


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The Americans, too, had learned the world's most important secret. A high German economic official from Weimar days, Erwin Respondek, who had been tasked with preparing the currency for the occupied Soviet Union, arranged meetings with the U.S. commercial attaché in a darkened cinema and passed him word of the invasion planning. In early 1941, Respondek had prepared the first of several detailed memoranda for the United States outlining the steps being taken for the destruction of the Soviet Union and "a rigorous liquidation of Bolshevism, all its political and other institutions, and, in particular, the 'extermination' of its leaders by the SS." Respondek, whose key contact was General Halder, had proved a reliable source till now, but officials in Washington were beginning to suspect that he was a plant. After internal debate, Roosevelt had undersecretary of state Sumner Welles tell Konstantin Umansky, the Soviet envoy in Washington, that the United States "has come into possession of information which it regards as authentic, clearly indicating that it is the intention of Germany to attack the Soviet Union." Umansky blanched. He promised to convey the information to

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Goebbels, in one of his regular conferences for the Nazi press on June 5, stated, "The Führer has decided that the war cannot be brought to an end without an invasion of Britain. Operations planned in the East have therefore been canceled. He cannot give any detailed dates, but one thing is certain: the invasion of Britain will start in three, or perhaps five weeks."<sup>296</sup> The next day, the British foreign office recalled Cripps to London for "consultations."<sup>297</sup> Berlin was worried that something was up; London, for its part, was still fearing a last-minute new Hitler-Stalin pact against the UK. That day, Stalin signed decrees "on measures for industry's preparedness to switch to the mobilization plan for [producing] ammunition" and for possible wartime mobilization of all industry from July 1.<sup>298</sup> Between June 6

Stalin tried to seize the initiative, composing a TASS bulletin, read out over Moscow radio at 6:00 p.m. on June 13 and published in Soviet newspapers the next morning. The impetus appears to have been the intensified speculation of a German-Soviet war that accompanied Cripps's recall to London. In issuing the bulletin, Stalin was effectively following the suggestion Schulenburg had made to Dekanozov that the Soviet leader write to Hitler, but the despot decided on the form of an open letter. "Germany is also, just as consistently as the USSR, observing the terms of the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact," it stated. "In view of this, according to Soviet circles, rumors of Germany's intent to break the Pact and to attack the USSR are utterly groundless." Stalin aimed not only to refute the rumors of war, again blaming them on British provocations to cause that very war, but also to elicit a German denial of any intentions to attack—or, failing that, a

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
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The Germans knew, of course, that the Soviets had been calling up reserves, moving forces to the frontier, furiously building border defenses, and stepping up patriotic propaganda.<sup>326</sup> The Wehrmacht's main worry was that, given its absurdly dense concentration of forces and weaponry smack up against the Soviet frontier, the Red Army could inflict great damage by striking preemptively—or, what might be worse, adjust their forward defense posture and move their own extremely vulnerable troops back away from the frontier, removing the danger of being wiped out in a lightning strike and preserving themselves for the counter-strike. Back on June 13, Timoshenko, in Zhukov's presence, had phoned Stalin to

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STALIN PACED AND PACED IN HIS KREMLIN OFFICE, with his usual short steps, gripping a pipe in the hand of his good arm. It was Saturday, June 21, 1941. The night before, he had repaired after midnight to his Near Dacha, in the woods at Kuntsevo, returning to the Kremlin in the afternoon.<sup>3</sup> From his office suite on the bel étage of the tsarist-era Imperial Senate, a person could see the whole world—or, at least, Stalin's world. Over the years, many of the party bosses and

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
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Such immense Soviet troop concentrations testify to both Stalin's understanding that Germany represented a monumental danger and his misunderstanding of blitzkrieg. But only one of the two vast armies on the frontier had occupied its firing positions.<sup>48</sup> Stalin had allowed covert strategic redeployments westward and lately had finally yielded to Timoshenko and Zhukov's insistence that the Red Army commence camouflaging of aerodromes, tank parks, warehouses, and military installations (which in many cases would require repainting).<sup>49</sup> But he would not permit assumption of combat positions, which he feared would only play into the hands of German militarist-adventurers, who craved war and schemed to force Hitler's hand, the way they had pushed the Wehrmacht beyond the agreed-upon German-Soviet line in Poland in 1939. Soviet planes were forbidden from flying within six miles of the border. Timoshenko and Zhukov, subject to the despot's admonitions and the watchful eye of Beria and his minions, made sure that frontline commanders did not cause or yield to "provocation."<sup>50</sup> Beria also tasked the assassin Sudoplatov with organizing "an experienced strike force to counter any frontier incident that might be used as an excuse to start a war."<sup>51</sup>

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Around midnight, Mikhail Kirponos, commander of the Kiev military district, called the defense commissariat on the high-frequency phone from his field HQ at Ternopol to report that another German had forded a river and crossed the border near Sokal (Ukraine) and said that Wehrmacht soldiers had taken up their firing positions, with tanks at their start lines. Zhukov called the Near Dacha to inform Stalin.<sup>84</sup> A little after midnight, a train carrying Soviet oil, manganese, and grain crossed the frontier into Greater Germany, its passage observed by waiting German divisions.<sup>85</sup> At around 1:00 a.m., Timoshenko called Pavlov on the high-frequency phone, evidently with word of Directive No. 1 to assume full combat readiness, and a caution not to succumb to provocation.<sup>86</sup>

(‘Stalin: Waiting for Hitler, 1929-1941’, Stephen Kotkin, p. 854)



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1941

- 151 -

January 1941

January 1 - Soviet Union: Stalin's New Year's message stated that the USSR was prepared for every eventuality, and was in a state of total mobilization.

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CHRONOLOGY OF PRINCIPAL EVENTS RELATING TO THE USSR PART I

CHRONOLOGY OF PRINCIPAL EVENTS RELATING TO THE USSR PART I 155 / 170 - 243% + [E] [O]

Soviet Union: Timoshenko, Defense Commissar, ordered strict economy in use of gasoline and oil by the Red Army in order to build up reserves.

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166 / 170

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1941

- 162 -

May 1941

May 1

Soviet Union: Annual May Day parade on Red Square displayed new motorized artillery and new long range guns in addition to familiar equipment.

Defense Commissar Timoshenko stated in his May Day proclamation the readiness of Red Army to repel any encroachment on Soviet territory; declared that the country was "in a capitalist encirclement."

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CHRONOLOGY OF PRINCIPAL EVENTS RELATING TO THE USSR PART I 157 / 170 - 256% + [E] [O]

30

Bulgaria: Agrarian and Communist Deputies in Sofia urged a treaty of friendship and mutual assistance with the USSR.

Soviet Union: Pravda announced that due to organizational changes, Red Army training and activity reached maximum approximation to real conditions of warfare.

PROVISIONAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT

THE ETHYL ALCOHOL INDUSTRY IN THE USSR

CIA/RR FR-27

27 February 1953

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Table 3 shows the planned production, capacity, and, where possible, the actual production for the period of the Third Five Year Plan (1938-42).

Table 3

Planned Production, Capacity, and Actual Production  
 of Ethyl Alcohol in the USSR  
 Third Five Year Plan (1938-42)

Year	Actual Production	Planned Production	Million Gallons	
			Capacity	
1938	243.8 <u>11/</u>	N.A.	313 (Actual)	<u>16/</u>
1939	245 <u>12/</u>	N.A.	N.A.	
1940	235.1 <u>13/</u>	N.A.	N.A.	
1941	N.A.	267.1 <u>14/</u>	N.A.	
1942	N.A.	409 <u>15/</u>	401 (Planned)	<u>17/</u>

It is apparent from Table 3 that the high hopes of the Third Five Year Plan failed to materialize. The annual rate of production increase dropped sharply in 1939 from the average of 24.5 million gallons of the preceding 6 years, and a decrease of 10 million gallons from the preceding year was registered in 1940. The reasons for this decrease are not known. The likelihood of war with Germany, however, was recognized in the USSR, and possibly a food-stockpiling program was instituted. Such a program, by taking grain and potatoes out of

2 / 29

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17 / 29

major states.<sup>21</sup> By the mid-1930s Soviet military forecasters were agreed that Nazi Germany and imperial Japan had become the chief threats to the USSR. According to M. V. Zakharov, Marshal B. M. Shaposhnikov, who served as Chief of the Soviet General Staff during the late 1930s, revised the threat estimate for the Third Five Year Plan to address this issue.<sup>22</sup> In the immediate (The Methodology of Foresight and Forecasting in Soviet Military Affairs, Soviet Army Studies Office, Jacob Kipp, May 31, 1998, p. 14)

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## IV PRE-WAR PREPARATION

Nevertheless, according to information gradually assembled by the Germans, it appears certain that partisan warfare was planned even before the beginning of hostilities, although not by the military, but by the Communist Party and the NKVD. This is substantiated in a report, by the Chief of German Army Military Police of December 31st, 1941.

This report noted the following statement of a twenty-five-year old Soviet partisan: "I know that, two to three weeks before the outbreak of war, Vassili Kossolapov, a member of the Bolshevik Central Committee (the highest Party group), who was in Kholm during meetings and discussions of the Party, repeatedly urged the organization of partisan groups."

The partisan said that Kossolapov pointed out the absolute necessity for the organization of partisan groups, and the possibility for every comrade not drafted by the army to fight the enemy in this way. Kossolapov conducted daily theoretical courses in the afternoon from two to six o'clock in the Red Party House in Kholm. Participants were, for the most part, registered members of Young Communist Organizations (Pioneers and Comsomols) as well as other acceptable persons who were not Party members.

"The large participation of female workers was remarkable," the partisan told the Germans. "Participants ranged in age from fifteen to thirty-five years. About ninety to one hundred persons attended the course I took... The lessons included instructions for the use of rifles, hand grenades, for attaching of explosives to bridges and so forth... The course lasted two weeks. During this time we were on the shooting range ten times."