSORIES
2 MACHINEGUN RPK WITH ACCESSORIES
3 ROCKET LAUNCHER RPKs 7 COMPLETE
4 LAUNCHER SA 7 COMPLETE
5 ROCKET LAUNCHER 75 MM RCL TYPE 56
6 ROUND 7,62 X 25 MM BALL
7 ROUND 7,62 X 27 MM BALL
8 MISSILE PG 7 40 MM
9 MISSILE CG 7 40 MM
10 HAND GRENADE F1
11 HAND GRENADE R 5 42
12 MINE A/T TMBA 3
13 MORTAR BOMB 92 MM
14 ROUND RECOILLESS 92 MM B10
15 ROUND 12,7 MM X 107 MM TYPE B2
16 ROUND 7,92 MM BALL
17 ROUND 7,92 MM BALL
18 ROUND 7,62 MM X 54 MM BALL
19 ROUND 75 MM RECOILLESS HEAT
20 MISSILE SA 7
21 MINE A/T TMBA 3
22 MINE AP OAMB
23 CHARGE EXPLOSIVE 14,5 MM TYPE B541
24 ROUND 7,62 X 29 MM AP TYPE B2
25 ROUND 7,62 X 29 MM TRACER TYPE T45
26 ROUND 7,62 MM X 54 R API
27 ROUND 7,62 X 54 R TRACER
28 ROUND 7,62 X 29 MM PRACTICE
29 GUNS 75 MM RECOILLESS
30 ROUND 75 MM HEAT AND AP
31 MORTARS 120MM
32 LAUNCHERS 122 MM SINGLE AND MULTIPLE
33 MISSILES 122 MM HE
34 MACHINE GUNS 14,7 MM AA
35 MACHINE GUNS 12,7 MM AA
36 CARTRIDGES 14,7 MM HE HEAT I/AP
37 CARTRIDGES 12,7 MM HE HEAT I/AP
38 GUNS 76 MM
39 MORTARS 92 MM
40 BOMBS 92 MM MORTAR HE
41 BOMBS 120 MM MORTAR HE

Both Mao-era and Deng-era China collaborated with American imperialism in all directions in space, in every region of the world. China's reactionary pro-fascist regime very much was the East Asian equivalent of Titoist Yugoslavia. There is no doubt that they who defend the legacy of Deng Xiaoping are objectively supporters of Titoism, international fascism, and Anglo-American imperialist designs.

C23S5.2. Mao-era Chinese Economic Revisionism Decimates China's Economy

Imperialist pro-fascist powers at times create infrastructure (such as railroads) in the colonized zones so to further facilitate the destruction of the productive forces surrounding the imperialist-built infrastructure, but such infrastructure investments do not in the least imply imperialist support for the development of the productive forces; rather, they merely reflect the imperialist-fascist forces' sober analysis that the destruction of productive forces in a colonized zone requires the limited development of the military infrastructure in the colonized zone as a launching pad for the destruction of other productive forces. It is in the nature of finance capital and its comprador allies to seek the dismantlement of the industries and rollback of the productive forces of the colonizable zones. In correlation, it is in the nature of imperialist finance capital to seek the advancement of the industries it dominates in the imperialist heartland to create the mighty industrial backbone at home for imperialist military programs abroad. Hence, the Maoist reactionaries that dominated China, representing the comprador classes allied to Anglo-American finance capital, desired the undermining of China's industry, for with the rollback of industry in China the progressive classes that advance in correlation with industrialization would be rolled back, allowing for the reactionary classes to dominate for longer.

The pro-fascist imperialist powers aim to conquer and colonize territories, not to develop their productive forces. A comprador regime allied to American finance capital will seek to develop its military in order to embark upon pro-imperialist agendas on behalf of its American imperialist allies. Yet, that same comprador regime hinders the development of the productive forces, the industrial backbone that could assist the development of its comprador military. How is such a contradiction to be resolved? It is to be resolved by the fact that such a comprador regime has much more to lose from the numerical rise of a proletarian class in its own territory, whereas economic underdevelopment will prevent the advancement and rise of the progressive classes in the society ruled by the comprador state. The comprador state can expand its military without developing its economy's productive forces – the expansion of the military can occur through purchases of arms from the imperialist powers. Such is part of the reason as to why American finance capital does not develop the productive forces of the countries it colonizes. For the same reasons, China's government could be comprador, aggressively hostile to the communist forces in the Red Army, while still hindering the development of the productive forces in China. The Mao-era policies decimated China's economy. Strategically to this end, Mao Zedong slandered the Stalin-era USSR by claiming that the Soviets gave "everything" to the central authorities and gave no decision-making power to the local authorities. Clearly, this was a lie, since not "everything" regarding the economic planning was in the hands of the central authorities. By slandering the USSR and presenting the Soviet model as lacking the proper balance between central and local authority, Mao fed himself the excuse to render China's economy more decentralized than what the Stalin-Era Soviets would have advised:

The relationship between the central and the local authorities constitutes another contradiction. To resolve this contradiction, our attention should now be focussed on how to enlarge the powers of the local authorities to some extent, give them greater independence and let them do more, all on the premise that the unified leadership of the central authorities is to be strengthened. This will be advantageous to our task of building a powerful socialist country. Our territory is so vast, our population is so large and the conditions are so complex that it is far better to have the initiative come from both the central and the local authorities than from one source alone. We must not follow the example of the Soviet Union in concentrating everything in the hands of the central authorities, shackling the local authorities and denying them the right to independent action.

(...). In short, if we are to promote socialist construction, we must bring the initiative of the local authorities into lay. If we are to strengthen the central authorities, we must attend to the interests of the localities.

At present scores of hands are reaching out to the localities, making things difficult for them. Once a ministry is set up, it wants to have revolution and so it issues orders. Since the ministries don't think it proper to issue orders to the Party committees and people's councils at the provincial level, they establish direct contact with the relevant departments and bureaus in the provinces and municipalities and give them orders every day. These orders are all supposed to come from the central authorities, even though neither the Central Committee of the Party nor the State Council knows anything about them, and they put a great strain on the local authorities. There is such a flood of statistical forms that they become a scourge. This state affairs must be changed.

(ON THE TEN MAJOR RELATIONSHIPS, Speech at an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, Mao Zedong, April 25, 1956. In: Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung, MIA) (IMG)

Mao also said:

Even industries directly under the central authorities need assistance from the local authorities. And all the more so for agriculture and commerce. (ON THE TEN MAJOR RELATIONSHIPS, Speech at an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, Mao Zedong, April 25, 1956. In: Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung, MIA) (IMG)

No reasonable individual disagrees with the notion that some level of local economic authority would have been needed for the material conditions of China. For the material conditions of China, furthermore, China could not swiftly leap to becoming as centralized as the Stalin-era USSR in its economy; centralization needed to happen gradually, but China was not ready to be as centralized in its economy as the USSR.

However, notice what Mao does with regards to the Soviet economic model. He first slanders the Stalin-era Soviet economic model by portraying it as unreasonable and saying that the Soviet system gave everything to the central authorities. And then Mao presents an economic argument that would have been reasonable if and only if his slanderous remarks against the Stalin-era USSR had been correct: China should not follow Stalin-era USSR in centralizing 'everything' into the hands of the central government. In practice, this would mean that China would deviate profoundly from central planning model because unlike what Mao slanderously said, the Stalin-era USSR did not give everything to the local authorities. Such remarks by Mao were a subtle way to promote decentralization and to launch an ideological assault on the central planning system. Mao was so blatantly revisionist.

The Chinese media admitted that the regime has pursued the Yugoslav-style "self-administration" in industry, which was a highly demagogical policy aimed not only towards undermining the efficiency of the management of industry, but was also aimed at decentralizing the economy, hence creating more bureaucracy, under the guise of fighting bureaucracy. China's Premier Po I-Po (Po Yibo) wrote for the Peking Review:

To develop industry at high speed, it is necessary that ... centralized leadership be combined with large-scale mass movements. In 1958, because large-scale mass movements to run industry and to smelt iron and steel were launched, because mass movements in large enterprises with modern methods of production went hand in hand with mass movements in small enterprises with indigenous methods of production, the dreary situation in which a handful of people were relied upon to run industry was brought to an end. and a new, vigorous situation in which the entire people run industry has arisen. This "all the people run industry" movement did more than bring big advances in output; it has also enabled large numbers of people to acquire industrial and technical training and to participate in physical labour, and contributed to the tempering of the people in the course of steel-making. At the same time it has brought about closer integration between industry and agriculture, and between town and countryside. (INDUSTRY'S TASKS IN 1959, Po I-Po, January 6, 1959. In: PEKING REVIEW, January 6, 1959, No. 1, p. 10) (IMG)

The strengthening of the bureaucratic class would entrench the influence of the reactionary forces over the state, at the expense of the influence of the proletariat. The increased influence of such a comprador class would thereby further entrench imperialism. Again, the imperialist-fascist finance capital is often not very keen on developing the industrial backbone of the military of the country it colonizes, for fascist finance capital finds it more efficient to concentrate industry in its own heartland and then to export weapons to the comprador states of the colonized zones. Therefore, it is not at all 'strange' that the comprador forces in China were hindering that country's industrial development.

The Mao faction decentralized the industrialization into the hands of the local communes, and got the Chinese peasant households to establish home-made blast furnaces in their backyards, resulting in the production of extremely poor-quality "iron" and "steel," as opposed to producing such metals in state factories. While denouncing Mao Zedong as a non-communist, Molotov corroborated:

Mao ... was far from a Marxist, of course – he confessed to me that he had never read Marx's Das Kapital.

Only heroes could read Das Kapital. When I was in Mongolia talking with the Chinese ambassador – he was nice to me – I said, "You want to create a metals industry quickly, but the measures you have planned – backyard blast furnaces – are improbable and won't work." I criticized the Chinese, and our people reproved me later. But it was such obvious stupidity! ... Backyard blast furnaces to produce worthless metals – nonsense.

(Molotov Remembers, Interviewer: Feliks Chuev, Interviewee: Vyacheslav Molotov, p. 81) (IMG)

The Chinese media admitted that it pursued such a policy of decentralizing the production of iron and steel:

Fenghuangwo ("Phoenix Nest") is the name of a small iron and steel complex operated by the "May 4" People's Commune in Central China's Hupeh Province. It is among the first to turn out rolled steel produced by small local iron and steel works in the country. This heralds the beginning of a new phase of development for the local steel industry which grew out of the national drive for steel, i.e. the formation of small integrated iron and steel works that combine indigenous and modern methods in the mining of ores, the production of fuels, refractory materials and steel products in addition to pig iron and steel.

An on-the-spot conference was convened in December by the Ministry of Metallurgical Industry in Macheng County, Hupeh Province, where the "May 4" People's Commune is located, to popularize the methods employed there. Small iron and steel complexes that combine indigenous and modern methods are now being set up in many parts of the country.

The Fenghuangwo steel complex has four small blast furnaces, three low-temperature steel-making furnaces, rolling mills, forging hammers, wire-drawing machines, and nail-making machines. It has already produced square sections, strips, round bars, sheets, wire and nails. The rolled steel produced has been used to make diesel engines and electric motors by a local machine-building plant.

This is the culmination of a series of developments in the local iron and steel industry. In August 1958, iron-smelting furnaces employing indigenous methods began to spread like a prairie fire throughout the country as the nationwide battle for steel got under way. They were followed two months later by numerous home-made steel-making furnaces to turn the pig iron produced into steel. As experiences accumulated, the inefficient furnaces were eliminated and those that had stood the test began to be grouped together to form integrated iron and steel making systems and rolling mills and other equipment were introduced.

In this way, production has become normalized and rationalized, the large quantities of steel produced from home-made furnaces can be processed locally and a reliable source of supply has been found for rolled steel and machines urgently needed by the people's communes. This is helping to lay the material foundation for the gradual industrialization of the communes and the mechanization and electrification of agriculture.

(ROUND THE WEEK. In: PEKING REVIEW, January 6, 1959, No. 1, p. 10) (IMG)

The CIA too reported:

By late 1958, according to Chinese Communist propaganda, 6 million new industrial enterprises had been established by rural communes, and as much as one-third of the rural labor force was engaged in such industrial efforts as the ill-fated drive to produce iron in native blast furnaces. (ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF COMMUNIST CHINA'S COMMUNES 1959-60, Economic Intelligence Report, CIA, Office of Research and Reports (ORE), October 1960, p. 29) (IMG)

The decentralization of industrial "development" to the local communes resulted in the production of useless metals, and hence sabotaged the economy. The promotion of Yugoslav-style self-administration created chaos in the economy and prevented the development of industry, and hence prevented heavy industry from coming to the rescue of agriculture. The result of such reactionary, revisionist 'Great Leap Forwards' policies was the disastrous famine in China, which the Chinese regime media downplayed as a "natural" famine, the likes of which had not been seen for "a hundred years past":

China's agriculture suffered extremely serious natural calamities in 1960. Of the more than 1,600 million mu cultivated land in the country, 600 million mu were affected in 1959 and 900 million mu — more than half the total cultivated land — were affected in 1960. The damage done to 309 to 400 million mu was particularly serious last year. Natural calamities of this order have been unknown for a hundred years past. The damage inflicted and the losses have been to a very great extent reduced due to the fact that we have further consolidated the people's communes, which possess great vitality, carried out large-scale construction of water conservancy projects on the farmland and organized the forces of industry and in other fields in an overall way to support the battles against natural calamities and for rehabilitation; and particularly, because the peasants throughout the country waged an intense, stubborn and fearless under the leadership of the Party. Nevertheless, the damage is still very serious. The 1960 production plans on agriculture and light industry which relies on agriculture for its raw materials have not been fulfilled. ('Unite, Rely on the Masses and Struggle For New Victories for World Peace And in Building Socialism at Home'. In: PEKING REVIEW, January 6, 1961, No. 1, p. 8) (IMG)

The famine began "[s]hortly after [the] establishment" of the communes, and the ostensibly-"natural" famine lasted for three consecutive years, according to Chinese media:

Shortly after their establishment, the rural people's communes underwent the severe test of three consecutive years of extremely serious natural calamities. (Collectivization of Agriculture in China, Written for "Cuba Socialista" of Cuba, Liao Lu-Yen. In: PEKING REVIEW, November 1, 1963, No. 44, pp. 13-14) (IMG)

Centralizing agricultural holdings into kolkhozes through the voluntary process is undoubtedly a necessary measure for bringing economic growth, because economic centralization increases efficiency in whichever sector it occurs. However, the collectivization of agriculture would need to occur within the correct pace. Aggressive, forceful, and hasty 'collectivization' of agriculture is a reactionary Trotskyite policy that undermines the economy and brings collectivization into disrepute. The Mao regime refused to acknowledge this fact, and thus launched a Trotskyite leap not into kolkhozes, but into mega-'collectives' that were referred to as the 'People's Communes'. The 'People's Communes' were excessively large pseudo-'collectives' into which the peasants had gotten — and since there was great haste into entering them, suspicion should be raised that the peasants were forced into these so-called 'People's Communes'.

The large-scale economic sabotage and famine inflicted on China resulting from the revisionist decentralization policy of Mao's group, handed Mao the leverage he needed for countering the Lenin-Stalin thesis in support of the prioritization of heavy industry. In his infamous 'critiques' of Stalin's book 'The Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR', Mao explicitly denounced Stalin's theses which entailed the prioritization of heavy industry over light industry and the prioritization of technological growth. In order to promote his own idealist notion of 'mass line', Mao also slandered Stalin for allegedly not caring about the masses at all. Mao said:

Stalin emphasized only technology, technical cadre. He wanted nothing but technology, nothing but cadre; no politics, no masses. This too is walking on one leg! And in industry they walk on one leg when they pay attention to heavy industry but not to light industry. Furthermore, they did not point out the main aspects of the contradictions in the relationships among departments of heavy industry. They exaggerated the importance of heavy industry, claiming that steel was the foundation, machinery the heart and soul. Our position is that grain is the mainstay of agriculture, steel of industry, and that if steel is taken as the mainstay, then once we have the raw material the machine industry will follow along. (Concerning Economic Problems Of Socialism In The USSR, Mao Zedong, November 1958, Source: Long Live Mao Zedong Thought, a Red Guard Publication) (IMG)

A few years later, what Mao wished for, i.e. the de-emphasis on heavy industry, was implemented. By 1960, when the Chinese economy was greatly damaged, when the development of the productive forces and the rise of a proletarian class in China was hindered, it became easier for the Mao faction to lobby for the further rollback of what remained of the scientific socialist economic policies. Indeed, again, Mao stated that the de-emphasis on heavy industry for which he had long fought, was "truly put into effect in 1960," and — in contrast to the scientific socialist line which promoted the allocation of not only money but also goods (e.g. steel) for the development of more heavy industry — proudly boasted that China prioritized the allocation of steel to agriculture as opposed to allocating steel to the development of more heavy industrial infrastructure:

38. Priority Growth in Producing the Means of Production;

Concurrent Promotion of Industry and Agriculture

On page 466 the problem of priority growth in producing the means of production is addressed.

Priority growth in producing the means of production is an economic rule for expanded reproduction common to all societies. If there are no priorities in producing the means of production in capitalist society there can be no expanded reproduction. In Stalin's time, due to special emphasis on priority development of heavy industry, agriculture was neglected in the plans. Eastern Europe has had similar problems in the past few years. Our approach has been to make priority development of heavy industry the condition for putting into effect concurrent promotion of industry and agriculture, as well as some other concurrent programs, each of which again has within it a leading aspect. If agriculture does not make gains few problems can be resolved. It has been four years now since we proposed concurrent promotion of industry and agriculture, though it was truly put into effect in 1960. How highly we regard agriculture is expressed by the quantity of steel materials we are allocating to agriculture. In 1959 we allocated only 590,000 tons but this year (including water conservancy construction) we allocated 1.3 million tons. This is truly concurrent promotion of industry and agriculture.

Here the text mentions that between 1925 and 1958 production of the means of production in the Soviet Union increased 103 times, while consumer goods increased 15.6 times. The question is, does a ratio of 103:15.6 benefit the development of heavy industry or not? If we want heavy industry to develop quickly everyone has to show initiative and maintain high spirits. And if we want that then we must enable industry and agriculture to be concurrently promoted, and the same for light and heavy industry.

Provided that we enable agriculture, light industry, and heavy industry to develop at the same time and at a high rate, we may guarantee that the people's livelihood can be suitably improved together with the development of heavy industry. The experience of the Soviet Union, no less than our own, proves that if agriculture does not develop, if light industry does not develop, it hurts the development of heavy industry.

(A Critique of Soviet Economics, Mao Zedong, originally published in: 1967. Translated version published by: Monthly Review Press, Translated by: Moss Roberts, Annotated by: Richard Levy, With an Introduction by: James Peck, New York and London, 1977) (IMG)

This revisionist and reactionary policy continued on in China, with Mao's full support. As late as 1964, Mao remarked:

Whom is Industry to serve? It should be made to serve agriculture. Of course, there is the question of interrelationship between sectors of heavy industry, but the whole spectrum of industry should be made to serve agriculture. (SOME INTERJECTIONS AT A BRIEFING OF THE STATE PLANNING COMMISSION LEADING GROUP, Mao Zedong, May 11, 1964. In: SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG, Vol. 9: years 1963-1971, 1st edition: 1994, p. 85) (IMG)

On the surface, Mao's claim is obviously 'true'. After all, as Mao rightly claimed, industry should indeed serve agriculture; however, agriculture should serve industry as well, since the economic sectors are interconnected. So why was Mao making such an obvious point? The policies pursued by the Chinese regime shed light on Mao's intentions from stating this. The reason why this kulak-minded intellectual was making such a point was to promote his reactionary line against the emphasis on heavy industry over light industry, and to subordinate the process of industrialization to the agricultural communes. In its context, the phrase 'Industry ... should be made to serve agriculture' really meant subordinating industry to the agricultural communes, and emphasizing the role of agricultural light industry over heavy industry. In doing so, Mao could demagogically promote self-administration in industry, since the self-management principle was the principle by which communes were run, hence to systematically decentralize industry. In doing so, Mao could also prevent the prioritization of heavy industry, and thus to prevent the rapid industrialization of China. This is why at that time period:

All industrial sectors are now going over to following the policy of taking agriculture as the foundation of the national economy, and an industrial system in the service of farming is gradually being set up. (Collectivization of Agriculture in China, Written for "Cuba Socialista" of Cuba, Liao Lu-Yen. In: PEKING REVIEW, November 1, 1963, No. 44, p. 13) (IMG)

C23S5.3. The Great Anti-Proletarian Anti-Cultural Counter-Revolution

China was burning. As though inspired by Goebbels's book-burning campaign and the Mongol invasion, Maoist barbarians launched a campaign of savage terror to turn libraries into ashes, ransack houses, humiliate as they please, etc. During that time period, Albania had pursued the correct policy of temporarily allying with China's left-deviationist regime in order to counter the right-deviations advocated by the Kremlin Titoists. As a country that was officially friends with China, the Albanians were not uncritical, however. In a speech to the Central Committee of the Party of Labour of Albania in October 1966, Comrade Hoxha remarked:

The "Red Guards" are changing the names of the streets and restaurants, because they had a reactionary content, writing dazibaos and criticizing anyone just as they please, ransacking houses and putting the dunce's cap on kulaks and reactionaries and parading them through the streets and squares; it is said they are wrecking the graves of foreign imperialists and, what is more dangerous, they are attacking party committees, burning libraries and paintings, destroying old monuments, etc. (Some Preliminary Ideas about the Chinese Proletarian Cultural Revolution: Speech to the 18th Plenum of the CC of the PLA, Enver Hoxha, October 14, 1966. Source: Text from Enver Hoxha. Selected Works Vol. IV. Toronto: Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin Institute. 1983. pp. 94-114. MIA) (IMG)

At the instigation of Mao Zedong, Maoist barbarians started a civil war in China, attacked China's military sites, "badly battered" the supposed 'capitalist-roaders', and thus sowed anarchy in China. They were assisted in this process by the Mao regime's military force, the "People's Liberation Army," and thus launched a Trotskyite military coup against local party committees, all in the name of fighting revisionism. The Chinese state media reported:

PROLETARIAN revolutionaries are uniting to seize power from the handful of persons within the Party who are in authority and taking the capitalist road. This is the strategic task for the new stage of the great proletarian cultural revolution. It is the decisive battle between the proletariat and the masses of working people on the one hand and the bourgeoisie and its agents in the Party on the other.

This mighty revolutionary storm started in Shanghai. The revolutionary masses in Shanghai have called it the great "January Revolution." Our great leader Chairman Mao immediately expressed resolute support for it. He called on the workers, peasants, revolutionary students, revolutionary intellectuals and revolutionary cadres to study the experience of the revolutionary rebels of Shanghai and he called on the People's Liberation Army actively to support and assist the proletarian revolutionaries in their struggle to seize power.

Chairman Mao's great call received an immediate enthusiastic response from the revolutionary masses and the commanders and fighters of the Peoples Liberation Army. The proletarian revolutionaries who have formed a mighty force are capturing one citadel after another in certain places and units, where the handful of persons within the Party who are in authority and taking the capitalist road have been entrenched, and are then consolidating these captured positions one by one. The storm of the "January Revolution" is now sweeping the whole country.

The ranks of the handful of persons within the Party who are in authority and taking the capitalist road have been badly battered.

(On the Proletarian Revolutionaries' Struggle to Seize Power, In: Peking Review, Vol. 10, No. 6, Feb. 3, 1967, pp. 10-15) (IMG)

To combat the right-deviationist, revisionist, Titoist, and/or "capitalist-roader" elements in the Party, the correct policy would have been to purge the Central Committee through socialist legality and strong counter-intelligence operations. Rallying the workers and peasants into the streets to create pressure from below so to force the right-deviationists to back down would have also been a useful means of pursuing the purges. Such methods would have been employed had there been a communist leadership. However, Mao's group were not communists, but more so reminisced the Mongol invaders. Mao's group instead got the masses into the streets, not so much to create pressure from below for pursuing legal purges, but to launch a unique combination of a colour revolution, a series of local military coups, and a civil war. At a time when China was not even remotely resembling the dictatorship of the proletariat, Mao's group launched a colour revolution against the people of China. China's state media, reporting on the remarks of Mao Zedong, stated:

Our present revolution – the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is a revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat, and we have launched it ourselves. This is because a portion of the structure of proletarian dictatorship has been usurped and no longer belongs to the proletariat, but to the bourgeoisie. Thus, we had to make revolution. The Central Committee Cultural Revolution Group must ponder

over it and write articles. This is called “Revolution Under the Dictatorship of the Proletariat.” This is a very important theoretical problem. (Talks At Three Meetings With Comrades Chang Ch’un-ch’iao And Yao Wen-yuan, February 1967. In: Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung. SOURCE: Long Live Mao Tse-tung Thought, a Red Guard Publication. In: MIA) (IMG)

Additionally, in line with the ‘Cultural Revolution’ agenda, Mao seemed to be implying that people coming from bourgeois or feudal family backgrounds should be named publicly. Mao said:

Class identifications should be drawn in all units, factories, streets, schools, and official organs. (SOME INTERJECTIONS AT A BRIEFING OF THE STATE PLANNING COMMISSION LEADING GROUP, Mao Zedong, May 11, 1964. In: SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE-TUNG, Vol. 9: years 1963-1971, 1st edition: 1994, p. 85) (IMG)

Was this a campaign of naming-and-shaming people just because of their bourgeois or feudal family background? To analyze an individual’s personality and motivations, an examination of the individual’s class roots is very important; however, to publicly name and shame swathes of individuals exclusively for their family class roots, and without regard to whether or not the individuals’ behaviour and actions are in line with their class roots, is a disgracefully left-opportunist measure. One may hope that the parasitic kulak-rooted left-opportunist intellectual Mao Zedong was intending no such a disgraceful move.

C23S5.4. The Sino-Eurasian Split / China’s Social-Chauvinist Aggression against Eurasia *** IMG-All-{China}

The Bukharinites and Trotskyites were overtly ‘hostile’ to each other but covertly allied in a pincer secret service assault against Soviet power. There is much evidence that the Maoist left-opportunists of China and the Khrushchevian right-opportunist administration in Eurasia were overtly ‘hostile’ but covertly allied, so to engineer a split in the international communist movement. One thing is for sure and well-documented: **the Mao clique and the Khrushchev group were both agents of the Yugoslav regime. Hence the avenue of the covert alliance, the key link, between the Mao clique and the Khrushchev group was via Yugoslavia.** Not all secretly-allied ostensibly-‘contradicting’ reactionary forces foster their secret alliance via secret direct connections. Sometimes, they add an additional layer of covertness, by having an intermediary – such as Yugoslavia – serve as the bridge linking them. Furthermore, throughout their careers, both the Mao clique and the Khrushchev group supported the same agendas. The Khrushchev group and the Mao clique both supported an alliance with USA, both denounced Stalin, both praised Tito and supported Yugoslavia, both supported the Sino-Eurasian split (and no, neither side’s contribution to the Sino-Eurasian split was unintentional), both supported economic decentralization, both supported the shift of emphasis away from heavy industry onto light industry, both supported the partition of Eurasia, both supported de-budgeting the Red Army, and both opposed the Peoples’ Democracies in Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Romania, and Cuba. Deceptively, however, they divided their tasks such that one side pursues such agenda through left-deviation and ostensible ‘anti-revisionism’ whereas the other side pursues such an agenda through right-deviation and blatant revisionism. I do not seek to imply that either of Khrushchevian Eurasia and Maoist China were at the time anywhere as dominated by the reactionary forces as the regimes of Israel and Saudi Arabia, but I also cannot avoid seeing a major functional analogy in one respect: the Saudi regime and the Israeli regime, both allied to the United States, vehemently denounced each other, aiming to polarize the Middle East situation into ‘Ishmaelite’ anti-Semitism vs. Zionist anti-Arabism; analogously, the Chinese leadership was virulently Maoist left-opportunist, whereas the ‘enemies’ of the Maoists – the Khrushchevians – were sickening right-opportunists, and these two reactionary currents – both allied to the Yugoslav regime, the number fifth columnist state of the Anglo-American imperialists – were aiming to split the anti-imperialist camp through such polarizations into the left-opportunist and right-opportunist ‘poles’. Critics would say that this is a conspiracy theory. Actually, in light of the evidence that both China and Eurasia were allied to Yugoslavia and both fought for Titoism, one from the left flank and the other from the right flank, the mainstream media narrative that the Maoist-Khrushchevian dispute was ‘genuine’ sounds all the more conspiracy-theoretic. I ask such critics: in light of Peking’s and Moscow’s alliance with Yugoslavia and their pursuit of a Titoist agenda worldwide, what evidence do you have that the Maoist-Khrushchevian dispute was any more real than the many fake ‘disputes’ and fake ‘conflicts existing between the many CIA-backed factions worldwide? The evidence for the Maoite-Khrushchevian connection via Yugoslavia and the service both of them to the same reactionary causes has been provided throughout this chapter. This all the more exposes the fake character of the Mao-Khrushchev ‘dispute’. The split between Eurasia and China was very real, but the ‘split’ between Mao and Khrushchev was not – both of those men and their respective cliques were, through Yugoslav intelligence, allies in engineering such a real Sino-Eurasian split. It is the turn of the critics to provide evidence supporting their hypothesis that the Maoite-Khrushchevian ‘dispute’ was real.

Note that the Khrushchevians are not to be confused with the Brezhnev-era Eurasians. During the Brezhnev era, the communist faction saw a partial resurgence in its influence, and hence the Sino-Eurasian conflict became a real thing. However, before the Brezhnev era, there is not even a shred of evidence of seriousness in the ‘fight’ between the Khrushchev group and the Mao clique.

Khrushchev definitely needed an excuse with which to expel China from the bloc; the excuse he had was given to him by Mao’s fake ‘anti-revisionist’ stance.

Khrushchev’s group served American interests through blatant advocacy for capitulationism and liberality, whereas Mao’s group served American interests through left-wing sectarianism. Mao and Khrushchev both had open friendly contacts with the CIA operative Anna Louise Strong. Khrushchev’s group would blatantly bash Stalin, whereas Mao’s group would – under the cover of ‘comradely criticism’ – slander Stalin as a pro-American tyrant worse than the feudal lords. Khrushchev’s group would seek to hand Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Romania over to the West through capitulationism and ‘liberalism’, whereas Mao’s group would conspire to give those countries over to the West by slandering their parties as ‘revisionists’, renegades, ‘cliques’, etc. That the Kremlin Titoists headed by Khrushchev ended almost all Eurasian economic cooperation with China was certainly beneficial to Mao’s group, firstly because it gave the latter greater leverage for pushing China into the camp of the United States – as it finally happened all the more blatantly in the 1970s – and also helped them severely cut China’s economic ties to the ‘revisionist’ ‘clique’ of the Czechoslovak communists headed by Novotny, and hence to undermine the ‘revisionist’ Czechoslovakia (see C22S9). The ceasing of Eurasian economic cooperation with China also helped undermine the DPRK, whom the Chinese regime frequently insulted since the 1960s. Hoxha recalled:

Many a time later I have turned back to this period of the history of the Communist Party of China, trying to figure out how and why the profoundly revisionist line of 1956 [adopted by the Chinese] subsequently seemed to change direction, and for a time, became “pure”, “anti-revisionist” and “Marxist-Leninist”. It is a fact, for example, that in 1960 the Communist Party of China seemed to be strongly opposing the revisionist theses of Nikita Khrushchev and confirmed that “it was defending Marxism-Leninism” from the distortions which were being made to it, etc. It was precisely because China came out against modern revisionism in 1960 and seemed to be adhering

to Marxist-Leninist positions that brought about that our Party stood shoulder to shoulder with it in the struggle which we had begun against the Khrushchevites.

However, time confirmed, and this is reflected extensively in the documents of our Party, that in no instance, either in 1956 or in the '60s did the Communist Party of China proceed or act from the positions of Marxism-Leninism.

In 1956 it rushed to take up the banner of revisionism, in order to elbow Khrushchev out and gain the role of the leader in the communist and workers' movement for itself. But when Mao Zedong and his associates saw that they would not easily emerge triumphant over the patriarch of modern revisionism, Khrushchev, through the revisionist contest, they changed their tactic, pretended to reject their former flag, presented themselves as "pure Marxist-Leninists", striving in this way, to win those positions which they had been unable to win with their former tactic. When this second tactic turned out no good, either, they "discarded" their second, allegedly Marxist-Leninist, flag and came out in the arena as they had always been, opportunists, loyal champions of a line of conciliation and capitulation towards capital and reaction. We were to see all these things confirmed in practice, through a long, difficult and glorious struggle which our Party waged in defence of Marxism-Leninism.

(The Khrushchevites, Hoxha)

With the rise of the Brezhnev faction, Titoism saw some – albeit not total – decline in Eurasia and some of the right-deviations by Khrushchev's group were checked. Since Mao's group could no longer so easily attack Brezhnev from the left, Mao's group decided to attack from the right and thus in 1971 unmasked itself as the ally of US intelligence that it had always been. Failing to distinguish between the People's Republic of China and the leadership of the People's Republic of China, some naïvely think that US conspiracies against China meant US conspiracies necessarily against Mao's group. In fact, contrary to what some naïvely think, during the first years of the People's Republic of China, when the Anglo-American intelligence services hatched plots against that country, waging bloody battles against it, the People's Republic of China undoubtedly would have seen damage from such US actions, but Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and Deng Xiaoping – representing the anti-Soviet kulak elements in the Chinese Party and state apparatus – would have benefited from US hostility towards revolutionary China, for it would have allowed them to weaken the leverage of the 'Stalinist' Soviet intelligence agents in China, hence to leave greater leverage for the enemies of 'Stalinism', namely Mao, Liu, Deng and other Titoists who had their social base in kulak reaction. There is no doubt that US action against China helped Mao's group in their secret service conflict to reduce 'Stalinist' Soviet influence in China.

Nikita Khrushchev desired to make extreme threats against China so to increase leverage for Titoist elements in China so that the latter can push China farther and faster into America's camp. This is why Khrushchev made his famous nuclear threats against China:

In the strongest public threat to use nuclear weapons against China ever made by Khrushchev, he warned that it would be "dangerous" to encroach on Soviet borders "given up-to-date weapons of annihilation" in the Soviet arsenal (speech of 15 September 1964). His policy was thus now to "rattle" nuclear weapons toward China, as he had done in the past to many other countries.

However, Mao and his lieutenants were able, given this clearly marked pattern of Khrushchev's behavior, to distinguish a bluff from a real threat of imminent attack. Chinese perception of the credibility of a Soviet threat was highly context-dependent, keyed to the positioning of Soviet forces. Khrushchev had failed to frighten the Chinese into ceasing their border probes because he had not made his threats sufficiently credible, either by deploying tactical nuclear weapons or by a big conventional buildup of regular forces on the frontier.

(THE CHINESE ASSESSMENT OF THE SOVIET MILITARY THREAT, CIA, April 1975, pp. 5-6) (IMG)

The CIA and RAND Corporation official Myron Rush wrote:

Moreover, despite the heightened tension between the Soviet Union and China in the early 1960s, Khrushchev made no serious effort to build military power along the Soviet border with China. This began only after Brezhnev came to power. (The Soviet Military Build-up and the Coming Succession: A Review Essay. Reviewed Work: 'Stalin's Successors: Leadership, Stability, and Change in the Soviet Union' by Seweryn Bialer. Review by: Myron Rush. Source: International Security, Spring, 1981, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Spring, 1981), p. 183. Published by: The MIT Press) (IMG)

While engaging in nuclear threats against China, Khrushchev did nothing to actually build up the Red Army presence in the border with China – and that was the point; the whole point of Khrushchev's nuclear threat-statements was not to actually bully the Chinese regime but to rather strengthen it, by giving it the excuse to boost its CIA-backed hostility towards Eurasia. The nuclear threats were not for the purpose of suppressing China, but were rather aimed at wedge-driving and division-sowing, so to push China further away from Eurasia and onto the US camp. Again, if that was not the case, then why did Khrushchev not build up and militarize the Eurasian border against China? If Khrushchev was so serious about confronting the Chinese, so serious and fanatical as to 'plan' a nuclear attack on China, then why did he act as an obstacle to the militarization of the border against China? Some would say that Khrushchev did not militarize the border because that would have strengthened his communist rivals in the Red Army, but that only goes on to reaffirm the strong positive correlation of the interests of the Khrushchev faction and the Mao faction exemplified in their pincer opposition to the communist faction of the Red Army – they both were hostile to the communist faction of the Red Army, and were thus fighting on the same side of history.

On the other hand, the rise of the communist-coopted Brezhnevian group meant that Khrushchev's nuclear threats against China would be abandoned:

By contrast, the post-Khrushchev Soviet leadership avoided threatening China with a nuclear strike.... (THE CHINESE ASSESSMENT OF THE SOVIET MILITARY THREAT, CIA, April 1975, p. 6) (IMG)

By refusing to make these nuclear threats, the communist-coopted Brezhnevian group also refused to hand the Mao-Liu group the excuse for pushing China further into America's camp. This helped Eurasia weaken imperialist influence in China. At the same time, knowing that the Chinese regime was a Trotskyite state and a covert satellite of Yugoslavia, the communist-coopted Brezhnevian group strengthened Eurasian defenses against China. Referring to the Brezhnev Administration, the CIA stated,:

The Soviet leaders were willing, however, to make moves which were more costly in terms of committing military manpower and resources to the border area. (THE CHINESE ASSESSMENT OF THE SOVIET MILITARY THREAT, CIA, April 1975, p. 6) (IMG)

Recall that Myron Rush too had remarked:

serious effort to build military power along the Soviet border with China ... began only after Brezhnev came to power. (The Soviet Military Build-up and the Coming Succession: A Review Essay. Reviewed Work: 'Stalin's Successors: Leadership, Stability, and Change

in the Soviet Union' by Seweryn Bialer. Review by: Myron Rush. Source: International Security, Spring, 1981, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Spring, 1981), p. 183. Published by: The MIT Press (IMG)

The Eurasians therefore pursued the correct policy of strengthening their defenses against Yugoslavia's East Asian satellite and ultra-reactionary Pakistan's ally, China:

Since 1966 the Soviets have more than doubled the total number of tactical aircraft opposite China. A new tactical air was created in the Transbaykal MD Mongolia area which now has 300 aircraft, making it the second largest Soviet tactical air army. Another 230 combat tactical aircraft are in the Far East. These numbers continue to grow. Over 30 airfields have been either renovated or constructed along the Chinese border. Eight of these are in Mongolia and are as yet unoccupied. Most of the newly activated tactical air regiments are equipped with older model aircraft (MIG-17 and IL-28). These aircraft are better suited for ground attack and reconnaissance missions than for air defense. The air forces opposite China have a much higher percentage of the new Mi-8 helicopters than do those opposite NATO. (THE SOVIET BUILDUP AGAINST CHINA: DIMENSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS: SPECIAL MEMORANDUM, CIA, Board of National Estimates, May 6, 1969, p. 5) (IMG)

The communist-coopted Brezhnev group militarily confronted China's regime while minimizing nuclear threat-statements, whereas the Khrushchev group maximized provocative nuclear threat-statements without a tough military stance against China. The communist-coopted Brezhnev group materially contained the Mao group, whereas the Khrushchev group opposed the material containment of the Chinese regime and phrasemongered in a manner ostensibly 'opposed' to, but practically beneficial to, the Chinese regime.

Deng Xiaoping and Zhou En-Lai both began to covertly promote the narrative that China will go to war with Eurasia:

The Chinese were aware of the Soviet buildup, and they seem to have had an increased sense that a war with the USSR, including the engagement of major ground forces, was a real possibility. This view was privately expressed by Chou En-lai in early 1966 and by Teng Hsiao-ping (among others) in mid-March. However, they still apparently did not perceive the threat of a major war as imminent: they spoke only of an "eventual" or an "inevitable" war with the USSR. Nevertheless, the USSR in fact had become the PRC's principal enemy, although not yet in official statements and documents. (THE CHINESE ASSESSMENT OF THE SOVIET MILITARY THREAT, CIA, April 1975, p. 6) (IMG)

China's leaders, hypocritical opportunists as ever, suddenly began to trumpet the narrative that China would be nuclear-attacked by the 'Soviet social-imperialists', just when the Eurasians gave up on their nuclear threats:

Chou and Teng in early 1966 had been speaking about Soviet conventional forces, but shortly thereafter, the Chinese for the first time seemed to take seriously the possibility that the Soviets would use nuclear weapons against them, whether in escalation of the border conflict or in a massive disarming strike. This new assessment was reflected in a public interview given by former Foreign Minister Chen Yi, who declared that:

Soviet missiles may one day fly from Moscow to Peking. Peking is already an atomic target. (Quoted by a Uruguayan newsman in Marcha, 1 May 1966.)

(THE CHINESE ASSESSMENT OF THE SOVIET MILITARY THREAT, CIA, April 1975, p. 6) (IMG)

With regards to China's military-industrial complex vis-a-vis the Eurasians and the Red Army, the Maoist infantile left-deviationists in China actually played an ironically progressive role. While the Chinese regime's so-called 'Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution' was overall reactionary, it did have a progressive aspect to it: it weakened China's military-industrial complex vis-a-vis Eurasia. The Mao-Deng group represented comprador bourgeois elements serving American imperialists under the cover of 'socialism'. One must remember that later on, Mao's group launched an aggression against the Eurasians by ambushing and terrorizing the Red Army troops. It follows that embracing damage to China's military and economy for that time period, far from being a chauvinist stance, is actually anti-chauvinist because China, a Yugoslav satellite, was pursuing an aggressively pro-American and anti-Eurasian chauvinist agenda. Whether out of opportunism or out of naivete, they who argue against the infliction of material damage upon the Maoist Chinese military are promoting a chauvinist line. Make no mistakes! Insofar as it damaged China's military-industrial backbone, the so-called 'Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution' was objectively great, proletarian and revolutionary in character.

By undermining China's economy and military at the time, the so-called 'Great Proletarian Cultural Revolutionaries' also unintentionally punished the Chinese regime for its violent, aggressive, and hostile stance against India, the country that had allied to Stalin-era USSR and which had assisted the UAR in hijacking Tito's 'Non-Aligned Movement' and which had refused to join the Moscow Titoists in slandering Abdel-Salam Aref for his non-existent 'genocide' 'against' Kurds. China's aggressive measures against India in 1962 had assisted the CIA in boosting its direct intelligence presence in India and thus had severe repercussions in the South Asia region. It is interesting to note that China's aggression against India took place around the same time as Morocco's invasion of Algeria and the Saudi regime's war on pro-Nasserist fighters in Yemen. On the surface, these three wars of aggressions may appear as irrelevant. In reality, they are very relevant, for they were all wars launched against the trade partners and allies of the United Arab Republic, and were in part aimed at containing and bogging down the UAR on several fronts. They had a direct role in causing inflation and severely weakening the Abdel-Nasser faction in Egypt by 1965. The social-chauvinist Mao-Deng group had the blood of so many Indian and Eurasian troops on their hands.

The CIA and DIA had differing intelligence assessments with regards to how much China had militarily recovered from the 'Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution', but they both agreed that the 'Cultural Revolution' had indeed damaged China's military:

The upheavals of the Cultural Revolution interfered with military training and degraded the combat capabilities and readiness of the Chinese Armed Forces. But the extent of this degradation and the degree of its persistence up to the present time is in dispute. CIA and INR believe that the level of training is still well short of normal in the army because of continued heavy involvement in non-military activities and that progress in extricating the People's Liberation Army (PLA) from these tasks will be slow. DIA and NSA, on the other hand, believe that training in the army approached normal levels in 1968 and that any residual degradation in combat readiness and effectiveness is slight. (...). In conventional combat against a modern opponent, however, each branch of the PLA would have critical weaknesses. Army units are believed to be seriously deficient in motorized transport and heavy armament; the air defense system probably lacks an adequate communications and data processing capability and could not withstand a large-scale, sophisticated air attack; and China's navy, while growing, is still little more than a coastal defense force. (...).

Air Forces. All elements of China's air defense apparently have been improved. Command and control capabilities have probably increased, more and better radars have been deployed at an increasing rate, and Mig-19 production probably has recovered from the

Cultural Revolution. SAM deployment, however, has been proceeding slowly and we are increasingly uncertain about Chinese plans for producing the Mig-21. There is some evidence that an aircraft of native design based on the Mig-19 has been produced in China. (...). Naval Forces. With few exceptions, naval shipbuilding programs appear to have recovered fully during 1969 from the Cultural Revolution, and current expansion of shipyards indicates that new programs could be planned. Greater emphasis is being placed on production of larger, longer range ships capable of extended patrols. Construction of R-class submarines now averages about two units a year, and China has begun to build destroyers. Old destroyers are being converted to carry cruise missiles.

(COMMUNIST CHINA'S GENERAL PURPOSE AND AIR DEFENSE FORCES, National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 13-3-70, Washington, June 11, 1970. In: 'National Archives, RG 59, INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 110, National Intelligence Estimates, NIE 13-3-70. Secret; Controlled Dissem. Another copy is in Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-R1012, NIC Files. According to a note on the covering sheet, the Central Intelligence Agency and intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, AEC, and NSA participated in the preparation of this estimate. All members of the USIB concurred with the estimate on June 11 except for the representative from the FBI, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside his jurisdiction. For the full text of this NIE, see Tracking the Dragon, p. 678.' In: 'Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968', Vol. 30, US Department of State, pp. 218-220) (IMG)

Why did the Red Guards and other student pseudo-revolutionaries end up decimating China's comprador military force? A 'cultural revolution' instigated by such comprador forces as Mao Zedong would have normally been organized very well by the CIA such that it would not undermine China's military, the enemy of the Red Army. And yet, the Red Guards or student 'revolutionaries' ended up undermining China's military. Why? It was because the students came from cooperative peasant family backgrounds, a factor which pitted them against imperialism, against the enemies of the Red Army. They may well have praised the Chinese military, but ended up unable to escape their own class behaviour, and thus damaged the Chinese military which they may have praised. Owing to their class origins, they were susceptible enough to agitation by the agents of the proletariat to engage in such sabotage against China's reactionary armed forces.

Unfortunately though, the Chinese army and Zhou En-Lai eventually succeeded in establishing stability in that country's military-industrial complex:

2. The prestige and authority of the Party have been damaged, but dissolution has stopped short of wrecking the Party's machinery; the concept of revolutionary communes, which Mao seems earlier to have envisaged as supplanting the Party, has been shelved. "Three-way alliances" are a far cry from "Paris communes," and are consonant with Chou's policies of stability and reason.
3. The damage to industry and agriculture is doubtless considerable, but will probably not be ruinous if present efforts to restore order are successful. Much depends upon peasant — and Army — reaction to increased Army participation in production. We should know more about the extent of damage in another month or so.
4. As expected, the Army is playing the crucial role in the Revolution's apparent denouement. The Army earlier would not back Mao's revolutionary rebels' take-overs, but is now backing Chou's efforts at preservation of nationhood and attention to the economy.
5. "Regionalism" is not a likelihood: the Army wouldn't have it.
6. The Army's crucial loyalty proved to be ... to stability — to the status quo. Most elements of the society seem to be preponderantly of like mind — and the status quo is "creeping revisionism."
7. However, the battle is far from over. The prestige of Mao himself is probably still high; support for Maoism is obviously less, but of unknown proportions.

(Memorandum From Alfred Jenkins of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Rostow), Washington, March 6, 1967. In: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, China, Vol. 9. Secret. In: 'Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968', Vol. 30, US Department of State, p. 527) (IMG)

Zhou had the support of both of the two extremes: Mao's left-deviation and Deng's right-deviation. Under his influence, stability was returning to China's reactionary army. It was therefore natural that he would be having an increase in his power. The following excerpts of a communication between Taiwan leadership and US Secretary Rusk provides the related information:

Answering a question of Secretary Rusk's about Chou En-Lai, the Vice President doubted that Chou could ever become a "third force" in the Communist hierarchy. He was well-known to many GRC leaders, and he was clearly identified as a man who always tried to side with the winner. He had once been close to Teng Hsiao-ping, the No. 2 man in the Liu group. Then he had wavered when he thought the Liu group was losing ground and had gone over to the Mao side. He had then tried to exercise a mediating influence between the Red Guards and the Communist Party elements. He had then been subjected to some censure. He did not have the strength to emerge as a third force. Yen thought Chou would be used by Mao as long as the struggle continued, and that he would lose favor with Mao after the eventual purge of Liu. He would have a place of some importance during the struggle.

('SUBJECT: Meeting of Chinese Vice President C.K. Yen with the President: Review of Events on Mainland China; Sino-Soviet Relations; Viet-Nam', Memorandum of Conversation, Participants: His Excellency Yen Chia-kan (Vice President/Prime Minister of Republic of China), Chow Shu-kai, (Ambassador Chinese Embassy), Li Kwoh-ting (Minister of Economic Affairs, Republic of China), Liu Chieh (Ambassador to the United Nations), Sampson C. Shen (Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China), Lai Chia-chiu (Director of the Information Department, Republic of China), The President Lyndon Johnson, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Walter P. McConaughy (Ambassador of American Embassy Taipei), James W. Symington (Chief of Protocol), William P. Bundy (Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs), Washington, May 9, 1967, 12-12:55 p.m. In: 'Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968', Vol. 30, US Department of State, p. 558) (IMG)

The damage inflicted by the 'Cultural Revolution' of course was not enough to prevent China from invading Eurasia, but it did weaken it in relative terms, delaying and sabotaging its advance. Therefore, in spite of this progressive aspect of the 'Cultural Revolution', China clearly was able to recover enough to be able to aggress Eurasia in 1969.

Whereas the Chinese regime presented the 'Soviet social-imperialists' as the aggressors in the war, the CIA, a foe of the communist faction resurging to dominance in the Red Army, admitted:

The Chinese leaders in 1969 tested the degree of Soviet tolerance of provocation as they carried out a policy of forward patrolling to contest Chinese defined "disputed" areas, keeping the probes down to small-scale encounters. Mao and his aides undoubtedly calculated that they had leeway to engage in such encounters with conventional weapons without provoking a major Soviet attack against China.

They seem to have anticipated retaliation by small Soviet conventional-force units only. They guessed right about the level of Soviet retaliation.

Between 2 March and mid-August, every Soviet riposte to Chinese patrol probes was carried out with such conventional ground weapons as artillery, tanks, armored personnel carriers, and automatic rifles. No aircraft were used, nor did the Soviets expand the conflict from the immediate areas of the skirmishes. Soviet conventional weapons, and the mobility supplied by their armored personnel carriers were sufficient to defeat each of the Chinese border units they were used against. (...).

The Chinese ambush of a Soviet border guard unit on Chen Pao Island on 2 March was a definite escalation. Mao and his aides appear to have chosen that particular Ussuri River island which provided them with the strongest case of Chinese ownership: Chen Pao was not only on the Chinese side of the main navigational channel in the Ussuri, but also 'was virtually a part of the Chinese bank. The opposing Soviet border guard unit at least twice previously (in late January and early February; in the latter instance, riflebutts were used by both sides in a fight) had come out across the river ice to the Chinese side onto Chen Pao to order Chinese forces to withdraw. Mao undoubtedly had been angered by this bullying.... The ambush of Soviet forces at Chen Pao escalated the dispute to a major shooting incident. In subsequent engagements at Chen Pao and other points along the border, the Soviets used their superior firepower to effectively defeat Chinese units entering Soviet-controlled territory.

(THE CHINESE ASSESSMENT OF THE SOVIET MILITARY THREAT, CIA, April 1975, p. 8) (IMG)

While some apologists for China like to denounce Fidel Castro as a 'social-fascist' 'puppet' of 'Soviet social-imperialism', some of the other apologists for China rightly acknowledge that Fidel Castro was an anti-imperialist and far from a 'Sinophobe' or 'orientalist'. It is therefore worth examining what Castro said about China. Referring to Mao as 'a ridiculous mortal', Fidel Castro denounced the 'great-power chauvinism' of China's nepotist regime and 'the mad adventure of the Cultural Revolution':

they turned a ridiculous mortal into a god in the People's Republic of China, destroyed the party and its best cadres in the days of the mad adventure of the Cultural Revolution and allowed themselves to be carried away by the petty bourgeois spirit and great-power chauvinism, which led them to betray internationalism and to the conversion of a socialist state into a nepotic satrapy, where the rulers' wives and sons-in-law became members of the Political Bureau.... (SPEECH MADE BY FIDEL CASTRO RUZ, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA, IN THE NATIONAL CENTRAL ACT FOR THE XXV ANNIVERSARY OF THE MONCADA BARREL ASSAULT, HELD IN THE SCHOOL CITY "26 DE JULIO", SANTIAGO DE CUBA, ON JULY 26, 1978, "YEAR OF THE XI FESTIVAL". (SHORTHAND VERSIONS - COUNCIL OF STATE), cuba.cu) (IMG)

Maoist left-opportunists exaggerate the extent of the influence of the counter-revolutionary forces in Eurasia, and argue that the correct thing to do was to pursue a war against Eurasia, as Mao's Trotskyite gang did in 1969. The left-opportunists refuse to acknowledge the incontrovertible fact that communists still retained some influence in Eurasia as a large minority, and that exaggerating the level of the influence of the counter-revolutionary elements would undermine the communist minority while playing into the hands of the counter-revolutionary majority. Such was why the Vietnamese communists opposed the Kremlin Titoists, while still maintaining relations with Eurasia; such was why Abdel-Nasser launched a Cold War against Khrushchev's group while still maintaining positive relations with Eurasia; such was why the Romanian communists confronted the Khrushchevians while also retaining relations with Eurasia; such was why even the Albanians loudly denounced the revisionists in Moscow all the while strategically reorienting trade away from China onto Eurasia's Eastern European allies in the late 1960s when the Brezhnevians rose to power. By launching their 1969 social-fascist aggression against Eurasia, the Maoist Chinese armed forces were waging a war of terror against not the Titoist reactionaries but against the resurgent communist faction in the Red Army, the faction of the comrades of Stalin, the faction of the generals Shtemenko and Vasilevsky.

C23S5.5. Deng Faction Sabotages China's Economy

By 1985, the communist faction in Eurasia had already become very weak. The Chebrikov-Gorbachev group, the leaders of the Titoist faction, had risen in strength. The communist faction was no longer able to strongly pressure Titoist China, a factor which gave the Deng faction much greater leverage at home. No longer did the funds available to the Titoist Deng faction have to be spent as much on countering the menace of the communist faction in Eurasia. Rather, the funds could be used for waging the secret service conflict against the communist faction in China. The Deng faction thus was able to win further in the struggle for control over the so-called "Chinese Communist Party", to elevate the white-collar contingent in the Party. The conference of September 1985 was a great victory for the Deng faction. The CIA reported that the National Conference of the Chinese 'Communist' Party in September 1985 had resulted in a drastic change in the cadres of the Party in favour of the Deng faction:

From 12 to 24 September, the Communist Party of China held an unprecedented series of meetings that together constitute a major milestone in Deng Xiaoping's decadelong struggle to restructure the party leadership. In two plenary sessions of the Central Committee and an extraordinary conference of party delegates, Deng managed to significantly weaken the conservative party old guard, promote his allies to the top party organizations, reduce the influence of China's senior military officers, and win a new party endorsement of economic reform.

Specifically:

- One-quarter of the 210-member Central Committee, including 10 of the 27 members of the Politburo, resigned.
- Ninety-one younger leaders were named full or alternate members of the Central Committee.
- Six new members joined the Politburo – five for the first time and one promoted from alternate – and five were added to the Secretariat.
- The Central Committee approved guidelines for the 1986-90 Five-year Plan that strongly reaffirm the reformist course of economic policy.

We believe Deng accomplished most of his short-term objectives at the meetings:

- The balance of forces in the Politburo and the Central Committee has shifted to the reformers.
- The influence on decision-making of the party's old guard, and especially its military contingent, has been significantly reduced.
- The leading reformers placed proteges on both the Politburo and Secretariat. Hu Yaobang put three on each body and Zhao Ziyang one.
- Serious economic performance problems, and growing conservative criticisms of reform policies, were not allowed to derail the economic development program approved in 1984.

(CHINA'S PARTY CONFERENCE: THE WANING OF THE ANCIEN REGIME, CIA, November 1985, p. III) (IMG)

Deng Xiaoping said in his speech during the Conference that a shake-up had occurred in the Party cadres:

A number of veteran cadres have taken the lead in abolishing the system of life tenure in leading posts, furthering the reform of the cadre system. This deserves mention in our Party's annals.

The members newly elected to the Central Committee as well as ministers and provincial Party committee secretaries who were recently appointed are comparatively young. They are generally in their fifties, with some just over forty. In the early days of the founding Of the People's Republic, many of the ministers and provincial Party committee secretaries were in such age groups.

(Deng Xiaoping's Speech At the CPC National Conference. In: Beijing Review, September 30, 1985, pp. 17-18) (IMG)

Indeed, reports by the Beijing Review, China's state media, confirmed the CIA claims that the Dengist reformers had the upper hand in the National Conference. During the Conference, the Central Committee of the Chinese 'Communist' Party provided its proposal for the Seventh Five-Year Plan. Excerpts of the document, which leaves no doubt as to the fact that the pro-decentralization 'reformer' current spearheaded by Deng Xiaoping emerged triumphant in the policy-making, are as follows:

48. To ensure the successful fulfilment of the Seventh Five-year Plan and sustained and balanced economic growth beyond that period, the most important thing is for us to restructure the economy, prudently but steadfastly, in accordance with the decision of the Third Plenary Session of the Twelfth Central Committee and in the next five years or more to lay the foundation for a vigorous socialist economic structure with Chinese characteristics.

49. Building a new type of socialist economic structure depends primarily on successes in the following three related areas. First, further stimulating all enterprises, and especially the large and medium-sized ones owned by the whole people, so that they will work efficiently as socialist producers and distributors of commodities, each enjoying relative independence and full power of management and bearing complete responsibility for profits and losses. Second, further expanding the socialist planned commodity markets, and gradually improving the market network. And third, gradually reducing state management of enterprises from direct to indirect control, and supervising and regulating economic activity mainly by economic, statutory and, if necessary, administrative measures. Focusing on these three areas, we must introduce a series of mutually reinforcing reforms in the planning system, the pricing system, the fiscal system, the banking system and the labour and wage system so that these mechanisms will function together, integrating planning with market regulation, and micro-flexibility with macro-control. Accomplishing this will lead to a satisfactory handling of various economic relations, making it possible to harmonize the interests of the state, the collectives and individuals, to achieve greater uniformity in the speed, proportion and efficiency of economic development and to bring about self-sustained growth in our national economy as a whole.

50. Invigorating enterprises is the key element in the economic restructuring with its focus on the cities. We must implement the decision and regulations issued by the Central Committee and the State Council for expanding the decision-making power of enterprises and continue to adopt measures, both inside and outside enterprises, to enhance their vitality, especially that of the large and medium-sized ones. These measures should include the following: 1) Further streamline administration and delegate more power to lower levels. With the exception of certain departments and trades where conditions are somewhat unusual, ministries of the central government, the provinces and autonomous regions should no longer directly control enterprises. In the cities, we must also draw a clear distinction between the responsibilities and functions of government and those of enterprises, reduce the intermediate levels, and grant enterprises the managerial power to which they are entitled. 2) Gradually reduce regulation taxes on large and medium-sized enterprises, lighten irrational burdens on them and gradually improve management policies and the taxation system for collective and individual businesses to allow all enterprises to compete with each other on an equal footing. 3) Systematically reduce mandatory planning to give enterprises greater decision-making power over production, supply and marketing and over the use of manpower and financial and material resources. At the same time, improve microeconomic mechanisms to enable enterprises to shoulder full responsibility for their own management. 4) Exercise control over total social demands, maintain a balance between demand and supply and bring the pressure of market competition to bear upon enterprises, so as to encourage them to improve their management and achieve better economic results. 5) See to it that all enterprises do their best to perfect various forms of the responsibility system. It is particularly important to reform the personnel system and promote to leading posts persons of ability and political integrity. Depending on specific conditions in each enterprise, this may be done through appointment after observation, democratic election, self-recommendation and recommendation, recruitment by advertisement and examination or through invitation. The responsibilities and power as well as rewards and penalties for such administrators as managers and factory directors must be clearly defined to give full scope to their initiative and pioneering spirit. Efforts should be made to strengthen democratic management, to encourage the workers and administrative staff to play their part as masters of the enterprises and to make best use of their intelligence and talent. 6) Turn some of the small state-owned enterprises over to collective or individual management, by contract or lease.

51. In order to invigorate enterprises, barriers between different departments and between regions must be broken down, and provinces, autonomous regions, cities of all sizes and all rural areas should open their doors to each other and expand their commodity markets, under the guidance of planning. We must not only continue to expand the consumer goods market, but also gradually reduce the varieties and quantities of means of production allocated by the state, so as to expand the market for them as well. To meet the needs of market expansion, we should gradually open up or expand the market of funds and of technology and encourage a rational flow of labour. Only by establishing an integrated network of markets under the guidance of state policies and plans and by improving market management can we enable competitive forces to play their role in selecting the superior and eliminating the inferior and allow economic levers to perform their regulatory function to fundamentally improve economic efficiency in enterprises and society as a whole. As the market network steadily improves, we must gradually reduce the scope of mandatory planning in favour of guidance planning, strive for an overall balance and shift the emphasis of planning to exercising indirect but more comprehensive macro-control through various economic policies and measures.

52. The key to the gradual establishment and perfection of the market system is reform of the pricing and price control systems. Except for a few major commodities whose prices should continue to be determined by the state, price controls on everyday consumer goods should be systematically relaxed and replaced by market regulation. As for major means of production, we should gradually reduce the proportion of goods whose prices are set by the state, increase the proportion of those whose prices are determined by the market, and steadily readjust planned prices so that the disparity between the planned and market prices will gradually diminish. The increase in production costs due to the rising prices of major means of production should be offset as much as possible by raising labour productivity, reducing consumption of energy and materials and making full use of enterprises' potential. We must strictly control the extent of price

increases. The fees charged by certain major public utilities and service trades should remain under state control and should be readjusted in a planned way. Price controls in tertiary industry should in general be gradually relaxed. Through these reforms, we will establish a pricing system that combines uniformity and flexibility by controlling prices on a few commodities and services and allowing prices for most of them to float. Thus we will expand the regulatory role of prices as the most important and efficient economic lever in production, distribution and consumption. In reforming the pricing and price control systems, we must consider the capabilities of the state, the enterprises and the people and maintain the basic stability of overall price levels to avoid excessive social repercussions. This is a principle we must strictly observe. Industrial and commercial administration departments must enforce rigorous control over prices. All state-owned industrial and commercial enterprises, supply-and-marketing departments and co-operatives should accumulate enough materials and economic means to take an active part in regulating the market and in keeping prices stable through purchases and sales. This is indispensable to the smooth progress of price reform, and is an essential element in the planned commodity economy.

(Proposal of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party for the Seventh Five-Year Plan for National Economic And Social Development – Adopted at the National Conference of the Communist Party of China, September 23, 1985. In: Beijing Review, October 7, 1985, pp. 18-20) (IMG)

There is no doubt that the Deng faction held the upper hand in the Conference, for otherwise, the pro-market and pro-decentralization ‘reforms’ which the Deng faction advocated would not have been pursued as the Party line. However, in case there is need for a direct quote to affirm that Deng did support the ‘accomplishments’ of the National Conference, here it goes:

Comrades,

This National Conference is a very good one. It has successfully accomplished the scheduled texts.

(Deng Xiaoping’s Speech At the CPC National Conference. In: Beijing Review, September 30, 1985, p. 15) (IMG)

The National Conference strengthened the Deng faction’s already-existing policy of getting China into massive debt. Proudly boasting of China’s selling of bonds as though bonds are some kind of a real product made in China, the Beijing Review reported:

International Bond Flotations

In the first five months of this year, the China International Trust and Investment Corp. (CITIC) and the Bank of China issued bonds in Tokyo, and Hong Kong and Singapore, totalling an equivalent of 60 billion yen and US\$200 million. Between 1982 and April 1987, China floated 25 bond issues valued at US\$2.789 billion on the international financial markets, as an important means of raising foreign exchange.

In January 1982, CITIC issued individual bonds of 10 billion yen on the Japanese market for the first time. Over the last few years, more and more foreign exchange has been required in China, and as a result, the flotations have also grown.

Year	Bond values (US\$ million)
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1982	43.58
1983	20.23
1984	83.17
1985	786.46
1986	1,255.53

The Bank of China floated 9 bond issues of US\$1.317 billion in Tokyo, Frankfurt and Singapore; CITIC, 10 bond issues worth US\$1.03 billion in Tokyo, Hong Kong and Frankfurt; the Investment Enterprise Co. of Fujian Province, 3 bond issues of US\$ 120 million in Tokyo and Singapore; the trust and investment corporations of Guangdong Province, Shanghai and Tianjin one issue each in Tokyo with a value of US\$129 million, 131 million and 61.73 million respectively.

The Bank of China and the Investment Enterprise Co. of Fujian Province are making preparations for issuing new bonds. (Beijing Review, June 15, 1987, p. 29) (IMG)

Two years later, the government was forced to admit to being on the verge of a debt crisis. Calling the ‘bold’ borrowing policy ‘A Knife Cutting Both Ways’, an article titled ‘China’s Borrowing: The Key to Preventing a Debt Crisis’ published by the Beijing Review stated:

Ten years ago, China neither external nor internal debts. However, through the pursuit of the policies of opening and reform, China has rapidly learned how to raise foreign loans and make [alleged] effective use of them. (China’s Borrowing: The Key to Preventing a Debt Crisis, Chen Jian (Renmin Ribao Correspondent). In: Beijing Review, April 3-9, 1989, p. 23) (IMG)

At the same time, China faced a massive inflation in 1989. The Deng faction’s ‘solution’ for such an inflation problem was to call for “a 649-million-yuan budget cut,” a massive reduction of spending on the development of the productive forces:

The Chinese have declared war on public enemy number one--inflation--calling for a 649-million-yuan budget cut. Finance Minister Wang Bingqian said that governments, both central and local, will have to balance their books to stop state deficits pegged at 7.4 billion yuan this year. The chopping of 8.1 percent from government spending announced March 21 at the Second Session of the Seventh National People’s Congress (NPC) continued Beijing’s rectification programme. Wang’s report hit out at government overspending for being a “contributing factor in inflation” -- the worst since liberation (1949), that has disrupted economic stability by chewing into the limited savings of common people. The exceptions to these cuts include increased payments to the farm community as well as wage increases to workers and staff members of administrative organs and public institutions. The State Council has also decided to increase subsistence allowances for retirees in these public and state-owned enterprises at an opportune time this year. Overall, Wang said, this year’s budget will pursue a financial policy of retrenchment, curb demand for funds, reduce expenditures and control deficits. Plans will also be made to build up revenues. The state budget projects revenues of 285.68 billion yuan, an increase of 10.4 percent over last year, and expenditures of 293.08 billion yuan, a 9.8 increase. Revenues in the budget include domestic receipts of 269.18 billion yuan and foreign loans of 16.5 billion yuan. And expenditures in the 1989 budget include 276.58 billion yuan covered by domestic funds and 16.5 billion yuan by foreign loans. Major items of expenditure include aid to rural production and other operating expenses for agriculture, 17.396 billion yuan, 1.886 billion yuan or 12.2 percent more than in last year; expenses for culture, education, science and public health,

51.388 billion yuan, an increase of 3.481 billion yuan or 7.3 percent; capital construction, 62.792 billion yuan, an increase of 843 million yuan; servicing the internal debt, 2.548 billion yuan and the foreign loans, 7.02 billion yuan. The increase of expenditure for salary and wage readjustments in administrative organs and institutions will be 3.5 billion yuan. NPC representatives have won concessions from the State Council to include specific budget breakdowns on both the central and local levels in the future, said the Finance Minister. Total expenditures in 1988 came to 266.831 billion yuan with revenues totalling 258.782 billion yuan, leaving a deficit of 8.049 billion yuan, said Wang. The figures might change when the final accounts comes out, but the deficit is not likely to exceed the estimated amount. (Thrift Policy Holds Inflation. In: Beijing Review, April 3-9, 1989, p. 6) (IMG)

All of the economic problems which Deng-era China was promoting could have been avoided, and all the problems that arose could be easily resolved, provided the existence of political will, of course. As confirmed by China's Ministry of Commerce, in 1986 and 1989, the GDP growth saw a slow-down, and 1988 saw a double-digit inflation:

3. Disordered investment behavior will cause economic fluctuations: After the implementation of the opening-up policy, economic fluctuations have become a common phenomenon. This two-decade growth cycle occurs frequently. **The slowdown in GDP growth in 1986 and 1989 and the double-digit inflation in 1988** and 1993-95 were the result of the business cycle. While these fluctuations in growth and inflation may be caused by temporary imbalances in certain sectors, they do not appear to have a significant impact on the economy as a whole. These imbalances are most likely caused directly or indirectly by investment anomalies. (Rapid Development and Fluctuation of China's Economy (1980-1999), Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, July 17, 2002. Bold added.) (IMG)

As confirmed by China's Ministry of Commerce, unemployment grew from 1985 onwards all the way till 1990, the main years of the Deng period: Imprecisely, its trending direction should suggest the orientation of unemployment. Figure 1.h shows that the unemployment rate bottomed out around 1985, then turned to rise until it reached equilibrium during 1990-93. (Rapid Development and Fluctuation of China's Economy (1980-1999), Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, July 17, 2002) (IMG)

Furthermore, there were recessions in 1986 and 1989, and there were economic fluctuations rather than rapid growth:

These time curves show economic fluctuations rather than rapid growth. Fluctuations in real GDP growth rates show the chronology of business cycles over the past two decades. Figure 2.a shows that the business cycle peaked in 1984, 1987 and 1992, and troughed in 1986 and 1989-1990 (these records are consistent with the findings of Liu Xiucheng in the 1995 Blue Book). The recessions of 1986 and 1989 were short-lived and the economy rebounded quickly. (Rapid Development and Fluctuation of China's Economy (1980-1999), Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, July 17, 2002) (IMG)

The double-digit inflation, the great debt, the recessions and unemployment, and the corruption all arose out of the economic Titoization reforms undertaken by the Deng faction. Decentralization, the promotion of the market, and the de-emphasis of heavy industry all directly contributed to getting China on the verge of economic collapse.

From the text of the previously-cited excerpt of the economic plan adopted by the Chinese 'Communist' Party in the 1985 conference, this quote is particularly astonishing:

We must not only continue to expand the consumer goods market, but also gradually reduce the varieties and quantities of means of production allocated by the state, so as to expand the market for them as well. (Proposal of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party for the Seventh Five-Year Plan for National Economic And Social Development – Adopted at the National Conference of the Communist Party of China, September 23, 1985. In: Beijing Review, October 7, 1985, pp. 18-20) (IMG)

In other words, the Chinese 'Communist' Party was arguing that in order to expand the consumer goods sector, the state should reduce the allocation of the means of production to the consumer goods sector. And the interesting aspect of this point by the Party is that it is within the context of the Party emphasizing consumer goods (light industry) over producer goods (heavy industry):

To ensure rapid growth of the consumer goods industry, we must continue to give it priority in procurement of loans, access to foreign exchange. the use of energy, raw and semi-finished materials and transport services. Price differences must gradually widen between ordinary products and brand-name, high-quality and new products, in order to encourage greater variety, better quality and the manufacture of new products. (Proposal of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party for the Seventh Five-Year Plan for National Economic And Social Development – Adopted at the National Conference of the Communist Party of China, September 23, 1985. In: Beijing Review, October 7, 1985, p. 10) (IMG)

In other words, the Party line was to 'prioritize' light industry over heavy industry but not to provide the light industry sector with the factory pieces for growth, because, the Party alleged, the allocation of factory pieces to the light industry sector will prevent the market from providing the factory pieces! Basically, the argument of the Party was as follows: "We should make the consumer goods sector grow, but we, the state, should not help it grow, because if we help it grow, the share of the market in making consumer goods grow will reduce." Not only is that a next-level clownish neoliberal argument, it is a policy of systematic industrial sabotage committed against the Chinese proletariat. The decline of China's heavy industry, the massive corruption and double-digit inflation were completely natural results of this policy along with other decentralization measures.

The CIA is infamous for its promotion of liberal economic reforms and decentralization. And yet, despite its massive campaign of propaganda in favour of decentralization, even the CIA could not hide the fact that economic decentralization actually results in a failing economy struck by corrupt bureaucracy, heavy debt, and inflation, amongst other economic ills. No, citing the CIA on the economic damage inflicted upon China due to Dengist decentralization is far from being CIA 'propaganda'. On the contrary, it debunks the CIA propaganda narrative that decentralization in China boosted that land's productive forces, when in fact, contrary to CIA propaganda, and as admitted by declassified CIA internal documents, decentralization decimated the Chinese economy.

The CIA confirmed that China's 'conservatives' were correct in stating that decentralization had caused China's massive inflation:

Conservatives have cited China's inflation, excessive investment, budget deficits, and foreign exchange shortfalls to criticize reformers for economic mismanagement, arguing that relaxed central controls are responsible for the economic dislocations. They are probably particularly alarmed by State Statistical Bureau figures showing that China's inflation rate has increased each month since April. Conservatives may argue that social stability is jeopardized because living standards for about one-fifth of urban workers have fallen this year; wage gains for some workers have not kept pace with inflation.

Conservatives are correct in believing that by relaxing central controls Beijing has increased inflationary pressures. Since the early 1980s, Beijing has broadened enterprise autonomy – particularly by allowing state factories to retain a larger share of their revenues and permitting them to sell overquota production of industrial goods at "negotiated," above-plan prices. However, it has not implemented effective measures to make enterprise managers accountable if funds are used inefficiently.

Judging from past responses to economic problems, we believe conservatives want to strengthen administrative controls over economic decision making and increase reliance on central plans. Conservatives would also like to lessen enterprise discretion over investment, and tighten controls over prices, wages, land use in the countryside, and foreign trade.

(China: A Look at 1987: Background Papers for the US Delegation of US-PRC Joint Economic Committee 16-18 November 1987, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, October 23, 1987, p. 8) (IMG)

A solution to an issue like inflation is to pursue the policy of 'material balances', according to which the inputs and outputs would be measured so as to correspond to each other – e.g. X amount of rubber for Y amount of tires for Z number of cars. The 'material balances' system ensures that the amounts of inputs and outputs are carefully calculated, centrally, so as to minimize waste and maximize production. This system of material balances, of course, required central planning, something to which the Deng faction was hostile.

The neoliberal model of the economy relies on monetary policy for 'improving' the conditions of industry and bringing about economic 'growth'. Actually, reliance on 'monetary policy' is reliance on the supply of pieces of paper and some thin air. Idealistic is the belief that changes in the supply and demand of pieces of paper can somehow be so great in effect as to be able to boost production. Reliance on the supply of pieces of paper in order to determine the level of the production of iron and steel – such is the idealism of the neoliberal model, not much better than the Maoist policy of 'producing' metals using blast furnaces. The Deng faction pursued the neoliberal model of the economy, relying on 'monetary policy', within the context of a decentralized market, for 'developing' the productive forces. There should be no surprise as to the fact that China's economy was devastated. The CIA confirmed that the strengthening of the local governments, resultant from decentralization, had prevented even the market mechanisms from easing inflation – as if the market, fiscal, and monetary policy was ever going to ease inflation. The CIA further confirmed that the empowering of the local governments had disabled the Chinese central government from blocking local governments' excess spending on low-priority construction projects. The CIA reported:

Political infighting this year, however, has prevented reformers from effectively using monetary and fiscal policies to ease inflationary pressure. Beijing [i.e. central government] has been unable, for example, to stop spending by local governments on low-priority construction projects, such as hotels and municipal halls:

Branches of China's central bank are ignoring head-office directives to limit credit and continue to fund whatever projects local officials want.

Previous reforms gave local governments a greater share of tax revenues, making them less dependent on funds from central coffers.

(China: A Look at 1987: Background Papers for the US Delegation of US-PRC Joint Economic Committee 16-18 November 1987, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, October 23, 1987, p. 9) (IMG)

The centralization of the economy in practice means a tighter coordination of the different sectors of the economy, as information from different local sectors is collected, centralized, and used for a central plan. Economic decentralization, by contrast, results in the empowering of local enterprises such that these local enterprises fail to coordinate with each other for production. The chaos resultant from the lack of coordination is precisely the key factor that allows for so much corruption and mafia, as was seen in Dengist China and elsewhere. The CIA further confirmed that the Chinese bureaucrats were using the loopholes resultant from the decentralization reforms as a means of filling their pockets:

Some Chinese bureaucrats, for example, are exploiting loopholes in reform policies by using their connections to purchase goods at low in-plan prices and resell them at much higher market prices. Public cynicism toward reform reportedly has begun to grow because many of the people involved are the children of senior officials. (China: A Look at 1987: Background Papers for the US Delegation of US-PRC Joint Economic Committee 16-18 November 1987, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, October 23, 1987, p. 10) (IMG)

Mao Zedong was a believer in the decentralization of the industrial sector. Deng Xiaoping pursued Mao's policy to as extreme as he could, and thereby proliferated a huge corrupt bureaucracy that produced millionaire and billionaire oligarchs in the Party and state, oligarchs that generate their profits through increasing corruption, 'biting' from production rather than expanding production, and in brief, sabotaging the economy. The Dengist right-deviation presents the corrupt oligarchs as the class force behind economic growth, as a national industrial bourgeoisie, when in fact such oligarchs have been a comprador bourgeoisie, a saboteurial and diversionary bourgeoisie allied to finance capital, an anti-industrial bourgeoisie. Only in the heartland of imperialist powers allied to the reactionary classes do the corrupt bureaucrats serve to expand military-industrial production. 'Thanks' to decentralization, the central government of China did not have a consolidated record of local finances:

With the compartmentalism of the Chinese bureaucracy, in any case, Beijing does not have a consolidated record of all the borrowings of its regional and state agencies. (China: A Look at 1987: Background Papers for the US Delegation of US-PRC Joint Economic Committee 16-18 November 1987, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, October 23, 1987, pp. 20-21) (IMG)

The 'conservative' faction in China had a difficult time reasserting central government control over the decentralized finances:

Leaders who are counting on local officials to carry out broader reform objectives have rejected proposals to restrict provincial control over bank loans and taxes, according to US Embassy contacts. (China: A Look at 1987: Background Papers for the US Delegation of US-PRC Joint Economic Committee 16-18 November 1987, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, October 23, 1987, p. 9) (IMG)

As explained in C1S6, the collectivization of agriculture was necessary for economic growth. However, the "Peoples' Communes" system in China was a left-deviationist policy that, in contradiction with the policy of collectivization, aggressively pushed the kolkhoz peasants into so-called 'communes' at a suspiciously too a high pace. Such an excessively high pace and such a leap from small farms and farm collectives into large communes was undoubtedly a left-deviationist policy that decimated the welfare of the Chinese people. The Deng regime undid the so-called 'People's Communes', and moved from the reactionary left-deviationist policy of the Mao era to the reactionary right-deviationist policy of de facto opposition to collectivization. It was inevitable that during the transition from this left-deviationist policy onto the right-deviationist policy, there would – for a very brief period of time – be a period of moderate economic policy as the transitional midpoint in between the Maoist left-deviationist and the Dengist right-deviationist policy lines. The moderate line that lies in between the left-deviationist and right-deviationist lines, is the line that brings economic growth. And this brief period of moderate policy, in the swing from left-opportunism to right-opportunism, did yield some acceleration in economic growth initially. However, the transition to the right-deviationist policy of opposition to collectivization inevitably boosted the parasitic kulak class that corrupted China's agriculture.

The policies of the Deng faction concerning the ‘Cultural Revolution’ bore some analogy to its agricultural policy in that it marked a swing from left-opportunism onto right-opportunism. Yes, the ‘Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution’ was a reactionary Maoist left-opportunist policy line that was damaging the Chinese people’s economic welfare. Yet, so is it also true that the excess cultural liberality promoted by the Deng faction emboldened and agitated the counter-revolutionary intelligentsia, allowing the imperialist-fascist secret services to freely agitate for one student colour revolution after another, of which the protests in Tiananmen were only the most infamous. Prior to Tiananmen, the student colour revolutions were occurring, which the CIA admitted was the result of the ‘liberal rhetoric of the spring’:

Moreover, the student demonstrations in December, which were encouraged by the liberal rhetoric of the spring, aroused fears of instability and lent credence to conservative arguments that excessive liberalization was undermining party control. (China: A Look at 1987: Background Papers for the US Delegation of US-PRC Joint Economic Committee 16-18 November 1987, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, October 23, 1987, p. 3) (IMG)

Even in the recent years, China has suffered from the student colour revolutions. Therefore, while the left-opportunist ‘Cultural Revolution’ was something from which to liberate China, no doubt, the Deng faction’s right-opportunist cultural liberality also promoted the CIA-backed student colour revolutions. And much as how the left-opportunist Red Guards were disrupting China’s production, so too did the right-opportunist liberal Chinese student protesters – and the Dengists certainly deserve the blame for the latter if not also the former.

Double-digit inflation, massive debt, unemployment, recessions, a decentralized economy that wastes massive amounts of resources, student colour revolutions resultant from a liberal cultural policy and disrupting the economy, a corrupt bureaucratic class made up of millionaires sucking the wealth of the economy without contributing to production – such was the ‘economic growth’ which the Deng Xiaoping faction brought to China. The Dengist intellectuals babbled the reactionary narrative that China was an exception, that decentralization in Eastern Europe and the USSR was pro-imperialist and anti-proletarian, but that somehow it was not pro-imperialist and anti-proletarian when applied in China. The Dengist intellectuals parroted the reactionary narrative that somehow, decentralization and pro-market policies by the Deng Xiaoping faction ‘grew’ China’s economy. No such a thing ever happened. Such severe economic problems in China were entirely avoidable, provided that there was political will to resolve them. The solution, as was mentioned in greater detail before, was to re-centralize the economy. However, the Deng faction were hostile to such an idea.

C23S5.6. CIA agent Deng Supports CIA-backed Tiananmen Colour Revolutionaries

Slowly, as a result of the growing manifest opposition of the Chinese proletarians to the proliferation of bureaucracy and double-digit inflation by the Deng faction, the anti-imperialist forces in the Chinese ‘Communist’ Party were gaining greater power in their struggle, at the expense of the Deng faction. One of Deng Xiaoping’s henchmen was of course Zhao Ziyang. Zhao’s career as a Premier of China and a General-Secretary of the Party was directly correlated with the rise of the Deng faction. When the Deng faction saw an elevation in influence, Zhao too was promoted in his rank as a Chinese regime official. Furthermore, Zhao Ziyang shared Deng Xiaoping’s views of economic Titoization ‘reforms’. Take for example the following remark by Zhao in which he declares support for the reactionary Titoist ‘Socialism with Chinese Characteristics’ and endorses a drastic economic decentralization and the expansion of the role of the market. Zhao said:

The period of the Seventh Five-year Plan is a crucial one for general reform of the country's economic structure. We must give the reform top priority if we want to lay the foundation, over the next five years and beyond, for a vigorous socialist economic structure with Chinese characteristics.

The restructuring of the national economy with focus on the cities is a tremendous, complicated task of social systems engineering. A new economic structure should serve to develop a planned commodity economy based on public ownership. To this end, we must do the following three things. First, further invigorate enterprises, especially state-owned large and medium-sized ones, and make them socialist commodity manufacturers and dealers that are relatively independent in management and responsible for their own profit and loss. Second, further expand the planned socialist commodity market and gradually improve the marketing system. And third, gradually relax the state's direct control over the economic operation of enterprises in favour of indirect controls, in the form of economic, legal and, if necessary, administrative means. All three things must be well coordinated.

(Explanation of the Proposal for the Seventh Five-Year Plan — Made at the National Conference of the Communist Party of China, Zhao Ziyang, September 18, 1985. In: Beijing Review, October 7, 1985, p. 10) (IMG)

The above remarks were a part of Zhao’s proposals in the Chinese Party conference for economic ‘reform’ in 1985, the reforms, adopted by the Party in that conference, that produced the double-digit inflation, unemployment, recession, corruption, etc. Yet, as confirmed by the CIA, Zhao Ziyang, who had the support of Deng Xiaoping and was a major ally of Deng, saw a slow erosion of his influence thanks to the rise of the anti-imperialist (‘conservative’) faction, the faction backed by the Chinese proletariat, in the Party:

Perhaps the single most important issue will be how Zhao Ziyang proves himself in his new position as party head. Zhao has many advantages – he is respected by both sides, has a generally successful record as premier, and has a personal political style much better suited to Chinese politics than was the abrasive Hu Yaobang's. He also has Deng Xiaoping's support, crucial to his success but a two-edged sword – he will have to find a way to establish himself as heir without alienating Deng. On the down side, Zhao is constrained by the continued influence of powerful conservative elders; he also has a decision-making machinery not entirely of his own choosing and not entirely in sympathy with his ideas. Ironically, this is especially true in economic policy bodies that Zhao once dominated. Finally, Zhao as party chief must deal with sensitive and messy issues such as the party's role under reform, or the ideological legitimacy of progressive economic proposals, that, as premier, he generally tried to avoid. If Zhao successfully manages the next few months, however, the long-term advantage is with him, view, as age will erode the ranks of prestigious party elders. (China: A Look at 1987: Background Papers for the US Delegation of US-PRC Joint Economic Committee 16-18 November 1987, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, October 23, 1987, p. 4) (IMG)

Despite the weight of argument in the favour of the so-called ‘conservative’ faction, the latter only slowly increased its influence in the Chinese state apparatus, with ups and downs in this current:

Conservative criticism of reform policies received a boost when reformers encountered problems in the economic area – inflation, a growing budget deficit, foreign exchange shortages – that forced a slowdown in implementation of economic reforms. Conservatives

had warned against some of these problems, which lent weight to their arguments that reform had moved too fast and it was time to retrench. (...).

The marked conservative shift has been moderated somewhat since last May. We believe the turning point came when some conservative leaders overplayed their hand and attempted to push the "anti- bourgeois liberalization" campaign into the economic sphere. Deng moved against this threat to his reforms, and the balance began to shift. Ideological pronouncements once again praise reform and promise continued experimentation, but they are still careful to stress the socialist nature of reforms--providing an opening for conservative pressure.

Recent evidence indicates that Deng and his allies have had to settle for a patchwork of compromises that includes a Politburo younger in average age but evenly balanced between reformers and conservatives. While reformers have made some gains in staffing party organs, conservative influence on economic policy making has increased. Political structural reform--a reformist code term for further reduction of party influence over government and economic decision making--seems stalled at the "general discussion" stage. In the months after the congress, we look for continued tensions and jockeying for power as leaders, including recently "retired" party elders seek to consolidate their positions and press their advantages.

(China: A Look at 1987: Background Papers for the US Delegation of US-PRC Joint Economic Committee 16-18 November 1987, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, October 23, 1987, p. 3) (IMG)

By 1989, the anti-imperialist faction was seeing yet another boost in its influence, as the Chinese proletarians expressed discontent towards the state of affairs in the Dengist economy and increased pressure against the Deng faction. Against the tide in favour of the anti-imperialist ('conservative') faction, the CIA and its allied comprador forces in China mobilized the Chinese intelligentsia to launch the Tiananmen colour revolution. The Anglo-American media propagates the myth that Deng Xiaoping was the main figure behind the suppression of the counter-revolutionary intelligentsia in Tiananmen. Not true. The Tiananmen colour revolutionaries, far from contradicting the Deng faction, were the combat units confronting the anti-imperialist faction of the Chinese Party, the faction opposed to the Deng gang. There was no reason for the CIA-backed Chinese intelligentsia to contradict the fascist spy for the CIA, Deng Xiaoping. As a matter of fact, the key agent linking the Deng group with the student colour revolutionaries was none other than Zhao Ziyang. The Deng henchman was regarded by the CIA-backed student colour revolutionaries as the leader of the Tiananmen protests. Prominent Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Amnesty International official Andrew Nathan admitted that the Western narrative that Deng was the main figure behind the 'crackdown' on Tiananmen was false. Nathan wrote:

The Tiananmen papers show that during the crisis Deng participated intimately in every important decision. His personal aide, Yang Shangkun (whose formal position was head of state but whose real job was Deng's business manager within the leadership), attended all important Politburo meetings. The most important decisions were made at Deng's house. It was Deng's idea to label the demonstrations "turmoil." He made the decision to declare martial law, he accepted the resignation of Zhao Ziyang, he engineered the selection of Jiang Zemin, he gave the order for the military to move on the Square, and after the crackdown he set the policy direction of trying to continue the ten-year project of economic reform and opening to the West despite the setback dealt to those projects by the events of the spring. Deng did not play this role happily.

(The Tiananmen Papers, Compiled by: Zhang Liang, Edited by: Andrew J. Nathan, Perry Link, Orville Schell, 2002, p. XXXV) (IMG)

Indeed, the primary source documents presented by Nathan show that Deng Xiaoping was not so powerful, and had been compelled to nod on the decisions during the time of the confrontation against Tiananmen protesters. To his friend Yang Shangkun, Deng Xiaoping complained:

These last few days I've been thinking. I've never been formally number 1 in the Party, but everybody keeps hanging around me, showing me deference. I have to give the nod on every important decision. I carry too much weight, and that's not good for the Party or the state. (Deng Xiaoping's sense of injury, Excerpt from memoranda of conversations supplied by a friend of Yang Shangkun who cannot be further identified. In: The Tiananmen Papers, Compiled by: Zhang Liang, Edited by: Andrew J. Nathan, Perry Link, Orville Schell, 2002, p. 288) (IMG)

Deng added:

You know that I've taken a lot of heat inside the Party since this whole thing broke out. After Zhao's speech to the ADB, Xiannian told me this was the voice of a second headquarters inside the Party, and he wanted me to say something about it. Later Chen Yun, Xiannian, and others telephoned me with their views time and again. In their view, the students went to Tiananmen because the Center let it happen, and we should do something about it. (Deng Xiaoping's sense of injury, Excerpt from memoranda of conversations supplied by a friend of Yang Shangkun who cannot be further identified. In: The Tiananmen Papers, Compiled by: Zhang Liang, Edited by: Andrew J. Nathan, Perry Link, Orville Schell, 2002, p. 287) (IMG)

Deng was referring to the immense pressure of the anti-imperialist faction in the Party to compel Deng and his group to denounce their own henchman Zhao and the latter's subgroup. In any case, as a means of undercutting Deng Xiaoping's base of support in the Party, and as a means of dismantling the network led by the Deng group, the proletarian-backed anti-imperialist faction, the so-called 'conservative' faction, spearheaded the anti-Zhaoist purges. Anti-Zhaoist purges were really in practice anti-Dengist purges, since Zhao was Deng's close henchman. The George H. W. Bush advisor Richard Baum confirmed:

In the face of strong conservative pressures to prosecute Zhao Ziyang, spearheaded by Chen Yun and supported by Li Peng and Yao Yilin, Deng Xiaoping refused to be drawn into an anti-Zhao vendetta. Counseling caution and restraint in the handling of Zhao's case, China's senior leader once again revealed his underlying concern for carefully counterbalancing fang and shou [i.e. opening and closing]. "Let us not get tangled up in who is responsible for what right now," he said on 16 June; "Let those questions be raised two or three years from now." Deng prevailed, and no formal charges were filed against Zhao; however, for the next several months the former general secretary remained confined to quarters, living in relative comfort at Hu Yaobang's former residence in Fuqiang Lane, Beijing. Although Deng's personal intervention enabled Zhao to avoid criminal prosecution, CAC old comrades nonetheless went forward with their attempt to root out remnant Zhaoists within the Party apparatus. At the end of June 1989, the CDIC, under Peng Zhen protege Qiao Shi, launched a new rectification drive, in the course of which all Party members in Beijing and other cities were required to undergo investigation and reregistration in connection with their attitudes and behavior during the six weeks of turmoil.

('The Road to Tiananmen: Chinese Politics in the 1980s', author: Richard Baum. In: 'The Politics of China: The Eras of Mao and Deng', Cambridge University Press edited by: Roderick MacFarquhar, 1997, p. 466) (IMG)

The Chinese anti-imperialist forces and the agents coopted by them in China's 'Communist' Party resisted opening up to the Anglo-American imperialists as advocated by the faction of the CIA agent Deng.

The purge against the Zhaoists weakened Deng's influence over the Party. This is corroborated by the Boston University scholar on Chinese history, Joseph Fewsmith, whose work was published and edited by Roderick MacFarquhar, the former Parliamentary Private Secretary to the minister of state at the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Fewsmith wrote:

Tiananmen shook the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to its core. The charge leveled against former general secretary Zhao Ziyang was that "[a]t the critical juncture involving the life and death of the Party and state, he made the mistake of supporting turmoil and splitting the Party, and he bears unshirkable responsibility for the formation and development of the turmoil. The nature and consequences of his mistakes are very serious." The issues the Party faced, however, ran far deeper than even this charge suggested. Tiananmen threw open a whole series of questions that had been simmering just below the surface for years.

The most fundamental of these was the nature of reform itself. Tiananmen, many Party leaders believed, was the inevitable denouement of the reform program that Zhao led and symbolized; more important, the content of that reform program was inextricably intertwined with Zhao's patron, senior leader Deng Xiaoping. The question raised by Tiananmen, then, was the nature of Deng's leadership and thus whether or not the Party should continue reform as Deng had defined it. Many believed it should not.

(‘Reaction, resurgence, and succession: Chinese politics since Tiananmen’, author: Joseph Fewsmith. In: ‘The Politics of China: The Eras of Mao and Deng’, edited by: Roderick MacFarquhar, 1997, p. 472) (IMG)

The denunciation of Zhao would have served to question the level of Deng's vigilance against Anglo-American intelligence conspiracies against China, and would have raised the question of whether Deng was linked to counter-revolutionary forces, which he obviously was. As Baum said, this ‘Zhao question’ would have questioned Deng's leadership:

The question of how to deal with Zhao Ziyang was inevitably linked with the question of Deng Xiaoping's leadership, not just because Zhao's selection first as premier and then as general secretary now seemed to reflect poorly on Deng Xiaoping's judgment, but because Zhao had been implementing a political-cum-economic line long supported by Deng. Deng clearly recognized that dismissing a second successor (following former general secretary Hu Yaobang's ouster in January 1987) would raise doubts about his own judgment, and he was determined to salvage as much advantage as he could by denying the fruits of victory to the winners. (‘Reaction, resurgence, and succession: Chinese politics since Tiananmen’, author: Joseph Fewsmith. In: ‘The Politics of China: The Eras of Mao and Deng’, edited by: Roderick MacFarquhar, 1997, pp. 473-474) (IMG)

Fewsmith also noted the deep division in the Party over Zhao's counter-revolutionary sympathies with the Tiananmen oppositionists:

The Fourth Plenary Session of the Thirteenth Central Committee, which convened on 23-4 June 1989 following a three-day enlarged Politburo meeting, confirmed Deng's decision to name Jiang Zemin as general secretary and added him, veteran planner Song Ping, and Tianjin mayor Li Ruihuan to the PSC. Li Ruihuan and Ding Guan'gen, Deng's bridge partner, were added to the Secretariat in partial replacement of Zhao associates Hu Qili, Rui Xing wen, and Yan Mingfu, who were removed. On the critical question of Zhao, however, the plenum could not come to a final resolution. Having judged Zhao's actions harshly, the conclave nevertheless could only declare that the party would "continue to investigate his problem."

The plenum's failure to conclude Zhao's case reflected the depth of division within the Party. Obviously, some within the Party wanted to pursue the issue of Zhao's guilt, perhaps even to the point of criminal prosecution, a course that would have had profound implications for Deng Xiaoping and the continuation of reform. For instance, Yuan Mu, the hard-line spokesman for the State Council and protege of Premier Li Peng, stated that Zhao's case would be handled "in accordance with the criterion based on law," suggesting the possibility of legal prosecution. Some Party elders were blunter. PRC president Li Xiannian allegedly called Zhao the "root cause of the riots and rebellion," while Party elder Peng Zhen accused Zhao of "attempting to topple the Communist Party and wreaking havoc with the socialist system in coordination with hostile powers at home and abroad."

(‘Reaction, resurgence, and succession: Chinese politics since Tiananmen’, author: Joseph Fewsmith. In: ‘The Politics of China: The Eras of Mao and Deng’, edited by: Roderick MacFarquhar, 1997, p. 475) (IMG)

Anyways, the Party, against the wishes of the Deng-Zhao clique, finally put down the Tiananmen colour revolutionaries. A report by the Political Officer (POLOFF) of the US intelligence den in Beijing provided a thorough description of the CIA conversation with the Pinochet-era Chilean second secretary Carlos Gallo and his wife. The following are excerpts of the intelligence report, which confirm that there was no bloodshed in the Tiananmen square itself, despite the fact that there was bloodshed elsewhere in Beijing:

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY DURING A RECENT MEETING, A LATIN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT AND HIS WIFE PROVIDED POLOFF AN ACCOUNT OF THEIR MOVEMENTS ON JUNE 3-4 AND THEIR EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF EVENTS AT TIANANMEN SQUARE. ALTHOUGH THEIR ACCOUNT GENERALLY FOLLOWS THOSE PREVIOUSLY REPORTED, THEIR UNIQUE EXPERIENCES PROVIDE ADDITIONAL INSIGHT AND CORROBORATION OF EVENTS IN THE SQUARE. THEY WERE ABLE TO ENTER AND LEAVE THE SQUARE SEVERAL TIMES AND WERE NOT HARASSED BY TROOPS. REMAINING WITH STUDENTS BY THE MONUMENT TO THE PEOPLE'S HEROES UNTIL THE FINAL WITHDRAWAL, THE DIPLOMAT SAID THERE WERE NO MASS SHOOTINGS OF STUDENTS IN THE SQUARE OR AT THE MONUMENT. END SUMMARY.

3. DURING A RECENT MEETING, CHILEAN SECOND SECRETARY CARLOS GALLO AND HIS WIFE (PLEASE PROTECT) PROVIDED POLOFF AN ACCOUNT OF THEIR MOVEMENTS ON JUNE 3-4 AND THEIR EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF EVENTS AT TIANANMEN SQUARE. ALTHOUGH THE GALLO'S ACCOUNT GENERALLY FOLLOWS THOSE PREVIOUSLY REPORTED, THEIR UNIQUE EXPERIENCES PROVIDE ADDITIONAL INSIGHT AND CORROBORATION OF EVENTS IN THE SQUARE. (...).

8. GALLO EVENTUALLY ENDED UP AT THE RED CROSS STATION, AGAIN HOPING THAT TROOPS WOULD NOT FIRE ON THE MEDICAL PERSONNEL THERE. HE WATCHED THE MILITARY ENTER THE SQUARE AND DID NOT OBSERVE ANY MASS FIRING OF WEAPONS INTO THE CROWDS, ALTHOUGH SPORADIC GUNFIRE WAS HEARD. HE SAID THAT MOST OF THE TROOPS WHICH ENTERED THE SQUARE WERE ACTUALLY ARMED ONLY WITH ANTI-RIOT GEAR--TRUNCHEONS AND WOODEN CLUBS; THEY WERE BACKED UP BY ARMED SOLDIERS. AS THE MILITARY

CONSOLIDATED ITS CONTROL OF THE SQUARE'S PERIMETER, STUDENTS AND CIVILIANS GATHERED AROUND THE MONUMENT TO THE PEOPLE'S HEROES. GALLO SAID WOUNDED, INCLUDING SOME SOLDIERS, CONTINUED TO BE BROUGHT TO THE RED CROSS STATION.

9. THE TROOPS BEGAN A SLOW ORDERLY APPROACH TO THE MONUMENT FROM THE NORTH WITH SOLDIERS ON FOOT PRECEDING APCs. FROM WHAT HE COULD SEE, GALLO FELT THAT MOST OF THE TENTS ON THE SQUARE WERE EMPTY WHEN THE ARMORED VEHICLES ROLLED OVER THEM. THE FIRST LINE OF TROOPS TO REACH THE MONUMENT AREA, PASSED BY THE RED CROSS STATION AND IGNORED THE MEDICAL PERSONNEL AND WOUNDED. AS A SECOND LINE OF TROOPS APPROACHED, THEY CIRCLED THE RED CROSS STATION AND BEGAN YELLING AND THROWING STICKS AND DEBRIS OVER THE HEADS OF THE PEOPLE AT THE STATION. THE MEDICAL PERSONNEL PANICKED AND FLED, LEAVING BEHIND THE WOUNDED. MOST PEOPLE, INCLUDING GALLO, FLED TO THE MONUMENT AREA WHERE THE STUDENTS WERE GATHERED.

10. ALTHOUGH GUNFIRE COULD BE HEARD, GALLO SAID THAT APART FROM SOME BEATING OF STUDENTS, THERE WAS NO MASS FIRING INTO THE CROWD OF STUDENTS AT THE MONUMENT. WHEN POLOFF MENTIONED SOME REPORTEDLY EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS OF MASSACRES AT THE MONUMENT WITH AUTOMATIC WEAPONS, GALLO SAID THAT THERE WAS NO SUCH SLAUGHTER. ONCE AGREEMENT WAS REACHED FOR THE STUDENTS TO WITHDRAW, LINKING HANDS TO FORM A COLUMN, THE STUDENTS LEFT THE SQUARE THROUGH THE SOUTHEAST CORNER. ESSENTIALLY EVERYONE, INCLUDING GALLO, LEFT. THE FEW THAT ATTEMPTED TO REMAIN BEHIND WERE BEATEN AND DRIVEN TO JOIN THE END OF THE DEPARTING PROCESSION. ONCE OUTSIDE THE SQUARE, THE STUDENTS HEADED WEST ON QIANMEN DAIJIE WHILE GALLO HEADED EAST TO HIS CAR. THEREFORE, HE COULD NOT COMMENT ON REPORTS THAT STUDENTS WERE AMBUSHED AND SLAUGHTERED IN THE ALLEY JUST WEST OF THE SQUARE NEAR THE BEIJING CONCERT HALL.

(LATIN AMERICAN DIPLOMAT EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF JUNE 3-4 EVENTS ON TIANANMEN SQUARE, 89BEIJING18828_a, from: US intelligence, to: US Commander in Chief of the US Pacific Command, US Secretary of State, US Secretary of Defense, US Information Agency, July 12, 1989) (IMG)

The bloodshed that existed elsewhere during the 1989 colour revolution could only mainly be because of either of the following: (1) the provocative terrorist agents of Deng and the CIA inside the Chinese security apparatus aimed to assist the CIA-MI6 colour revolutionaries by terrorizing civilians so to provoke civilians into an uprising against the Chinese state; the uprising against the Chinese state would have undermined those elements that resisted the Dengist reforms and would have strengthened Deng's leverage in liberalizing China enough so that China gets partitioned; for years, the PLA and Chinese intelligence had cooperated with the CIA in espionage against Eurasia, in funding Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, in waging war on Vietnam, etc.; hence the PLA and the Chinese intelligence were infiltrated by enough CIA-MI6 elements so that the mentioned outcome (i.e. provocative terror aimed at expanding the colour revolution) would inevitably happen. (2) Chinese colour revolutionaries engaged in violence against anti-Dengist elements in the Chinese security forces, so that the Deng faction could become stronger against the anti-Dengist elements in the Chinese security apparatus; hence, in response, the anti-Dengist elements in the Chinese security engaged against the colour revolutionaries and 'spilled the blood' of the pro-Deng colour revolutionary terrorists.

As a result of the purge of the Zhaoists, the influence of the Deng faction began to diminish, and correlated with this was the diminishing of the influence of US intelligence. The influence of US intelligence in China began to decline since 1989 but the decline was very slow, contrary to what the right-deviationists would have their readers believe. This is demonstrated, for example, in the fact that the CIA was still able to operate freely in China for the purpose of gathering military intelligence against the Eurasians (and against the anti-imperialist faction in China):

Trucks with highly classified tapes from two U.S.-built listening posts are still traveling from remote sites in western China to the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, despite a steadily worsening relationship between the two nations' governments, according to informed sources. At the same time, Chinese scientists have assured their U.S. counterparts that they will continue to furnish unique information on Soviet nuclear tests and other seismic disturbances recorded at nine other stations built by the United States in China, other sources said. In short, they said, the Chinese government has not allowed its public anger over the sanctuary provided to dissident Fang Lizhi at the U.S. Embassy or the U.S. cutoff of military sales and diplomatic contacts to interfere with a secret partnership that began more than a decade ago. (INTELLIGENCE TIES ENDURE DESPITE U.S.-CHINA STRAIN, The Washington Post, George Lardner Jr., R. Jeffrey Smith, June 25, 1989) (IMG)

In replacement of Zhao Ziyang and Deng Xiaoping, the anti-imperialist faction coopted and promoted Jiang Zemin. Jiang Zemin was a distant agent of Deng Xiaoping. An ally of Deng, he had been elevated during the Deng era, but was not in Deng's immediate entourage and did not have much power. As such, the anti-imperialist faction promoted him in exchange for him being a coopted yes-man. Chen Yun was not necessarily a loyal fighter for the progressive anti-imperialist cause and did not always promote a socialist revolutionary line, but he was coopted by the progressive anti-imperialist faction and thus was compelled to promote correct stances on many issues. In spite of promoting many Dengist right-deviations, he was nonetheless coopted to be the leading Party official spearheading the campaign against the Maoist 'Cultural Revolution', the 'Great Leap Forward', and the Trotskyite pseudo-collectivization of agriculture into 'Communes', while also campaigning against Deng-era cultural liberality, supporting the suppression of the student colour revolutionaries, denouncing many of the decentralization measures of the Deng group, and supporting confrontation with the United States. Admired by the Chinese proletarians for many of the correct stances he was coopted to adopt, he was one of the most influential leaders of the Party in the 1980s and the 1990s. It was he who engineered the rise of Jiang Zemin against the will of Deng:

At a preliminary meeting on the issue on May 21, Chen Yun and Li Xiannian favored Jiang Zemin, a career factory boss, while Deng Xiaoping and Deng Yingchao proposed Li Ruihuan, a nationally well-known model construction worker. Wang Zhen voted for Li Peng, the son of a revolutionary martyr and a career technocrat, while Yang Shangkun supported Qiao Shi, the only candidate with extensive experience in the party center (Party Central Office Secretariat 2001a). Although multiple candidates emerged at that stage, Jiang Zemin might have been the front-runner even then due to backing from two major groups in the party, the central technocrats led by Chen Yun and the New Fourth Army faction represented by Wang Daohan (Gilley 1998: 3 5). Because Li Xiannian and most of the FFA voted

with Chen Yun, Jiang also obtained the support of FFA veterans along with Chen Yun's support. The others were backed by smaller coalitions. (Coalitions of the Weak, Cambridge University Press, Victor Shih, 2022) (IMG)

China's economy was saved thanks to the rise of the 'conservative' faction, really the progressive anti-imperialist faction, in China's so-called 'Communist' Party. Had the 'conservative' faction not increased its influence, had the Deng faction not seen such defeats in its factional conflicts, had China not began to reassert central economic controls over the localities, had the liberal cultural policy not been curbed, all such factors would have resulted in China being a country like how Afghanistan was for so many decades. The 'conservative' re-centralization drive, and the 'conservative' anti-Dengist/anti-Zhaoist purges saved that country from partition and destruction. And all of this was thanks in part to the pressures inflicted upon the Deng faction by the Chinese proletariat in the favour of the anti-imperialist faction which had coopted the Chen Yun group. In describing the ideology of present-day China, Chenyunism (Chen-Yun-ism) is a more accurate term than Dengism, as Dengism would have resulted in the partition of China into several CIA-backed comprador warlord regimes. Dengism would have done to China what Dengism (China's funding of Al-Qaeda in the 1980s) did to Afghanistan.

Due to the influence of the progressive-coopted Chen Yun group, China transitioned from a comprador state to an anti-imperialist state by the early 1990s. The anti-imperialist 'conservatives' in China's Party, not the CIA-backed Dengists, have been the force behind China's strategic partnership with the Russian Federation and the Iranian anti-imperialists. Forget not that as confirmed by Iran's archives center, Dengist China was a major supporter of the Iraqi regime, Iran's foe, in the Iran-Iraq War, and forget not that Dengist China was hostile to Eurasia, to which Russia is the successor. All the more naturally, the rise of the anti-imperialist 'conservative' faction since the late 1980s resulted in China being closer to the Russian Federation and the anti-imperialist faction of Iran's regime. Some two decades later, China emerged as the primary financial supporter of the Russo-Iranian military and intelligence campaigns against the Anglo-American imperialists, thanks not to the fascist Dengist reaction but to the 'conservative' re-centralizers.

Understand this: owing to the predominance of the petit-bourgeoisie in China and the small percentage of the proletariat, the corrupt bureaucrats could easily take over the Chinese state while meeting minimal resistance. The petit-bourgeoisie tend to not risk losing their businesses in a fight against the parasitic class forces. China's 'collectivization', done excessively quickly in the 1950s, appears all the more fake, leading me to believe that real collectivization did not actually take place in China. Owing to the continued predominance of the petit-bourgeoisie in that land, the parasitic classes take over China easily, a factor which led to that country being dominated by opportunists – left-opportunists as manifested in the form of Maoism, and right-opportunists as manifested in the form of Dengism. Both were reactionary pro-fascist comprador currents directly allied to Anglo-American finance capital. The opportunism was not spontaneously generated; it had a historical explanation, which was precisely the predominance of the petit-bourgeoisie in China. All the opportunist intellectuals around the world hail the opportunists in China, either in the form of Maoism or Dengism, and all such opportunist intellectuals whine and babble such identity politics terms as 'orientalism' and 'Sinophobia' in order to condemn scientific and legitimate criticism of the regime dominating China until the late 1980s. In reality, by supporting Mao Zedong group, the gang that via decentralization inflicted a pseudo-'natural' famine on the Chinese people, or by supporting the Deng group – the terror gang that brought double-digit inflation, unemployment, recession, corruption, and CIA-backed liberal student colour revolutions to China – the willing supporters of Chinese-style opportunism only prove their own vicious hostility to the Chinese proletarians and to China's existence as a country.

Due to the outbreak of the Dengism disease in 'communist' parties in recent years, some scores must eventually be settled with the Dengists outside of China as well. Not out of an outburst of rage and excess passion, but out of a coldest of calculations, and armed with a wealth of personal experience, I say: almost all of the Dengist intelligentsia are hopelessly reactionary, and there should be no waste of effort to persuade them to ideologically change, for almost all of such intellectuals cannot escape the influence of their parasitic class roots over the depths of their psyche. The proletariat, not the intelligentsia, will determine the course of history in favour of communism. In time, the might of the proletariat will circumvent the venomous influence of such arrogantly opportunistic intellectuals and will force them to recant and submit to the will of the workers' state. Hence, in attempting to 'change' the poisoned minds of such 'innocently ignorant' right-opportunist intellectuals, waste your time not, I advise. When, under the influence of the anti-imperialist 'conservative' faction, even China itself – at a snail pace, but steadily nonetheless – continues the process of dismantling the legacy of Deng Xiaoping and his fascist terror gang, that is when it becomes clear that the Deng-loving intellectuals stand no chance.

Whereas anti-Dengism is the new anti-Bukharinism, anti-Maoism is the new anti-Trotskyism. It is crucial that Maoist terrorist espionage networks be ruthlessly exposed by communists around the world. It is crucial that the Maoist spies and assassins in the payroll of the imperialist-fascist secret services be exposed, and that the sincere believers who have been misled into adopting such a reactionary ideology, be helped, if at all mentally capable of and susceptible to receiving such help, in freeing themselves from such left-opportunist reaction. The attacks on both Maoism and Dengism have to be done in a responsible manner, because while the Maoists and Dengists are covertly on the same side, they 'oppose' each other on the overt level; such an overt-level 'hostility' between Maoism and Dengism must be exploited in order to gradually annihilate both of them. The left-opportunists are useful for speeding up the pace of the revolution and the right-opportunists are useful as anti-leftist antidote when pace is too high, when things begin to go too far, when left-deviationist excesses begin to emerge.

C23S6. The Shehu Faction after Official Sino-Albanian 'Split' *** IMG-All-{Albania}

While trade with the West was not a bad thing in itself, a reorientation of commercial relations towards mostly the West would have given imperialist-fascist front companies a dramatic increase in economic leverage over Albania, thus strengthening the hand of the traitor Shehu. This is why:

Hoxha insisted on maintaining the principle of self-reliance, whilst Shehu argued for more economic interaction with the West. (The Albanians: A Modern History, Miranda Vickers, 2014) (IMG)

As mentioned before, Hoxha's insistence on self-reliance did not mean full-on autarky, however, because Albania began to reorient trade with the Eurasian-aligned states in Eastern Europe in the late 1960s.

The decline in the influence of the Trotskyite/Titoist regime in China meant a decline in the influence of the anti-Albanian renegade Mehmet Shehu, who, as mentioned in C13S1.3, had been a brutal intelligence official pursuing Trotskyite terrorist measures in Albania, against Hoxha's will. Hence,:

In April 1980 [Shehu] was relieved of his duties as minister of defence during a government reshuffle, but managed to retain the post of prime minister. As Albania faced mounting social problems and economic slowdown in the wake of the break with China, Hoxha had apparently decided that Ramiz Alia was better equipped than Shehu to carry the heavy responsibilities and burdens that his own successor would inherit. Alia was seen as less unpredictable and extremist than Shehu. (The Albanians: A Modern History, Miranda Vickers, 2014) (IMG)

Ramiz Alia was a right-deviationist, but at the time, he was useful for containing Shehu's Trotskyism. Subsequently, a part of the military and the intelligence service was purged:

Since Shehu's main power base had been the military and the Sigurimi, Hoxha quickly instigated sweeping purges of a number of military and Sigurimi officers who were supporters of Shehu. (The Albanians: A Modern History, Miranda Vickers, 2014) (IMG)

Shehu was later found 'dead' under mysterious circumstances. Vickers of the Soros-funded ICG remarked:

According to his nephew, Luan Omari, Hoxha was badly shaken for several days following Shehu's death. (The Albanians: A Modern History, Miranda Vickers, 2014) (IMG)

The 'death' of Shehu was indeed a real tragedy; had he been captured by Albania's counter-intelligence, Shehu could be duly interrogated and have his accomplices in the crimes against Albania be revealed. For this reason, Shehu was silenced. Of course, Western media blames Hoxha, claiming that Shehu was murdered by him. Then,

almost a year after Shehu's death Hoxha announced to a bewildered Albanian populace that Shehu had all along been a multiple agent, in the pay of the British, Yugoslav, American and [Titoist elements in the] Soviet secret services. (The Albanians: A Modern History, Miranda Vickers, 2014) (IMG)

C23S7. The Vietnamese Freedom-Fighters against Titoism / Pol Pot, a Yugoslav agent *** IMG-All-{Vietnam-Cambodia}

Tito's regime assisted the US in containing the Vietnamese freedom fighters. According to Mao Zedong,:

When U.S. imperialism stepped up its intervention in Laos in January 1961, the Tito clique spread the view that the United States "is really concerned for the peace and neutralization of Laos". When U.S. imperialism engineered political assassinations and armed conflicts in Laos in May 1963, the Tito clique attacked the Laotian patriotic forces for "putting all the blame on the United States." (Is Yugoslavia a Socialist Country?, Mao, 1963, MIA)

The Vietnamese Communist Party was one of the signatories to the 1960 declaration in Moscow which denounced the fascist regime in Yugoslavia. The text of the 1960 declaration is as follows:

The Communist Parties have unanimously condemned the Yugoslav variety of international opportunism, a variety of modern revisionist "theories" in concentrated form. After betraying Marxism-Leninism, which they termed obsolete, the leaders of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia opposed their anti-Leninist revisionist program to the Declaration of 1957; they set the L.C.Y. against the international Communist movement as a whole, severed their country from the socialist camp, made it dependent on so-called "aid" from U.S. and other imperialists, and thereby exposed the Yugoslav people to the danger of losing the revolutionary gains achieved through a heroic struggle. The Yugoslav revisionists carry on subversive work against the socialist camp and the world Communist movement. Under the pretext of an extra-bloc policy, they engage in activities which prejudice the unity of all the peace-loving forces and countries. Further exposure of the leaders of Yugoslav revisionists and active struggle to safeguard the Communist movement and the working-class movement from the anti-Leninist ideas of the Yugoslav revisionists, remains an essential task of the Marxist-Leninist Parties. ('STATEMENT OF 81 COMMUNIST AND WORKERS PARTIES MEETING IN MOSCOW, USSR', 1960, Source: Statement of 81 Communist and Workers Parties Meeting in Moscow, USSR, 1960. New York: New Century Publishers, 1961. MIA)

In a highly diplomatic manner, the Vietnamese Communist Party also criticized the Moscow Titoists for their favorable stance towards the Yugoslav regime. The CIA, which records foreign media statements declassified its 'Foreign Radio Broadcasts' 'Daily Report', which contained a massive load of copies of media broadcasts and statements from different countries around the world. The CIA published the full text of a top article by the Vietnamese Communist Party's Hac Top Editorial in 1963, in which the Yugoslav regime was denounced. By now, it should become clear enough that citing the CIA for exposing Tito's hostility to the communist movement does not generate bias, but on the contrary reduces it, because Tito and his gang were indeed CIA agents, as has been clearly proven by the Stalin-era Soviet statements and mildly even by the Khrushchev-era Moscow statement in 1960 cited above. In that respect, therefore, using a CIA source for exposing the hostile attitude of the Vietnamese communists towards the CIA agent Tito is not an act of spreading imperialist lies. More importantly, citing the CIA source is actually a way of defending the Vietnamese communists against the imperialist media accusation that Vietnam's communists had 'friendly' relations with Yugoslavia. Anyways, here are excerpts of the statement by the Vietnamese communists' Hac Top editorial:

The attitude toward the Tito revisionist clique is one of the most important questions which have caused differences in the international communist movement. Concerning the Tito group, the 1960 statements of the conferences of representatives of communist and workers parties pointed out:

"The Communist parties have unanimously condemned the Yugoslav variety of international opportunism, a variety of modern revisionist theories in concentrated form. After betraying Marxism-Leninism, which they termed obsolete, the leaders of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia opposed their anti-Leninist revisionist program to the declaration of 1957; they set the League of Yugoslav Communists against the international communist movement as whole, severed their country from the socialist camp, made it dependent on so-called 'aid' from the United States and other imperialists, and thereby exposed the Yugoslav people to the danger of losing revolutionary gains achieved through a heroic struggle.

"The Yugoslav revisionists carry on subversive work against the socialist camp and the world communist movement. Under the pretext of an extrabloc party, they engage in activities which prejudice the unity of all peace-loving forces and countries. Further exposure of the leaders of the Yugoslav revisionists and active struggle to safeguard the communist movement and the working class movement from the anti-Leninist ideas of the Yugoslav revisionists, remains an essential task of the Marxist-Leninist parties."

The question of the attitude toward the Yugoslav revisionist clique is a question of principle of the Moscow documents. It is a question of choosing either Leninism or revisionism, a question of either strictly following the two Moscow statements or cancelling them.

At present, a number of persons are claiming that the analysis of the Tito clique by the 1960 statement is wrong. They eulogize the Tito clique. They take up Tito and draw his group into the ranks of the Marxist-Leninist parties in the world to create more conditions for it to undermine in the international communist movement. Meanwhile, they seek every means to isolate a number of the true Marxist-Leninist parties. They declare that Tito's Yugoslavia is a member of the great family of socialist countries. In fact, the 1960 Moscow statement pointed out that the Tito clique "severed its country from the socialist camp." Yugoslavia is not on the list of socialist countries mentioned by the 1960 statement. (...).

These two statements constitute the common program of the international communist movement. They have defined the strategic and tactical principles of the communist movement, the rules governing the relations among the communist and workers parties, and the methods to overcome the differences through meetings and consultations if they arise among the parties. All communist and workers parties have an obligation to abide strictly by all provisions of the statements which they have recognized.

Vietnamese communists have strictly respected the provisions set out in the two statements.

(Hoc Tap Editorial on Moscow Documents, Hanoi VNA International Service in English, November 16, 1963. In: Daily Report, Foreign Radio Broadcasts, CIA, JJJ, pp. 6-9) (IMG)

The Vietnamese communists pursued the correct policy of criticizing Nikita Khrushchev's gang while remaining wary so as to not completely sever relations with Eurasia because that would have actually cut off relations with the communist faction in Eurasia and would have benefitted the Moscow Titoists in forcing Vietnam into America's hands. For this, the Vietnamese freedom-fighters were denounced by the Moscow Titoists. Regarding the mistreatment of the Vietnamese comrades by the Kremlin Titoists, Enver Hoxha recalled:

From a number of reliable sources, we are hearing what occurred in Moscow with the delegations of China, Korea and Vietnam, which had gone «to celebrate» the great anniversary of the Revolution with the «Soviet brothers» and «to assist the Soviet comrades». It is said that these delegations were humiliated by the Soviet revisionists.

Only Kosygin, quite alone, reluctantly received the delegation from Vietnam, having previously warned it that he could spare it no more than one hour. Kosygin received it coldly and disdainfully, listed the aid which the Soviets had provided for Vietnam, and then criticized them because their papers published anti-Soviet materials. In regard to the question of Khrushchev, he barely mentioned it and said that the Soviets were not changing their line one iota.

The same arrogant and humiliating behaviour with the Korean delegation, too, indeed with it he cut down the time of the meeting, because the Vietnamese had taken up fifteen minutes more than Mr. Kosygin had deigned to reserve for them.

(THE DEFEAT OF CHOU EN-LAI IN MOSCOW, Enver Hoxha, November 21, 1964. In: Enver Hoxha Selected Works, Vol. 3: June 1960 to October 1965, Published by Decision of the Central Committee of the Party of Labour of Albania)

The Vietnamese communist-led anti-fascist forces launched a war against 'Titoism with Cambodian Characteristics'. Among Tito's agents, Pol Pot was perhaps the cheapest of all – literally. In 1978, Pol Pot not only declared his camaraderie with Yugoslavia's fascist dictator but also confessed that he traveled to Yugoslavia to work for Tito for free. When thousands of Yugoslavs were hunted by the regime and taken to work as slaves for the anti-Soviet military-economic construction projects in the Belgrade-Zagreb Highway, Pol Pot was busy working as a volunteer for Tito's fascist regime during 1950 – that is two years after Tito's group had been unmasked by the Cominform. The following excerpts of the Khmer Rouge regime media are instructive:

At 08:30 on 17th March 1978 at the state guest house, Comrade Pol Pot, Secretary of the CPK Central Committee and Premier of the Democratic Cambodian Government, received and answered questions in an interview with the Yugoslav press delegation which is now on a visit to Democratic Cambodia.

First of all, our Comrade Party Secretary said to the journalists from the friendly country: We are very pleased with the Yugoslav press delegation's visit to our country. The visit of our comrade Yugoslav journalists will further strengthen the ties of friendship between our two peoples and countries. Like our Democratic Cambodia, Yugoslavia is a non-aligned country which has adhered to the position of preserving independence. Friendship between our two countries is therefore based on the same principle. We have always esteemed and respected Comrade President Tito and the friendly Yugoslav people. Comrade President Tito and the Yugoslav people have always supported and helped us. We have sympathy for them and wish to express our thanks to Comrade President Tito and the friendly Yugoslav people. In 1950, I went to Yugoslavia to work in a work unit in the Zagreb area. I have sympathy for President Tito and the Yugoslav people. Comrades, you come to our country as friends.

(Pol Pot's Interview with Yugoslav Journalists: Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol. 8, No. 3. Phnom Penh Home Service, March 20, 1978, 23:00 GMT. Description: 'Text of report of interview given on 17th March by the Cambodian Premier, Pol Pot, to a visiting Yugoslav press delegation'.) (IMG)

There were reports that whenever Yugoslav humanitarian aid was sent to the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia, Yugoslav arms also arrived at the Pol Pot regime territory in Cambodia at the same time, indicating that the Yugoslav regime was providing military support for the Cambodian regime under the cover of 'humanitarian' aid. However, as the reports do not explicitly confirm that Yugoslav arms were sent under 'humanitarian' cover, they cannot be cited as concrete evidence of Yugoslav regime military support for the Cambodian regime. One such report is by the Chicago Tribune:

Sok Pha said her job in Thor Maroy was to cook and prepare rooms for special guests of such Khmer Rouge officials as Ieng Sary, one of the Khmer Rouges most senior leaders,. She said the guests included Chinese and Yugoslav officials, who came in groups of 10 to 20 every month or so. "The Chinese and Yugoslavs wore military uniforms," she said through an interpreter. "Every time they came, new shipments of ammunition came too."

Although the Chinese have long been known as the Khmer Rouges main military backer, the only previously known Yugoslav aid to the Khmer Rouge has been "humanitarian" aid such as baby food, pencils, medicine and sports shoes.

Yugoslavia has given similar aid to the Khmer People's National Liberation Front and the forces of former Cambodian leader Prince Norodom Sihanouk. Those noncommunist groups are united with the communist Khmer Rouge in fighting the Vietnamese-backed regime in Cambodia.

(KHMER ROUGE ISLAND REPORTEDLY AN ARMS BASE, Chicago Tribune, Mary Kay Magistad, April 12, 1989) (IMG)

In the eyes of most reasonable observers aware of the truth about fascist Yugoslavia, it would seem utterly naïve to believe, even for one second, that the outreach of Yugoslav 'humanitarian' aid to the Cambodian 'Khmer Rouge' fascists – completely simultaneous with the arrival of arms and Yugoslav military advisors to the Cambodian 'Khmer Rouge' fascists – could be anything but a case Yugoslav military aid, under the cover of 'humanitarian' aid, to the 'Khmer Rouge' fascists.

C24S1. The Titoist Role in the Fall of Yugoslavia as a Country *** IMG-All-{Partition of Yugoslavia}

The imperialist-fascist reaction, which promoted the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia as a bulwark against Soviet and later Eurasian influence until 1989, saw 1989 as the year in which to abandon such a policy of territorial integrity and to pursue the partition of Yugoslavia. The year 1989 was the year in which the Eastern European allies of Eurasia were collapsing one by one, and thereupon, from the lens of NATO, the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia was of use no more, and rather was detrimental to the imperialist camp. As such, the Anglo-American and German imperialists unleashed a policy of supporting the partition of Yugoslavia.

It may appear as though the elevation of the much-slandered Milosevic faction, the anti-imperialist faction, to the 'leadership' of Yugoslavia was the rise to dominance of the anti-imperialist faction in the Titoist fascist regime; it is true that the Milosevic faction was anti-imperialist, but the truth is that the Milosevic faction never at any point in time dominated Yugoslavia, never reaching anywhere close to even a 50% stake in control over the Yugoslav state apparatus. The 'balance' of power in Yugoslavia continued to decisively remain in the hands of the Titoist fascist forces throughout the 'Milosevic era'. For Anglo-American finance capital, by 1989, a territorially disintegral Yugoslavia was far more useful. Hence, all of the Titoist agents who had been striving to bring about a territorially integral powerful fascist Yugoslavia until 1989 suddenly went for weakening Yugoslavia and making it a territorially disintegral fascist-occupied territory. Such was why in Croatia, the Ustase faction of the notorious Tito agent Franjo Tudjman was in charge. Such was why in Bosnia, although the Libyan-backed Iran-backed anti-imperialist Alija Izetbegovic faction was ostensibly in charge, in reality Bosnia was taken over by the Afghan Al-Qaeda terrorists whom Tito had endorsed many years prior. In Serbia, although the Milosevic faction held the upper hand, much of the power was in the hands of the Staniscic faction, Staniscic being the Titoist UDB agent who rose to be the leader of the Serbian intelligence service and carrying out anti-Albanian pogroms so to provoke CIA-backed Kosovar Albanian rebellions. In Kosovo, the anti-Titoist warrior and Kosovar Albanian hero, Adem Demaci, along with his comrades, unofficially supported a strategic partnership with the Milosevic faction against NATO, but the Demaci faction was quickly sidelined in the KLA and the narco-terror gang of the UDB-backed KLA commander Hashim Thaci retained its decisive upper hand over the KLA. Until 1989, the Titoists dominated a territorially integral Yugoslavia. From 1989, the Titoists dominated a territorially disintegral Yugoslavia – no change in the fact of the Titoist domination.

In this section, the case of the Ustase operative and Titoist commander Franjo Tudjman as well as the case of the UDB official Jovica Staniscic and UDB-backed KLA commander will be explored, documenting their works as accomplices of the Titoist fascist secret service and their role in the collapse of Yugoslavia as a country.

The USSR Information Bulletin, the media of the Soviet embassy in the United States, reported in 1952:

Ruthlessly dealing with genuine patriots of the Yugoslav people, the Tito-Rankovic clique flung open the of the officers corps and the army to the enemies of the people – fascist and bourgeois nationalist elements – reactionary officers of the old royal army, Chetniks and Ustasi. Senior and higher officers are promoted from their midst; crimes against the people are their common bond with the Titoite clique. (The Tito Clique Has Turned Yugoslavia Into a Military Camp, V. Nemchinov, June 9, 1952. USSR Information Bulletin, Vol. 10, No. 11, p. 352) (IMG{Titoist Yugoslavia})

Recruiting from the army of the ancien regimes was something that the USSR did too. However, the USSR recruited these elements while remaining vigilant so to eventually purge the reactionary infiltrators into the army and to replace these infiltrators were communists and pro-communist sympathizers, whereas the Tito regime exterminated communists and pro-communist individuals in Yugoslavia. As may be recalled from the reader from C15S5, the Tito regime and the Ustase officials collaborated for the purpose of colonizing Macedonia in the post-war years. Tito and the Ustase were both backed by the Gestapo and later the CIA and MI6, the Yugoslav regime's secret service headed by Rankovic was made up of Gestapo officers, and the Yugoslav regime military was open to the Ustase elements. Let us not forget that Franjo Tudjman, an Ustase terrorist who rose to become a prominent military official in Croatia during the Tito years, was and remained an Ustase terrorist and tried to partially re-establish Ustase rule in Croatia in the 1990s.

In the 1960s, Franjo Tudjman went to the academia in order to agitate for Titoism and fascism there:

In 1961 Tudjman gave up his army career, and moved to Zagreb to become the director of the Institute for the History of the Working-Class Movement in Croatia, commanding a team of more than 200 researchers. In 1963 he was also appointed professor of history at the Zagreb University Faculty of Political Sciences, the only applicant without the usual prerequisite of a Ph.D. (Tito: And the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, pp. 300-301) (IMG)

However, by the mid-1960s, it became ever more obvious that Tudjman was associated to the Ustase terrorist networks. Yet, Tito continued to support Tudjman, knowing that Tudjman was a vicious enemy of the Yugoslav people. Evidence of the collusion of Tito with the Ustase terrorists lies in the fact that Ustase leader Franjo Tudjman was saved from prosecution upon the personal intervention of Tito:

During the mid-1960s, Tudjman became involved in Matica Hrvatska, especially in its relations with the Croats of diaspora, and in 1967 he signed the declaration about the language. For this he was thrown out of the party and stripped of his two official positions. During the crackdown on nationalists in the winter of 1971-2, Tudjman was arrested and charged with espionage, presumably because of his contacts with Croats abroad. However, Tito intervened to drop the more serious charges, and Tudjman spent only ten months in gaol. (Tito: And the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, p. 301) (IMG)

During the late 1960s, the partial resurgence of communist influence in Eurasia had given greater leverage to the communist 'Cominformists' in Yugoslavia in the secret service conflict against the Tito faction. Such was why by the 1970s, Tudjman was arrested. However, Tito's gang still retained dominant influence, a key factor that allowed the release of Tudjman, the Ustase general that would later destroy Yugoslavia. Tudjman, an agent and protégé of Tito, later on by the 1990s became the leader of the Ustase terrorists and established the new 'independent' state of Croatia, waging the Anglo-American and German imperialists' war against the Milosevic faction in Serbia. Patriotic Serbian scholars have already written plenty with regards to the Tito-Tudjman connection and Tudjman's role as Ustase leader in the 1990s.

Considering such an extensive cooperation between Tito's regime and the Ustase criminals, there is no way that the Ustase terror attacks launched on Yugoslavia would have occurred without the approval of the Tito regime. The dialectical laws of history dictate that since there was such a vast network of intelligence cooperation both directly (in the case of Macedonia) and indirectly (through CIA, MI6 and Gestapo) between the Tito regime and the Ustase, the case of the terror attacks by the Ustase could only have been with the – at best, tacit – approval of Tito and his fascist secret service. The goal of such operations was obvious: to terrorize the Yugoslav population into submission to the Yugoslav regime, to make the real opposition – i.e. the 'Cominformist' opposition – appear as being on the same side as the Ustase, and to perhaps also eliminate some persons regarded

as potential threats to Tito's regime in the process of such Ustase terror operations. As for the Bosnian branch of Al-Qaeda, lest we forget that Tito officially condemned the Soviet 'invasion' of Afghanistan, and that Tito supported the Afghan 'resistance' against the Soviet Red Army; those same Al-Qaeda terrorists returned to Bosnia later and prevented the Libyan-Iranian agent Alija Izetbegovic from pursuing his anti-NATO agenda. Less known than the case of the Ustase leader and Titoist commander, Franjo Tudjman, are the cases of UDB chief Jovica Stanisic and the UDB-backed KLA commander Hashim Thaci, and their roles in the destruction of Yugoslavia.

The UDB had recruited a man named Jovica Stanisic in 1975:

Stanisic joined the Yugoslav service in 1975, when the country was still under the communist rule of Josip Broz Tito. He was never regarded as an ideologue or rabid nationalist. But he had a rare aptitude for espionage.

"Stanisic was not an ordinary intelligence officer," said Dobrica Cosic, a writer and former dissident who was president of Serbia in 1992 and 1993. "He is an intellectual, not a radical policeman. He was educated and skilled, and he knew how to organize that service." (Serbian spy's trial lifts cloak on his CIA alliance, Los Angeles Times, Greg Miller, March 1, 2009) (IMG)

Naturally, since the Yugoslav intelligence service was a front for all the imperialist-fascist enemies of Milosevic, the latter had to choose not between good and evil but between the evil and the lesser evil. Hence, Milosevic felt no choice but to appoint Stanisic as the head of the Serbian secret service, because although Milosevic never really trusted the imperialist-fascist spy Stanisic, the latter was nonetheless enough of an intellectual to be easier to control:

Milosevic made Stanisic his top spy, despite long-standing distrust between the two. (Serbian spy's trial lifts cloak on his CIA alliance, Los Angeles Times, Greg Miller, March 1, 2009) (IMG)

That Stanisic was easier to control of course did not mean that the Yugoslav intelligence service which Tito-Rankovic founded was going to be less of a CIA-MI6-Mossad front. Stanisic simply continued his service to the CIA as early as 1992, the year in which he became the chief of the Yugoslav intelligence service, and he provided all kinds of services to the NATO enemies of Milosevic:

in 1992, as the former Yugoslavia was erupting in ethnic violence, ... a wary CIA agent made his way toward the park's gazebo and shook hands with a Serbian intelligence officer.

Jovica Stanisic had a cold gaze and a sinister reputation. He was the intelligence chief for Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, and regarded by many as the brains of a regime that gave the world a chilling new term: "ethnic cleansing."

But the CIA officer, William Lofgren, needed help. The agency was all but blind after Yugoslavia shattered into civil war. Fighting had broken out in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Milosevic was seen as a menace to European security, and the CIA was desperate to get intelligence from inside the turmoil. (...). So on that midnight stroll, the two spies carved out a clandestine relationship that remained undisclosed: For eight years, Stanisic was the CIA's main man in Belgrade. During secret meetings in boats and safe houses along the Sava River, he shared details on the inner workings of the Milosevic regime. He provided information on the locations of NATO hostages, aided CIA operatives in their search for grave sites and helped the agency set up a network of secret bases in Bosnia.

At the same time, Stanisic was setting up death squads for Milosevic that carried out a genocidal campaign, according to prosecutors at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, which was established by the U.N. Security Council in 1993 to try those responsible for serious human rights violations in the Balkan wars.

Now facing a trial at The Hague that could send him to prison for life, Stanisic has called in a marker with his American allies. In an exceedingly rare move, the CIA has submitted a classified document to the court that lists Stanisic's contributions and attests to his helpful role. The document remains sealed, but its contents were described by sources to The Times. (...). This account is based on dozens of interviews with current and former officials of U.S. and Serbian intelligence agencies, as well as documents obtained or viewed by The Times. Among them are official records of the Serbian intelligence service, and a seven-page account of that bloody period that Stanisic wrote while in prison in The Hague.

In that memo, Stanisic portrays himself as someone who sought to moderate Milosevic, and who worked extensively with the CIA to contain the crisis.

"I institutionalized cooperation with the U.S. intelligence community in spite of the notoriously bad relations between our two countries," Stanisic writes. That collaboration, he continues, "contributed significantly to the de-escalation of the conflict." (...). In spring 1993, at CIA prodding, Stanisic pressured Ratko Mladic, military commander of the breakaway Serb republic in Bosnia, to briefly stop the shelling of Sarajevo.

Two years later, Stanisic helped secure the release of 388 North Atlantic Treaty Organization troops who had been taken hostage, stripped of their uniforms and strapped to trees as human shields against NATO bombing runs. In his own written account, Stanisic said he negotiated the release "with the support of agency leadership."

That same year, Stanisic tried to intervene when French pilots were shot down and taken captive. Mladic "refused to admit that he was holding the pilots," Stanisic wrote. But "my service managed to discover the circumstances and location of their captivity," and shared the information with the CIA and French authorities.

By then, the Clinton administration was engaged in an all-out diplomatic push to end the war. Stanisic accompanied Milosevic to Dayton, Ohio, for peace talks, then returned to Serbia to carry out key pieces of the accord.

It was left to Stanisic to get the president of Bosnia's Serb republic, Radovan Karadzic, to sign a document pledging to leave office. And Stanisic helped the CIA establish a network of bases in Bosnia to monitor the cease-fire.

Doug Smith, the CIA's station chief in Bosnia, recalled meeting with Stanisic and a group of disgusted Bosnian Serb officials in Belgrade. As Stanisic instructed them to cooperate with the CIA, Smith said, the assembled guests "shifted uneasily in their seats."

Smith began meeting with Stanisic regularly, including once on a boat on the Sava. In typically dramatic fashion, Stanisic arrived late at the docks.

"He emerged out of the darkness with bodyguards" and spent much of the evening talking about his boss, Smith said. "He intensely disliked Milosevic. He went off on how awful Milosevic was -- dishonest and crooked."

(Serbian spy's trial lifts cloak on his CIA alliance, Los Angeles Times, Greg Miller, March 1, 2009) (IMG)

Stanisic set up death squads throughout Yugoslavia in order to terrorize the different ethnic minorities. The international judicial bodies decided to prosecute Stanisic but the CIA rushed in to protect its agent. However:

The chief prosecutor, Dermot Groome, says that Stanisić's actions to help the CIA and counter Milosević only underscore the power he had. In his opening argument, Groome said that the "ability to save lives is tragically the very same authority and the very same ability that [Stanisić] used . . . to take lives."

(...). At one point, Groome introduced a videotape showing images of Muslim men and boys -- their hands bound with wire -- being led into the woods and shot, one by one, by members of the Scorpians.

"Jovica Stanisić established these units," said Groome, an American lawyer. And Stanisić made sure "they had everything that they needed, including a license to clear the land of unwanted people, a license to commit murder."

(Serbian spy's trial lifts cloak on his CIA alliance, Los Angeles Times, Greg Miller, March 1, 2009) (IMG)

The goal of such terror by Stanisić though was not to commit genocide against the ethnic minorities but to rather provoke those ethnic minorities into revolting against the central government of Yugoslavia in order to bring about the partition of that country. The intelligence service that Tito's fascist gang established launched campaigns of terror until 1989 in order to suppress the voices that called for freedom from Titoist yoke. From 1989, however, the intelligence service was engaged in terror attacks not to suppress but to provoke. This was in addition to the vast economic inequality and the countless years of socio-economic oppression of ethnic minorities that Tito's fascist gang established in Yugoslavia. Stanisić's use of terror operations as a means of provoking Kosovar Albanian rebellions against the Milosević faction was no coincidence. On the contrary, it was a part of the broader effort of the UDB network in Yugoslavia to support the Al-Qaeda terrorists and drug lords that made up the dominant faction of the KLA. Stanisić's henchman in the KLA was the infamous Hashim Thaçi, the drug lord and bloody assassin, savagely betraying the Kosovar Albanian people. Years of the repression of the Kosovo national liberation movement by the Titoist fascist regime in Yugoslavia had resulted in the jailing or killing of Albanian revolutionaries and had allowed the elevation of fascist UDB agents in the ranks of the Kosovo Albanian militants organizations. One person backed by the Titoist UDB agent was none other than the notorious Hashim Thaçi. Stanisić's UDB fascist secret service promoted Hashim Thaçi, the head of the KLA, thus assisting the KLA war effort against the peoples of Serbia and Kosovo. Naim Miftari – a former KLA commander and a former special agent of the post-socialist Albanian regime's intelligence service, SHIK – confirmed that Hashim Thaçi was backed by the Titoist fascist UDB. Indeed, Thaçi's connections to the UDB have been documented by:

Former KLA superior and former SHIK agent Naim Miftari.... ('Naim Miftari: Gjykata Speciale e çliroi Kosovën nga regjimi i profiterit dhe përcarësit të luftës Hashim Thaçit', Bota Sot, Interview with SHIK official Naim Miftari, July 20, 2022) (IMG)

One of Thaçi's comrades-in-arms, Naim Miftari, [who] has explained in chronological order, all the tricks and political bargains in which he was involved. He also mentioned the fact that Thaçi has been accused many times of murder, not only of LDK members, but also of his associates. "Hashim Thaçi, neither today nor in the future, can escape conspiracies or games behind his back, since he himself came to power with the help of games, where he is sometimes accused of many murders, not only of LDK members, but for most of his former colleagues. Let's go back before the war. (...)" ('Thaçi i lidhur me UDB –ën, tradhëtoi UÇK-në?', Bota Sot, Interview with SHIK official Naim Miftari, March 13, 2016) (IMG)

Indeed, in the interview with Bota Sot, Naim Miftari, the SHIK agent and KLA official, noted that a senior UDB official had helped Hashim Thaçi 'escape' from the UDB prosecution and go to Switzerland:

Hashim Thaçi was a bad student, then after a while he was punished in absentia because he was a member of the KLA. With those "convictions" missing, **he and some friends secure political asylum in Switzerland, where the main help is provided by the statements of B-S [abbreviated name], a senior member of the Serbian UDB in Belgrade....** Surprisingly, H[ashim] Th[açi], with their own group, are sentenced in absentia, as they surprisingly escape the arrests of the UDB, but Nait Hasan's group is arrested and some are killed in an ambush, like Zahir Pajaziti, and some are killed by torture in prison.... ('Thaçi i lidhur me UDB –ën, tradhëtoi UÇK-në?', Bota Sot, Interview with SHIK official Naim Miftari, March 13, 2016. Bold added.) (IMG)

Baton Haxhiu, an agent of the UDB and of Jovica Stanisić, was a liaison officer linking Thaçi to the UDB. Documenting the UDB-Stanisić-Haxhiu-Thaçi connection, Miftari said in an interview with Bota Sot:

"When Sali Berisha mentions the connections between Hashim Thaçi and Baton Haxhiu and Serbia ... he is completely right. Let's not forget that Sali Berisha has been the main man of the Albanian government for many years and had access to the military intelligence service and SHISH, so these are very serious words. I justify it by the fact that our data from the ZKZ (G2) of the UÇK and TMK, then the Kosovo Police and the SHIK show that there is no doubt that Baton Haxhiu was before the war a collaborator and coordinating postman of Jovica Stanisić, the head of the Serbia [branch of] UDB, SDB, mediator of the meetings in Brezovica by the head of the UDB and the former communist leaders of Kosovo, so Batoni was important and is still important for the UDB (BIA) and a professional friend of Hashim Thaçi", Miftari said. ('Policia e Kosovës, ZKZ (G2) dhe SHIK-u kishin të dhëna se Baton Haxhiu ka qenë bashkëpunëtor i Ivica Stanishiçit', Bota Sot, Interview with SHIK official Naim Miftari, December 8, 2018) (IMG)

As can be seen, the UDB from 1989 launched terror operations against Kosovar Albanian civilians in order to provoke riots, and simultaneously supported the 'escape' of Thaçi in order to make a 'hero' out of him. Thaçi was protected by the Titoist secret service agency, UDB.

As mentioned before in C12S6, the Yugoslav Titoists were master pan-chauvinists. They supported the Albanian terrorists that massacred Serb civilians, while also supporting Serbian terrorists massacring Albanian civilians. There should be no surprise that the bourgeois-nationalists were stabbing their own nations in the back, through such bloody reign of terror, for such a thing as 'nationalism', in its classless meaning, bears no material reality, unless in extremely rare accidents. The question is not whether or not 'nationalism' is good or bad; the question is whether it exists beyond just one's imaginations. And the truth is that nationalism, in its classless sense, has never materially existed, unless by accident. For almost all of the time, there have been two types of 'nationalists': (1) proletarian pseudo-nationalists, really just proletarian internationalists with a spirit of socialist patriotism instead of rootless cosmopolitanism, and (2) bourgeois-nationalists (not to be confused with national bourgeoisie), imperialist agents who preach the greatness of their own nation while allying with the chauvinist terrorists savagely massacring the nation whom the bourgeois-nationalists ostensibly uphold; the most cited case of bourgeois-nationalist betrayal of their own people has been the Zionist anti-Arab chauvinist collaboration with the Nazi anti-Semites, but the truth is that the Nazi-Zionist connection is only one out of thousands of cases in point. Such an alliance of seemingly 'contradictory' chauvinisms is rooted in the fact that the chauvinists or bourgeois-nationalists of different ethnicities are all agents of the same reactionary parasitic classes, and have the same class interests, making them natural allies despite appearances to the contrary.

The history of Yugoslavia goes on to prove the point made by the Cominform in 1949: that the Titoists were not 'nationalists'. The Titoists were not loyal to Yugoslav 'national' interest, but were rather agents of imperialist-fascist finance capital, committing a betrayal of even the narrow national

interests of Yugoslavia. The very same Titoists that promoted a Balkan fascist 'federation' when the US-led camp needed it against the USSR and Eurasia, began to push for the crumbling of Yugoslavia when the Anglo-American imperialists needed a crumbled 'Yugoslavia'. Added to Tito's fascist secret service were the fake 'anti-Titoists' and the fake 'communist' 'anti-revisionists' (e.g. the Maoists, as well as countless – though not all of – the 'Hoxhaist' parties) who were deafeningly silent on the genocide in Kosovo by Tito's gang, preferring instead to launch operations against those whom they called 'Soviet social-imperialists', but who suddenly 'woke up' in 1989 and started supporting the partition of Yugoslavia just when the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia was necessary. There are also of course those who are nostalgic towards the 'glorious' days of His 'Eminence' the Marshal of the Renegades Tito, when Yugoslavia resembled an inferno. Many in this category will continue to slander anti-Titoists as 'pro-imperialist' and 'pro-NATO', much as how Tito himself several times in his speeches slandered Stalin-era USSR and the Cominform as being in cahoots with NATO, the MI6, and the Italian Fascists. In reality, these Titoism apologists – and they are numerous – are at best useful idiots, and at worst fascist agents, of NATO, MI6, CIA, etc.

C24S2. Some Last Remarks on Titoist Yugoslavia in this Book

It may come as a surprise to future generations reading this book; however, the fact is that, at the time of writing, Tito is loved and romanticized by the overwhelming majority of 'communists', the majority of the self-described 'staunch supporters' of Stalin-era USSR, and also the majority of Serbs, new generations of Yugoslavs systematically brainwashed to worship the sanguivore that made long streams off the blood of their grandparents. These facts speak volumes about the terrifying propaganda power which Tito's gang obtained. Tito's fake 'friendship' with Abdel-Nasser and Nehru cultivated around the Yugoslav tyrant an image of a 'freedom-fighter' and 'proletarian internationalist', whereas NATO's fascist nuclear assaults on Yugoslavia fostered the infantile feeling of nostalgia for the years of Titoist fascist occupation, with many foolishly ignorant of the fact that the Yugoslav Titoist agents assisted NATO in the war effort against Yugoslavia in the 1990s. Increasingly dominated by intellectuals rather than proletarians, the 'communist' parties have been Titoized in recent years. Yet, handled carefully, this global Titoist propaganda dominance in the communist movement's discourse can be broken, torn asunder, scintilla by scintilla. Armed with evidence and reason against Titoist propaganda, the communists worthy of the name can wage the class struggle to oust the intelligentsia and bureaucrats from communist parties and to increase the percentage membership of proletarians and cooperativists in these parties, so to pave the way for the de-Titoization of the communist movement. Worldwide, the thousands of fake 'communists' join the CIA propaganda bullhorns in preaching the myth that Tito's regime was 'more democratic' than the USSR and the Peoples' Democracies, that Tito's regime was a 'democratic' 'federation' of different nationalities living with each other peacefully, that religious minorities were 'tolerated', that the Yugoslav regime stood up 'heroically' against 'both' the 'totalitarian Soviet Union' and the 'imperialist West'; that there were 'improvements' in the conditions of women, that 'worker self-management' allowed for 'lower' bureaucracy and greater 'workplace democracy', that Tito was 'a benevolent' leader 'popular' among Yugoslavs, that the slavery and feudal modes of production were 'eradicated'; that Tito was a 'anti-fascist' and that he made the situation in Yugoslavia 'less hellish'; that the Yugoslav regime was 'simultaneously' 'tolerant towards the Ashkenazim and Sfaradim at home' and 'anti-Zionist' and 'favorable to Arabs abroad'; that the denouncers of Tito are 'pro-NATO', 'pro-American', 'Zionist apologists', 'pro-imperialist', 'CIA propagandists', and 'Trotskyite'; and that the supporters of the Cominform's line are all 'too radical' 'left-sectarian' 'petit-bourgeois' 'Maoist' 'lunatics' when denouncing Tito's regime as the fascist regime it actually was. The CIA portrayed Titoist Yugoslavia as every infantile leftist's dream country. Yugoslavia's fascist regime was able to cover up its genocides and crimes against humanity with the façade of 'democratic' and 'federative' 'non-aligned' 'socialism'. Certainly, there are many well-meaning individuals who are misled into genuinely believing this junk about Tito's gang, and while they deserve much criticism for their low vigilance, they should not be condemned for making such an error; however, there are those fake 'progressives' who push for such junk vigorously and aggressively, and it is essential that these elements be ruthlessly exposed, isolated, and quarantined, so that their venomous influence may be contained. Apologetics for Tito is better than apologetics for Himmler only and only because Tito has not yet been unmasked before the whole world. Shame be on those fake 'communists' and fake 'Yugoslav patriots' who continue to support, even when faced with so much evidence, the virulent legacy of this massive club of Nazi assassins. When different places in the territory of former Yugoslavia are named after Tito, Rankovic, Kolisevski, etc., such namings should spark worldwide outrage and should receive international condemnation; alas, the cries of them who suffered are completely ignored, and so many in the territory of former Yugoslavia have been brainwashed on the Titoism question. There are those who are aware of such crimes, but who show a soft attitude towards these crimes; they too have no place in the anti-imperialist movement in the long-term. The case of Yugoslavia also has much to teach not only to the present generations but also to the future generations who may face such a propaganda bombardment. It is essential that they understand the way that 'Third Force' propaganda was utilized in the Yugoslav context as a cover for imperialist intelligence penetration into the anti-imperialist camp. It is also important that they learn to remember the cries of the peoples of Yugoslavia who were subjected to such terror and the fact that so few people actually exposed such massive crimes, so many were deafeningly silent, and instead believed the lies of the CIA's media mercenaries and the thousands of pseudo-'communist' helpers of the CIA.

C24S3. The Titoists' Second Coming

One can split the history of Titoism in post-Stalin USSR/Eurasia into two phases: the Khrushchevian Titoism and the Andropovian-Gorbachevian Titoism. We know that although Brezhnev himself was a Titoist 'at heart', so encircled and coopted he was by the communist forces that the Brezhnev era saw a resurgence of communist influence at the expense of the Titoists. Already, there were improvements in the composition of the CPSU, and a dictatorship of the proletariat had been restored by around the year 1980. What, then, resulted in the tide to be turned again? What caused the communist faction to go on the decline yet again, while the Titoist faction saw an increase in its influence in the early 1980s? The answer to this question lies in the campaign in Afghanistan, the military campaign in which the Red Army lost, hence resulting in the communist faction in the Red Army to have to reallocate some of its funds away from the secret service conflict against the Titoists and bureaucrats at home and onto fighting Al-Qaeda and the H. Amin gang in Afghanistan.

This then begs the question of why the Red Army began to lose in Afghanistan in the first place, why the Afghan communists were in so weak a condition that they had to invite the Soviets. And the answer to this question lies in the Algiers Accord of 1975, by the time of which the Ahmad Hasan Al-Bakr faction of Iraq had gone on the decline and Vice President Saddam had become the main leader of Iraq. By 1975, a coup d'etats had occurred against the King Faysal faction, allowing the United States to more firmly control Saudi Arabia, while the Saddam faction ascended to de facto dominance in Iraq, and the Shah in Iran was able to crush the anti-Shah guerrilla movement. With Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq under the control of the Anglo-American imperialists by 1975, most of the petroleum of the world was in the hands of the allies of the American imperialists; such an

advantage in turn gave an advantage in financing the military spending by the allies of the American imperialists. Iran and Iraq, by then allies, went ahead and began setting the Middle East on fire, starting from the Sadat group gaining the full upper hand in 1975, the PLO terror bombing of Lebanon in 1975, the boost in Muslim Brotherhood rebellion in Syria in 1976, the Yitzhak Rabin team's influence over the state reducing in 1976, the Abdel-Fattah Al-Ismael faction in South Yemen beginning to decline in 1976, the MEK forces in Iran becoming completely a SAVAK front by 1975, the Fedai guerrillas in Iran being crushed in 1976, etc. Throughout the Middle East and North Africa, there came either a temporary decline or a collapse of the revolutionary forces. The huge shake-up affected Afghanistan too. Despite the rise of the progressive forces there in 1978, the new communist-led progressive government was fragile right from the start. There, Al-Qaeda, allied with the Titoist faction headed by Hafizullah Amin, was reducing communist influence. Then occurred the rest of the story, the military defeat of the Red Army, the strengthening of the leverage of the Gorbachevian Titoists, etc. The Titoists' "Second Coming" in the 1980s was 'thanks' to American imperialism, but the key strategic turning point in favour of American imperialism, which offset the chain reaction resultant in the Titoists "Second Coming" was the 1975 Iran-Iraq alliance, which caused American imperialist control over all the major oil resources of the world outside Eurasia (and Libya), hence an advantage in financing military spending. Such an upper hand in military spending resulted in the defeat of the Red Army in Afghanistan, which yielded the Titoists' "Second Coming" in the forms of Gorbachev, Andropov, Chebrikov, Yeltsin, Primakov, etc., causing the 1989-1991 collapses.

C24S4. Anglo-American Spy Gorbachev and his Henchpeople *** IMG-All-{Gorbachev}

Mikhail Gorbachev was a British spy, providing top secret nuclear-military intelligence to the MI6. In his 1990s memoirs, Gorbachev confessed:

I laid out in front of the British Prime Minister a large map on which all stocks of nuclear weapons were drawn in thousandths. And each of these cells, I said, is quite enough to destroy all life on Earth. This means that all living things can be destroyed by the accumulated nuclear reserves 1000 times! (Life and Reform, Mikhail Gorbachev, Chapter 8) (IMG)

The Gorbachev group helped entrench the corrupt bureaucrats in the Eurasian state, while allowing the Gorbachev faction to suppress the proletariat. Such class struggles were reflected in the strengthening of the Titoist faction at the expense of the communist faction in Eurasian institutions. Under the guise of fighting the corrupt bureaucracy, the British spy Gorbachev embarked on a project of systematically expanding bureaucracy, hence to expand economic corruption and the wealth of the oligarchs. Under the guise of fighting the chaos and the corrupt mafia, Gorbachev expanded the very things he pretended to oppose. This is confirmed by Gorbachev's own neoliberal economic advisor at the time, Yuri Maltsev, who defected to the United States in the late 1980s, served on such US government agencies as the United States Institute for Peace (USIP), and provided advisory on national security and economic matters to the US Congress. Maltsev wrote:

The budget cuts appeared to be a reality when Gorbachev sacked 600,000 bureaucrats from central operations of the ministries — which amounts to 30 percent to 50 percent of each department. Alongside that, however, he also created a set of new mega-enterprises to substitute for the ministries. A study I did of these new enterprises at the time showed they hired 720,000 people, most of them just-fired bureaucrats, but with a generous 35 percent salary increase. Gorbachev's "cuts" actually represented a twenty percent increase in the managerial sector of the Soviet State, which was exactly the point of the move. The old structures of the command economy began to evaporate with all these changes, reversals, and talk of creating a market. But since no market was actually set up, everything [in terms of the corrupt bureaucracy] came to a standstill. (Requiem for Marx, Ludwig von Mises Institute, Yuri N. Maltsev, 1993, p. 22) (IMG)

Maltsev continued:

Thus Gorbachev's new "market" ... piled new regulations and ministries on top of the old... (Requiem for Marx, Ludwig von Mises Institute, Yuri N. Maltsev, 1993, p. 22) (IMG)

Gorbachev also created a privatized corrupt bureaucratic mafia structures which he falsely named 'cooperatives' to make them appear socialistic. Maltsev wrote:

The Law on Cooperatives – a new regulation allowing pseudo-private ownership – seemed to be a step in the right direction. But in fact, the newly created cooperatives became an organized mafia themselves, extracting and paying out bribes at an unprecedented rate. As soon as a person would start a business, the fire department would arrive to close everything down and then wait for bribes. A person could sue the fire department, but he would have to pay a bribe to the judge. In the Soviet Union, people learned that it is better to pay bribes directly. (Requiem for Marx, Ludwig von Mises Institute, Yuri N. Maltsev, 1993, p. 22) (IMG)

The cooperatives, which were ostensibly meant to benefit the consumers, largely did not sell to the consumers hence further driving the process of consumer goods up, making Soviet people poorer, and expanding the profits of the mafia oligarchs:

During 1986-88 the Soviet Government passed legislation legalizing a wider range of individual private enterprise and encouraging the formation of cooperatives, particularly in the area of consumer goods and services. (...). These measures allowed the emergence of a new group of high-income earners.

Although cooperatives did provide some consumer goods and services, this boost was smaller than hoped for because of a series of restrictive amendments to the Law on Cooperatives, changing tax laws; supply difficulties, obstruction from local officials. and negative popular reaction to private activity. Many cooperatives simply ... stole cheap state goods and resold them at much higher prices. Other cooperatives avoided harassment by tying themselves closely to state-controlled firms and producing goods and services for these enterprises rather than directly for the early 1991, public. According to [CLASSIFIED CIA SOURCE], only 15 percent of what the cooperatives produced was sold directly to the public.

Growing shortages and higher incomes encouraged growth of legal and illegal private economic activity, which diverted more goods away from state stores. High prices and high profits transferred money from workers to entrepreneurs. black-marketeers, and racketeers. Private incomes began to dwarf state wages.

Even with more rapid wage increases, the average state worker's wage still trailed that of the average cooperative member. Moreover, much private and shadow-economy business transferred to a hard currency basis, promoting the development of a de facto parallel currency that further devalued the rubles earned by state workers and pensioners.

(WINNERS AND LOSERS: INCREASING SOCIAL STRATIFICATION IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, November 1991, p. 2) (IMG)

The Gorbachev-engineered mafia promoted inflation:

Even with more rapid wage increases, the average state worker's wage still trailed that of the average cooperative member. Moreover, much private and shadow-economy business transferred to a hard currency basis, promoting the development of a de facto parallel currency that further devalued the rubles earned by state workers and pensioners. (WINNERS AND LOSERS: INCREASING SOCIAL STRATIFICATION IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, November 1991, p. 2) (IMG)

The Nazi Germans supported Russian chauvinism as means of driving a wedge between the Russian people and the other ethnicities in the USSR, hence to partition the USSR and isolate the very Russia they pretended to support; Tito's gang picked up Hitler's mantle and Yugoslav spies in the USSR promoted Russian chauvinism so to drive this wedge and pave the way for the partition of the USSR. Gorbachev and Eurasian Titoists continued the legacies of Hitler and Tito and privileged the Slavs over the Caucasian and Central Asian populations, hence driving a wedge between these nationalities and provoking bourgeois-nationalist separatist sentiments:


Under Gorbachev, income differences among the republics increased. The change in average monthly wages since 1985 shows that the Slavic and Baltic republics were clear winners, while the Caucasus and Central Asian republics, whose wages were already below the country average, slipped even further behind. In addition to relative differences among republics in wage compensation, income differences within republics also widened. Differentials tend to be the widest in Central Asia and the Caucasus, where the mean wage is low and the shadow economy is particularly active. (WINNERS AND LOSERS: INCREASING SOCIAL STRATIFICATION IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, November 1991, p. 4) (IMG)

The economy was Balkanized, and bourgeois-nationalist officials were able to promote their own region's 'interests' over the rest of the Eurasian Heartland, hence widening the gap between nationalities, paving the way for partition:

The devolution of economic authority to republic and local governments and the economic decline led to a Balkanization of the union market that helped to increase regional disparities in the supply of food and consumer goods. To protect their own consumer markets, local officials created barriers to trade, forbidding the export of certain deficit goods or limiting the purchase of some items to local residents only. Agricultural regions increasingly preferred to use their output locally or barter it for scarce consumer goods rather than sell it to the state for devalued rubles. The Soviet Union's former "showcase" cities, Moscow and Leningrad (St. Petersburg), and centers of heavy industry in the Urals suffered most. With a weak local agricultural base, few attractive goods to barter, and panic buying by the population, these cities

became the most poorly stocked of urban centers. (WINNERS AND LOSERS: INCREASING SOCIAL STRATIFICATION IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, November 1991, pp. 2-3) (IMG)

**USSR: Average Monthly State Wages by Republic,
1985 and 1989**



(WINNERS AND LOSERS: INCREASING SOCIAL STRATIFICATION IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, November 1991, p. 4)

To summarize:

Economic policies introduced under the banner of perestroika resulted in a general slide in Soviet living standards and a growing inequality between socioeconomic groups. (WINNERS AND LOSERS: INCREASING SOCIAL STRATIFICATION IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION, CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, November 1991, p. III) (IMG)

With the 'need' for medical 'humanitarian aid' in Moscow as her excuse, Raisa Gorbacheva received money from the United States in the 1980s. As the New York Times reported:

Raisa M. Gorbachev, wife of the former Soviet President, ... helped secure thousands of dollars worth of Western aid. (Medical Care in Russia Seems Near Collapse, New York Times Archives, May 9, 1992) (IMG)

One of the CIA operatives providing financial aid to the Gorbachevs' 'humanitarian' project was Sun Myung Moon. Sun Myung Moon was a South Korean CIA spy arrested in 1947 by the North Korean government and released in 1950 during the Korean War. He subsequently founded the Unification Church which was a front for the South Korean CIA (KCIA), which was the South Korean comprador intelligence service established and run by America's CIA:

In Congressional hearings [of the United States,] Moon was accused of working with South Korean intelligence in order to buy influence with the US government, with some US officials regarding the Unification Church as a "front" for the Korean CIA. (Reverend Sun Myung Moon: Self-styled 'prophet' and founder of the Unification Church, The Independent, September 4, 2012) (IMG)

The Rev. Sun Myun Moon's Unification Church was founded by a director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency, Kim Chong Pil, as a political tool in 1961, according to intelligence reports released by a House investigating subcommittee. (Moon's Church was Founded by Korean CIA Chief, Panel Says, reprinted in CIA, p. 1) (IMG)

Among the financial sponsors of Raisa Gorbacheva was the South Korean spy Sun Myung Moon. A 1990 report by The Economist stated:

Even the Rev Sun Myung Moon is getting in on the act: he has given \$100,000 to Mrs Raisa Gorbachev.... (The Economist, Volume 317, Issues 7683-7687, 1990) (IMG)

The funds provided to the Gorbachev family could only be of a money-laundered nature. Note that the Gorbachev family systematically destroyed the economy of Eurasia and the health of the Soviet peoples. That same family which destroyed the health and welfare of the people was setting up a 'humanitarian' project for 'medical assistance' to the people, and ostensibly for this 'medical' 'humanitarian' project, they were receiving these funds from the Anglo-American intelligence agencies. Actually, it was obvious that the 'medical' 'humanitarian' project, run by a Gorbachev family that destroyed the medicine of Eurasia and which caused a massive humanitarian crisis, could not have been anything but a money-laundering cover through which to receive funds from Anglo-American intelligence agencies and their front organizations, such as the Unification Church.

All along, behind Gorbachev lied the KGB chiefs Yevgeny Primakov and Viktor Chebrikov. They were the real and main figures behind Gorbachev. Gorbachev was a cover for the corrupt and traitorous chiefs of the KGB.

The class struggles in society always reflect themselves in the configuration of the power positions held in a state. It is therefore quite common for one of the high-ranking security officials of a state to be a traitor to that state. Already, in the 1980s, the Mossad Director Nahum Admoni was a revolutionary socialist anti-imperialist warrior who had infiltrated the highest rank of the Mossad, the Reagan-era US Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger was an anti-imperialist freedom-fighter who decimated the US military and was responsible for opening the front for the Lebanese martyrs to bomb the US Marines Barracks in 1983, and the Saudi Mukhaberat chief Turki Al-Faysal was the son and loyal protégé of his pro-Soviet pro-Nasserist father Saudi King Faysal bin Abdel-Aziz. All of this may seem strange at first, but it is not surprising in the slightest when we account for the fact that class struggles in a society affect the positional configuration in the cabinet, i.e. they affect the question of whom from what faction becomes the head of which government institution. Socialist class struggles help the proletariat destroy the material bases of the anti-proletarian classes, thus allowing for the workers' state to consolidate control over its own state and to launch a great purge against the intelligence agents reliant upon the anti-proletarian classes in the society. Unfortunately, in Eurasia by the Gorbachev era, the state was not a workers' state but was rather a dictatorship of the comprador bourgeoisie, particularly of the corrupt bureaucrats. This gave the upper hand to the anti-communist bureaucratic traitors who were leading the KGB, and such anti-communist bureaucrats pursued their agenda through the face of a 'pro-democracy' intellectual, Mikhail Gorbachev.

The root of the Gorbachev group emanated directly from Yuri Andropov, who, as was mentioned in C20S13, was a Beriaite operative assisting the MI6-backed Nazi rebels in Hungary in 1956 and collaborating with Tito's group. Sergio Beria recalled how the Anglo-Yugoslav agent and KGB chief Yuri Andropov told Sergio Beria:

'I have closely studied your father's proposals on economic and foreign policy fields. Many of them are absolutely correct.' ('Beria, My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin', Sergio Beria, p. 277) (IMG)

The rise of Gorbachev to power brought Andropov's allies in the KGB back to power.

Former KGB official Vyacheslav Matuzov confirmed that Gorbachev-era KGB leader Primakov was implementing Andropov's plans regarding Eurasia:

The personality of Primakov is conspiratorial to the limit to this day. I believe that he was the main actor who completed Andropov's plan to reorganize the Soviet Union. In simple terms, Primakov was overseeing the process - all these years. ('Vyacheslav Matuzov: Mikhail Gorbachev was a pawn in the plan for the collapse of the USSR', EurAsia Daily, interviewer: Sarkis Tsaturyan, March 11, 2019) (IMG)

The KGB as a whole was progressive and anti-imperialist, just like how the Mossad, Pentagon, and the Saudi Mukhaberat were, as wholes, reactionary. Yet just as how the Mossad, Pentagon, and the Saudi Mukhaberat were led by revolutionary traitors to such reactionary institutions, so was it also the case that the KGB was led by reactionary traitors to such a progressive institution. Such was why the KGB chief Yuri Andropov distrusted the medium ranks of the KGB command. During his years as KGB chief, Yuri Andropov established Eurasian think tanks that lied outside of the KGB. The Eurasian think tanks were centers in which American intelligence agents would begin their career in the Eurasian state hierarchy. Andropov first planted his agents in these think tanks and then would, over time, elevate these agents in the Eurasian state hierarchy:

The KGB was a system that did not allow to deviate from the general line. Andropov, himself creating this system, understood that if information gets into it, then it automatically becomes utilized by many employees who may be dissatisfied with one or another political position of the leadership.

Therefore, further changes (“restructuring”) were carried out not on the basis of the KGB, but with the help of the KGB, but outside the framework of the KGB. Where did Primakov come from? This is not the KGB system. He is from the side shoots that Andropov created, being already the chairman of the KGB and a member of the Politburo. Director of the Institute of USA and Canada, Georgi Arbatov, director of IMEMO Nikolai Inozemtsev, director of the Institute of Oriental Studies Bobojan Gafurov .

These were parallel structures that duplicated the KGB. Outwardly, they worked in conjunction with the party apparatus. But in reality, these institutions were so strong, being under the patronage of Andropov, that the influence of the leading departments of the Central Committee on them was zero.

(‘Vyacheslav Matuzov: Mikhail Gorbachev was a pawn in the plan for the collapse of the USSR’, EurAsia Daily, interviewer: Sarkis Tsaturyan, March 11, 2019) (IMG)

Bronfman, the President of the Zionist pro-imperialist intelligence front (chapter 16) ‘World Jewish Congress’, noted that the intelligentsia and the KGB were the only two categories supporting Gorbachev:

IN THE USSR, BRONFMAN SAID, THERE HAD BEEN A VIRTUAL "SEA CHANGE" IN DOMESTIC ACCEPTANCE OF JEWS AND JUDAISM. THIS EVEN INCLUDED THE IMPENDING OPENING OF A JEWISH CULTURAL CENTER IN WHAT HAD BEEN A MOSCOW SYNAGOGUE. AT THE SAME TIME, HE ADDED, THE COMMITMENT WAS REAL TO RESOLVING JEWISH EMIGRATION.... THE PROBLEM WAS, HE FELT, THAT EVERYTHING DEPENDED ON GORBACHEV "AND I AM SKEPTICAL ABOUT HIS ABILITY TO SURVIVE." HE ACCOMPANIED THIS JUDGMENT WITH A BRIEF ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEMS GORBACHEV FACES, **NOTING THAT THE ONLY TWO GROUPS NOW BACKING HIM WERE THE INTELLIGENTSIA AND THE KGB.** (‘SUBJECT: WORLD JEWISH CONGRESS PRESIDENT BRONFMAN ON MIDDLE EAST, SOVIET UNION; ASIDES ON US ADMINISTRATION, AUSTRIA; GOL BALANCED’, US State Department, January 27, 1989, p. 4. Bold added.) (IMG)

The Gorbachev group, backed by the Chebrikov-Primakov group in the KGB, also gave a major boost to the CIA-Mossad presence in Eurasia. The Joint Distribution Committee, a CIA-Mossad front, was invited to and welcomed in Moscow. In an article for Jerusalem Post, Isi Leibler wrote:

In 1959 as a young graduate visiting Israel, I was recruited by Shaul Avigur, the talented head of Nativ (the then-covert agency dealing with Soviet Jews) who played an enormous role behind the scenes in the formulation of policy during the early years of the state.

(Candidly Speaking: A triumph of light over darkness, The Jerusalem Post, Isi Leibler, November 2, 2010) (IMG)

As may be recalled by the reader from C16S1, Shaul Avigur was the founder of the Mossad. There were co-founders of the Mossad, but the most well-known and most prominent among all of them was none other than Shaul Avigur, who was also the head of the Nativ (the organization in which the Mossad official Ya’kov Kedmi was a prominent official), as well as a co-leader of the American-Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (‘Joint’) which was the CIA-Mossad intelligence organization condemned for being involved in the assassination plots during the Doctors’ Plot case. For his subversive activities for the Mossad, Leibler had been arrested by socialist Soviet counter-intelligence:

Before the collapse of the USSR, Leibler made numerous visits to the Soviet Union and developed close associations with the leading Jewish dissidents and refuseniks. The visits came to an end in 1980 with his arrest and expulsion from the Soviet Union. (Isi Leibler z’l (Honorary Vice-President), World Jewish Congress) (IMG)

However, soon enough, the time for Leibler’s return came. Under the cover of ‘glasnost’, the MI6 spy Gorbachev opened up Eurasia for imperialist-fascist secret services to gather intelligence. As such, Leibler wrote in reference to his brief expulsion in 1980,:

Ironically, it was only seven years later, in 1987, that my wife and I were invited by the Moscow chief rabbi of the KGB-controlled Archipova Synagogue to be his guests over Rosh Hashana and address worshipers from the pulpit. Giving a Zionist address in broken Yiddish to a packed synagogue in the presence of refusenik friends who had previously refused to set foot in this KGB-controlled center was an unforgettable experience. I subsequently learned that I was the first international Jewish leader invited to evaluate the Gorbachev reforms.

That was followed by a series of visits which culminated in the establishment of the first Jewish cultural center since the revolution, named after Solomon Mykhoels, the famous Yiddish poet murdered by Stalin in 1948.

(Candidly Speaking: A triumph of light over darkness, The Jerusalem Post, Isi Leibler, November 2, 2010) (IMG)

The World Jewish Congress too stated:

Paradoxically, when Gorbachev liberalised the system with the introduction of perestroika, Leibler became the first international Jewish leader to be invited to the Soviet Union to evaluate the changes. He subsequently launched the first Jewish cultural centre in the Soviet Union – the Solomon Mykhoels Centre in Moscow – together with the first Hebrew Song Festivals in Moscow and Leningrad. (Isi Leibler z’l (Honorary Vice-President), World Jewish Congress) (IMG)

It should also come as no surprise that the Gorbachev group permitted the JDC to officially establish a base in Moscow:

Reflecting the profound changes unfolding in the Soviet Union, the Solomon Mikhoels International Cultural Center opens in Moscow, with the help of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (JDC or "The Joint"), a social welfare agency whose mission is to assist Jews throughout the world. (Timeline of the American Soviet Jewry Movement, American Jewish Historical Society (AJHS)) (IMG)

Gorbachev was keen on sending Eurasia’s Yiddish and Juhuri peoples (‘Soviet Jews’) as cannon-fodder for Ariel Sharon:

Although the lack of direct flights was not hampering the exodus per se (a record 71,196 Jews were to leave in 1989), it did slow the potential emigration to Israel, which, nonetheless, had risen rapidly in the last three months of 1989 (1,565 Jews arrived from the USSR in October, 1,936 in November, and 3,590 in December). Indeed, the head of the Jewish Agency’s Aliyah (immigration) Department, Uri Gordon, had predicted that with direct flights, about 1,000 Soviet immigrants a day could land in Israel. (Soviet Policy Toward Israel Under Gorbachev, Robert Owen Freedman, p. 85) (IMG)

The Washington Times, an American news media founded by the prominent South Korean CIA operative Sun Myung Mun, reported that CIA director Webster had remarked that Gorbachev, under the cover of joint anti-terrorism efforts, has been getting the KGB to cooperate further with the CIA:

CIA Director William Webster said yesterday that the governments of the United States and the Soviet Union have discussed establishing a joint CIA-KGB cooperative effort to combat international terrorism.

(...). A tape recording of his remarks was obtained by The Washington Times.

(...). Soviet officials first approached Western governments in late 1986 about working together to oppose terrorism as part of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's new foreign policy initiatives.

Moscow was linked to the support and training of international terrorists by Reagan administration CIA chief William Casey, who said in a 1987 speech that the Soviets have been training up to 600 terrorists each year in training camps in Eastern Europe.

(...). The Soviet overtures on joint cooperation appear to be gestures resulting from Mr. Gorbachev's glasnost, or openness, policies, Mr. Webster said. The January meeting in Moscow between KGB chief Vladimir Kryuchkov and U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union Jack Matlock was another similar gesture, he said.

State Department officials said at the time of the meeting that Mr. Kryuchkov assured Mr. Matlock that the KGB is fully supporting the Gorbachev reform program.

Mr. Webster said he has not seen any indications that the KGB is opposing Mr. Gorbachev's reforms. But he said the KGB is "a potential source of trouble" for Mr. Gorbachev if his reform program fails.

Rand Corporation Sovietologist Jeremy R. Azrael stated in a report on the KGB released last week that former KGB Chairman Viktor Chebrikov is the leading candidate to replace Mr. Gorbachev if hardliners pull off a coup to oust him.

Mr. Webster said the KGB currently appears to be on Mr. Gorbachev's "side of the aisle" in the struggle between reformers and hardliners.

(JOINT CIA-KGB TARGETING OF TERRORISM TALKED ABOUT, Washington Times, Bill Gertz, April 7, 1989, p. 1. In: CIA Archives) (IMG)

Again, the KGB as a whole was an anti-imperialist body – and rumours to the contrary are baseless – but the high command of the KGB were utter traitors. Gorbachev's rise to power brought the KGB chief Chebrikov swiftly to power as well:

Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev, moving with unprecedented speed to consolidate his power, has elevated the head of the KGB and two other key party officials to the ruling Politburo.... ('KGB chief, 2 others elevated to Politburo', Washington Times, Michael J. Bonafield, April 24, 1985, p. 1. In: CIA archives) (IMG)

Mr. Chebrikov, who is a colonel general, was named director of the KGB in December 1982. His was one of the late Yuri V. Andropov's first major personnel changes after he took control of the party in that year. Mr. Chebrikov had worked under Mr. Andropov during the 15 years Mr. Andropov headed the KGB. ('KGB chief, 2 others elevated to Politburo', Washington Times, Michael J. Bonafield, April 24, 1985, p. 1. In: CIA archives) (IMG)

In his memoirs, the CIA-Mossad arms contractor Ari Ben Menashe has documented extensively the contacts of the KGB chief Chebrikov with the MI6, CIA, and Mossad. Another of the KGB elements from Andropov's group was Viktor Sharapov and he too was closely associated to Gorbachev:

Soviet relations with socialist countries are the domain of Viktor Sharapov, the one carryover on Gorbachev's inner staff. He appeared frequently at the side of Andropov and later Chernenko and now assists Gorbachev during meetings with the leaders of socialist countries. Sharapov has ties to Andropov and the KGB, experience in the media, and expertise in Asian affairs--an area receiving significant policy attention under Gorbachev. All of these factors, in our view, make him a logical choice for Gorbachev's circle of advisers. (...). Sharapov's position as an aide to Gorbachev on Socialist Bloc affairs is probably due as much to his personal connections as to his expertise. He may have been associated with the KGB since about 1972, and he served as a personal aide to Andropov from about 1976 (when Andropov was still chairman of the party) to his death in February 1984. In addition, while Andropov was ailing during the last few months of his tenure as General Secretary, only Sharapov and Gorbachev were permitted to see him. Sharapov retained his job as bloc affairs adviser throughout the brief tenure of Konstantin Chernenko. He was elected a member of the Central Auditing Commission at the close of the recent party congress on 6 March 1986. (USSR: GORBACHEV'S PERSONAL ADVISERS, CIA, May 8, 1986, p. 5) (IMG)

Two other major Gorbachev allies were Ligachev and Ryzhkov:

Yegor Ligachev, 64, and Nikolai Ryzhkov, 55, were named directly to the Politburo from the party Secretariat. The new Soviet leader has had a close working relationship with these men, who skipped the normal step of being named candidate members. ('KGB chief, 2 others elevated to Politburo', Washington Times, Michael J. Bonafield, April 24, 1985, p. 1. In: CIA archives) (IMG)

Only much later when Gorbachev became extremely unpopular, Ligachev opportunistically 'defected' to the camp of Gorbachev's 'critics'.

Screenshots & Photos of Sources Used

How to Navigate the Screenshots section

As mentioned in the Foreword, the screenshots and photos of the sources used throughout this book have been provided in the 'Screenshots' section. To find the screenshots corresponding to each part of the text of this book,:

Step 1. See the title. For example, the phrase '*** IMG-All-{Mongolia}' corresponds to the title 'Mongolia'. The '(IMG{GDR})' corresponds to the title 'GDR'.

Step 2. Find the title in the following table of contents.

Step 3. See the page number of the title.

Step 4. Look for the screenshot(s) of the source used under that title.

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