

In March 1917 the Tsarist government collapsed because reverses suffered in the course of World War I had exposed its inherent incompetence. The moderate coalition government that succeeded it also proved unable to cope with the deteriorating military and domestic situation, and on November 7, 1917, the Bolsheviks seized power under the slogans of peace, bread, and land for the peasants. The promise of peace appealed to the masses of the proletariat and the peasantry. The promise of bread applied to the city workers, while the poor peasants, many of whom still lacked land, were attracted by the promise of land. During the ensuing Civil War and the period of foreign intervention, a hastily organized system of communism was established. After the end of the Civil War, the withdrawal of Allied troops, and the termination of hostilities with Poland, Russia was virtually in ruins, and the economic life of the country had reached a primitive level. Lenin, leader of the Bolsheviks, reversed the trend of War Communism in 1921 and introduced the New Economic Policy, which looked to private enterprise to set the economic wheels in motion again while retaining control in the hands of the state.

Kazan', Khar'kov-Dnepropetrov (Kiyev)-L'vov-Odessa regions (First section of European USSR in the and Komi ASSR and the Stalin the south are sparsely populated.

Significant population movement during the war and since its end a section of the area is devastated. People formerly residing there have been evacuated to the east during the war. Although Stalin in 1946 said that it would take at least six to seven years to repopulate this region with its former population. However, the Soviet Government intends to concentrate strategic industries in the area (Belarus, Khrebet). Within European USSR a shift of population from the sparsely inhabited regions, in line with the government's plans for the location of industries in the latter areas.

Original

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JOINT ARMY NAVY INTELLIGENCE STUDY EUROPEAN U.S.S.R. PEOPLE AND GOVERNMENT, Joint Army Navy Intelligence Group, (in CIA archives), p. X-3)
<https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79-01144A000200010010-8.pdf>

Clandestine Communist Organization
 Communist Party Military Organization

March 1950

INTERIM REPORT

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Note: This is an interim study. Statements herein should be considered in many places to be open to question and conclusions, to be tentative. Comments, criticisms, additions and suggestions are earnestly solicited.

6. This is the striking organizational feature of the Bolshevik Revolution: it was prepared for by organized penetration and manipulation of non-Bolshevik organizations: factory committees of workers, soldiers' committees in army units (both front-line and garrison), sailors' committees in the fleets, and the semi-official political assemblies of workers' and soldiers' representatives called "soviets." By skillful exploitation of every cause and symptom of unrest (war-weariness, unemployment, high prices, etc.) the Party got the workers, soldiers, and sailors to vote Party members into positions of leadership in these organizations.

1 The Russian Calendar then in use, was 13 days behind the Western Calendar. Therefore, the "October Revolution" was, by Western dating, in November; similarly, the "bourgeois February Revolution" was in March.

3. The Bolshevik Party got organizational control of the workers, and led them to a revolutionary position. It also got control of the army where it counted most--in the capital. When the revolutionary workers were led by the Bolsheviks to overthrow the Government, the latter found itself without effective defenses. The garrison had been subverted and either stood aside from the struggle or took the part of the workers. Bolshevik control over the workers was obtained through its normal Party apparatus: factory cells, neighborhood and city directing organs. Control over the garrison, however, was achieved by a special, secret auxiliary Party apparatus in the army and navy, the "military organization" of the Bolshevik Party.

4. The uprising in Petrograd was a military operation: armed workers (Red Guard) under Party direction attacked the physical installations of the Government (offices, utilities, warehouses) and took them over. There was little actual fighting in the capital, because the political-organizing work had put the mass of armed effectives all on one side. The military insurrection itself, therefore, was less important than the preceding political-organizing struggle. For this reason, relatively large space is given in the following discussion to the preliminaries.

5. There were theoretically two ways in which the Party could have organized the potentially revolutionary elements. First, it could take the workers directly into the Party, and convert itself into a "mass" Party on the order of some of the CP's of Western Europe following the last war. Or, it could continue to be a relatively small "cadre" Party, an apparatus controlling the work of its members in strategic organizations outside the Party itself. It chose the latter way. It remained comparatively small with a total of 400,000 members on the eve of the insurrection--50,000 in the Petrograd area, 70,000 in the Moscow region--but its members controlled large numbers of workers, soldiers, and sailors through their extra-Party organizations.

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13. Frictions arose between the Provisional Government on the one hand and the Petrograd Soviet on the other. Division of authority was never clearly decided upon. The Bolshevik Party gradually got control of increasing numbers of factory and soldiers' committees, which elected the members of the Soviet, and thereby got control of Soviets in the Districts of the city, and finally, of the Executive Committees of the Soviets in Petrograd, Moscow, and several other cities. The Party never won control of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, which continued to support the Provisional Government up to the time of the October Revolution.

17. The growth of the Party, and more importantly, the growth of its influence, was due to its skillful exploitation of social and economic discontent growing out of the war. The railway transport system had all but broken down and made the already bad food situation even worse. Prices were high. There was a general decline in industrial productivity--and consequently, in workers' incomes--owing to the wearing out of machinery, personnel turn-over,

30. On 9 September, the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet created a "Committee of Struggle against Counterrevolution" to resist Kornilov. The Bolsheviks entered this committee, which was also known as the "Military Revolutionary Committee,"¹ as a dominant minority. The district soviets passed resolutions in favor of sending representatives to the committee, establishing control over the commissars of the Government, and of organizing mobile fighting squads to arrest Kornilov's agitators. The Military Organization met

23. The demonstration the next day was even bigger than before. The workers, led by Bolsheviks, played the leading role, rather than the soldiers. Clashes resulted in about 29 killed and 114 wounded, about equal numbers on both sides.

24. Trotsky raises the question whether the Bolsheviks could have seized power during the "July Days." He is convinced they could, but that they could not have held it. Neither the

unions of technical and administrative personnel, declining profits, and a general closing-down of factories by owners unwilling to risk their capital to increasing worker unrest. Counting military defeats ate into morale. The Bolsheviks sent agitators into the plants and army units and organized the discontent around their slogans for "peace" and "land" and workers' control of production. The regime could not offer what the Bolsheviks demanded and promised. The Bolsheviks harped on these matters and made the regime and the parties supporting it appear both unwilling and unable to better conditions.

18. Peace demonstrations reached violent proportions in Petrograd early in May. The Petrograd Committee of the Party was responsible for at least one of these.

19. Committees in the factories and lower army units began to pass Bolshevik slogans (against the Government, etc.) and to elect Bolshevik delegates to the soviets. Party representation in the soviets grew.

20. The "July Days." The extent of discontent among the Petrograd workers and soldiers was made glaringly apparent in July. On the first the regime sponsored a "patriotic manifestation" with a view to arousing support for a military offensive in Galicia. It backfired: the placards carried by the 400,000 demonstrators were overwhelmingly Bolshevik in spirit--"Down with the Ten Minister-Capitalists!" "Down with the Offensive!" "All Power to the Soviets!"

21. On 16 July several thousand machine-gunners threw out their regimental committees, elected a Bolshevik chairman, and discussed the feasibility of an armed demonstration. They organized a provisional revolutionary committee, consisting of two men from each company, to replace the old regimental committee. They sent delegates to other units of the Petrograd garrison, to Kronstadt, and into the factories asking for support for an armed demonstration. One of the principal leaders of the machine-gunners commanded vehicles from the factories, armed them with machine-guns, posted them at strategic points along the proposed line of march, got promises from other units that they would go with the machine-gunners. He kept the Military Organization of the Bolshevik Party informed of all his activities and sent sentries to guard Khesinskaya Palace, where the Party had headquarters.

Factories organized and armed detachments of workers (Red Guards) to take part in the demonstration.

Seven garrison regiments joined with the machine-gunners and workers' detachments in the march to the Tauride Palace (then the headquarters of the Soviet), carrying the slogan "All Power to the Soviet!"

22. The armed demonstration was not prepared by the Bolshevik Party, but the Party assumed its leadership when it proved impossible to prevent. The Central Committee met on the night of the 16th and decided to continue the demonstration the next day, but to ensure that it not go on to insurrection, for which the Party was not yet ready. The Petrograd Committee took charge of the movement. An ad hoc staff was formed under Podvoisky and Nevsky, leaders of the Bolshevik Military Organization.

"Brief appeals and instructions were issued to all the troops of the garrison. In order to protect the demonstration from attack, armored cars were to be placed at the bridges leading from the suburbs to the capital and at the central crossings of the chief streets. The machine-gunners had already, during that night, established their own sentries at the Peter and Paul fortress. The garrisons of Oranienbaum, Peterhoff, Krasnoe Selo and other points near the capital, were informed of tomorrow's demonstration by telephone and special messenger. The general political leadership, of course, remained in the hands of the Central Committee of the party."

(Trotsky)

35. In the elections for district dumas in Moscow, the Party more than doubled its vote, winning about 52% of the total. The "compromisists" Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary Parties lost enormous chunks of their previous vote. Whereas the Socialist-Revolutionary candidates had won 375,000 votes in June, they got only 54,000 in October. Mensheviks dropped from 76,000 to 16,000. Significantly, the bourgeois Constitutional Democrats lost only 8,000 votes. The lower middle class stayed away from the polls, and this accounted for much of the decline of the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary votes. Evidently, considerable numbers in Moscow were either moving to the left or being politically "neutralized." It is also significant that in the Moscow garrison, Bolsheviks won 90% of the vote.

36. The Party chalked up appreciable gains in factory, trade union, soviet, and municipal elections elsewhere: Finland, Kiev, Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Kronstadt, Urals; Baltic and Black Sea Fleets.

38. The Bolshevik Party, in addition to capturing control of many soviets, was able to put considerable pressure on non-Bolshevik soviets--by getting control of factory committees and having them refuse to support the soviet financially. The Bolshevik soviets similarly refused to support the "compromisist" Central Executive Committee.

39. During the summer a great number of strikes were carried out throughout the country, an increasing proportion of these were engineered by Bolshevik controlled factory committees. In most cases the strikes were local and were called in opposition to trade union leadership, which in many unions remained loyal to the regime right up to the Revolution.

50. On 23 October, Lenin forced the Central Committee to take a definite stand. Only two members, Zinoviev and Kamenev, voted against the resolution which made "armed insurrection. . . the order of the day," and called upon all Party organizations to "consider and decide all practical questions" on the basis of this decision.

70. Wherever Bolsheviks got control of the committee of a military command, they set up a revolutionary committee, which took control of the command, helped local soviets seize power, and prevented commanders from sending reinforcements to the aid of the regime during the uprising.

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61. Extension of Party control in army committees proceeded exactly as in the factories -- by political agitation for Bolshevik slogans resulting in the election of Party men to committees of lower units; these agitated for new elections to oust "compromised" committees of higher units. As committees were won over, more Bolshevik delegates succeeded in being elected to soldiers' sections of various soviets, and once in the majority there, they were able to rig elections in military units still more in favor of Party candidates and to push programs and procedures that drew more of the soldiers into the Bolshevik ring of influence.

62. Bolsheviks in unit committees used the facilities of the committees (printing presses, clerical help, communications facilities) for Party purposes. Agitators and organizers were sent to work with other units as needed, and even to help out local civilian Party organizations. In one case, a Party Committee was organized in a regiment. At first it had only 18 - 20 adherents, but it rapidly expanded and became a "District Committee." Then it began working in other regiments in the division and even organized a group to work among the peasants in the division sector.

63. The Bolsheviks in the Baltic Fleet were particularly energetic and effective organizers. The Party organization at Kronstadt, the Baltic Naval Base, dominated the Central Executive Committee of Sailors of the Baltic Fleet (Centrobalt). The Centrobalt dispatched agitators to the Black Sea Fleet and through the countryside. They carried mandates from the Centrobalt which guaranteed them a friendly reception by soviets wherever they went, and immunity from arrest.

64. Party work in the army capitalized on the peace and land slogans: the army consisted largely of peasants who, especially since the February Revolution, were easily persuaded that they had no real stake in continuation of the "imperialist war," particularly since they were suffering continual defeats.

The Bolsheviks organized clubs for soldiers and workers coming from a particular section of the country--even from a single village. Party agitators gave lectures in the clubs and distributed literature. Special efforts were made to get soldiers on furlough to visit the clubs.


Party agitators were sent into the countryside to talk to soldiers on leave and deserters. Peasants were encouraged to seize land and engage in political activities, and to write about it to soldier relatives at the front. Conversely, Bolshevikized soldiers wrote home encouraging their families to engage in the political struggle.

65. Another factor that worked in the Party's favor was the fact that the Monarchy had made a practice of drafting worker malcontents for the army. Many of these had taken part in the 1905 uprising and were generally sympathetic to Bolshevik ideas. The practice also contributed to the further deterioration of economic health and the further expansion of the proletariat: unskilled peasants were brought into industrial centers to replace the drafted workers; they were less productive than the old workers and suffered the more with the economic decline. The "hereditary proletariat" that was drafted naturally sympathized strongly with the development of revolutionary sentiment among the workers who remained in the cities. A large party of the Petrograd garrison consisted of drafted workers.

66. Still another factor contributing on the one hand, to the success of Bolshevik work in the army and on the other, to the difficulty the regime had in keeping a firm hand over the army, was the "democratization" of the lower ranks of officers and NCO's. Relatively few of the commissioned officers went actively over to the Bolshevik side, but large numbers of them were not resolutely anti-Bolshevik and in a crisis, could not be counted reliable by the regime.

67. The Party published newspapers for soldiers. They were distributed by Bolsheviks and sympathetic workers--railway men, postal workers, automobile drivers, field kitchen staffs.


"These army newspapers were vivid examples of Lenin's description of what a newspaper should be--a 'collective organizer'--the correspondents who wrote for the papers became organizers of Bolshevik work in the regiments, while the readers became rank-and-file Bolsheviks." (Gorky, et al)



99. Arms.

Before it was legalized by the Kornilov affair, the Red Guard was armed largely with weapons seized by the workers and soldiers during the February Revolution. It was estimated by the Commander of the Petrograd Military District that over 30,000 revolvers and 40,000 rifles disappeared from army stores during the February Revolution. In at least one case (at Orekhovo-Zuyevo), Bolsheviks obtained arms by cultivating army officers of the local garrison: they gave them a party and obtained 300 rifles and 61,000 cartridges. Following the "July Days" the regime gathered up as many arms as it could. Large stocks of the best weapons, including machine guns, were hidden by reliable Party members. Substantial numbers of arms were cached in the factories. The Government issued arms to the workers during the Kornilov danger. When the Red Guard was legalized, and wherever at any time the Bolsheviks dominated the local soviet, the Red Guard was able to purchase arms out of factory funds. The Military Organization of the Party obtained arms for the Red Guard from the stores of Bolshevized garrison units.

(THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917, CIA, pp. 4-5. Part of: Clandestine Communist Organization, SECRET, CIA, March 1952) <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP78-00915R000200130001-4.pdf>



Doc. 4
 Mr. Lockhart to Mr. Balfour. (Received November 8.)
 London, November 7, 1918.
 Sir, I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith a memorandum dealing with the internal situation in Russia from the 28th January to the 30th September, 1918. For purposes of convenience I have divided this memorandum into three sections:—
 1. Bolshevism and the Bolshevik Government;
 2. The Counter-Revolutionary Forces; and
 3. Allied Intervention.
 As Allied intervention would seem to be the most important need of the moment, I have so arranged the memorandum so that the section dealing with intervention can be typed as a separate report.
 In sending you this account of my activities in Russia I have the honour to express my deep regret that, owing to circumstances over which I had no control, I was unable to leave Russia without falling into the hands of the Bolsheviks. I regret sincerely the trouble and inconvenience thus caused to His Majesty's Government. At the same time I venture to express to you the warmest gratitude of myself and of the other members of my mission for your successful efforts in securing our release.
 I feel that in many respects my mission has not succeeded. I trust, however, that the valuable material and information which we have been able to obtain concerning a movement that constitutes a menace to the whole civilised world may redeem it from being considered altogether as a failure.
 I have, &c.
 R. H. B. LOCKHART

Doc. 5
 Inclosure in Doc. 4.
 MEMORANDUM ON THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN RUSSIA.
 No. 1.—Bolshevism and the Bolshevik Government.
 (a.) Internal Policy.
 AT the present moment the Bolsheviks have been in absolute power for exactly one year. With reluctance I am forced to admit that their position is to-day perhaps stronger and more consolidated than at any previous period during the past twelve months. They possess one fundamental attribute of any real government: they have put down anarchy and counter-revolution until to-day within the limits of that Russia which they rule there is more order of a kind than there has been at any moment since the first revolution in February, 1917.
 As a proof of their virility, I would point out that since the 7th November, 1917, their government has remained practically unchanged, and in spite of many trials the Du-unvirate of Lenin and Trotsky is still unchallenged.
 It is a mistake to imagine that the terrible measures of repression which are being carried out almost daily in Petrograd and Moscow are the result of anarchy or the destruction of all responsible mob. They are in reality part of a system which aims at the particular. And for these measures the Bolshevik leaders alone must bear the full responsibility.

the cost of living and of the dearth of food and manufactured goods. He is, however, better educated than the peasant, has been brought up on Socialist doctrines, and readily believes that his present difficulties are due to the efforts of the capitalist Governments of Germany and the Allies to suppress the anti-capitalistic proletariat revolution of Russia. He is inspired to a certain extent by the ideals of Bolshevism.

He is inspired to a certain extent by the ideals of Bolshevism, to which I shall refer later, and class-warfare. Finally, while the economic policy of the Bolsheviks as an idea should not seem likely to bring their régime to ruin, the force of Bolshevism may go, but Bolshevism and the Soviet idea have entered deeply into the mind of the Russian people and may be under-estimated. Much as we all like the Russian people and may be inclined to eradicate. It is impossible to believe that the Russian people will ever accept Tsardom under its ancient form.

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(b.) Bolshevik Foreign Policy.

In an article in the "New Europe" in May of this year, Professor Pares states that there are only two ideas in this war: one, the German idea of world-domination, and, two, the national idea of people's rights and people's frontiers. There is, however, a third idea, which is certainly not novel but which has gained considerable popularity in all countries since the war, namely, the international idea of class warfare and anti-capitalism. "To turn the first imperialistic war into a civil war," this is the guiding principle which Lenin adopted years before the war, and from which he has never swerved.

It is to the dangers of this idea that I venture most respectfully to direct the attention of His Majesty's Government. Whatever may be Lenin's policy as regards Russia herself, it is clear that he looks upon his mother country merely as the most fertile ground for his experiments. A general European revolution on a class basis is, and always has been, his goal, and it is from this angle only that Bolshevism should be viewed. I shall not enter here into the vexed controversy of the Bolshevik relations with the Imperial German Government. As far as the Bolshevik leaders are concerned and, in particular, Lenin, who is the brain and guiding force of the whole movement, I have never believed in such a combination, and the documentary evidence which has recently been published by the U.S.A. Government only strengthens this belief. Without further discussion, however, it is obvious to-day first, that even if Lenin took money from the German Government, he used it for his own ends and not for German ends, and, secondly, that Bolshevism has now gone far beyond the stage of any outside control. It is perhaps no exaggeration to say that Bolshevism is now a far greater danger to Europe than German militarism.

At the present moment Lenin's eyes are focussed on Central Europe. He knows and understands perfectly the weak and strong joints in his armour. He has great hopes of a class revolution in Italy, Austria and Germany. He is certain of it in the Ukraine and in Poland, and he admits quite openly that such a revolution has least chance of success in England and in America—in England, as he says, because the working-classes are too ignorant (*i.e.*, of Socialism)! He knows that without the class revolution in other countries his own régime is doomed because of the unreliable material upon which he has to work in Russia. His great hope is fixed on the German Socialist party, which is strong and well-disciplined, and which might conceivably make a success of social revolution. While his foreign policy has been governed by playing off the Central Powers and the Allies against each other, he has never ceased to endeavour to strengthen his position with the German Socialist party. It was in order to strengthen his position with that party that he maintained such a bitter propaganda against the Allies, and his main task has been to exist until the German Socialists should follow his example. He has done much propaganda in Germany both before and since the revolution, and he has many friends amongst the independent German Socialist party. In this connection it is significant to note how the British press denounces Lenin as a traitor and in the same breath lauds Liebknecht to the skies as a genuine Socialist, and almost indeed as a hero. It should be recognised at once that Lenin and Liebknecht represent one and the same thing, and that the latter is as great a danger to Europe as the former. We should do well, too, to accept with caution the

It is frequently pointed out in the foreign press that the Bolsheviks rule by methods which far cruelly surpass the worst days of the old régime and which are opposed in every sense to what we call democracy. This is undeniably true, and the Bolsheviks themselves admit these accusations quite frankly.

They point out that until capitalism is destroyed the mere fact that every man has a vote does not in itself make for equality, and in their struggle for this equality they consider any measures justifiable. They have therefore restored the death sentence which is generally enforced without any further trial than the decision of the half-dozen men who compose the Directorate of the Commission for combating Counter-Revolution and Speculation. They have taken away the vote from all except workmen and the poorer peasants. They have suppressed all newspapers except those which favour their own cause, and they have so far oppressed and maltreated the Russian bourgeoisie as to render that unfortunate class almost entirely destitute.

It would seem at first sight that a régime of this kind would soon render itself hated to a large percentage of the population. It has been stated—and not untruly—that the Bolshevik supporters do not number more than 10 per cent. of the entire population. Since November of last year practically every Russian politician, and certainly every English expert on Russia, have assured us that the Bolsheviks could not last for more than a few weeks. There have been moments when the Bolsheviks believed themselves that their end was near; for example, after the first Brest peace, after the Czecho-Slovak revolt, after Count Mirbach's murder, and again on the 5th August, when Dr. Helfferich left Moscow for Berlin with the avowed purpose of persuading his Government to suppress the Bolshevik régime in Russia. In spite, however, of numerous crises the Bolshevik Government has maintained its position, and even if one makes the wildest allowances for the terrorist measures by which the Bolsheviks rule, it must be admitted that the success of Bolshevism in Russia is due to some more deep-rooted cause than the mere terrorism of a band of workmen. Indeed, although the Bolshevik supporters may not number more than 10 per cent. of the population, their worst enemies cannot deny their energy and party discipline. Unfortunately, too, no other party can claim even half as large a percentage of supporters. In Russia the aristocracy and bourgeoisie (including the *petit bourgeoisie*) do not number more than 15 to 20 per cent. of the entire population, and this small percentage is divided against itself into Monarchists, Constitutional Monarchists, Republicans, and Socialists. Some 70 per cent. of the population, *i.e.*, the majority of the peasantry, remain amorphous and inactive. But this very inactivity is in itself a certain advantage to the Bolsheviks whose influence amongst a non-Bolshevik peasantry is to be ascribed almost entirely to the Brest peace and the land reform. At every congress, at every Soviet election, at every meeting, the Brest peace has saved the Bolsheviks time and again. Condemned as it was by many of the Bolsheviks themselves, the Brest peace from the Bolshevik point of view is a further proof of Lenin's clear-sightedness and sagacity. The peasant is by instinct *petit bourgeois*, and with certain reservations it seems probable that Russia will become a land of small holdings. The peasant, however, must have land. He really requires it to live, and for years almost every party has encouraged him to expect it. The Bolsheviks gave him the land—not exactly as he desired it, perhaps, and without any very great security of tenure, but still without any restriction or delay. Skilfully nursed by Bolshevik propaganda, and warned by the concrete example of the Skoropadsky régime in the Ukraine, he believes that counter-revolution means the restoration of the land to the landowners, and as all other parties urge him to break both land and peace to a régime which he does not know, and which will send him back to the trenches. The result of the German occupation in the Ukraine is an example and a warning of what one may expect from a reactionary and purely military intervention in Russia. The peasant, it is true, objects strongly to the Bolshevik requisitions of grain and foodstuffs. This may lead to trouble in the future, but in his present disorganised state it is unwise to hope too much from the peasant as an anti-Bolshevik element. He might welcome a deliverer who would relieve his wants, but he will, and can do little on his own account. And certainly he does not want to do any more fighting either for himself or for anyone else.

In spite of all reports to the contrary the workmen are still true to their Bolshevik leaders. This again, is partly due to the Bolshevik method of suppressing all other parties, but chiefly to the fact that under the Bolshevik régime the working man is in a peculiarly favoured position. Of such food as is available he has the first choice. He receives large wages, and his working hours are short. He complains, it is true, of

(d.) *Economic Situation.*

While politically the power of the Bolsheviks seems undiminished, their economic policy is likely to bring them to serious disaster. Indeed, the economic situation in Russia to-day is tragic in the extreme. In the Bolshevik budget the annual expenditure exceeds the revenue by hundreds of millions of roubles. Not only is there an appalling shortage of foodstuffs, but also the almost complete dearth of manufactured articles has destroyed the exchange of goods for bread, which is to-day in Russia the sole means of forcing the peasant to yield up his grain to the starving towns. Money has almost lost all value, and in Petrograd it is practically impossible to buy grain except by the primitive method of barter. Where money still has a purchase value, prices are fantastic. The following table, compiled by the Bolsheviks themselves, shows better than any words the appalling state to which Russia has come under the Bolshevik régime.

This table shows the maximum price at which a working-man can buy the bare necessities of life. It should be borne in mind that this is a table prepared by the Bolsheviks for Bolsheviks, that the prices here given are the "fixed" or "normed" prices only obtainable by working men, and that in spite of this the increase in the cost of living since the war is still shown as thirty-seven times. For the *bourgeois* who has not the advantages of the workmen the cost is still greater.

TABLE showing Average Minimum Daily Budget of Workmen, 1914-18.

	1914.		1918.	
	Rs.	K.	Rs.	K.
Bread (white), ½ lb.	..	5	7	50
Milk	6	2	50
Sugar	2	4	75
Tea	2	0	17
Meat	2	5	0
Bread (black), 2 lb.	..	10	20	0
Fats	5	3	50
Meal	5	3	0
Lodging	50	2	0
Light	10	2	0
Paper	2	0	35
Clothes, boots, washing, &c.	..	53	6	0
Total	1	52	56	77

It is therefore in their economic policy that the Bolsheviks are most vulnerable to attack. The Bolsheviks realise this to the full, and on that account are most anxious to conclude a commercial agreement with any foreign Power that might be willing and able to alleviate their financial and economic difficulties. In this connection they have already made many secret overtures to America. To a considerable extent these difficulties are due to the fact that the richest parts of the former Russian Empire are in the hands of either Germany or the Allies (v. the most interesting map in Appendix I, which shows the districts of Russia capable of supporting the local population). It is clear, therefore, that, unless the Bolsheviks can improve their position by reconquering either the Ukraine or Siberia, they are bound sooner or later to go down before the anger of a starving population. This is, in my opinion, the greatest argument against our abandoning our intervention or allowing the fertile districts of the Ukraine to be handed over to the tender mercies of the Bolsheviks.

(e.) *The Terror.*

I have thought it important to dwell at some length on this subject because it supplies our best justification for *intervention*. The terror may be divided into two classes: the Red terror, and the Cold Terror. The Bolsheviks have been for some months past in the habit of summarily executing their active opponents, i.e., active counter-revolutionaries. Some of these sentences may be said to have been justified, as for example the shooting of the murderers of Uritsky, Mirbach, etc. Executions on a wholesale scale (i.e., systematic murders for which the Bolshevik Government can be held responsible) first began after the murder of Uritsky and the attempt on Lenin's

assurance that there is no danger of Bolshevism in the new order which is springing up out of the ruins of the Empire of Austria and Germany.

At the present moment Lenin believes that his hopes with regard to Austria and Germany are about to be realised. For that reason he is ready to come to almost any terms with the Allies in order to induce them to abandon intervention, and to leave him a free hand to support the revolution in Central Europe. In this connection he is prepared to make important concessions, and to come to an agreement with the Allies. It need hardly be said, however, that in the event of the success of his dreams and of trouble breaking out in any of the Allied countries he would be the first to break his word, and to throw his whole weight into the scale against us.

(c.) *The Bolshevik Army.*

Partly, in order to maintain his position at home, but also undoubtedly with an eye to the future and with the intention of creating at least a greater Bolshevik Russia, Lenin has endeavoured to create an army. This work was entrusted to Trotsky, a man of very different character to Lenin, but possessed of tremendous energy and boundless ambition. His first efforts to create a volunteer army resulted in complete failure. To-day, however, conscription has been restored, and several classes have been mobilised. (The soldiers are drawn exclusively from the working classes, the *bourgeoisie* being drafted into labour battalions.) Discipline has been established in the army by the same methods as in the towns, and the death sentence is as common at the front as in Petrograd and Moscow. In particular, the position of the officer in the Red Army is painful in the extreme. Mobilised for service but mistrusted (many officers have entered the Red Army, some in order to gain their daily bread, others for counter-revolutionary purposes), they are placed at the head of their men and shot for the least failure of their troops. By a recent order of Trotsky's the wives and children of officers who desert to the Allies or the Czechs are thrown into prison. Although the Red Army in May was an insignificant rabble, to-day, thanks to a certain enthusiasm created by its recent successes on the Volga front, it has become a force which is not altogether to be despised. This opinion is supported by General Lavergne of the French Mission, and by the testimony of several counter-revolutionary leaders who have been fighting against the Bolsheviks. At the end of September there were some two hundred thousand troops under arms, while another three hundred thousand were receiving six hours' training per week. On the 20th September the disposition of the regular troops was as follows:—

	Men.
Screen on German front	15,000
Archangel and Northern front	6,000
Ekatereburg front	12,000
Kazan to Samara front	105,000
Caucasus from Tsaritsin to Baku	75,000
Total	213,000

Of these troops some 23,000 are Lettish. These are excellent troops and constitute the backbone of the Bolshevik strength. The Commander-in-Chief of the Bolshevik armies is a Lettish Staff officer, as is also the head of the commission for combating counter-revolution on the front. There are also a certain number of troops formed from enemy prisoners. These are mainly Hungarians. They may be divided into two classes: (1), those who are genuine Internationalists and (2), those who joined the Red Army to avoid going back to fight in the German and Austrian Armies against the Allies. From what I have seen of them they are certainly not acting on instructions from the German or Austrian Governments. There are also a certain number of Chinese coolies who have been drafted into military service. The stories about German officers and German troops in the Bolshevik movement or appreciate its danger if we continue to regard it merely as a toy of German Imperialism.

We shall never understand the Bolshevik movement or appreciate its danger if we do not regard it as a toy of German Imperialism. There is, however, a great shortage of artillery, especially of heavy artillery. As a military force the Red Army is as yet unimportant. But it is increasing daily in strength and in efficiency, and, if, as the result of a German withdrawal from the Ukraine, or the abandonment of intervention, it is allowed further triumphs in Russia it may become a serious danger to the rest of Europe.

On that occasion some five hundred people were shot in Petrograd, some 120 in Moscow, and a large number in the provinces, many of them innocent people, purely as a measure of revenge and in order to terrify the opponents of Bolshevism. In this connection, Major Wardwell, of the American Red Cross, possesses an original document of Chicherin's which might be published throughout the civilised world. In spite of their truculent answer to the Neutral Ministers, it appears certain that these executions were not wholly approved of by the Bolshevik leaders, and in particular by Lenin himself. At any rate, soon after Lenin's recovery, this particular form of terror was changed for another which is equally diabolical and even more effective. This terror consists in depriving all opponents of Bolshevism of everything they possess, and is indeed a systematic attempt to destroy every form of *bourgeoisie* in Russia. In Petrograd and Moscow the *bourgeoisie* receives practically nothing to eat. (They are placed on the fourth and lowest category of food cards.) Their houses and flats with the exception of one or two rooms have been taken away from them and been given to the workmen. Their money has long since been confiscated. Now their very clothes, with the exception of one suit, are to be requisitioned. Up to the present they have been enabled to live by selling their art treasures, their furniture, and their jewellery. Of this last resource they have been now deprived by an official decree which is only too likely to be rigorously enforced. At the present moment many *bourgeois* families are literally dying of starvation. Indeed, their situation is too deplorable for words, and what their fate will be during the coming winter defies all description. The number of people arrested without the slightest reason must be very large, and the conditions of prison life under the Bolshevik régime are such that they can only fitly be compared with the horrors of India or China. In this connection I should like to point out that at the present moment it is almost impossible for the *bourgeoisie* to leave Petrograd and Moscow. Even if they succeed in obtaining a Bolshevik foreign passport, the Swedish Government is now refusing visas on the ground that there is no food in Sweden for these unfortunates. I venture to recommend that His Majesty's Government, in the interests of humanity, and also friendship to a class who did well by us at the beginning of the war, should immediately come to some arrangement with the Swedish Government whereby this obstacle can be overcome.

Conclusions.

In the above cursory and very incomplete review of Bolshevik activities, I have endeavoured to show that the Bolsheviks are still the strongest political party in Russia, that in the Bolshevik idea there is a serious danger to the rest of Europe, but that if Bolshevism can be confined to its present limits it must fail, sooner or later, owing to the weakness of its economic policy. Its strength is difficult to gauge, as one cannot help feeling that the Bolsheviks are strong mainly because of the weakness of all other parties in Russia. At the same time most Russians, and nearly all Allied experts on Russia, seem to me to under-estimate the strength of the Bolshevik movement. At the present moment, quite apart from Soviet Russia itself, the Bolsheviks are extremely powerful in the Ukraine, which can hardly fail to turn Bolshevik in the event of the withdrawal of the German troops. The position of Poland and Roumania is also very precarious, while according to Bolshevik evidence both Italy and Roumania would seem to furnish a fertile field for Bolshevik propaganda and Bolshevik ideas. Finally, it should be remembered that the Bolshevik leaders are not working-men. They are a band of intellectuals, some of them of great intelligence, who have been studying international revolution for years, and who have a dangerous knowledge of the best means of inspiring class-hatred.

No. 2.—The Counter-Revolutionary Forces.

I arrived in Petrograd on January 29th in the middle of the Brest negotiations. I wish to state that at this particular moment several of the leading British representatives in Petrograd, including Mr. Bruce of His Majesty's Embassy, and General Poole were in favour of recognising the Bolsheviks. In a conversation, too, which I had with Sir George Buchanan on board a Norwegian yacht off Bergen, the latter was also in favour of establishing relations with the Bolshevik Government. As the Bolsheviks were then by far the strongest force in Russia, and as a renewal of the war with Germany seemed at any moment probable, my first efforts were directed mainly towards inducing the Bolsheviks (1) to fight Germany, and (2) to accept Allied military aid.

(MEMORANDUM ON THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN RUSSIA, R. H. B. Lockhart. In: Mr. Lockhart to Mr. Balfour, November 7, 1918, Received: November 8, 1918. In: Foreign Office (1917-1918), p. 37. Bold added.)

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Diaries of William Lyon Mackenzie King

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Saturday, January 28, 1922. (Cont'd)

(Handwritten - p. 28)

attention during the day to Russian Famine Relief, attended the Canadian Club luncheon at which Col. Mackie spoke and promised him the Govt's co-operation if private agencies formed a national organization. Spent some time with him during the afternoon getting particulars and drafting a communication for the press. The situation is appalling. I rebuked myself for not having got this underway sooner. However, the suggestion is my own as to method of securing the Govt's co-operation, and I am framing the communication to the press in the form of a public appeal. I believe Mackie is right in his view that current opinion of Lenin & Trotsky is result of propaganda, and that the Soviet Govt. is after all the people's govt. as vs. the corrupt autocracy and vicious secret service allied to privileged classes. Had Mayor Gale to the luncheon with me & a talk with A.K. McLean after. Had invitation from Canadian Textile Exhibition to attend their meeting in Toronto Feb: 15, unable to accept - brief interview with F.J. Gillespie re "Electrical Energy" supply to Rys. Was at office from 9.30 to 1, 3 to 6.45. Met Tom Eakin at the station & brought him with me to the Roxborough. We spent the evening looking at fireworks - Carnival celebration just opposite, & talking over matters of mutual interest, to bed about 11.30. This has been a discouraging week in that but little has been accomplished in overtaking vast arrears of correspondence. I feel quite tired out. The danger is that of becoming a drudge and 'losing the vision'.

(Diaries of William Lyon Mackenzie King, Saturday, January 28, 1922. Handwritten - p. 28. Item 8076 in the Library and Archives of Canada.)
<https://www.bac-lac.gc.ca/eng/discover/politics-government/prime-ministers/william-lyon-mackenzie-king/Pages/item.aspx?IdNumber=8076&>

(a) Early decision of policy in regard to Transcaspia is, he further strongly urges, extremely necessary.

(b.) The British declaration (*vide* your telegram of the 2nd August) to Russian peoples was followed at once by military action of Allies against Bolsheviks, and is, therefore, interpreted by Turkestan population, Bolsheviks included, as a pledge that, in first place, Bolsheviks will be suppressed by Allies, who will then permit Russian people to exercise right of self-determination.

(c.) Any doubt on this point should at once be cleared away. Present situation may probably admit of terms with Bolsheviks; but Bolsheviks will give no mercy to Askabad Government, if latter continue to fight relying on our support, and if this is no longer given.

(d.) Latent Bolshevism exists in Transcaspia. Adherents to it frankly urge follow in the reliance on promises by British, taking as an example case of Baku, and they suggest that to make terms at once with Bolsheviks would be better than to discover later on that they were abandoned to them. Financial situation is greatest lever for these people, and whenever Askabad Government failed to meet its obligations they would gain the upper hand.

(e.) Askabad Government essays to follow our advice, and in time of necessity they gave us real help. This help can now be dispensed with, but we are morally bound to give them assistance. Due largely to delay in announcing policy and in granting financial aid, impression is gaining ground that we intend to abandon them, though this may not be our intention.

2. Summing up, Malletson considers that a serious situation exists, and that it is essential to give very early declaration of policy and financial aid. The restoration of law and order depends on our support. Without this, present Government will fall, anarchy ensue, and our reputation for good faith will disappear with our prestige.

Doc. 9 Report on the Georgian Government by Major McDonnell.

Tiflis.— THE following are the names of the members of the present Government at

Prime Minister	...	M. Jordani (Social Democrat).
Foreign Affairs	...	M. Gegechkori (Social Democrat).
Interior	...	M. Ramishwilli (Social Democrat, Labour).
Finance and Trade	...	M. Jurilli (National Democrat).
War	...	M. Georgadzi (Social Democrat).
Education	...	M. Lorkashashwilli (Federalist).
Supplies	...	M. Ardashwilli (Non-Party).
Ways and Means	...	M. Lorkepianidze (Social Revolutionary).
Justice	...	M. Iev Meskiev (Federalist).
Lands and Agriculture	...	M. Homeriki (Social Democrat).
President of the Parliament	...	M. Cheidzi (Social Revolutionary).

Nominally democratic, the Government is really entirely in the hands of the advanced Socialist Party in the Parliament, who have gained very considerable popularity with the labouring and peasant classes. The actual members of the Council of Ministers are not true Georgians, but either Emeritins or Mongralians, and this causes a certain amount of discontent among the true Georgians. The methods and ethics of the Government are ultra-socialistic. Land has already been nationalised, and railways and all public institutions are to be nationalised during the early part of this year.

The Georgian Government maintains:—

1. That they are already actually an established and independent State.
2. That no decision of any outside Power or Peace Conference can alter the fact of their independence.
3. That their boundaries are fixed by the history of their nation.

4. That all property and institutions at present within the boundaries of historical Georgia belong to the Georgian Republic.

5. That they are perfectly able to maintain order within their boundaries, and in this respect require no help from outside.

1. The actual establishment of the present Georgian Republic came about with the advent of the German troops. M. Gegechkori, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, states that he, as a representative of the then Tiflis Commissariat, applied to Colonel Pike, the representative of the British Mission in Tiflis, for British or Allied assistance in troops and finance, in order to keep the Turk out of Georgia and to establish Georgian independence. On being informed that this was impossible, the Tiflis Commissariat accepted Germany's offer and M. Gegechkori left the Government. He subsequently returned to office on the 4th December, when news of armistice and the removal of the Turk and German from the Caucasus was confirmed.

2. Their apparent conviction that nothing can alter the fact of their independence is based on statements of Mr. Lloyd George and President Wilson regarding the independence and self-determination of other small nations, and our own support of the rights of the Armenian people. This conviction makes arguments as to their attitude towards various questions almost impossible. Statements made by our own Labour Party are constantly brought to bear when discussing their actions, and the probability of these prejudicing their claims to future independence.

3. Disputes between the Georgians and their neighbours are bound to arise over historical boundaries. Vast tracts of lands were originally owned by the Georgian aristocracy. These people in many cases found that Armenian and Mussulman labour was cheaper and more industrious than their own people; large tracts of land therefore gradually became populated with Armenians and Mussulmans. Added to which tribes were continually invading the country; and further, after the conquest of the Caucasus, the Russian Government did everything to encourage colonisation by the Armenian and Tartar tribes. The Georgian aristocracy, who are a pleasure-seeking and lazy people, later fell into debt to these colonists and mortgaged or sold them their lands. Consequently large tracts of historic Georgia are now actually populated with a preponderance of Armenians or Tartars, and in many cases these people actually hold the lands. The Georgians now claim that these historic lands should be included in their territories, while the Armenians or Tartars, fearing the advanced socialism and nationalisation of lands by the Georgians, claim the right of the majority to settle their destinies, and are willing to fight for their lands.

4. That all property on Georgian territory belongs to the Georgian Republic is a source of endless dispute between the Georgians and the Russians, the latter maintaining that railways and institutions built up entirely on Russian money cannot be considered as the property of Georgia. The same applies to the large quantity of military stores and material supplied for the Russian armies on the Caucasian front and at present in the hands of Georgia.

5. That the Georgian Government is able to maintain order within its boundaries seems to be more or less correct, and compared with the rest of Russia order exists. German troops have done much to establish this, although they never seem to have been used except for the moral effect of their presence. The Government maintain that the social reforms and nationalisation of the land did much to establish order and check Bolshevik propaganda. The German troops were under contract to support the Government or risk an infringement of the contract, which meant the loss of trade concessions to Germany. The reactionary element is very weak in Georgia, and led by an indolent aristocracy.

The Prime Minister, M. Jordani, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs are undoubtedly the soundest elements in the Government. They are both former members of the old Russian Duma, men of enlightenment and high education, and more democratic than socialist. They are, however, almost entirely in the hands of the ultra-socialistic elements, which are led by Cheidzi and Ramishwilli, with Tseritillie in the background. Open support of Jordani and Gegechkori, with a fixed policy and strong guiding hand on the part of the Allies, would probably have the effect of establishing a feeling of strength and confidence among the followers of the democratic element, and enable Messrs. Jordani, Gegechkori and company to check the extreme socialist left party. Even the most violent monarchists are rightly of the opinion that a change of Government at the present time might lead to fatal