

760.5/7-2954: Telegram

*The United States Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Hughes) to the Department of State<sup>1</sup>*

**TOP SECRET**

PARIS, July 29, 1954—8 p. m.

Polto 171. Subject: NAC Discussion Balkan Alliance, July 29.

I. Discussion opened by formal statements of Greek and Turkish representatives. Greek statement contained nothing new. Emphasized Yugoslav attachment to West and importance Yugoslavia to defense Greece. Stated alliance committed Yugoslavia to be on our side if attack made on other NATO power without formal commitment to Yugoslavia by NATO. Stated no question of Yugoslavia in

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(Subject: NAC Discussion Balkan Alliance, July 29, 1954. In: 760.5/7-2954: Telegram, The United States Permanent Representative on the North Atlantic Council (Hughes) to the Department of State, Top Secret, Paris, July 29, 1954, p. 1. In: Foreign Relations of the United States, United States Department of State, p. 671)

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STATUS REPORT ON THE GREEK, TURKISH, YUGOSLAV MILITARY ALLIANCE

Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP91T01172R000300010024-3

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE  
29 June 1954

Copy No. 35

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Intelligence)

**SUBJECT:** Status report on the Greek, Turkish, Yugoslav military alliance

Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia have agreed that the time has come to transform the tripartite Ankara Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation (28 February 1953) into a formal military alliance. They are now working out the details.

Concurrently, representatives of the United States, Britain and France are formulating a united position on the proposed alliance and its implications for NATO. Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty provides that "The parties agree that an armed attack against one...shall be considered an attack against all...if such an armed attack occurs, each of them...will assist the party or parties so attacked by taking forthwith...such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force...")

The apparent abandonment by Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia, of the principle of "automatic action" in the event of attack on a member of their proposed tripartite alliance substantially increases the probability that the NATO members will give the alliance at least tacit moral approbation. The secretary general of the Greek Foreign Ministry has indicated to the American ambassador in Athens that the North Atlantic Council will be informed of the details of the proposed alliance as soon as the common text has been agreed on by the three principal parties to the alliance. Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia has accepted the principle of liaison between the projected tripartite alliance and NATO, but he has left to Greece and Turkey the task of formulating the details.

(‘STATUS REPORT ON THE GREEK, TURKISH, YUGOSLAV MILITARY ALLIANCE’, Office of Current Intelligence, CIA, June 29, 1954, p. 1)

<https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP91T01172R000300010024-3.pdf>

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## JOURNAL ARTICLE

## Israel and the Balkan States

Jacob Abadi



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Vol. 32, No. 4 (Oct., 1996), pp. 296-320 (25 pages)

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U.S. DIPLOMATIC RECORDS ON RELATIONS WITH YUGOSLAVIA DURING THE EARLY COLD WAR, 1948-1957

CEH

398 . *U.S. Diplomatic Records on Relations with Yugoslavia*

Funds tentatively planned for FY 1955 will complete the initial equipping of these forces, and provide additional war reserves and limited maintenance support for equipment previously furnished. The programmed amount assumed for FY 1956 will provide only for the continued maintenance of the forces equipped through FY 1951-55 funds.

5. Based upon this planned program, deliveries will continue high through FY 1956, decline in FY 1957 and level off in FY 1958.

*NSC Staff Study on United States Policy Towards Yugoslavia.*

*Problem:*

1. To determine what policies with respect to Yugoslavia will best serve the immediate objectives of the United States, and in particular will assure to the West the military, political, psychological and other advantages deriving from Tito's successful defiance of the Kremlin, without compromising long term United States interest as regards Yugoslavia or prejudicing the moral, political and military position of the West.

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of strategy Yugoslavia's break has potentially moved the entire area of initial western defense effort in southern Europe farther East and has opened up greater scope for defensive and limited offensive action in the Eastern Mediterranean area. Yugoslavia stands in the path of any aggressive Soviet moves directed toward southern Europe and the central Mediterranean area. The armed forces of Yugoslavia represent a military factor of considerable importance. The Yugoslav army now consists of some 341,000 men in twenty-eight divisions with a considerable number of independent brigades and other units. The equipment and efficiency of this force has been and is being considerably improved by MDAP aid. It is estimated that the army is capable of expansion to a force of 1,200,000 in thirty days. Although the Yugoslav air force has approximately 1,000 World War II type aircraft, its present capabilities are negligible for its two principal missions of air defense and tactical support of ground forces. However, air force capabilities are gradually increasing as a result of technician and pilot training under MDAP and will be further enhanced by the scheduled addition in 1954-1955 of some 200 late model F-84 jets. The navy is small and its present capabilities in the event of hostilities are limited to mine and patrol operations along the Adriatic coast. Manpower and material are of course, not the only consideration in determining the effectiveness of an armed force. Morale and discipline are no less important. Although these factors are difficult to evaluate, the Yugoslav people have a long tradition of stalwart resistance to aggressors, and their determined opposition to Soviet domination leads to the belief that, at least in the initial stage of any war in defense of Yugoslav territory, the Yugoslav forces would offer vigorous resistance to any invader.

*Military Collaboration*

11. The conclusion of the Friendship Pact between Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia on February 28, 1953 and the contingent military planning thereunder, has materially increased the military significance and possibly the reliability of Yugoslavia in the event of Soviet aggression. Cooperative defense arrangements should enhance substantially the defensive potential of these three countries. There is also reason to believe that through this association Tito hopes *inter alia* to gain some of the advantages of NATO membership without the necessity for actual Yugoslav membership. Tito has clearly manifested a desire for firm ties with other nations which would give him a feeling of security be-



yond that entailed in previous military arrangements. The willingness of the United States, United Kingdom and France to give him such commitments was one reason for the limited success of the contingent military planning talks in the fall of 1952 (The Handy Talks). The "Balkan Entente" has to some extent given him the political ties he desires, and in this way his confidence in and willingness for military planning with the West has been bolstered.

12. Despite this desire for political assurances, for the moment Tito probably means what he says when he publicly denies any intention to seek membership in NATO. At present he has almost no alternative to this position, for he is aware that his current strained relations with Italy together with other factors such as the reluctance of certain NATO powers to be further committed in the Balkans, or associated with a nation whose political institutions are in large measure unacceptable to the West, make Yugoslavia's membership in NATO impossible. However, it is probable that Tito considers full membership in NATO would involve a degree of foreign control over his forces and his strategy which he would not find acceptable. It is probable also that Tito believes his bargaining position with the West will remain stronger if he stays outside of NATO, and further, that his own power within Yugoslavia is best served if the West must continue to curry his favor to assure his continued cooperation without being able to obtain from him commitments of a nature which would permit greater western interference in internal Yugoslav affairs. However, as an alternative to NATO membership, Tito has gone far in parallel directions to assure to Yugoslavia the benefits of NATO. In addition to association in the "Balkan Entente" he has stated that, in any war originating elsewhere, Yugoslavia would fulfill its obligations as a member of the United Nations, and that Yugoslavia would fight in case of aggression against any independent European state.

[#13 DELETED - NOT DECLASSIFIED]

NSC Staff Study on United States Policy Towards Yugoslavia, US NSC, 1954. In: "U.S. DIPLOMATIC RECORDS ON RELATIONS WITH YUGOSLAVIA DURING THE EARLY COLD WAR, 1948-1957", Nick Ceh, 2002, pp. 401-402)

States. Marked and enduring improvements must be effected by Yugoslavia in its agriculture and consumer industries over the next few years in order to correct the present imbalance in production, employment, foreign trade and foreign exchange with has been occasioned by overambitious and unrealistic Communist plans for the industrialization of Yugoslavia. [SOME OF # 17 DELETED- NOT DECLASSIFIED]. Improvement in the balance of payments position, however, will remove the necessity which has existed up to the present of extending some assistance, regardless of other objectives, simply in the interest of averting the economic collapse of Yugoslavia.

18. Pursuant to the policy adopted in NSC 18/6 the United States has, since late 1951, been extending military assistance to Yugoslavia under MDAP. This assistance has included material for the Yugoslav armed forces and an extensive program of advising and training Yugoslav military and technical personnel. This program has increased the capabilities of the Yugoslav army to the point that it could now offer effective initial resistance to a combined Soviet/Satellite attack and could successfully repel an attack by any single satellite.

19. In export licensing procedures and controls, Yugoslavia has been treated as being in the same category as other allied nations, although the export of goods on the Atomic Energy Commission lists has not been authorized. This policy has been followed in the interest of the short term United States objective of assuring the strategic and military benefits to the West of Yugoslav orientation toward the western defense structure. This objective has been considered to be of overriding importance and has been sought despite the communist character of the existing regime in Yugoslavia.

#### *Yugoslavia's Position in the Event of War*

20. [#20 DELETED - NOT DECLASSIFIED].

#### *Problems in Formulating US Policy Political*

21. Despite its successful defiance of the Kremlin, Yugoslavia is still a communist dictatorship. Power is in the hands of a small group of men who control all aspects of national life, including the armed forces and the security police, and who hold interlocking positions in the Communist party, the governmental apparatus and the main organizations on a national as well as provincial level. The majority of the population is still opposed to the Tito regime, but the regime is in firm

#### 408. E. Sasson to W. Eytan. 30 September 1951

##### Notes

1. In File 130.02/2382/2.
2. See No. 341, n. 1.
3. See No. 152, n. 1.
4. See Sasson to Elath, 21 September 1951, 130.02/2382/2.
5. See No. 405 (appendix).

#### 409. M. Sharett (New York) to W. Eytan. 30 September 1951

Coded Tel. X407; Outg.: 93.01/2203/14

The telegram is intended for Ben-Gurion and Kaplan. Sharett reports to them on the following developments: (1) Grant-in-aid: (a) The Senate-House conference committee has approved a ceiling of \$68.8 million in aid to Israel, including \$50 million for immigrant absorption. Its report will be presented to both houses in a few days; once passed by them the authorization bill will await the President's signature. Then the appropriations bill will be considered by the House and

the entire... Israel must initiate such a request. (c) Once approval for military aid, the procedure is that a survey commission is sent to examine Israel's needs. This commission will demand full details about Israel's arsenal and about how the formations to receive the weapons are organized. (d) Once the quantity of weapons is approved, a military delegation will come to deliver the weapons and instruct the Israelis in their use. It is possible to request civilian cover for the survey commission and the military delegation. (e) In the case of Yugoslavia, which can serve as a precedent, no survey commission had been sent. However, the Yugoslav Chief of General Staff visited Washington and met the Chiefs of Staff, and Tito declared that Yugoslavia would fight with the West. (f) Kollek and Herzog are convinced, and Eban is inclined to agree, that unless Israel first applies to the Americans as stipulated in Paragraph 2(b) *supra*, implementation of the grant-in-aid, which is riddled with pitfalls in any case, may be sabotaged.<sup>1</sup> Kenen, who coordinated grant-in-aid activities in both houses of Congress, admits that those in favour of aid were prompted mainly by defence considerations. At the same time, he disagrees with Kollek's and Herzog's assumption that the grant will not go through unless Israel puts in for military aid first. Sharett disagrees with Kenen. (g) Herzog is sending the General Staff a detailed report<sup>2</sup>; a decision will be taken when Sharett returns.

##### Notes

1. By way of follow-up to Sharett's statement, Eban cabled Eytan on 4 October as follows: "Pending further clarification and inquiries here I cannot subscribe to the idea