1942: Tito’s group establishes a direct military alliance pact with the Nazi Wehrmacht
In his memoirs, Milovan Djilas ‘accuses’ himself and Tito of alliance with Nazis during WW2. With Axis collusion, Tito’s group makes fake “escapes” from the battlefield, leaving behind Yugoslav communists to die. Under the cover of a ‘prisoner exchange’, Tito’s group successfully negotiates military alliance with Nazi Wehrmacht, receives funding from the German army, incorporates 2,000 Handzar SS into Yugoslav “Communist” Party security apparatus.
The History of the USSR & the Peoples’ Democracies
Chapter 12, Section 1 (C12S1)
Saed Teymuri
As shown in a previous article, the USSR accused Tito’s group of intelligence activities for the Gestapo during the Second World War. Hereby, in corroboration of the Soviet allegations, documentation on the Gestapo activities of Tito’s group will be provided using Anglo-American-German imperialist security sources as well as from the Djilas memoirs, with a focus on the Tito group’s direct alliance with the Nazis. Djilas admits to his own partaking in Tito’s policies.
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The Italian General Roatta assured the German command that he would cooperate in the fight against the partisans:
Interestingly, however, [German General Walter] Kuntze had already reconciled himself with the idea of continuing the operations even before the release of Rogatica. Roatta's assurance of 21 April seems to have played a decisive role here, and the command of the troops deployed would definitely remain in German hands even after the demarcation line had been crossed. Unlike his subordinate Bader, Kuntze was able to gain something from the idea of commanding Italian troops south of the demarcation line. Not least of all, he promised himself the chance of being able to persuade the Italians within their own sphere of influence "to engage in more active warfare." In any case, there was cause for hope that the cooperation agreed upon in Abbazia might yet lead to a presentable result. (PARTISANENKRIEG IN JUGOSLAWIEN 1941-1944, Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn GmbH, Klaus Schmider, p. 128) (IMG)
Therefore, on:
May 2, an armed force of one German and three Italian divisions could be targeted against an area roughly bordered by the Sarajevo-Gorazde-Foca-Kalinovik line. While the 718th ID [i.e. Infantry Division] had to advance from the northeast, the 1st Italian Mountain Division “Taurinense” from northwestern Germany, which meanwhile had arrived in Sarajevo, and the 22nd ID “Cacciatori delle Alpi”, deployed in Nevesinje in Herzegovina, came from the south. Towards the east, the securing of the Drina section between Gorazde and Foca had been entrusted to the 5th Mountain Division "Pusteria". That, unlike the attack on Rogatica, the "Bader Task Force" finally arrived on the eve of the pincer operation against the capital of the partisan movement. (PARTISANENKRIEG IN JUGOSLAWIEN 1941-1944, Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn GmbH, Klaus Schmider, p. 129. Citing: BA/MA, RW 40/26 Kampfgruppe General Bader, Befehl zur Bildung der Einschließungsfront (30.4.1942).) (IMG)
‘However, the company "Trio II" … was not even a day old’, said Schmider, ‘when’:
Contrary to the assurance given by Roatta Bader on April 21, Colonel-General Ugo Cavallero decreed on May 3 that the three Italian divisions should withdraw from the combat group and the Italian VI responsible for this area. Army Corps (General Renzo Dalmazzo) are to be subordinated. It was only thanks to the protest of Rintelens that at least the “Pusteria”, which at no time belonged to the VI. AK, under Bader's command remained.
The further course of the operation, despite all efforts to the contrary, showed striking parallels to the previous operation against Rogatica. On the one hand, because again no major enemy forces were put to the fight, on the other hand, because due to the delayed opening up of the “Cacciatori” once again no timely south barrier could be established. It was also this gap that made it possible for Tito and his staff to detach themselves via Zabljak to Pluzine in the Herzegovinian-Montenegrin border region.
(PARTISANENKRIEG IN JUGOSLAWIEN 1941-1944, Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn GmbH, Klaus Schmider, p. 129. Citing: KTB OKW, II. 1, S. 334 (Eintrag vom 3.5.1942); BA/MA, RH 20-12/145, Der Deutsche General beim Hauptquartier der italienischen Wehrmacht an den Wehrmachtbefehlshaber Südost (3.5.1942). BA/MA, RW 40/26 Abschlußbericht »Unternehmen Foca« (20.5.1942).) (IMG)
Luciano Viazzi, a head of Italy’s ‘Historical Society for the Study of the Second World War’, argued that:
the "Cacciatori" Division approaching from the south only by the order issued on 15.5. [i.e. June 15th] prevented the setting of the "trio" operation. This laid the way [for escape] for Tito and his staff. (‘L'inutile vittoria: La tragica esperienza delle troupe italiene in Montenegro’, Giacomo Scotti, Luciano Viazzi, Milan, 1989, p. 331. Cited in: PARTISANENKRIEG IN JUGOSLAWIEN 1941-1944, Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn GmbH, Klaus Schmider, p. 129) (IMG)
In other words, the Italian forces allowed Tito and his supreme staff to escape the battlefield. Indeed, Dedijer and Djilas:
agree that the group around Tito during the retreat from Foca at not time was in immediate danger of being cut off…. (PARTISANENKRIEG IN JUGOSLAWIEN 1941-1944, Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn GmbH, Klaus Schmider, p. 129. Citing: Wartime, Milovan Djilas, pp. 173-175. War Diaries, Vladimir Dedijer, pp. 156-175 (entries from 9.5.-20.5.1942).) (IMG)
The British intelligence agent Richard West wrote:
the Italian soldiers were loath to get involved in fighting the Partisans, and in July 1942 they began to withdraw from the NDH to their territory on the coast. (Tito: and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, p. 136) (IMG)
Schmider adds:
The temporary evacuation of Konjic by the Italian garrison on the route of the "long march" at least suggests this conclusion; (PARTISANENKRIEG IN JUGOSLAWIEN 1941-1944, Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn GmbH, Klaus Schmider, p. 190. Citing: BA / MA, RH 26-118 / 28 Annex 7 to 718. ID, Ia, No. 2554/42 go.) (IMG)
Thus:
the Italians started to leave places like Bihac, Drvar, Kalinovica, Karlovac and Petrova Gor…. (Tito: and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, p. 136) (IMG)
Elsewhere Richard West writes:
Although the Partisans captured and briefly held small highland towns such as Uzice, Foca, Bihac and later Drvar and Jaice, they seldom descended into the cities or the rich lowland plains which held most of the country's wealth and population. Until the end of 1942, their presence did not much bother the Axis occupation force. When the Italians moved into the NDH in the summer and autumn of 1941, this was not to suppress the Partisans…. (Tito: and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, p. 126) (IMG)
A German intelligence officer named Wilhelm Hottl reported in his memoirs that a courier of Tito:
had traveled the road between Tito and Roatta several times. (Use for the Rich: In the Foreign Secret Service of the Third Reich, Koblenz, Wilhelm Höttl, 1997, p. 223. Cited in: PARTISANENKRIEG IN JUGOSLAWIEN 1941-1944, Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn GmbH, Klaus Schmider, p. 190) (IMG)
The Nazi officials themselves stated that the Italian Fascist commander Roatta and Tito had colluded. Indeed, there were remarks:
by some German authorities in 1942, that the "long march" was even based on a collusion between Roatta and Tito…. (PARTISANENKRIEG IN JUGOSLAWIEN 1941-1944, Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn GmbH, Klaus Schmider, p. 190) (IMG)
For the second and third times in a row, the Trotskyite agents of the Gestapo were able to escape the battlefield, as their subordinates, Yugoslav patriots, were being martyred by the Axis assassins. One may allow the Tito apologists to argue, for as much as they desire, that divine providence was at work, but for the non-superstitious, it is clear that the Nazi Germans and Fascist Italians, not the heavens, were on Tito’s side. As documented previously, the Nazi German authorities, entirely correctly, remarked that the ‘long march’, Tito’s escape from the hands of the Nazis, was a case of collusion between the Italian Fascists and Tito.
Having annihilated more and more of the communist and progressive children of Yugoslavia rivalling Tito’s group, the latter gained even further leverage. A leap from quantity to quality, the annihilation of many Yugoslav communists and progressives, allowed Tito’s clique to consolidate its influence on more sections of the Party. More than ever before, the hold of fascist faction over that Party was growing. In this midst, Tito’s group confidently went ahead and treated the Nazi German military and intelligence officials loyally and royally, expressing to them a desire for consolidating the strategic partnership between Tito’s group and the Nazis. In ‘a comprehensive report compiled for Heinrich Himmler’, said Schmider, the ‘German police attaché in Zagreb’ stated the following in September 21, 1942:
"The loyal treatment in the headquarters even went so far that the Germans were invited for lunch on Sunday. The table was laid white and it was served like a first class hotel. The food order was accordingly. Noteworthy are political statements by the Partisan Commander-in-Chief Tito. On the occasion of a conversation with a German, he expressed the view that, in spite of the present terrible bloodbath on the eastern front, it was necessary to bring about an understanding between Germany and Russia. Otherwise there would be the danger that England and America would eventually emerge victorious again, and the victory of these regimes would mean the downfall and subjugation of the working peoples." (PARTISANENKRIEG IN JUGOSLAWIEN 1941-1944, Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn GmbH, Klaus Schmider, p. 159. Citing: PA/AA, Inland II g 99, 1956 Der Polizeiattache in Zagreb an den Reichsführer SS (21.9.1942).) (IMG)
Another report shortly after by the German police attaché made the same remarks
In another report, written three days later, … the [German] police attaché once again referred to the negotiating readiness of the partisans…. (PARTISANENKRIEG IN JUGOSLAWIEN 1941-1944, Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn GmbH, Klaus Schmider, p. 159. Citing: PA/AA, Inland II g 99, 1956 Der Polizeiattache in Zagreb an den Reichsführer SS (24.9.1942).) (IMG)
In October 1942, the Nazi high command reported that Tito was willing to serve as an economic ‘partner’ of the Third Reich:
Thus, above all, the question of the undisturbed exploitation of the resources of the country by the occupying power, which had already been discussed three months earlier, seems to have been the subject of extensive discussions. On October 30, the commander-in-chief of the Commanding General noted the following impressions: "Tito believes that economic cooperation between the partisans as equal partners with Germany, even in the Yugoslav area, is quite possible." (PARTISANENKRIEG IN JUGOSLAWIEN 1941-1944, Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn GmbH, Klaus Schmider, p. 171. Citing: ‘BA/MA, RH 26-114/14 Die kommunistische Aufstandsbewegung im Raum des ehemaligen Jugoslawien (30.10.1942)’.) (IMG)
It was for this reason that:
In November 1942, the Partisans were not even a serious threat to the Ustasha government of the Independent State of Croatia. (Tito: and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, p. 127) (IMG)
By late 1942, a strategic alliance had indeed been consolidated between the Ustase and certain elements of the partisan movement, involving joint plunder raids:
Thus, the 718th ID and the IC Department [note: IC refers to Abwehr, the German intelligence service] of the Commanding General reported in late October 1942 that in the area of Rogatica, the Ustasha and Partisans a deliberate alliance was formed, which among other things also served to carry out joint plunder raids. The fact that a few weeks later (beginning of December 1942) an attempt to contact the partisan leadership in Bihac by a senior Ustasha leader was taken very seriously by the latter can be seen from the fact that a member of the Politburo (Milovan Djilas) was sent out as negotiator; the establishment of a connection failed only at the outbreak of hostilities that forced Djilas and his companion Velebit to turn back. (PARTISANENKRIEG IN JUGOSLAWIEN 1941-1944, Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn GmbH, Klaus Schmider, p. 400. Citing: BA/MA, RH 26-118/12 KTB-Eintrag vom 20.10.1942; RH 26-118/41 718.ID. Ic-Lagebericht für die Zeit vom 17.10.- 26.10.1942 (26.10.1942); RH 26-114/13 Kdr. Gen. u. Bfhls. in Serbien, IcLagebericht für die Zeit vom 19.10.-29.10.1942 (29.10.1942). Survey of Dr. Vladimir Velebit in Zagreb (9. u. 10.5.1998).) (IMG)
Nor did the Axis occupation forces attempt to combat Tito’s army. Referring to the presence of Tito’s group in some Yugoslav cities, the MI6 operative Richard West wrote:
Until the end of 1942, their [i.e. Titoist-led Partisans’] presence did not much bother the Axis occupation force. When the Italians moved into the NDH in the summer and autumn of 1941, this was not to suppress the Partisans….
The Germans also intervened to restrain and sometimes to hang the Ustasha in Slavonia and the Srem, but did not … take the Partisans seriously. Hitler’s vital interests in the former Yugoslavia were first to protect the railway line down the Sava and Morava valleys, and secondly to ensure the supply of strategic ores such as copper and chrome from the mines, which were mostly in Bosnia. Since the Partisans wanted to win power in Yugoslavia rather than damage the Axis war effort, they seldom threatened either of these two German interests.
(Tito: and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, p. 127) (IMG)
In late January 1943, Tito was maintaining secret talks with the heads of the Ustase. This fact is backed up by the Italian intelligence archives cited by Avramov:
Josip Broz himself, according to these [Italian intelligence] sources, maintained communications with certain members of Pavelic’s cabinet. At a time when the Italian command from Sibenik informed the superiors about the meeting between Broz and Ustasa minister Rustinovic in 1943, the latter had already ceased to be the Independent State of Croatia’s permanent emissary to the Holy See, but he continued to carry out various assignments in his old role. In this connection, a whole series of new questions arises, which call for comprehensive study: Was Josip Broz playing a double role? (Genocide in Yugoslavia, Smilja Avramov, p. 232. Citing: AVII – ANJ, Contatti tra il Ministro croato Rustinov e il Tito, K. 58, Reg. No. 34/9-1) (IMG)
He sure was, as confirmed also by the German side. Regarding January 1943:
the visit of a three-headed Ustasha delegation in Livno is confirmed by the testimony of a German eyewitness. (PARTISANENKRIEG IN JUGOSLAWIEN 1941-1944, Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn GmbH, Klaus Schmider, p. 400) (IMG)
‘The German Reich citizen Franz Leinschütz’, said Schmider referring to the eyewitness, ‘gave the following statement on the record’:
When I was in Livno last week, I saw an Ustasha officer in uniform, but without weapons. The partisans told me there were two more here. All three, according to the partisans, had come to Livno for negotiations. (PARTISANENKRIEG IN JUGOSLAWIEN 1941-1944, Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn GmbH, Klaus Schmider, p. 400. Citing: BA/MA, RH 26-118/42 718. ID Abt. Ic, Vernehmung (25.1.1943).) (IMG)
Although pro-Soviet communists still formed a majority in the YCP, the slaughtering of thousands of Yugoslav communists and progressives had weakened the communist faction enough to render the YCP into a force susceptible to a full-on alliance with the Nazis. Via several intermediaries, only some of which were the Nazi German officials with whom Tito’s group spoke, the Berlin leadership was receiving signals to that effect. Note that Tito had told the Nazis that “it was necessary to bring about an understanding between Germany and Russia. Otherwise there would be the danger that England and America would eventually emerge victorious again, and the victory of these regimes would mean the downfall and subjugation of the working peoples.” The communications with the Pavelic regime in Croatia were almost certainly along such lines as well. Tito’s group was thus indicating to the Nazis that the time was ripe for elevating the relations between the YCP and the Axis to a new level, to render the YCP, a Party by then decisively dominated by the fascist agents, into a force no longer to be decimated by the Nazis but to be embraced as an ally in the war against the Soviets.
On March 4, 1943, the partisans, which by then had too low a potential for a serious combat against the Nazis, surprising achieved an ostensible ‘victory’ over the Germans:
It was around nine o'clock when we reached the plateau at Gornji Vakuf, amid campfires and the roar of artillery. We walked among the soldiers, who were eating their supper around the fires. They recognized us and saluted with an easygoing seriousness. The commanders were stiffer, and terse and direct in their reports. The immediate surroundings of the battle area were as I had imagined them from novels and pictures. The battle had already been won, in the sense that the Germans had been pinned down, thus ensuring the wounded a successful retreat. (Wartime, Milovan Djilas, 1977, p. 225-226) (IMG)
The YCP ‘victory’ over the Nazis on March 1943 was highly suspicious. The behaviour of Tito’s group after this tactical ‘victory’ made it appear all the more so as a case of collusion. It would start with ‘prisoner exchanges’ as the mask for something far worse:
Some dozen Germans were captured in the Gornji Vakuf battles, among them a high-ranking officer by the name of Stoecker, a short man of dignified bearing. The idea came up in a conversation involving Velebit, Rankovic, Tito, and myself that a letter be sent to the Germans through the captured Major Stoecker, offering the captured Germans in exchange for our arrested comrades, especially since the Germans had agreed to such an arrangement in 1942. It was Tito who developed the idea – or rather, immediately sought ways of putting it into effect. He brought together the Central Committee members – Rankovic, Pijade, and me – in his water mill by the Rama River, and suggested that we send a letter to the Germans through Major Stoecker proposing, in addition to an exchange of prisoners, that the wounded and prisoners be treated according to international conventions, and demanding specifically that the Germans recognize us as a "belligerent force." We had been briefed before in detail on the issues of the "belligerent force" by Vlatko Velebit, who was a good lawyer. The covering letter bore the seal of the Supreme Staff, but Terzic’s signature, not Tito's. However, it was clear to the Germans that the offer had been made with the knowledge and approval of the supreme command: they knew that our movement was centralized. Our assumption was that the Germans would not easily agree to our proposal, and we phrased the proposal in a way that left room for negotiation. (Wartime, Milovan Djilas, 1977, p. 229) (IMG)
A Nazi German Major named Stoecker had easily been captured by Tito’s group – or much more likely, as the behaviour of Tito’s group afterwards indicated, the Nazi German Major was an undercover German negotiator dispatched by the Nazis to communicate with Tito’s group regarding the details of a YCP-Nazi alliance, all under the guise of a ‘prisoner’ ‘captured’ by the Partisans during a highly unlikely tactical ‘victory’. As mentioned by Djilas in the above excerpt, Major Stoecker was freed, permitted to leave the Partisan camp, and to go to the German-occupied camp and let the authorities in the latter know that the YCP leadership had been ‘centralized’ under Tito’s authoritarian rule and that the Germans should start treating the YCP in a much more favourable manner, as a ‘belligerent force’ respected in accordance to the Hague Convention. Tito’s gang sent a message to the Germans, and the latter responded positively:
we received an answer from the Germans within two or three days: the message that we could immediately send our negotiators was signed by an officer and sealed with an eagle. On the day the German reply came – March 9, 1943 – another meeting was held, attended only by Tito, Rankovic, and myself, to appoint a delegation and work out tactics to deal with a hypothetical German offer. (Wartime, Milovan Djilas, 1977, p. 230) (IMG)
The goal of these talks between the Germans and the partisans was not at all a prisoner exchange but rather the establishment of an alliance of a Titoist-dictated YCP and the Axis. Tito decided to entrench his own alliance with the Nazis by reducing the conflict between the Partisan troops and the army of the Third Reich:
It was now in the first days of March, in a mill-house over the River Rama, that Tito conceived the most daring and controversial stratagem of his long career. He decided to make a truce, even an alliance with the Germans.
In the battle at Gornji Vakuf during the first days of March, the Partisans captured a number of Germans including one Major Stoecker. Remembering how the previous year they had used the German civilian Hans Ott to effect the release of some of their prisoner, Rankovic, Djilas and other suggested to Tito that they might reopen talks. On the face of it, this was simple offer to hand over some of the Germans, including Stoecker, in return for some of the Communists now in the gaols of the NDH, including Tito’s common-law wife Herta Hass, by whom he had had a child shortly before the Axis invasion. The Partisans also wished to be recognized as a belligerent force to ensure the proper treatment of casualties and prisoners.
In fact, Tito wanted very much more than this. His most pressing need was to break through the Chetnik forces now blocking his way across the River Neretva and then to press on through eastern Bosnia-Hercegovina to the comparative safety of Montenegro and Sandjak. His long-term need was come to an understanding with the Germans by which, in return for ceasing attacks on their forces and lines of communications, the Partisans would be given carte blanche to destroy the Chetniks in eastern Yugoslavia. Tito was also willing to talk with the Germans on joint military action against the expected British landing.
Tito authorised Major Stoecker to send a letter through the lines suggesting talks about the exchange of prisoners. A reply came two days later giving the time and place for receiving a Partisan mission.
(Tito: and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, pp. 148-149. Bold added.) (IMG)
The ‘arrest’ of Herta Haas (or Hass) by the Nazis was also extremely suspicious and seems to have born the same character as the ‘arrest’ of Stoecker by Tito’s group. Recall that:
Ivan Srebrnjak (Antonov), an agent of the Soviet military intelligence, … called the attention of the IKKI to the romance Walter had in Moscow with a certain Elsa, a member of the German Communist Party, who was suspected of working for the Gestapo. He also affirmed that the young woman who brought party correspondence from Yugoslavia to Paris and back (obviously Herta Haas) was also a Gestapo spy. For all these reasons, Srebrnjak felt that Walter needed to explain himself, underscoring his resemblance to Gorkic and inviting the IKKI to disband the CPY. (Tito and His Comrades, Joze Pirjevec, 2015, p. 38) (IMG)
In essence, Tito’s plan was to ‘give’ to the Germans regions such as Serbia, Montenegro, and parts of Kosovo. These were strategic zones which the Germans surely could utilize as a launching pad for counter-offensives against the Red Army. Many parts of these territories were already under German control. However, Tito’s gang would ‘give’ these territories by, at least for the while, not fighting for them. In ‘exchange’, the Gestapo agent Tito and his clique would divert the Yugoslav patriots to fight to death against Chetnik Yugoslavs in the less strategic Sandzak region. Both by giving such territories to the Nazis and by fighting the Chetniks, Tito’s group was serving the Nazi agenda while getting nothing favourable to the anti-fascist forces in return.
By 1943, the MI6 had shifted its alliance network onto partnership with the Nazis again. Naturally, this resulted in a strategic partnership between the MI6-backed contingent in the Chetnik movement and the Nazis. The Chetniks thus became a generally Axis-collaborationist force. Nonetheless, Soviet support for the Chetniks had allowed Moscow to strengthen the hand of the progressive forces in the Chetnik movement. Therefore, not everyone from among the Chetniks was reactionary or Axis-collaborationist. After all, such was why, based on Djilas’s personal experience during the March dealings,:
The German officers spoke with contempt of the Chetniks…. (Wartime, Milovan Djilas, 1977, p. 235) (IMG)
Even if the Chetniks were so pervasively Nazi-collaborationist as to deserve a full-scale war, the strategy pursued by Tito’s terror bands was reactionary and favourable to fascism. The Comintern emphasized that the communist parties must invite such MI6-backed right-wing fake ‘anti-fascist’ movements to cooperate against the Nazis. The objective was that (1) if they, the fake ‘anti-fascist’ non-communist organizations, do accept cooperation, the communists gain a channel to surveil them and ensure that these right-wing parties really do fight against the Nazis, and (2) if they refuse to cooperate with the communists against the fascist occupiers, they only expose themselves, and (3) if they betray their deal of cooperation with the communists, the communists can then use the surveillance capacity which they gained through a cooperation agreement to expose the fascist-collaborationism of the MI6-backed right-wing movements. In this setting, Tito’s continuation of the years-long policy of waging war against the Chetniks instead of the Nazis would have seriously harmed the anti-fascist movement. Furthermore, ‘giving’ the Nazis the more strategic parts of Yugoslavia was a grand betrayal.
Forming a military alliance with the Nazis against the Soviet-backed progressive elements amongst the Chetniks constitutes not only a proxy war for Nazism against Soviet socialism but also assistance to the Nazis in retaining and expanding their physical presence in Yugoslavia. Assisting the Nazis in retaining and expanding the number of their military and intelligence bases in Yugoslavia in turn constitutes a form of espionage for the Nazis. Undoubtedly, the phrase "Nazi spies" is a generous description of Tito and his terror band.
These facts set the context for the following remarks by Djilas in his memoirs:
The tactics to be followed in the negotiations could only be formulated generally, especially since Tito did not get into hypothetical situations and strategies. The Germans were not to know that our chief objective was to penetrate into Serbia, or that we intended to occupy northern Montenegro, Sandzak, and parts of Kosovo and southern Serbia. We were aware of German sensitivity with regard to Serbia as a central Balkan region with a strongly anti-German population and a sense of national identity. But we had to offer them something convincing: Sandzak was the most expendable, being our poorest and most backward territory, while the Chetniks were an enemy of ours of whom the Germans were also apprehensive – though they had not fought against one another in some time, but on the contrary were collaborating, as on the Neretva. In short, we were to name Sandzak as the future Partisan territory, and the Chetniks as our main enemy. (…). There was not a word about the cessation of fighting between the Germans and ourselves, but this too was understood. (Wartime, Milovan Djilas, 1977, p. 231) (IMG)
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A photo of the secret deal between Tito and his gang with the Nazi Germans in March 1943 |
Djilas, while admitting many facts, was also distorting the picture in the above excerpt. Indeed, contrary to Djilas’s remark in the memoirs, in their written agreement with the Nazis, the Titoist Yugoslav delegation promised to not fight against them and to instead concentrate on the Chetniks as their main foes. Below is the full transcript of the deal, translated from German:
Gornji Vakuf, March 11, 1943.
Written submission of proposals by the delegation of the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia, authorized by the high command of this army, on the basis of the letter from Major Barth dated March 10, 1943.
1) On January 2nd, Mr. Leinschutz was probed to Mostar to end the question of prisoner-of-war exchanges that had been already raised in earlier talks with members of the German Wehrmacht. He had to return by February 1, 1943 but has not yet reported. We believe that prisoner exchanges should finish sooner. The following can be considered for exchange:
a. The ethnic German prisoners from Jajce and the crew of the Croatian plane, which was replaced by Mr. Leinschutz.
b. Major Strecker, for whom we request Prof. Ivan Marinkovic from Karlovac in exchange. He himself is in the police prison in Zagreb.
c. 25 captured German soldiers who were caught in the fighting at Sitnica.
d. Around 100 officers, under-officers [German: Unteroffizier; Abbreviated: Uffz.] and officials of the Croatian Wehrmacht and the Croatian State.
e. 15 Italian officers.
f. About 500 Italian soldiers and under-officers.
2) We believe that the command of the German Armed Forces vis-à-vis the Yugoslav PLA in this respect gives full guarantee from this side that the rules are strictly observed.
3) The command the Yugoslav PLA is of the opinion:
a. That in the given situation, there is no reason that the German Wehrmacht’s warfare against the Yugoslav PLA is in the interests of either side. However, it would be of mutual interest if the delicacy were discontinued. In connection with this, the German command and this delegation had to put forward their proposals about a possible zone and the directions of the economic or other interests.
b. The Yugoslav PLA considers the Chetniks as its main foe.
4) Throughout the duration of the sub-accumulations after all these functions, we put an end to the acts of war by the German troops and the troops of the Yugoslav PLA before.
(Gornji Vakuf, March 11, 1943)
Koca Popovic, Vladimir Velebit, and Milovan Djilas were the three representatives from the YCP side in these March 1943 negotiations. However, only Popovic revealed his real name during the negotiations:
Tito regarded the matter as so delicate and important that he proposed that I be appointed to the delegation as a member of the Politburo. No one raised any objection, and I did not demur. I knew enough German to follow a conversation and get along somehow or other. After all, we didn't intend to discuss Goethe and Kant. Tito also felt that a senior commander should go; Koca Popovic was designated; he knew German fairly well. Vlatko Velebit’s participation in the delegation was taken for granted; he had shown adroitness in handling the exchange with the Germans in Livno, and he knew German so well – he had studied it in Vienna – that the Germans thought he was Viennese. (Wartime, Milovan Djilas, 1977, p. 230) (IMG)
We had agreed that only Koca Popovic would give his real name: because he had introduced himself as the commander of the First Division, it made no sense to conceal it, and the Germans probably knew of him through prisoners. Velebit changed his surname to Petrovic, for fear of reprisals against his family, while I assumed a common name – one borne by a Montenegrin hero of long ago: Markovic. I was too prominent a figure to reveal myself, and too tempting a prisoner for the Gestapo in case the Germans reneged on their bargain. Later, when Velebit and I went to Zagreb to negotiate, I permitted Velebit to give his real name and to visit his family. The Germans in Gornji Vakuf took photographs of us by surprise, but I covered my face. (Wartime, Milovan Djilas, 1977, p. 234) (IMG)
In all likelihood, the reason why the Djilas group refused to disclose their names was to maintain secrecy from potential Soviet spies in the Nazi Wehrmacht. After all, the Nazis were well aware of Djilas's identity:
the German officers in Gornji Vakuf were not deceived by our secrecy. When I told them that I was the quartermaster of a division, the coarse major remarked with irony, "This one is their commissar!" On the morning of March 14 both officers wished Koca a happy birthday with cordially ironic expressions. Koca wasn't at all taken aback; he thanked them and added, "That was easy enough for you to find out: the Belgrade police have had a file on me for a long time." (Wartime, Milovan Djilas, 1977, p. 235) (IMG)
‘A few days later’, said Walter Roberts, ‘on March 17, the German Minister in Zagreb, Kasche, sent a telegram to Berlin in which, clearly referring to the German-Partisan talks,’ he noted the possibility:
that Tito and supporters will cease to fight against Germany, Italy and Croatia and retire to the Sandzak in order to settle matters with Mihailovic’s Cetniks. (‘Tito, Mihailović, and the Allies, 1941-1945’, Walter R. Roberts, p. 109) (IMG)
Kasche added:
Under circumstances possibility exists that Tito will demonstratively turn his back on Moscow…. The wishes of the Partisans are: Fight against the Chetniks in the Sandžak, thereafter return to their villages and pacification in Croatian and Serbian areas; return of camp-followers to their villages after they are disarmed; no executions of leading Partisans on our part... It is my opinion that this possibility should be pursued since secession from the enemy of this fighting force highly regarded in world opinion would be very important. In fact, the Tito Partisans are, in their masses, not Communists…. I refer to previous written reports and also to my conversation with State Secretary von Weizsacker. Request instructions. In talks with Casertano [Italian Minister in Zagreb] and Lorković [Croatian Foreign Minister] I found that the above development would be treated positively. (‘Tito, Mihailović, and the Allies, 1941-1945’, Walter R. Roberts, p. 109) (IMG)
Indeed, Tito had already turned his back on Moscow since long ago. The Nazi agent was never a friend of the USSR in the first place; nor were such deals with the Nazis particularly new for him, considering his history of collaboration with the Third Reich as their agent. In fact, Gestapo agents Tito and Djilas were very confident about the need for backstabbing the USSR:
Neither I nor the other Central Committee members [who were aware of these deals] had any pangs of conscience that by negotiating with the Germans we might have betrayed the Soviets, internationalism, or our ultimate aims. (Wartime, Milovan Djilas, 1977, p. 244) (IMG)
We were in agreement on the course of the negotiations, though Tito was the least skeptical of all. I raised the question, "What will the Russians say?'
Tito replied almost angrily – in anger at the Russians, not me – "Well, they also think first of their own people and their own army!" (…). I was very pleased with Tito's reaction: yes, it was clear to me that we were beginning to differ with the Soviets over a very sensitive question – the most sensitive of all – and one that was vital to us. Had someone asked me then if this divergence from the Soviets agreed with our ideology, I would have replied, "Well, our struggle is also a contribution to the Marxist-Leninist teaching." In other words, as long as life fits into the ideology – as long as the ideology makes possible a productive orientation – the ideology is alive.
(Wartime, Milovan Djilas, 1977, p. 231) (IMG)
Here too, the widening rift between Tito’s fascist clique and Moscow can be observed. Stalin, as implicitly admitted by the prominent US military and intelligence official Franklin Lindsay, would have strongly disapproved of any such deals between Tito’s gang and the Nazi Germans. Referring to the matter, Lindsay wrote:
had [Stalin] known of the latter [i.e. Titoist-Nazi deal] he would have considered it high treason. (Beacons in the Night: With the OSS and Tito’s Partisans in Yugoslavia, Franklin Lindsay, p. 334) (IMG)
As Djilas himself pointed out:
The negotiations were held in great secrecy. There were no differences among the top leaders…. (Wartime, Milovan Djilas, 1977, p. 244) (IMG)
The Soviet leaders almost certainly had an idea as to the nature of the negotiations between Tito’s terror gang and the Nazis, although they may not have necessarily known all the details. Note again that the Soviet intelligence service found Tito and his group highly suspicious since the 1930s, and, upon gaining the chance to hunt down Tito’s girlfriend Elsa, had executed her during the Great Purge on the charge of espionage for the Gestapo.
Moscow expressed its suspicion of the treasonous Titoite-Nazi collaboration by asking on March 9, two days prior to the signing of the deal, whether Tito’s clique would betray ‘enslaved Europe’ by ceasing ‘the struggle against the worst enemy of mankind’:
Besides, Tito had already received Moscow's reply. At the same time as the letter to the Germans, a dispatch had been sent to Moscow which mentioned only an exchange of prisoners. But this time Moscow was quick and discerning, and we received an immediate and angry reply, true to style: Is it possible that you who were an example to all of enslaved Europe – you who have until now shown such heroism – will cease the struggle against the worst enemy of mankind and of your people? (Wartime, Milovan Djilas, 1977, p. 232) (IMG)
One needs not mention the fact that the phrase "you who were an example to all of enslaved Europe – you who have until now shown such heroism" in Moscow's statement to Tito's Gestapo gang was merely diplomatic rhetoric in which the Soviets themselves disbelieved. After all, the Soviets regarded Tito as a Nazi agent long before 1943.
Tito’s gang also promised to the Germans that the partisans would combat the British if they land in Yugoslavia:
We didn't shrink from declarations that we would fight the British if they landed. (Wartime, Milovan Djilas, 1977, p. 243) (IMG)
Again, by 1943, with Soviet victory in the Battle of Stalingrad, the balance had tilted in the favour of the Soviets, and hence the MI6 policy of bleeding the Soviets and Nazis out implied that the MI6 would ally with the Nazis – and with Tito’s gang. Therefore, Tito’s gang would not hold on to that promise of striking the British imperial forces, nor would their German spymasters want them to act on their promise. Therefore, it was only a matter of time before the MI6 would begin supplying the Third Reich’s agents – in the case of Yugoslavia, the Gestapo agent Tito’s clique – with all kinds of assistance in order to prop up Tito’s gang against the Soviets.
By the time Djilas returned to the partisan base later in March,:
I found Tito and the Supreme Staff in a village not far from Kalinovik. I made my report to Tito, but he didn't seem quite as interested as before: the Germans had, in fact, already called a halt to their drive, while our units had won a hard-fought victory over Pavle Djurisic's Chetniks, and were penetrating into Hercegovina toward Montenegro and Sandzak. (Wartime, Milovan Djilas, 1977, p. 244) (IMG)
For further negotiations:
Velebit and Djilas passed again through the German lines and were brought by a German military plane from Sarajevo to Zagreb on March 25, 1943. (‘Tito, Mihailović, and the Allies, 1941-1945’, Walter R. Roberts, p. 109) (IMG)
It should not come as a surprise that the Germans allowed their own agents, Velebit and Djilas who served their top agent Tito, to travel through German lines on German aircraft. Djilas returned to the partisan base but was greeted with the skepticism of the Hero of Yugoslavia and top Yugoslav communist freedom-fighter, General Sava Kovacevic, who warned Djilas and Tito against collaboration with the Nazi enemy:
Sava was sprawled out by a fire, eating supper. He said to me, … suddenly, with a sly smile, he added, “Don't you go making peace between us and the Germans!”
I felt trapped and confused, nevertheless I was on the offensive: “Don't be a wise guy! Don't you have any confidence in the Central Committee? This is an exchange of prisoners. And to protect the wounded from being killed.”
“I do trust them!” Sava said, “but the army has just barely gotten started against the Germans. They're our worst enemies.”
(Wartime, Milovan Djilas, 1977, pp. 238-239) (IMG)
The Tito-Djilas faction had serious disputes with Sava Kovacevic. As the reader may recall, the Soviets believed that the casualties of the Battle of Sutjeska, in which General Kovacevic was murdered by the Nazis, was a case of tactical sabotage in favour of the Nazis by the command of the Yugoslav "Communist" Party. In any case, by allying with the Nazi Wehrmacht, Tito's gang inevitably contributed to the murder of their and the Wehrmacht’s Yugoslav communist foe, Kovacevic.
Upon returning to Tito’s position in the partisan base, Djilas was welcomed by the ‘overjoyed’ Tito who claimed that the Germans maintained the ‘spirit of chivalry’ given their well-treatment of Djilas:
Tito and the Supreme Staff were up there by a cliff, deep in the forest.
Tito was overjoyed to see me. (…).
"And how did the Germans treat you?" Tito inquired.
"Correctly, very correctly."
"Yes, it seems that the German army has kept something of the spirit of chivalry," Tito commented.
I told Tito and the others of my impressions and experiences, talking until the afternoon, when Tito had to go on to Glavatitevo and I had to return to Bijela, to await word from Velebit.
(Wartime, Milovan Djilas, 1977, p. 240) (IMG)
As mentioned previously, the deal with the Nazis was only nominally a prisoner exchange. In reality, it was not a prisoner exchange at all. Tito’s gang unilaterally released Major Stoecker not in exchange for something from the Nazis but as a gesture of good will. The rest of the prisoners had already been allowed to escape. As Djilas put it in the following exceprt, ‘there were no more’ ‘prisoners’, and it was illogical to say that the Partisans could send those ‘prisoners’ back to the Nazis because those ‘prisoners’ were not really ‘rounded up’ at all in the first place. Djilas wrote:
Tito and the Supreme Staff were up there by a cliff, deep in the forest.
(…). I was convinced that the … release of Major Stoecker and the other prisoners by us would be looked upon as a token of good will, so Tito approved this immediately. We sent Major Stoecker and my escort on their way to Konjic within the next twenty-four hours. As for the remaining dozen or so prisoners – there were no more – we couldn't send them yet because they weren't rounded up.
(Wartime, Milovan Djilas, 1977, p. 240) (IMG)
The fact that these ‘prisoners’ were not really rounded leaves no doubt that those Nazi German officials ‘captured’ during the Partisans’ implausible tactical ‘victory’ over the Nazis were not really captives at all. Rather, that Tito sent back Major Stoecker as an intermediary for alliance negotiations shows that these ‘captives’ were a delegation of negotiators and spies dispatched by the Nazi command to inquire about the conditions of the Yugoslav ‘Communist’ Party and to then be dispatched back by Tito’s group to inform the Nazi authorities of the susceptibility of the Titoist-dictated YCP for a strategic partnership with the Axis. The fake ‘exchange’ of fake ‘prisoners’ was purely a cover for intelligence contacts with the Nazis.
On March 31, Kasche confirmed to Ribbentrop that:
the reliability of Tito’s promises has been confirmed. (‘Tito, Mihailović, and the Allies, 1941-1945’, Walter R. Roberts, p. 110) (IMG)
Indeed, Tito had strictly ordered his troops not to fight the Germans, and, as with the past, was able to ‘escape’ through a deal with the Gestapo:
The Yugoslav archives show that Tito wrote to the commandant of the 6th Bosnian Brigade, telling him to continue attacking the Chetniks but to avoid fighting the Germans on the way to the Sandjak. Similar orders, written partly in Spanish were sent to the 1st Bosnian Corps and the 1st Proletarian Brigade. General Glaise von Horstenau personally made it possible for Velebit to deliver a letter from Tito to the Partisans in Slavonia. It seem that von Horstenau and local German intelligence officers favoured a deal with the partisans….
Meanwhile the 2nd Proletarian Division had scored a crushing victory over the Chetniks; and by early April the Partisans were standing upon the banks of the River Drina, preparing to cross to the Sandjak, Montenegro and, as they imagined, safety.
Tito’s escape across the River Neretva, once hailed as a triumph of tactical feint and daring, was really made possible by a deal with the Germans.
(Tito: and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, Richard West, p. 152) (IMG)
Through such cowardly ‘escapes’, the Nazis were intentionally making a hero out of him. On November 17, 1943, Velebit proposed to the Nazis to recognize the partisan units of Yugoslavia as a legitime and legal belligerent to be respected according to the Hague Convention:
The idea of this "equality" seems to have been so mature until the day of the prisoners’ exchange (17 November) that one of the partisan negotiators, Agramer's advocate Dr. Vladimir Velebit, took this opportunity to formally propose to the German side the recognition of the People's Liberation Army as a legal belligerent power and a mutual respect for the Hague Convention on Land Warfare. (PARTISANENKRIEG IN JUGOSLAWIEN 1941-1944, Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn GmbH, Klaus Schmider, p. 171. Citing: BA/MA, RH 26-114/14 Die kommunistische Aufstandsbewegung im Raum des ehemaligen Jugoslawien (30.10.1942). For Velebit interview, the author cites: Survey of Dr. Vladimir Velebit in Zagreb (9. u. 10.5.1998).) (IMG)
Usually, calling on the enemy forces to recognize one’s own forces as legitimate is a correct policy, given it serves as a propaganda victory against the enemy. However, I need not mention that in this case, and in light of the history of the espionage and sabotage by Tito’s gang on behalf of the Axis, this measure by Velebit can be seen as yet another instance of how Tito’s gang aimed to retain the favour of the fascist forces. During March 1943, Tito sent Velebit to Croatia to prevent the partisans from engaging in combat against the Nazi Germans. However, the Croatian Communist Party leadership suspected Velebit of being an undercover agent:
Tito immediately approved Velebit's return to Zagreb, and stopped the operations of the Slavonian Partisans, particularly on the Zagreb-Belgrade railroad. Velebit carried out this assignment, taking quite a bit of time. He also brought Herta back. He told me that he had trouble in Slavonia: the Partisans suspected him of being a provocateur, and the supreme command in Croatia had to intervene. (Wartime, Milovan Djilas, 1977, p. 244) (IMG)
Recall that the Soviets had accused Velebit of being a high-level Nazi spy. A Soviet Foreign Ministry had stated:
In [1941] Tito's colleague Velebit denounced members of the Central Committee of the Croatian Communist party who met at his villa. (Tito-Rankovic Clique Has Established Fascist Regime in Yugoslavia, A. Kalinin, April 14, 1950. In: Information Bulletin, Soviet Union. Posolʹstvo (U.S.), p. 221) (IMG{Titoist Yugoslavia})
(…).
Under the command of the blood-soaked Gestapo agent Tito, numerous Yugoslav communists and patriots had been killed at the frontlines of the anti-fascist war. It was necessary for Tito’s gang to increase the number of its troops, so to appear ‘popular’ and ‘powerful’, and to infiltrate thousands of Nazis to become members of the Yugoslav Communist Party or army, as means of rendering the fascists in the YCP into a powerful minority if not a majority, helping to tilt the ‘democratic’ balance of power in the Party and army in favour of the Tito faction against the communists and democratic freedom-fighters. For the Nazi troops, in the face of the advancing Red Army troops, it was important that they join the Yugoslav Titoist army so to present themselves as ‘anti-fascists’ and save themselves from purges by the USSR and the Peoples’ Democracies. This last point in turn would have given the British the excuse to covertly fund and arm the Nazis under the guise of ‘anti-fascist’ work. The combination of all of these factors was manifested in the fact that:
2,000 members of the SS Handzar division, joined the Partisans and formed Tito's "Sixteenth Muslim Brigade" in September 1943. (The War in Bosnia, 1992-1995: Analyzing Military Asymmetries and Failures, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, Thesis Advisor: David Yost Co-Advisor: Donald Abenheim, Thesis Author: Gheorghe Anghel, June 2000, pp. 18-19) (IMG)
The Tito group’s permission to thousands of Handzar SS Nazi-Ustase operatives to infiltrate the YCP, hence to access internal YCP documents, constitutes a form of espionage for the Nazis.
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