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YUGOSLAVIA: THE OUTWORN STRUCTURE

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THE MANY FACES OF "SELF-MANAGEMENT"

The New Myth

At the Fifth Congress of the Yugoslav Communist Party in July 1948, three weeks after Yugoslavia had been expelled from the Cominform, Tito ended his speech with the words "Long live the Soviet Union, long live Stalin!" This was neither so suicidal nor so naive as it appears. In a certain sense he might have been taken aback by the turn of events, since he had been one of the founders of the Cominform and was busily building a state on Stalinist patterns. But by the same token he knew how to protect his state and himself in a Stalinist fashion. At his bidding, and under the guidance of Party Secretary Aleksandar Rankovic and State Secretary for Internal Affairs Svetislav Stefanovic, local "Cominformists" were rounded up for imprisonment on Tito's Adriatic Devil's Island, Goli Otok: 4,000 in 1949, over 3,000 in 1950, 2,500 in 1951, and over 1,000 in 1952; in March 1956, after the first Soviet Yugoslav rapprochement, the National Assembly was told that 15,800 "Cominformists" had been prosecuted between 1948 and 1955.

Perhaps more important than neutralizing these actual or potential enemies was the need for a new myth, a new ideological framework. In justifying his closing words at that Fifth Congress, Tito noted, according to his biographer Dedijer, that loyalty to Stalin and the Soviet Union had been the myth which had supported the Partisan resistance, and that he could not drop it overnight. Yet he could not persist in encouraging so treasonous a loyalty. Thus he now needed the support of the workers and the republics against Stalin and the Soviet Union. The formulation which eventually emerged, "self-management," has become the touchstone of Yugoslav Communism. Indeed, the mere suspicion of opposition to

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dissident pluralists -- will be examined later, as part of the ongoing Party struggle since the fall of Rankovic.

Self-Management as "Direct Democracy"

Representative democracy involves an organized, legitimate pluralism made up of competing political parties or interest groups with access to the polls and the communications media. Although there is much more freedom of expression in Yugoslavia than in any other Communist state, pluralism remains proscribed by such official ideologists of self management as LCY Executive Bureau member Edvard Kardelj. As chief ideologist under Tito and as Tito's most likely successor (at least for the short term), Kardelj's views are of crucial importance.

Kardelj's reputation for supposed liberalism stems in part from his defense of nationhood against the Cominform in 1948, his espousal of self-management in 1950, and his cultivation of the federal legislature in the first half of the 1960's. It springs also from the fact that Kardelj has always kept open his lines of communication with West European Social Democrats. He is detested by the Soviets, who regard him, with some reason, as the most revisionist theoretician in power in any Communist country. He is willing to accept political pluralism in advanced, Western countries, as is required by the parliamentary road to socialism, a doctrine which he espouses.

Nevertheless, Kardelj is not considered a liberal by many of his colleagues who feel that his theorizing could lead him as easily in authoritarian directions. His opposition to political pluralism in Yugoslavia (which he has termed a "reactionary" concept) could be documented at length. One recent example is a revealing interview with the editor of *Die Neue Gesellschaft*, reprinted in *Borba*, 10 January 1970, in which Kardelj states that "the problem now is to broaden the existing forms and find new, democratic ones which will grow organically from self-management; that is, to ensure that the classical representative democratic system is replaced by a democratic system based on the forms of a direct self-managing democracy at the social base." Asked: "Is not this a utopian goal? How should it function?" Kardelj replied:

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An Open Letter to Congress, Central Committee and Members of the Yugoslav Communist Party

From the International Secretariat of the Fourth International 1948

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It is no less true, comrades, that the nationalism introduced into the Communist parties corresponds precisely with this same kind of degeneration which you now discern in Russia. No progress can be made toward socialism unless every trace of nationalism is extirpated from the thinking of communist

harmonious planning and development of the country. It is essential that the masses be induced to participate as actively as possible in the work of planning, that the greatest heed be paid to their complaints, and that the needs expressed by them be the primary factor in planning.

Complete sovereignty of the *factory committees* must be established in the plants, and genuine *workers' control of production* must be instituted. The trade unions must be granted their real function, which is to defend the interests of the workers, even against the Soviet State if necessary, as Lenin repeatedly asserted. In a word it is necessary to give the workers and poor peasants the clear feeling that they are the *masters in the country*, and that the state and the progress of the economy are in direct correspondence with their own interests.

We do not at all conceal that such a policy will encounter very great obstacles in your country and even in your own ranks. A complete reeducation of your cadres in the spirit of genuine Leninism would be necessary. Still less do we conceal that world imperialism and the present leadership of the Russian State would furiously attack your policy, for it would appear to them a mortal threat to their acquired positions. But if you will apply the same Leninist principles in your foreign policy, you can be sure of powerful support from the workers and the oppressed of the entire world, and your cause cannot lose.

You would have to make a sharp break with all the practices of traditional secret diplomacy and return to the revolutionary diplomacy practiced in the time of Lenin; you would have to become the champion and active supporter of all colonial peoples revolting against their imperialist masters; you would have to proclaim to the world the conditions for a just peace, without annexations or reparations; you would have to demand the immediate withdrawal of the occupation troops of all the great powers from all occupied countries, and strict application of the right of self-determination of peoples in all disputed questions. With one blow you will gain the sympathy of the Austrian and German masses who today feel themselves deceived and betrayed by all parties. You would have to develop and sharpen your propaganda in favor of the Danubian Federation by giving it its classical communist form and by launching the slogan for the *Balkan Federation of Soviet Socialist Republics* among the workers and poor peasants of neighboring countries, who would take it up with enthusiasm. And finally it would be necessary to incorporate this propaganda within the concrete framework of propaganda for the SOCIALIST SOVIET UNITED STATES OF EUROPE; to convoke a conference at Belgrade of the trade-union and workers' representatives from all the countries of Europe, including Germany and Austria; to draw up with them a plan for the economic reconstruction of the continent on a socialist basis, in opposition to the Marshall Plan, and to make this socialist plan the central axis for revolutionary propaganda in Europe and in the world.

Our organization, the Fourth International, originated in the Left Opposition of the Bolshevik Party, which 25 years ago already saw the germs of the degeneration of the Russian Communist Party which you are discovering today. Hunted, persecuted, expelled, the Left Opposition fought nevertheless for

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physical and political existence of Tito. That is why the Yugoslav dictator backs up the so called "Third Force" and the neutral block; his activities are very intense in this field, and especially so among the Asiatic peoples. He holds up the beam (backs up) the labourist dissident Javan as well as the Indian chief Nehru, while his diplomatic mission to Tehran numbers not less than thirty persons. This neutral block does not deprive the Soviets of a single satellite, but tends to paralyze India and the whole Middle East, and to diminish the moral resistance of Great Britain, France, and Italy, and all that to the detriment of the United States.

On the other hand, Tito is the weakest of all the red dictators of the world. It is true that also the other red dictators have against them the overwhelming majority of their own peoples, but they have at least the valid support of their respective communist parties, which are the true masters of the "people's democracies." As for Tito, beside the implacable hatred of the people, he has against himself also the majority of the Yugoslav Commu-

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nists. In the field of international policies, the other red dictators fear the West, but they can count on the complete support of Stalin. Tito,

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Subject: Tito's True Face

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If the war breaks out before Stalin's death or before the conclusion of an accord between Tito and Moscow, he does not even think to defend himself. Actually, all his activities are dominated by prudent provisions which shall secure to himself and his faithfuls a safe and undisturbed retreat toward the Adriatic coast. To this end, magazines of food stuff, arms, and munitions, as well as fortifications on the Islands of Korčula, Vis, and Cherso (sic - Trarem.: May be it is Cres) are already prepared for Tito and his intimate friends; they intend to take refuge there, under the protection of the American fleet. There is no true line of defense against the aggressor, and even if there were one, in case of war, Tito could not find anybody ready to defend it. All the plans of his Staff are made only to delude (deceive) the Americans.

All the heavy armament given by the Americans to the Yugoslav dictator can be already considered as Soviet war booty. It is not only a question that Tito will not fight, but by backing him the Americans are neutralizing a

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We had been afraid of a pro-Stalin disturbance; instead, we had a peasant counterrevolutionary uprising. The Cazin Moslems are a world unto themselves: a warlike and fanatic people, living for centuries in a pocket between Austria and Turkey. During the Partisan war, after a period of vacillation, they finally allied themselves with the Partisans, although as a separate army. Obviously they had been alienated by forced collectivization, but they had no more reason to complain than anyone else. Yet, what was most curious and most unexpected was what incited them to rebel. Nothing in their religious or ethnic background disposed them toward the Serbian monarchy. Yet the rumor that King Peter II had been dropped by parachute somewhere in their region set them off.

It was at the beginning of winter at that same time, 1948–1949, that eleven or twelve pro-Soviet regional and town officials in Bijelo Polje, led by the Secretary of the Regional Committee, Ilija Bulatović, fled into the forest.

That is a taboo subject. No one has written anything about it except Antonije Isaković. His novel dealing with Goli Otok was denied publication two years ago, but recently I heard that it might be published. The subject is truly important in every respect. I cannot avoid it here, not only because of Tito's involvement, but also because of my own: Goli Otok has haunted me both intellectually and morally since my own break with the system, and my re-evaluation of it.

It was in the fall of 1948 that Tito made the decision to house the Cominformists at Goli Otok—without consulting the Central Committee, the Politburo, or the secretaries of

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the Central Committee, which is to say, Kardelj and Ranković and me. I heard of the decision while I was in Montenegro. Andro Mugoša, a member of the Montenegrin Central Committee, told me that an order had been received from Belgrade for the arrest of the Cominformists. They were to be shipped off to the camp at Goli Otok. Ranković must have known of the decision early, simply because his bureaucratic apparatus was needed and responsible for the implementation of the order. Presumably, the decision was made in great haste. When the arrests began, the camp was not ready—if indeed there had been any preparations at all.

I can only speculate as to why Tito skipped over the Central Committee and his closest long-time comrades. In the Central Committee he would not have met with any substantial opposition, yet perhaps he suspected a strong resistance (or hesitation) at the top. It was common knowledge that there were federal ministers, deputies, members of the republican Central Committees, favorably disposed toward the Soviet Union and the Cominform. By nature, Tito was not morbidly suspicious, but he was vigilant and cautious. Although the atmosphere was tense and poisoned by conspiratorial moods, we were continuously surprised to learn that this or that high official was wavering, that he was expressing support for the Cominform. Stalinists were soon discovered in every institution of national life. Slanderous and threatening pro-Soviet propaganda addled the brains of many. Suspicion wormed its way into the souls of all who felt responsible for the state and the Party.

At the onset of the troubles, Ranković said with great distress: "The worst thing is that you don't know who your enemy is! Yesterday's friend becomes today's enemy—the enemy in one's own house!" If Tito was more suspicious

than the others, it was because of his experience in the Soviet Union. There was, too, the weight of his responsibility. In 1951, Tito asked Ranković what was the matter with me, because I seemed anxious and depressed. Ranković told him that I had fallen in love with a comrade from the Central Committee, who was to become my second wife, Stefanija. Tito shrugged: "Oh, that. I thought it was something serious."

Perhaps Tito was led to make his sudden, solitary decision—this seems to me the most persuasive explanation—by reports about the rising tide of Stalinists in the Party committees and among the army officers. Although the most outspoken and most militant Stalinists had been arrested, the Cominformists appeared to be multiplying. The arrests of Sreten Zujović and Andrija Hebrang were not discussed in the Central Committee either. Tito made that decision on his own. I suppose it can be argued that it was an incomplete Central Committee. It was elected in 1940 at the Fifth Party Congress but its Plenum did not meet until March 1948, and then to answer the letter of Molotov and Stalin that criticized the Yugoslavs for deviation.

In the notes to his official *Collected Works*, Tito maintains that the Central Committee could not have met because of the circumstances of war. This is nonsense. The time was three years after the war! There had indeed been plenty of time for leisure and hunting. Couldn't the Central Committee have met during the war, just as the Partisan assembly known as AVNOJ had met? The truth is that the Central Committee met when Tito needed its legal support. He needed its support against Stalin and wanted a full forum. Prior to that, the Politburo had met irregularly, with coopted members. The attack by Stalin accelerated

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In retrospect, and with all the self-criticism of which I am capable, I must admit that we could not have avoided a concentration camp for the Cominformists. Our Party was in its literal sense Stalinist and it had a monopoly of power. Had it shown tolerance; had it allowed the legalization of opposition within the Party; had it compromised its defense against the aggressive pressure of the Soviet Union and the Communist Parties within the Eastern European bloc—had the Party allowed these, they might have led to the disintegration of the Party and to the ascendancy of pro-Soviet forces. It is the misfortune of dictatorial and particularly totalitarian powers that they cannot allow opposition without undermining their own survival. Besides, the pro-Soviet forces were more Stalinist than our own leadership. The ascent to power of those forces—and there could have been no doubt in anyone's mind about that—would have meant not only the removal of our present leadership

and bloody purges within the Party, but also the subjugation

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The arrests were already under way when a hastily drawn up law regarding the camp was pushed through the National Assembly. The wording was clumsy and naïve. But it was functional in the use of a term, "socially beneficial work," for which the security chiefs had a certain taste. Prison sentences meted out by the security forces usually amounted to two years, but the terms could be extended in the camp.

Evil and shame—evil beyond compare, unending shame—is what lay in store for the prisoners in the camp. Never mind the foul food, the mindless and exhausting labor in the quarry, the prisoners were subjected to torture, the cruelty of which was matched by its perversity. The security officers were given the task of reeducating the prisoners and were instructed to avoid using force. Tito even, in his speeches, boasted that we were reeducating the prisoners. The secret police recruited teams from the ranks of the penitent and organized them into "self-managing units"—that is exactly what they were called. These units then took over the task of reeducation, through violence.

The duality of Yugoslav Communism in that period—not to be as inhuman as Stalinism, but to achieve results not too dissimilar—was revealed by the camp. It was revealed in the most monstrous way. On boarding the boat to Goli Otok, prisoners were shoved head first into its hold, and, on landing, they were herded through a double row of security

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guards, who punched and kicked them. This practice, which is referred to in Isaković's novel as the "principle of the frightened rabbit," was frequently tested on the so-called incorrigibles. There were lynchings, too. Those who would not repent were subjected to humiliating abuse, which could only result from the dogmatic fury and the ingenuity of those who had reformed. Prisoners had their heads plunged into pails of human excrement. They were forced to wear placards that read "Traitor." They were required to confess publicly their nonpolitical sins. All of this was carefully planned.

It is not as if no one in Belgrade knew what was going on at Goli Otok. People had their suspicions. I, too, began to suspect from the public retractions of certain persons and from random bits of information. But not even Ranković, the head of the secret police, knew the worst. He returned from a visit to Goli Otok—it must have been in the summer of 1952—moved and delighted by the welcome he had received from the inmates, which is to say, the comrades who had seen the error of their ways. We must change our attitude toward them, he maintained. In September of 1953, I spent some time at the resort of Niška Banja with the writers Dobrica Ćosić and Oskar Davičo. We talked about the new, liberal trends that resistance to Stalin and the Soviet bloc had unleashed in our Communism. I heard that Ćosić, out of curiosity, had visited Goli Otok. He told me that the security service, the UDBA, had devised and applied corrective methods that were possibly the most diabolical in history. When I returned to Belgrade, I told Ranković what I had heard from Ćosić and arranged for Ćosić to report it directly to Ranković. Kardelj also attended the meeting. He shouted in anger: "I knew something vile was going on there!" Ranković ordered an in-

vestigation. The situation soon underwent improvement, but the camp was not closed.

Approximately fifteen thousand Party members and sympathizers passed through the camp. A substantial number served time simply because of having expressed pro-Soviet sentiments among friends. Some were entirely innocent. There were also quite a few activists who spread propaganda and tried to organize the overthrow of the regime. The inmates were not provided with the protection of the law; nor were they allowed visits from their families. The camp was, in fact, a source of information for further arrests; to betray an ally still at large was the best way to demonstrate one's own rehabilitation and repentance.

If we take into consideration the fact that among army officers there was a substantial number of Cominformists, seven thousand, I believe, the possible danger to the system was not negligible. But vigilance was carried too far. Very few, if any, returned from Goli Otok unscathed. Not so much physically, perhaps, as psychologically and intellectually. Many were bitter, depressed, shattered. Even wise and well-intended ideological reeducation—let alone the forced methods of Goli Otok—leads inevitably to aberration and tragedy if it goes on without public control. Public control is the only control.

Although I was not involved directly in the organization and management of the camp, my ideological activity was not to be ignored. The sharpness and depth of my criticism of Stalin and the Soviet system contributed to the sufferings of the inmates. My positions were taken as official and prescribed. Those who were believed to harbor doubt were forced into self-criticism—in what ways, and with what results, one can only imagine. But doubt arose in me, too. At the end of 1949, when I returned from the United Nations

their revolutionary illusions allow the revolution to devour them are not real revolutionaries.

In the state that Josip Broz Tito created and which created him, the absence of public notice, of public information and discussion, at least within the ruling Party, led to the crisis with the Cominformists. It led to all kinds of excesses and aberrations. The ban on freedom of information is the source of evil in Communist regimes, and in Tito's and Yugoslavia's. This evil permeates society, seeps into its pores, prevents organic development, impels dictatorial authority to terror and violence.

If only there had been freedom of information, if only it had been possible to debate openly . . . But that would have been a different Yugoslavia, a third Yugoslavia, of which, for the time being, we can only dream. There would have been no camp at Goli Otok. Even if there had been a camp, if the will of the leader and the intractable secret police had not dominated the Party, the regime in that camp would not have been such a monstrous combination of two right-minded groups, the security officials and the reeducated.

If only, if only . . . If only we had done things differently, so many problems would have been avoided. For example, deep down, Kardelj was opposed to collectivization, although he had delivered a report in favor of the collectives at the Central Committee Plenum in 1949. For many years there would have been no forced selling. Kidrič, the chief economist, finally called forced selling a form of robbery. Yet that was not its most sinister aspect. I remember Kidrič announcing at a Politburo meeting that sixty-five thousand freight cars of wheat had to be bought on a forced basis. While Ranković was noting down the figure, he groaned: "Twelve thousand arrested!" These peasants were

session in New York, I had already begun to think heretical thoughts.

While at the United Nations I observed that the official West viewed the persecution of the Cominformists with understanding, but not without malice. Of course there were humanitarian protests as well. At the meeting during which I reported to Tito on the activity of our delegation to the United Nations, I urged that some thought be given to dissolving the camp, that those who were guilty should be, instead, handed over to the courts. Kardelj was the first to oppose my recommendations. "We need the camp now desperately!" If I remember correctly, Ranković remarked that it would not be so easy to settle accounts with the Cominformists through normal procedures. Tito was silent, reflective, then he dismissed my proposal, probably on the ground that it was premature. And so we reacted in the typical fashion of politicians who are above public control—in pursuit of political goals, arbitrarily and without overriding concern for human conditions, human suffering.

At the plenary meeting of the Central Committee on April 12, 1948, which was the first such meeting since the election of the Central Committee in 1940, and the one at which the reply to the condemnation from Molotov and Stalin was drafted, Tito shouted out: "Our revolution is honest! Our revolution does not eat its children!" This statement, however encouraging to himself and others, was not true at that time. Through its resistance, the Yugoslav revolution was beginning to repay a debt to its Leninist and Stalinist components—to eat its children who continued to be faithful to old faiths. The arrests and the camp for Cominformists confirm this unbearable cruelty. Yes, that's the way it is: the revolution that does not eat its children is not a real revolution, just as the children who because of

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released after two or three months, but what an atmosphere those arrests and the accompanying brutality created! What despair and misery!

Despite his earlier assertion that the Yugoslav revolution was not devouring its children, Tito embarked on a most ruthless wholesale Stalinization of the same cadres that he had earlier Stalinized. Mass conversions to Titoism were carried out from above, by a variety of manipulative Stalinist methods, including administrative persuasion, intimidation, expulsions, purges, incarceration, concentration camps, and torture. Between 1948 and 1952, Tito expelled almost 200,000 Communists, of whom 30,000 were imprisoned and several thousand killed.

Those who were expelled represented 50 percent of the total strength of the CPY and 75 percent of the leading cadres. The Stalinists alleged that the true Marxist-Leninist CPY was liquidated. From its remnants, the so-called Communist League of Yugoslavia was formed. Its principal aim was to secure personal power for Tito and his clique by means of ruthless counterrevolutionary terror and suppression of all Yugoslav Communists with an internationalist outlook. Tito then opened the party to everyone. Abjectly docile, these instant Titoists, as a sign of gratitude for their miraculously improved status, were only too willing to sing Tito's praises.

The most traumatic effect of the crisis was the victimization of the imprisoned Communist opposition. Most were sent to concentration camps on the Naked Island. A miniature replica of Stalin's Siberian camps, Tito's own Gulag was euphemistically known as a correction center for "socially beneficial work."¹⁷ The worst Stalinist sinners were shipped off first, in great haste and without any technical and engineering preparations, to build the camps themselves and to welcome its steadily growing population.

The camps were said to be reeducation centers, where self-punishment became the norm. In the development of the system, Titoist security men were assisted by Gestapo experts still in Yugoslav captivity and by those collaborators of the Nazis and the Ustasha who were serving time for crimes committed in enemy concentration camps during the war. They were reinforced by some common criminals who were instructed to pose as "Cominformists" in order to create divisions among the inmates and to act as provocateurs.

In an unpublished article given to me by Dr. Sava Bosnitch, one of Canada's foremost experts on Yugoslavia, I have learned that the prisoners were exposed to horrendous physical and psychological torture. Special efforts were made to remind the inmates that they were outside the rule of any law apart from their keeper's fiat. Investigators and prosecutors kept the inmates in a constant state of fear, and eventually drove them into a state of mental anxiety. Subject to refined methods of torture, the inmates were forced into implicating and denouncing their next of kin. Thousands of innocents were herded into camps this way; and they, in turn, accused more of their party comrades. Countless

inmates confessed to having worked for six or seven foreign intelligence agencies.

The ideological reeducation of the Stalinists required that they read so-called imperialist publications denouncing the USSR and the Comintern movement. Some prisoners who resisted conversion were executed. The inmates' families were also targeted. Wives of inmates were ordered to divorce their husbands; other wives, out of loneliness, naively allowed themselves to be seduced by secret policemen. Many such women were forced to work as domestic servants; they were evicted from their apartments and frequently compelled by circumstances to become prostitutes. The horrendous reeducation process continued for many years.

Of course, Tito ultimately triumphed over his ideological enemies. The Yugoslav cadres could never develop any significant ideological muscle. The transformation of the former Stalinist ideology of the party into an official Titoist creed affected an entire generation of Yugoslav Communists. The struggle left indelible mental scars on both the victors and the vanquished. The Yugoslav party's conversion was the first major Marxist-Leninist ideological crisis to be precipitated by a dispute between two Communist states sharing the same ideology.

At the beginning of the crisis, the Soviet Union and its satellites had imposed an economic boycott on Yugoslavia. With the breakdown of industry and agriculture, the Yugoslavs were desperate for goods. The West welcomed this rift, just as it was to welcome the rift between Communist China and the USSR. The Americans released millions of dollars worth of gold deposited in the United States by the former Yugoslav government. Washington sent a military mission, and it sponsored loans through the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Italy and Yugoslavia settled their differences over Trieste, and Italy became Yugoslavia's strongest trading partner. One incisive biographer of Tito, Nora Beloff, says, "The Yugoslavs were astonished at the credulity of the Americans and admit today that they published fictitious data to obtain more aid."¹⁸ Tito stood on a precipice. He could become a vassal of the West, or he could continue his one-party rule and consolidate his power. Tito chose the latter.

Stalin died in 1953, and the new leadership wanted to make its peace with Yugoslavia. Tito cautiously sent an ambassador and began trade negotiations, but did nothing that would jeopardize his new relationship with the West. In May 1955, Nikita Khrushchev visited Tito and apologized for the Soviet's past treatment of Yugoslavia. Khrushchev and Tito signed the Joint Declaration of Friendship and Cooperation, which stressed their two countries' separation of powers. Yugoslavia had won its right of independence.

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MIRON REZUN

ABOUT ME



MIRON REZUN
CANADA

I trained as a paratrooper in an elite airborne unit before

earning a doctorate in International Relations from the University of Geneva. I worked as a war correspondent for international wire services in Switzerland, reporting from Afghanistan, Lebanon, Iran and the Balkans. I met and interacted with agents of all kinds. I researched the

About the author (2008)

Miron Rezun trained and fought as a paratrooper and later worked as foreign correspondent before he earned a doctorate in International Relations from the University of Geneva in Switzerland. He teaches Globalization, the Economics of Transition and Chinese Studies.



(Europe and War in the Balkans, Miron Rezun, Chapter: The Legacy of Tito, p. 102)

<http://mironrezun.blogspot.com/> https://books.google.ca/books/about/In_China_s_Shadow.html?id=-gJVLAAACAAJ&source=kp_author_description&redir_esc=y

Resolutions of the Communist Information Bureau Condemning Titoite Revisionism

Resolution of the Information Bureau Concerning the Situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia

June 1948



During the second half of June, a meeting of the Information Bureau was held in Romania. The meeting was attended by the following representatives:

Bulgarian Workers' Party (Communists), Comrades T. Kostov, B. Chervenkov; Romanian Workers' Party, Comrades G. Georgiu Dej, V. Luca, A. Pauker; Hungarian Workers' Party, Comrades M. Rakosi, M. Farcas, A. Gero; Polish Workers' Party, Comrades J. Berman, A. Zavadski; Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), Comrades A. Zhdanov, G. Malenkov, M. Suslov; Communist Party of France, Comrades J. Dados, E. Fajon; Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Comrades R. Slansky, V. Siroky, B. Geminder, G. Bares; Communist Party of Italy, Comrades P. Togliatti, P. Secchia.

The Information Bureau discussed the situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and unanimously adopted a resolution on this question.

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The Information Bureau regards as disgraceful such actions as the expulsion from the Party and the arrest of the Central Committee members, Comrades Djuiovic and Hebrang because they dared to criticize the anti-Soviet attitude of the leaders of the Yugoslav Communist Party, and called for friendship between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union.

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Unable to face the criticism of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) and the Central Committees of the other fraternal Parties, the Yugoslav leaders took the path of outrightly deceiving their Party and people by concealing from the Yugoslav Communist Party the criticism of the Central Committee's incorrect policy and also by concealing from the Party and the people the real reasons for the brutal measures against Comrades Djuiovic and Hebrang.

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5. The Information Bureau considers that the bureaucratic regime created inside the Party by its leaders is disastrous for the life and development of the Yugoslav Communist Party. There is no inner Party democracy, no elections, and no criticism and self-criticism in the Party. Despite the unfounded assurances of Comrades Tito and Kardelj, the majority of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia is composed of co-opted, and not of elected members. The Communist Party is actually in a position of semi-legality. Party meetings are either not held at all, or meet in secret -- a fact which can only undermine the influence of the Party among the masses. This type of organization of the Yugoslav Communist Party cannot be described as anything but a sectarian-bureaucratic organization. It leads to the liquidation of the Party as an active, self-acting organism, it cultivates military methods of leadership in the Party similar to the methods advocated in his day by Trotsky.

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Recently, even after the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) and fraternal parties had criticized the mistakes of the Yugoslav leaders, the latter tried to bring in a number of new leftist laws. They hastily decreed the nationalization of medium industry and trade, though the basis for this is completely unprepared. In view of such haste the new decision only hampers the supply of goods to the population. In a similar hurried manner they brought in a new grain tax for which the way is also not prepared and which can, therefore, only dislocate grain supplies to the urban population. Finally, only recently the Yugoslav leaders in loud declarations declared their love for, and devotion to, the Soviet Union, although it is known that in practice they are pursuing an unfriendly policy toward the Soviet Union.

Communist Party of Yugoslavia in the Power of Murderers and Spies

November 1949

The Information Bureau, consisting of representatives of the Communist Party of Bulgaria, Rumanian Workers' Party, Working People's Party of Hungary, United Workers' Party of Poland, Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), Communist Party of France, and the Czechoslovak and Italian Communist Parties, having considered the question: "The Yugoslav Communist Party in the power of murderers and spies", unanimously reached the following conclusions:

Whereas, in June 1948 the meeting of the Information Bureau of the Communist Parties noted the change-over of the Tito-Rankovic clique from democracy and socialism to bourgeois nationalism, during the period that has elapsed since the meeting of the Information Bureau, this clique has travelled all the way from bourgeois nationalism to fascism and outright betrayal of the national interests of Yugoslavia.

Recent events show that the Yugoslav Government is completely dependent on foreign imperialist circles and has become an instrument of their aggressive policy, which has resulted in the liquidation of the independence of the Yugoslav Republic.

The Central Committee of the Party and the Government of Yugoslavia have merged completely with the imperialist circles against the entire camp of socialism and democracy; against the Communist Parties of the world; against the New Democracies and the U.S.S.R.

The Belgrade clique of hired spies and murderers made a flagrant deal with imperialist reaction and entered its service, as the Budapest trial of Rajk-Brankov made perfectly clear.

This trial showed that the present Yugoslav rulers, having fled from the camp of democracy and socialism to the camp of capitalism and reaction, have become direct accomplices of the instigators of a new war, and, by their treacherous deeds, are ingratiating themselves with the imperialists and kow-towing to them.

The change-over of the Tito clique to fascism was not fortuitous. It was effected on the order of their masters, the Anglo-American imperialists, whose mercenaries, it is now clear, this clique has been for long.

The Yugoslav traitors, obeying the will of the imperialists, undertook to form in the People's Democracies political gangs consisting of reactionaries, nationalists, clerical and fascist elements and, relying on these gangs, to bring about counter-revolutionary coups in these countries, wrest them from the Soviet Union and the entire socialist camp and subordinate them to the forces of imperialism.

The Tito clique transformed Belgrade into an American center for espionage and anti-Communist propaganda.

When all genuine friends of peace, democracy and socialism see in the U.S.S.R. a powerful fortress of Socialism, a faithful and steadfast defender of the freedom and independence of nations and the principal bulwark of peace, the Tito-Rankovic clique, having attained power under the mask of friendship with the U.S.S.R., began on the orders of the Anglo-American imperialists, a campaign of slander and provocation against the Soviet Union, utilizing the most vile calumnies borrowed from the arsenal of Hitler.

The transformation of the Tito-Rankovic clique into a direct agency of imperialism, and accomplices of the war-mongers, culminated in the lining up of the Yugoslav Government with the imperialist bloc at U.N.O., where the Kardeljs, Djilas and Beblers, joined in a united front with American reactionaries on vital matters of international policy.

In the sphere of home policy, the chief outcome of the activity of the traitor Tito-Rankovic clique is the actual liquidation of the People's Democratic system in Yugoslavia.

Due to the counter-revolutionary policy of the Tito-Rankovic clique which usurped power in the Party and in the State, an anti-Communist police State -- fascist type regime -- has been installed in Yugoslavia.

The social basis of this regime consists of kulaks in the countryside and capitalist elements in the towns.

In fact power in Yugoslavia is in the hands of anti-popular, reactionary elements. Active members of the old bourgeois parties, kulaks and other enemies of People's Democracy, are active in central and local government bodies.

The top fascist rulers rely on an enormously swollen military-police apparatus, with the aid of which they oppress the peoples of Yugoslavia.

They have turned the country into a military camp, wiped out all democratic rights of the working people, and trampled on any free expression of opinion.

The Yugoslav rulers demagogically and insolently deceive the people, alleging they are building socialism in Yugoslavia.

But it is clear to every Marxist that there can be no talk of building socialism in Yugoslavia when the Tito clique has broken with the Soviet Union, with the entire camp of socialism and democracy, thereby depriving Yugoslavia of the main bulwark for building socialism and when it has subordinated the country economically and politically to Anglo-American imperialists.

The State sector in the economy of Yugoslavia has ceased to be people's property, since State power is in the hands of enemies of the people.

The Tito-Rankovic clique has created wide possibilities for the penetration of foreign capital into the economy of the country, and has placed the economy under the control of capitalist monopolies.

Anglo-American industrial-financial circles investing their capital in Yugoslav economy, are transforming Yugoslavia into an agrarian-raw materials adjunct of foreign capital.

The ever growing slavish dependence of Yugoslavia on imperialism leads to intensified exploitation of the working class and to a severe worsening of its conditions.

The policy of the Yugoslav rulers in the countryside bears a kulak-capitalistic character.

The compulsory pseudo co-operatives in the country-side are in the hands of the kulaks and their agencies and represent an instrument for the exploitation of wide masses of working peasants.

The Yugoslav hirelings of imperialism, having seized leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, unloosed a campaign of terror against genuine Communists loyal to the principles of Marxism and Leninism and who fight for Yugoslavia's independence from the imperialists.

Thousands of Yugoslav patriots, devoted to Communism, have been expelled from the Party and incarcerated in jails and concentration camps. Many have been tortured and killed in prison or, as was the case with the well-known Communist, Arso Jovanovic, were dastardly assassinated.

The brutality with which staunch fighters for Communism are being annihilated in Yugoslavia, can be compared only with the atrocities of the Hitler fascists or the butcher Tsaldaris in Greece or Franco in Spain.

Expelling from the ranks of the Party those Communists loyal to proletarian internationalism, annihilating them, the Yugoslav fascists opened wide the doors of the Party to bourgeois and kulak elements.

As a result of the fascist terror of the Tito gangs against the healthy forces in the Yugoslav Communist Party, leadership of the Party is wholly in the hands of spies and murderers, mercenaries of imperialism.

The Communist Party of Yugoslavia has been seized by counter-revolutionary forces, acting arbitrarily in the name of the Party. Recruiting spies and provocateurs in the ranks of the working class parties, is, as is well-known, an old method of the bourgeoisie.

In this way the imperialists seek to undermine the Parties from within and subordinate them to themselves. They have succeeded in realizing this aim in Yugoslavia.

The fascist ideology, and fascist domestic policy, as well as the perfidious foreign policy of the Tito clique, completely subordinated to the foreign imperialist circles, have created a gulf between the espionage fascist Tito-Rankovic clique and the vital interests of the freedom-loving peoples of Yugoslavia.

Consequently, the anti-popular and treacherous activity of the Tito clique is encountering ever-growing resistance from those Communists who have remained loyal to Marxism-Leninism, and among the working class and working peasantry of Yugoslavia.

On the basis of irrefutable facts testifying to the complete change-over of the Tito clique to fascism and its desertion to the camp of world imperialism, the Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers' Parties considers that:

1. The espionage group of Tito, Rankovic Kardelj, Djilas, Gosnjak, Maslaric, Bebler, Mrazovic, Vukmanovic, Koca Popovic, Kidric, Neskovic, Zlatic, Velebit, Kolishevski and others, are enemies of the working class and peasantry and enemies of the peoples of Yugoslavia.

2. This espionage group expresses not the will of the peoples of Yugoslavia but the will of the Anglo-

American imperialists, and has therefore betrayed the interests of the country and abolished the political sovereignty and economic independence of Yugoslavia.

3. The "Communist Party of Yugoslavia", as at present constituted, being in the hands of enemies of the people, murderers and spies, has forfeited the right to be called a Communist Party and is merely an apparatus for carrying out the espionage assignments of the clique of Tito-Kardelj-Rankovic-Djilas.

The Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers' Parties considers therefore, that the struggle against the Tito clique, hired spies and murderers, is the international duty of all Communist and Workers' Parties.

It is the duty of Communist and Workers' Parties to give all possible aid to the Yugoslav working class and working peasantry who are fighting for the return of Yugoslavia to the camp of democracy and socialism.

A necessary condition for the return of Yugoslavia to the socialist camp is active struggle on the part of revolutionary elements both inside the Yugoslav Communist Party and outside its ranks, for the regeneration of the revolutionary, genuine Communist Party of Yugoslavia, loyal to Marxism-Leninism, to the principles of proletarian internationalism, and fighting for the independence of Yugoslavia from imperialism.

The loyal Communist forces in Yugoslavia, who in the present brutal conditions of fascist terror, are deprived of the possibility of engaging in open action against the Tito-Rankovic clique, were compelled in the struggle for the cause of Communism, to follow the path taken by the Communists in those countries where legal work is forbidden.

The Information Bureau expresses the firm conviction that, among the workers and peasants of Yugoslavia, forces will be found capable of ensuring victory over the bourgeois-restoration espionage Tito-Rankovic clique; that the toiling people of Yugoslavia led by the working class will succeed in restoring the historical gains of People's Democracy, won at the price of heavy sacrifice and heroic struggle by the peoples of Yugoslavia and that they will take the road of building socialism.

The Information Bureau considers one of the most important tasks of the Communist and Workers' Parties to be an all-round heightening of revolutionary vigilance in Party ranks, exposing and rooting out bourgeois-nationalist elements and agents of imperialism, no matter under what flag they conceal themselves.

The Information Bureau recognizes the need for more ideological work in the Communist and Workers' Parties; more work to train Communists in the spirit of loyalty to proletarian internationalism, irreconcilability to any departure from the principles of Marxism-Leninism, and in the spirit of loyalty to People's Democracy and Socialism. End.

(Resolutions of the Communist Information Bureau Condemning Titoite Revisionism: Resolution of the Information Bureau Concerning the Situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, June 1948, MIA) <https://www.marxists.org/history/erol/ncm-1/workers-advocate/7-6.html> (Communist Party of Yugoslavia in the Power of Murderers and Spies, Cominform, November 1949. MIA. The same document can be found in the 'Revolutionary Democracy Organization of India' archives section) <https://www.marxists.org/history/erol/ncm-1/workers-advocate/7-6.html>

COMMUNIST PARTY OF YUGOSLAVIA IN THE POWER OF MURDERERS & SPIES

The Information Bureau, consisting of representatives of the Communist Party of Bulgaria, Rumanian Workers' Party, Working People's Party of Hungary, United Workers' Party of Poland, Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), Communist Party of France, and the Czechoslovak and Italian Communist Parties, having considered the question: "The Yugoslav Communist Party in the power of murderers and spies", unanimously reached the following conclusions:

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F. Maintenance

The responsibility of the Yugoslav secretariats for internal affairs (Figure 6). The League of Communists of Yugoslavia... Like Albania, Bulgaria in 1957 began again to disseminate propaganda with irredentist overtones...




FIGURE 6. Structure of Intelligence Services

organization which is capable of committing acts of terrorism both within and outside their homeland. Some organizations publish newspapers and propagandize other emigres by radio. Money is plentiful, with contributions coming from outside Yugoslavia. Rich emigre businessmen apparently are willing to donate large amounts.

Yugoslav authorities have been effective in combating subversion. Although the effectiveness of the secret police has been somewhat undermined by the purges and reorganizations since July 1966, it is able to cope with emigre activities. The regime is sensitive to the efforts of the emigres, and both the military and civilian intelligence services are targeted toward them.

Other factors undermining the emigres' efforts at subversion include the grudging respect Tito has earned since 1948, the support given his regime by the U.S. and U.K. Governments since 1949, and the regime's success in raising the standard of living of the Yugoslav people.

There appears to be high correlation between economic hardships and the incidence of domestic subversion. There was a rash of expensive industrial fires in Slovenia and Croatia in 1967, one of the leanest years during the economic reform. More recently, the Croatian emigres took advantage of the relaxed political climate in Yugoslavia in 1970 and 1971 to flood Croatia with separatist propaganda.

Came under the influence of a quasi-fascist movement which emerged as a result of the revolutionary Brotherhood and Australian-based emigre organizations. The main goal is to carry out subversive activities in Yugoslavia and to carry out sabotage.

Organization which is active in the West and has members of the Yugoslav Communist Party. One of the main goals is to carry out subversive activities in Yugoslavia and to carry out sabotage.

Responsible for the Yugoslav consulates and the embassy in Belgrade. In the United States, it is responsible for the Yugoslav consulates and the embassy in Washington, D.C.

Character of the organization is to carry out subversive activities in Yugoslavia and to carry out sabotage.

Yugoslavia

April 1973

Albanian nationalism. Concentrated in Kosovo, the Albanians in Yugoslavia were repressed by the Serbian-dominated Yugoslav secret police, under Rankovic's command, with considerable brutality. The improvement in the status of Albanians after Rankovic's fall however, has not fully met their demands. Moreover, the Albanians' demands have stirred resentment among many Serbs, who retain a romantic attachment to Kosovo as the center of the medieval Serbian empire.

Like Albania, Bulgaria in 1957 began again to disseminate propaganda with irredentist overtones—in this case pressing its claims to Macedonia. This propaganda increased to such a point that in October 1957 Belgrade officially protested Bulgaria's "open and rude interference" in Yugoslavia's internal affairs and "hostile actions against the integrity of Yugoslavia and the unity of its people."

There is little concrete evidence that the U.S.S.R. is conducting subversive activities against Yugoslavia. After the worsening of relations with the Soviet Union in the wake of the invasion of Czechoslovakia, however, the Tito regime became apprehensive about such a possibility. Many Yugoslavs believe that the Soviets are behind the Bulgarian irredentist press campaign. Protests in the Yugoslav press in January 1969 about antiregime, nationalist propaganda from abroad directed at the Hungarian minority in Vojvodina revealed the Yugoslav concern that the U.S.S.R. might play on the nationality problem to bring pressure on Tito to moderate his domestic reforms and end opposition to Soviet policy in Eastern Europe. In December 1971 there were unconfirmed reports of Soviet meddling in the Croatian crisis.

25X1

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET - U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY

COUNTRY	Albania	REPORT	
SUBJECT	1. Yugoslav-Albanian Relations	DATE DISTR.	3 January 1955
	2. Yugoslav Attitude vis-a-vis the Soviet Union	NO. OF PAGES	#
	3. League of Albanian Refugees (Prizren Committee)	REQUIREMENT NO.	RD
DATE OF INFO.		REFERENCES	
PLACE ACQUIRED			

This is UNEVALUATED Information

THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
 THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
 (FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)

1. Since the 1948 break between Tito and the Cominform, there have been no diplomatic relations between the Albanian and Yugoslav governments. Albania has been the most arrogant of the Satellites in her attitude toward Yugoslavia. 25X1
2. The first sign of change in this political posture was when the Albanian government invited the Yugoslav government to discuss certain problems concerning their common frontier. General Dushan Mugosha has said that it was very difficult to discuss anything with the Albanian officer delegates, but they did reach an agreement. 25X1
3. Since the new Albanian Ambassador has arrived at Belgrade, there have been some policy changes. Postal and telephone traffic has been re-opened between the two countries. Some Albanian political refugees have been able to telephone their relatives in Albania. Mehmet Shehu returned a polite answer to the Yugoslav protest on the recent killing of a Yugoslav soldier on the frontier, and offered to pay compensation. The old Yugoslav Legation building in Tirana had been badly damaged by the Albanians. They have now presented the Yugoslavs with a new building.
4. Eighty percent of the Albanians in the Kosmet area do not like the Yugoslav regime. They are not Cominform Communists. They live in the hope of reunion with Albania. Western propaganda in the Albanian language is listened to by the refugees. If you wander around Kosmet, you will find this as the general attitude among the Albanians: "Oh, these Serbs; they have never liked us and never will. They want to put out our eyes." Even Hoxha turned around after 1948 and demanded Kosmet as a vital interest of Albania.



www.cia.gov

1. YUGOSLAV-ALBANIAN RELATIONS 2. YUGOSLAV ATTITUDE VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIET UNION 3. LEAGUE OF...



Approved For Release 2007/11/01 : CIA-RDP80-00810A005600130002-7

SECRET - U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY

- 2 -

5. Yugoslav clandestine activities against Albanians have continued, at any rate until recently. Cedo Mijovic, Kapllan, (fnu) and Viado Popovic, who is a major in the UDB, are among the chief recruiters of Albanian agents who are sent into Albania. General Dushan Mugesha (member of the Communist Party, Serbia, Deputy in the Federal Parliament, and director of all immigrants) does not appear as one of the recruiters, although he directs these activities. He certainly wants to overthrow the present Tirana regime and substitute one under Yugoslav influence. But Mugesha has said that they must wait for the opportune moment.

6. The Yugoslav Government seeks, in a quiet way, a closer relationship with the National Committee for a Free Albania - NCFB, and with the Albanian emigrants in the West, in an effort to gain greater influence in this refugee community. The Yugoslav Government does not see the West as a trusted friend, with whom it can cooperate closely, and it fears the type of government the Anglo-Americans might introduce into Albania.

7. All Albanian political emigrants in Yugoslavia believed they were going to be sent back to Albania after the exchange of embassies. Mugesha issued a declaration that they would never do this, regardless of relations with Albania, and drew attention to Tito's declarations on the subject of normalization.

Yugoslavia - Soviet Union

8. After 1948, Moscow thought that Yugoslavia could not survive political isolation and continued to work for revolution on the borders of Albania and Bulgaria. Now their policy has changed (e.g. their instructions to Satellites were to ask for resumption of diplomatic relations) and they appear to be trying to win back Yugoslavia. The fierce tension reflected on the radio and in the press has relaxed with the resumption of diplomatic relations.

9. The Yugoslav Government took strong measures against those who, after the break in 1948, still clung to a Moscow policy as the result of their political education. Only a few officers of importance were imprisoned, but many people were put into newly created internment camps.

10. Now there is more of a Western influence in Yugoslavia. Daily, you can hear people in various walks of life, speaking in favor of the West. The government has created a strong atmosphere of feeling against the Soviet Union. They even go back to the history of the war and say that the Soviet Union worked against the interests of Yugoslavia.

11. An Albanian political officer of some standing who fell into Yugoslav hands in 1952, was worked over for months by many Yugoslav officials to turn him against Moscow, eventually with success. He was induced to broadcast propaganda to Albania against Moscow policies.

12. This officer has had constant dealings with General Mugesha and other figures, and has spoken to people like Flika, of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Communist Party and a leading official of the Macedonian Communist Party. They all have tried to convince him to abandon Moscow ideas forever. None has ever given him any indication of wanting to return to Moscow.

13. The above officer also attended meetings of the Yugoslav Communist Party. At these meetings they discussed domestic problems only, but he found the atmosphere quite different from that in Albania. In Yugoslavia people don't

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- 3 -

look at a person with fear or dislike and say, "he is an official, or a member." Party units meet only once a month and talks are few and confined to special occasions. The authorities also do not weary the people with constant political education. When the officer expressed surprise, Mugesha said, "We do not want to tire the people." 25X1

14. The Balkan Alliance has been well received as a diplomatic triumph for Tito, and the people see in it a sign of good will among the Balkan nations. The authorities have said that for Albania the Alliance is a defense against Italian aims in Albania, if any.

15.

Prizren Committee

16. The role of the Prizren Committee is a political one. They have no independence of decision or action and are a front for Yugoslav activities.

25X1

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INFORMATION REPORT

CD NO.

DATE DISTR 24 JUL 50

NO. OF PAGES 1

COUNTRY Yugoslavia

SUBJECT The Concentration Camp Near Zrenjanin, Serbia

25X1

NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW)

CONFIDENTIAL


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SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

25X1

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25X1



1. The concentration camp at Zrenjanin was established during World War II by the Nazis and later taken over by the UDB. Its capacity is not known, although between February and November 1949, there were approximately 800 persons incarcerated there. At present, the camp is used to hold refugees from Hungary and Rumania. The commandant of the camp is UDB Captain Joseph Tubic, who speaks Hungarian.
2. The buildings in which the prisoners are kept are two storeys high, measure twenty-six by eight meters, and are equipped with large wooden shelves arranged in tiers, which serve as bunks. Outside these barracks are concrete bunkers, two and one-half meters deep and two and one-half meters long, inside which are wells in which prisoners sentenced to solitary confinement are kept in a crouching position. The entire camp is surrounded by a barbed wire fence and guarded by troops of the UDB. New arrivals are told by Tubic that the camp is the end of their journey; that anyone who breaks the rules will be shot.
3. Treatment of the prisoners is very harsh; the daily food ration consists of tea, 400 grams of bread, and thin soup. Neither fuel nor blankets are issued during the winter months. The most minor infractions of the camp rules are punished by ten days' confinement in the bunkers. There is considerable corruption among the UDB guards who, in exchange for personal possessions, will obtain some food, mostly vegetables, for the prisoners.
4. Artisans among the prisoners work at their trades in Zrenjanin and surrounding towns; the remainder are forced to work on nearby state collective farms, under the supervision of UDB sub-lieutenant Djuro Grabic.
5. At various times during 1949, but especially in March, April, and July, an unspecified number of prisoners was taken to the border and forced back into Hungary and Rumania. During December 1949 and January 1950, an unspecified number of prisoners was sent to Dobroveni in Macedonia, where they were forced to work on a project to widen the Cerna Reka River.

(THE CONCENTRATION CAMP NEAR ZRENJANIN, SERBIA', CIA, July 24, 1950, p. 1) <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP82-00457R005300420012-8.pdf>

TOP SECRET
10 October 1951
CIA No. 49885
Copy No. 143

DAILY DIGEST

Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DAILY DIGEST 5/22

Comment: Minister of Interior Rankovic stated in June that since the Cominform break in 1948, 8,403 Cominformists had been arrested. Tito's figure of 98 spy centers in the Cominform countries represents a considerably larger number than previously estimated. Early this year the Yugoslav radio stated that over 20 "centers for sabotage" were located in the Satellite countries on Yugoslavia's periphery. While over 90 Cominform subversive camps have been reported to exist in the neighboring satellites, fairly reliable information is held on less than 20 of them.

(Daily Digest, CIA, October 10, 1951, p. 4) <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79T01146A000400330001-2.pdf>

DEVA, X-HAVER, 0068.pdf

1 / 14 - 160% +

SECRET

OPERATIONAL AND SOURCE COVER SHEET

FROM: ITALY REPORT NO. 007 11110

REPORT MADE BY: [redacted] NO. PAGES: 13

REPORT APPROVED BY: [redacted] NO. ENCLOSURES: 1

DATE OF REPORT: 15 March 1955 REFERENCES:

DISTRIBUTION: Wash DC 1/enc1
By copy to: [redacted] (Info. [redacted])

Source Files: [redacted]

SOURCE CRYPTONYM: [redacted] ID NO. [redacted] IG NO. [redacted]

SOURCE, OPERATIONAL DATA AND COMMENTS: [redacted] YES NO

[redacted] KRYPTON: YES NO

1. There is forwarded herewith a report on Xhafer DEVA, leader of the 2nd League of Prisoners, prepared by [redacted] at the request of [redacted]. A photograph of DEVA is also attached.

From: [redacted] B-3
Date Recd: 10 March 1955
Date Logd: 11 March 1955

DEVA, X-HAVER, 0068.pdf

14 / 14 - 167% +

(1) Nexhip MUSA:

This person is the former body-guard of Xhafer D. DEVA in Albanian Kossovarian. He is responsible for the death of an Albanian in the camp of JESAVICE (Yugoslavia) called Sulejman BEGEJA, killed on the 4 July 1952, and many tortures against Albanians, Hungarians, Rumanians, and Bulgarians living in the camp. He was commander of this camp and had formed his own team composed by former communist policemen of Albania, who had been caught by the Yugoslavs as diversionists of Tirana, for crimes and attempts among the Albanian emigration. The persons on this team were: Han-Raxh HASANI from Luma and Ali MICI from Has. In Yugoslavia, they tortured the following Albanians: Zef VILLA; Mehmed SPAHIU; Zef KACA; Anton SIKAV, Sabat VERHAPI (March-April 1953).

During his stay in Yugoslavia he took the engagement of killing Xhafer DEVA signing a document for such. This is why he obtained a passport for Turkey, Austria and Italy.

In the summer of 1953, he arrived in Turkey where one of his brothers is a Turkish officer, but Turkey refused his stay and expelled him. So he came to Italy where he met Xhafer DEVA to whom he revealed his mission. DEVA through COBU immediately sent him next to the Polish war relief where he received a special support, living and eating at the boarding house of Ramazan, 40SJA in Via Gallia.

Hyzen FERPEZA had the occasion of living there during the summer of 1954 and both slept in the same room. This is how FERPEZA learnt about the contacts of DEVA with the British, during the summer of 1954. SUSA also said that these contacts took place quite often. Nexhip MUSA is now in Turkey.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY REPORT NO.
INFORMATION REPORT CD NO.

COUNTRY Yugoslavia DATE DISTR. 10 February 1949
SUBJECT Cominformist Activity within Yugoslavia NO. OF PAGES 1
PLACE ACQUIRED 25X1A6a NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW)
DATE OF INFO. [Redacted] SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

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1. Approximately 700 Cominform sympathizers were arrested during the last few days in the coal regions of Trbovlje, Hrastnik, Zagorje, Kocevje and Jesenice.
2. An extensive anti-Tito net was rounded up in the Trbovlje area by the UDB. The net seemingly had regular communications with Yugoslav Cominformists in Prague and was supported by collaborators in Zone A of the Free Territory of Trieste. The ringleaders, among whom are prominent Tito officials (unidentified), will be brought to trial within the fortnight.
3. It is alleged that Minister Ivan Regent has been imprisoned on a charge, among other things, of communicating with Riko Malalan, the top Yugoslav Cominformist in Opicina, Zone A of the Free Territory of Trieste.
4. Slovene Communists predict a new war of nerves by the Kremlin in the spring of 1949. The cells are alerted to watch for listeners to Radio Moscow and satellite broadcasts attacking Tito. Listeners will be penalized and severely so if they are members of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. Apparently no action is planned against listeners to Radio Trieste and Western broadcasts.

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CLASSIFICATION SECURITY/CONTROL - U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY REPORT
INFORMATION REPORT CD NO.

COUNTRY Yugoslavia DATE DISTR. 13 December 1949
SUBJECT UDB Installations and Personnel in Ljubljana, Slovenia NO. OF PAGES
PLACE ACQUIRED [Redacted] NO. OF ENCLS.
DATE OF INFO. [Redacted] SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

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1. UDB Headquarters for Ljubljana is located in the Slavija Bank Building at the corner of Tyrseva and Gajeva Streets. Chief of the interrogation section of UDB, Captain Franc ZMASCER, who resides at Gajeva Street No. 10, is also chief of the UDB prison in the Narodni Dom Arena.
2. UDB Headquarters for the suburbs of Ljubljana is located in the Hotel Socer, St. Peter Street No. 4, and is under the direction of Jose RIZIAN. The sections for the various precincts are located throughout the city: one at Katedrsko Street No. 3, another in the courtyard of the Provisions Cooperative in Vodnik Square, and a third in Zalotkar Street No. 1.
3. A building, located in the Narodni Dom Arena garden, now serves as a UDB prison. Under the building the UDB constructed nine bunkers, six of which serve as cells for prisoners and three as torture chambers. The cells are for three persons each and are provided with beds made of cement. The torture chambers are one meter square and are equipped with hooks for tying people to be tortured. One of the most common practices is to fill the bunker with ice or hot water into which the prisoners are placed for hours.

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CLASSIFICATION 25X1A2g

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REPORT NO.

CD NO.

DATE DISTR. 2 March 1949

NO. OF PAGES 1

NO. OF ENCLS. (LISTED BELOW)

SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

COUNTRY Yugoslavia

SUBJECT Arrests of Cominformists Continue

CE 25X1A6a

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1. Among the many Cominformists arrested in Slovenia during January were Vito Zupanc, prominent party member and Bogumil Kristan, an old-guard Communist. The latter was honored by the State following his liberation in 1945 from a Nazi concentration camp.
2. Dr. Lemez (fnu) and Dusan Kermener (or Kermaner)*, pre-war Communists and functionaries of the Communist Party of Slovenia, are Cominformists. To date they have not been arrested.
3. Plevlje in Montenegro is the site of a concentration camp for Cominformists. At the penitentiary of Pozarevac in Zabela, 120 government officials, charged with Cominformism, are kept in solitary confinement.
4. A battle between Yugoslav troops and Cominform guerrillas allegedly took place recently at Kolasin in Montenegro. Guerrillas led by one Bulatovic (fnu). Outnumbered, the guerrillas retreated across the Albanian Frontier.
5. During early February the UDB arrested at Pazin, Istria, Dusan Dimadic and Vlado (?) Stefencic, who were former partisan officers, Political Commissars and prominent members of the Regional Committee of the Communist Party for Istria, on charges of Cominformism. At the same time Sestan (fnu), President of the Regional Committee, was apprehended by UDB in Fiume. The arrests were preceded by a special session held in late January by the Regional Committee.

* Comment: Kermener may be identical with a one-time member of the Yugoslav representation in Austria.

IA6a

(ARRESTS OF COMINFORMISTS CONTINUE, CIA, March 2, 1949, p. 1) <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP82-00457R002400520002-0.pdf>

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New Directions Publishing | Stephen Clissold

by Stephen Clissold

The Wisdom Of St. Francis and His Companions

The Wisdom Of The Spanish Mystics

As translator

The Wisdom Of St. Francis and His

Stephen Clissold

Stephen Clissold (1913-1982), He received his MA from Oriel College, Oxford. During World War II, he worked as an intelligence officer in Cairo and Bari for the British Army. In 1976, he was appointed to the Order of the British Empire. He passed away in 1982.

Stephen Clissold <https://www.ndbooks.com/author/stephen-clissold/#/>

113 Soviet-Yugoslav trade agreement, 25 July 1947: excerpt (p. 43)

... The Soviet Union will deliver to Yugoslavia equipment for the ferrous and non-ferrous metal industries, oil, chemical and timber industries, necessary for Yugoslavia in connection with the five-year plan for the development of the Yugoslav economy. The Soviet Union will also render Yugoslavia the necessary technical assistance in the designing and assembly of equipment, and in the mastering of the above undertakings. . . .

In addition, an agreement was signed on trade turn-over and payments between the USSR and Yugoslavia. The agreement has been concluded for the term of two years and may be prolonged for a further term. It determines the way in which trade turn-over and clearings between the USSR and Yugoslavia are to be realized.

At the same time the contracting parties have agreed on a list of mutual deliveries of goods from 1 June 1947 to 31 May 1948. According to this agreement the Soviet Union will deliver to Yugoslavia cotton, paper, cellulose, oil products, coal and coke, ferrous and non-ferrous metals, automobiles, tractors and other equipment, agricultural fertilizers and various other goods. Yugoslavia will deliver to the Soviet Union lead, zinc and pyrite concentrates, copper, tobacco, hemp, plywood and agricultural goods. . . .

THE CALL TO ORDER: THE INTER-PARTY POLEMIC

117 Tito protests to Molotov against the withdrawal of Russian advisers and enquires the reasons for Soviet displeasure, 20 March 1948 (p. 52)

On 18 March General Barskov [Head of the Soviet military mission] told us that he had received a telegram from Marshal Bulganin, Minister of People's Defence of the USSR, in which we are informed that the Government of the USSR has decided to withdraw immediately all military advisers and instructors because they are 'surrounded by hostility', that is, they are not treated in a friendly fashion in Yugoslavia.

Of course, the Government of the USSR can, when it wishes, recall its military experts, but we have been dismayed by the reason which the Government of the USSR advances for its decision. Investigating, on the basis of this accusation, the relations of the lower-ranking leaders of our country towards the Soviet military advisers and instructors, we are deeply convinced that there is no basis for this reason for their withdrawal, that during their entire stay in Yugoslavia relations with them were not only good, but actually brotherly and most hospitable, which is the custom towards all Soviet people in the new Yugoslavia. Therefore, we are amazed, we cannot understand, and we are deeply hurt by not being informed of the true reason for this decision by the Government of the USSR.

118 Stalin complains to Tito of the anti-Soviet atmosphere in Yugoslavia and shortcomings of the CPY, 27 March 1948 (p. 53)

Your answers of 18 and 20 March have been received.

We regard your answer as incorrect and therefore completely unsatisfactory.

1. The question of Gagarinov [Soviet official deemed to have shown disrespect

of the state security organs to exercise control in this matter. Szreni c also said that Kidri  himself intended to speak about this with Lebedev.

From Lavrentiev's report it can be seen, firstly, that Szreni c did not even mention the possibility of obtaining economic information from the CC of the CPY or the Yugoslav Government. In any case, it would be ridiculous to think that it would be necessary to approach the CC of the CPY for all economic information while there still existed the appropriate ministries from which Soviet specialists had previously obtained the necessary economic information direct.

Secondly, it is clear from Lavrentiev's report that the reverse of what you write is true, namely that the Yugoslav security organs controlled and supervised the Soviet representatives in Yugoslavia.

One might well mention that we have come across a similar practice of secret supervision over Soviet representatives in bourgeois States, although not in all of them. It should also be emphasized that the Yugoslav Security agents not only follow representatives of the Soviet Government, but also the representative of the CPSU in the Cominform, Comrade Yudin. It would be ridiculous to think that the Soviet Government would agree to keep its civilian specialists in Yugoslavia in such circumstances. As can be seen in this case, too, the responsibility for the conditions created rests with the Yugoslav Government.

4. In your letter you express the desire to be informed of the other facts which led to Soviet dissatisfaction and to the straining of relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia. Such facts actually exist, although they are not connected with the withdrawal of the civilian and military advisers. We consider it necessary to inform you of them.

(a) We know that there are anti-Soviet rumours circulating among the leading comrades in Yugoslavia, for instance that 'the CPSU is degenerate', 'great power chauvinism is rampant in the USSR', 'the USSR is trying to dominate Yugoslavia economically' and 'the Cominform is a means of controlling the other Parties by the CPSU', etc. These anti-Soviet allegations are usually camouflaged by left phrases, such as 'socialism in the Soviet Union has ceased to be revolutionary' and that Yugoslavia alone is the exponent of 'revolutionary socialism'. It was naturally laughable to hear such statements about the CPSU from such questionable Marxists as Djilas, Vukmanovi , Kidri , Rankovi  and others. However, the fact remains that such rumours have been circulating for a long time among many high-ranking Yugoslav officials, that they are still circulating, and that they are naturally creating an anti-Soviet atmosphere which is endangering relations between the CPSU and the CPY.

We readily admit that every Communist Party, among them the Yugoslav, has the right to criticize the CPSU, even as the CPSU has the right to criticize any other Communist Party. But Marxism demands that criticism be above-board and not underhand and slanderous, thus depriving those criticized of the opportunity to reply to the criticism. However, the criticism by the Yugoslav officials is neither open nor honest; it is both underhand and dishonest and of a hypocritical nature, because, while discrediting the CPSU behind its back, publicly they pharisaically praise it to the skies. Thus criticism is transformed into slander, into an attempt to discredit the CPSU and to blacken the Soviet system.

We do not doubt that the Yugoslav Party masses would disown this anti-Soviet criticism as alien and hostile if they knew about it. We think this is the reason why the Yugoslav officials make these criticisms in secret, behind the backs of the masses.

Again, one might mention that, when he decided to declare war on the CPSU, Trotsky also started with accusations of the CPSU as degenerate, as suffering from the limitations inherent in the narrow nationalism of great powers. Naturally he camouflaged all this with left slogans about world revolution. However, it is well known that Trotsky himself became degenerate, and when he was exposed, crossed over into the camp of the sworn enemies of the CPSU and the Soviet Union. We think that the political career of Trotsky is quite instructive.

(b) We are disturbed by the present condition of the CPY. We are amazed by the fact that the CPY, which is the leading party, is still not completely legalized and still has a semi-legal status. Decisions of the Party organs are never published in the press, neither are the reports of Party assemblies.

Democracy is not evident within the CPY itself. The Central Committee, in its majority, was not elected but co-opted. Criticism and self-criticism within the Party does not exist or barely exists. It is characteristic that the Personnel Secretary of the Party is also the Minister of State Security. In other words, the Party cadres are under the supervision of the Minister of State Security. According to the theory of Marxism, the Party should control all the State organs in the country, including the Ministry of State Security, while in Yugoslavia we have just the opposite: the Ministry of State Security actually controlling the Party. This probably explains the fact that the initiative of the Party masses in Yugoslavia is not on the required level.

It is understandable that we cannot consider such an organization of a Communist Party as Marxist-Leninist, Bolshevik.

The spirit of the policy of class struggle is not felt in the CPY. The increase in the capitalist elements in the villages and cities is in full swing, and the leadership of the Party is taking no measures to check these capitalist elements. The CPY is being hoodwinked by the degenerate and opportunist theory of the peaceful absorption of capitalist elements by a socialist system, borrowed from Bernstein, Vollmar [former leaders of the German Social Democrat Party] and Bukharin [former prominent Bolshevik leader, executed in 1936].

According to the theory of Marxism-Leninism the Party is considered as the leading force in the country, which has its specific programme and which cannot merge with the non-party masses. In Yugoslavia, on the contrary, the People's Front is considered the chief leading force and there was an attempt to get the Party submerged within the Front. In his speech at the Second Congress of the People's Front, Comrade Tito said: 'Does the CPY have any other programme but that of the People's Front? No, the CPY has no other programme. The programme of the People's Front is its programme.'

It thus appears that in Yugoslavia this amazing theory of Party organization is considered a new theory. Actually, it is far from new. In Russia forty years ago a part of the Mensheviks proposed that the Marxist Party be dissolved into a non-party workers' mass organization and that the second should support the first; the other part of the Mensheviks proposed that the Marxist Party be dissolved into a non-party mass organization of workers and peasants,

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119 Tito rejects the charges and defends his policies, 13 April 1948 (p. 54)
To Comrades J. V. Stalin and V. M. Molotov—

The fact of the matter is that unfortunately you are not acquainted with the nature of the Front in Yugoslavia and criticize us for not publishing reports of Party meetings and conferences. All the important decisions, from those of the Federal Government down, regarding all questions of social and state life, are either decisions of the Party or made on the initiative of the Party, and the people understand and accept them as such. Therefore, we do not feel it necessary to emphasize that this or that decision was made at this or that Party conference.

The great reputation of our Party, won not only in our country but in the whole world, on the basis of the results it has obtained, speaks for itself. On the other hand, we emphasize that our Party achieved all this thanks to the fact that it followed the doctrine of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin; that it benefited by the experiences of the CPSU, applying these experiences to the given conditions. Therefore, we do not understand the allegation made in your letter that our leaders hypocritically and 'pharisaically' praise the CPSU to the skies' and at the same time work against it.

We cannot believe that the CC of the CPSU can dispute the services and results achieved by our Party up to today because we remember that such acknowledgement was given us many times by many Soviet leaders and by Comrade Stalin himself. We are also of the opinion that there are many specific

The call to order: the inter-party polemic 181

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Soviet Union, 1939-1973 : a documentary survey

120 Stalin rehearses his complaints and accuses the Yugoslav leaders of 'unbounded arrogance', 4 May 1940 (p. 54)

The call to order: the inter-party polemic 179

five are still alive and working today. The Politbureau invites those members of the CC of the CPY who are in Belgrade to its sessions. In the CC of the CPY, in all only seven new members have been co-opted, and these were from the candidates and best leaders of the Party. Finally, during the war, two members were expelled from the CC of the CPY, so that there remain at work today nineteen members of the CC of the CPY elected at the Conference and seven co-opted members. Accordingly, the CC of the CPY is composed of twenty-six members; this is how the matter stands.

As regards the remark of not holding a Party congress, it is necessary to mention here that the Politbureau of the CC of the CPY has been making preparations for a congress of the CPY for a year. We feel that this congress should be prepared so that it has not only a demonstrational character, but that it be a congress in which a Statute and a Party programme will be brought forth. This programme will later be adopted in its essentials by the People's Front at its congress.

What is the basis of the allegation in the letter that there is no democracy in our Party? Perhaps information from Lavrentiev? Where did he get this information? We consider that he, as an ambassador, has no right to ask anyone for information about the work of our Party. That is not his business. This information can be obtained by the CC of the CPSU from the CC of the CPY.

The fact that the Organization Secretary in the CPY is also Minister of State Security in no case interferes with the self-initiative of Party organizations. The Party is not placed under the control of UDDBA; this control is exercised through the CC of the CPY, of which the Minister of State Security is a member. Besides this, we must add that the chief of the Administration of

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The letter further mentions the report of Tito to the Second Congress of the People's Front in Yugoslavia. A small extract is made from this report and a comparison is drawn with the attempt of the Mensheviks to break up the Social Democratic Party forty years ago.

First, that was forty years ago under Tsarism, and today we in Yugoslavia have power in our hands. That is, the CPY has the leading role in the Government. In watching social development in process, it is inevitable that organizational forms must be changed somewhat, methods of work changed, as well as forms of the leadership of the masses in order to achieve specific ends more easily.

180 *II The Postwar Period*

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Soviet Union, 1939-1973 : a documentary survey

180 *II The Postwar Period*

Second, the People's Front of Yugoslavia, by its quality, is not only equal to some other Communist Parties, which accept anyone into their ranks, but is even better in its organization and activity. Not everyone can be a member of the People's Front of Yugoslavia, even though today it has approximately 7,000,000 members.

Third, the CPY has a completely assured leadership in the People's Front because the CPY is the nucleus of the People's Front. Therefore, there is no danger of its dissolving into the People's Front—as it said in the letter. Through the People's Front the CPY gradually realizes its programme, which the People's Front voluntarily adopts, considering it as its own programme. This is the basis of Tito's statement that the CPY has no other programme.

sixteen candidates. Here is what Comrade Valter (Tito) reported from Belgrade at the end of October 1940 . . . [text given in 7].

If, out of twenty-two elected members of the CC, ten died, this would leave twelve elected members. If two were expelled this would leave ten. Tito and Kardelj say that now there are twenty-six members of the CC of the CPY—therefore, if from this number we subtract ten, this leaves sixteen co-opted members of the present CC of the CPY. It thus appears that the majority of the members of the CC of the CPY were co-opted. This applies not only to the members of the CC of the CPY but also to the local leaders, who are not elected but appointed.

We consider that such a system of creating leading organs of the Party, when the Party is in power and when it can use complete legality, cannot be called anything but semi-legal, and the nature of the organization sectarian-bureaucratic. This sort of situation is quite inadmissible, where meetings are either not held or held in secret, which must undermine the party's influence over the masses, and when party membership is fixed up behind the backs of the workers, whereas acceptance into the party should play an important educational role in linking the party to the working class and to all the workers.

If the Politbureau of the CC of the CPY had real regard for the Party it would not tolerate such a condition in the Party and would, immediately on gaining power, that is, three and a half years ago, have asked the Party to call a Congress in order to reorganize on the lines of democratic centralism and start work as a completely legal Party.

It is entirely understandable that under such conditions in the Party, when there is no election of the leading organs, but only their appointment from above, there can be no talk of internal Party democracy, and much less of criticism and self-criticism. We know that members are afraid to state their opinions, are afraid to criticize the system in the Party and prefer to keep their mouths shut, in order to avoid reprisals. It is no accident that the Minister of State Security is at the same time the Secretary of the CC for Party cadres, or,

as Tito and Kardelj say, the organization secretary of the CC of the CPY. It is evident that the members and cadres of the Party are placed under the supervision of the Minister of State Security, which is completely impermissible and cannot be tolerated. It was sufficient, for example, for Comrade Žujović, at a session of the CC of the CPY, not to agree with a draft of the answer of the Politbureau of the CC of the CPY to the letter from the CC of the CPSU, to be immediately expelled from the Central Committee.

As can be seen, the Politbureau of the CC of the CPY does not consider the Party as an independent entity, with the right to its own opinion, but as a partisan detachment, whose members have no right to discuss any questions but are obliged to carry out all the demands of the 'chief' without comment. We call this cultivating militarism in the Party, which is incompatible with the principles of democracy within a Marxist Party.

As is known, Trotsky also attempted to force a leadership based on militarist principles on the CPSU, but the Party, headed by Lenin, triumphed over him and condemned him; militarist measures were rejected and internal Party democracy was confirmed as the most important principle of Party development.

We feel that this abnormal condition inside the CPY represents a serious

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danger to the life and development of the Party. The sooner this sectarian-bureaucratic regime within the Party is put an end to the better it will be both for the CPY and for the Yugoslav People's Democratic Republic.

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Tito was, as ever, outwardly cool, though Djilas wrote that he frequently changed his orders. But he was never petty as a commander and did not stifle initiative in his colleagues. Djilas also remarked that Tito was always more confident when laying down strategy that was political rather than military. It was now, in the first days of March, in a mill-house over the River Rama, that Tito conceived the most daring and controversial stratagem of his long career. He decided to make a truce, even an alliance, with the Germans.

In the battle at Gornji Vakuf during the first days of March, the Partisans captured a number of Germans including one Major Stoecker. Remembering how the previous year they had used the German civilian Hans Ott to effect the release of some of their prisoners, Ranković, Djilas and others suggested to Tito that they might reopen talks. On the face of it, this was a simple offer to hand over some of the Germans, including Stoecker, in return for some of the Communists now in the goals of the NDH, including Tito's common-law wife Herta Hass, by whom he had had a child shortly before the Axis invasion. The Partisans also wished to be recognised as a 'belligerent force' to ensure the proper treatment of casualties and prisoners.

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In fact Tito wanted very much more than this. His most pressing need was to break through the Chetnik forces now blocking his way across the River Neretva and then to press on through eastern Bosnia-Herzegovina to the comparative safety of Montenegro and the Sandjak. His long-term need was to come to an understanding with the Germans by which, in return for ceasing attacks on their forces and lines of communications, the Partisans would be given

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The Fourth and Fifth Offensive

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carte blanche to destroy the Chetniks in eastern Yugoslavia. Tito was also willing to talk with the Germans on joint military action against the expected British landing.

Tito authorised Major Stoecker to send a letter through the lines suggesting talks about the exchange of prisoners. A reply came two days later giving the time and place for receiving a Partisan mission.

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In their isolation and hopelessness, some of the Partisans in Montenegro seem to have taken refuge in fantasy. The avant garde

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painter Moša Pijade, or 'Uncle Janko', started a sovkhos, or Soviet state farm, on Mount Durmitor, stocked with animals stolen from Chetnik peasants. Uncle Janko busied himself making a detailed

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On their way to Bihać in the mainly Muslim north-west of Bosnia, the Partisans put to the torch the Chetnik villages in the plain of Grahovo, and almost burnt to the ground the birthplace of Gavriilo Princip, the Sarajevo assassin of 1914. Three hundred

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Although the Partisans captured and briefly held small highland towns such as Užice, Foča, Bihać and later Drvar and Jajce, they seldom descended into the cities or the rich lowland plains which held most of the country's wealth and population. Until the end of 1942, their presence did not much bother the Axis occupation force. When the Italians moved into the NDH in the summer and autumn of 1941, this was not to suppress the Partisans but to save the Serbs from the Ustasha.

The Germans also intervened to restrain and sometimes to hang the Ustasha in Slavonia and the Srem, but did not at first take the

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The Long March

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Partisans seriously. Hitler's vital interests in the former Yugoslavia were first to protect the railway line down the Sava and Morava valleys, and secondly to ensure the supply of strategic ores such as copper and chrome from the mines, which were mostly in Bosnia. Since the Partisans wanted to win power in Yugoslavia rather than damage the Axis war effort, they seldom threatened either of these two German interests.

In November 1942, the Partisans were not even a serious threat to the Ustasha government of the Independent State of Croatia.

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Tito was lenient to Žujović, yet he sent thousands of Cominformists to slave in the camp on Goli Otok (Naked Island), opposite Senj in the north Adriatic. From autumn 1948 until well into the 1950s, about 12,000 men and some women as well were shipped to this inhospitable rock to quarry for marble. The camp was run on the principle of making the prisoners earn their release by breaking the will of those who had not yet made a confession and recantation. All new arrivals were made to run a gauntlet of beating, followed by constant physical and verbal abuse. The prisoners were not allowed visitors, and relatives were not even informed as to the whereabouts of their loved ones; they were merely told that 'Daddy has gone away on a business trip'. All those released from Naked Island were sworn not to talk about it, under pain of returning there. Even after the end of Communism in Yugoslavia, veterans of Naked Island were loath to speak of their hellish experience.

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Tito set up the Naked Island camp through Ranković, although even Ranković did not know, or want to know, exactly what went on there. According to Djilas, Tito was more than once heard to exclaim in 1948: 'Off to jail with him! Off to the camp! What else can he expect if he works against his own Party?' The horror of

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Indeed Boris Kidrič, the head of the Federal Planning Commission, indicted Hebrang and Djujović, the previous economic bosses, for sabotaging and holding back 'the construction of socialism'. They were accused of attempting to check overambitious planning, and of insisting on the profitability of individual enterprises.³¹ The Second Plenum of the Central Committee in February 1949 prescribed 'greater boldness and a faster pace in setting up collective farms'.³² Although collectivisation in Yugoslavia was not as murderous as it had been in the Soviet Union, it caused immeasurable suffering, anger and waste. In Macedonia there were only two collective farms in 1945; by the end of March 1949 there were 400. In Croatia the number doubled during the first quarter of that year. Collectivisation provoked violent resistance in north-west Bosnia, the Muslim region round Bihać, where Tito had established his headquarters in 1943. The failure of the collective farms caused food shortages in the towns.

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During the summer of 1943, more British officers parachuted into the territory held by the Partisans, while the RAF started to drop in supplies of clothing and food for the ragged and hungry guerrillas. Tito had not yet lost his fear and suspicion of British political machinations; nor had he cut off his ties with German agents such as the engineer Hans Ott. Even in late November 1943, when Britain was pouring in arms and supplies to the Partisans, Tito's transport department obtained a herd of horses from the Germans, in return for allowing shipments of chrome to enter the Reich.¹

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principle of national self-determination. Roosevelt appeared to believe that Yugoslavia was an unreal state, formed by committee, and that Serbs and Croats should be allowed to go their separate ways. He did not share Churchill's enthusiasm for Tito, and in December 1943 he announced his continued support for King Peter. To emphasise this commitment, he made a gift of four US planes to the Royal Yugoslav Air Force.

President Roosevelt wanted to rid the world of empires, whether that of the British in India or of the French in Indo-China, and this attitude may have coloured his outlook on Yugoslavia. Fitzroy

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Yugoslav'. As head of the project for rapid industrialisation, Hebrang relied on plant and economic expertise from the Soviet Union, and came to be seen as Moscow's man in the leadership. In 1945 he wrote a report for the Kremlin on differences in the Yugoslav Party.¹⁰ When he was dropped from the Politburo in April 1946, Hebrang looked to the Soviet Union for sympathy and support.

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The Yugoslav archives show that Tito wrote to the commandant of the 6th Bosnian Brigade, telling him to continue attacking the Chetniks but to avoid fighting the Germans on the way to the Sandjak. Similar orders, written partly in Spanish, were sent to the 1st Bosnian Corps and the 1st Proletarian Brigade. General Glaise von Horstenau personally made it possible for Velebit to deliver a letter from Tito to the Partisans in Slavonia.²⁰ It seems that von Horstenau and local German intelligence officers favoured a deal with the Partisans but knew that such an arrangement would not please the German High Command or the Foreign Office. Von Horstenau's approach through the Secret Service and Himmler clearly did not work, for at the end of March Hitler announced that he did not deal with rebels – he shot them.²¹

Djilas believes that the 'March Consultations' could not have led to any significant result: 'This was because we essentially sought a respite, while the Germans were setting a trap for us.'²² The trap was sprung in May, when the Germans almost succeeded in destroying the Partisans in 'Operation Schwarz', the Fifth Offensive. Meanwhile the 2nd Proletarian Division had scored a crushing victory over the Chetniks; and by early April the Partisans were standing upon the banks of the River Drina, preparing to cross to the Sandjak, Montenegro and, as they imagined, safety.

Tito's escape across the River Neretva, once hailed as a triumph of tactical feint and daring, was really made possible by a deal with the Germans. Nevertheless, Tito was pleased with himself to the

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On 11 May the Yugoslav government in exile, probably under British coercion, instructed Mihailović to make up his differences with the Partisans and to join the fight against the Germans.

Those Partisans who knew of the 'March Consultations' heard all this with private amusement. They still regarded themselves as on the side of the Germans against the British and the royalist exiles. Moreover Mihailović and the Chetniks were moving towards a 'Great Serb' chauvinism that made it improbable that they could ever again rule a united Yugoslavia. And in 1943 Mihailović's commander in Montenegro issued a circular letter addressed 'To Chetnik intellectuals', explaining the propaganda they were to spread in Serbian villages. Among the aims to be announced: 'We are seeking a pure national state. If we achieve that, there will be

telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/11564222/Richard-West-writer-obituary.html

Richard Leaf West was born in Chelsea on July 18 1930, the son of a publisher and sometime journalist who was once the literary editor of the Daily Mail. The family were bohemian and peripatetic. West was educated at Marlborough, which he disliked conventionally, and at Magdalene College, Cambridge, which he disliked surprisingly. He read History. His education had been interrupted by wartime evacuation to Canada and the United States and was interrupted again by National Service which, in contrast to school or university, he greatly enjoyed.

Serving as an NCO in the Intelligence Corps he spent much of his time in Field Security in Trieste, at the end of the 1940s a tense trouble-spot. Dick

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All such reports must be treated with caution. Post-war Austria and Italy were awash with agents, many of whom were peddling highly suspect intelligence. CIC agents themselves could also be remarkably unprofessional in the way they gathered their “product.” Richard West, a member of the British Intelligence Corps in Trieste in 1949, recalled meeting a CIC agent who would have been dismissed had his superiors known how he was operating. “He had got hold of some Albanian newspapers,” said West, “and gave them to an Albanian to get translated, and he translated all this absolute drivel. He passed it off as though he had a man in Tirana. It made me realize how ridiculous most intelligence services are.”⁷⁷ Of course, by no means all intelligence was worthless, but until the British intelligence files on Pavelić are released, which is unlikely, it is hard to be definitive, and it would be a mistake to adopt a tone of knowing cynicism as a replacement for actual knowledge. However, as we shall see, the British, like the Americans, would employ war criminals in their nascent fight against Communism, but such agents were not of the stature of a former head of state, or quite so bloodstained as

Richard West <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/11564222/Richard-West-writer-obituary.html#:~:text=-serving%20as%20an%20NCO%20in,his%20life%20as%20a%20journalist>.